Hume' s Reflections on the Identity

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Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of MindAuthor(s): Donald C. AinslieSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62, No. 3 (May, 2001), pp. 557-578Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653536.

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Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LXII,No. 3, May 2001

Hume's Reflections on the IdentityandSimplicityof Mind1DONALD C. AINSLIEUniversity of Toronto

The article presents a new interpretationof Hume's treatmentof personal identity, andhis laterrejectionof it in the "Appendix" o the Treatise. Hume's project,on this inter-pretation,is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarilywithin philosophicalprojects,not in everyday life. The belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as abundle of perceptions is an abstrusebelief, not one held by the "vulgar"who rarelyturntheirmindson themselves so as to think of theirperceptions.The authorsuggests thatitis this philosophical observationof the mind that createsthe problemsthatHume finallyacknowledges in the "Appendix."He is unableto explain why we believe that the per-ceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizingare themselvespartof ourminds. This suggestion is then tested againstseven criteriathatany interpre-tationof the "Appendix"must meet.

It is notoriouslydifficult to make sense of Hume's discussion of persons. Inthe section of the Treatise2 devoted to this issue ("Of personal identity,"T.I.iv.6; hereafter theSection'), he describes themindas a bundleof percep-tions to which we ascribe both identity and simplicity only in virtue of ourassociating its members together. The most famous interpretive problemarises because Hume laterrejectsthis account:The "Appendix" o the Trea-tise, published a little less than two years after the original appearanceof

I owe thanks to the journal's referees for their helpful comments as well as to StephenEngstrom, Andr6 Gombay, Carol Kay, Mary Leng, Terence Penelhum, David Raynor,Lisa Shapiro, Sergio Tenenbaum,Udo Thiel, Wayne Waxman, and Jennifer Whiting fortheir responses to various versions of the argument that I have given here. I presentedparts of this paperat the 1997 InternationalHume Society Meeting in Monterey, CA; Iwould like to thank James Ross, who was the commentator on that occasion, andmembers of the audience, for their many useful questions and criticisms. My largest debtis to Annette Baier; our many conversations about my reading of these portions of theTreatise helped me to become clear about what I think on this matter. Her support andencouragementof my work has been invaluable.A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P. H.Nidditch (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1978). HereafterI will refer to this text parentheti-cally as 'T' followed by the appropriatepage number.I will refer to various subsectionsof the Treatise as 'T' followed by Book, Part,and Section numbersgiven in large Roman,small Roman,and Arabic numeralsrespectively.

HUME'S REFLECTIONSON THE IDENTITYAND SIMPLICITYOF MIND 557

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Books I and II, includes a retractionof his treatmentof persons. The reasonsfor the retraction,however, are farfrom clear.

I offer a new interpretationof this vexed issue in what follows. As apreliminary step, I point out in ?1 that Hume's project in most of theSection is to explain a belief that arises primarily within certain kinds ofphilosophical projects, not in everyday life. The belief in the identity andsimplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is, after all, an abstrusebelief, not one held by the "vulgar"who rarely,if ever, turn their minds onthemselves so as to think of theirperceptions.In ?2, I argue that it is exactlythis philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems thatHume finally acknowledges in the "Appendix."For he is unableto explainwhy we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe ourminds while philosophizing are themselves partof our minds.Finally, in ?3,I test my suggestion against criteriathat, I argue, any interpretationof the"Appendix"must meet.

?1. Philosophical and Common-life Ideas of SelfThe Section is Hume's contribution he debate aboutpersonal identity thathad "become so great ... in England" (T.259) in the years following uponLocke's publicationof the second edition of An Essay Concerning HumanUnderstanding,with its chapteron identity (Book II, Chapterxxvii).? A briefconsideration here of Locke's view and Hume's response to it will set thestage for my interpretationof the Section and the "Appendix" in whatfollows. For we shall see that Hume, unlike Locke, separatesthe issues ofthe identity and simplicity of persons as minds from issues relating to oureveryday ways of making sense of one another.In particular,Hume thinksthat questions about the mind arise primarily n the course of philosophicalenquiry,not in common life.In the Essay, Locke claims thatthe identities of personsarebased, not onthe material or immaterial substances underlying them, nor on the animalbodies in whichthey arelocated,but areinstead the resultof the continuationin them of the consciousnessesby whichthe personsin questionareawareoftheir ideas (E.II.xxvii).4To be a person, on this view, is to be a subject ofthought,wherethought s construedbroadlyas the perceptionof ideas.5Twopoints aboutthis claim should be noted. First,Locke understands onscious-ness to have a self-intimatingquality.And so persons are not only subjects

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1975). Hereafter I will refer to this text parenthetically as 'E' followed by theBook, Chapter, and Paragraph numbers in large Roman, small Roman, and Arabicnumerals respectively.Locke's officially defines consciousness as "the perception of what passes in a Man'sown mind"(E.II.i.19)."PERCEPTION .. is the first Faculty of the Mind,exercisedabout our Ideas; ... andis bysome called Thinkingin general"(E.1l.ix.1;see E.II.vi.2).

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of thought, they areawareof themselves as such subjects: "It being impossi-ble for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive"(E.II.xxvii.9); "[i]n every Act of Sensation,Reasoning, or Thinking, we areconscious to our selves of our own Being; and, in this Matter, come notshort of the highest degree of Certainty"(E.IV.ix.3). Second, Locke thinksthat his analysis of persons as consciousnesses capturesthe most importantaspectof oureverydaynotionof persons,its "Forensick" spect.Forwe takepunishmentor rewardto be justified only if the one who is to experiencetheassociated pain or pleasureis the continuationof the same consciousness asthe one who did the relevantdeed(E.II.xxvii.26).

Hume rejects the first of these two Lockianpoints in the first threepara-graphsof the Section (T.251-53). He startsby outliningthe view of "somephilosophers"that we are "everymoment intimatelyconscious of what wecall our SELF; .. [and]feel its existence and its continuance n existence;andare certainbeyondthe evidenceof a demonstration oth of its perfect identityand simplicity"(T.251). While it is not clear that Locke is precisely whomHume has in mind here,6 hese philosophersclearlyshare with him the claimthat self-awareness is omnipresent.Hume quickly rejects their view, baldlydenying that we have any idea of self "after he manner t is here explain'd"(T.251). Since he thinksthatsimple ideas are derived frompreceding simpleimpressions (T.4), in order to have an idea of a simple, unchanging self, wewould have to have a simple impressionthat remainedconstanteven whileall our otherperceptions hanged:But there is no impressionconstant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief andjoy, passionsand sensations succeed each other,and never all exist at the same time.... For my part,when Ienter most intimately nto what I call myself,I always stumble on some particularperceptionorother, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself atany time without a perception,and never can observe anythingbut the perception. (T.25 1-52)And thus Humereaches his conclusionthat the mind is "nothingbuta bundleor collectionof differentperceptions,whichsucceed each other withan incon-ceivablerapidity,and are in perpetual lux and movement" T.252).

