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International Practices in Policy and
Regulation of Flaring and Venting in
Upstream Operations
Lessons from International Experience
GGFR SCM Workshop
Washington, DC
December , 2011
Anastasiya Rozhkova
Sources
• “International Practices in Flaring and Venting Policy and Regulation and their Adaption for Indonesia”, 2011 GGFR Study requested by DG MIGAS of Indonesia (2011 Regulatory Study)
• “Regulation of Associated Gas Flaring and Venting: Global Overview and Lessons from International Experience”, GGFR Report No. 3, April 2004, www.worldbank.org\ggfr
• “GGFR Voluntary Standard for Global Gas Flaring and Venting Reduction” , www.worldbank.org\ggfr
• Regulatory workshops in Alberta, Canada and a workshop in Russia with participation of regulators from Norway and Alberta, www.worldbank.org\ggfr
• GGFR regulatory assistance in Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Qatar
2
2011 Regulatory Study: Objectives & Output
• PART 1 of the Report
• Workshop
Review, analyze & summarize variety of flaring & venting policies & regulations adopted by a selection of oil producing countries (7 country case studies)
Extract key lessons learned & outline key features of an effective regulatory system
• Part 2 of the Report
• Two workshops
Review existing regulatory system
Conduct extensive consultation
Recommendations on the new design
Propose the roadmap for development and implementation
3
Analytical Framework for Country Case Studies
• Legal & institutional framework, policy:
– roles of legislative &/or executive brunches of power involved in setting flare &
vent policy;
– policy objectives & their main drivers – environmental/climate change, health,
energy efficiency &/or fiscal
– provisions in the national hydrocarbon, environmental and/or other law(s) stating
the policy and granting regulatory powers to specific government bodies etc.,
– Regulatory bodies & their effectiveness:
• Mandate, responsibilities, powers, capacity, overlaps, collaboration mechanisms of the
regulatory bodies;
• Flaring & venting regulations:
• List of key regulations on flaring and venting and their key elements;
• Flaring & venting management concept: circumstances when flaring &
venting are allowed & not allowed;
• Permitting, fines/taxes, targets or combination approach;
4
5
Analytical Framework for Country Case Studies
• Procedures for permit application;
• Clustering requirements;
• Company measurement and reporting requirements including
measurement and reporting of CO2 emissions;
• Monitoring of compliance;
• Enforcement of compliance;
• Technical (performance) requirements (Conversion efficiency
incl. combustion efficiency, liquid separation, smoke emissions, stack
design, pilot flare, spacing requirements, noise, flare pits, etc.)
• Access to flare and vent data
• Tax incentives
• Cost recovery rules for flare reduction investments where
PSCs exist;
• Regulation on access to transportation & processing
infrastructure
Study limitations
• Focus is on policy and regulation on flare and vent
management in upstream oil and gas operations
• Recognition of importance but no detailed analysis of wider
sectoral disbalances such as:
– Pricing distortions
– Local gas market development
– Availability of infrastructure
– Access to infrastructure/regulation of natural monopolies
6
Key lessons learned: Policy
• Government commitment to reduce flaring is critical to success
– Policy decision with understanding of main drivers & trade-offs needs to be made
(ideally this shall define institutional and regulatory set-up)
– Commitment means much more than simply setting targets for elimination (which may
be unrealistic or unachievable)
– Government must follow through on institutional and regulatory measures to ensure
control of flaring
– National strategies and plans for the petroleum sector must include consideration of
associated gas utilisation
– Government must also work to ensure that midstream and downstream markets
support flared gas utilisation
• Without the ability to access viable markets, regulating to reduce flaring is unlikely to succeed
• Reforms to downstream pricing, third party access to infrastructure and interventions to
improve viability of offtakers might be required
• Identification and implementation of government-led or G-leveraged infrastructure projects
7
Key lessons learned: Institutional
• Creation of effective regulatory body with clear mandate (responsibilities, authority),
adequate staff & financial resources (ideally independent)
