Intelligence Risk Assessment 2016 · 2018-04-11 · Intelligence Risk Assessment 5 The Intelligence Risk Assessment from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service brings together a

1Intelligence Risk Assessment

Intelligence Risk Assessment 2016 An assessment of developments abroad impacting on Danish security

2 Intelligence Risk Assessment


Danish Defence Intelligence Service

Intelligence Risk Assessment

2016



The Intelligence Risk Assessment from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service brings

together a picture of the most important threats that may afect Danish naional security over a ten-year perspecive.

The Risk Assessment relects the security policy agenda and its main emphasis is again on Russia’s poliical and military aciviies, the terrorist threat from militant Islamist groups and on the cyber threat. Other high-priority areas include the Middle East, a region which will coninue to be afected by unrest and will coninue to generate loods of refugees and migrants, as well as Russia’s and China’s roles in the Arcic.

The main assessment is that Russia is engaged in military build-up and modernizaion in western Russia and that the Balic Sea region has become a key area of fricion between Russia and NATO. The terrorist threat coninues to be among the most important threats against Danish naional security. The cyber threat against Denmark is severe and Danish authoriies and companies are facing a persistent threat involving regular cyber espionage atempts. ISIL poses the greatest terrorist threat against the West, and at the same ime, lone-wolf terrorist atacks in the West will become a more common phenomenon than in the past.

The analyses contained in this Risk Assessment are based on intelligence and the data have been processed accordingly. The assessment, however, is unclassiied and writen for the public, which is signiicant in regard to the wording and the extent of the details.

Every year, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service publishes this compiled and unclassiied Risk Assessment but also produces coninuous, mainly classiied assessments and analyses which, among others, contribute to Denmark’s ability to conduct its foreign, security and defence policies as a sovereign state.

Informaion cut-of date is 1 December 2016.

Introduction

Lars FindsenDirector of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service



Contents

Russia 11

The Middle East

and North Africa 29

Terrorism 19

The Arctic 39 Sub-Saharan Africa 35

The Cyber Threat 25

Proliferation of Weapons

of Mass Destruction 47

Afghanistan 43

China 45



Russia has started a build-up and modernizaion of its armed forces in western Russia, including the Balic region. The region has become an area of fricion between Russia and NATO. Russia will coninuously try to weaken the credibility of NATO’s collecive defence commitments to the three Balic countries. Russia’s military build-up and modernizaion will strengthen the ability of its armed forces to engage in high-intensive combat against the West, but Russia will not risk a direct military confrontaion with NATO. However, Russia’s distrust of NATO and willingness to take risks increase the chance for miscalculaions and strategic blunders. Overall, this contributes to greater uncertainty, not least in the Balic Sea region, and in the coming years, Russia will remain a signiicant security policy challenge to the West, including Denmark.

The terrorist threat against Denmark and other Western countries is serious and constantly changing. The instability in parts of the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq, in parts of Africa, and in southern Asia will coninue to nourish and support terrorist groups such as ISIL and al-Qaida in the coming years. Acts of terrorism in the West and against Western interests worldwide will coninue to be predominantly carried out by individuals and groups in contact with or inspired by ISIL and al-Qaida. At the same ime, lone actors in the West who sympathize with these groups will, to a greater extent than before, carry out acts of terrorism without prior training or direct control from terrorist groups.

The cyber threat against Denmark, paricularly from cyber espionage, but also from cyber crime, is very high. The cyber threat has both geopoliical and signiicant economic consequences for Denmark. Add to this a potenial threat from foreign states using cyber atacks as a means to afect public opinion in other countries. Several countries are building up capabiliies which can be used to carry out destrucive cyber atacks against other countries. While the present threat of destrucive cyber atacks against Denmark is low, the threat has the potenial to increase in connecion with a deepening poliical or military conlict in which Denmark is involved.

In the long term, the Middle East will be characterized by instability and conlicts. Oppressive regimes cannot solve the underlying poliical and economic problems, and the region will coninuously generate lows of refugees and migrants. In one to two years, ISIL will no longer control a large, unbroken belt of territory in Syria and Iraq. But

Sunni extremism will sill be present in the region, and the weakening of ISIL may act as a precursor for increased inluence from other local insurgent groups and internally oriented terrorist groups, including al-Qaida. Sunni extremism in various forms and violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims will thus coninue to contribute to destabilizaion in large parts of the region.

For many years ahead, Syria will be unstable and the object of regional rivalry and internaional intervenion. It is likely that US and Russian mediaion will lead to a setlement, which may form the framework for a parial soluion to the conlict. Bashar al-Assad will likely remain as president and the insurgency will be contained. However, some radical Islamist groups will coninue the armed struggle. Iraq’s marginalized Sunni Muslims will sill be potenial recruits for ISIL or other terrorist groups. Iran’s inluence in the region is growing, and Iran will maintain its close military and poliical relaions to Syria, Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The conlicts between the many dispuing paries in Libya will coninue. The UN-endorsed Government of Naional Accord will remain weak and will have diiculty limiing the low of refugees and migrants from Africa to Europe.

The security situaion in northern and central Mali will become further impaired in the coming years. Implementaion of the peace agreement has de facto come to a halt, ethnic tensions are intensifying, and militant Islamists enjoy favourable condiions for operaing across the borders. It is less likely that the internaional forces or the Malian security forces can reverse the negaive development in the country.

Parts of West Africa are threatened by piracy, and the general security situaion in West Africa’s most piracy-infested waters will not be markedly improved in the next few years. By contrast, the pirates in Somalia have ceased their atacks against civilian shipping of the Horn of Africa.

Russia expects a recommendaion in 2017 from the UN Commission on the Limits of the Coninental Shelf on the country’s territorial claims in the Arcic. Whatever the outcome, the Danish Commonwealth will face a challenge in insising that the border demarcaion issue be resolved in compliance with internaional law. It is likely that Russia will coninue to pursue a cooperaive track, as long as doing so will safeguard the majority of its interests in the region.

Main Conclusions


However, Russia’s course of cooperaion is increasingly challenged by a circle of inluenial Russian poliicians with security and defence policy experise pushing for a stronger and more asserive Arcic policy. In recent years, China has increased its interest and its involvement in the Arcic and Greenland. China’s main interest in the Arcic is the prospect of new sea routes and access to raw materials. China’s Arcic involvement is also driven by its ambiion to strengthen its inluence on Arcic policies, which China seeks to achieve through strengthened bilateral ies to the Arcic naions, including Denmark and Greenland.

The Afghan Naional Defense and Security Forces are under pressure and they will coninue to rely heavily on NATO support in the coming years. Problems with leadership, retenion of personnel and corrupion make it diicult for The Afghan Naional Defense and Security Forces to turn the situaion around. Meanwhile, the Taliban is gaining ground, and its conidence in ulimate victory and fear of disunity will dissuade the Taliban leadership from siing down at the negoiaing table. Also contribuing to the diiculies are the rits among the naional unity government and its ensuing inability to realize major reforms. The prospect of

unemployment and coninuing conlict efecively pushes migraion to Europe high on the wish list of many young Afghans.

China’s growing inluence on developments in the Asia-Paciic challenges its relaions with the United States and a number of neighbouring countries, paricularly in relaion to the South China Sea issue. China’s eforts to increase regional cooperaion and obtain greater inluence in Central Asia also heighten the potenial for tensions with Russia.

Iran coninues to develop its ballisic missile capability, though the agreement on the country’s nuclear

programme has reduced its nuclear capability. It is likely that Iran will honour the nuclear agreement in the short

term. North Korea coninues to challenge internaional treaies by systemaically expanding its capacity to produce nuclear weapons and means of delivery. North Korea has contributed to the proliferaion of sensiive technology to other countries. Knowledge and technology transfer will generally consitute a signiicant future threat to the internaional non-proliferaion regimes.


RussiaRussia has started a build-up and modernizaion of its armed forces in western Russia, including the Balic region. The region has become an area of fricion between Russia and NATO. Russia will coninuously try to weaken the credibility of NATO’s collecive defence commitments to the three Balic countries. Russia’s military build-up and modernizaion will strengthen the ability of its armed forces to engage in high-intensive combat against the West, but Russia will not risk a direct military confrontaion with NATO. However, Russia’s distrust of NATO and willingness to take risks increase the chance for miscalculaions and strategic blunders. Overall, this contributes to greater uncertainty, not least in the Balic Sea region, and in the coming years, Russia will remain a signiicant security policy challenge to the West, including Denmark.

Over the past few years, Russia has pursued an increasingly asserive and challenging policy towards the West in general and NATO in paricular. In 2016, Russia has started implemening planned military iniiaives in response to the deteriorated relaions with the West. The most signiicant is Russia’s build-up of its ground forces in western Russia. In addiion, Russia has taken iniiaives to modernize its military posture in the Balic Sea region, which has become an area of fricion between Russia and NATO.

It is Russia’s ambiion to be recognized as a great power with inluence on key internaional issues and to be a great power capable of challenging the United States. Russia will atempt to compensate for its inferior economic and military power by cooperaing with China and regional powers, for example Iran, which also challenge the United States and the West. Russia will also demonstrate its great power role by projecing military force over long ranges as seen by Russia’s military intervenion in Syria.

At the same ime, Russia wants to strengthen its regional inluence and security, in paricular on Russia’s western borders with NATO, from the Balic Sea to the Black Sea. Russia wants the United States and the major European countries to recognize Russia’s dominance over the post-Soviet space, which Russia regards as its sphere of interest and security zone. Russia feels enitled to dominate the countries’ foreign and security policies, in paricular those of non-NATO member states such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. It is Russia’s percepion that NATO and the EU are penetraing Russia’s sphere of interest with the intent to undermine Russia’s security. Despite the Balic states’ NATO membership, Russia to a certain extent sill regards the Balic countries as its historic sphere of inluence. However, Russia is aware that the Balic countries’ full integraion in the EU and NATO limits Russia’s ability to regain inluence over the three countries’ foreign and security policy.

The tensions in the Balic Sea region between Russia and the West are partly caused by the fact that Russia’s

percepion of internaional poliics diverges considerably from the West’s. Russia considers internaional poliics as a zero sum game between the great powers in which they either win or lose inluence at the expense of each other. However, Russia will engage in pragmaic cooperaion with other powers on issues where Russia inds that its interests might converge with those of other powers.

Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, the 2013 iniiaive to remove Syria’s chemical weapons, the annexaion of Crimea and destabilizaion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, and the intervenion in Syria in 2015 demonstrate that Russia’s leadership is capable of taking bold decisions and is willing to use also military means to achieve its strategic

objecives. In addiion, Russia’s resumpion of poliical dialogue with Turkey in the summer of 2016 demonstrates the ability of Russia’s leadership to change course quickly when it judges it strategically advantageous. Finally, the Russian decision-making process is very short, and this enables Russia’s leadership to take rapid and bold poliical iniiaives towards the West.

Russia seeks to exploit and deepen divides in the WestIt is likely that Russia will try to increase its leverage

in internaional poliics by exploiing rits in European cooperaion in order to weaken the common European policy towards Russia, for example on the issue of the EU’s sancions against Russia and the EU’s energy policy.

Russia is very aware of the EU’s vulnerabiliies and dividing lines, and Russia is acively trying to deepen divisions in the EU countries, between the EU countries and in the transatlanic relaions.

In recent years, Russia’s propaganda campaign has shited focus from primarily atempts to improve Russia’s image in the West to more acively atemping to inluence the poliical situaion in the EU countries and the United States and also the relaions between Western countries.


Russia uses a wide range of instruments, including informaion campaigns through Russian state-controlled media targeing Western audiences; disseminaion of parially false and biased informaion through Russian think tanks, research insitutes, oicial news outlets, bloggers, and commentators who pretend to be independent. In addiion, Russia likely also uses hacking and selecive publicaion of informaion aimed at inluencing public opinion. A known example of hacking and leak of selected informaion is the US Democraic Party e-mail leak in connecion with the 2016 US presidenial elecion campaign, which the US authoriies assess was orchestrated by Russia.

Russia atempts to sway the strategic balance in the Balic Sea regionRussia is increasingly trying to sway the strategic situaion in the Balic Sea region in its favour. Russia is using poliical statements, including rhetoric military threats against the Balic Sea countries, and military aciviies as strategic messaging in order to underline that the Balic Sea region and the Balic countries are part of Russia’s sphere of interest where other countries must respect Russia’s

security interests. Russia will also seek for opportuniies to intensify a poliical, economic and military pressure on the Balic countries to weaken their ies to NATO and the EU.

It is Russia’s strategic intenion to deter NATO from increasing the Alliance’s military presence in the Balic countries and Poland in order to undermine, to the widest possible extent, NATO’s ability to ensure the collecive defence of the Balic countries. Finally, it is also Russia’s intenion to deter Sweden and Finland from applying for NATO membership.

Russia is improving its military posture in the region with

a wide range of military iniiaives, including military modernizaion, military build-up and modernizaion of command structures. Russian forces are locally superior, and the forces in western Russia have the capacity to launch ofensive operaions with regular combat forces against the three Balic countries within a week.

However, Russia is aware that its policy opions against the Balic states are much more narrow than its policy opions against non-NATO and non-EU countries in the post-Soviet space. Thus, Russia’s leadership will especially not take poliical and military iniiaives that it assesses hold the risk of a direct military confrontaion with NATO. Consequently,

it is highly unlikely that Russia will launch a direct military atack on the three Balic countries.

The Balic Sea region – an area of fricion between Russia and NATOThe Balic Sea region, paricularly the Balic countries, has become an area of fricion between Russia and NATO. Apart from the Norwegian-Russian border in the Arcic, the Balic Sea region is the only place in Europe where NATO member states have borders with Russia. Since 2014, Russia, NATO and non-NATO Western countries have increased their military aciviies in the region.

Russia’s policy in the Balic Sea region will to a certain extent depend on the general relaions between Russia and the West, primarily NATO and the United States.

