Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations - Analysis on Military ...99).pdf · 2005-11-18 · PREFACE i 1. Scope This publication provides joint tactics, techniques,

Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures forPeace Operations

Joint Pub 3-07.3

12 February 1999

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides joint tactics,techniques, and procedures for the planningand execution of peace operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine andselected joint tactics, techniques, andprocedures (JTTP) to govern the jointactivities and performance of the ArmedForces of the United States in joint operationsand provides the doctrinal basis for USmilitary involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrineand selected tactics, techniques, andprocedures for joint operations and training.It provides military guidance for use by theArmed Forces in preparing their appropriateplans. It is not the intent of this publication torestrict the authority of the joint forcecommander (JFC) from organizing the forceand executing the mission in a manner the JFCdeems most appropriate to ensure unity ofeffort in the accomplishment of the overallmission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics,techniques, and procedures and guidanceestablished in this publication apply to thecommanders of combatant commands,subunified commands, joint task forces, andsubordinate components of these commands.These principles and guidance also may applywhen significant forces of one Service areattached to forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

V. E. CLARKVice Admiral, US NavyDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IPRIMER FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

• US and Multinational Doctrine Development and Terminology................................ I-1• National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and US Policy...................... I-2• Relationship of Peace Operations to Diplomatic Activities........................................ I-3• Legal Basis of Peace Operations............................................................................... I-4• Peace Operations....................................................................................................... I-6• Distinction Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations................... I-10• The Peace Operations Environment......................................................................... I-11• Command and Control ............................................................................................ I-20• Key Documents in Peace Operations....................................................................... I-21• Conclusion.............................................................................................................. I-23

CHAPTER IIPEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

• General.................................................................................................................... II-1• Description of Peacekeeping.................................................................................... II-1• Fundamentals........................................................................................................... II-1• Peacekeeping Personnel and Forces......................................................................... II-3• Peacekeeping Missions.......................................................................................... II-11• Command and Control ........................................................................................... II-14• Planning Considerations......................................................................................... II-15• Employment.......................................................................................................... II-25• Conclusion............................................................................................................. II-33

CHAPTER IIIPEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

• General.................................................................................................................. III-1• Description of Peace Enforcement.......................................................................... III-1• Fundamentals......................................................................................................... III-2• Peace Enforcement Personnel and Forces............................................................... III-4• Peace Enforcement Missions.................................................................................. III-4• Command and Control ........................................................................................... III-6• Planning Considerations......................................................................................... III-7• Employment......................................................................................................... III-13• Conclusion............................................................................................................ III-17

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CHAPTER IVEDUCATION AND TRAINING

• General.................................................................................................................. IV-1• Education............................................................................................................... IV-2• Training ................................................................................................................. IV-2

APPENDIX

A Key Documents in Peace Operations................................................................ A-1B US Government Involvement in Peace Operations............................................. B-1C United Nations Involvement in Peace Operations............................................... C-1D Chains of Command......................................................................................... D-1E References......................................................................................................... E-1F Administrative Instructions................................................................................ F-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms................................................................... GL-1Part II US Terms and Definitions......................................................................... GL-5Part III UN and NATO Terms and Definitions...................................................... GL-9

FIGURE

I-1 Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts................................................. I-3I-2 US Peace Operations.................................................................................... I-6I-3 Principles of Military Operations Other Than War........................................ I-7I-4 Common Characteristics of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

Operations................................................................................................ I-12I-5 Constructs Suitable to the Development of Measures of Effectiveness........ I-19I-6 Key Documents in Peace Operations.......................................................... I-21II-1 Fundamentals of Peacekeeping Operations.................................................. II-2II-2 Ground Force Support Capabilities.............................................................. II-5II-3 Air Assets Support Capabilities................................................................... II-6II-4 Naval Vessels Support Capabilities.............................................................. II-7II-5 US Coast Guard Support Capabilities.......................................................... II-8II-6 Space Force Enhancement Capabilities........................................................ II-8II-7 Geospatial Information and Services Capabilities........................................ II-9II-8 Special Operations Forces Support Capabilities......................................... II-10II-9 Peacekeeping Mission Activities............................................................... II-12II-10 Commander’s Directive Elements.............................................................. II-16II-11 Standing Operating Procedures.................................................................. II-17II-12 Categories of Logistic Support.................................................................. II-18II-13 Examples of Advanced Technology........................................................... II-23II-14 States of Readiness.................................................................................... II-23II-15 Armistice Demarcation Line Trace............................................................ II-27II-16 Deployment of Peacekeeping Forces Along an Armistice

Demarcation Line and Withdrawal of Disputing Forces........................... II-28

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II-17 Withdrawal of Disputing Forces Behind Lines of Demarcation.................. II-29II-18 Establishment of a Buffer Zone................................................................. II-30II-19 Establishment of Areas of Limitation......................................................... II-31II-20 Report Formats in Peacekeeping Operations.............................................. II-32III-1 Peace Enforcement Operations Fundamentals............................................ III-3III-2 Peace Enforcement Operations Command and Control.............................. III-7III-3 Planning Considerations............................................................................ III-8III-4 Peace Enforcement Operations Employment Phases................................. III-14III-5 Peace Enforcement Force Missions During the Enforcement of the

Mandate Phase........................................................................................ III-15IV-1 Education and Training for Peace Operations............................................ IV-1A-A-1 Sample UN PKO Mandate..................................................................... A-A-1A-B-1 Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA.............................................. A-B-2A-C-1 Terms of Reference for US Participation In and Support to the MFO....... A-C-2A-D-1 Rules of Engagement for Operation RESTORE HOPE........................... A-D-1A-E-1 Sample SOP Format for UN PKO........................................................... A-E-1A-F-1 Table of Contents, Sinai Area Information Handbook.............................. A-F-1C-1 United Nations Secretariat........................................................................... C-3C-2 Department of Peacekeeping Operations...................................................... C-4C-3 Extracts from the UN Charter................................................................... C-11D-1 Notional Chain of Command for a Peacekeeping Operation....................... D-1D-2 Chain of Command for Multinational Force and Observers........................ D-2

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Provides an Introduction to Peace Operations

Describes the Related United Nations Charter Chapters

Defines Peacekeeping and Peace EnforcementOperations

Discusses Fundamentals and Key Considerations forOrganizing, Planning, and Conducting Peacekeepingand Peace Enforcement Missions

Outlines Education and Training Considerations

Introduction to Peace Operations

US doctrine is consistent with the doctrine of many nationsin recognizing the important but limited role of militaryforces in the creation of peace in today’s turbulent world— that peace is a product of the will of the parties to aconflict. Influencing that will requires the concurrentapplication of all the instruments of national andinternational power — military, diplomatic, economic, andinformational. These instruments are closely linked withthe conduct of peace operations (PO). There are nostandard PO, each having a unique setting with its ownpolitical, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, andmilitary characteristics. All US military PO supportstrategic and policy objectives and their implementingdiplomatic activities. In addition to PO, the military mayconduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts toestablish peace and order before, during, and after conflict.These include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, andpeace building.

Chapter VI of the United Nations (UN) Charter addressespeaceful means of establishing or maintaining peacethrough conciliation, mediation, adjudication, anddiplomacy. Chapter VII provides the UN Security Councilwith a wide range of enforcement actions, from diplomaticand economic measures to the extensive application ofarmed force. Although the terms peacekeeping and peace

Peace operations (PO)are a type of militaryoperations other thanwar.

The United NationsCharter provides severalmeans for theinternationalcommunity to addressthreats to peace andsecurity.

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enforcement are not in the UN Charter, they generallydescribe actions taken under Chapter VI and Chapter VII,respectively. The US Constitution, the UN Charter, andUS law and policy provide the legal underpinnings for USparticipation in PO.

Although peace operations are guided by the six principlesof military operations other than war (objective, security,unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, and restraint), theprinciples of war should also be considered in those peaceoperations where combat actions are possible.Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are military operationsundertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute,designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of anagreement (cease-fire, truce, and other related agreements)and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term politicalsettlement. Peace enforcement operations (PEO) are theapplication of military force or the threat of its use, normallypursuant to international authorization, to compelcompliance with resolutions or sanctions designed tomaintain or restore peace and order. Although the UnitedStates will normally participate in PO under thesponsorship of the UN or other multinational organization,it reserves the right to conduct PO unilaterally.

Transitions will occur in PO requiring planning for changesto rules of engagement (ROE), force structure, and otheraspects of these missions. Posthostilities activities may alsooccur, requiring early consideration and interagency andmultinational planning concerning responsibilities,activities to take place, and any need for agreements.Because of the dynamic nature of the PO mission, changesmay occur and gray areas can develop requiring closepolitical-military communication and coordination,assessments of the situation and threat, and priorcontingency planning for practical requirements. PKO andPEO take place under different circumstances characterizedby three critical factors: consent, impartiality , and useof force. Commanders who are aware of the importance ofthese factors and how military actions affect them are aptto be more successful in controlling the operational settingand the ultimate success of the operation. The United Statesmay participate in PO under various command and control(C2) arrangements. These arrangements might include aunilateral US operation, a multinational operation with theUnited States as the lead nation, or a multinational operation

Peacekeeping Operations and Peace Enforcement Operations

PO encompasspeacekeeping operations(PKO) and peaceenforcement operations(PEO) conducted insupport of diplomaticefforts to establish andmaintain peace.

