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India’s position in the Climate Change negotiations
Prodipto Ghosh, Ph.D Distinguished Fellow
The Energy & Resources Institute May 2014
Key Issue: India’s Energy Challenge
2
Some 470 million Indians, c. 8% of global population, live without electricity!
Traditional biomass is the primary cooking fuel for over 700 million Indians
34.7% and 79.9% population below income level of $1 and $2 a day respectively
Lack of access to commercial energy leads to Illiteracy, Gender Inequality/Disempowerment, High IMR and MMR, Poor Health & and hence a low HDI (125 rank!)
India’s per capita commercial energy consumption is about 20% of the world average, 4% that of the US and 28% that of China
Sustained GDP growth of 8-9% a year will enable India over the next 25 years to lift the bottom 40% of her citizens to an acceptable level of economic & social well being – this will require provision of modern energy to them
Myths about India’s climate change situation
Myth 1:
4
“India has a very high level of energy intensity (inefficiency?) of its economy (and has done nothing about it)!”
India’s Decreasing Energy Intensity
5
Energy intensity of GDP (kgoe/$ 2000 PPP) based
on IEA data
0.15
0.17
0.19
0.21
0.23
0.25
0.27
0.29
0.311971
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
TP
ES
(kg
oe)/G
DP
($2
000
PP
P)
6
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
US
China
Russia
Japan
India
Germany
Canada
UK
RoK Ita
ly
S Africa
France
Iran
Australia
Mexico
Sau
di Arabia
Ukraine
Spa
in
Brazil
Indone
sia
CO2 2004/GDP in 2000$ at PPP % of US GDP in 2000$ at PPP per Capita % of US
The fossil fuel CO2 intensity of the Indian economy in
2004 was the same as Japan; better than Germany!
Data: “Growth and CO2 Emissions – How do different countries fare?” :
Roger Bacon and Soma Bhattacharya: World Bank, 2007:
Myth 2:
7
“India’s low per-capita GHG emissions reflect its low per capita incomes, but India is extremely inefficient when it comes to CO2 intensity of consumption!”
GHG emissions depend upon lifestyles!
8
• India’s low per-capita GHG emissions are only partly due to poverty. A significant part is due to inherently sustainable lifestyles that do not change significantly as people become better-off!
• Some international comparisons illustrate the point:
9 Source: TERI analysis (various data sources)
CO2 emission from food sector--from Field (production) to
Table (processed food)-excluding cooking
0.1 0.1
1.7 1.8 1.9 2.02.2
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
India China United
Kingdom
Germany Netherlands Australia United States
ton C
O2/m
kcal of
food e
nerg
y
Production related CO2 emission (tonne CO2/million kcal of food energy)
Processing related CO2 emissions (tonne CO2/million kcal of food energy)
Total CO2 emissions (tonne CO2/million kcal of food energy)
10
30
47.353
70
0
20
40
60
80
US Germany Japan India
48
10
23
0
5
10
15
20
25
USA UK Germany India
Average rate of recycling (%) (excl. re-use)
GHG emissions from waste (gm/’000$GDPppp)
Municipal solid waste
Source: TERI Analysis, based on National Communications of different countries
16
118
193
0
50
100
150
200
250
India EU (15 countries) USA
11
Estimated CO2 emissions from passenger transport
(gm/passenger-km)
Source: TERI Analysis, various data sources
Greendex Ranking
• Since 2008, the National Geographic has ranked consumers in major countries in terms of sustainability of consumption
• In all four editions so far, India has been ranked No. 1 in the world!
Myth 3:
13
“Indian policymakers are oblivious to the potentially catastrophic impacts of climate change on its people!”
Adaptation to Climate Change
14
• India is historically vulnerable to climate variability: floods, droughts, vector borne disease, cyclones, ocean storm surges, etc.
• For over 6 decades, India has had large, nationally funded programmes to address climate variability and disasters.
Expenditure
on
Adaptation
oriented
Programme
s as per
cent of total
Govt
Expenditure
on
Adaptation-
oriented
Programme
s as per
cent of
GDP2000-01 8.06 1.45
2003-04 8.39 1.79
2005-06 12.2 1.91
2008-09 11.82 2.56
2009-10 12.34 2.84
Table 12.15-Total Expenditure on
Adaptation-oriented Schemes
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2000-01 2003-04 2005-06 2008-09 2009-10
pe
r c
en
t
Figure 12.2 - Total expenditure on adaptation oriented schemes
Expenditure on Adaptationoriented Programmes as per cent
of total Govt Expenditure
Expenditure on Adaptation-oriented Programmes as per cent
of GDP
Expenditures on Schemes to Respond to Climate Variability by the CentraL Government 200-01 to 2009-10
Source: Department of Economic Affairs, Govt. of India
Myth 4:
India’s GHG future emissions growth is explosive!