The Balic countries are in an vulnerable strategic posiion

Relaions between Russia and the Balic countries are tense, and the countries have limited poliical contact. Beyond Russian dissaisfacion with the Balic countries’ NATO membership, relaions are fraught with signiicant poliical disagreements, especially on Russia’s self-assumed role as protector of the rights of Russian minoriies, the conlicing interpretaions of the countries’ shared past under the Soviet Union, and the Balic countries’ integraion into the EU’s energy strategy.

Russia has oicially declared itself protector of the rights of all Russian minoriies residing outside of Russia proper, including Russian minoriies in the Balic countries. Estonia and Latvia in paricular have large ethnic Russian minoriies. Russia claims that the Russian minoriies are systemaically oppressed.

Russia is not atracive to the majority of Russian-speaking minoriies in the Balic countries. However, Russian mass media have a strong posiion among the minoriies and thus the means to inluence their poliical opinion. This gives Russia a potenial to exploit elements in the Russian-speaking minoriies as poliical instruments, also in a hybrid warfare scenario.


However, the level of tension in the Balic Sea region will also be determined by Russia’s interest in escalaing tensions.

Russia is deeply anxious of NATO’s aciviies in the Balic Sea, in paricular the permanent deployment of forces and infrastructure, and NATO’s recent decision to deploy four mulilateral combat batalions, the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), on a rotaional basis in each of the three Balic countries and in Poland.

For years, Russia’s leadership has expressed its strong disapproval of NATO’s enlargement. Russia perceives increased NATO presence in the Balic Sea region as ofensive and provocaive acts to which Russia is compelled to take military countermeasures.

Russia does not accept that NATO’s deployment of forces in the Balic countries and Poland is a response to Russia’s policy, especially in Ukraine. Instead, Russia sees hidden moives behind NATO’s military iniiaives. Russia not only sees these iniiaives as a breach of agreement between NATO and Russia but also as a military containment of Russia and thus as potenial NATO ofensive military preparaions against Russia. Also, Russia sees NATO’s missile defence installaion in north-western Poland from 2018 as a part of NATO’s military preparaions against Russia in the Balic Sea region. In Russia’s opinion, the missile defence system is solely directed at Russia’s nuclear deterrence capacity.

The Russian leadership’s deep-rooted distrust of the United States and NATO, its willingness to take bold decisions, the quick decision-making process and the leadership’s readiness to use military means to achieve strategic objecives all increase the risk of miscalculaions and strategic blunders. This contributes to greater uncertainty, also in the Balic Sea region.

Russia strengthens its military posture in the Balic Sea regionThe Balic countries make great eforts to develop modern defence forces but have only few military forces. To repel a determined Russian military incursion into their territory the Balic countries depend on the presence of NATO forces as well as addiional reinforcements.

Russia will strengthen its capacity to threaten NATO’s ability to deploy reinforcements by the long and vulnerable communicaion lines to the Balic countries. Russia already has modern and mobile air defence systems that can threaten NATO’s ability to reinforce the Balic countries by air in imes of crisis.

Within a year, it is likely that Russia will deploy new mobile Iskander M surface-to-surface missiles permanently to the Kaliningrad region. In October 2016, amidst great media atenion, Russia deployed a batalion of Iskander missiles to the Kaliningrad region from the Russian mainland in connecion with a major military exercise. This deployment likely heralds the future permanent deployment of Iskander missiles to the Kaliningrad region.

The deployment of Iskander M missiles has been long in coming and is part of a modernizaion of older and shorter-range surface-to-surface missiles in the region. However,

NATO will ensure collecive defence

NATO gives great importance to ensuring the reliability of the Alliance’s collecive defence of the Balic countries and Poland, cf. Aricle 5 of NATO’s founding treaty. This is ensured through frequent exercises involving temporarily deployed forces from NATO member countries.

At the 2014 Wales summit, NATO adopted a packet of reassurance iniiaives, the Readiness Acion Plan, aimed at improving the Alliance’s capability to quickly react militarily to a crisis situaion in the Balic Sea region. In 2016, these measures were expanded to also include deployment of four mulinaional combat batalions, known as enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), in each of the three Balic countries and in Poland as of 2017. In addiion, logisics and infrastructure will be improved to support the deployed forces and potenial rapid deployment reinforcements from NATO’s response forces.

In addiion, NATO is conducing air policing of the Balic countries’ airspace, Balic Air Policing, and NATO and partner countries carry out rouine reconnaissance lights in internaional airspace over the Balic Sea to collect militarily relevant informaion.


Russia will present the permanent deployment of Iskander missiles as a strategic countermove to NATO’s deployment of the four mulinaional combat batalions in each of the three Balic countries and in Poland and to NATO’s coming missile defence installaion in Poland.

With ranges of at least 500 km, the Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region will be able to reach NATO installaions, infrastructure and staging areas in Lithuania, Latvia, the greater part of Poland, north-west Germany and eastern Denmark, as well as the south-eastern part of Sweden.

Russia has already deployed new mobile, long-range Basion ani-ship missile systems in the Kaliningrad region, which could seriously threaten Western shipping traic in large parts of the Balic Sea in the event of an escalaing crisis. In Syria, Russia has demonstrated that Basion ani-ship missiles can now also be used against ground targets and thus strike the same targets as the Iskander missiles.

Russia has already made large-scale reshules on the command posts in the Kaliningrad region, and the ground forces in the Kaliningrad region will also be placed under a new command. Within the next year, Russia will likely take new iniiaives to strengthen its military posture in the Kaliningrad region.

Sweden and Finland draw closer to NATOAs a consequence of Russia’s policy, Sweden and Finland increase their cooperaion with NATO. In September 2014, the two countries, which have been NATO partners for many years, signed a “host naion support” agreement with NATO, allowing NATO forces to use Swedish and Finnish territory in imes of crises and conlict. Sweden and Finland also increasingly paricipate in NATO meeings and in exercises with NATO member states.

Russia has threatened Sweden and Finland with military countermeasures if they apply for NATO membership. Russia is concerned about Sweden’s and Finland’s closer cooperaion with NATO, and Russia would regard Swedish or Finnish applicaion for NATO membership as a serious change in the security situaion in the Balic Sea region.

Occasional relaively high levels of Russian military acivity Since 2014, a new patern of Russian military acivity in the Balic Sea and in the western part of Russia has emerged, and the level of acivity may at imes be relaively high. Russia’s military aciviies are partly in response to Western military aciviies in the region, but Russia is also conducing military exercises independently of Western military exercises.

The Balic Sea region – ranges of Iskander missiles deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast marked by red circle

RUSSIA

RUSSIA

SWEDEN

NORWAY

BELARUS

POLAND

FINLAND

LATVIA

GERMANY

LITHUANIA

ESTONIA

DENMARK

NETHERLANDSUKRAINE

Kaliningrad


Hybrid warfare

Hybrid warfare is a strategy that combines the concurrent or stage-by-stage deployment of regular and irregular means. They are deployed in a coordinated efort with the aim of consituing a single cohesive operaion.

Regular means include military acivity of uniformed military forces. Irregular means cover a wide array of components such as cyber atacks, inluence by or use of irregular forces composed by separaists or guerrilla movements, maybe even proxy forces, propaganda, misinformaion and denial, inluence of minoriies, clandesine deployment of special forces and iniltraion of another naion’s territory, making it diicult to determine the true ailiaion of these soldiers.

Apart from cyber atacks, the use of irregular means is far older than the term hybrid warfare.

Russia’s military aciviies include lights with tacical ighters close to NATO member states’ territory, including air policing from the Kaliningrad region against Western collecion aircrat – aircrat that collect militarily relevant informaion. Russia also conducts rouine strategic bomber patrol lights and reconnaissance lights in internaional airspace over the Balic Sea.

In 2016, the level of Russian air acivity with tacical aircrat from the Kaliningrad region was similar to that of 2015, though there was a drop in the number of lights over the Balic Sea. Most of the Russian tacical lights sill take place over the Kaliningrad region, but Russia regularly conducts air policing operaions against Western air acivity in the Balic Sea close to Kaliningrad region.

In 2016, the acivity involving strategic bombers in the Balic Sea was much lower than in recent years. Similarly, the number of intelligence collecion lights in the Balic Sea has been somewhat lower. The reduced level of acivity is in all likelihood mainly due to Russia’s involvement in Syria.

In April 2016, Russian ighter-bombers lew very low and close to a US destroyer of the cost of the Kaliningrad region in the eastern part of the Balic Sea. This was likely an atempt to demonstrate that Russia will not tolerate US naval operaions close to the Kaliningrad region even if these operaions take place in internaional waters in the eastern part of the Balic Sea.

Russia frequently conducts snap alert exercises, in which the forces are given short noice to relocate from their garrisons to assembly areas to conduct combat training. Russia has also held snap alert exercises in the Kaliningrad region, where the training has involved receiving reinforcements from the Russian mainland.

However, the aciviies of the Balic Sea Fleet remain at a low level and are concentrated on local training exercises in the eastern part of the Balic Sea. The same area is used for tesing of new ships and weapons systems, mainly for export. However, in late October 2016 Russia deployed two missile corvetes from the Black Sea Fleet to the Balic Sea. The two corvetes are capable of iring modern long-range cruise missiles against ground targets as well as sea targets. This weapons system is far more modern and precise than the systems currently used by the Balic Fleet. As long as this type of corvetes are deployed with the Balic Fleet, they consitute a signiicant Russian

military reinforcement in the region as they, protected by the Kaliningrad region air defence systems, are capable of hiing targets in most of the Balic Sea and in western and northern Europe.

Russia strengthens its ground forces in the western direcionIn recent years, Russia has developed efecive, modern and lexible forces which are highly capable of deployment in conlict areas in Russia’s vicinity against inferior adversaries, for example as part of a hybrid warfare operaion. According to Russia’s 2010 military doctrine and subsequent statements by the chief of the Russian general staf, hybrid warfare has become an integral part of the country’s military and strategic thinking and mode of operaion.

In 2014, Russia took the irst steps towards strengthening its ground forces in western Russia, in paricular with the creaion of 1st Tank Army which has signiicantly sharpened Russia’s military proile. In 2016, Russia has coninued this development.

In 2016, Russia announced that it will add three new divisions to its ground forces in the western part of the country. In


this connecion, Russia is re-introducing the division as a troop unit, primarily in western Russia. Russia also plans to reinforce the divisions with addiional regiments which will make the divisions larger, stronger and more robust. The new divisions and their regiments will likely only be fully formed with personnel, equipment and garrisons in 2020.

Overall, this will result in a considerable strengthening of the combat strength of Russia’s ground forces in western Russia, in paricular tank power.

The new forces will mainly be garrisoned near Ukraine, where they will replace the batalion combat groups which Russia had temporarily deployed to the Russian-Ukraine border area in the past few years. However, as the forces are highly mobile they can easily be deployed in ofensive operaions elsewhere.

The strengthening of the ground forces is to a large extent strategic messaging to the United States and NATO that Russia is capable of deterring what it perceives as the threat posed by NATO’s military build-up in the Balic Sea region and Eastern Europe. Thus, the strengthening of the ground forces is a consequence of Russia’s recent threat assessment published in the December 2015 revised security strategy. Here, NATO is deined as a threat to Russia – a ightening of the wording of the 2014 revised military doctrine in which NATO was ideniied as a military danger.

Meanwhile, the build-up of the ground forces will also provide Russia increased military opions to the west, including the Balic countries. Within a very few years, Russia will be able to deploy a larger number of high readiness batalion combat groups. This will improve Russia’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare against inferior adversaries in Russia’s vicinity.

Also, the build-up of the ground forces and the re-introducion of the division as a troop unit will, over the next ive to ten years, strengthen Russia’s ability to engage in high-intensive combat involving defensive and ofensive tacics against an equal adversary on its own territory and in its immediate vicinity.

Russia’s military intervenion in Syria has demonstrated that Russia has both the intent and capacity to launch a major military operaion far beyond its borders. However, Russia’s armed forces will not be capable of ofensive

operaions on the same scale as, for example, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Russia can complete the build-up of the ground forces despite economic problemsRussia gives high priority to its armed forces in order to sustain its claims to be a great power. Russia’s economy is under pressure due to the fall in the global oil prices and the Western economic sancions. In addiion, Russia’s structural economic problems were not solved in imes of high oil prices. The economic crisis has forced Russia’s leadership to cut the defence budget on to 2020 but the

Russia’s military nuclear and convenional prioriies

Russia will coninuously prioriize preserving its strategic deterrence capabiliies vis-à-vis the United States. Nuclear weapons are the only area in which Russia really has an equal status with the United States. As part of the START agreements with the United States, Russia has nevertheless reduced its arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons substanially since the end of the Cold War. In addiion, Russia has likely trimmed the total number of tacical nuclear weapons as well, even though these are not restricted by internaional weapon control agreements.

Russia coninues to see nuclear weapons as a key means of prevening both nuclear conlicts and convenional conlicts. According to the 2014 revised military doctrine, Russia not only contemplates using nuclear weapons as a response to a nuclear atack on Russia, but also as a response to convenional aggression against Russia if such aggression were to threaten the survival of Russia as a state.

In addiion, Russia prioriizes the long-range power projecion capacity of the Navy and the Air Force in order to sustain Russia’s claims to be a global great power. Finally, Russia has developed mobile reacion forces superior to Russia’s neighbours in the post-Soviet space. These forces can quickly be deployed in crises and local conlicts along Russia’s borders.


leadership will sill prioriize defence expenditures over welfare expenditures. It is thus likely that the defence cuts will not have serious consequences for the current military build-up and modernizaion programme. Russia has large defence forces and will be able to redistribute resources to highly prioriized programmes.

Therefore, it is likely that Russia will be able to complete the planned build-up of its ground forces by 2020. It will be no challenge for Russia to equip the new divisions and regiments with relaively modern equipment, as Russia has large quaniies in its inventory. The main challenge facing the compleion of the new divisions and regiments will be recruiing suiciently qualiied personnel, also ater 2020.