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with the United States as a participant or in support. Keydocuments in PO include the mandate, status-of-forcesagreement (SOFA), terms of reference (TOR), and ROE.

The peacekeepers’ main function is to establish apresence which inhibits hostile actions by the disputingparties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. PKOsupport continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve long-termpolitical settlements and normalized peaceful relations.The United States may participate in PKO as a lead nation,as a contingent, or by providing military observers . Theobjective of these operations is to fulfill a mandate, in manycases to reduce or eliminate violence, facilitate theimplementation of an agreement, and support diplomaticefforts to reach a long-term political settlement.Fundamentals of PKO include firmness, impartiality,clarity of intention, anticipation, consent, integration, andfreedom of movement. Coordination between peacekeeping(PK) military forces and international organizations,nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntaryorganizations is an important feature of PKO. US militarypersonnel may perform a wide variety of functions insupport of PKO. They may be detailed to serve on amultinational staff or in an observer group as militaryobservers. The United States may also participate in PKOby providing PK forces. These may include ground, air,maritime, space, and special operations forces. The forcesize, contribution, and mix will vary depending on themission, mandate, and threat in the operational area. PKmissions will usually involve observing, monitoring orsupervising, and assisting parties to a dispute.

The organization of a PK force headquarters willgenerally be structured around common military stafffunctions such as administration, intelligence, operations,logistics, communications, and civil affairs. Thecommander will also have a personal staff and civilianstaff. In UN-sponsored operations, national contingentsperform under operational control of the UN forcecommander. The geographic combatant commanderexercises combatant command (command authority) overUS forces assigned to PKO, and operational control overUS forces attached for PKO in the combatant commander’sarea of responsibility. The US contingent commander, whois the senior US officer, provides the command link betweenUS PK units and the geographic combatant commander.

PKO support diplomaticefforts to establish ormaintain peace in areas ofpotential or actual conflict.

Commanders haveresponsibility for thecommand and control (C2)of the forces assigned tothem.

Fundamentals and Key Considerations of PKO

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The force commander’s directives provide numerousdetails about C2, responsibilities, tasks, methods, forceidentification, media relations, and other details of PK forceoperations.

The mandate, TOR, and SOFA are important sources ofinformation for mission analysis and planning.Additionally, commanders and staffs may gain valuableinsights by reviewing lessons learned from previous PKOor training exercises. In PKO, just as in any other militaryoperation, logistics considerations are as important asoperational considerations. Intelligence is criticallyimportant to a PK force, not only for mission success but toprotect the force. The methodology for collectingintelligence is generally the same as that for any othermilitary operation. Force protection is a high priority fora deployed PK force. Coordination between the PK militaryorganizations and international organizations,nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntaryorganizations is essential to providing a secure PKenvironment within which these organizations can operate.ROE are also an essential element of force protection andwill provide for appropriate action to protect the force.Although the UN utilizes multinational reserves, the UScontingent commander will also designate a US reserve.The US contingent reserve should be sufficiently armed,trained, equipped, funded, advantageously located, andmobile. Technologically advanced equipment canimprove the ability of the PK force to perform its mission.PKO will require contingency planning for disasters,evacuation and handling of displaced persons and refugees,and hostile action. PK employment includes separatingparties to a dispute, observing and reporting, patrolling, andthe operation of checkpoints.

In PEO, the enemy is the dispute, not the belligerentparties or parties to a dispute. Although PEO may requirecombat, they are not wars and may have more restrictiveROE than wars. Conflict, violence, disorder, a high levelof mistrust, and possibly even chaos, rather than peace,describe the environment surrounding PEO. PEO may beconducted in interstate conflicts, but increasingly haveinvolved intrastate conflicts. In PEO, consent of the partiesto the dispute is not a requirement, although some partiesmay extend it. Although there may be some restrictions onweapons and targeting, peace enforcers generally have full

Fundamentals and Key Considerations of PEO

The goal of PEO is toenforce the provisions of amandate designed tomaintain peace and order.

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combat capabilities, depending on the mandate, ROE, andtactical situation. Fundamentals that help guide theconduct of successful PEO include impartiality, restraint inthe use of force, a goal of settlement rather than victory, theuse of methods of coercion, and the presence of civilians.Accurate intelligence and comprehensive missionanalysis will be the basis for determining the structureand composition of the force. The US commander willhave the authority to employ the force’s full range ofcombat capabilities to achieve mission objectives andprotect the force. Peace enforcement (PE) missions mayinclude enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones,protection of humanitarian assistance, operations to restoreorder, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or partiesto a dispute.

For both unilateral and multinational operations, US forceswill probably be structured as a joint task force (JTF).The composition of the JTF will depend on the mission,political objectives, and the threat. For multinationaloperations, PE forces may operate under either a lead nationor a parallel C2 arrangement. US PE forces are normallyemployed in accordance with a detailed campaign oroperation plan, which includes the desired end state and aplan to transition responsibilities. A correspondingpolitical-military interagency plan supports successfulmission achievement and smooth transition. Mission-termination objectives, determined by political objectivesand desired end state and found in a mandate in UNoperations, ideally aim for conditions that will provide thebasis for maintaining or restoring peace and order and along-term settlement of the dispute or conditions that ledto the operation in the first place. Intelligence is developedto support PEO using the same process used in war, but itwill also seek information similar to that which is requiredin PKO. In PEO, fire support is constrained by morerestrictive ROE, and a prime consideration is the need tominimize collateral damage. Logistics planning andsupport in PEO are the same as in war but include theconsiderations for PKO. The combination of informationoperations with other advanced and nonlethaltechnologies that are integrated into an overall campaignor operation plan can help to support PEO. Use of specialequipment requires special consideration for thecapabilities of allies and coalition members. Well-conceived, clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminatedROE can make the difference between success and failurein PO. ROE in PEO are usually less restrictive than in

In most cases, PEO mirrorconventional militaryoperations and possessmany of the same C2characteristics.

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PKO, but more restrictive than in war. To ensure a mobile,survivable force, both engineer and chemical protectionforces provide essential support during peace operations.Employment planning for PEO is the same as for combatoperations, since these may occur. Establishing phasesfor PEO provides an execution framework for staff planning.

Readying forces for PO requires building on the primarypurpose of the Armed Forces of the United States — tofight and win the nation’s wars. In PO, military personneladapt their warfighting skills to the situation. Crediblewarfighting skills are the foundation for successfulperformance in PO. Professional military education andthe training of individuals, units, and staff before, during,and after operations are essential considerations inplanning PO. Members of a deploying force requireknowledge and proficiency in a wide variety of basicmilitary skills as well as specific aspects of the missionand operational area. Negotiation, mediation, and othernonstandard skills will also be required. Situationaltraining exercises to enhance the use of ROE have provenespecially helpful.

This Executive Summary provided an introduction to peaceoperations, along with key considerations for the planningand conduct of these operations. The subsequent chapterselaborate on this basis by providing joint tactics, techniques,and procedures.

Education and Training

Readying forces tosuccessfully conduct POrequires an approachbased on both educationand training.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IPRIMER FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

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1. US and MultinationalDoctrine Development andTerminology

During the Cold War, the military doctrineof the Armed Forces of the United States andits allies focused on deterrence and preparationto fight and win wars. Given changes in thepolitical-military and strategic environmentof the post-Cold War era, the US military andothers began to develop new doctrine. Thisdoctrine addressed a broad range of missionsto include those short of war, called militaryoperations other than war (MOOTW).Some MOOTW came to be called peaceoperations (PO) in the US and othermilitaries, and peace-support operations inother quarters, such as the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Thedifference is not significant. Early drafts of aUS approach to these operations used the term“peace support operations” as a way tohighlight the important but limited role ofmilitary forces in the creation of peace intoday’s turbulent world. This publicationmaintains that approach, but does not use theterm “support,” in order to preserve its usagefor other purposes.

Common to most military doctrine is therecognition that peace is a product of thewill of parties to a conflict and the

“We have seen and we will continue to see a wide range of ambiguousthreats in the shadow area between major war and millennial peace.Americans must understand . . that a number of small challenges, year afteryear, can add up to a more serious challenge to our interests. The time toact, to help our friends by adding our strength to the equation, is not whenthe threat is at our doorstep, when the stakes are highest and the neededresources enormous. We must be prepared to commit our political, economic,and if necessary, military power when the threat is still manageable andwhen its prudent use can prevent the threat from growing.”

