Jounal of Cumculwn and SupenrwonFall 1991, Vol 7, No 1, 1-12

ISSUES IN RESEARCHON INSTRUCTIONAL SUPERVISION:

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION

JEAN HILLS, The University of British Columbia

The environmental perturbation that \riggered the preparation of thisarticle was a chance exposure to the Sprig, 1990 issue of theJournal ofCurriculum and Supervision.' There, in a dis cssion of the state of the art ininstructional supervision research, I found a stimulating exchange of viewson interesting questions and fundamental issues of epistemology and thephilosophy and methodology of science. While I claim no expertise in theformer area, I have had a long-standing interest in the latter. Therefore, fromthe viewpoint of the philosophy and methodology of science, I submit acontribution to the discussion.

Here I draw attention to some problems I have with several articlespublished in the Spring 1990Journal. I have found problems of four kinds:(1) ambiguities in the meanings of words and phrases; (2) apparent contradic-tions in and among the writings of several authors (apparent because theambiguities do not permit a more definite characterization); (3) an artificiallydichotomous formulation of the relationship between two complementaryforms of inquiry; and (4) uncritically held assumptions on the contributionswe might reasoiably expect research to make to practice. I can do no morethan interpret these authors' writings, assume tentatively that I have validlyinterpreted what they wrote, and respond accordingly, leaving them in thesame situation in relation to what I write. In that sense, we are all engagingin hermeneutic studies.

POINTS OF AMBIGUITY

The principal ambiguities I find relate to the meanings or conceptsGarman, Grimmett and Crehan, Blumberg, Sergiovanni, Holland, and Grim-mett associate with various words and phrases: rationalist view of science,science, rational or technical worldview, scientific, doing science, cognitive

'Journal of Curriculum and Supervision 5 (Spnng 1990).

Issues in Research on Instructional Supenrison

rationalism, cognitite-technical-rational, and technical-rational 2 Each termappears to refer to a concept, or a conception, with at least some elements incommon with the others. In none of the articles do the authors provide asufficient amount of discussion to permit us to identify confidently the concep-tion they are referring to. Thus, at the risk of creating a straw person, I drawon all the relevant articles in constructing a composite (and, in relation to anyone author's intention, probably incorrect) conception to use to contrast otherstatements of the same authors.

Garman refers to the use of classroom narratives, checklists, and verbatimobservation protocols; to the rigorous analysis of classroom data operatingfrom "a rationalist, even scientistic, point of view" (p. 207), and to the analyticalcomponent of clinical supervision as "the assumption of the rational or techni-cal worldview laid over the process of clinical supervision" (p. 208). Fromher discussion, I assume that her conception of rationalistic science includessystematically collecting data within predetermined categories (and perhapson the values of preselected variables) with which to analyze and draw infer-ences. Her seeming rejection of the rationalist view and her advocacy forhermeneutics suggest that she considers hermeneutics neither technical norrational.

In their co-written article, Grimmett and Crehan leave room for doubtover their position on what Grimmett, in his separate article, calls "the dominant cognitive-technical-rational paradigm" (p 256) In his separate article,however, Grimmett refers to "the misplaced application to the study of humaninteraction of cognitive-rational methods associated with the natural sciences"and "this unmindful aping of natural science paradigms" (p 25') Therefore,I assume that he, at least, rejects these paradigms.

Blumberg does not reveal what he means by "scientific" and "doingscience" (p. 237ff.), but I assume he refers to the activity of conductingempirical or theoretical studies to identif- and explain generalized relationships among variables. The plausibility of this interpretation gains credencefrom his assertion that "we have gone astray, in our desire to be scientific, intrying to be universalistic about practice through 'science' "(p. 240). Blumbergalso appears to equate science with "the search for universal truths" (p. 240).

