In Eugenio Eusebio Vs

Comparative Analysis (1)

In Eugenio Eusebio vs. Eusebio, et al., petitioner filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father resided in Quezon City. Eugenios siblings, stating that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga.

The issue here is whether the venue had been properly laid in Rizal. Supreme Court said that it did not. Don Andres Eusebio was and had always been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot in Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided there. It is well settled that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one owns health even if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.

Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. Documents evidenced that Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga as his residence. In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.

As compared to the case of Fule v. CA: here, Amado G. Garcia died. He owned a property in Calamba, Laguna. Virginia G. Fule, the illegitimate sister of the deceased, filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration and ex parte appointment as special administratix over the estate where the motion was granted. Preciosa Garcia, wife of deceased opposed, which was granted by CA and annulled the appointment of Fule. Preciosa then became special administratrix.

Fules own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was improper. However, venue is distinct from jurisdiction which is conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to be with CFIs independently from the place of residence of the deceased. This case defines what resides means with respect to Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court as actual residence which must be more than temporary as distinguished from legal residence or domicile which requires bodily presence and an intention to make it ones domicile.

On another issue, Court said that Preciosa is prima facie entitled to the appointment as special administratrix. The New Rules RULE 80 SECTION 1 broadened the basis for appointment of special administrator (temporarily) to take possession and charge of the estates of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and regular executors or administrators appointed.

The main distinction of the last two cases is that in Eusebio case, the Court defined what domicile means which is actual presence and must also be accompanied by an intent to stay there indefinitely and it made a point that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one owns health even if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home. However, in Fule case, SC defined what resides means with respect to Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court as actual residence which must be more than temporary as distinguished from legal residence or domicile which requires bodily presence and an intention to make it ones domicile.


In Rodelas vs Aranza, appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor the question posited in this case was whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proven by means of a photostatic copy. The Court ruled on the positive saying that a photostatic copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. The authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

As compared to the case of Gan vs Yap where it also involves a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased which was opposed by the petition of her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap and asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The main contention in this case was that whether or not a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of thetestator. The court ruled on the negative, it held that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may notbe proved by the bare testimony of witnesseswho have seen and/or read such will. The loss of theholographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof. Even if oral testimony were admissible toestablish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is sotainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct"proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.Both in the cases of Rodelas vs Aranza and in Gan vs Yap involves probate of a holographic will whether or not it should be admitted for probate. The rules provide that Probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least 1 identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least 3 identifying witnesses are required.

However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will as applied in the case of Gan vs Yap.

As differentiated in the case of Rodelas vs Aranza where a photostatic copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. The authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.


In the case of Nuguid vs Nuguid, the deceased died without any descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Her surviving relatives were her legitimate parents and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of her sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. In this case, the parents of the deceased filed their opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased they were illegally preterited as being compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line and that in consequence, the institution is void.While the Court ruled on the positive that the case is one of preterition of the parents and not of ineffective disinheritance since the deceased left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether.In another case of Cacho vs Udan, Silvina G. Udan, single died leaving a purported will naming her illegitimate son and one Wencesla Cacho as her sole heirs. Cacho filed a petition to probate said will which was opposed by his legitimate brothers on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required by law, that the testator was incapacitated to execute and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence.Having Francisco Udan as the illegitimate son of the late Silvina which fact is not denied by the oppositor brothers. He is so acknowledged to be in the testament hence, the death of Francisco two years after his mothers demise does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are the legitimate brothers ofhismother and forthatreason the legitimate relatives of themother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. The latters own opposition to the probate of the alleged will is perfectly compatible with the intention to exclude the proponent Cacho as testamentary coheir and to claim the entire inheritance as heir ab intestato.

Both the above cases are differentiated in the case of Sumilang vs Ramagosa, wherein Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa. Said document institutes Mariano as the sole heir of the testator. The petition was opposed questioning the due execution of the document claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa also claimed otherwise and that were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased.With respect to the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings of oppositors filed by the petitioner, it appears that oppositors have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore the oppositors are totally strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate. This being so, the motion to strike out opposition and all other pleadings pertinent thereto is hereby ordered stricken out of the record.

In cases of Nuguid vs Nuguid, Sumilang vs Ramagosa as well as Cacho vs Udan involve a question as to the intrinsic validity of the will, the Court said that in a petition for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity only. The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites orsolemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature (Nuguid vs. Nuguid)

Probate is one thing and the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.

Comparative Analysis

Eusebio vs. Eusebio vis--vis Fule vs CA

Rodelas vs Aranza vis--vis Gan vs Yap

Nuguid vs Nuguid vis--vis Cacho vs Udan vis--vis Sumilang vs Ramagosa

Rhobie S. CorboAtty. Brenda L. TangarorangSpecial Proceedings