This is perhaps not a very good argument,7but leaving that aside, itreveals what separatesHume from Locke and the otherphilosophers. Theytake self-awarenessto be a necessaryconcomitantof any mental act, while6 For these philosophersalso thinkthat self-knowledge has a foundationalepistemic role-

Hume says that part of their view is that there is nothing"of which we can be certain,ifwe doubt" (T.251) it-while Locke does not give it this special status. I discuss whoHume's target s in moredetail in "Hume'sAnti-cogito"(ms).7 Indeed it can be read as having the opposite force from what Hume intends: In so far ashe describes himself as the one "stumbling" n his perceptionsand"observing" hem as arapidly changing bundle, he might seem to be admittingthat his awareness of his percep-tions includes self-awareness.I discuss Hume's negative argument n the Section in moredetail in "Hume's Anti-cogito."

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Hume supposes that when we have a perception we are aware only of itsobject without thereby being aware of ourselves as subjects of this aware-ness.8 For his opponents, for example, when we look at a tree, we are awarenot only of the tree but of ourselves seeing the tree. For Hume, when welook at a tree, we are aware only of the tree. Awarenessof ourselves wouldrequireanothermentaloperation.

In the quotation above, Hume describes one such operation, namely'intimateentry' into himself, a process of reflectively turninghis mind ontoitself so as for him to "observe"the perceptions that constitute his mind.How does he explain ourcapacityfor this kind of introspectiveself-observa-tion? The answer to this question comes quite early in the Treatise; after all,his projectin it is to use this kind of observation to "explain the nature andprinciples of the human mind"(T.8). And so he mentions at one point thatthe vehicles for this self-examinationare what he calls secondaryideas (T.6),ideas that have otherperceptions,either impressionsor ideas, as theirobjects(I will call the perceptionsthat are the objects of secondaryideas primaryimpressions or ideas). Thus in Hume's view my seeing a tree involves thepresence of a complex impression of that tree in the bundle of perceptionsconstitutingmy mind; my remembering he tree involves the presencein thebundleof a complex idea of thattree, an idea that is a less vivacious copy ofthe original impression.As we have noted, given Hume's denial of the firstof the Lockian points, neither the impressionnor the idea of the tree bringswith it any kind of awarenessof myself or of the perception n question;I amaware only of the tree. But I can become aware of the perceptions if Ireflectively observe my mind while I am seeing the tree, in which case thebundlewould include a secondary dea of the primary mpressionof the tree(which impression would, of course, also be in the bundle); my reflectiveobservationof my mind while I am remembering he tree would involve thepresencein the bundle of a secondary dea of the primarymemory-ideaof thetree. Note, then, that while primaryideas copy impressions by their bothbeing of the same thing (the tree), secondary deas arecopies of theirprimary

It is slightly morecomplicatedthanthis. Hume thinks thata perceptionhas a characteris-tic feeling, vivacity, as well as an object. That is, the awareness of the object feels acertain way, depending on how it arises in the mind. Sensations and emotions-whatHume calls impressions-have a high level of vivacity since they arise spontaneouslyandare independent of conscious control. Thoughts-what Hume calls ideas-can beresisted to some extent and thus have lower vivacity (T.1-2).

Not all Humean perceptions have objects; in particular, passions and other"impressions of reflexion" (T.7), since they are merely feelings of various sorts, aredefined by the kind of vivacity they have (T.277). But when discussing the perceptionsthat constitutethe understanding,he topic of Book I of the Treatise, Hume is willing tosay that impressions,as well as ideas, have objects in the sense that they are all of things(see for example, T.36, 38, 84, 90). For a complete catalogue of Hume's use of 'object,'see M. Grene,"TheObjectsof Hume's Treatise"Hume Studies 20 (1994), 163-77.




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perceptions in a different sense: ratherthan sharing a common object, theprimaryperceptionsare the objects of the higher-level deas.9

Hume allows that secondary ideas arise not only in situations of philo-sophical self-observation, but also in common life. For sometimes when Irememberthe tree, my attention s not on the tree, but on my having seen it.Such a memory is the idea of an impression, namely the idea of seeing thetree (T.106). It is as a result of these spontaneous secondaryideas that wehave an idea of our mindedness outside of philosophical contexts."' But,because these secondaryideas ariseonly intermittently,because most of ourperceptionsare not observedby meansof secondary deas,Hume thinksthat:['t]is certainthat there is no questionin philosophymore abstruse hanthatconcerning dentity,and the nature of the uniting principle,which constitutes a person. So far from being able byour senses merely to determine this question, we must have recourse to the most profoundmetaphysicsto give a satisfactoryanswer to it; and in commonlife 'tis evidentthat these ideasof self and person are never vetyfix'd nor determinate. T. 189-90; emphasis added)When we 'enter most intimately' into ourselves in the course of philosophi-cal enquiry,in contrast,we form a much more determinate dea. We inten-

There are two other places where Hume considers the relation between our primaryperceptions and the secondary ideas by means of which we think about them. First, heraises the question of how, in cases when we cannot remember an experience, we caninfer that we once had the relevant impressions merely from the fact that we have aprimary dea of the event (T.105-6). The problemis that Hume's analysis of our causalbeliefs requires that our inference start with an impression, either of the senses or ofmemory (T.82-83). But in the case at hand, our starting point is the primary idea weobserve in ourselves, not an impression. Hume solves this problem by saying that theobserved idea can "supply the place of an impression:""For as this idea is not hereconsidered, as the representationof any absent object, but as a real perception in themind, of which we are intimately conscious, it must be able to bestow on whatever isrelated to it the same quality,call itfirmness,or solidity,or force, or vivacity,with whichthe mind reflects upon it, and is assur'dof its presentexistence"(T. 106). Thus reflectingon our minds or entering "intimately"into ourselves involves the re-focusing of ourattention from the objects of our perceptions to the perceptions themselves. In a way,such re-focusing allows a primaryperceptionto act as impression,the copy of which isthe secondary dea we use to think about that perception'srole in our mental economy.

In the second of the two relevant passages, Hume describes this re-focusing as achange in perspective. We "change the point of view, from the objects to the percep-tions" (T.169) when we reflect on our thought.This passage deals with the nature of thecausal connectionbetween our ideas and impressions;it is, Hume says, akin to all othercausal connections-dependent on our tendency to associate ideas of event-types uponhaving experienced a constantconjunctionof instances of the two types of events-andthus can only be noticed by us in so far as we have had experience in observing, viasecondary ideas, the operations of our minds. Such experience eventually causes our(secondary)idea of impressionsto be associatedwith our (secondary)idea of ideas, andthus supportsour belief that impressionscause ideas.Hume relies on our having such an idea when, throughoutBook III of the Treatise, heequates the virtues or vices with "qualities of mind" (e.g. T.575). Recognizing oneanother as the bearersof such qualities require only that we have a determinateenoughidea of mind to see behavior as issuing from people's passions and beliefs, not that wethinkof their mindsas bundles of perceptions.




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tionallyreflect on ourminds, forming the secondary deas by means of whichwe observe the perceptions hat are their objects, and thus we come to recog-nize the mind as the bundleof perceptions hatHumetakesit to be.