Results of 5 modeling studies: What will India’s GHG emissions be in the future? What does it cost to mitigate GHG emissions?
18
18
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032
McKinsey
NCAER-CGE
IRADe-AA
TERI-MoEF
TERI-Poznan
Year
Per capita emissions, tons CO2e
Per capita GHG emissions projections for India from 5 studies in Illustrative Scenarios (2010-2030)
India’s Per capita GHG emissions till 2030
The projections range from 2.77 tons/capita CO2e (NCAER-CGE) to 5.0 tons/capita CO2 (TERI-Poznan). Except for the last all studies indicate that India’s per capita GHG emissions in 2030 will be below the 2005 global average of 4.22 tons!
19
19
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032
McKinsey
NCAER-CGE
IRADe-AA
TERI-MoEF
TERI-Poznan
Year
Total GHG emissions, billion tons CO2e
Aggregate GHG emissions projections for India from 5 studies in Illustrative Scenarios (2010-2030)
India’s Aggregate GHG emissions till 2030
The projections range from 4.0 billion tons CO2e (NCAER-CGE) to 7.3 billion tons (TERI-Poznan)
20
Declines in energy and CO2e intensities of the economy:
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
2003
-04
2005
-06
2007
-08
2009
-10
2011
-12
2013
-14
2015
-16
2017
-18
2019
-20
2021
-22
2023
-24
2025
-26
2027
-28
2029
-30
Yearkgoe/$
GD
P a
t P
PP
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
2003-04
2005-06
2007-08
2009-10
2011-12
2013-14
2015-16
2017-18
2019-20
2021-22
2023-24
2025-26
2027-28
2029-30
Year
kg C
O2/U
S$ of G
DP
at P
PP
CO2e intensity, kg/$GDP at PPP
Energy intensity, Kgoe/$GDP at PPP
Both CO2e and energy intensities of the economy decline steadily till 2030. Even at present they are among the lowest in the world!
Costs of GHG Mitigation
• Model results for:
NCAER-CGE: GHG mitigation and GDP losses from imposition of carbon taxes
TERI-MoEF: Energy system incremental investment and economic costs from CO2 constraints
22
Undiscounted Incremental Investment Cost for CO2
Reductions from Illustrative Scenario (2011-31)
Undiscounted Incremental Investment
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Progressive CO2 emissions reduction from illustrative scenario in year 2031(in %)
Bill
ion
US
$
10% reduction: ~ US$ 215 Billion
20% reduction: ~ US$ 493 Billion
30% reduction: ~ US$ 798 Billion
Loss of GDP in the Carbon Tax Scenario (2010-
11 to 2030-31)
-668-1194
-2173
-4013-5000
-4000
-3000
-2000
-1000
0
$10 Carbon Tax $20 Carbon Tax $40 Carbon Tax $80 Carbon Tax
Scenarios
Lo
ss o
f G
DP
REV +ve
Undiscounted Cummulative GDP Loss
US $ billion (constant 2005)
24
The Global Climate Change Regime:
The Story So far…
25
-0.5000 -0.4000 -0.3000 -0.2000 -0.1000 0.0000 0.1000 0.2000 0.3000 0.4000
United States of America
Germany
United Kingdom
Canada
France
Japan
Australia
Italy
Denmark
Sweden
Norway
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Uruguay
South Africa
Cuba
Peru
Uganda
Brazil
Nigeria
Bangladesh
Indonesia
China
India
Historical Responsibility for Climate Change of Selected Developing and Developed Countries, 1850-2005
26
Myth: The climate change negotiations are about “saving the only planet we have!”
Working paradigm of (all) negotiators: Climate Change negotiations are primarily economic negotiations, to determine future global economic patterns and strategic potentials!