George ShultzSecretary of State, 1986

concurrent application of all theinstruments of national and internationalpower — military, diplomatic, economic, andinformational. NATO doctrine for peacesupport operations, in fact, includeshumanitarian efforts as part of the doctrine,while US doctrine does not. Again, thedifference is not significant since US doctrineaddresses such efforts separately, but in amanner that closely links those humanitarianefforts with the conduct of PO. (See JointPub 3-07.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Foreign HumanitarianAssistance,” and Part III of the glossary ofthis publication, “UN and NATOTerminology.”) For the Armed Forces ofthe United States, PO encompasspeacekeeping operations (PKO) and peaceenforcement operations (PEO). SinceWorld War II, the United States hasparticipated in and supported several types ofthese operations, ranging from the moretraditional peacekeeping missions, like themultinational force and observers (MFO) inthe Sinai, to more complex andmultidimensional operations, like theUnited Nations (UN) transition Authority inCambodia (UNTAC) or the UN Mission inHaiti (UNMIH). These included missionsunder the legal authority of mandatespromulgated by the UN and othermultinational organizations. Also included

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were tasks that ranged from monitoring andobserving cease-fires and separation of formerbelligerents to more complex tasks ofsupporting civilian efforts to assist in elections,rehabilitation of civic institutions,establishment and support of civilian police,and the reintegration of former combatants tonormal life. There is no standard peaceoperation. As in other types of militaryoperations, PO will have a unique settingwith their own political, diplomatic,geographic, economic, cultural, andmilitary characteristics.

2. National Security Strategy,National Military Strategy,and US Policy

US military participation in PO supportsthe national security strategy (NSS),national military strategy (NMS), and USpolicy. The US approach is to apply effectivepolicies and strategies which combine thefour instruments of national power(diplomatic, economic, informational, andmilitary). With the careful orchestration ofthese instruments, in conjunction with otherinternational resources, the peace process maybe effective. The nature of each situation,

coupled with the desired end state, as relatedto US national strategies and interests, guidesthe National Command Authorities (NCA)in the selection and balance of theinstruments of national power. Theresulting US policy is then implementedpreferably through diplomatic activities,supported by military, economic, andinformational efforts designed to achieve USobjectives.

“The world has grown smaller, in recentyears ever more rapidly. It is hard todivorce our country from a number ofconflicts to which years ago we wouldhave hardly paid any attention. Whilewe cannot engage ourselves in allconflicts, we now have a choice. It isalso true that if we move early indealing with these conflicts, and if wehave an effective method for carryingout international peace enforcement,especially in a preventative way, wehave a new tool which can help in theearly resolution of enormously difficult,potentially intractable situations thatcould well offset our national interestand our future.”

Ambassador Thomas R. PickeringRemarks to an NDU Conference

While there is no standard peacekeeping operation, monitoring and observingevents in the area is a common task for joint forces.

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3. Relationship of PeaceOperations to DiplomaticActivities

All US military PO support strategic andpolicy objectives and their implementingdiplomatic activities. Military support ofdiplomatic activities improves the chances forsuccess in the peace process by lendingcredibility to diplomatic actions anddemonstrating resolve to achieve viablepolitical settlements. In addition to PO (PKOand PEO), the military may conduct

operations in support of diplomatic effortsto establish peace and order before, during,and after conflict. These are listed in FigureI-1 and described below.

• Preventive Diplomacy. Preventivediplomacy consists of diplomaticactions taken in advance of apredictable crisis to prevent or limitviolence. An example of military supportto preventive diplomacy is the preventivedeployment Operation ABLE SENTRY,where US forces deployed in 1993 in

OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATICEFFORTS

DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS TAKEN IN ADVANCE OF A PREDICTABLECRISIS TO PREVENT OR LIMIT VIOLENCE

THE PROCESS OF DIPLOMACY, MEDIATION, NEGOTIATION, OROTHER FORMS OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT ARRANGES ANEND TO A DISPUTE AND RESOLVES THE ISSUES THAT LED TOCONFLICT

POSTCONFLICT ACTIONS, PREDOMINATELY DIPLOMATIC,ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY-RELATED, THAT STRENGTHEN ANDREBUILD GOVERNMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS INORDER TO AVOID A RELAPSE INTO CONFLICT

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

PEACEMAKING

PEACE BUILDING

Figure I-1. Operations in Support of Diplomatic Efforts

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support of the UN effort to limit thespread of fighting in the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia. If preventivediplomacy is successful and conflict isaverted, the military may conduct PKOto help ensure agreements are followedby the parties to the dispute.

• Peacemaking. Peacemaking is theprocess of diplomacy, mediation,negotiation, or other forms of peacefulsettlement that arranges an end to adispute and resolves the issues that ledto conflict. Military support to thepeacemaking process may includeprovision of military expertise to thepeacemaking process, military-to-military relations, security assistance, orother activities to influence the disputingparties to seek a diplomatic settlement.

“Consolidating (the Cold War) victoryrequires a continuing US role and newstrategies to strengthen democraticinstitutions. Military civic action can,in concert with other elements of USstrategy, be an effective means ofachieving US objectives around theglobe.”

General Fred F. Woerner, Jr.US Army, Retired

• Peace Building. Peace building consistsof postconflict actions, predominatelydiplomatic, economic, and security-related, that strengthen and rebuildgovernmental infrastructure andinstitutions in order to avoid a relapseinto conflict. Peace building in thegeographic confines of failed states mayrequire a much longer and more robustpresence. Initially, intervening forcesmay have to assume governing functionsand rebuild absent governmentinstitutions prior to transitioning totraditional peace building actions.Military support to peace building mayinclude PKO, nation assistance, or other

activities which establish an environmentconducive to continuing the postconflictpolitical process. The PO force mayfacilitate demobilization, arms limitation,referenda, national reconciliation,elections, or creation of newgovernments.

See JP 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense(FID),” and JP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint CivilAffairs.”

4. Legal Basis of PeaceOperations

The UN Charter (see extracts in AppendixC, “United Nations Involvement in PeaceOperations,” Figure C-3) provides severalmeans for the international community toaddress threats to peace and security.Although the terms “peacekeeping” and“peace enforcement” are not in the UNCharter, they generally describe actions takenunder the Charter’s Chapter VI and ChapterVII, respectively. Chapter VI addressespeaceful means of establishing ormaintaining peace through conciliation,mediation, adjudication, and diplomacy.Chapter VII provides the UN SecurityCouncil with a wide range of enforcementactions — from diplomatic and economicmeasures to the extensive application of armedforce by the air, sea, and land forces of membernations. The range of potential actions inChapter VII is so broad that operations suchas the UN operations in Korea (1950-1953)and in Kuwait and Iraq (1990-1991) are oftenreferred to as PEO. However, these operationswere considered wars, with an aggressor beingdefined and military victory sought. They arenot operations within the scope of thispublication.

a. The domestic legal authority for USforces to participate in peace operations (eitherUN authorized or UN directed) is founded in

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the US Constitution, the UN Charter, and USstatutes.

“Since wars begin in the minds of men,it is in the minds of men that thedefenses of peace must beconstructed.”

Constitution of the United NationsEducational, Scientific and

Cultural Organization

• The US Constitution. The Constitutionaffords the President independent legalauthority to order the deployment of USforces to support peace operations.Under Article II, the President isexclusively responsible for the “conductof diplomatic affairs.” (Johnson v.Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 [1950]).Further, as Commander in Chief, thePresident has the “power to dispose oftroops and equipment in such a mannerand on such duties as best to promote thesafety of the country.” (Training ofBritish Flying Students in the UnitedStates, Op. Att’y Gen 58, 62 [1941]). Arecognized limitation on thisconstitutional authority is that such adeployment must be to protect USnational security interests or to protectUS nationals abroad.

• The UN Charter. In addition toproviding international legal authority forthe conduct of peace operations, the UNCharter is a treaty ratified by the Presidentwith the advice and consent of the Senateunder the treaty clause of the USConstitution. As such, it constitutesFederal law and provides domestic legalauthority for US support to peaceoperations authorized or directed by theUN. Specifically, Art. 2, Section 5, ofthe UN Charter calls upon all membersto give the UN “every assistance” in anyaction it takes under the Charter. Inaddition, Art. 25 calls upon all member

States to agree to accept and carry outthe decisions of the UN Security Council.

• Statutory Authorization. The Presidentalso has statutory authorization to supportpeace operations. The UN ParticipationAct of 1945 (UNPA) and the ForeignAssistance Act of 1961 (FAA) are the twoprimary statutory enactments whichprovide legal authority for US supportto peace operations. For example,Section 7 of the UNPA (22 US Code(USC) Section 287d-l) authorizes thePresident to provide support, includingthe formal detail of up to 1,000 USmilitary personnel worldwide, to UNdirected peace operations dedicated to thepeaceful settlement of disputes (e.g.,Chapter VI peacekeeping operations).For Chapter VII, peace enforcementoperations, Sections 628 and 630 of theFAA have in the past served as legalauthority for the formal detail of USforces to such UN directed operations(e.g., UNOSOM II).

b. Although the UN has been the mostfrequent sponsor of international PO, regionalorganizations such as NATO, theOrganization of American States (OAS), theOrganization of African Unity (OAU), theEconomic Community of West Africa States,and the Arab League have also acted toprevent, halt, or contain conflict in theirrespective regions. Regional arrangementsto maintain peace and security are the focusof Chapter VIII of the UN Charter .

c. Similarly, some nations have negotiatedmultilateral agreements to create PKOindependent of any permanentinternational forum. An example is theMFO mission established in 1982 on the basisof the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords toProtocol to 1979 Egyptian Israeli Treaty.There have also been instances of other typesof operations such as the loose coalition of

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national units known as the MultinationalForce (MNF) in Beirut. However, suchoperations have usually taken place with thetacit approval of a regional organization orthe UN.

d. Although the United States willnormally participate in PO under thesponsorship of the UN or other multinationalorganization, it reserves the right to conductPO unilaterally.