Sergiovanni says that "truthfulness" is the standard of validity for the"now discredited notion that supervisory knowledge exists separately from

iNoreen B. Garman, 'heories Embedded in the Events of Clinical Supervision: A Hermeneu-tic Approach, Journal of Curmculum and Supevrtsion 5 (Spring 1990). 201-213. Peter PGrimmeft and E. Patricia Crehan, "Barry A Case Study of Teacher Reflection in Clinical Supervision," Journal of Curriculum and Supervision 5 (Spring 1990). 214-235; Arthur Blumberg,"Toward a Scholarship of Practice,"Jounal of Curriculum and Supervision 5 (Spring 1990)236-243; ThomasJ. Sergiovanni, "An Emerging Scholarship of Practice,"Journal ofCurrlculumand Supervision 5 (Spring 1990). 247-251, Patricia E. Holland, "A Hermeneutic Perspective onSupervision Scholarship,"Journal a/of Curriculum and Supernision 5 (Spring 1990) 252 254,Peter P. Grimmett, "Toward a Practice of Scholarship Beyond the Private Cold War Metaphor,"Journal of Curriculum and Superviwion 5 (Spring 1990): 255-259.

Jean Hills

person and context and directly applies to practice" (p. 247). Thus, I assume heshares Blumberg's equation of science with the search for universal truths.Sergiovanni's apparently approving reference to the view of Handal and LauvAsthat "good supervisory theory is practical, not scientific" (p, 249), though silenton the properties of scientific theory, seems to imply that it is not practical.

Grimmett writes in his separate article of universities' imposition of"cognitive rationalism" on professional schools (p. 255), of the search foruniversal truths within "the dominant cognitive-technical-rational paradigm"of science (p. 256), of "the misplaced application to the study of humanInteraction of cognitive-rational methods associated with the natural sciences"(p. 257), and of "this unmindful aping of natural science paradigms, [which]trivtalizes the study of [supervisory] practice" (p. 257). From these statements,I infer that, by cognittve-technical-rational science, Grimmett means the effortsin the natural sciences to identify and explain empirical regularities by invent-ing conceptual systems that define hypothetical worlds. These natural scien-tists attempt to explain the regularities as logical consequences and specificevents as specific instances of general (covering) laws.

Therefore, I have constructed a composite conception of cognitive-technical-rational science from this (hermeneutic?) analysis: Science as a pro-cess consists of (1) systematically observing, recording, Eind analyzing thevalues of preselected variables (or occurrences of preestablished categoriesof events) to identify universal truths about the relationships among them, (2)inventing conceptual systems that model hypothetical mechanisms capable ofgenerating the relevant phenomena and thus explaining those truths, (3)deriving hypothesized new truths from the conceptual system through validlogical operations, (4) empirically validating, or invalidating, the hypothesizednew truths, and (5) either deriving further hypothesized new truths fromthe conceptual system or reformulating it to achieve consistency with theinvalidating evidence. All these authors reject this sort of science as eithermisplaced, inappropriate, or unproductive for studying human interactiongenerally and supervisory behavior specifically-and well they might rejectparts of it. Thoughtful students of science no longer believe that sciencediscovers universal or even conditional truths.

Though there is no specific reference to other sorts of scholarship thatmany would consider rational, if not scientific (ranging from natural historyresearch, through history, to literary criticism), this characterization of scienceseems to be a reasonably accurate one and one shared widely if not uniformlyor to the exclusion of other approaches among bbth social and natural scien-tists. Although this conception has characteristics in common with what somewould identify as positivist thought, some characterizations of the latterinclude elements not present in the above.3

3For example, see Georg Hennk von Wright, Evplanation and Undestanding (Ithaca NY.Lomrell Unlversity Press, 1971), Karl-Otto Apel, Understanding and EFplanaton (Cambridge.Massachusetts Insutute of Technology Press, 1984).

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APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS

Most of these apparent contractions involve the authors' apparentlyunwitting, but in the present context highly significant, tendency to justifytheir anti rationalist positions by appealing to aspects of the very form ofscience they reject The first, and at once the least obvious and most striking,example is Garman's invocation of Muturana's concept of consensual domainin support of her hermeneutic perspective Not only is this concept an integralpart of a theory that exemplifies the hypothetico-deductive and deductivenomological method common to the natural sciences, but also its proponentsreject the common assumption that communication between living systemsinvolves the transmission of information and that meanings operationallydetermine the course of interaction between such systems.

Muturana and Varela have proposed a conceptual system that characterizes living beings as autopoietic (self-producing) systems.4 This conceptualsystem determines the behavior of living beings not by events external totheir nervous system which would happen if information or meanings determined the course of interactions between them-but by the organizatlon andstructure of the nervous system itself. Interactions with the environment,including those with other beings, serve only as perturbations that triggerstructural changes Thus, "changes that result from the interaction betweenthe living being and its environment are brought about by the disturbingagent but determined by the structure of the disturbed system."'