It follows from this that Hume must reject the second of the two Lockianpoints noted above-the claim that an analysis of persons as subjects ofthought capturesthe importantaspects of our everyday notion. Since think-ing of ourselves as such subjects requires the unusual mental posture of'intimateentry', and most people have only an indeterminate nderstanding fthemselves in these terms,this "abstruse"notion cannot be what we rely onin everydaylife. What does Hume think that we do rely on? He hints at howhe answers this question in the Section when he distinguishes between"personal dentity, as it regardsour thought or imagination,and as it regardsour passions or the concern we take in ourselves" (T.253). Our everydaynotion of self, the notion tied up with our self-concern, is here linked to thepassions.And in theportionof the Treatisedevoted to the passions(Book II),Hume explores the so-called indirectpassions of prideandhumility,both ofwhich cause us to focus our attention on ourselves (T.277) by "makingusthink of our own qualities and circumstances"(T.287). Feeling proud of ahouse, for example, causes us to think of ourselves as homeowners.Indeed,on Hume's analysis, our everyday sense of ourselves as embodied agents,definedby ourvalues, commitments, riends, family, possessions, andso on,seems to springfromourexperienceswith the indirectpassions.11

After makingthe distinction between the two kinds of personal identity,Humedeclaresthat his topic for the rest of the Section will be personaliden-tity "asit regardsourthoughtor imagination" T.253). We are now in a posi-tion to be clear about what this amountsto. He has alreadyestablished thatthe mindsof all of "mankind" re "bundlesor collections of differentpercep-tions" (T.252). And one of his fundamentalclaims aboutperceptionsis thatdifferent perceptions are distinguishable and separable from one another

I have discussed Hume's treatmentof the passional self in more detail in "Scepticismabout Persons in Book IIof Hume's Treatise," Journal of the History of Philosophy 37(1999),469-92. Otherdiscussions of the distinction between the passional self and the selfof thoughtand imaginationare:Terence Penelhum, "Self-identityandSelf-regard," n A.0. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1976),253-80, and "The Self of Book I and the Selves of Book II"Hume Studies 18 (1992),281-91; and J. L. McIntyre, "PersonalIdentity and the Passions," Journal of the Historyof Philosophy 27 (1989), 545-57.

At T.261, Hume notesthathis analysis of our beliefs about our minds' simplicity andidentity is "corroborated"by our everyday passional idea of self "by the making ourdistant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our pastor future pains or pleasures."His point here is that the philosophical analysis of the mindas a bundle of perceptionsthatwe believe to continueidentically throughtime fits with,e.g., our everyday expectations that a future harm to us is to be avoided, in that theconnections between our perceptionsthat these expectationsinvolve are such as to facili-tate the philosopher's belief in the identityof mindwhen these perceptionsareobserved.




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(T.207, 233, 244, 252, 634). This means that "there s properly no sinmplic-ity in [a mind qua bundle]at one time, nor identityin different" T.253). Theonly question to ask is why we nonetheless believe that the mind hassimplicity and identity.But since, as we have seen, most people do not everconsidertheirminds-or only rarely andindeterminately-Hume must meanfor this questionto applynot to the beliefs of the vulgar, butto the beliefs ofthose philosopherswho reflectively investigate theirminds in the course oftheir studies. For they must believe thatthe mindsthey observeareeach oneidentical mind, if their observationsare going to be helpfulfor anexplanationof our mental economies. We can conclude, then, that the positive portionsof the Section, in which Hume offers a psychological mechanism for thegenerationof the beliefs in mental simplicity andidentity,are meantto dealwith the beliefs of philosophers who are observing their minds, not thebeliefs of those inhabitingcommon life, where, despite the occasional spon-taneous secondary idea, the questionsof the identityand simplicity of minddo not arise.12

?2. Philosophical Beliefs in the Identity andSimplicity of MindHume models his accountof philosophers'beliefs in their minds' simplicityand identityon his accountof the generalhumantendencyto find simplicityandidentityin cases where we havecomplex and diverseexperiencesthat arecongenial to our natural associative principles (T.253); for philosophers'beliefs, though different in content, are generated according to the samefundamentalprinciplesof humannatureas areoperative n the vulgar.Humeexplains thatwhen we have experiences,the objects of which arerelatedbycausation, resemblance, or contiguity, the associations among our percep-tions lead us to overlook the differences between our experiences and tosuppose that we are dealing with one simple and identicalobject."3He callsthis 'imperfect identity' (T.256), in contrast to the 'perfect identity' weattribute to objects when our attention remains fixed on them and theyundergo no change at all (T.65, 254).14 It is because the mental activityinvolved in cases where we attribute perfect identity feels similar to themental activity involved in interrupted xperiences of changing objects thatwe treatthese changingobjectsas if they had the same kind of identityas the12 My claim that Hume's primary nterest in the Section is the self-as-mind helps to explain

his equivocating throughout it between the terms 'self' (T.251, 252, 253, 254, 262),'person' (T.251, 253, 259, 260, 262), 'soul' (T.254, 261), and 'mind' (T.253, 259, 260,261, 263).

13 Of course, causal relations between objects are partly constituted by our tendency toassociate the ideas of causes and effects (T.92, 170).

14 The importanceof the distinction between perfectand imperfect identity is stressed in L.Ashley and M. Stack, "Hume's Doctrine of PersonalIdentity,"Dialogue 13 (1974), 239-54.

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identitiesof our minds when, as philosophers,we observethemas bundles ofperceptions, says: We take our perceptualbundles to continue identicallywhen our ideas of our perceptionsare associated ogetherbecauseof the causalandresemblancerelationsamongthe primaryperceptions hat are the objectsof these ideas (spatialrelationsdo not applyto perceptions;T.260). Becausemy occurrent mpression of my computerresembles my memory-idea of ityesterday,becausemy impressionof the coffee cup in frontof me causes anidea of it, my ideas of theseperceptionsareassociatedtogetherandit feels tome almost the same as it would had I been observing uninterruptedlyanunchangingbundle of perceptions.17The explanationof our beliefs about ourminds involves the association of perceptionsin the observers' minds. Thepoint is that,for Hume's account of imperfect dentityto applyto minds, theassociation of ideas that this account involves must be the association ofsecondary deas-ideas of perceptions, ither mpressionsor ideas.'8

Given my claim that Hume's treatmentof personal identity addresses aproblemthat arises only for philosopherswho are investigatingtheirmindsreflectively, it should not be too surprising hat it involves secondaryideas.For, as we have seen, Hume thinks thatphilosophersobservetheirminds byforming secondary deasof theirprimaryperceptions; econdary deas are thevehicles of reflectivethought.And Humemakes it clear that his explanationof personal dentity nvolvessecondary deas:

17 Some of Hume's interpretershave suggested that his account of personalidentity breaksdown here (S. C. Patten,"Hume's Bundles, Self-consciousness, and Kant,"Hume Studies2 [1976], 59-75; and Stroud,Hume, 125-27). Our primaryperceptions,especially thoseof sensation, do not seem to have sufficientrelationsamongthemto lead us to take themto be a continuing mind. We see a computer screen and then a coffee cup, but theseimpressions are neithercausally related nor resembling.But Pattenand Stroud overlookthe special context of Hume's considerationof the mind in the Section. We are not justhaving an impression of a coffee cup, we are observing the impressionby means of asecondary idea of it. And immediately thereafterwe observe a causally related idea ofthe coffee cup. We observe an impressionof a computerscreen followed by the causallyrelated idea of it; and we can also observe our memories of previous encounters withcoffee cups and computers, ideas which resemble the currentlyobserved perceptions.Overall, Hume does not seem incorrectin suggesting that this "system"of perceptionscontains a complex enough network of relationsto lead us to ascribeimperfect identitytothe observed perceptions.See Garrett,"Hume's Self-doubts," 347-50, Cognition, 172-73, for anotherexaminationof this purportedproblem.