27
Story so far: Global Climate Change Regime:
• UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992: “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities”, and developed countries to return to 1990 levels of emissions by 2000
• Kyoto Protocol, 1997: Legally binding treaty
requiring developed countries to reduce emissions by average of 5.2% from 1990 levels by 2008-2012. It also set up a global carbon market, comprising Emissions Trading” (ET), “Joint Implementation”(JI), and “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM). Of these only the CDM applies to developing countries.
28
Bali Action Plan, December 2007
• Launching of a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the UNFCCC through long-term cooperative action.
• The decision reaffirms the importance of provisions & principles of UNFCCC, including common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
• Two year negotiations process for an “agreed outcome.” Ongoing negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol for the 2nd Commitment period for developed countries maintained.
• At Copenhagen in 2007, a majority, but not all countries agreed on a political statement (“Copenhagen Accord”) which does not constitute a legal agreement
Cancun Decisions
• Focus on operational details of Copenhagen Accord (CA)
–Legitimization of CA; weakening of UNFCCC Principles, esp.Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR); political signal about continuance of carbon market
• Gives way to pledge and review for setting GHG mitigation targets as opposed to targets based on equity Principles.
• Uncertainty about future Kyoto Protocol targets.
29
Durban Package: CoP 17/CMP 7
• The “Durban package” comprises:
• (i) the second commitment period (2CP) for emissions reductions by Annex 1 Parties under the KP (targets to be decided in CoP 18/CMP 8);
• (ii) a decision on the work of the AWGLCA;
• (iii) a decision on the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and
• (iv) an agreement on the Durban Platform for enhanced action.
30
• The CoP agreed to set up a new “Ad-hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” (ADP)
• ADP to immediately commence negotiations on a new outcome, described as: “a protocol, another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC, applicable to all Parties”.
• Negotiations are to conclude by 2015, and it would come into force, after the requisite number of ratifications are obtained, from 2020
• Emerging workplan of Durban Platform looks a replica of AWG-LCA, with the addition of “transparency of actions and support” as a new agenda.
• There is nothing in the Decision that indicates in any way that Parties would accept commitments to mitigate GHGs, or take any other specified type of action.
31
Durban Platform
Outcomes in Doha: CoP 18-CMP 8:
• Finally, a ratifiable second commitment period under the KP; closure of AWG-KP
• Closure of the AWG-LCA, and transfer of unresolved issues to subsidiary bodies, from where (developing countries hope) they would re-enter the Durban Platform.
• Under the Durban Platform, mention of Principles of the UNFCCC, and indirect references to equity, CBDR, technology transfer.
• Emerging workplan of Durban Platform looks a replica ofBali Action Plan, with the addition of “transparency of actions and support” as a new agenda.
32
Warsaw Outcomes
• CoP 19 at Warsaw in 2013 resulted in the following significant Outcomes:
(i) A new international mechanism to help developing countries affected by loss and damage from climate change (e.g. Philippines typhoon Haiyan):
- To provide countries with technical support, facilitate actions and coordination of actions within the UNFCCC and other organizations, mobilize and secure funds, technology and capacity building wrt loss and damage
Warsaw…
(ii) Climate Finance issues: there is lack of progress on how to mobilize funds upto the $ 100 billion a year by 2020 to help developing countries take climate action. A Decision was adopted on continuing deliberations on long-term, including that developed countries would provide biennial submissions on their approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020.
(iii) Durban Platform negotiations: Rich countries were determined to break the firewall in mitigation obligations of developed and developing countries, while developing countries wished to maintain the firewall between “ commitments” of developed countries and “enhanced actions” of developing countries. The outcome called for countries to “initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions…
(iv) Framework for REDD+: Described in greater detail below:
Some Key issues in the Negotiations:
Reduced deforestation and degradation, afforestation, reforestation, and sustainable
forest management (REDD+)
36
Current Global Regions of Deforestation
Source: Millenium Ecosystem Assessment
37
What is REDD+?
• The basic idea behind Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) is that developing
countries that are willing and able to reduce emissions from
deforestation should be financially compensated
• for doing so.
• Previous approaches to curb global deforestation have so far
been unsuccessful, however, and REDD may provide a new
framework to allow deforesting countries to break this
historical trend.
• While different countries have varying positions on REDD
(and REDD+), there is no clear north-south divide, as on other
Building Blocks of the BAP.
38
From REDD to REDD+
• The “+” in REDD+ has drawn increasing
attention towards the activities after the
semicolon, (in the Bali Action Plan) related to the
conservation and enhancement of carbon
stocks.