From this point of view, the language produced by one being, even inthe consensual domain, is a potentially perturbing environmental event forother beings, as well as for the producing being itself Even if the life historiesof the interacting beings are similar', their interactions through the mediumof language involve nothing more than mutually triggering changes of stateas determined by the beings' respective structures. Therefore, in a sense,Garman's appeal to Muturana in opposition to rational science and in defenseof interpretive Inquiry constitutes an appeal to the very science that sheappears to reject. In another sense, however, it does not. Rather than rejectsymbolic (interpretive) explanations in favor of operational (causal) explana-tions, Muturana and Varela cast the two in a relation of essential complementarity. Varela says, "An operational explanation for the living phenomenologyneeds a complementary mode of explanation to be complete, a mode ofexplanation that I have referred to as symbolic."6

'Humberto R Muturana and FranciscoJ Varela,Autopotesis and Cognition The Realizationof the Lyng (Boston! Kluwer, 1980), Humberto R. Muturana and FranciscoJ Varela, The Tree ofKnowledge. The Biological Roots of Human Understanding, trans John Z Young (Boston-Shambhala New Science Library, 1988)5

Humberto R Munirana and FranciscoJ. Varela, The Tree of Knowledge The Biological Rootsof Human Understanding (Boston- Shambhala New Science Library, 1988), p. 96.

6Francisco J. Varela, Principles ofBiological Autonomy (New York. Elsevier, 1979.

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Jean Hills

The second contradiction recurs throughout these articles in the authors'use of various terms: thought, belief, meaning, cognition, theorizing, under-standing, interpretation, intention, goal, cognitive map, and mindscape.Although other approaches are possible, given the state of knowledge onperception, and certainly from the Muturana-Varela point of view, I see nodefensible alternative to regarding the referents designated by these terms aspostulated hypothetical entitles and processes that fulfill logical and explana-tory functions in conceptual systems.' Therefore, in justifyig their rejectionof cognitive-rational-technical science, these authors invoke theoretical mech-anisms from the very science they reject.

The third example of contradiction appears prominently in, but is notconfined to, the Grimmett and Crehan article. There, despite Grimmett'srejection elsewhere of the search for generalized relationships among vari-ables, the authors advance several generalizations based on their case stud>.

Collegiality, then, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to bringabout the reflectivetransformation of expenence. Something-else has to happen within a supportive,cullegial environment. The teacher must name the problem, the pnncipal must acceptthe teacher's designation and explore it collaborativell, the teacher must feel secureenough professionally to risk reconstructing tried-and-true views of classroom practiceand then reframe the context in which further teaching will take place.

To reconstruct their views and reframe their instructional contexts, teachers needto feel a sense of efficacy and empowerment in conference discussions.... Collegialsupportiveness andacceptance of the teacher's designated area of instructional concernthus constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for fostering teacher reflection inclinical supervision. (p. 234)

In addition, Grimmett and Crehan quote, with no indication of disagree-ment, the following theoreucal generalization advanced by LakoffandJohnson:

Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and howwe relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in definingour everyday realities. (p. 219)

In a similar contradiction, Sergiovanni, with apparent approval, quotesthis theoretical proposition from Handal and Lauvas:

Every teacher possesses a "practical theory" of teaching which is subjectively thestrongest determining factor in her educational experience. (p. 249)

In his own voice, Sergiovanni says:

These mindscapes [accumulated self-understandings, personal skills, bundles ofassumptions and beliefs and correlated cognitive maps of how the worlds of supervi-

'Some points of view do not distinguish between observational and theoretical statementsTherefore, such entities and processes differ from those commonly, but mistakenly, referred toas accessible to direct observation only in being postulated higher-order phenomena in terms ofwhich similarly postulated lower-order phenomena are given different meanings (explained)See, for example, Harold L. Brown, Pereption, eory, and Commitment. The New Pbflosoplof Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

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sion, teaching, and schooling work] program the actions and behaviors of teachersand supervisors. (p. 247)

Although other interpretations may be possible, I believe the authors notonly propose generalized relationships among variables but also engage inhigh-level theorizing-both activities they seem to dismiss as "discredited,""misplaced application," or "mindless aping."