5. Peace Operations

PO encompass PKO and PEO conductedin support of diplomatic efforts to establishand maintain peace (see Figure I-2). PO aretailored to each situation and may beconducted in support of diplomatic peaceactivities before, during, or after conflict. POare guided by the six principles of MOOTW

which are listed in Figure I-3. The principlesof war should also be considered in thosePO where combat actions are possible.These principles are discussed fully in JointPub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” andJoint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for MilitaryOperations Other Than War.” The latterincludes a discussion of the application of theprinciples of MOOTW to a PO.

a. Peacekeeping Operations. PKO aremilitary operations undertaken with theconsent of all major parties to a dispute,designed to monitor and facilitateimplementation of an agreement (cease fire,truce, or other such agreement) and supportdiplomatic efforts to reach a long-termpolitical settlement. PKO are conducted bypeacekeeping (PK) forces that are impartial.Chapter II, “Peacekeeping Operations,”provides a detailed discussion of PKO.

US PEACE OPERATIONS

the application of military force, orthe threat of its use, to compelcompliance with resolutions orsanctions designed to maintain orrestore peace and order

operations designed to monitor andfacilitate implementation of anagreement and support diplomaticefforts to reach a long-term politicalsettlement

PEACE ENFORCEMENTOPERATIONS

PEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS

PEACE OPERATIONSPEACE OPERATIONS

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Figure I-2. US Peace Operations

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b. Peace Enforcement Operations. PEOare the application of military force or thethreat of its use, normally pursuant tointernational authorization, to compelcompliance with resolutions or sanctionsdesigned to maintain or restore peace andorder. Chapter III, “Peace EnforcementOperations,” provides a detailed discussionof PEO.

c. Transitions. Optimally PK forcesshould not transition to PEO or vice versaunless there is the requisite mandate orpolitical decision and appropriateadjustments to force structure, rules ofengagement (ROE), and other importantaspects of the mission. Nevertheless, just asin war, it is crucial that commanders and theirstaffs continually analyze the mission. In PO,this translates into planning for a possiblyunavoidable transition from PKO to PEOor for other transitions, such as from PEOto PKO. In the former cases especially, rapidand unpredictable events may occur. Bycontrast, the shift from PEO to PKO might bemore deliberate and predictable as theoperation unfolds successfully. Examples oftypes of transitions include the following.

• From a US unilateral operation or amultinational coalition to a UN-ledcoalition. The transition in Haiti forOperation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY isan example of this type of transition. TheUS unilateral effort expanded to a US-led coalition. This coalition then cameunder UN leadership.

• From combat to noncombatoperations. In this type of transition, apeace enforcement (PE) force, forexample, might be prepared by virtue ofits force structure to engage in activecombat operations but, due to its size andcapabilities, serves as a deterrent toopposition. Initial stages of UPHOLDDEMOCRACY in Haiti, conductedunder the auspices of a UN Chapter VIIPeace Enforcement Security CouncilResolution, is an example. Versatile USforces were able to transition swiftly to apreplanned noncombat course of action(COA). Again, continuous missionanalysis is key.

• From military to civilian control.Transitions may involve the transfer ofcertain or most responsibilities to localgovernment and civil agencies as therequirement for some form of militarypresence diminishes. This may occurduring termination of the peaceoperation. Nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) and private voluntaryorganizations (PVOs), for example, maybe responsible for a major contributionto the overall success of the peaceoperation. During Operation UPHOLDDEMOCRACY in Haiti, the desired endstate involved such a transition.

d. Posthostilities Activities. Related totransitions, these activities requireinteragency and multinational planning.Joint forces involved in PK or PE may conductposthostilities operations concurrent with or

PRINCIPLES OFMILITARY OPERATIONS

OTHER THAN WAR

OBJECTIVE

SECURITY

UNITY OF EFFORT

LEGITIMACY

PERSEVERANCE

RESTRAINT

Figure I-3. Principles of MilitaryOperations Other Than War

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following the primary peace operationactivity. These activities may include militarysupport to relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction,or development, negotiation and mediation,management of arms, or human rightsinvestigations conducted by other agencies.In some cases, joint forces will provide directsupport to a recovering host nation (HN) orpopulation. Specific types of support mayinclude but are not limited to demobilizationof belligerent parties, training for demining,temporary support to or repatriation ofrefugees or return of displaced persons to theiroriginal homes, electoral assistance,maintenance of public order and security, ormaintaining a deterrent presence. (Note:Authority for US forces to conduct what iscalled “humanitarian demining” is found inTitle 10, USC, Section 401. As a matter ofpolicy, US forces shall not engage inphysically detecting, lifting, or destroying landmines. The Department of Defense (DOD)has the expertise to establish training programsto assist foreign countries with a land mineproblem.) An example which involves thecontinuing presence of some US forces is theUS Support Group Haiti, formed fol lowingOpera t ion UPHOLD DEMOCRACYby US Southern Command. The mission ofthis force is to conduct civil-militaryoperations (CMO) and exercise command andcontrol (C2) of deployed-for-training unitsconducting humanitarian and civic assistanceoperations approved by the government ofHaiti. Some guidelines for planningposthostilities activities, which shouldcommence prior to the introduction of forces,may include the following.

• Achievement of the end state, asdetermined by the mandate or otherinstructions.

• Determination of correct players such aslocal government agencies, US agencies,NGOs and PVOs, regional powers,

representatives of parties to the conflict,and other military forces.

• Types of activities required, such assecurity assistance, demobilization, andelectoral assistance.

• Funding and other responsibilities.

• The acceptable size, location, types ofunits, and equipment that may berequired in a remaining military elementfrom the PO force or its national ormultinational sponsor.

• Any need for bilateral agreements forfollow-on US presence and activity.

• Establishing appropriate ROE and rulesconcerning treatment of inhabitants andproperty to include procurement, claims,souvenirs, trophies, and adoptions. Illconceived actions or rules can become asource of new disputes, cause parties torenege on agreements, or result inrenewed resolve to further repudiatedobjectives on the part of some of theparties to the conflict. Rules andprocedures should also balance thenecessities of the military situationagainst infrastructure degradation andcivilian casualties. For example,neutralizing a city’s electrical powersupp ly may appear m i l i t a r i l yadvantageous in some PEO, but may alsodisrupt water and sewage treatmentfacilities, which could lead to choleraand dysentery epidemics, thuscomplicating posthostilities activities andrequirements.

• Security Requirements for the USForce and Others. The transition fromhostilities to posthostilities is a volatileand uncertain process. The effectivenessof military operations will often be

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determined by the force’s ability toprovide for its security and ensure thesafety of the civilian population.

• Intelligence Requirements. Timelyand accurate intelligence will aid theforce and other agencies in identifyingand marginalizing potential threats andwill provide information on the needsof the population, the condition of theinfrastructure, and other areas critical toaiding recovery from hostilities.Intelligence support can also assess theeffects politics, history, and culture mayhave on COAs.

• Information Activities. The media mayhave a significant influence on theeventual outcome of the conflict. Asupportive portrayal of militaryoperations during posthostilities activitiescan further the desired end state byenhancing local public support. Effectivepsychological operations (PSYOP) andcivil affairs (CA) can also positivelyimpact posthostilities efforts byinfluencing attitudes and behaviors of avariety of important audiences.Information operations (IO) maycontribute to thwarting activitiescounterproductive to the goals ofposthostilities operations.

See JP 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense(FID),” especially Chapter IV, for a host ofmatters related to posthostilities activities. Seealso JP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint CivilAffairs,” and DA Training Circular 31-34,“Humanitarian Demining OperationsHandbook,” for related material. See alsothe section on Civil Aspects of the DaytonAccords in Annex G (“Historical Examples”)to Appendix A, “Key Documents in PeaceOperations.”

e. Mission Creep. This occurs when themission assigned to a PO force changes in

response to new events or circumstances. Inmost cases, mission creep is undesirable.

• Mission creep may develop frominadequate or false assumptions,misinterpreted intent, or unrealisticdevelopment of implied tasks inplanning. It can also derive from well-meaning but erroneous interpretation oflaw or regulation. One example wouldbe direction to execute civil actionprojects that fall outside the authority ofthe force commander. Mission creep canbe avoided by paying special attentionto specified and implied tasks inplanning, and to the desired end stateduring both planning and execution.Implied tasks especially are subject tointerpretation and require thoroughexamination to conform to higher levelintent and the mission or mandateprovided by higher authorities.

• Mission creep does not includeactivities that: are consistent with themandate; are within the legal authorityof the commander; contribute to thelegitimacy of the force; or enhance forceprotection, even if not specified tasks.

• Circumstances may arise from rapidand unpredictable changes in theoperational environment unrelated tothe activities of the PO force thatthreaten US or indigenous lives orproperty. In such cases, commandersshould apply sufficient force to addressthe threat. ROE should be tailoredaccordingly. Similarly, natural disastersmay require the PO force to supportunderdeveloped or degraded indigenouscapabilities. Continuous political-military assessments of the situation andthreat and prior contingency planningfor practical requirements for missionchanges will confront commanders.Proposed mission changes raisequestions about the commander’s legal

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authority to act, reimbursement, and onthe impact on readiness due to theincreased tempo of operations. Legalsupport will be important in answeringmany of these questions.