Russia has played itself into a key role in the Syrian conlictFollowing its military intervenion in Syria in support for the Syrian leadership, Russia has succeeded in placing itself in a key posiion along the United States in the internaional negoiaions on the Syrian conlict. Russia has demonstrated its capacity to establish a military base and a powerful military presence far from Russia’s borders. Russia’s military intervenion has thus been essenial for the Syrian regime’s ability to launch its ofensive against the armed opposiion.

It is likely that Russia will succeed in maintaining a Syrian leadership that will remain dependent on Russia, and it is also likely that the United States will accept the Syrian leadership as a prerequisite for the coninued ight against ISIL. This will provide Russia with a military plaform that

will sustain Russia’s strategic interests in Syria, the eastern Mediterranean Sea and in the Middle East in general. Russia will engage ISIL, to the extent it serves to stabilize the Syrian leadership.

Russia has interest in a frozen conlict in eastern UkraineBy destabilizing south-eastern Ukraine and annexing Crimea, Russia has successfully created a frozen conlict in south-eastern Ukraine. It is highly likely that Russia considers a frozen conlict in south-eastern Ukraine an efecive instrument to prevent Ukraine from EU and NATO membership.

It is likely that Russia is saisied by the fact that the negoiaions between Russia, Ukraine and the separaists on the Minsk II agreement are making no substanial progress. Russia will use all means of inluence and leverage to split and destabilize the Ukrainian government and, in the long term, strengthen pro-Russian forces in Ukrainian poliics. Russia’s new ground forces divisions will pose an increased military threat to Ukraine, which will not be able to repel a resolute Russian atack.

It is less likely that Ukraine will launch military operaions to retake the areas under separaist control since the Ukrainian forces are militarily inferior to the separaists, as long as they are supported by Russian forces. The ights along the ceaseire line in eastern Ukraine will coninue, and it is likely that both Russia and Ukraine will occasionally ind it opportune to exploit incidents to verbally escalate the conlict as a way of accentuaing their conlicing interests and frozen posiions.


Terrorism The terrorist threat against Denmark and other Western countries is serious and constantly changing. The instability in parts of the Middle East, especially in Syria and Iraq, in parts of Africa, and in southern Asia will coninue to nourish and support terrorist groups such as ISIL and al-Qaida in the coming years. Acts of terrorism in the West and against Western interests worldwide will coninue to be predominantly carried out by individuals and groups in contact with or inspired by ISIL and al-Qaida. At the same ime, lone actors in the West who sympathize with these groups will, to a greater extent than before, carry out acts of terrorism without prior training or direct control from terrorist groups.

The greatest threat of terrorism to the West comes from militant Islamism and originates from the conlicts in the Middle East and North Africa, paricularly the conlicts in Syria and Iraq. The conlicts and the generally weak state structures in the region will also nourish ISIL and other militant Islamist groups in the coming years. In addiion to ISIL, al-Qaida seeks to establish itself and create a safe haven in Syria. Atacks and atempted atacks in the West will coninue to be interpreted by ISIL as a victory, as they contribute to raising fear among the populaions and divert atenion when ISIL sufers military setbacks.

ISIL consitutes the greatest terrorist threat against the WestISIL will coninue to lose territory in Syria and Iraq. Despite military setbacks, ISIL remains intent on carrying out large-scale atacks in the West. ISIL has shown that even though the organizaion is under pressure, it is sill capable of planning and carrying out atacks. The terrorist atacks in Paris in November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016 were planned in periods during which ISIL was under military pressure in Syria and Iraq. Especially the countries acively taking part in the military eforts against ISIL in Syria and Iraq, including Denmark, will be atracive terrorist targets for ISIL. ISIL has coninuously adapted and improved its capabiliies to plan atacks in the West based on lessons learned from both unsuccessful and successful atacks. It is highly likely that individuals ailiated with ISIL have the capabiliies to execute coordinated terrorist atacks in the West.

Western interests, including Danish ones, will remain a terrorist target in the parts of the world where ISIL-ailiated terrorist groups operate. Their presence in a number of countries such as Egypt, Libya and Afghanistan has worsened the security situaion and contributed to increased local rivalry and conlict. ISIL-ailiated terrorist groups in these countries will also have the intent and capacity to atack Western interests in the future.

The threat from sympathizers and lone actor atacks will coninueThrough extensive propaganda, ISIL has created an image of the West as the enemy, paricularly the coaliion countries. Compared with past propaganda from militant Islamist groups, especially al-Qaida, ISIL’s messages have reached a wider audience and have had a greater efect. More than any other terrorist group, ISIL has managed to inspire sympathizers to carry out acts of terrorism independently and with simple means, resuling in a high number of casualies. Illustraive of this is the July 2016 atack in Nice, France, in which an ISIL-inspired perpetrator killed 86 people and wounded hundreds by ramming a lorry into crowds on the promenade.

In the short term, ISIL’s propaganda will also be easily accessible, contain calls to carry out acts of terrorism, and be partly directed at ciizens in the West. Militant training will not be a prerequisite for carrying out acts of terrorism. Through its propaganda, ISIL will also be able to inspire sympathizers to carry out acts of terrorism in the future.

The threat from coordinated acts of terrorism will coninueIn the short term, ISIL will be capable of inspiring, supporing and direcing acts of terrorism globally. Plans for atacks against targets in the West approved by and, in some cases, devised by individuals connected with ISIL’s leadership will remain a serious threat. The tendency to select targets in which the intenion is to cause maximum casualies, and symbolic targets, such as Jewish targets, public oicials and individuals regarded as having ofended Islam, will coninue.

The terrorist threat can arise both from returning ISIL foreign ighters and from sympathizers who have not had the opportunity to join ISIL in Syria and Iraq. In addiion, ISIL will coninue seeking to send individuals to the West to carry out acts of terrorism. ISIL coninuously adapts its methods and has repeatedly exploited the refugee situaion to send operaives to the West as part of the planning and


execuion of terrorist atacks as evidenced by the Paris and Brussels atacks. ISIL will likely coninue to use this approach. However, the inlux of refugees to Europe has diminished signiicantly following the agreement between the EU and Turkey.

ISIL has executed coordinated terrorist atacks in the West in 2015 and 2016. The atacks have involved several perpetrators and have required careful planning and preparaion. Much indicates that the atacks have been completely or partly planned in Syria, and that they, to some extent, have been sancioned by ISIL’s leadership. Sympathizers who have not travelled to the conlict areas, returned ISIL foreign ighters, and individuals who have been sent to the West from Syria and Iraq have all been involved in the atacks.

ISIL foreign ighters will pose a threat to the West At least 6,000 individuals from the West have travelled to the conlict zones in Syria and Iraq since 2012. Not all have paricipated in armed ighing, but a large share either ight or have fought together with ISIL or other militant Islamist groups. It is possible that the total number of ISIL foreign ighters returning to the West will increase as ISIL comes under addiional pressure in Syria and Iraq. Because of the militant training and the readiness for violence that many of these individuals have acquired, they will pose a terrorist threat to the West for many years. The conlicts in Syria and Iraq have atracted and created a new generaion of militant Islamists, which in the future will be a centre of gravity for extremism and radicalizaion. The security challenge in the West will be the greatest in the countries with the largest number of the departed and returned ISIL foreign ighters. But the threat is global and cross-border because of the internaional networks and contacts that are created between ISIL foreign ighters in Syria and Iraq.

Al-Qaida is sill intent on atacking the West In recent years, the al-Qaida leadership has not only appeared as weakened in general but also inferior with regard to propaganda compared with ISIL. In addiion, ISIL has gained inluence in several former al-Qaida strongholds.

However, the al-Qaida Senior Leadership (AQSL) has maintained its ambiions to atack the West and Western interests worldwide. AQSL will coninue to call for atacks against the West, as armed struggle against the West lies at the heart of the group’s ideology. In the short term,

AQSL will less likely gain suicient capability to launch well-coordinated atacks against targets in the West. Nevertheless, lone actor atacks inspired by AQSL pose a threat.

In the coming years, Syria will play a central role for al-Qaida. A good many high-ranking members of al-Qaida coninue to be present in Syria. In the short term, it is possible that al-Qaida will focus on building up its capabiliies and strengthening its presence in Syria rather than planning

terrorist atacks against the West from Syria. Al-Qaida’s ailiate in Syria, the former Nusra Front, oicially distanced itself from al-Qaida in August 2016 and simultaneously changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. It is likely the name change was prompted by strategic consideraions aimed at strengthening cooperaion with other opposiion groups in Syria to ensure al-Qaida a leading posiion among its peers. Al-Qaida will coninue to be able to look ater its interests in Syria through Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.

Al-Qaida and subgroups coninue to pose a threat against Western targets, including Danish ones, in large areas of North, West and East Africa, on the Arabian Peninsula, and in some parts of Asia. Terrorist atacks against Western interests in these regions will paricularly be a prioriized and more easily accessible goal than atacks in the West.

It is possible that al-Qaida’s popularity will rise as ISIL is further pressured in Syria and Iraq and in other regions where ISIL subgroups operate. This can result in an inlux of, among others, former ISIL followers into al-Qaida and its regional subgroups. However, it will depend to a great extent on the ability of al-Qaida and the subgroups to appear as an atracive alternaive.

The terrorist threat in several parts of the world arises from conlict areas During recent years, militant Islamist groups ailiated with ISIL have established themselves in several countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia and have atracted militant Islamists from across the world. ISIL and ISIL ailiates are under pressure in several places and will not be able to keep control of the areas they have conquered. By contrast, groups ailiated with al-Qaida have managed to maintain their presence in several areas of the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In addiion to the general terrorist threat from ISIL and al-Qaida especially, several countries in the Middle East as well as Central and South Asia, and Africa will, in coming years, see militant Islamists return from

22 Intelligence Risk Assessment22

The map gives a schemaic picture of the changes in the presence of terrorist groups in 2015-2016

LibyaAlgeria

SudanChad

NigerMali

Ghana

Nigeria

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

Ethiopia

Somalia

KenyaUganda

Cameroun

Morocco

South Sudan

Yemen

Oman

Iraq IranAfghanistan

Pakistan

Syria

Turkey

Tunisia

CentralAfrican

Republic

Dem. Rep. Congo

Al-Qaida and subgroups - 2016

Al-Qaida and subgroups - 2015

ISIL and subgroups - 2016

ISIL and subgroups - 2015

the conlict areas, heightening the terrorist threat in those countries even more.

TurkeyOver the past year, Turkey has been the target of several terrorist atacks. ISIL-ailiated individuals were behind two atacks against tourist targets in Istanbul in January and March 2016 as well as the atack against Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport in June 2016. ISIL’s most recent large-scale terrorist atack in Turkey took place in August 2016 in the city of Gaziantep and was aimed at a civilian target.

Turkey is acively ighing ISIL, both militarily in Syria and via the police in Turkey itself. However, in the short term, ISIL will coninue to have the capability to carry out atacks in Turkey. As has been the case over the past year, ISIL will remain intent on atacking Kurdish, Turkish and Western targets in Turkey. In November 2016, ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called on ISIL sympathizers to launch addiional atacks on Turkey, likely heightening the threat from ISIL-related atacks in Turkey.

In addiion, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and ailiated terrorist groups have launched a number of atacks over

the past year mainly in south-eastern Turkey but also a

few large atacks in ciies in western Turkey. The atacks have targeted Turkish authoriies, and it is less likely that terrorist atacks related to the conlict between the PKK and the Turkish state will directly target Western interests or tourists.

The Middle East and the Arabian PeninsulaISIL is a terrorist threat in Syria and Iraq, where the organizaion has its power base. ISIL is an actor in both the Syrian civil war and the conlict in Iraq and executes terrorist atacks against civilians, government targets and rival groups on a daily basis. ISIL will coninue to engage in acts of terrorism in both Syria and Iraq as the group inds itself increasingly pressured militarily, forcing it to resort to asymmetric warfare tacics.

In the past year, ISIL has claimed responsibility for terrorist atacks against both military and civilian targets in Jordan and Lebanon. At the same ime, security oicials in Lebanon and Jordan have prevented other atacks against civilian targets. ISIL-ailiated groups and sympathizers remain intent on carrying out terrorist atacks in these countries.


ISIL remains intent on carrying out terrorist atacks in both Saudi Arabia and Yemen, where it has established itself with small groups. In Saudi Arabia, local ISIL networks have carried out a number of terrorist atacks over the past two years. Most recently in early July 2016, when ISIL-ailiated individuals launched four small, simultaneous suicide atacks in the country.

In the coming years, Yemen will also be characterized by conlict and instability, providing laitude for militant groups such as Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIL in Yemen. Even though AQAP has been weakened militarily in 2016, the group coninues to play an acive role as an insurgent group in the ight against the Houthi-led government. AQAP coninues to be an efecive terrorist organizaion determined to mount atacks in the West, but for the ime being the group prioriizes the insurgency in Yemen. In addiion, AQAP publishes the online magazine Inspire, which calls for acts of terrorism in the West. ISIL in Yemen has been fraught with internal disputes but has carried out a number of large terrorist atacks in the country.

ISIL in Yemen will likely try to exploit AQAP’s weakness in a bid to become the dominant Sunni Islamist group in the country. However, ISIL in Yemen coninues to be small in size and will not be signiicantly rooted in the local populaion during the next few years.

North AfricaThere are very few signs that the security situaion in North Africa will be signiicantly improved. Libya plays a central role for terrorist groups in North Africa, and the security situaion in the country will remain extremely unstable. Both ISIL and al-Qaida will be a threat and a destabilising factor in Libya for years to come.

Even though ISIL has lost control of its former headquarters in the Libyan coastal city Sirte, the threat from ISIL will not diminish in the short term. It is possible that ISIL members will look towards the areas in southern Libya not controlled by miliias loyal to the Libyan government. ISIL’s anchoring in Libya means that there is a heightened terrorist threat against Western targets in Libya and the neighbouring countries. At the same ime, there are signs that the North African branch of al-Qaida, the Algeria-based Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), seeks to exploit ISIL’s decline and threaten Western interests in Libya.