DICHOTOMOUS FORMUIATION

The dichotomy here is between the composite view of scientific researchsynthesized from these writings and the view of hermeneutics (interpretiveunderstanding). The writers seem uniformly to regard scientific research ascognitive, rational, and technical. By implication, the hermeneutic interpretivealternative is noncognitive, nonrational, and nontechnical. Moreover, exceptfor theories that feature meanings, metaphors, concepts, and mindscapes(which the authors seem not to regard as theories), the authors appear tobelieve that attempts to develop empirically relevant theory (which necessarilyinvolves general categories and propositions) on human action are inappropriate, illegitimate, or unproductive. From the viewpoint of one prominentsocial scientist, from an examination of common practice, and from a furtherconsideration of the work of Muturana and Varela, I believe this stance ishighly debatable.

Parsons has argued that not only the natural and social-behavioral sciences but also the humanities

should be treated as intellectual disciplines concerned with gaining rational knowl-edge of the human condition and of its products and environment. I include in theconcept of "environment" the cultural or symbolic systems which, like artifacts, areclearly human creations or products of human action, whatever their sources in otherrespects may be interpreted to be.8

In Parsons's view, the intellectual disciplines vary, not in the relevance of thetwo basic methodological standards of science-logical clarity and coherenceand empirical validity-but in

the nature of the objects they study, and consequently the more specific standards andmethods appropriate in implementing the general standards. Another way of puttingthis point is to say that as modes of action oriented to valid knowledge, the disciplines(German Wisseraschften) share the primacy of the values of cognitive rationality, butthe modes of implementation of these values vary as a function of the type of objectstudied, the type of interest manifested, the variety of data available, and the methodappropriate for such study.9

'ralcott Parsons, Theory in the Humanities and Socxulog), Daedalus 2 (Spring 1970). 495(italics added)

91bid.

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Jean Hills

Parsons believes the humanities and the social-behavioral sciences sharea problem arising from the study of human action and certain classes of itsproducts:

They must "lnterpretivel" attempt to understand, in the sense of the German conceptVerstehen, the subjective meanings of that action and those products by "sharing" insome sense the motives and experience of the actors involved and by putting them-selves in the place of those actors, including the creative anistL'

Parsons says, 'This [interpretive understanding of action] is an essentialaspect of the empirical reference of these disciplines."" But which operationsspecific to hermeneutic studies might constitute a mode of establishtng withpersuasive warrantability the empirical validity of such interpretations ts farfrom clear.'2 Realistically, none are comparable to those applied in the naturalsciences. After nearly 400 years, the meanings of Shakespeare's plays are stilldebated vigorously, as are the writings of numerous social scientists, Parsonsincluded."

But the impossibility of achieving certainty on the validity of interpretiveefforts does not imply that every interpretation has equal validity, Assumingthat these authors read my article, a few moments of reflection on theirexperience while reading will, I sincerely hope, convince them of my hypothe-sis. In accordance with common practice, they are actively engaged in theprocess of evaluating my work in terms of its precision, clarity of conceptual-ization, coherence, logical validity, and perhaps, indirectly, empirical validity.Clearly, if I am correct in believing that they are so engaged, and if weaccept these standards as appropriate for assessing the rationality of attemptedcontributions to knowledge, then by their very actions, the authors reveal theinappropriateness of their dichotomous formulation of the issue.4

In answer to the authors' apparent assumption that we cannot codify andextend our knowledge of the meanings of human action by implementingthe cognitive-rationality value pattern, and in particular by trying to developempirically relevant theory, I would only point to the works of Parsons and,more recently, Luhmann.' 5 However wanting Parsons's work may prove to bein the long run, I believe that he has demonstrated beyond any reasonabledoubt that we can usefully treat the meaningful actions of individuals, collectiv-

"°Ibid, p 497"Ibid.'"This comment would not seem to apply to those cases where generalized categories or

patterns of meaning are incorpo'ated into theoretical systems subject to indirect validationthrough the empirical testing of hypotheses-for example, Parsons's pattern variables and theirderivatives.

"David Bevington, "Reconstructuring Shakespeare," Universiy of imcago Magazine 82(Spring 1990): 21-25.

"From this point of view, the recent positivist versus post-positivist, quantitative versusqualitautive, and ratonalist versus naturalistic debates have been much ado about nothing.