18 This difference in level has often been overlooked. Wade Robison, for example,misquotes T.259 (see p. 8), as investigating what "associates ideas in the imagination,"whereas Hume's concern is what "associates their ideas [sc. the ideas of "our severalperceptions"]n the imagination."Robisonmakesa similarmistakein his summaryof the"Appendix."He thinksthat Hume says that the "ideas in a mind 'are elt to be connectedtogether, and naturally introduce one another"' (T.635; Robison's emphasis), whereasHume's actual statementconcerns the felt connection between the "ideas of them [sc.ideas of "past perceptions"]" T.635) ("Hume's Appendix" in D. F. Norton, N. Capaldi,and W. L. Robison [eds.],McGill Hume Studies [San Diego: Austin Hill, 1979], 93, 97).

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[I]dentity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions,and uniting them together;but is merely a quality, which we attribute o them, because of the union of their ideas [sc. thesecondary ideas of the primary perceptions] in the imagination,when we reflect upon them.(T.260, emphasis added)

Also:[A]s ... we suppose the whole train of perceptions o be united by identity, a question naturallyarises concerningthis relation of identity; whether t be somethingthat really binds our severalperceptions together, or only associates their ideas [sc. the secondary ideas of the primaryperceptions] n the imagination.Thatis, in other words, whetherin pronouncingconcerningtheidentity of a person, we observe some real bond among his perceptions, or only feel oneamong the ideas we form of them [sc. the secondary ideas we form of the primary percep-tions]. (T.259, emphasis added)Hume, of course, takes the latteroption, denying thatwe have any evidenceforreal bondsbetweenperceptions.

But what of these secondary ideas? Humerelies on associationsbetweenthem in orderto explain our beliefs in personal dentityandhe suggest that asimilar story accounts for our beliefs in the simplicity of mind (T.263).These secondary deas, however, remainas distinct existences since there arenot ideas of them (tertiary deas?) associated togetherwith the ideas of ourotherperceptions. And, Hume thinks, there is no otherway to explain howwe believe a perception o be partof a simple, continuingmindother than bythe associationof secondary deas of it with othersuch secondary deas. Yetwe nonethelessbelieve these secondary deas arepartof ourminds. To denythis would be to deny that the vehicles by means of which we are thinkingabout ourminds' constituentsare themselvespartof the mind.

Here, I think, is the problem that Hume finally recognizes in the"Appendix:"Theprocess he has describedto explain why we believe in theidentityand simplicityof our minds(theassociationof secondaryideas of ourprimary perceptions) does not explain why the secondary ideas used in theprocess are also taken to be part of our minds. The very explanation thatHume offers for our beliefs in the simplicity and identity of mind invokesmental items our belief in the unity of which with the rest of our mindsremainsunexplained.1919 To a certain extent, then, my interpretation s in agreementwith those who see Hume'sproblem as having to do with mental activity (see n.15). The difference is that I do not

see Hume as having a problem with mental activity per se. But the mental activityinvolved in Hume's explanationof our belief in personalidentityturnsout to requirethepresence of secondary ideas, our belief in the unity of which with the rest of the mindremainsunaccounted for.

John Bricke is one of the few interpretersto acknowledge Hume's appeal tosecondary ideas (Hume's Philosophy of Mind [Princeton: Princeton University Press,1980], 74-99). We disagree, however, on where the problem with Hume's account islocated: Bricke thinks that Hume cannot adequately distinguish some secondary ideasfrom the primaryperceptionsthat are their objects. I thinkthat Hume's problem lies in




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?3. The "Appendix"In defense of this proposed interpretation,and to clarify it further, I wouldlike to test it against what I take to be the criteria that any interpretationofthe "Appendix"must meet. Althoughit is probablytruethatHume's secondthoughts n the "Appendix" reunderdetermined y the text, the proliferationof conflicting readingsseems due in partto a lack of clarityamong commen-tators as to whatan interpretation f the "Appendix"must account for.2"' hecriteria hatI suggest herepresupposeonly that the "Appendix"s a responseto a problemin the Section that Humewould recognize from within his ownview.21

(1) The Principles: The first criterion requires that an interpreter pec-ify what Hume thoughthe had overlookedin the Section. The first 11 para-graphs (T.633-35) of the partof the "Appendix"devoted to personalidentitysummarize, or the most part,Hume's earlier account. In particular,once ourobservational stance on the mind has served to "loosen all our particularperceptions,"ourbelief in the mind's identityis attributed o the associationof secondarydeas:[T]houghtalone findspersonal identity, when[,] reflectingon the train of past perceptions,thatcompose a mind, the ideas of them [sc. the secondaryideas of the past primary perceptions]are felt to be connectedtogether,and naturally ntroduceeach other. (T.635; my italics)He comments that this means that he agrees with those philosophers whothink that"personal dentityarises fromconsciousness,"whereconsciousnessis now defined as "reflectedthought or perception" (T.635). But he seemsnow to recognize thathis previousaccountapplies only to our beliefs about

our belief in the unity of the secondary ideas with the rest of ourminds. Partof the prob-lem with Bricke's interpretations that, given the centralityof secondary ideas to Hume'sproject, it would be unlikely that his problem would be specific to the treatment ofpersonal identity. But Hume clearly thinks that the "Appendix"points to only the one"considerablemistake"(T.623) in Books I and II. See my discussion of the SingularityCriterion,?3 (6), below.

2() Garrett is an exception here. In "Hume's Self-doubts," 355, he presents three criteria,similar to the first three I list below, thatany interpretation f the "Appendix"must meet.

21 Thus I do not accept Corliss Swain's argument that, in the "Appendix," Hume meansmerely to show the incoherence of traditionalsubstantial theories of the mind ("BeingSure of Oneself: Hume on Personal Identity,"Hume Studies 17 [1991], 107-24). 1 takeseriouslyHume's admissionthatthe Section contains a "considerablemistake"(T.623).

Those commentatorssuch as Jane McIntyre ("Is Hume's Self Consistent?"in D.Fate Norton, N. Capaldi, and W. L. Robison [eds.], McGill Hume Studies [San Diego:Austin Hill, 1979], 79-88, and "FurtherRemarkson the Consistency of Hume's Accountof the Self" Hume Studies 5 [1979], 55-61) and Tom Beauchamp("Self Inconsistency orMere Self Perplexity,"HumeStudies5 [1979], 37-44), who think thatthe "Appendix" sa case of Hume's 'backsliding'-his losing the courage of his empiricist convictions-must take up the burden of showing that the problems in the Section are not trulyHumean.And they shouldprovidean accountof why Hume would backslide in only thisone case.

HUME'S REFLECTIONSON THE IDENTITYAND SIMPLICITYOFMIND 567



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our past perceptions.His problem arises when it comes to beliefs about ourpresent perceptions: "The present philosophy ... has so far a promisingaspect. But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, thatunite our successive22perceptionsin our thoughtor consciousness" (T.635-36).23 The problematic principles, whatever they are, should explain ourbeliefs in the unity of our minds not only in the past, but during the veryperiod when we observe them; the problem thus primarily concerns ourbeliefs in the simplicityof our minds (thereis a derivativeproblemconcern-ing identity, since an object must have some kind of unity or simplicitybefore its continuity throughtime can count as identity). It follows that anyinterpretation f the "Appendix" hould specify why his original account isunable to explain the "uniting"of our currentsuccessive perceptionsevenwhile it workswhen it comes to explainingour beliefs about ourpast percep-tions.