• The majority of case study countries have separate agencies, reporting to the
relevant Minister, who are responsible for flaring regulation (and other upstream
petroleum regulation)
– not always necessary – Qatar has managed relatively well without such agency. Lack of
such an agency appears to be a problem in Malaysia
– not always effective – Algeria has a separate agency, but the political power of the state
petroleum company appears to override it
• Industry consultation mechanisms are important in ensuring flaring targets are
feasible and regulations are realistic
– Alberta has perhaps the most developed consultation process
– previous failures to consult on the realism of targets are one of the causes cited for the
failures of past flaring bans in Nigeria
8
Key lessons learned: Regulations
• Translation of the policy decision into set of transparent and enforceable
regulations and operational guidelines
• Regulations should establish the framework for reducing flaring wherever it is
economic to do so
– blanket prohibitions are unlikely to be effective, unless backed up by other
measures such as creation of downstream markets
• Emphasis should be on making operators look for opportunities to utilise gas
economically
– Alberta has annual obligations for tests of economic viability – although this is a
potentially complex process
– Nigeria is planning an obligation to „use it or lose it‟ for flared gas
– Kazakhstan is introducing three-yearly economic assessments, backed up by
powers for Government to take unutilised gas for free
• Such tests need to be backed up by an effective enforcement deterrent for
unauthorised flaring
9
Key lessons learned: Enforcement
• Accurate measurement and reporting of flared volumes is necessary if enforcement
is to be effective
– There are a number of jurisdictions where gov-ts lack data or reliable data
• Scarce resources for enforcement should be allocated in a targeted manner, to
ensure they are used efficiently
– Alberta‟s linking of inspections to past track records is a good model here
• Penalties may be useful when they lead to flare reduction
– Nigeria show the ineffectiveness of low penalties in changing behaviour
– threats to suspend or withdraw licences for flaring may not be credible
10
Key lessons learned: The importance of data
• Regulation of flaring is critically dependent on access to reliable and consistent
data
– identify need for intervention
– monitor achievements and trends
– rapidly identify and respond to large increases in flaring
• Publication of data on company performance and field-by-field flaring volumes can
support flaring reduction
– creates public pressure to improve, even where monetary penalties may be
limited
– helps interested parties identify flared gas volumes which may be utilised
11
The case studies
Case Studies Justification
Alberta (Canada) Examples of international best practice, achieving and
maintaining very low flaring rates Norway
Kazakhstan Engaged in process of ‘learning by doing’ with ongoing
improvements to regulatory framework for gas flaring
Nigeria Limited success in reducing gas flaring due to conflicts of
interest, lack of downstream markets and poor enforcement
Algeria Successful in reducing gas flaring over time, despite
institutional limitations
Summary Case Studies
Malaysia Reliance on voluntary actions to reduce flaring appears to
have largely been ineffective
Qatar
A contrasting example, where the absence of a formal
regulatory framework has not prevented dramatic reductions
in flaring intensity
12
Alberta (Canada)
13
Alberta: Flaring performance
90% 90% 90% 90%91% 91%
92%93%
93%94%
93%
94%95%
95%96% 96% 96% 96%
95%96%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
BCM pa
Solution (associated)
gas flared and vented
Share of solution
(associated) gas conserved
Source: ERCB
14
Alberta: Institutional
– Regulation of gas flaring and venting was originally driven by concerns over wasted
resources, but more recently environmental considerations have become
paramount
– The Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) is the independent upstream
energy regulator. ERCB is the latest in a line of energy regulatory agencies
functioning since 1938 and was created in 2008 when upstream and downstream
regulation were separated
– Consultation with key stakeholders on environmental matters is formalised through
the Clean Air Strategic Alliance (CASA), a government-funded platform for dialogue
including industry, environment and health organisations and consumer groups.