Tunisians make up a large number of the foreign ighters in ISIL’s ranks in Syria, Iraq and Libya, and Tunisian ISIL members have special focus on execuing atacks in Tunisia. This will contribute to worsening the security situaion in Tunisia for years to come. In Algeria, security oicials have had success in limiing ISIL’s presence in the country. However, as a result of AQIM’s years-long anchoring in Algeria, the terrorist threat in the country will coninue.

In Egypt, the Sinai branch of ISIL (IS-Sinai) is under strong pressure from the Egypian authoriies. The group is the biggest terrorist threat against both naional and Western interests in Egypt. IS-Sinai will exploit the unstable security situaion in Libya and the porous border with Gaza to sustain its capabiliies. IS-Sinai will look to expand its operaional area to the rest of Egypt. Here, the conlict between President al-Sisi’s regime and poliically marginalized groups is escalaing. This escalaion will likely provide ferile ground for militant groups and the threat of terrorism against Western interests will likely remain persistent in Egypt.

West AfricaMilitant Islamists will atempt to carry out terrorist atacks in several of the countries in West Africa. There is a threat from terrorism in those parts of the region where the

authoriies are unable, in the short term, to contain the threat from militant Islamists operaing across the borders of the whole region.

In Mali, militant Islamists have united under AQIM’s leadership and are a destabilizing factor. This union has improved the groups’ overall capabiliies, which they have demonstrated by launching terrorist atacks in both southern Mali and in the neighbouring countries Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast. Niger will coninue to be used as a transit area connecing areas where militant Islamists have established a presence, paricularly in northern Mali and Libya. In coming years, the use of Niger as a transit area will be a signiicant security problem for both Niger and the Sahel region. It is possible that a sustained pressure on ISIL and AQIM in Libya will moivate the groups’ members to turn to safe havens in northern Mali, thereby strengthening AQIM.

In Nigeria, Islamic State in West Africa, the former Boko Haram, has been forced on the defensive. But Islamic State in West Africa sill has considerable capabiliies. From its safe havens, the group will coninue its acts of terrorism


in north-eastern Nigeria, southern Niger and northern Cameroon. It is possible that the group will look to atack Western targets in Nigeria and atract foreign ighters via propaganda to draw greater atenion to the group and its new leadership.

East AfricaAl-Shabaab will remain a terrorist threat to both Western and local interests in East Africa for years to come. Despite several years of military ofensives from naional and internaional forces, southern and central Somalia remain al-Shabaab strongholds. Almost daily, al-Shabaab carries out terrorist atacks against military and civilian targets in Somalia. Also, al-Shabaab will coninue to have access to weapons and explosives. The terrorist movement will therefore be able to coninue its atacks on both Somali targets and Western interests in Somalia and at the same ime atempt to carry out atacks against countries contribuing to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Within the past year, al-Shabaab has, on the whole, prevented ISIL from gaining a foothold in Somalia. For some ime, ISIL has tried to get al-Shabaab to break with al-Qaida and unite with ISIL. ISIL has also challenged rank-and-ile members of al-Shabaab to break with al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab’s leadership has, however, resolutely rejected every overture from ISIL and, at the same ime, killed and imprisoned a large number of ISIL sympathizers. This resolute dissociaion from ISIL and purging of its own ranks have, for the present, prevented ISIL from gaining a foothold in southern and central Somalia.

The only real ISIL group is in Puntland in the northern part of the country, far away from al-Shabaab’s core areas in southern and central Somalia. It is possible within the next few years that this ISIL group will bolster its capabiliies and thus increasingly threaten Western interests in the area.

Afghanistan, Pakistan and the rest of South AsiaIn Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaida, including the organizaion’s senior leadership, poses a threat to Western interests in the region. The group is based in the mountain regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where it is paricularly preoccupied with maintaining its safe havens. From here, the group’s members support the Taliban insurgency against the Afghan government and coaliion forces. Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan remain intent on atacking the West. In the short term, the group will less likely have suicient capability to launch a well-coordinated atack against targets in the West.

ISIL’s subgroup in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (ISKP), igures into the Afghan conlict. The organizaion poses a threat to Western interests in Afghanistan but does not operate internaionally.

Al-Qaida’s branch in South Asia, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subconinent (AQIS), works closely with Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan. AQIS is acive in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. AQIS has close connecions with local Islamist groups and networks in the region. Al-Qaida’s vision for South Asia is to gradually build up the organizaion. In the autumn of 2015, two AQIS training camps were discovered in southern Afghanistan. The organizaion has had success recruiing locally and has managed to sustain its body of followers despite counter-terrorist operaions in 2015 and 2016.

The local subgroups of AQIS and ISIL in South Asia, including in Bangladesh, have carried out a series of terrorist atacks during 2015 and 2016. The most recent large-scale terrorist atack took place in Bangladesh in July 2016 against a café popular with Westerners. Both groups will coninuously try to carry out terrorist atacks in Bangladesh and the rest of South Asia against Western targets, among others.


The Cyber ThreatThe cyber threat against Denmark, paricularly from cyber espionage, but also from cyber crime, is very high. The cyber threat has both geopoliical and signiicant economic consequences for Denmark. Add to this a potenial threat from foreign states using cyber atacks as a means to afect public opinion in other countries. Several countries are building up capabiliies which can be used to carry out destrucive cyber atacks against other countries. While the present threat of destrucive cyber atacks against Denmark is low, the threat has the potenial to increase in connecion with a deepening poliical or military conlict in which Denmark is involved.

The threat of cyber espionage against public authoriies and private companies remains the most signiicant cyber threat against Denmark as well as Danish geopoliical and economic interests. The threat is very acive, and Danish authoriies and companies are regular vicims of cyber espionage atempts.

The threat of cyber espionage is directed at the enire public sector. Main targets of the persistent threat have been authoriies that are vital to Danish foreign and security policy, including the Ministry of foreign Afairs and the Ministry of Defence as well as their ailiated agencies. Several countries have launched cyber espionage against the two ministries within recent years. Internaional security cooperaion forums, for instance NATO, are facing the same threat.

The threat against private companies is paricularly aimed at research-heavy and high-tech industries and sectors. Here, several state actors have taken direct aim at companies in Denmark in recent years. In addiion, state actors coninue to probe company IT infrastructures for vulnerabiliies that can be exploited.

State actors also atempt to compromise service providers and subcontractors to other companies to gain knowledge about negoiaions, products, or other sensiive informaion. The actors may compromise hosing companies responsible for the IT systems and data of other companies to gain access to the actual target in the

industries menioned above.

The state actors which pose a threat to Denmark have

very substanial resources and their atack methods and capabiliies such as malware and infrastructure are oten reused across sectors and industries.

The cyber threat is constantly evolving, as technological development enables atackers to develop new atack tools to exploit vulnerabiliies in IT systems and networks. Thus, in the future, new and more sophisicated atempts at cyber espionage will occur as the actors gradually develop

their capabiliies. The cyber threat against Denmark is persistent.

State actorsA number of countries systemaically use cyber espionage to gain industrial and business advantages and to support their poliical and economic interests. It is likely that the actors behind cyber espionage aciviies are linked to the security and intelligence services of these countries.

The threat against Denmark arises especially from

countries atemping to posiion themselves poliically and economically and whose security and intelligence services occupy a central posiion of power.

For these services, cyber espionage also presents an opportunity to enhance their naional inluence and

Russia - a leading actor in the cyber realm

Russia has long invested intensively in its cyber capabiliies and now holds sophisicated capabiliies to launch extensive cyber espionage campaigns against poliical and military targets in the West. Russia also has access to cyber capabiliies suited to bolster the country’s convenional military operaions, for example targeted operaions against criical infrastructure.

Chinese cyber espionage

China’s cyber espionage capabiliies are quite extensive. Several Chinese authoriies, including the Chinese military, have publicly been criicized in the West for orchestraing large-scale espionage via the Internet against a large number of targets abroad. China uses its cyber capabiliies for obtaining informaion of economic, poliical, and military importance.


legiimacy. Lack of coordinaion between rival services leads, at imes, to mutual exposure and failure.

Cyber espionage via the Internet allows informaion collecion over great distances and via connecing links in other countries. Therefore, cyber espionage has proven to be both an efecive and a relaively risk-free way of procuring informaion compared to methods such as human intelligence (HUMINT). Cyber espionage is an atracive way to supplement the more tradiional methods of obtaining classiied informaion.

With these advantages, it is likely that threats against Denmark will emerge from new state actors in the coming

years.

More ofensive behaviourIn recent years, incidents have indicated that some states are willing to use cyber espionage more ofensively.

The US Democraic Naional Commitee (DNC) e-mail leak is an example of a more ofensive behaviour. US authoriies have oicially described the compromise and subsequent e-mail leak as a Russian atempt at inluencing the US elecion process. Cyber acivists have been known to use this method to leak sensiive informaion to afect public opinion to promote their own poliical agenda.

The DNC leak relects the potenial threat from foreign states willing to use cyber espionage to try to afect public opinion in other countries. The countries which already pose a cyber espionage threat to Denmark seem to pose the greatest threat to Denmark as these countries

are not afraid to use sensiive informaion ofensively to shape public opinion. While the present threat against the formaion of public opinion in Denmark is only potenial, the threat could grow in connecion with a poliical or military conlict with another country in which public seniment in Denmark plays a central role to the respecive country.

In December 2015, western Ukraine was exposed to widespread power outage likely as the result of a destrucive cyber atack – that is a cyber atack aimed at destroying the IT networks or data – carried out by a state actor that has been known to conduct cyber espionage. Prior to the power outage, the actor had infected malware into a number of systems belonging to several Ukrainian

electricity companies. The objecive of the malware was

not to commit cyber espionage, but to facilitate a shutdown of the supply network.

These incidents are examples that several states, in addiion to carrying out cyber espionage against other countries, are working to use the Internet and IT networks ofensively. Thus, a number of countries are building up cyber capabiliies which can be used against various types of essenial infrastructure, including the energy sector. The capabiliies could be used in connecion with military operaions but also provide the states the opportunity for destrucive operaions without the use of armed means. While the threat against Denmark is low at present, the threat from destrucive atacks could grow in connecion with a deepening poliical or military conlict in which Denmark is involved.

Increasing threat from cyber criminals Cyber crime poses a very high threat to Denmark and is increasing in extent and complexity. The threat is aimed at authoriies, companies, and ciizens.

The threat from cyber crime is heightened by the availability of personal and inancial informaion, and easily usable malware – such as ransomware, which encrypts data on the vicim’s computer – and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) tools that can easily be bought on the Internet’s black markets.

The economic consequences of both ransomware and DDoS atacks for private companies are potenially very severe in the form of lost data or producion halts and interrupion of services. The societal consequences of this type of atack against public authoriies are also potenially major. Abroad, the health care sector in certain countries has been especially hard hit by ransomware atacks. During at least one of these incidents, a ransomware atack against hospitals in the United States in 2016 afected the treatment

Cyber crime

Cyber crime covers a wide range of acts in which criminals use informaion technology for other types of criminal conduct, for example thet of inancial informaion, fraud, extorion, and violaion of intellectual property rights.


of paients. In addiion to the economic threat, the spread of ransomware can, at the worst, be a threat to IT systems criical to society if they are not adequately protected.

In paricular, the threat from ransomware has increased in extent and complexity in recent years. Cyber criminals display both ingenuity and technical competence. For example, cyber criminals use techniques involving emails designed to lure unsuspecing recipients into opening the e-mails in their inbox and visiing malicious websites.

DDoS atacks are also an increasing problem in Denmark. Both cyber criminals and cyber acivists use DDoS atacks.

The threat from acivists can arise suddenly Cyber acivism typically targets single issues or individuals and organizaions which the acivists perceive as opponents of their cause. In 2016, calls were made on social media for cyber acivism against the inancial sector, though they did not lead to tangible atacks in Denmark.

Not many examples of cyber acivism against Danish authoriies and businesses are found, and generally the threat of cyber acivism is medium. Yet, due to the changeable, cause-oriented nature of cyber acivism, a

threat against authoriies and companies can increase suddenly if the authority or the company atracts the atenion of acivists. The acivists may also direct focus at individuals if they perceive them to be opponents of their cause. In addiion to DDoS atacks and other types of malicious acts, cyber acivists also leak sensiive informaion acquired through hacking of, for example, personal e-mail accounts.

In addiion, some state actors use cyber acivists as an instrument in local armed conlicts and in the formaion of poliical opinion, suggesing that state actors may also be responsible for informaion leaks.

Cyber terrorismIn the short term, terrorists will not have the capability to carry out full-blown terrorist atacks through the Internet, that is, atacks involving loss of life or destrucion of property. Therefore, the threat of cyber terrorism is low. Terrorists paricularly and extensively use the Internet and social media for aciviies such as inancing, recruiing, and disseminaion of propaganda. But the threat of cyber terrorism will increase if terrorist groups succeed in atracing members with suicient technical skills, or if established cyber acivist groups become radicalised.


The Middle East and North AfricaIn the long term, the Middle East will be characterized by instability and conlicts. Oppressive regimes cannot solve the underlying poliical and economic problems, and the region will coninuously generate lows of refugees and migrants. In one to two years, ISIL will no longer control a large, unbroken belt of territory in Syria and Iraq. But Sunni extremism will sill be present in the region, and the weakening of ISIL may act as a precursor for increased inluence from other local insurgent groups and internally oriented terrorist groups, including al-Qaida. Sunni extremism in various forms and violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims will thus coninue to contribute to destabilizaion in large parts of the region.