• A future REDD + mechanism has the potential to
deliver much more than GHG mitigation. REDD+
could simultaneously address climate change
and rural poverty, while conserving biodiversity
and sustaining vital ecosystem services.
39
REDD+: Economic Considerations:
40
• Changes in atmospheric concentrations of GHG attributable to forest sector arise from:
Changes in flux of GHG emissions from reduced deforestation
Changes in flux of GHG emissions from carbon sequestration (A&R)
In addition, opportunity costs are incurred in sustainable forest management which prevent carbon emissions
REDD+: Economic Considerations…
41
• Changes in flux (only negative changes for deforestation, and total for A&R) may be monitored and certified.
• Trading in the global carbon market is, in principle, feasible for such certificates.
• In respect of SFM, since carbon stocks are maintained, but no change in flux occurs, a trading mechanism is not feasible.
• Opportunity costs in respect of SFM, accordingly, need to be directly compensated from the Financial Mechanism under the Convention.
Building Blocks of REDD+ Proposals
Source: The Little REDD+ Book 42
Coverage of REDD+ proposals
Source: The Little REDD+ Book
43
REDD+ Proposals: Reference Level
Source: The Little REDD+ Book
44
REDD+ Proposals: Spatial Scales
Source: The Little REDD+ Book
45
Copenhagen Accord provisions on REDD+
• “We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries.”
46
“Warsaw Framework for REDD+ Action”:
• REDD+ negotiations have been held in each CoP since Copenhagen. Finally, at Warsaw in 2013, 7 Decisions on REDD+ were adopted comprising the “Warsaw Framework for REDD+ Action”
• 5 Decisions under SBSTA cover “technical guidance” for REDD+ implementation, i.e. forest monitoring system, MRV, technical assessment of reference levels, drivers of deforestation, and frequency of reporting for safeguards information systems.
• REDD+ results based finance: the Decision relates to (i) link between progression of developing countries between different phases of REDD+ and the provision of adequate and predictable support, (ii) focus on safeguards reporting, (iii) GCF to play a central role in REDD+ financing, (iv) creation of an information hub to collect and disseminate information on results-based actions and corresponding payments, (v) the importance of non-carbon benefits, which are crucial to viability and sustainability of REDD+ actions.
REDD+ Finance…
• It has been estimated that $ 20-35 billion a year are required for a REDD+ global programme.
• At Warsaw Germany, Norway, UK, US together pledged $ 290 million
• Separately, Norway pledged $ 100 million for developing countries still at the earliest phase of REDD+ development.
• Clearly, we have a long way to go before REDD+ funds are provided that would match the actual needs od developing countries.
Financial Mechanism
“Aid Paradigm” versus “Responsibility Paradigm”
• “Aid Paradigm”: In the traditional ODA or MDBs model, “donors” accept no responsibility for causing the underlying condition (e.g. low levels of development, poverty, climate change) in the “recipient” that is sought to be alleviated by the “aid”. The claim is that the assistance is provided solely on considerations of “solidarity” of “donor” with the “recipient”.
• This enables “donors” to determine quantum, modalities, extent of concessionality of funding, priorities, besides specific activities, and proponents that may be funded, and through which agencies.
• Governance structure of funding agencies (bilaterals, MDBs) are heavily weighted in favour of “donors”.
“Responsibility Paradigm”
• The greater share of “responsibility” for climate change of developed countries is clearly emphasized in the UNFCCC (Preamble, Art 3. Principles).
• According to this paradigm, (embedded in Art. 11 of the UNFCCC which deals with the Financial Mechanism), causal responsibility determines responsibility to address climate change. This has the following implications:
(i) Quantum of contributions must be explicitly based on responsibility and capability, and not discretionary.
(ii) Activities, priorities, modalities, extent of concessionality of funding, and who may be funded, is no longer the prerogative of the “donors”, but should be collectively agreed between source and destination countries.
“Responsibility Paradigm…”
(iii) Funding institutions through which the resources are provided must have agreed “balance” between source and destination countries in their decision making structures, and procedures should be transparent and fair.