'5Nikdas Luhmann, The Differeniaron of Society (New York: Columbia University Press,1982)

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Ioes, and even whole societies within generalized categories and can orderand explain these actions rationally within general theoretical systems. Luh-mann, while relecting central tenets of Parsonman theory, has also contributedsignificantly to a theoretical understanding of social action.

My final reason for regarding as artificial the dichotomy between theinterpretive study of human action (and some of its products) and cognitive-technical-rauonal inquiry derives from a further consideration of the work ofMuturana and Varela. Whereas Parsons insisted on the compaublllty of bothapproaches with the value pattern of cogniuve rationality, Muturana and Varelago one step further and insist on their essential complementarity. They arguethat concepts such as information, purpose, function, and meaning areentirely superfluous in defining and constructing an operational descriptionof livmng systems. Symbolic (communicative) behaviors do not participate asoperational (causal) elements in such systems and thus have no explanatory,manipulative, or predictive value. However, Muturana and Varela insist on theusefulness of symbolic descriptions, which complement operational explana-tions in an essential way. In answering the question whatfor, as opposed towhy, symbolic descriptions conceptually abbreviate, or ignore, underlyingchains of causal mechanisms and concentrate on patterns of particular interestto an inquiring community. As Varela says, a symbolic explanation points toan identification of certain "coherent patterns of behavior to which we chooseto pay attention" without specifying the incomprehensibly complex mecha-nisms that underlie the generation of those patterns i6 Thus, in speaking ofunderstanding language, "we do not trace the sequence of causes from thewaveform in the air to the history of the brain operations, but stmply take Itas a fact that we can understand.17

UNCRITICALLY HELD ASSUMPTIONS

These writers reject the scientific study of supervisory behavior because"our efforts to influence the field by 'doing science' have been largely futile,""[have] failed us," and "have borne little fruit" (p. 239). Sergfovanni arguesindirectly that scientific theories are not practical and are not useful to practicing supervisors and teachers (p. 249ff.). Holland nominates hermeneutius asan alternative to "attempts to fit the study of supervision into the procrustean

'6Francisco J. Varela, Pr-tncuers of Biological Auonomy (New York: Elsevier, 1979), p- 75.

Varela also asserts, In prmciple, all the biological phenomena can be reduced to autopoletiemechanisms,- but he says this statement Is reminimscent of the statement that all the history ofthe universe could be predicted if we only knew all the positions and momenta of all the parclesof the universe so that we could calculate their future tralectories ' To say that such is the case,in pnnciple, '-says nothing about whether it is cognittvely possible or satisfactory" (p 74). 'Thus,autopolesis is, on logical grounds, necessary and sufficient to characterize living systems, asclaimed before. What Is incomplete here ts that autopolesis, though necessary, is not sufficientto give a satisfactory explanation of the living phenomena on both logical and cognitive grounds'(p 77).

'"See FranckscoJ varela, Pmncp/es of BtologicalAuonomy (New York Elsevier, 1979), p 73

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bed of science--[whichl have proven inadequate to portray the complexityof practice" (p 252). Finally, Blumberg rejects the idea of attempting to placesupervision on a scientific footing because "to practice in this sense refers toan idiosyncratic doing of something in the service of some goal, and we cannotcreate a science of 'idiosyncratic doing' " (p. 240).

Although my responses are only more or less plausible conjectures, Ibelieve these statements reflect several highly questionable assumptions. Thefirst is that the only conceivable use of scientific theory and research for thepractitioner is providing the basis for a scientifically reliable technology orfor technically rational decision making. The second is that some otherapproach will prove to be more adequate than the scientific in portraying thecomplexities of practice. The third is the explicitly stated assumption that topractice is to engage in "an idiosyncratic doing of something," and thereforesupervision cannot become a science, even in the applied sense.

On two occasions, 30 and 20 years ago, respectively, Getzels has cogentlydiscussed the relationship between theory and practice in education.' s In thefirst essay, he writes persuasively, albeit in the symbolic-explanatory mode,about successive changes in learning theory and logically related coincidentalchanges in such practical matters as teachers' orientations to teaching, teachingmethods, furniture arrangements, and grouping practices in classrooms. Inthe second essay, he writes:The significant influence of research on [educational] practice comes not piecemeal-study by study, technique by technique, and practice by practice. Rather it comescumulatively through altering the general conceptions and ultimately what Kuhn callsthe paradigms of the human being and of human behavior which serve as the contextfor educational practice It is b) examining these general conceptions and paradigmsthat we may trace systematically both the nature of significant educational researchand the character of its contributions to the classroom.'