6. Distinction BetweenPeacekeeping and PeaceEnforcement Operations

a. A clear distinction between PKO andPEO is important. Although both are PO, theyare not part of a continuum. A distinctdemarcation separates these operations.PKO and PEO take place under differentcircumstances, characterized by three criticalfactors — consent, impartiality , and the useof force. Commanders who are aware of theimportance of these factors and how militaryactions affect them are apt to be moresuccessful in controlling the operationalsetting and the ultimate success of theoperation. Consent is evident where partiesto the conflict, those that shareresponsibility for the strife, exhibitwillingness to accomplish the goals of theoperation. These goals are normallyexpressed in the mandate. Consent may varyfrom grudging acquiescence to enthusiasticacceptance and may shift during the courseof an operation. Impartiality means thatthe PO force will treat all sides in a fairand even-handed manner, recognizingneither aggressor nor victim. This impliesthat the force will carry out its tasks in a waythat fosters the goals of the mandate ratherthan the goals of the parties. During PE, theforce maintains impartiality by focusing onthe current behavior of the involved parties— employing force because of what is beingdone, not because of who is doing it. TheFrench Army has called this notion activeimpartiality. Parties may believe they arebeing treated unfairly and will accuse the POforce of favoring the opposition. They willoften set an impossible standard, demandingthat the PO force affect all parties equally. Butimpartiality does not imply that a PO will

affect all sides equally; even the least intrusivePO is unlikely to do so. However, the standardremains for the PO force to be impartial andeven-handed in its dealings with all sides to aconflict. This standard does not preclude theuse of force in either PKO or PEO. In theformer, the use of force is for self-defense.In the latter, force is used to compel or coercecompliance with established rules.Moreover the central “goal” of PEO isachievement of the mandate, not maintenanceof impartiality. While impartiality is desirable,it may be extremely difficult to attain andmaintain in an actual PEO, no matter how thePE force executes its mission.

b. The Gray Areas. PKO and PEO aredistinct operations, the dividing line beingdetermined by the variables of consent,impartiality, the use of force, and decisionsby the NCA. The existence of a cease-fire tothe conflict among the parties and ademonstrated willingness to negotiate on theirpart are indicators of the presence of consent.Other variables are more clearly within thecontrol of outside actors. However, becauseof the dynamic environment in which theseoperations take place, gray areas candevelop. Such operations foist oncommanders and policymakers the potentialfor uncertainty, ambiguity, and lack of clarity,which requires extremely close political-military communication.

• For example, during PKO conductedunder the general provisions of ChapterVI of the UN Charter, cease-fires maybreak down, factions may withdrawtheir consent, some elements mayoperate outside the authority ofexisting leadership structures, or newpolitical entities may emerge that hadno part in the original granting of consentto the PKO. Therefore, the assigned forcewill be capable of defending itself asappropriate to the threat level in itsoperational area. Force augmentationmay be necessary, and the commander

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of the PKO force will monitor thesituation to ensure the force is capable ofself-protection. Commanders alsoshould be prepared for transition to aPEO, if a change of mission is directed,or for withdrawal if a higher authoritydecides the mission is not achievable. Atthe same time, geographic differencesin the nature of the operation maydevelop or the conflict may spread todifferent geographic areas. Certainsectors of the operational area mayassume different characteristics in termsof threat, consent, perceptions ofimpartiality, and other factors. In thiscase, commanders may need to beflexible and prepared to adjust theactivity of the force in terms ofcomposition, threat posture, and use offorce to account for these differences andnew or emerging guidance from higherauthorities. In these cases, closepolitical-military coordination andcommunication are essential. Many ofthese circumstances arose during theconduct of operations by the UNProtection Force in the Balkans in 1995.

• During PEO conducted with theauthority granted for the use of force

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,the deployment of a robust force, withflexibility in its authority to use force,may serve as a deterrent tounacceptable behavior by parties tothe conflict and others. Such a forcemay encounter a degree of cooperationand consent. It may build on and fosterthis cooperation. In this case, such a forcemay conduct itself in mostcircumstances as if performing PKO,and be prepared to use force toimplement the mandate by virtue of itssize, composition, and authority. Again,close political-military communication isessential to ensure that all military actionssupport the overall political objectives.Many of these circumstances apply to theconduct of operations by the peaceimplementation force in the Balkansduring Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

7. The Peace OperationsEnvironment

PKO are dramatically different than PEOand military operations in support of thediplomatic activities of peace building,peacemaking, and preventive diplomacy.However, the environments of these

The presence of a robust force may serve as an effectivedeterrent in peace operations.

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operations and activities share somecommon characteristics which are listed inFigure I-4 and described below.

a. Primacy of Political Objectives. In POand in war, political objectives derived fromthe NSS, NMS, and US policy drive militarydecisions at every level, from the strategicto the tactical. As in war, commanders shouldadopt COAs and plans that support politicalobjectives. While applicable throughout therange of military operations, two importantfactors are particularly sensitive in PO.

• First, military personnel at all levelsshould understand the objectives of theoperation and the potential impact ofinappropriate military actions.Having such an understanding helpsavoid actions that may have adverseeffects on the force or the mission at thetactical or operational level, andcatastrophic effects on US policy at thestrategic level. Junior personnel could

make decisions which may havesignificant strategic implications.

• Secondly, commanders should remainaware of changes in objectives, thesituation, or the players which demandan adjustment of the militaryoperations. These changes may besubtle, yet failure to recognize them andadjust may lead to operations that do notsupport the attainment of objectives andmay cause needless casualties.

b. Complexity, Ambiguity, andUncertainty. PO often take place in political,military, and cultural situations which arehighly fluid and dynamic. Ambiguity maybe caused by unresolved political issues, anunclear understanding or description of adesired end state, or difficulty in gaininginternational consensus. Additionally, thedeploying PO forces may have little or nofamiliarity with the operational area or thecomplex ethnic and cultural issues which, in

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OFPEACEKEEPING AND PEACEENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Primacy of Political Objectives

Complexity, Ambiguity, and Uncertainty

Parties to the Dispute or Belligerents

The Planning Process

Force Structure and Composition

Interagency Coordination

Nongovernmental Organizations andPrivate Voluntary Organizations

Multinational Cooperation

Information Intensity

Force Protection

Measures of Success

Measures of Effectiveness

Civil Disturbances

Figure I-4. Common Characteristics of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations

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some cases, led to the dispute. Complexityin PO may derive from:

• Difficulty in identifying the disputingparties;

• Absence of basic law and order;

• Widespread destruction of physical andsocial infrastructure and institutions;

• Tenuous cease fire arrangements;

• Environmental damage;

• Threats of disease or epidemics; and

• Emigration (flight) of indigenouspopulation.

Consequently, commanders strive toprovide clear guidelines for military supportof political objectives even when the situationis constantly changing.

c. Parties to the Dispute or Belligerents.The parties to the dispute or the belligerentsmay or may not have professional armiesor organized groups responding reliably toa chain of command. Operations may takeplace within a functioning state or within afailing or failed state. Rogue, undisciplinedelements or paramilitary units may be present.Decisions by the leaders may not bind thesubordinate elements. Loosely organizedgroups of irregulars, criminal syndicates, orother hostile elements of the population maybe present. Multiple parties, each having adifferent agenda or view of participant’smotives, may have to be considered.Disputing or belligerent forces may rangefrom insurgent forces to large military forceswith ground, air, and maritime capabilities.Weapons may range from conventionalmunitions and mines to weapons of massdestruction such as nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) devices. Modern weaponssystems may include surface-to-air and

surface-to-surface missiles as well as long-range mortars.

d. The Planning Process. The planningprocess for PO is the same as for any othermilitary operation. Planners need to ensurethey have a complete understanding of theimplied and specified tasks and the desiredend state before planning begins. However,the wide-spread availability of data and itsbroad dissemination in time-urgent fashion,to civilian and military alike, requiressimultaneous planning for each level of apolitical-military operation. This processwill address as early as possible factors relatedto the location and duration of operations andforce structure.

• Location of Operations. Frequently, POtake place in austere or highlypopulated urban environments.Logistics may become a major challengewhen PO are conducted in remote areaswith poor air and sea ports, over ruggedand broad spans of terrain with poortransportation networks, or in citieswith underdeveloped infrastructure.Therefore, deploying forces requirecareful time-phasing with theappropriate resources to accomplish themiss ion and compensa te fo runanticipated shortfalls. Carefullyplanned and executed reconnaissancesurveys of anticipated operating areascarried out by key members andspecialists of the force are essential to thelater efficient and effective deploymentof the force and associated resources.Logistics and health service referencesand lessons learned found in AppendixE, “References,” will contribute to theskills, knowledge, and training requiredfor successfully meeting thesechallenges.