My suggestion is that Hume's problemis explaining why we believe thatthe secondary deas, the association of which causes the belief in the identityof mind, arealso partof the mind. When theperceptionswe reflect on are inthepast,this accountsucceedsin explainingour currentbelief in the continu-ity of the mind during thatprior stretch of timebecauseourcurrent econdaryideas of the past perceptionsare runtogetherso as to producethe belief thatthose perceptionsconstituteda simple, identicalentity. The fact thatcurrent22 Wayne Waxman thinks that Hume's problem in the "Appendix"arises when he realizes

that, in the Section, he had presupposed he successiveness of perceptionsto one anotherprior to their being associated by the imagination. But, Waxmanthinks, a succession isconstituted out of the association of its elements ("Hume's Quandary ConcerningPersonal Identity,"Hume Studies 18 [1992], 233-53).

I find this suggestion doubtful. First, Hume allows that objects exist in succession"independentof our thought and reasoning" (T.168). Second, Waxman supposes thatperceptionsmust be retained in memorybefore the imaginationcan associate them. Andthus he supposes that we must have "consciousness" of the succession of perceptionsbefore we can associate its elements (it is exactly this "consciousness"that creates theproblem he takes Hume to recognize in the "Appendix").But Hume does not think thatassociation is something done to perceptionsof which we are already aware; rather,theassociation of ideas is what explains why we think of one object after having experi-enced (or thought of) another. And, third,Waxman treats "consciousness" as if it werepresupposedin all association, whereas Hume is quite clear that it is the equivalent of"reflected" hought, thought thatis being investigatedreflectively.

As Waxman admits, his problem would go to the heart of Hume's treatment ofassociationand thus it is hard to reconcile with the "Singularity" 6) and "Insulation"7)criteria, below.

23 Stroud points out that this statement s ambiguous.Hume could be askingfor an explana-tion of the principlesthatactually producea connection between our perceptions,or hecould be asking for an explanation of the principles in virtue of which we come tobelieve that our perceptions are united (Hume, 133). It seems to me that unless the'backsliding' thesis is correct(see n.21), the second option is clearly what Hume has inmind, given his earlier statementthat "the uniting principle among our internal percep-tions is as unintelligible as that among external objects, and is not known to us any otherway than by experience" (T.169).




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secondary deas are involved in the productionof this belief poses no problembecause the belief does not concern current constituents of the mind. Butwhen it comes to the belief in the simplicity of the mind during the momentwe are reflecting,then the secondary deas by means of which this reflectiontakes place are themselves takento be partof ourmindseven though they arenot themselves "observed" n such a way that associations of ideas of themcan explainour beliefs aboutthem; for, since there arenot ideasof these ideasin our minds, no association of ideas of them can takeplace. This means thatthe very ideas in virtue of which we are able to thinkof our perceptions-theideas that are the vehicles of "consciousness,"that is, "reflectedthought orperception"-are not themselvesassociatively integrated nto the restof whatwe taketo be oursimple identical minds.

(2) The Inconsistency: In the twelfth paragraph of the relevantportionof the "Appendix,"Hume tells us why he has been dissatisfiedin hisattempts o accountfor the unexplainedprinciples:[T]hereare two principles,which I cannot renderconsistent;nor is it in my power to renounceeither of them, viz. that all our distinctperceptions are distinct existences, and that the mindneverperceives any real connexionamong distinctexistences. (T.636; Hume's italics)These two principlesare centralto Hume's understanding f perceptionsandappearthroughoutBook I (T.207, 233, 244, 252); he even reiterates hem inthe "Appendix" T.634). And, as has oft been noted, they are not inconsis-tent. Interpretershusmust bothprovidea plausiblethird(or more) principlewhich leaves Hume facing an inescapable inconsistency and connect thisinconsistencywith the problemof accountingfor the "uniting"of oursucces-sive perceptions.

Since, on my interpretation,Hume's problemin the "Appendix" s thatwe still take to be oursthe secondary deas which, accordingto his explana-tion of our beliefs in personal identityand simplicity, oughtto be viewed asoutside of ourminds,I see the enthymematic nconsistencyas pointingto thefollowing set of propositions:

(i) All ourdistinctperceptionsare distinctexistences (T.636).(ii) The mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct exis-

tences (T.636).(iii) We attributesimplicity and identity to the bundle of perceptions

making up ourminds (T.635).(iv) The only way to explain our belief that our successive perceptions

constitutesimple identical minds is by the association of secondaryideas of theseperceptions T.635).




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(v) The secondary ideas in (iv) are distinct existences, (i), no ideas ofwhich are associatedwith the ideas of the other perceptionswe taketo make up ourminds. Nor can we discern a real connectionbetweenthesesecondary deasand the otherperceptions, ii).

(vi) From (iii) and (v), we know both that there are perceptionswhichwe take to be part of our minds and that there are not ideas of theseperceptions associated togetherwith the ideas of our otherpercep-tions. From(iv), we know that there is no other way to explain ourbelief in the unityof oursecondary deas with the rest of ourminds.

It might seem that (v) would not really trouble Hume. He is not, forexample, troubled with the thoughtthatsome of ourpast experiences are soirrecoverable hat we cannot formthe propersecondary deas of them neces-sary for their integration nto the bundle.It is enoughthat we can tracecausalconnections between the forgotten experiences and those we remember(T.262). Can Hume make a similar move to avoid the problem in (i)-(vi)?Even thoughat a particularmoment,the secondary deas used in the associa-tion of our primaryperceptions remainapartfrom the bundle, this need notbe a permanent ituation.We can reflect on our secondary ideas, make themobjects of tertiary deas, and thusassociatively integrate hem-although notthe tertiaryideas-with the rest of the perceptions in the bundle. At eachlevel, a furtherreflectionwill both integratea set of higher-level ideas, andintroduce a new set of ideas of perceptions which, not being observed asperceptions, remain distinct from the bundle. We might not get all of ourperceptions nto the bundleall at once, butthey can all be integratedat sometime or another.

True enough, but this does not solve the problem of our belief in themind's simplicity, the unity of the mind at a time. At any moment, whenreflectingon ourminds, we take ourselves to be observingone mind. Whenwe recognize that,at that moment,we have perceptionswhich are not asso-ciatively integrated into our mind-bundles, then our belief in the mind'ssimplicitycannot be explainedsolely in terms of the associationof secondaryideas. There remain these occurrentsecondary ideas, no ideas of which areassociatedwith the ideas of our otherperceptions, hat we nonetheless take tobe partof ourminds.2424 The fact that secondary ideas are caused by the primary perceptions that are their

objects (T.6) might seem to be enough to explain our belief that these ideas are partofour minds. But recall that,for Hume, causal beliefs involve the association of the idea ofthe cause and the idea of the effect (T.I.iii.6). Believing thatprimaryperceptionsare thecauses of secondary ideas thus involves the association of (secondary) ideas of theprimary perceptions and tertiary ideas of the secondaryideas. And yet we believe thatthese other secondaryand tertiary deas (those that constitute our belief that secondaryideas are caused by primaryperceptions)are themselves partof our minds, even though




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(3) The Escape: The problem with Hume's explanation of our beliefin personal identity would be avoided, he tells us, "[d]id our perceptionsinhere in somethingsimple and individual,ordid the mindperceive some realconnexion among them..." (T.636). I take this to mean that if we couldrecognize connectionsbetween ourperceptionsother than by the associationof their secondary deas, we would not have to be reflectivelyobserving ourperceptions in order to include them in what we take to be our minds. Thesecondary ideas, which are not observed as perceptions in the process bywhich he had originally thought we come to believe in personal simplicityand identity,could then be recognizedas partof a simple and identicalmindafter all. But neither inherencenor "real connexions"are viable in Hume'ssystem, and so he is left with his insolubleproblem.