Within CASA a dedicated flaring and venting team has been put in place
15
Alberta: ERCB organogram
Chairman/CEOBoard Members
Senior Advisor to the
Chair
Public InvolvementSenior Executive to
the Chair
Regulatory
Development
Executive Manager
Central Council and
Law Branch
Executive Manager
Board Project
Executive Manager
Chief Operating
Officer
Finance Branch Chief
Financial Officer &
Executive Manager
Board Secretariat
Public Security
Officer
Oil Sand Branch
Executive Manager
Applications Branch
Executive Manager
Field Surveillance &
Operations Branch
Executive Manager
Geology,
Environmental,
Science & Economics
Executive Manager
Information & System
Service Executive
Manager
Corporate Services
Branch Executive
Manager
Oil Sands and Coal
Mining Manager
Chief Operations
Engineer
Insitu Oil Sands
Manager
Chief and Senior
Advisor
Facilities Applications
Manager
Business Op. &
Dev.Manager
Resources
Applications Mngr.
Senior Applications
Officer
Senior Advisors
Sr. Technical
Engineer
Emergency Mgmt
Mngr
Field Operations
Manager
Technical Operations
Manager
Liability Management
Manager
Bus. Analysis
System & Supp Mngr
Advisory& Regulatory
Change Mngr
AGS Mngr & Prov.
Geologist
Economics
Manager
Env. Monitoring &
Reg.Mngr
Reserve & Porespace
Mngmt Mngr
Energy-Resource
Appraisal Mngr
Chief and Senior
Advisors
Bus. Info Solutions
Manager
Info Collection &
Dissemination Mngr
Techn. Support and
Infrastr. CTO & Mngr
External Relations
Manager
Human Resources
Manager
Administrative
Services Mngr
Communications
Manager ERCB has 900
staff and 9 field
centres
16
Alberta: Regulations
– Key regulation is Directive 60, originally issued in 1999 in consultation with CASA
– Associated gas flaring volumes are subject to an annual industry-wide target,
proposed by ERCB in consultation with CASA. If necessary, ERCB has powers to
impose targets
• Annually, operators assess if associated gas can be utilised economically
– the economic test uses guidelines and parameter values set by ERCB
– if the NPV of a project is greater than C$-50,000, it must be implemented
– operators in proximity are required to consider the option of clustering
– where utilisation is not economic, flaring must conform to strict standards
17
Associated Gas Decision Tree
Alberta: Flaring management framework
18
Alberta: Enforcement
– Penalties apply to individual facilities in case of non compliance
– Operators flaring or venting above 100 m3/month have to report their flaring and
venting quantities, which are published to increase transparency and pressure to
reduce flaring
– Penalties for non-compliance are applied in relation to the severity of the
consequences and whether the operator has a previous record of non-compliance
– ERCB enforces compliance through inspections. The frequency of inspections also
increases with the significance of flaring volumes and impacts and with previous
records of non-compliance
19
Alberta: Publication of flaring data
ERCB annually reports flaring by company and their ranking
Maps show the levels of flaring and venting affecting townships
20
Alberta: Lessons learned
– Continued strong political commitment to reducing gas flaring, although motivations
have changed, has been critical
– Alberta‟s approach combines effective enforcement with a degree of flexibility for
operators in implementation
– Consultation with industry produces targets and regulations that are effective but
realistic
– Annual requirements to assess whether gas utilisation projects are economically
viable maintains pressures on operators to explore opportunities to reduce flaring
– Monitoring and enforcement costs are reduced by focus on those operators and
fields with poor past records
21
Nigeria
22
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
000 bpdBCM pa
Oil production
Flared gas'Shut-in' of oil
production and development of
downstream utilisation
Nigeria: Flaring performance
Source: NNPC
23
Nigeria: Institutional
• The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) is responsible for supervising
petroleum industry operations, including gas flaring. DPR is responsible to the
Minister for Petroleum Resources
• Approval of field development plans, including gas utilisation plans, is undertaken
by National Petroleum Investment Management Services, a subsidiary of the
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)
• Onshore and shallow water fields (59% of production) are developed as joint
ventures in which NNPC holds a 55% or 60% share
– NNPC is frequently unable to cover cash costs of investments by JVs
– results in delays in investing in gas-gathering infrastructure
• Deep water fields are developed under PSCs
24
Nigeria: Regulations
• Various acts have been passed setting deadlines for eliminating
flaring and providing incentives for associated gas utilisation
– Associated Gas Reinjection Act 1979 and accompanying decree
set a deadline of 1984 for flaring to cease
– weakened by subsequent decrees allowing continued flaring on
payment of a fine
– Associated Gas Framework Agreement 1979 introduced a
package of fiscal incentives for investments to increase gas
utilisation
– investments have been made in gas utilisation infrastructure, but
seem to be as much about using non-associated as associated
gas
• Other flaring targets (2008 phase-out) have not been met
• Further legislation is now planned
25
Nigeria: Enforcement
• DPR has the authority to suspend or remove licences and permits in
the event of non-compliance of gas flaring and venting regulations.