The Middle East and North Africa will also be characterized by conlict in the long term. The wars in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen will increase tensions between ethnic and religious populaion groups, severely hampering economic growth in the afected countries. The conlicts will also have negaive efects on neighbouring countries in the form of instability, terrorism and loods of refugees, just as they will involve external powers, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran as well as the United States and Russia.

Regional power holders cannot solve the countries’ underlying poliical, social and economic problems, thereby contribuing to creaing unrest and popular revolt, as was seen in connecion with the so-called Arab Spring. Consequently, the state apparatuses in the region are becoming increasingly authoritarian with centralizaion of power and suppression of poliical opponents, including countries such as Egypt and Turkey, which increasingly make use of government-loyal military elements to keep

power in the hands of the few.

The regional great powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, will try to use ethnic-sectarian divides in the region to pursue their own interests, contribuing to feeding tensions between

Sunnis and Shiites. In addiion to the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, which among other things afects the conlicts in Yemen, Iraq and Syria, Sunni Muslim terrorist groups and Kurdish groups in the region will contribute to deepening the divides between religious and ethnic groups.

In one to two years, ISIL will no longer control a large, unbroken belt of territory in Syria and Iraq, and the organizaion will lose control of large ciies such as Raqqah and Mosul. But Sunni extremism will coninue to exist in the region and the weakening of ISIL may act as a precursor for increased inluence from other local insurgent groups and internally oriented terrorist groups, including al-Qaida. In recent years, the conlicts in Syria, Iraq and Libya have moivated a large number of young people, as many as 40,000, to travel across the Middle East to train and ight in other countries. This group will pose a terrorist threat inside and outside of the region for many years.

As a consequence of the many conlicts and the lack of economic development, the Middle East will coninue to generate a low of refugees and migrants inside and outside of the region.

ISILThe military progress in the ight against ISIL will coninue, and the majority of ISIL’s unbroken territory will be liberated during the next one to two years. However, the fundamental structural problems in Iraq and Syria which contributed to ISIL’s growth will also coninue over a ten-year perspecive. ISIL or the organizaion’s heirs will sill be able to mobilize support in Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq and Syria for insurgencies against local opponents.

The pressure on ISIL will coninue, and the organizaion will lose the majority of its state-like structure and of its territory during the next one to two years. As a result, ISIL will lose its stronghold ciies of Raqqah and Mosul, and the organizaion will, at best, control smaller areas in the Sunni-dominated parts of Syria and Iraq. However, ISIL as a terrorist and insurgency movement will not disappear. It is likely that ISIL or groups with similar ideology will remain present in Syria and Iraq, paricularly in the Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq and Syria. Local marginalized Sunni Muslims will be atracted

by ISIL’s Sunni extremism and strong ani-Shiite ideology.In Iraq, progress in the ight against ISIL has happened faster than it has in Syria. This trend will likely coninue due, among other things, to the fact that the coaliion cooperates with the Iraqi government and the Kurdish forces that are closing in on Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul. In Syria, the coaliion does not cooperate with the regime, which is preoccupied with ighing the other parts of the armed opposiion in the western part of Syria where ISIL is not a factor of power.


Turkey’s intervenion in Syria has dislodged ISIL militants from the Turkish border with Syria. At the same ime, Turkey’s intervenion weakens the Kurdish YPG miliia, which so far has been the primary driving force in the ight against ISIL in northern and eastern Syria. The YPG’s success has propelled Turkey to become directly involved in the Syrian conlict, for one thing because Turkey perceives the Kurds’ success as a threat to Turkish naional interests.

However, developments in both countries are dynamic and may quickly change. The ight against ISIL depends on factors such as the morale of ISIL’s ighters, the degree of Sunni tribal paricipaion, the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds’ willingness to ight ISIL in Sunni Arab-dominated areas, and poliical developments especially in Iraq, where internal power struggles in Baghdad weaken ani-ISIL eforts. In addiion, the engagement of internaional actors, paricularly the United States and Russia but also Turkey, will afect the intensity of the ight against ISIL.

The fundamental structural problems in Syria and Iraq which contributed to ISIL’s growth will coninue and, in some instances, be exacerbated by the conlicts in the two countries. These fundamental structural problems include weak state structures, lack of control over naional territories, and ethnic conlicts. Consequently, the potenial for extremism and terrorism in Iraq and Syria will coninue to lourish in the long term.

ISIL will split into several facions with diferent goals and means as the organizaion falls apart and loses territory. The majority of these groups will have a local anchoring, where they will be able to mobilise support from discontented Sunni Muslims in the area. Thus, it is likely that the groups will be able to gain support in the local populaion to carry out operaions and terrorist atacks against enemies in the region.

The loss of territory will weaken ISIL’s recruitment capabiliiesThe many foreign ighters from especially the Middle East and the West have helped raise ISIL’s internaional proile. These ighters already have access to established transnaional networks, enabling them to relocate to countries such as Libya, Egypt or Yemen where ISIL or al-Qaida has already established a foothold. Here, they will be able to join local networks and use their ighing experience in other conlicts. Thus, it is likely that ISIL’s subdivisions, for example in North Africa, will be able to build on ISIL’s ideology, either as a part of the local ISIL branch or under new names, following ISIL’s loss of territory in Syria and Iraq. But ISIL’s senior leadership as a group will not relocate to Libya or any other places, as most of its members are rooted in Iraq and thus want to remain in the country.

However, ISIL’s opportuniies for recruiing new ighters from the region and the West will be diminished as a result ISIL’s loss of territory. Control over territory enabled ISIL to

The military situaion in Syria and Iraq, October 2016

Amman

Beirut

Jerusalem

Turkey

Iran

Saudi Arabia

Jordan

Israel

Lebanon

Asad regime

Armed opposi�on/Jabhat Fateh al-Sham

Kurds

ISIL

Disputed areas

Iraqi security forces

0 50 100 150 200 250 km

BaghdadDamascus

Kirkuk

Mosul

Ar RaqqahAleppo

Latakia

Al-Asad Airfield

Tartus

Beirut

Amman

Jerusalem


construct the narraive of a caliphate in Syria and Iraq. A divided and weak ISIL without its own territory will hamper

ISIL’s narraive of the caliphate, reducing the group’s ability to atract sympathizers.

SYRIAFor many years ahead, Syria will be unstable and the object of regional rivalry and internaional intervenion. It is likely that US and Russian mediaion will lead to a setlement, which may form the framework for a parial soluion to the conlict. Bashar al-Assad will likely remain as president and the insurgency will be contained. However, some radical Islamist groups will coninue the armed struggle.

Within the next few years, the civil war will turn into a low-intensity insurgency in which the Assad regime and its allies will succeed in containing the armed rebellion in fewer pockets of resistance.

Russia’s intervenion and coninuing military engagement together with Iran’s and Hezbollah’s sustained support are crucial for the Assad regime’s survival. At the same ime, it is likely that the insurgents will coninue to be supported by regional allies for a number of years. Syria will remain the object of regional rivalry and internaional intervenion.

Despite military progress, the Assad regime sufers from lack of troops. Even with the support from Russia, Hezbollah and Iran, including the Iranian-backed Iraqi and Afghan Shiite miliias, the Assad regime will have to carefully prioriize its ofensive eforts.

The Assad regime will prioriize the ight against the insurgents in the populous western part of Syria. The capture of Aleppo is imminent, and over the next one to two years the Assad regime will succeed in increasing control over north-western Syria coningent on coninued support from both Russia and Iran. However, it is highly unlikely that the Assad regime will gain full control over all areas in western Syria.

While giving priority to western Syria, the Assad regime has maintained a military presence in low-priority areas with the aim of being able to re-establish control of the enire Syrian territory at some later point in ime.

At the onset of the conlict, the regime largely let control in north-eastern Syria to the Kurdish YPG miliia, barring a few garrisons. In 2016, the regime has gradually started to undermine the self-rule established by the Syrian Kurds in northern Syria in a bid to re-establish its authority over the region.

Only when the Assad regime has established a irmer grip on the insurgency in western Syria, will the regime increasingly focus on ighing ISIL. Then the regime will be able to liberate forces from western Syria, redeploying them to the ISIL-controlled areas in eastern Syria.

Even though ISIL is on the retreat in Syria, the terrorist organizaion and other Sunni extremist groups could, for several years, maintain safe havens along the Euphrates Valley in eastern Syria towards the border with Iraq. Al-Qaida ailiates such as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly the Nusra Front) will also be able to operate in the western part of Syria.

Bashar al-Assad likely to coninue as presidentThere is no prospect that the direct negoiaions between the Assad regime and the Syrian opposiion coaliion anchored in the so-called Geneva Process will lead to sustained peace. Rather, if the bilateral discussions between the United States and Russia are resumed, it is likely that a setlement can be reached that can provide the framework for a parial soluion to the conlict.

Such a setlement will likely allow Bashar al-Assad to remain as president and ensure that a coaliion government with opposiion elements will be formed. In this event, it is highly likely that a peace setlement would split the Syrian opposiion. Some of the insurgents will lay down their weapons and accept Assad’s ofer of amnesty, especially locally based groups. At the same ime, it is likely that many radical Islamist groups, overall up to 40,000 men, will coninue the armed ight in various parts of Syria.

Syria will be a country in ruins The civil war has fundamentally changed Syria. Even ater a peace setlement, those in power will not be able to re-establish the same control and stability as before the conlict. The regime will be dependent on alliances with local defence miliias, ethnic miliias and other irregular units.


The Assad regime will not be able to resolve the structural problems which sparked the uprising in 2011. On the contrary, the regime will have fewer resources to address these problems, and at the same ime the economic problems will be signiicantly greater. Consequently, it is likely that Syria, in addiion to a coninuing armed insurgency, will be hit by recurring periods of poliical instability and civil unrest. The Syrian economy has retracted by between 50 to 70 per cent and at the same ime the country’s criical infrastructure has been extensively damaged. Financially, Syria will be far more dependent on Russia and Iran ater the civil war than before. Also, the Assad

regime will have much less support in the populaion than before the conlict ater having quelled an uprising, which was originally backed by a majority of Syrians, resuling in hundreds of thousands killed and displaced.

Finally, it is less likely that the refugee crisis caused by the conlict in Syria will be resolved once the civil war is over. On the contrary, it is possible that a weakened Assad regime may see an advantage in prevening many of the predominantly Sunni Arab refugees from returning as that would give the regime a more favourable populaion demographics.

IRAQIraq will remain a de facto divided state with a Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad that holds back from involving other populaion groups in the running of the country. The Iraqi Kurds will work for increased autonomy but will not achieve independence. Iraq’s marginalized Sunni Muslims will sill be potenial recruits for ISIL or other terrorist groups.

In Iraq, Shia Muslims will dominate in the south and in Baghdad, while Sunni Muslims will dominate the western and northern region, and Kurds will dominate in the eastern and north-eastern region.

It is likely that the Iraqi central government will sill be dominated by Shiites, who will rule according to Shiite interests and not really involve the other populaion groups in the running of the country. Through its deep relaions with miliias and powerful Shiite circles in Baghdad, Iran will be able to maintain its strong inluence in the country.

Iraqi Kurds will coninue to push for economic and diplomaic independence from Baghdad. But, because of

regional and internaional opposiion, there is no prospect of Kurdish independence. As ISIL is quelled in Iraq, the power struggle over control, paricularly over oil-rich Kirkuk, will intensify, potenially leading to armed clashes between Kurds and the Iraqi Army or Shiite miliias.

The ethnic divide in Iraq will contribute to perpetuaing the causes for extremism in the country. Iraq’s Sunni Muslims live in the poorest part of the country with few resources, contribuing to their sense of marginalizaion. Sunni-dominated areas such as Mosul and Anbar will therefore coninue to hold recruiing potenial for ISIL and other terrorist groups.

IRAN AND THE GULFIran’s inluence in the region is growing, and Iran will maintain its close military and poliical relaions to Syria, Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The rivalry between Iran on the one side and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries on the other will contribute to instability and conlict in the region in coming years. However, it is less likely that the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia will escalate into direct military confrontaion.

The regional rivalry between Shiite Persian Iran and Sunni Arab Saudi Arabia shows no signs of decreasing. Saudi Arabia perceives Iran’s aciviies in Saudi Arabia’s neighbouring countries such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen as hosile to Saudi Arabia. Like other Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia fears that the nuclear agreement between Iran and the internaional community will increase Iran’s regional

inluence, as Iran emerges from years of poliical and economic isolaion.

From an Iranian viewpoint, Saudi Arabia has adopted an aggressive and hosile policy towards Iran. In response, Iran will work to maintain its inluence especially in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and to a lesser extent in Yemen, in paricular


by enhancing pragmaic cooperaion with Russia, but also with Turkey to some degree.

In the absence of reconciliaion between Iran and Saudi Arabia as well as the other Arab Gulf states, the paries will each support opposite sides in the regional conlicts. In addiion to the current tensions and proxy conlicts in Yemen and Syria, the dispute between Iran and Saudi Arabia could also afect other areas in the region, such as Bahrain. However, it is less likely that the rivalry between the two countries will escalate into direct military confrontaion.

It is possible that tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia will, at imes, consitute a threat to the free passage of ships through the two strategic straits in the region,

the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, at the entry to the Red Sea.

In the short term, Iran will likely honour the terms of the nuclear agreement. President Hassan Rouhani and his moderate supporters will ight to uphold the agreement with the purpose of improving the Iranian economy and opening the country to foreign investments.

On the other hand, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the conservaive powers in the Revoluionary Guards Corps will coninue to criicize the agreement and, if possible, deepen hosile relaions with the United States. Iran will thus coninue to test new ballisic missiles, detain Westerners, especially those with dual ciizenship, and harass US mariime traic in the Strait of Hormuz.

LIBYAThe conlicts between the many dispuing paries in Libya will coninue. The UN-endorsed Government of Naional Accord will remain weak and will have diiculty limiing the low of refugees and migrants from Africa to Europe. Militant Libyan groups, including ISIL’s branch in Libya, will contribute to destabilizing large parts of North Africa.