(4) The Sceptic's Plea: This, of course, leads Hume to "plead theprivilege of a sceptic" (T.636). ClearlyHume thinks thatthis entitles him tocontinuehis projectof using reflective observationof the mind to explain itsfundamentalprincipleseven though he now recognizes that he is unable toaccountfor one of the beliefs presupposedby his method-the philosopher'sbelief that the mind she observes is one identical mind. I have tried to stayneutral n this essay on the controversialquestionof how to interpretHume'sscepticism.25But any such interpretationmust be able to make sense of hisresponse to the problem about personal identity that he recognizes in the"Appendix."For he prefaceshis second thoughtsby sayingthathis confusionabout personsis akin to "thosecontradictionsandabsurdities,which seem toattendevery explication, that humanreason can give of the materialworld"(T.633), the very problemswhich broughthim to embrace "trueskepticism"in the "Conclusion" o Book I of the Treatise(T.273).

(5) Charity: A successful interpretation f the "Appendix"should also,I think,make clear why Hume was so quick to recognize the limitations ofhis original account in the Section. There must be a fairly natural movewhich he had overlooked. At the same time, an interpretationhouldexplainwhy Hume was likely to have missed thatmove in his initial consideration.My claim that the problemarises from the role secondaryideas play in theaccountleaves it close enough to the surfacethat it is plausiblefor Hume tohave discovered it on a re-reading. The harder question is why he wasconvinced by his first discussion of the issue in the Section. I think that thereare fourreasons for Hume'shavinginitiallyoverlookedtheproblemposed by

no (higher order)ideas of them are being associated with our ideas of our other percep-tions.

25 For two recent interpretationsof Hume's view that play up its 'naturalistic'explanatorydimension, see Annette Baier,A Progress of Sentiments(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1991) and Garrett, Cognition. For more sceptical interpretations see RobertFogelin, Hume's Scepticism in A Treatise of Human Nature (London: Routledge andKegan Paul, 1985) and Wayne Waxman,Hume's Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1994).




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his reliance on secondaryideas in explainingour beliefs in the identity andsimplicity of ourminds.

First, in the Section, Hume follows in the footsteps of Locke by givingmost of his attentionto our belief in the identity of mind. His treatmentofour belief in its simplicity is clearly an afterthought (T.263). Since it isexactly the issue of simplicity that creates the problems for him that heconfronts in the "Appendix,"his earlierneglect of the issue might go part ofthe way towardsexplaining his originallymissing them.

Second, in comparing our belief in the identity of external objects withour belief in the identity of our minds, Hume seems to have failed to noticethe significantdifferences between these two kinds of identification.Mostimportantly, n the case of external objects, that to which we ascribe identity(the object) is different from that which does the ascribing(the associativetendencies in our minds). In the case of our minds, however,we are both theobjects of our internal nvestigationandthe subjects doing the investigation.We do not get outside of ourselves when we reflectively observe ourselves,but remain simultaneouslythe observers and the observed. In the Section,Hume treats the mind as if it were differentfrom the observer, ignoring thesecondary deas, the associationsof which explainourbelief in the identityofthe mind. But in the "Appendix,"on my interpretation,he realizes that ourbelief in the unity of these secondaryideas with the rest of the mind mustalso be explained.

Third, Hume's premature atisfaction with the Section might stem in partfrom some of the analogiesandthoughtexperiments hat he uses there. Mostnotably, at a crucial moment in the argument,Hume considers what wouldhappenwere he able to observe the "breastof another" T.260), that is, theperceptions n someone else's mind.And, he says, from thatperspective,theresemblances between and causal connections among the other person'sperceptions ead him to ascribeidentityandsimplicityto thatperson's mind.He goes on to say that"[t]hecase is the same whetherwe considerourselvesor others"(T.261). But, of course, these two cases are not the same. In thethought experiment,Hume does (albeitonly imaginatively)stand outside ofthe observedmind andcan thus observe all of thatmind's occurrentpercep-tions;the secondary deas which have these perceptionsas theirobjectsare inhis mind,whereas the observedperceptionsare in the otherperson's mind.Inthe first-personcase, however, these secondary deas arepartof the mind towhich we are attributing dentity and simplicity, even though we are not atthat momentobservingthem as perceptions.Ourbelieving thatthey are partof the mind needs to be accounted or.

A similarproblemcan be seen in one of Hume's most famousmetaphorsfor the mind, the theatre,where the perceptionsconstituting the mind are




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comparedto the actors in a play (T.253).26But Hume goes on to explain ourbeliefs in the identity and simplicity of mind from the perspective of theobserverof the mind, or, analogously,the spectatorof the play. And yet theoperations n the mind of the observeror the spectatorare not recognized inHume's metaphor,even though in the case of the mind, these operations arealso believed to be partof the mind being observed. Hume's disavowal of aninterest in the "place, where [the play's] scenes are represented, .. [and] thematerials,of which it is compos'd" (T.253)-anything thatmight serve as asubstance-likesupport or the actors-perceptions-seems to have blinded himto his relianceon a position in the audienceof his mind.

The fourth reason why Hume might originally have been satisfied withhis account of the belief in the mind's simplicity in the Section is that ourbeliefs aboutour secondary deas have a somewhat different status from ourbeliefs about our primary perceptions. Hume thinks that usually we formbeliefs aboutperceptionswhen we "observe" hem(T.252). But even thoughwe do not observethe secondary deas involved in producingour belief in theunity and identity of the observed perceptions,we nonetheless believe thatthey arepresent n our minds.But what is the natureof this belief? How is itpossible to believe that the secondaryideas by means of which we observeour minds are themselves partof our minds withoutthereby having higher-level ideas of them?Why does Hume not say that, ust as we arenot aware ofthe perceptionof a tree when we areawareof a treeby meansof thatpercep-tion (recall Hume's denial of the first of the Lockian points), we are notaware of thesecondary deas of ourprimaryperceptionswhen we areawareofthose perceptionsby meansof thosesecondary deas?

Indeed,I take it that this is how things normallywork when we philoso-phize.We remainunawareof the secondarydeasby meansof whichwe makeclaims aboutour minds. We have only an indeterminateunderstanding f theplace of oursecondary deas in our mindsjust as in commonlife people haveonly an indeterminateunderstanding f the place of theirprimaryperceptionsin theirminds (T. 189-90). But things aredifferentwhen, in the context of adiscussion like the one that occurs in the Section, philosophersbringforwardthe perceptualconstitution of mind as a topic of discussion. For then webelieve that the mind is a bundle of perceptions at the same time as webelieve that secondary ideas are working behind our backs, as it were, toproduce our beliefs in the simplicity and identity of mind. Our secondary26 "The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their

appearance;pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures andsituations.There is properlyno simplicityin it at one time, noridentityin different;what-ever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. Thecomparisonof the theatre must not mislead us. They arethe successive perceptions only,that constitutethe mind;nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where thesescenes arerepresented,or of the materials,of which it is composed" T.253).