Financial Mechanism
• Art 11 of UNFCCC defines a Financial Mechanism “for the provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis, including for the transfer of technology”. The mechanism is to function under the guidance of and be accountable to the Conference of Parties, which shall decide on its policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to the Convention. However, its operation is to be entrusted to one or more existing international entities
53
Financial Mechanism…
• Further, the Financial Mechanism is required to have “an equitable and balanced representation of all Parties within a transparent system of governance” (Art 11.2)
• However, “the developed country Parties may also provide, and developing country Parties avail themselves of, financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels” (Art 11.5)
54
“Green Climate Fund”
• A “Green Climate Fund” (GCF) was agreed a Durban (2011), and its Governing Instrument adopted at Doha (2012)
• The GCF Governing instrument marks an important departure from the “aid paradigm”, and (as yet) except for requirement of assessed financial contributions embodies several of the essential features of the “responsibility paradigm”!
Possible roles of the GCF
• Ensuring (developing) country ownership: GCF should operate strictly within national sustainable development and climate change strategies.
• Scaling up finance for climate change from public and private sectors: GCF resources should catalyze large-scale resources from other sources.
• Ensuring complementarity with diversified sources of climate finance: Co-financing activities with other components of the Financial Mechanism (FM) under the UNFCCC, and national/regional institutions.
• Applying a diversity of financial instruments: To address differentiated capabilities of DCs, and range of investment situations, different types of financial instruments should be used, whether by the GCF itself, or by collaborating institutions.
• Ensuring rapid progress towards direct access by DCs of GCF resources: GCF should promote National Implementing Agencies and National Financing Entities through capacity building and independent, transparent accreditation.
Financial Inputs
• Financial Inputs: • “Financial Inputs” may include funding for grants, as well as equity
contributions if loans are (also) to be given. Equity contributions are investments!
• GCF Governing Instrument: “The GCF will receive financial inputs from developed countries, as well as from a variety of sources, private and public, and alternative sources”.
• Scale of inputs from fiscal / public sources in different developed countries is an unresolved issue!
• “Variety of sources”: Code word for contributions by developing countries? Contributions for grants by developing countries is not contemplated in the UNFCC.
• Private sector: May contribute only small amounts as grants, esp. when they have no direct say in GCF governance.
57
Financial inputs…
• “Alternative sources”: May include marine and aviation levies, Tobin tax on international financial transactions, etc. Possible scale of these sources may be 10s of $ bn a year.
• How to ensure that “alternative sources” do not involve mandatory funding by developing countries?
e.g. airline ticket surcharges on developed country nationals only; surcharges on marine cargo deliveries to consignees in developed countries only; no intra- or into developing country financial flows to be subject to Tobin tax, etc.
58
Financial Inputs…
• Whether “tying” of inputs is possible? (i.e. money to be spent only on specific activities of interest to, or on purchases from, source countries).
• In MDBs at present, tying is not explicit, but implicit, through adoption of procurement guidelines that are apparently weighted in favour of suppliers from “donors”.
• Bilateral development finance is still frequently tied to country of “donor”, but not invariably.
Adaptation to Climate Change
Adaptation: Position of Developed countries
• In general, developed countries have focused on “climate resilient development” pathways by developing countries.
• This would largely internalize adaptation measures and costs, including national budgets of developing countries, opportunity costs of regulatory measures (e.g. coastal setbacks, building codes) ,and refocusing international development assistance.
• Further international adaptation assistance for developing countries would be targeted at SIDS, LDCs and Africa.
61
Adaptation: Position of developing countries
• Developing countries have generally characterized
the proposals to internalize adaptation costs by
them as diversion of resources away from their
overriding priority of social and economic
development, and have called for greater
international resources for adaptation in all
developing countries, with, however, priority to
SIDS, LDCs and Africa.
• They have also pointed to the imperative of
vigorous action on mitigation by developed
countries to reduce adverse impacts of climate
change.
62
Adaptation…
• OPEC and esp. several developing countries dependent upon agricultural exports (e.g. Africa – concern with “food miles” proposals) or long transport leads to markets (e.g. Pacific Islands) have called for attention to “response measures”, i.e. adverse impacts on their economies owing to measures taken elsewhere in respect of GHG mitigation.
• SIDS have drawn attention to the need for international cooperation in respect of people displaced across international borders due to climate change impacts (e.g. sea-level rise and increased cyclones), as well as planned migration.
63
Technology Transfer
Technology Transfer:
• Developed countries: Urge the removal of barriers to technology transfer in
developing countries, chiefly tariff barriers. They also seek measures in developing countries for
enhanced deployment, such as technology standards, renewable energy portfolios, feed-in tariffs, as well as international harmonization of energy efficiency standards.