Libya will remain fraught with conlicts despite internaional eforts to stabilize the situaion in the country. The UN-supported Tripoli government is weak and is coninually challenged by various miliias, including, in paricular, the miliias in eastern Libya commanded by General Khalifa Hatar.

Popular support for the Government of Naional Accord in Tripoli – which relies on support from a number of Islamically oriented miliias – will likely coninue to decline. Though their country holds the largest oil reserves in Africa, Libyans have seen their standard of living reduced since the 2011 revoluion due to factors such as a plunge in oil producion and exports. A majority of Libyans therefore need external assistance as they sufer from lack of water, medicine and electricity. As a result, civil unrest and crime are growing in Libya.

The quesion of control over the Libyan military also separates the paries. The miliias and the Government of Naional Accord in Tripoli do not want General Khalifa Hatar to be a part of the overall Libyan military. Hatar has launched an ani-Islamist campaign, and his miliias have engaged in ierce ighing against ISIL-ailiated miliias in several eastern Libya ciies. It is possible that these clashes will trigger a wider military confrontaion between

Hatar’s miliias and the predominantly Islamist miliias in western Libya.

In addiion, ISIL will remain a threat and a destabilizing factor in all of Libya. Though the organizaion has lost territory, ISIL followers will blend in with the local populaion and coninue to carry out covert and asymmetric insurgency in Libya’s larger ciies. It is also possible that ISIL members will look to the more lawless areas in southern Libya and to the neighbouring North African countries.

Despite an internaional weapons embargo, several countries in the region contribute to keeping Libya in a state of poliical unrest and conlict by providing ammuniion and arms to the country’s dispuing paries. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates thus support General Hatar in the eastern part of the country, while Turkey and Qatar support a number of Islamist miliias in western Libya.

It is likely that Libya will remain a hub for refugees and migrants travelling to Europe. Libya has become an atracive transit country for African migrants as a result of the coninuing unrest and conlict in the country and the absence of stable government and security structures, enabling miliias and criminal networks facilitaing transport from Libya to Europe to operate relaively freely.


Sub-Saharan AfricaParts of Sub-Saharan Africa will coninue to experience economic growth, but developments in certain regions and countries will be fraught with armed conlicts over resources as well as ethnic and poliical ailiaions. These factors will combine to afect developments and cause serious humanitarian consequences.

A number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa face serious

security policy problems. From Mali in the west to Somalia in the east, militant Islamist acivity is a mouning problem. At the same ime, ethnic and poliical conlicts in the Central African Republic, Nigeria and South Sudan will most likely coninue unabated. In countries such as Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and Zimbabwe, smouldering discontent in parts of the populaion could quickly escalate into armed clashes.

Several countries in Africa will coninue to experience posiive economic and democraic development. On the regional level, in West Africa for example, the extent of these posiive efects will vary among the countries. In the future, the poliical and military rulers in several countries will coninue to prioriize their own futures above naional needs as well as the needs of the populaions, making it diicult to nip new conlicts in the bud. The coninued regional atempts by African countries to create peace and stability will thus sufer amid a lack of resources and real poliical backing.

Coninued demands for Western aid The perpetual instability in Sub-Saharan Africa will coninue to have serious humanitarian consequences and afect large

segments of the populaion in the coming years, many of whom will be internally displaced, as has been the case in Nigeria and South Sudan. Others will lee to neighbouring countries or seek towards North Africa and further on to Europe. Economic problems, poliical oppression and other problems will coninue to make people migrate. The presence of large groups of refugees and migrants could contribute to destabilizing host countries in Africa and thus create new conlicts.

Exising eforts in Mali and Somalia, among others, as well as new missions in other countries may be hampered in the future by lack of qualiied personnel and suitable equipment from both the African Union (AU) and the UN, hampering atempts at resolving several of the long-term conlicts on the coninent and hindering the creaion of ferile soil for stability and development to beneit the populaions. Thus, in coming years, there will be great demand for economic and military support from the West from several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Western countries’ approach to democracy, peacemaking, and development will coninue to be pited against the inluence of other state actors such as China.

LibyaAlgeria

SudanChad

NigerMali

Ghana

Nigeria

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

Ethiopia

Somalia

KenyaUganda

Cameroun

Morocco

South Sudan

Yemen

Oman

Iraq Iran Afghanistan

Pakistan

Tunisia

CentralAfrican

Republic

Dem. Rep. Congo

Gulf of Guinea

C

NigerDelta

Burkina Faso

Mauritania

Burundi

Rwanda

Guinea

Senegal

IvoryCoast

Liberia

Sierra Leone

Selected conlict areas in Sub-Saharan Africa


Poliical instability will inluence developments in SomaliaLike several other countries in Africa, Somalia will probably be fraught with poliical instability and conlicts in the coming years. At the same ime, formal poliical progress may be diluted by clan-based power struggles, corrupion and self-serving poliicians, severely hampering real democraic elecions. Countries in the Middle East will increasingly afect poliical developments in Somalia, reducing the opportuniies for Denmark and other Western countries to inluence developments in the country.

The threat from al-Shabaab will coninueIn the future, Somalia will remain among the African countries most afected by militant Islamism whose main

promoter is al-Shabaab. With relaive ease, the terrorist movement will be able to atract new members and alliance partners who feel that they have lost the ight over economic and poliical power in Somalia.

The Somali Army is unable to independently maintain security in the country, as it lacks basic training, fundamental skills and necessary military equipment. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali Army will not be able to defeat al-Shabaab. Neither the Army nor AMISOM has the suicient level of organizaion to control the rural districts or coordinate eforts, providing the terrorist movement wide laitude. The withdrawal of AMISOM from Somalia in the coming years would further deepen instability in the country.

MALI The security situaion in northern and central Mali will become further impaired in the coming years. Implementaion of the peace agreement has de facto come to a halt, ethnic tensions are intensifying, and militant Islamists enjoy favourable condiions for operaing across the borders. It is less likely that the internaional forces or the Malian security forces can reverse the negaive development in the country.

In the coming years, the general security situaion in Mali will deteriorate. In paricular the northern and central parts of Mali will experience more terrorist atacks and violent clashes. At the same ime, insecurity will spread further south, and militant Islamists will again carry out atacks in the capital Bamako. The terrorist threat against Danish and Western interests in Mali will remain severe.

The United Naions Mulidimensional Integrated Stabilizaion Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) will have to use the bulk of its resources on protecing itself against atacks by militant Islamists rather than on stabilizing the situaion. The mission will, at the same ime, remain one of the UN’s most dangerous missions. The Malian security forces sufer from poor training, low morale and lack of equipment and will thus ind it diicult to establish efecive cooperaion with MINUSMA. As a result, large areas in the central and northern parts of Mali will be under control of militant Islamists or armed groups.

AQIM’s regional ofensive coninuesAl-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other militant Islamist groups will exploit the Malian army’s and MINUSMA’s weaknesses and lacking capabiliies to bolster their inluence and power in northern Mali. At the same ime, AQIM will try to inluence developments in other

regional countries whose security forces sufer from limited capabiliies.

Militant Islamists, other armed and criminal groups, and corrupt government oicials alike have substanial interests vested in the extensive cross-border smuggling of goods, weapons and narcoics. Smuggling aciviies will coninue at an undiminished pace in the coming years, as numerous groups and individuals are proiing from smuggling.

The peace process will grind to a haltNorthern Mali will be fraught with instability. It is likely that neither the Malian government nor the armed groups will push for the implementaion of the 2015 peace agreement. Therefore, small progress will also be overshadowed by larger setbacks in the future. The paries only have limited interest in seeing the agreement honoured, since they basically do not want to grant each other concessions. From the beginning, their cooperaion has been characterized by mutual distrust. As a result, the local populaion will experience no noiceable improvements in their living condiions or security situaion.

Relaions between the armed groups in northern Mali will be dominated by fundamental disagreements. Even though the groups try to allay fricion, even small confrontaions


between them have the potenial for rapid escalaion. The armed groups’ cohesiveness will become even more strained by discontented members, who will try to provoke a conlict. Moreover, several smaller groups which feel marginalized by the larger groups will be able to create instability locally.

Poliicians look towards the 2018 presidenial elecion In the capital Bamako, the problems for the government will grow prior to the expected presidenial elecion in

2018. Increasingly, poliical leaders want to raise their own proiles at the government’s expense and put its weaknesses on display. Rampant corrupion and the lack of economic results are obvious points of criicism. The response will likely be further centralizaion of power around a small group of key individuals. As a result of the poliical game-playing ahead of the elecion, only few of the reforms and poliical programmes which could seriously remedy the poliical and security problems facing Mali will be carried out.

DDIS deiniion of piracy and armed robbery at sea

Under the terms of the UN Convenion on the Law of the Sea, certain crimes are deined as piracy if they are commited outside naional territorial waters. Similar crimes commited inside naional territorial waters are deined as armed robbery at sea. The disincion between piracy and armed robbery at sea is appreciable, in so far as concerns states’ rights, obligaions and opportuniies to intervene. In the context of the 2016 Risk Assessment, the term piracy is used as an inclusive descripion that also covers armed robbery at sea.

PIRACY IN AFRICAParts of West Africa are threatened by piracy, and the general security situaion in West Africa’s most piracy-infested waters will not be markedly improved in the next few years. By contrast, the pirates in Somalia have ceased their atacks against civilian shipping of the Horn of Africa.

The overall threat from piracy along West Africa will likely not change markedly. Nigeria’s organized pirates will pose the most serious threat against shipping. Local small-ime criminals will coninue to launch atacks on ships at anchoring berths outside the harbours in the enire region, but they will generally pose a limited threat to the ships and their crews.

A number of the social and economic problems that lead to piracy along West Africa will remain unsolved. Many of the countries in the region will coninue to struggle with widespread poverty and high youth unemployment rates. Moreover, weak and corrupt state insituions in several of the countries will likely weaken the efect of potenial iniiaives to combat piracy and remedy its underlying causes.

It is doubful as to whether the region’s coastal states will rally around efecive, coordinated ani-piracy eforts. Though the states certainly express the will to deal with the mariime security situaion through both naional and regional iniiaives, litle progress has been made in implemening these iniiaives, and ani-piracy eforts seem to be a relaively low priority in pracice. Yet, it is possible that increased internaional engagement could inject some impetus to the regional security cooperaion.

NigeriaThe Niger Delta in south-eastern Nigeria will coninue to be a hotbed of organized piracy. Many years of poliical instability in the oil- and gas-rich Niger Delta have yielded ferile ground for strong miliias involved in various criminal aciviies, including piracy. As a result of the miliias’ ability to sabotage the strategically important oil and gas producion as well as the central government’s weak posiion of power in the Delta, the government will probably conduct a very restrained policy towards the miliias over the next few years. Therefore, they will extensively be able to coninue their criminal aciviies.

Nigerian pirates have generally proved beter organized and more prone to violence than pirates operaing in other parts of the region. Kidnappings at sea will coninue to be relaively common. By contrast, hijackings of oil tankers with the purpose of stealing the oil cargo will probably

remain at a low level. Basically, the condiions for this type of piracy have become more diicult, reducing its atracion for the pirates.


Nigeria’s outer waters are the scene of the most frequent and most violent pirate atacks launched along West Africa. It is doubful whether the country’s mariime authoriies will markedly improve their monitoring and patrolling capabiliies in these waters. The Nigerian state faces various other problems which pose a greater threat to its

internal security and economic interests. It is therefore less likely that the Nigerian government will prioriize resources for substanially strengthened ani-piracy eforts. In the light of these facts, the shipping trade of Nigeria, and also of the other West African coastal states, will coninue to be forced to buy protecion against pirate atacks from mixed public-private security services ofering surveillance, escort and military guard. Though the services increase security for the ships that use them, they may contribute to a heightened threat against those that cannot or will not use the assistance ofered.

Horn of AfricaThe pirates in Somalia have abandoned their atacks against civilian shipping due to a combinaion of best management pracices that have been introduced to prevent pirate aciviies. These include in paricular the use of armed security guards, ani-piracy operaions at sea, the Somali authoriies’ increased and internaionally backed ani-piracy eforts that have resulted in reduced earning possibiliies. Several of the measures implemented are sill being maintained.

It is likely that Somalia will coninue to be fraught with poliical instability and military conlicts. The precarious situaion in the country could therefore result in a revival of piracy.


The ArcticRussia expects a recommendaion in 2017 from the UN Commission on the Limits of the Coninental Shelf on the country’s territorial claims in the Arcic. Whatever the outcome, the Danish Commonwealth will face a challenge in insising that the border demarcaion issue be resolved in compliance with internaional law. It is likely that Russia will coninue to pursue a cooperaive track, as long as doing so will safeguard the majority of its interests in the region. However, Russia’s course of cooperaion is increasingly challenged by a circle of inluenial Russian poliicians with security and defence policy experise pushing for a stronger and more asserive Arcic policy. In recent years, China has increased its interest and its involvement in the Arcic and Greenland. China’s main interest in the Arcic is the prospect of new sea routes and access to raw materials. China’s Arcic involvement is also driven by its ambiion to strengthen its inluence on Arcic policies, which China seeks to achieve through strengthened bilateral ies to the Arcic naions, including Denmark and Greenland.

Russia in the Arcic regionRussia sees itself as the leading Arcic power. This is manifested in the leadership’s poliical prioriies and military aciviies in the region. Sill, the Arcic is broadly unafected by the growing tensions between Russia and the West. Consensus sill prevails among Arcic countries on resolving possible disputes peacefully. Nevertheless, Russia’s distrust of the West afects its prioriies in the Arcic providing a strong impetus for Russia to strengthen its military presence

and pursue a more self-asserive policy.

The main track in Russia’s Arcic policy revolves around safeguarding its interests through internaional cooperaion and negoiaion. Russia gives priority to the cooperaion with the other Arcic states and has adopted a construcive approach to solving shared challenges in the Arcic. Russia, in line with other Arcic countries, has great interest in maintaining stability and peace in the Arcic region. Russia has access to extensive natural resources in the region, but needs massive investments and transfer of technology to uilize them. Also, friendly relaions between the Arcic states are a precondiion for negoiaing border demarcaion between the Arcic coastal states.