In recent years, Gibson and I have drawn heavily on the works of Bronow-ski, Bruner, Parsons, Luhmann, and Vygotsky to synthesize a conceptual sys-tem.2 0 This system deals more satisfactorily with the mechanisms that might

5Jacob W Getzels, 'Theory and Practice in Educational Adminstration: An Old QuestionRevisited, in Admttstratwe 7beory as a Gutde to Aaton, ed Roald F Campbell and James M.iUpham (Chicago. Midwest Administration Center, 1960), pp 37- 58,Jacob W Getzels, "Paradigm

and Practice On the Contributions of Research to Educational Practice," EucationalResearcber20 (No 5, 1969) 10.

' 9Jacob W Getzels, "Paradigm and Practice: On the Contributions of Research to EducationalPractice," Educational Researcber 20 (No. 5, 1969): 10.

ZJean Hills and C Gibson, "Problem Analysis and Reformulation Skills for Administrators"(unpublished manuscript, University of British Columbia, 1988), Jeans Hills and C Gibson,"Reflections on SchOn's The Reflectite Practitioner," in Realection in Teacber Education, ed PeterP Grimmet and Gaalen L Erickson (New York. Teachers College Press, 1988), pp 147-175,JeanHills and C Gibson, "A Conceptual Framework for Thinking about Conceptual FrameworksBridging the Theory Practice Gap" (unpublished manuscript, University of British Columbia,1990),Jacob Bronowski, The Common Sense ofScience (Hammondsworth Penguin Books, 1962),Jacob Bronowskl, The Identity of Man (Garden City, NJ3 American Museum of Science Books,1966);Jacob Bronowski, A Sense of the Future. Essays on Natural Philosopby (Cambridge: Massa-chusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1977), Jacob Bronowski, The Origns of Knowledge and

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underlie the use of Getzels's general conceptions and paradigms than do"sensitizing ideas and concepts," Charters and his colleagues' "aids to insightand understanding," and Morgan's "metaphors that lead us to see and under-stand."21 We have argued that these conceptions are specialized linguistic-conceptual systems with their own vocabularies, concepts, and semantic andsyntactic rules. We can use the linguistic-conceptual systems in the exerciseof analytic competence to select and manipulate information from problematicsituations so we can analyze and reformulate the problematic aspects of thesituation and identify alternative problem formulations and thus alternativesolutions. Further, given the improbability, in the foreseeable future, if ever,of a scientifically reliable technology of teaching, administration, or supervi-sion that would make technically rational decision making possible, we cannotreasonably expect any more of theory and research.

My discussion of the first presumed assumption foreshadows myresponse to the second one, that some approach other than the scientific willbe capable of adequately portraying the complexities of practice. I am uncer-tain about what might constitute an appropriate criterion of adequacy in thiscontext, but any way of portraying anything abstracts from a situation socomplex that the approach cannot possibly portray the situation in any approx-imation of completeness.2 2 If by adequacy we mean sufficient to provide thebasis for a scientifically reliable technology of supervision, then I do notbelieve that any approach is, or is ever likely to be, adequate. At this point, Ican do no more than advance this theoretically defensible conjecture, but Ibelieve that the self-conscious and recursive use of multiple linguistic-conceptualsystems in formulating and reformulating problems will come closest toapproximating adequacy (conceived as the greatest feasible usefulness).

Blumberg's explicit assumption that no practice can become a sciencebecause to practice is to engage in "an idiosyncratic doing of something" is

Imagination (New Haven, CT Yale Umversity Press, 1978),Jerome S Bruner, "Language as aninstrument m Thought.," in Problems of Language and Learning, ed Alan Davies (LondonHeinemann, 1975), pp 61-81; Talcott Parsons, "Culture and the Social System," in 7heores ofSociety, ed Talcott Parsons et al. (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1961), pp. 963-993; Nikdas Luhmann,The Dfferentrrron of Society (New York. Columbia University Press, 1982), L 5. Vygotsky, Thoughtand Language (Cambridge Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1962)

nNeal Gross, "The Use and Abuse of Sociological Inquiry in Training Programs for Educa-uonal Administrators," in The Social Sciences and Educational Administration, ed. Lawrence WDowney and Frederick Enns (Edmonton. Division of Educational Administration, University ofAlberta, 1963), pp. 23-38, W W Charles,Jr, Roald F Campbell, and William L. Cragg, "ImprovingAdministrative Theory and Practice: Three Essential Roles," in Administratve Thbeory as a Guideto Acion, ed. Roald F. Campbell andJames M Lipham (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center,University of Chicago, 1960), pp 171-189, Gareth Morgan, Images of Organzations (BeverlyHills, CA: Sage, 1986).