• Breaches of environmental legislation also carry the risk of
prosecution of the operating company and its employees
• Milder sanctions for non-compliance include the imposition of fines
• In practice, a lack of resources at DPR and the remote and insecure
location of many facilities makes it difficult to conduct regular
inspections
• Sanctions are usually limited to fines
– until 2008, fines for flaring were set at US$0.07/mscf. They were
increased to US$3.50/mscf in that year but they have not been
applied to date
– the low level of fines means operators are often willing to pay
these instead of reducing flaring
26
Nigeria: Petroleum Industry Bill
• The Petroleum Industry Bill would reform the governance of the
petroleum sector as a whole
• The Bill was submitted to the National Assembly in 2009 but has not
progressed and has been subject to large-scale amendments
• With respect to gas flaring, the Bill provides that
– all operators must produce gas utilisation plans within six months
of the Bill being enacted
– where flaring is planned to continue past 1 January 2013, third
parties can bid to use this gas, within 120 days of the plan being
published
– any unplanned (unutilised) gas must be shut-in or reinjected
– no new licences for oil or gas production will be issued unless a
satisfactory gas utilisation programme is in place
27
Nigeria: Downstream markets
• A major cause of flaring has been the lack of a downstream market
– gas-gathering and transportation infrastructure is limited and third party access
is difficult to achieve
– downstream gas prices for power generation have been extremely low
($0.20/mmbtu until recently) and payment uncertain
• Recent reforms aim to address these problems
– a Central Processing Facility (CPF) will be established in each region
– operators will be able to sell associated gas to the CPF or pay for it to process
gas under a tolling arrangement
– the power sector is being reformed and privatised. A new single buyer is being
established with World Bank-backed guarantees
– electricity tariffs and prices of gas into power are being increased (to
$1.0/mmbtu in June 2010 and to $2.0/mmbtu by December 2013)
28
Nigeria: Future gas market structure
29
Nigeria: Lessons learned
• Nigeria‟s efforts to eliminate flaring have been handicapped by
– lack of funding for flaring reduction projects due to combination of JVs and
Government budgetary constraints
– low prices and poor payment records in downstream markets meaning
utilisation projects are unlikely to be commercially viable
– inadequate penalties for flaring, making paying fines preferable to increasing
utilisation and compounded by limited institutional capacity
– conflicts of interest between increasing oil production and eliminating flaring
leading to reluctance to take measures to achieve targets
• The Petroleum Industry Bill and downstream market reforms may help. But the
delays in passing the Bill and numerous rewrites make this questionable
30
Malaysia
31
Malaysia: Flaring performance
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
000 bpdBCM pa
Oil production
Flared gas
Source: NOAA / BP
32
Malaysia: Lessons learned
• Petronas, the major oil and gas producer, is implementing the Towards
Zero Flaring and Venting programme
• State ownership of Petronas and its involvement in most petroleum sector
may mean that a formal regulatory framework has been considered
unnecessary to reduce gas flaring
• However, reliance on voluntary measures appears to have been ineffective
to date
• One concern that has been raised is that any offshore pipeline must involve
Petronas who will also, generally, be the operator. As a result, the viability
of flaring reduction projects by operators other than Petronas can be
dependent on the transport charges applied by Petronas
33
Norway
34
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
0
50
100
150
200
250
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Flared gas (mmcm)Pipeline capacity (bcm)
First export pipeline (Norpipe)
Introduction of CO2 tax
Norway: Flaring performance
Pipeline Capacity
Flared gas
Source: NPD
35
Norway: NPD organogram
Discoveries and Fields