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ideas are the objectsof a theoreticalclaim-that associations among them areresponsiblefor these beliefs-without being "observed" n the mannerneededfor themto be associatively integrated nto the bundle. What then can explainour nonethelessbelievingthat theunobserved econdary deas, thepresenceofwhich is indirectlyrecognized given Hume's explanationof our beliefs aboutthe mind, arepartof our simple, identicalminds?This is what leaves Humein the "labyrinth"T.633) he describes n the "Appendix."

(6) Singularity: Perhapsthe most difficult problem for most interpre-tations of the "Appendix" s that they fail to explain why Hume thinksthathis discussion of personal identity contains his single "very considerablemistake"(T.623) in all of Books I and 11.27He seems to findthe problemhe27 For example, those who see Hume's problem in the "Appendix"as having to do withmental activity (see n.15) will have difficulty explainingwhy this problem does not infect

the whole of Book I, since mental activities are endemic to it.Also, several recent interpreters take Hume's problem in the "Appendix" to

concern how perceptionscan be taken to be in a bundle in the firstplace. Garrett hinksthat this is a problem for Hume only in the case of those perceptionsthat lack spatialproperties(such as passions, tastes, and smells [T.235]) ("Hume'sSelf-Doubts," 350-58;Cognition, 180-85). Stroud worries about how Hume can explain the discreteness of oneperson's bundle from another's (Hume, 134-40). John Haugeland thinks that Hume'saccount of mental causation presupposes that perceptionscome in bundles, but that hecan only explain their coming in bundles in terms of mental causation ("Hume onPersonal Identity;"this essay has circulatedin manuscriptform for many years, and isoften cited as being co-authoredby Paul Grice, but it has recently appearedin Hauge-land's Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysicsof Mind [Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1998], 63-71, where he clarifies his sole authorshipof it, and apprecia-tion of Grice for his help with it [364]). Pearsthinks thatthe problem s understandinghecausal relations between perceptions "as mental particulars"prior to the 'bundling' ofthe "total mind" into "individual minds"(Hume's System [Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1990], 135-51).

The general problemwith these interpretationss thatthey think thatHumestarts outwith a notion of perceptionsas existing in some free-floating way, such that theirbeingfoundin bundlesconstituting ndividuals' mindsbecomes a mystery.The text they take tosupportthis assumption s Hume's commentthat "there s no absurdity n separatinganyparticular perception from the mind; that is, in breakingoff all its relations, with thatconnected mass of perceptions,which constitutea thinkingbeing" (T.207). But we shouldbe wary of wrenchingthis statementfrom its unusual,dialectical context, where Humehas announced that he will speak of objects and perceptions interchangeably (T.202,211). I take it that his point in this passage is that we can always separatein thoughtaperception from all others;we have the freedom to resist our associative impulses (T.10).And there could be a mind with this single perception (T.634). In undertaking the"science of man,"we step outside of our minds, as it were, to observe its operationsinterms of perceptions.But we do not therebyobserve all the perceptions n the world

In the end, it is hard to see how these interpretations an explain Hume's thoughtthat his problem about personal dentityis singular:If he hadrecognizeda grave problemabout bundling, he should have expressed concern about the overall success of hisproject (Stroud acknowledges this consequence of his interpretation,Hume, 140, as doPears,Hume's System, 151, and Haugeland, "Hume,"70). These interpretationswill alsohave problemswith the "insulation"criterion,describedbelow, (7), in that other occur-rences of the idea of self in Books I and II would be jeopardized if Hume had indeedrecognized any problemswith bundling.




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diagnoses in the "Appendix" o be a limited one, affecting only the Sectionandnot any otherpartof his treatmentof the understanding. ndeed, most ofthe rest of Book I (the discussion of space andtime, Partii of Book I, is thenotable exception) re-appears n one form or anotherin the first Enquiry,which he describes as differing from the Treatise only in the "manner" nwhich his views are presented.28Accordingly, as much as we might seegeneral and pervasive problems in Hume's quiteaustereempiricist program,we ought not to read them into an interpretation f the "Appendix;" nsteadwe should explain why Hume thinksthat the problem acknowledgedthere isnot a threatto his otherviews.

On my interpretation,Hume's problemis in explaining our belief in themind's simplicity-why we believe the secondary deasto be partof the mindeven though no ideas of them are associated with our ideas of our otherperceptions. Given that, for him, the vehicles for mental observation aresecondary ideas which themselves remain unobserved, it will always beimpossible to have all of the mind in view all at once. But the only time heneeds to have this panoramicperspectiveon the mind is in his explanationofour belief in its simplicity. We have seen that in othercases, if he needs toconsiderthe role of secondary deas, he can always stepback andbring theminto view, by formulating tertiary ideas of them. It follows that the"Appendix,"which on my view dependson Hume'srecognitionof this prob-lem with mental observation,is a withdrawalonly from the account of thebelief in mental simplicity and identity. Hume's conception of scepticismseems to allow him to take this problemto be a localized one, and thus notto see his second thoughtsas creating dangerousproblems anywhereelse inhis theory.

(7) Insulation: Not only does Hume think that his "mistake"in histreatmentof personal identity is singular, he also seems to think that thismistake is insulated from the many otherappearancesof the idea of self inBooks I and II of the Treatise. For example, even though Hume openlyappeals to his view of the mind as a "bundle"of perceptions at a crucialmoment in "Of scepticism with regardto the senses,"29he shows no sign of28 Hume says: "I had always entertaineda notion, thatmy wantof success in publishingthe

Treatise of Human Nature, had proceeded more from the manner than the matter,andthat I had been guilty of a very usual indiscretion, n going to the press too early. I, there-fore, cast the first part of that work anew in the Enquiry concerningHuman Understand-ing" ("My Own Life," in D. Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, E. F. Miller[ed.], [Indianapolis: Liberty/Classics, 1987], xxxv). He says in a letter that the"philosophicalprinciples are the same"in both the Treatise and the first Enquiry (Lettersof David HumeVol. 1, J. Y. T. Grieg [ed.], [Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1932], 158).