• Duration of Operations. PO are oftenconducted on short notice, yet mayrequire long-term commitments to

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resolve the issues that led to theescalation of tension or conflict. Yearsof problems may have preceded thesituation, and the disputing parties mayhave determined that violence is justifiedand inevitable. Therefore, long-termsolutions that are primarily politicalin nature should not be assumed to beachievable by short-term militaryactions. The process of reconciliationmay take years. However, PO can helpestablish stable and secure conditions forprogress towards long-term politicalsettlements. Time constraints for theduration of the operation are high-level political-military decisions. Onthe one hand, the declaration of anoperational timescale can cede theinitiative to the parties to the conflict.They can then wait out the departure ofthe PO force. On the other hand,establishing a fixed date for theparticipation of the PO force servesnotice that parties must also workdiligently to resolve their differences,unless they are willing to forgo thesupport of the PO. In either caseestablishing criteria and conditionswhich define a successful end state inas timely a fashion as possible anddirecting efforts to that end state areimportant.

e. Force Structure and Composition.Force selection for PO must consider the roleof units in Major Theater War plans. Plan tomitigate risk and maintain flexibility toexecute other aspects of the NationalSecurity Strategy. Close political-militarycommunication is essential to assure that thecomposition of the force is based on themission, the threat, and possible no-noticeoperational permutations. Force compositionshould be robust enough to respond to threatsto force security. Use of air, space, ground,maritime, and special operation forces isdiscussed in more detail in later chapters.Each capability has advantages and

disadvantages to employment. Use of JointPub 3-33, “Joint Force Capabilities,” willprovide commanders with a resource toreview and align their mission needs withavailable capabilities. See also “Wings forPeace” excerpt in Annex G (“HistoricalExamples”) to Appendix A, “Key Documentsin Peace Operations.”

• Force Caps. These establish limits onthe number of military personnel, numberand type of weapons, or the type of units(such as light infantry) to be deployedin support of PO. To be avoided areforce caps that may result in a forcestructure that is not appropriate to themission or the threat and may cause anotherwise avoidable increase in risk.Within the limits of the cap, commandersshould posture to protect the force.

• Unit Integrity. Another important issuein planning force structure ismaintaining unit integrity wheneverpossible. Units that have trained togetherand operate within normal chains ofcommand and under establishedprocedures are more likely to besuccessful in any mission to include PO.Unit integrity may be especiallyimportant for US units assigned to amultinational formation. Flexibility,modularity, and tailorability, however, arealso important considerations, along witha reduced footprint for US forces. Manyunits train to be flexible and tailorable.A commander seeking the capacity of abulldozer, for example, may need toweigh its usefulness without the completecomplement of its structure, leadership,and sustainment.

f. Interagency Coordination. In PO,other agencies including the Department ofState (DOS) will be involved. Therefore,commanders should ensure militaryactivities are closely integrated at all levels— strategic, operational, and tactical — with

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the activities of other agencies to optimizethe effectiveness of the total effort and preventmilitary actions which may becounterproductive to achieving the end state.Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56,“Managing Complex ContingencyOperations,” is designed to improveinteragency planning of future complexcontingency operations. The PDD’s intentis to establish management practices toachieve unity of effort among USGovernment (USG) agencies andinternational organizations engaged incomplex contingency operations. A detaileddiscussion of other USG agencies is inAppendix B, “US Government Involvementin Peace Operations.” Emphasis should beplaced on early establishment of liaisonamong the various agencies. Theestablishment of interagency coordinatingcenters, such as civil-military operationscenters (CMOCs), is one means of fosteringunity of effort in achieving objectives of theoperation. If available, a Country Team mayfacilitate coordination at the HN level.

For detailed information, refer to JP 3-08,“Interagency Coordination During JointOperations.”

g. Nongovernmental Organizations andPrivate Voluntary Organizations. In manycases, adverse humanitarian conditions arisingfrom natural or manmade disasters or otherendemic conditions such as human suffering,disease, violations of human rights, civil wars,or privation that presents a serious threat tolife or loss of property will characterize thePO environment. Commanders, therefore,coordinate their efforts not only with thesponsoring organization, other militaries, andHN, but also with a myriad of NGOs, PVOs,and other agencies involved in relievingadverse humanitarian conditions. Structureslike the CMOC are specifically designed tofacilitate this process. Only through concertedcooperation and coordinated efforts can thehuman tragedy that led to or resulted from

the conflict be adequately addressed.Therefore, it is desirable for all participantsto understand the intent, methods, and in-country disposition of the NGOs and PVOsand to foster a spirit of cooperation andmutuality of interest. It is in the military’sinterest to allow NGOs/PVOs to take over thehumanitarian assistance (HA) role. Bycooperating, both organizations help facilitatea transition to a desired end state. Theseorganizations can be an important sourceof information. They may help PO forcecommanders and staffs to better accomplishthe mission because of their familiarity withthe culture, language, and sensitivities of apopulace. However, caution is necessaryto prevent any perception by the populaceor the parties to the dispute that theseorganizations are part of an intelligence-gathering mechanism. Their purpose is toaddress humanitarian requirements, andtheir primary source of security is theirneutrality. Commanders will also find thatthe cultures of some of these organizationsdiffer markedly from military culture, andthere may be a strong desire on their part tomaintain a wide distance from militaryactivities.

For detailed information, refer to JP 3-08,“Interagency Coordination During JointOperations.”

h. Multinational Cooperation. Severalfactors are essential for success whenoperations are conducted in cooperation withother nations.

• Respect and Professionalism. Mutualrespect for multinational partners’ ideas,culture, religion and customs, and ademeanor of military professionalismhelps establish a basis for cooperation andunity of effort.

• Mission Assignment. Missions assignedby the force commander will beappropriate to each multinational

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engagements to control the situation. Thecommander knows that informationsuperiority has been gained when the staffsenses and acts more quickly, usinginformation to forestall potential hostile actsand convince parties to the conflict to act in amanner supportive of the peace process. Thepayoff from information superiority is that itincreases survivability and potential lethalityof the force and its ability to control the tempoof operations. See “Information Dominance forOperation JOINT ENDEAVOR” excerpt inAnnex G (“Historical Examples”) to AppendixA, “Key Documents in Peace Operations.”

• Liaison. Liaison officers (LNOs) arecritical to the successful conduct of allPO, but particularly in multinationaloperations. In some situations, LNOsmay be the only means for thecommander to communicate with somemembers of the force. LNOs helpcoordinate a myriad of details withina joint task force (JTF) or POheadquarters and among themultinational contingents, the sponsoringorganization, USG agencies, internationalagencies, NGOs, PVOs, and otheragencies. LNOs are well-qualified andspeak with the authority of thecommander they represent. Manyintelligence linguists and SOFpersonnel are well-suited to serve asLNOs because of their languageabilities, training, and experience.The importance of LNOs in PO cannotbe overemphasized.

“From their inception, contingencyoperations are high visibility. TheAmerican and world publics, familiesof Service members, the news media,and the government have an insatiabledemand for information that must bemade readily and immediatelyavailable.”

Joint Universal Lessons LearnedNo. 70344-88264 (06186)

partner’s capabilities and nationaldirection. Multinational partners shouldbe integrated into the planning process,thus assuring both the perception andthe reality of unity of effort. Languagerequirements and linguistic support willbe an important consideration. Specialoperations forces (SOF) capabilities, suchas liaison elements, may assistcommanders in the employment ofmultinational forces.

• Management of Resources. Multinationalpartners may seek assistance with logisticsupport. Agreements need to beestablished for exchangeable ortransferable commodities beforeoperations begin and are furtherdeveloped and refined throughout theoperation. Legal support will beimportant in formulating and interpretingthese agreements.

• Harmony. Personal relationships and aneffective rapport established amongmembers of a multinational force at allcommand levels can contributesignificantly to the success of the operation.

i. Information Intensity. All militaryoperations are information intensive. InPO, this is further complicated by themultiplicity of parties and other actorsinvolved. The scope and scale of requiredcoordination and communication is anothermajor information challenge. The cascadingeffects of events and their magnificationglobally through the media further exacerbatethe complexity of this characteristic of the POenvironment. The PO force can master thisenvironment by gaining and maintaininginformation superiority through effectiveemployment of IO and/or warfare. Activitiessuch as public affairs (PA), CA, andinteragency and multinational cooperation andcoordination can assist in this effort. In thePO environment, the centerpiece of IO is theability to use information to focus

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environments, force protection measureswill be employed commensurate with thesecurity risks to the force. These risks mayinclude conventional military threats and awide range of nonconventional threats suchas terrorism, exotic diseases, criminalenterprises, environmental hazards, computerhackers, and so forth. Thorough research anddetailed information about the operationalenvironment, training, and intelligencepreparation of the battlespace will prepare thePO force for adequate force protection. Theimpartiality of the force may also serve as ameasure of force protection. ROE andweapons control policies are also an aspectof force protection. In developing thesepolicies planners take into account thecapabilities of the PO force. This will avoida situation where policies and capabilities donot match. Measures taken to identify andplan for possible hostile acts against a POforce can only be successful if the force isgiven the commensurate ROE to protect itself.If a weapons-control policy is in effect, as isin most POs, capability and ROE have tomatch the tasking. See Appendix E,“References,” for details and referencematerial related to logistics, IO, engineering,risk management, safety, security, healthservice support, morale, and welfare aspectsof force protection.