ZFor an analogous situation, imagine the complexity of the representation that would resultfrom a geologist, a mineralogist, a hydrographer, a botanist, a zoologist, a climatologist, a politicalgeographer, and a demographer trying to synthesize the information that each of their disciplineswould abstract from the same segment of the surface of the earth Remember, we have notincluded the physicist, the chemist, or the entomologist.

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troublesome. He seems to imply that examining the professional behaviorsof physicians, lawyers, engineers, architects, and even scientists themselveswould reveal no common elements that we could identify as having a basisin scientific knowledge. Any common elements that did appear within anyparticular group we would have to attribute to some such source as socializa-tion in common nonscientific elements of culture or chance similarities inthe peculiar physical and mental constitutions of individuals.

CONCLUSION

I do not intend in this critique to discredit hermeneutic, or interpretive,studies. Nor do I want to demonstrate the superiority of what these authorsrefer to as the rational approach to research. Rather, by referring to their ownwords and to the works of other scholars, I have shown the compatibility ofboth approaches with the cognitive-rationality value pattern and thus thelegitimacy of both approaches, as well as their essential complementarity.

If we take seriously the contributions research-shaped generalized con-ceptions (linguistic-conceptual systems) can make to practice, then we willfind ample justification for continuing to pursue what these authors havetermed cognitive-technical-rational research (which, incidentally, can anddoes deal with meaningful action and its symbolic products). If we takeseriously Varela's.arguments on the need for symbolic explanations (includingthose involving systematic theory), then we will find ample justification forconunumg to pursue interpretive investigations of various kinds. We will gainlittle and lose much in attempting to enhance the credibility of one approachby attacking the credibility of the other. Finally, given the improbability ofdeveloping a scientifically reliable technology of teaching, supervision, oradministration, changes and Improvements in practice are more likely to comeabout through evoluuonary processes than through the direct application ofresearch findings of any kind.

Evolution occurs through processes of natural selection from amongstructures sufficiently stable to provide a degree of continuity yet flexibleenough to permit variations. No stability, no evolution; no variations, noevolution. One possible way to increase variations, without risking a self-defeating degree of instability, is to encourage practitioners to approachproblemauc situations through a variety of linguistic-conceptual systems (gen-eralized conceptions). In turn, these systems will increase the variety ofproblem formulauons and thus the variety of problem solutions for us toselect from among in any given situation.23 From that point of view, to be sorigid as to reject particular approaches to research either because they did

Z-The grounds for this asseruon are developed at length in Jean Hills and C Gibson, "AConceptual Framework for Thinking about Conceptual Frameworks BndgtngtheTheory-PracuceGap" (unpublished manuscript, University of British Columbia, 1990)

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not yield directly applicable results or because their standards of rationalitydid not encompass the entire cognitive-rationality value pattern would bedysfunctional. After all, the central epistemological point to the work ofMuturana and Varela is that the ultimate and only test of validity is thedegree to which knowledge contributes to individual and collective adaptivecapacities--adaptive in the sense of constituting structural change that permitsthe relevant system to maintain its autopoietic organization in the face of achanging environment.

JEAN HILLS is Professor of Educational Administration, Faculty of Education, 2125Main Mall, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4,Canada.

Schon, Donald A, ed The Reflecitie Turn Case Studies in and on EducationalPractice. New York. Teachers College Press, 1991 376 pp. $48.95/$24 95

Fourteen cases provide examples of reflection In action from school and othereducational settings and form the basis for Sch6n's own cross-case analysis andconcluding comments. He considers what topics are appropriate to address;what are appropriate ways to observe, reflect on, and represent what prac-titioners do and know, what constitutes appropriate rigor, and the researcher srole in studies of educational practice.

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Copyright © 1991 by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. All rights reserved.