They also urge “full respect for IPRs”, meaning no compulsory licensing of IPRs to address climate change, but agree that climate change finance may pay (part of) the licensing costs.
65
Technology transfer…
• Developing countries, on the other hand: Argue that patent regimes represent a social contract
whereby the inventor is granted a (spatially and temporally) limited monopoly over the innovation (and a limited breadth of its derivatives) in return for specified societal benefits, conventionally disclosure of the scientific basis of the invention, to enable further technology innovation by others.
Accordingly, they urge a new social contract whereby the definition of societal benefits is enlarged to include addressing climate change, and corresponding limitation of monopoly rights of the innovator.
66
Technology transfer…
In particular, developing countries call for invocation of compulsory licensing of IPRs (which already exists in the WIPO/TRIPS) in respect of climate change actions.
However, compulsory licensing does not mean “free” access to IPRs, but access under regulated (not monopoly) royalties.
Developing countries urge compulsory licensing as a back-stop to payments for licensing by the financial mechanism for climate change.
They also point out that lifting tariffs is in the jurisdiction of the WTO, not the UNFCCC, and that regulatory/tariff measures for enhanced deployment would internalize the incremental costs of the technologies to developing countries.
67
Unilateral Measures
Unilateral measures
• Unilateral measures refer to domestic legislative proposals in the US, EU, etc. enabling them to unilaterally levy border tariffs over those agreed under the WTO on imports from developing countries which do not have GHG mitigation regulations equivalent to that of the importing country
• This is irrespective of whether the exporter is compliant wrt its agreed international commitments
• Developing countries caution that this could lead to trade wars, and given the vast range of goods that may be impacted, may lead to unraveling of the global trading regime
• The one instance where this has been attempted (by the EU in respect of international civil aviation) has met with a strong reaction from both developing and other developed countries, and the EU has put this measure on hold
What does the future hold?
Future of negotiations:
• The positions of different groups of countries as the ADP negotiations go forward are as follows:
• “Principles of the UNFCCC”: Developed countries speak of “reinterpretation” of the Principles to fit the post-2020 world. Developing countries argue strongly against any such reinterpretation, and emphasized that CBDR and equity remain fundamental.
• Nature of new agreement: Developed countries insist that the 2015 agreement must have uniform legal application to all, but not uniformity of commitments. Developing countries insist that universality of application does not mean uniformity of application (code word for differences between developed and developing countries on legal enforceability of targets).
India: Applicability to all refers to the question of legal form and speaks to binding-ness.
US: Legal binding-ness must be the same for all.
71
Future…
• Basis of commitments: Developed countries advocate “bottom-up” commitments based on “capability” and “national circumstances”. Developing countries generally speak of “top down” commitments based on historical responsibility, and equity.
• National circumstances and changes: Developed countries assert that the key issue is “twenty-first century” changes which bear on capabilities and socio-economic circumstances. Developing countries argue that national circumstances are not a justification for inaction, and that equity, CBDR and historical responsibility must remain the basis for mitigation responsibilities.
Singapore has divided the issue of national circumstances into those that change, such as socio-economic conditions, and those that are immutable, such as geography, and those that may change over very long periods, such as economic dependence on agriculture or fossil fuels.
72
Future…
• Equity and CBDR: No one frontally attacks equity and CBDR.
Developed countries argue that “capability” and national circumstances are the key, and that there can be no formulaic approach, i.e. mitigation pledges should be “bottom-up”.
US argues that one aspect of equity is to make commitments in a collective effort that is also adequate where Parties are accountable to each other. It states that the agreement must incentivize broad participation, and that countries do not feel that they are forced to do something, and that their level of effort is similar to others similarly placed (essentially, procedural as opposed to substantive equity, as for example in equal per-capita).
73
Future…
• US will push for a post-2020 agreement modeled on the WTO, i.e. eliminating distinctions between developed and developing countries in legal applicability, mitigation commitments based on pledge and review, strong accountability mechanisms applicable equally to all, no public funding for climate action in developing countries, and no compulsory licensing of IPRs.
• Developing countries will push for equity and CBDR based commitments, no international legal enforceability of mitigation targets for developing countries unless provision of finance and technology by developed countries is also similarly legally binding, and clear articulation that developing countries may compulsory license IPRs in the climate change context.
74