“My initial concern for the task forcedeploying to Operation ABLE SENTRYwas force protection. Some UN militarycommanders don’t understand ourpreoccupation with this issue becausethey are not faced with the same threatas US forces. They don’t understandthat because we are the AmericanArmy, we are an isolated target ofopportunity.”

MG W.H. Yates, USACDR, Berlin Brigade

k. Measures of Success. A commonunderstanding of the desired end state andthe conditions that will constitute successis important to commanders at all levels.

• Public Affairs. In PO, news mediacoverage generally plays a major rolein quickly framing public debate andshaping public opinion. Consequently,the media serve as a forum for theanalysis and critique of PO. US andinternational public opinion affectpolitical, strategic, and operationaldecisions, and ultimately the perceivedsuccess or failure of a mission. The keyissue is that the legitimacy and supportfor a PO can be lost if PA does not receivethe proper leve l o f a t ten t ion .Commanders will also be aware that theparties to a dispute may find itadvantageous to release informationwhich is slanted to support their position.These activities may grow into a fullyorchestrated media operation, making itdifficult, if not impossible, for US PApersonnel to set the record straight.Consequently, a close workingrelationship between the PO force andthe media can be mutually beneficial.Providing journalists and other membersof the media with releasable informationon a timely basis can help reduce the levelof speculation in the news.

For additional information about PA, referto JP 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs inJoint Operations.” See also the “PublicAffairs Update” excerpt in Annex G(“Historical Examples”) to Appendix A, “KeyDocuments in Peace Operations.”

“The media gives you a chance to tellyour story. You never get a secondchance to create a first impression.”

Colonel G. Anderson, USMCMarine Warfighting Center

j. Force Protection. Force protectionconsiderations are central to all aspects ofPO planning and execution, particularlywhen the mission is a PEO or a PKO thatinvolves interposition between formerbelligerent forces. Even in relatively benign

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Ultimately, settlement, not victory, is thekey measure of success in PO. Settlementis not achieved through military operationsalone, but through a combination of actionsthat may include all the elements of nationalpower and various international factors. Aresolution reached by conciliation amongthe disputing parties is preferable totermination by force. PO are conducted tocreate or sustain the conditions in whichpolitical and diplomatic activities mayproceed. Military operations will complementdiplomatic, economic, informational, andperhaps humanitarian efforts in the pursuit ofthe overarching political objective. Theconcept of traditional military victory ordefeat is not an appropriate measure ofsuccess in PO. It is also important torecognize when the mission is notachievable. This may stem from suchfactors as a breakdown in political resolveby the parties to the dispute or theinternational community. In these cases,close political-military communicationsagain remains important.

l. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).Measures of success may be difficult todetermine at the operational and tactical levelof action, because they require higher level,strategic political-military assessments.Nevertheless, at the military operational andtactical levels, MOE may assistcommanders and political decision makersin gauging progress in the accomplishmentof the mission. The key question is whetherthe military effort is doing what it is expectedto do in terms of the mission or mandate.MOE focus on whether military efforts arehaving the desired result in achieving themandate or mission specifically assigned tothe force. These measures will providecommanders and higher authorities with ameans to evaluate the contribution ofmilitary efforts to the more encompassingand overarching desired end state. Moreimportantly, these measures will provide abaseline of indicators of how well the

military effort is achieving its specific,possibly limited goals in accordance with themission statement provided by higherauthorities. Such measures will besituationally dependent, often requiringreadjustment as the situation changes andhigher level political-military guidancedevelops. MOE are normally discrete,quantifiable, and helpful in understanding andmeasuring progress.

• Constructs. A variety of constructsmay prove suitable to the developmentof MOE, depending on the mission ormandate provided to military forces.These may include the constructs listedin Figure I-5 or combinations thereof.

• Caveats. MOE are only limited by theimagination of commanders and theirstaffs. However, they should exercise acertain degree of caution andjudgment when using statisticalindicators alone. These may varywidely in interpretation, may be validonly for a specific time, place, or groupof people, and may not have a directcorrelation to effectiveness. Suchindicators as enemy unit-effectivenessstatus, weapons seized or confiscated,and the like may have limitedapplicability in MOE for PO.

m. Civil Disturbances. PKO and PEOinherently include the likelihood ofencountering civil disturbances. Success inhandling these disturbances will have an effecton operations. A poorly handled civildisturbance can quickly escalate out of controlwith potentially long-term negative effects forthe mission. Conversely, a well-handledsituation can lead to both an enhanced viewof the professionalism and strength of the POforce, instill confidence in democratic and lawenforcement institutions involved, and resultin fewer disturbances in future operations.Controlling civil disturbances includes thefollowing actions.

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• Isolate in time and space the trouble spotfrom outside influence or interaction.Use a system of checkpoints to limit andcontrol access together with the use ofhelicopters and other monitoringtechnologies to screen the flanks. Attackhelicopters may also overwatch nearby

sites that may pose a threat and as adeterrent to outside intervention.

• Dominate the situation through forcepresence and control of informationresources. An overwhelming show offorce at checkpoints, coupled with

CONSTRUCTS SUITABLE TO THEDEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES OF

EFFECTIVENESS

Variables of consent, impartiality, use of force

Principles of war and military operations other than war

Centers of gravity, decisive points, and culminating points. See JointPub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."

Universal Joint Task List, component interoperability tasks, or Servicetasks

Phases or patterns of operations

Force projection and entry operationsShaping the environmentDecisive operationsInformation operationsProtecting the forcePreparation and planning for posthostilities activitiesSustainmentTransitions, termination, or redeployment

Consent or compliance with specific provisions of the mandate

Violations of buffer zones, cease fire lines, demilitarized zones,areas of limitation, safe areas, checkpointsRules of Engagement viability and enforcementViolations of cease-firesFreedom of movement complianceInterference with humanitarian assistance effortsCurfew complianceDemobilization, disarmament, demilitarization, mine clearance,fortification removal

Figure I-5. Constructs Suitable to the Development of Measures of Effectiveness

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helicopter overflights, may dissuadeentry into the area by potentiallydestabilizing elements. Unmanned aerialvehicle platforms and helicopters mayprovide real-time situation reports,ensuring that units know the “groundtruth” at all times. This situationalawareness gives commanders a decisiveadvantage in both negotiations withpotentially hostile elements and duringtactical operations.

• Maintaining common situationalawareness by requiring timely, accurate,complete, multi-source reporting andeffective information dissemination. Abroad spectrum of sources will assist thiseffort.

• Multi-dimensional, multi-echelonedactions. One element may provide localsecurity while another focuses its effortson the larger strategic or politicalspectrum. Use all available resources toinfluence the outcome, includingconvincing local media to avoidinflammatory broadcasts or to makebroadcasts designed to quell and dispersethe crowds. Multi-dimensionalresponses include the use of civil andmilitary nonlethal assets. Nonlethalassets will be considered and applied toavoid overwhelming military responsesthat could escalate tensions or causeunnecessary injury or death.

n. Other Factors. Other factors whichcharacterize the PO environment and demandcareful analysis include, but are not limitedto the following:

• Geopolitical situation;

• Prevailing social conditions andindigenous cultures;

• Level of conflict or the effectiveness ofthe cease fire;

• The number, discipline, andaccountability of disputing parties;

• Effectiveness of the governmentsinvolved; and

• The degree of law and order that exists.

8. Command and Control

The United States may participate in POunder various C2 arrangements. Thesearrangements might include a:

• Unilateral US operation;

• Multinational operation with the UnitedStates as the lead nation; and/or

• Multinational operation with the UnitedStates as a participant or in support.

See JP 3-0, “Doctrine for JointOperations,” Chapter VI, “MultinationalOperations.”

In any of these arrangements, US forceswill report to the US NCA. However, inmultinational PO, US forces may alsoreport to the sponsoring organization suchas the UN, NATO, OAU, and/or OAS. InPKO, the United States will normally be acontingent; in PEO, the United States shouldordinarily be the lead nation, in accordancewith the policy of PDD-25, “ReformingMultilateral Peace Operations.”

Although US forces may be placed under theoperational control (OPCON) of non-UScommanders in certain circumstances, thecommand line from the NCA will remaininviolate, running from the NCA to thecombatant commander (and other supportedcombatant commanders, as appropriate) tosubordinate US commanders.

For additional information, refer to JP 0-2,“Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),”

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and PDD-25, “Reforming Multilateral PeaceOperations.”

9. Key Documents in PeaceOperations

The political objectives of a particularoperation guide the development of keydocuments that provide legal authority anddefine the parameters for a PO. Keydocuments include the mandate, status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) (often called statusof mission agreement [SOMA] in UNoperations), terms of reference (TOR), andROE (see Figure I-6).

a. Mandate. In PO, the force generallyconducts operations based on a mandate thatdescribes the scope of operations. UN POconduct operations in accordance withmandates established by the UN SecurityCouncil. Operations sponsored byorganizations other than the UN may also bebased on mandates. These mandates willusually result from treaties, accords,resolutions, or agreements of internationalor regional organizations. A sample UNmandate is in Annex A (“Mandates”) toAppendix A, “Key Documents in PeaceOperations.”

• For PKO, the mandate issued by the UNSecurity Council is based on negotiationswith the parties to the dispute, the HN,and potential contributors of PK forcesor personnel.