29 "[W]hat we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions,united together by certain relations, and suppos'd tho' falsely, to be endow'd with aperfect simplicity and identity" (T.207; there is a footnote referring o T.I.iv.6 at T.206).Robert Fogelin draws attentionto this passage when suggesting thatHume's problem inthe "Appendix" concerns the nature of the "connection" that is supposed to obtain




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worry that he must re-visit this section in the "Appendix."3"On my view,this is not a problem becauseHume,in the "Appendix," s not backing off ofhis claim that the mind is a bundle of perceptions, even though he nowrecognizes that no one can view, at one time, all of her own mind as such abundle.31He is withdrawingonly from his explanationof our belief in themind's simplicityandidentity.Hume also seems to think that his problemwith his treatmentof personalidentityandsimplicitydoes not infect his use of the idea of self in Book II ofthe Treatise, even though the idea of self plays two centralroles there:First,it is the object of the "indirectpassions"of prideandhumility (T.277). And,second, Hume relies on what he calls "the idea, or rather impression ofourselves"(T.317) in his discussion of sympathy,a process by which other

between elements of the bundle. Hume needs to maintainboth thatperceptionsare sepa-rable from the bundle, so that they could exist independent of it, and that they are inte-grated into it in such as way as for associations involving its elements to produce thebelief in the mind's identity and simplicity (Hume's Skepticism, 105-8). As Fogelinadmits, if this were really Hume's problem, he should have recognized that it affectsmore than the Section; in particular it applies to "Of scepticism with regard to thesenses." But, like those who see Hume's problemas one of bundling, Fogelin wrenchesHume's discussion of 'unperceived perceptions' (T.206-8), where the idea of separatingperceptionsfrom the bundle arises, out of context even though Hume is openly using anon-standardnotion of perceptionat this point in his argument T.202, 211).

30 In fact, the bundle view even re-appears n Hume's final work, the Dialogues Concern-ing Natural Religion, where all of the charactersassent to Demea's statement that "thesoul of man ... [is] a compositionof various faculties, passions, sentiments ideas; united,indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each other" (Norman Kemp Smith[ed. andintro.], [Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1947], 159).

31 Our ideas of our minds as bundles of perceptionswill, however, be "inadequate" T.23,29), Hume's term for ideas that do not fully capture the details of their objects (Lockealso uses this term, E.II.xxxi). Our ideas of higher numbers, for example, are usuallyinadequateto their objects, in that we often do not have a distinct notion of 1000 (asopposedto 1001) when thinkingof it. Humethinksthat,since the mind has "thepowerofproducing"an adequateversion of the idea when needed, the inadequacyof these ideasdoes not make a difference in our reasoning (T.23). The fact that the idea of our mind asa bundle of perceptions misses out on some of the unrememberedperceptions is aninadequacy somewhat similar to the inadequacyof our ideas of high numbers.If I needto know whether I was the one who, say, went to Englandwhen I was two years old, Ican rectify the inadequacyof the current dea of my mind by tracingout causal connec-tions between my remembered perceptionsand the forgotten experiences of the trip toEngland. Most of the time, the inadequacyof our ideas of ourmindsbroughtaboutby theomission of the secondary deas (by which we thinkaboutour mental contents as percep-tions) can easily be fixed by a further reflection through which we make the missingsecondary ideas into the objects of tertiary deas. But the fact that I can never form anidea which capturesall the perceptionsin my mind at that very momentmeans that theidea of self is necessarily inadequate.

Since the discussion of inadequacycomes as an aside in the discussion of generality(T.I.i.7), I interpretGarrett o mean that the idea of self is inadequatewhen he suggeststhat the idea of self is general ("Hume'sSelf-Doubts," 340). For surelyit makes no senseto treat the idea of self as a general idea. My idea of self-qua-mindis the idea of myconcretebundle of perceptions,one that containsonly the experiences I have undergone;it is not the idea of mind-in-general.




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people's sentiments are transfused into us so that we come to feel theirsentiments. An interpretationof the "Appendix"must be able to show thathis rejection of the Section's argumentdoes not affect his use of the idea ofself in these othercontexts.

My interpretation an easily satisfy this criterion because it points to thespecial philosophicalcontext of Hume's concernwith personsin the Sectionand the "Appendix."He is interested n understandingour beliefs about ourminds, especially when we observe them philosophically. But as I noted in?1 above, the self as it appears in Book II is the self "as it regards ourpassions or the concern we take in ourselves"(T.253). There Hume describesthe mental principlesthat explain our everyday notion of persons. The factthat he is unable to account for why, when reflecting on the mind's percep-tual constitution,we take it to be simple and identical is irrelevant for thisproject.

?4. ConclusionI am not the first person to have suggested that Hume's problems in the"Appendix" oncernthe issue of reflection.NormanKemp Smith, for exam-ple, suggests that Hume came to recognize that the mind must include"thoughtprocesseswhich amountto reflexion,in the ordinary,non-technical,sense of that term,"32but that he was unable to explain the possibility ofreflective thinking. Unfortunately Kemp Smith does not explain what hemeans by 'reflexion',nor he does spell outjust why Hume would have prob-lems with explainingthis kind of thought.D. G. C. MacNabb wondershowa bundle of perceptionscould reflectivelybe awareof itself.33But he missesout on the fact that, for Hume, this means simply that there are perceptionsin the bundle which have other perceptions as their objects.34In the end,neither of these interpretationss successful because they do not show howreflectionwould pose a problemfor Hume, given his own understandingofhis project. And, more importantly, hey fail to recognize the special charac-ter of the reflectionpresupposedby our beliefs aboutourminds as bundlesofperceptions. They fail to see that the negative argumentat the beginning ofthe Section meansthat theremainingpositive argumentsdeal with the beliefswe hold when we reflectivelyobserve ourperceptions n the course of philos-ophizing.

WhatI have shown is thatunderstanding eflectionin the way thatHumehimself seems to understandt-namely, as makingourperceptionsinto theobjects of ourthoughtthroughthe use of secondary deas-allows us to finda trulyHumeanproblemin the "Appendix."We cannot reflect on all of our32 The Philosophy of David Hume(London:Macmillan, 1941), 556.33 David Hume: His Theoryof Knowledgeand Morality (London:Hutchinson, 1951), 152.34 Pike makes this point in "Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self: A Limited Defence,"

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perceptionsat one time, even though the only Humean explanation we cangive for our belief in the mind's simplicity requiresjust such a reflection.Hume saw no route out of this problem, I suggest, and he concluded that theonly method available for understanding he operations of the mind-his"scienceof man"-was of no use forunderstandinghis facet of humanexpe-rience. Hume seems to have been remarkablyunconcernedaboutthis limita-tion to his philosophicalproject.

But, in retrospect, we can see Hume's recognition of the inability ofintrospective investigationto yield an explanationof our beliefs in the unityof mind as settingthe stage for Kant's innovation-transcendental appercep-tion, a mode of self-awarenessboth differentfromHumeanreflection(whichhe calls 'innersense') and in virtue of which our representationsare united.Kant concedes the empirical point about self-awareness that Hume levelsagainst Locke and the otherphilosophersin the first few paragraphsof theSection; it is true that we are not always thinkingof ourselves when we goabout our business in the world. But, in anotherway, namely transcenden-tally, Kant retains the firstof the Lockianpoints about the omnipresenceofself-awareness.We aresubjectsof thought only if ourvariousideas, percep-tions, representations,call them what you will, are united in such a way asfor a personto be able to makejudgements.This is a condition of the possi-bility of thought. And thus even though Hume is right that the mind assimple and identical only arises as a topic for those who reflect on theirminds, it nonethelessplays a role in oureverydaylives because,even withoutthinkingof it, we presuppose t all the time.35

5 Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp Smith (tr.), (New York: St. Martin's, 1965). Kantdiscusses transcendental apperception and its role in our thought throughout the"TranscendentalDeduction" (A 84-130, B 116-69). For his agreement with Hume'sclaim that there is no empirical supportfor the ever-presence of the idea of self, see A107.

578 DONALDC. AINSLIE

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Hume' s Reflections on the Identity