Exploration Director
General HR
Strategy, Communication
and Projects
Internal Services and
Development
Environment and Energy
Prognosis, Analysis and
Data
North Sea
North
North Sea
South
Norwegian
Sea and
Barent Sea
Storting (Parliament)
Standing Committee on Energy and Environment
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE)
Ministry of Environment (MOE)
Department for Climate, Industry and Technology
Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate (NPD)
Department for Climate Change and Pollution
Control
Statoil
Gassco
Climate and Pollution Agency (Klif)
Petoro
State of Environment, Norway
Ministry of Finance (fiscal policy)
The Government
NPD has 210 staff organised into
80 teams. Only 10 staff members
are classified as managers
36
• Norway‟s commitment to eliminate flaring dates back to the start of oil and gas
production. The “10 Oil Commandments” issued in 1971 include:
5 - Flaring of exploitable gas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf must not
be accepted except during brief periods of testing
• Operators are required to include plans for associated gas utilisation or
reinjection in their field development plans
• Since 1991, a CO2 tax has been applied to emissions from the burning of all
hydrocarbons including flaring and venting
• Since 2008, offshore petroleum industry activities have been included in the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme with which Norway is aligned
• Following entry into EU ETS, the CO2 tax was reduced so that the overall
penalty for flaring (tax + EU ETS price) remains constant
Norway: Regulations
37
• Field development plans and gas utilisation plans are approved by NPD and
the Ministry for Petroleum and Energy (MPE).
• Annual flare gas permits must be obtained from the MPE, with strict control on
the volumes and duration of flaring allowed
• Operations are subject to ongoing compliance reporting requirements, and
regular inspections by the NPD.
• The CO2 tax and the Norway ETS impose strict rules as to how flare volumes
and carbon content are to be monitored and reported. This is backed up by an
enforcement system consisting of six-monthly reporting and collection cycles,
and annual inspections
Norway: Enforcement
38
Norway: Lessons learned
• As with Alberta, Norway shows the benefits of a clear political commitment to
reducing gas flaring (in this case, with the “10 commandments”)
• There has been increased emphasis on the use of market mechanisms to
encourage flaring reductions, alongside an emphasis on the climate change
impacts of flaring (CO2 tax and EU ETS)
• Government has taken various measures to encourage gas utilisation and
export including
– promoting the creation of a gas exporting union (subsequently ruled illegal
under EU law)
– forcing the merger of the pipeline interests of major producers into a single
company, operating under a common carriage model
39
Kazakhstan
40 ©
2011 Economic
Consulting
Kazakhstan: Flaring performance
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
000 bpdBCM pa
Oil production
Flared gas
Source: NOAA / BP
41
Kazakhstan: Institutional
• The main responsibility for regulating gas flaring and venting activities lies with
the Ministry of Oil and Gas (MOG)
– MOG‟s implementing agency for gas flaring policy is the Committee of
State Inspection of the Oil and Gas Industry (CSIOG). While legally
separated from the MOG, CSIOG is subordinate to MOG
• The Ministry for Environmental Protection (MEP) also plays a key role in the
regulation of gas flaring activities in Kazakhstan
– under MEP, the Committee on Ecological Regulation and Control (CERC)
is responsible for monitoring environmental compliance. Among its
competencies are the issuance of emissions permits
• Industry representatives can voice concerns or suggestions on policy and
regulation within the Foreign Investor‟s Council (FIC). This is a chaired by the
president of Kazakhstan and includes an Oil and Gas group within its structure
42
Kazakhstan: Regulations
• New legislation in 2010 greatly strengthened gas flaring regulations
– gas flaring is only permitted for reasons of safety or on a temporary basis.