Sill, in recent years this main track has been supplemented by another track, a track strongly encouraged by key Russian poliicians and oicials – most of whom are involved in security and defence policy – who are scepical of Russia’s cooperaive course. They believe that the West will use this cooperaion to counteract Russian interests in the Arcic. This other track may at imes overshadow the cooperaion track.

The Arcic countries must reach agreement on a number of concerns in coming years. For the Danish Commonwealth, the most central concern is the issue of border demarcaion between the Arcic coastal states, which ulimately can only be resolved through negoiaions among the states

that have overlapping claims.

Russia expects to receive an answer from the UN Commission on the Limits of the Coninental Shelf (CLCS) as early as next year on its claims to the North Pole seabed, even though it is as yet unclear when the CLCS will deliver its recommendaion. The Danish Commonwealth has submited a claim to the CLCS which extensively overlaps with claims made by Russia, but will have to wait between ive to ten years for a decision. If, as in 2001, key parts of Russia’s claims are rejected by the CLCS, the possibility cannot be excluded that Russia will disregard the recommendaion, potenially complicaing the subsequent border demarcaion. It is sill possible that Russia will pursue the track of bilateral negoiaions, but disregard the recommendaions by the CLCS.

If the CLCS backs the Russian claims, parts of the Russian leadership could potenially view the CLCS’s recommendaion as inal and regard the region as Russian. In this event, they would work to exert Russia’s rights to the region based on the CLCS recommendaions even though consensus with Denmark on the issue of demarcaion is pending and Russia therefore is not enitled to the region. In that case, disagreements over exploitaion rights to the seabed and regional control could intensify.

Military expansion coninuesRussia will coninue to expand its Arcic military capabiliies. The nature of Russia’s military expansion and aciviies in the region is primarily defensive. For several years, Russia has rebuilt and expanded six forward bases on the Russian islands in the Arcic Ocean.

The Arcic is the home base to a large number of Russian nuclear submarines patrolling the Arcic seas. The submarines have to a high degree been able to operate undetected under the Arcic ice, but the ice cap


will diminish in coming years, leaving the submarines increasingly exposed and expediing the need to safeguard the submarines against air atacks.

Russia coninues to build infrastructure in support of navigaion in the North-East Passage in hopes that traic along the Passage will increase in coming years. Russia is focusing on establishing complete control over the North-East Passage, for instance by reinforcing the forward

bases. As traic grows, so does Russia’s need to be able to exercise control over the shipping routes, and Russia is strengthening its border control and search-and rescue capabiliies.

At the same ime, Russia is expanding its military presence, acivity and capabiliies in the Arcic region and Russia now commands several Arcic-viable military units. Also, Russia increasingly focuses on its ability to address potenial military threats and to move its line of defence as far north as possible.

In addiion to the expansion of its defensive capabiliies, Russia will coninue a more ofensive demonstraion policy. In both 2015 and 2016, Russia has carried out airborne landing exercises close to the North Pole, and it is likely that Russia will carry out the same type of exercise in 2017. The siing of the exercises in this area is primarily symbolic and intended as a signal to the other Arcic states that the area up to the North Pole belongs to Russia.

China in the Arcic regionChina has recently increased its interest and its involvement in the Arcic. China’s primary interests in the Arcic are sill raw materials and access to the Northern sea routes. Further, China has a strategic interest in posiioning itself as an inluenial actor in the Arcic, not only through internaional Arcic cooperaion forums, but also bilaterally with Arcic countries and coastal naions.

China has sill got an increasing demand for energy and the country wish to secure access to resources without relying

exclusively on one country or region. Despite the limited growth in the current market for raw materials, China is keeping an interest in important resources for the ime when market prices will rise again and extracion of raw materials in the Arcic is more economically atracive.

China’s interest in the Arcic shipping lanes is mainly commercial. China sees the North East Passage, which runs along Russia’s northern coast, as a potenial atracive opportunity for transportaion of both Chinese-produced goods and raw materials extracted in the Arcic. The Arcic shipping lanes are sill only navigable during the summer months, and expenses for reloading of freight and ice-breaker assistance exceed the commercial proits. Consequently, the North-East Passage will only be atracive to China once the route is open for extended parts of the year.

Mariime demarcaion in the Arcic

The ive Arcic coastal states agree that they will rely on the internaional laws of the sea and submission of claims to resolve border demarcaion and administraive issues in the Arcic region. Mariime claims revolve around the rights over natural resources on and below the seabed beyond the 200 nauical mile limit, but not resources such as isheries and airspace.

Russia submited its Arcic claims in 2001 but was asked for further documentaion, which was submited in 2015. The Kingdom of Denmark handed in its claim to the area north of Greenland in 2014, and there is signiicant overlap between the Danish and Russian claims. Since Russia has updated an earlier claim, its claim takes priority over the Danish one, and Russia expects that its claim will be processed by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Coninental Shelf (CLCS) in 2017. It remains uncertain when Canada will submit its claims to the Arcic.

A claim from the United States likely presupposes that the United States will raify the UN Convenion on the law of the Sea. Since the United States can also submit overlapping claims, it is uncertain when the CLCS is able to deliver its inal recommendaions concerning the Arcic. The processing ime in the CLCS varies, and the Kingdom of Denmark’s claim will therefore, at the earliest, be inalized within the next 5-10 years. Possible overlapping claims in the Arcic must be resolved through bilateral or mulilateral negoiaions between the countries involved, and these negoiaions can start before the CLCS has delivered its recommendaions.


In recent years, China has worked on gaining a more prominent role in Arcic cooperaion, as observer to the Arcic Council as well as the meeings in the more commercially oriented Arcic Circle forum in Iceland. China has also boosted its focus on bilateral cooperaion, including with Denmark and Russia. China works to ensure the inluence of non-Arcic states in the Arcic region and the country uses Arcic research to increase its abiliies to partner with paricularly the Arcic countries.

China maintains interest in raw materials in Greenland A number of Chinese companies, investment banks and government agencies show a sustained interest in economic involvement in Greenland, especially in raw materials such as iron, zinc and rare earth minerals, but also within other sectors such as tourism and ishing. Another key moivaion for China’s interest in Greenland is its ambiion to strengthen Chinese inluence in the Arcic and on Arcic maters.

Greenland has abundant mineral and natural resources, which China assesses to be criical, or which China may

lack in the future. China’s current interests in Greenland are mainly linked to a resource demand for the country’s industrial producion. However, potenial Chinese investments in Greenland will likely not be a part of a central state-run plan directly aimed at strengthening Chinese involvement in Greenland.

Sill, as a result of close links between Chinese raw materials companies and the poliical system in China, there are certain risks related to large-scale Chinese investments in Greenland due to the efect that large investments would have on an economy of Greenland’s size. In addiion, the risk of poliical interference and pressure increases, when investments concern strategic resources.

China’s ambiion to strengthen its bilateral cooperaion with the Arcic states also extends to Greenland. In Greenland, just as in the rest of the Arcic, China’s main goal is to strengthen its bilateral relaionships and the opportunity to bolster its inluence through increased cooperaion on research and trade.


Afghanistan The Afghan Naional Defense and Security Forces are under pressure and they will coninue to rely heavily on NATO support in the coming years. Problems with leadership, retenion of personnel and corrupion make it diicult for The Afghan Naional Defense and Security Forces to turn the situaion around. Meanwhile, the Taliban is gaining ground, and its conidence in ulimate victory and fear of disunity will dissuade the Taliban leadership from siing down at the negoiaing table. Also contribuing to the diiculies are the rits among the naional unity government and its ensuing inability to realize major reforms. The prospect of unemployment and coninuing conlict efecively pushes migraion to Europe high on the wish list of many young Afghans.

Taliban top leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and his closest allies will further consolidate their hold on the insurgent group in the coming years, reducing – yet not eliminaing – internal disunity within the Taliban. The remaining tensions will probably neither be strong enough to weaken

the group’s cohesion nor its military power. The militant insurgent group known as “Islamic State in the Khorasan Province” (ISKP) will remain the Taliban’s strongest rival in Afghanistan. The Taliban leadership will keep up its uncompromising approach towards the ISKP, and clashes between the Taliban and the ISKP will coninue mainly in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.

In the short term, the Taliban will increase pressure on The Afghan Naional Defense and Security Forces. The insurgents will ighten their grip on Afghanistan’s rural areas from where they will intensify their atacks against exposed checkpoints, small camps and vulnerable district centres, just as they will curb the security forces’ freedom of movement. They will also maintain pressure on exposed provincial capitals, and some will possibly fall briely like Kunduz did in September 2015. The Taliban’s dominance over large, adjoining areas will increase its scope for levying taxes on the local populaion, recruiing new insurgents, and carrying out military operaions.

However, the Taliban’s progress will be blunted by US and NATO support of The Afghan Naional Defense and Security Forces, weakening the Taliban’s freedom of movement and capability to employ large assembled units against The Afghan Naional Defense and Security Forces. The Afghan Naional Defense and Security Forces will remain strongly dependent on NATO support in the form of funding, training and military capabiliies in the coming years.

The intensity of the conlict and the extent of civilian casualies the next few years will coninue at the current level. It is possible that a sharper division will emerge between the areas controlled by the Afghan unity government and the Taliban. The conlict between the government and the Taliban will thus focus on securing

control of a number of key areas and supply lines.

In the next few years, the Taliban leadership will show no interest in real negoiaions on a peace agreement with the Afghan unity government. The insurgency leadership believes that the Taliban will win over the Afghan unity

government in the long run, and it therefore sees no need to sit down at the negoiaing table. Pakistan may be able to pressure the Taliban into paricipaing in internaionally mediated peace negoiaions, but the insurgency leadership will not be pressured into acceping an agreement that it inds unfavourable. Potenial negoiaions may thus probably bear the characterisics of pseudo-negoiaions and have scant prospect of success. However, it is possible that freezing of the lines of confrontaion between the Taliban and the Afghan unity government can lead to local negoiaions and ceaseires.

Growing problems in The Afghan Naional Defense and Security ForcesThe Afghan Naional Defense and Security Forces are crucial to the outcome of the conlict in Afghanistan. These Forces are struggling with problems with recruiing, training and retaining personnel, and these challenges will probably grow in coming years. As a result of losses, deserions or contract expiraions, The Afghan Naional Defense and Security Forces will be forced to recruit numerous new personnel every year. The high personnel turnover results in waste of training and experience. Hence, the consequences are coninuous and perpetual poor morale and efeciveness among the Security Forces.

Weak leadership will coninue to reduce the efeciveness of the Security Forces. However, in coming years, the Security Forces will probably remain militarily superior to the insurgents in targeted operaions. The Afghan unity government has iniiated a number of reforms of the Security Forces. But it is less likely that these reforms will decisively improve the Forces’ capability to establish security in the next few years.


Unity government creaks, but holdsAnother central factor is the naional unity government. The government coninues to come apart at the seams due to the rit between President Ashraf Ghani and the de facto Prime Minister Abdullah Abdullah. They disagree on issues such as reform of the consituion and the holding of parliamentary elecions. The government’s diiculies are intensiied by a growing opposiion spearheaded by former president Hamid Karzai. The disagreement in the government will coninue, but the government will sill hold together, in as much as its unity is a condiion for NATO’s coninued economic and military support. The diicult security situaion in Afghanistan efecively reduces the likelihood of parliamentary elecions in 2017.

It is less likely that there will be marked progress in Afghan governance and economy in the next few years. The government will sill struggle with adoping and aterwards implemening needed reforms aimed at combaing rampant corrupion, etc. For the next decade, Afghanistan will remain heavily dependent on internaional inancial assistance. Contribuions by internaional donors thus make up more than two thirds of the Afghan naional budget. The Afghan economy will not be able to create jobs for the 400,000 young people who enter the labour market every year. In the very long term, improved level of educaion, upgraded infrastructure, investment in agriculture and mining combined with an improved security situaion may pave the way for economic growth.

The prospect of unemployment and coninuing conlict efecively pushes migraion to Europe high on the wish list of many young Afghans as was the case in 2015, when 176,900 Afghans sought asylum in the EU countries. An escalaion of the conlict would increase the inlux of Afghan refugees in Europe. The Afghans’ wish for refuge in Europe is enhanced by the fact that in 2016 Pakistan and Iran have started to expel large groups of refugees.

Pakistan will not change its policy towards the TalibanRelaions between Afghanistan and Pakistan will remain strained in coming years. Especially issues such as Pakistani intervenion against the Taliban and the insurgent group’s paricipaion in real peace negoiaions will hamper bilateral relaions. Pakistan’s cordial relaions with the Taliban have allowed Pakistan to exert inluence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Pakistani government probably fears that a tough approach towards the Taliban could backire, promping the Taliban to turn against the Pakistani government. Thus, chances are slight that Pakistan will crack down on Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan.

The terrorist group Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan is hiding in the mountainous areas on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and possibly supports the Taliban’s insurgency.


Woody Island

Subi Reef

Mischief Reef

Fiery Cross Reef

South China Sea

INDONESIA

CHINATAIWAN

Hainan

MALAYSIABRUNEI

PHILIPPINES

VIETNAM

SRILANKA

MYANMAR

BANGLADESH

LAOS

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

PAPUA NEWGUINEA

INDIA China’s claim line

Map showing China’s claims in the South China Sea


ChinaIn China poliical decision-making powers are becoming more and more concentrated around key leaders and advisors in the country’s poliical elite. China’s growing inluence on developments in the Asia-Paciic challenges its relaions with the United States and a number of neighbouring countries, paricularly in relaion to the South China Sea issue. China’s eforts to increase regional cooperaion and obtain greater inluence in Central Asia also heighten the potenial for tensions with Russia.