Any operator wishing to flare gas is required to have a gas flaring permit
and an ecological permit determining allowed CO2 emissions
– operators must „process‟ (use commercially) gas unless it is shown not to
be economically viable, in which case they can „utilise‟ the gas (eg, for re-
injection). Studies must be updated every three years and approved by
MEP and MOG
• The 2010 legislation also made associated gas the property of the State
– Government can now access associated gas for free, if the operator is not
processing or utilising it
– failure to process or utilise associated gas can be penalised at the
resulting revenue losses to the Government
43
Kazakhstan: Enforcement
• Targets such as the elimination of flaring by 2004 have not been met (there is now an
indicative target of 95% utilisation by 2012)
• Comparisons of officially reported flaring data and NOAA estimates suggest some
under-reporting of flaring
3.1
1.7
6.2
3.8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Offical MEP Data
NOAA Data
Vo
lum
e in
bil
lio
n m
3
Where penalties are applied, these are
generally insignificant despite high fines
being applicable in theory (equal to the
foregone revenue)
actual fines paid totalled $120,000 in
2008 and $114,700 in 2009
MEP charged operators $115 million in
2009, compared to estimated damages
(lost revenues) from flaring of $3 billion
44
• Previous targets (elimination of flaring by 2004) were overly-ambitious and
ineffectual
• Enforcement appears to have been weak (fines much less than potential
penalties and apparent systemic under-reporting of flaring)
• 2010 legislation should greatly strengthen powers of Government to ensure
use of associated gas, but creates its own problems
– can Government credibly commit to enforcing flare processing
requirements in absence of developed downstream markets?
– will penalties be enforced in this case?
Kazakhstan: Lessons learned
45
Algeria
46
Algeria: Flaring performance
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
Flared gas (bcm)Gas (bcm)
Total gas exports
Flare volume
Flare data available for 1994-2008 only
Pipeline capacityTransMed gas pipeline
commissioned
Bettioua LNG plant commssioned
LNG capacity
Mahgreb-Europe gas pipeline commissioned
47
Algeria: Institutional, regulations and enforcement
• Prohibition on flaring reported to have been in place since 1966
• Sonatrach has set objective of recovering 93% of associated gas by 2008-09 and
100% by 2010, but seemingly not achieved
• 2005 Hydrocarbon Law and 2006 Ordinance introduced the following
– prohibition of flaring, except where prior authorisation from ALNAFT (National
Agency for the Development of Hydrocarbon Resources)
– authorisations to flare limited to durations not to exceed 90 days
– permitted flaring subject to a tax of 8,000 DZD per 1,000 Nm³ (~US$110 per
Nm³), modified each year at a fixed rate
• Taxes are estimated to costs operators in excess of US$600 million annually
48
Algeria: Lessons learned
• Algeria appears to take a tough stance on gas flaring
– prohibition on flaring in law since 1966 and reconfirmed in 2005
– one of only three countries (with Nigeria and Norway) that taxes flaring
– current level of flaring tax similar to that levied in Norway.
• However, the ongoing high level of flaring (50-100 Sm² per Sm² oil; maybe more
than half of all associated gas produced) suggests that the strong legal framework
is ineffective in practice
• Lack of evidence of monitoring, reporting, and tax collection. This may in part be
attributable to the political power of Sonatrach.
• Has one of the few operational CCS projects in the world, injecting CO2 removed
during sweetening into a saline formation (Salah Gas)
49
Qatar
50
Qatar: Flaring performance
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
000 boe pdBCM pa
Oil production
Flared gas
Gas production
Start of Al Shaheen Block 5gathering system, delivering associated gas for domestic
market (0.6 BCM pa)Source: NOAA / BP
51
Qatar: Lessons learned
• Qatar has been very successful in reducing flaring intensity, despite dramatic
expansion of oil and gas production (intensity is seen by Qatar as a better measure
than absolute volumes given this growth in output)
• The primary causes appear to be a commitment at the highest levels of
Government to manage the environmental impacts of Qatar‟s energy sector, and its
Government‟s ability to rapidly and effectively implement this committment
• Qatar is now looking to formalise its control of flaring. A Health and Safety
Executive was created in 2005 within Qatar Petroleum (although still in the process
of staffing itself). A regulation on flaring is being drafted by HSE, with assistance
from GGFR
• Qatar‟s circumstances are probably unique and difficult to replicate elsewhere
52