Chinese President and leader of the Communist Party, Xi Jinping, is increasingly making himself the main arbiter on all key decisions regarding China’s development and foreign policy. Xi Jinping is China’s strongest leader in several generaions, and going forward it is highly likely that Xi himself will keep on making key decisions about China’s development and foreign policy based on the advice of a narrow group of highly trusted advisors.

Xi Jinping will make use of China’s growing clout on the global poliical and economic scene to take part in seing the agenda for internaional quesions while at the same ime promoing Chinese interests. China’s diplomaic approach to its neighbouring countries will show increased self-assurance and pursuit of own interests.

In the coming year, China’s leadership will focus on preparing the Communist Party’s 19th Naional Party Congress, where a number of leading Chinese poliicians will step down. However, the coming changes in the composiion of China’s leadership do not include Xi Jinping himself, and Xi will seek to maintain a steady course in China’s domesic and foreign policies.

China’s asserive foreign policy challenges the United States China’s foreign policy strategies in the Asia-Paciic pose a signiicant strategic challenge to the United States, but tensions will not translate into armed conlict between the two countries. In the coming years, the US leadership will observe with growing concern how China seeks to adjust the economic and commercial structures of the Asia-Paciic in order to make China the economic centre of the whole region.

Due to the large populaion and the economic potenial of the Asia-Paciic, seing the rules for regional trade is not only a regional but also a global mater. Consequently, China and the United States will most likely keep on compeing for inluence to set those rules by advocaing their diferent strategies for overall regional free trade.

China coninues its South China Sea policy China will highly likely coninue its current course in the South China Sea, which aims at increasing its exercise of authority in the area. Using both military and civilian components, China will increasingly seek to monitor and control the parts of the South China Sea that China considers part of its legiimate territory without regard to other countries’ corresponding claims nor Western criicism of China’s conduct in the area. In this context, it is likely that China will coninue the build-up of military installaions on the ariicial islands in the Spratly Islands.

However, China will only be able to monitor and enforce an air defence ideniicaion zone in the South China Sea in the medium term at the earliest. In the short to medium term, it is less likely that China will establish an air defence ideniicaion zone corresponding to the zone it set up in 2013 in order to gain control over parts of the airspace over the East China Sea.

Tensions between China and Russia are expected China’s growing regional inluence and self-assured foreign policy towards its neighbouring states will not only spark tensions with the United States, but will also result in tensions with Russia. Especially China’s increased presence in Central Asia, which Russia regards as a part of the Russian sphere of interest, will probably become an object of increased atenion from the Russian leadership because Russia will lose poliical and economic inluence in the region.

Despite Russian scepicism concerning China’s foreign policy conduct in Russia’s neighbouring areas, China and Russia will have a common interest in working together

against the global inluence of the United States and will emphasize common interests and values through mulilateral insituions. It is highly likely that China will carry greater weight than Russia, both in their bilateral relaionship and in their joint eforts.


Esimated range of Iran’s current ballisic missiles

Safeguards agreements and the IAEA

The Internaional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) acts as the internaional community’s nuclear inspectorate. The individual member states sign safeguards agreements with the IAEA which regulate the agency’s inspecion and control eforts.

A key agreement in the complex is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferaion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which among other things, directs non-nuclear weapon states to sign safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

The goal for the IAEA is to verify that the informaion provided by a country about its nuclear aciviies is correct and complete and that no nuclear material or equipment is diverted to non-peaceful use.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass DestructionIran coninues to develop its ballisic missile capability, though the agreement on the country’s nuclear programme has reduced its nuclear capability. It is likely that Iran will honour the nuclear agreement in the short term. North Korea coninues to challenge internaional treaies by systemaically expanding its capacity to produce nuclear weapons and means of delivery. North Korea has contributed to the proliferaion of sensiive technology to other countries. Knowledge and technology transfer will generally consitute a signiicant future threat to the internaional non-proliferaion regimes.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Acion (JCPOA) went into efect in October 2015. The agreement grants the Internaional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) increased access to inspect and monitor faciliies in Iran, making it virtually impossible for Iran to secretly produce issile material for nuclear weapons at known Iranian faciliies.

The agreement has cut back Iran’s uranium enrichment

capacity to half its pre-agreement level. The country has now been restricted to operate only 5,060 centrifuges. Iran’s plutonium producion capabiliies have also been reduced. The Arak heavy water reactor is being redesigned, rendering it unsuited for producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. Iran has also abandoned building heavy water reactors for the duraion of the agreement.

According to the agreement, procurement for Iran’s nuclear industry must follow certain guidelines. Under the agreement Iran is required to seek approval for any such purchases with representaives from the JCPOA paries. It is as yet unclear how efecive this mechanism will be in creaing transparency in Iran’s nuclear-related

procurement aciviies.

Implementaion of the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programmeOn 16 January 2016, the IAEA conirmed the implementaion of the agreement. Aterwards, several of the sancions against Iran were lited in accordance with the agreement.

The agreement’s imprecise wording in certain places may give rise to confusion and disagreement as to whether Iran is in fact upholding the agreement.

Since the implementaion of the agreement, Iran on several occasions has distanced itself from both the actual agreement and the West in general as well as the United States in paricular. However, it is likely that all paries will uphold the agreement in the short term, though it is equally likely that tensions will coninue between the paries to the agreement.

3,500 km Musudan

2,300 km Ashura

2,000 km Shabab-3 mod 3

1,300 km Shabab-3

Iran

Yemen

Oman

Afghanistan

Pakistan

India

China

KasakhstanUkraine

Romenia

Bulgaria

Turkey

Syria

Egypt

Sudan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Saudi Arabia

Iraq

Russia


Two possible nuclear weapons tracks

Nuclear weapons are based on weapons-grade issile material, either plutonium or uranium. Weapons-grade plutonium can only be produced in a nuclear reactor. Uranium can be enriched to weapons-grade in various ways.

Common to the two tracks is that they require massive investments in infrastructure and training of relevant personnel.

The internaional community atempts to regulate the knowledge and equipment necessary for development of nuclear weapons through treaies. However, the proliferaion of relevant knowledge and capabiliies puts these treaies under considerable pressure.

From nuclear devices to nuclear weapons

Development of a nuclear weapon typically requires a number of tests of nuclear devices, dependent on prior knowledge and experience. The tesing process stretches from a test of the design concept, a “physics experiment”, to a series of tests with the ulimate goal of obtaining a viable nuclear weapon.The objecive of the “physics experiment” is to establish the best possible foundaion for the further design and opimizaion work. Before a funcional nuclear weapon is completed, the nuclear device must be integrated with a means of delivery, for example a ballisic missile.

It is diicult to assess how far along a country is in weaponizing a nuclear weapon based solely on the number of nuclear tests. A qualiied assessment requires speciic knowledge of the tests carried out.

Iran coninues to improve its ballisic missile programmeIran’s ballisic missile programme is one of the most advanced in the Middle East, and the range of Iran’s ballisic missiles extends as far away as south-east Europe.

Iran coninues to improve the accuracy of its operaional ballisic missiles. Increased accuracy will make the country’s missiles a more credible threat.

Iran coninues to test short- and medium-range ballisic missiles as well as space rockets. It is likely that Iran will coninue to test and improve the accuracy and range of its ballisic missiles.

Fith North Korean nuclear test in ten yearsNorth Korea carried out its fourth nuclear test in January 2016 and its ith nuclear test in September 2016. Earlier tests were carried out in 2006, 2009 and 2013. Following the test in January 2016, the regime claimed to have successfully tested a hydrogen bomb, suggesing that the country had made signiicant technological progress. However, it is less likely that North Korea conducted a successful test of a hydrogen bomb. On the other hand, ater the test in September 2016, the regime claimed to have tested an actual nuclear warhead, which would give North Korea a real nuclear deterrence capacity. The

explosive yield of North Korea’s ith nuclear test exceeded that of all of the previous ones without being signiicantly larger. The tests conirm that North Korea coninues to work systemaically on the development of its nuclear weapons programme. It is sill likely that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons that can be delivered by a ballisic missile.

North Korea remains capable of conducing a nuclear test at short noice. Nuclear device tesing is a precondiion for the development of sophisicated, reliable nuclear weapons.

North Korea’s proliferaion of WMD technologyNorth Korea coninues to produce the issile material plutonium, and the country has developed the capabiliies to use gas centrifuges to enrich uranium.

Technology for the producion of issile material involves a considerable risk of proliferaion, for example through actual ‘Turn-key’ export. North Korea has likely exported a plutonium-producing reactor to Syria. The reactor was bombed and destroyed in 2007.

It is very hard for the internaional community to uncover possible export of centrifuge technology, which can be used to produce weapons-grade uranium. Complete centrifuge faciliies are more diicult to uncover, in as much as the


New producion techniques

New producion techniques pose a considerable challenge for the exising export control regimes. It is now possible to 3D-print materials relevant in WMD-programmes. If one has access to such 3D printers and the right materials, it is possible to produce highly advanced components and parts, requiring only access to 3D drawings of the components.

Modern passenger planes thus contain 3D-printed metal parts in landing gears and jet engines, which are exposed to very high loads during operaion. Also, a group of engineers made a fully funcional 3D printed experimental jet engine.

Expected range of North Korea’s exising ballisic missiles

physical faciliies are smaller than a reactor for producion of plutonium.

North Korea sill poses a serious obstacle for the internaional community’s eforts to limit the proliferaion of nuclear technology for the development of nuclear weapons and has contributed to proliferaion of sensiive technology to other countries.

North Korea coninues to develop its ballisic missilesIn September 2016, North Korea launched three ballisic missiles, probably of the Nodong type, from the western part of the Korean Peninsula towards the east. The Nodong medium-range missiles have a range of 1,200 to 1,500 km.

In June 2016, North Korea tested a Musudan medium-range ballisic missile with parial success. It is possible that a fully developed version of this missile has a range of 3-4,000 km. On the map below, a range of 3,500 km is shown for this missile.

In February 2016, North Korea launched a satellite. The launch was only parially successful, as the satellite was tumbling in orbit. Yet, the launch showed progress in the development of liquid-fuel rockets. Progress in the development of space rockets can oten be transferred to ballisic missiles.

North Korea works on developing missiles with even longer ranges. In the long term, the country will likely possess long-range ballisic missiles capable of reaching parts of NATO’s territory. However, much development is sill needed before the country possesses reliable medium- or long-range ballisic missiles.

Proliferaion risk The general threat from proliferaion of weapons of mass destrucion remains signiicant. The removal of trade barriers have complicated control of dual-use products, which in addiion to their civilian use can also be used to produce weapons of mass destrucion and means of delivery. Export control regimes and sancions contribute to prevening the spread of dual-use products, but challenges such as the growing economies in Asia pose an

increasing problem with regard to proliferaion of dual-use technologies.

Also, access to relevant knowledge is becoming ever easier. Modern means of communicaion facilitate the disseminaion of criical knowledge about the producion of weapons of mass destrucion such as design drawings, sotware for modelling and simulaion, or sotware for controlling advanced producion equipment.

3,500 km Musudan

1,300 km Nodong

Mongolia

Russia

China

Japan

North Korea

South KoreaChina


Terms and definitionsIn order to facilitate the reading of this risk assessment, we have prepared a brief outline of the special terms and deiniions used in our assessments.

Intelligence assessments almost always contain elements

of doubt. The level of probability in assessments must thus always be made clear. To facilitate this and to ensure that all analysts express levels of probability consistently, we use standardized phrases to indicate probability, in paricular when making key assessments.

Probability levels, terms and deiniions used in this risk assessment are as follows:

The scale does not express precise numeric diferences but merely informs the reader whether something is more or less probable than something else. In other words, this scale shows whether we assess the probability to be closer

to 25 per cent than to 50 per cent. This is the best way for us to ensure consistency between analyst intenion and reader interpretaion.

Probability levels are not an exact science but are intended to give the reader an indicaion of our level of certainty. Probability levels, terms and deiniions used in this risk assessment are as follows:

Degrees of probability • Highly unlikely. We do not expect a certain development.

Such a development is (almost) not a possibility. • Less likely/doubful. It is more likely that something will

not happen than vice versa.• Possible. It is a likely possibility, however, we do not

have the basis to assess whether it is more or less

possible that something will happen. • Likely. It is more likely that something will happen than

vice versa.• Highly likely. We expect a certain development. It has

(almost) been conirmed.

Time frames • Few months Very short term• 0-2 years: Short term• 2-5 years: Medium term• 5-10 years: Long term• Over 10 years Very long term

Perspecives exceeding 10 years (very long term) are subject to great uncertainty and are thus only seldom used.




Photo credit list

Front page Collage of photos from pages 20, 28, 34 and DDIS photo

Side 14 US NAVY/ Scanpix: Russian ighter bomber close to US destroyer in the Balic Sea, April 2016

Side 20 JOEL SAGET/Scanpix: Eifel Tower in naional colours, Paris, November 2015

Side 27 JOHN MINCHILLO/AP/Polfoto: Protests in the wake of the DCN leak during the 2016 US presidenial elecion

Side 28 BULENT KILIC/Scanpix: Fighing close to the Turkish-Syrian border, September 2016

Side 34 MOHAMED ABDIWAHAB/Scanpix: Somali security forces in acion in Mogadishu, June 2016

Side 40 Squadron 723/Royal Danish Air Force: Danish warships of Greenland

Side 44 JAWED TANVEER/Scanpix: Soldiers from the Afghan army on patrol in the Kandahar area, October 2016

Side 48 XINHUA/Scanpix: Chinese-Russian naval exercise in South China Sea, September 2016


Danish DefenceIntelligence Service

30 Kastellet2100 Copenhagen

Tel: +45 3332 [email protected]

www.fe-ddis.dk

01 December 2016English ed. ISSN 1604-4444

Documents

Intelligence Risk Assessment 2016 · 2018-04-11 · Intelligence Risk Assessment 5 The Intelligence Risk Assessment from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service brings together a