• For PEO, the UN Security Council willnormally seek broad ranging support forenforcement actions from theinternational community before issuinga mandate.

b. Status-of-Forces Agreement or Statusof Mission Agreement. These agreements,negotiated between the HN and thesponsoring organization on behalf of theparticipating countries, establish thedetailed legal status of PO forces. Theseagreements are negotiated between UN, HN,and sponsoring organizations on behalf ofparticipating countries and involve closecoord ina t ion be tween combatan tcommanders, the Department of Defense, andthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Authority to negotiate and concludeinternational agreements (such as a SOFA)is held at the national level. Some specifiedportions of that authority have been delegatedto the Joint Staff and combatant commanders.Neither the commander nor his staff has suchauthority without specific approval ordelegation from higher authority. Beforeentering into any negotiations or agreementwith another nation, consult the staff judgeadvocate. A sample SOFA is at Annex B(“Status-of-Forces Agreement”) of AppendixA, “Key Documents in Peace Operations.”

• The SOFA or SOMA (hereafter SOMAis included wherever the term SOFA isused) proceeds from the mandate.However, PEO do not normally includea SOFA, except with the HN or othercountries from which operations arestaged.

• Members of PO contingents remainsubject to applicable national laws,

KEY DOCUMENTS IN PEACEOPERATIONS

MANDATE

STATUS-OF-FORCESAGREEMENT

ORSTATUS OF MISSION

AGREEMENTS

TERMS OF REFERENCE

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Figure I-6. Key Documents inPeace Operations

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policies, and regulations of their ownnations, including military criminalcodes. Ordinarily, military disciplineand punitive actions are taken by theappropriate national chain of command,not by the sponsoring organization. AllUS personnel remain subject to theUniform Code of Military Justice, whichwill be administered by the appropriateUS commander.

c. Terms of Reference. The TOR aredeveloped to govern implementation of thePO based on the mandate and the situationand may be subject to approval by the partiesto the dispute in PKO. The TOR describethe mission, command relationships,organization, logistics, accountingprocedures, coordination and liaison, andresponsibilities of the military units andpersonnel assigned or detailed to the POforce. The TOR are written by the UN orother sponsoring organization. When theUnited States is a participant in a PO, the TORare coordinated with the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, andDOS before final approval by the NCA. Asample TOR is in Annex C (“Terms ofReference”) of Appendix A, “Key Documentsin Peace Operations.”

d. Rules of Engagement. In PO, wellconceived, clearly stated, and thoroughlydisseminated ROE can make the differencebetween mission success and failure. ROEare directives that delineate thecircumstances and limitations under whichUS forces initiate or continue engagementwith other forces or elements. ROE definewhen and how force may be used. Allcommanders will assess threat capabilities andmake recommendations for specific ROEthrough the chain of command. The ROEare written with consideration of legal,political, and military factors and may includeelements of the law of armed conflict. Asample ROE is at Annex D (“Rules of

Engagement”) of Appendix A, “KeyDocuments in Peace Operations.”

• CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01,“Standing Rules of Engagement forUS Forces,” provides the starting pointfor all ROE development. These ROEmay be tailored to each PO, but areapproved by the combatant commander.

• Restraint, a principle of MOOTW,should guide ROE development. Thedevelopment process balances missionaccomplishment with politicalconsiderations that ensure protection ofthe force and its mission. However,nothing in the ROE can negate acommander’s responsibility andauthority to take all necessary andappropriate action in self-defense.

• Commanders ensure dissemination ofthe ROE to all personnel. Additionally,because ROE seldom anticipate everysituation, commanders ensure personnelunderstand the intent of the ROE. ROEshould be included in all plans and bereviewed by the force commander’s legaladvisor.

• When ROE change, the changesshould be rapidly disseminated to allpersonnel. Changes may be driven bytactical emergencies, attacks by hostileforces, incidents involving loss of life,or other events. Commanders mayrequest changes to the ROE through thechain of command. A strong, reliablecommand and control system must be inplace, especially for PEO where ROEinputs to fielded troops under rapidlychanging conditions is of utmost concernfor force protection.

• US commanders will be aware that POforces from other nations mayinterpret ROE differently than US

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forces or may wish to use differentROE. This creates a challenge for unityof effort of the PO force as a whole. Acommon interpretation of the ROEbetween the contingents will facilitateunity of effort.

• For PKO, ROE are normally highlyrestrictive and written to limit the use offorce to self-defense of the force andprotection of its mission.

• In PEO, the ROE are less restrictiveon the use of force than in PKO, butare tailored to the situation. Restraint willstill be a primary consideration since thetransition to peace may be easier whenthe PE force has only used proportionaland appropriate force.

e. The Campaign Plan. The theater ormultinational campaign plan is the tool forlinking operational- and tactical-levelactions to strategic aims. Because PO tendto unfold incrementally, the joint ormultinational staff writes a campaign planthat lays out a clear, definable path to thedesired end state. This plan should relate toand support a strategic-level interagency,political-military plan. Such a plan will help

commanders to assist political leaders invisualizing operational requirements anddefining a desired end state. Essentialconsiderations for developing a PO campaignplan include understanding the mandate andTOR, analyzing the mission, anddeveloping the ROE. A concept fortransition and termination is essential. JointPub 5-00.1, “JTTP for Campaign Planning,”includes a sample outline of a PO campaignplan.

10. Conclusion

PO are complex operations conducted in adynamic environment that involves initialobjectives that may change in pursuit of theend state. Consequently, commanders seekan understanding of the political-militaryobjectives, the tasks and political-militaryplans designed to attain them, forces required,and the operational environment. Thencommanders ensure that military actionssupport political objectives. Commanders andtheir staffs conduct detailed mission analysisand clearly articulate the situation, mission,and ROE. Finally, commanders will continueto analyze the situation to prevent divergencebetween military actions and the overallobjectives of the operation.

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Intentionally Blank

participant. The objective of these operationsis to fulfill a mandate, in many cases to reduceor eliminate violence, facilitate theimplementation of an agreement, and supportdiplomatic efforts to reach a long-termpolitical settlement.

“War is an invention of the human mind.The human mind can invent peace withjustice.”

Norman Cousins

3. Fundamentals

There are certain fundamentals that helpguide the conduct of successful PKO (seeFigure II-1).

• Firmness. On matters of principle andintegrity, peacekeepers must show afirmness of purpose and unwaveringsolidarity or the force’s ability toeffectively operate will suffer. However,PK forces are generally lightly armed andauthorized to use force only in self-defense of the force and its mission.Hence, PKO have highly restrictiveROE.

“If historical experience teaches usanything . . . it is that the militarymeasures alone will not suffice.”

BGEN. S.B. Griffith1961

• Impartiality. A PK force does not actin support of a government or any partyto a dispute; it is entirely impartial. Ifthe parties to the dispute perceive theactions of the PK force as partial, the

CHAPTER IIPEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

II-1

1. General

PKO support diplomatic efforts to establishor maintain peace in areas of potential oractual conflict. The United States hasparticipated in and supported UN-sponsoredPKO; for example, UNMIH, the UnitedNations Preventive Deployment Force in theFormer Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia,and others. The United States has alsoparticipated in non-UN sponsored PKO,which include the MFO in the Sinai and theMNF I in Beirut.

2. Description of Peacekeeping

PKO take place following diplomaticnegotiation and agreement among theparties to a dispute, the sponsoringorganization, and potential force-contributingnations. Before PKO begin, a credible truceor cease-fire is in effect, and the parties to thedispute must consent to the operation.Peacekeepers conduct their operations in anopen and highly conspicuous manner. Thepeacekeepers’ main function is to establisha presence which inhibits hostile actions bythe disputing parties and bolsters confidencein the peace process. PKO supportcontinuing diplomatic efforts to achievelong-term political settlements andnormalized peaceful relations. Agreementsoften specify which nations’ forces areacceptable, as well as the size and type offorces each will contribute. The United Statesmay participate in PKO as a lead nation, as acontingent, or by providing militaryobservers. A major challenge for a PK forceis to effectively deal with situations of extremetension and violence without becoming a

“Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it.”

Dag Hammarskjold

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force’s usefulness in the situation will becompromised. Therefore, the actions ofthe PK force should be impartial topreserve the parties’ consent. If the PKforce is suspected of favoring one of theparties concerned, the trust of the otherparty will be lost. Once lost, the PK forcewill find it difficult to implement itsmandate. Demonstrated impartiality isessential to establish and maintain thelegitimacy of the PKO.

“Key to this business (peacekeepingoperations) is absolute impartiality.Favoritism will get you in trouble if youshow the slightest hint of it.”

Colonel H.C. RossCanadian Army

National Defense Headquarters

• Clarity of Intention. The parties shouldbe made fully aware of what the PK force

FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONS

Firmness

Impartiality

Freedom ofMovement

Consent

Anticipation

Clarity ofIntention

Integration

Figure II-1. Fundamentals of Peacekeeping Operations

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Peacekeeping Operations

is trying to achieve, and why. Failurei n th i s respec t w i l l l ead tomisunderstandings and distrust.

“The formulation of a clear and precisemission statement which definesmeasurable and attainable objectivesis paramount.”

General Joseph P. Hoar, USMCCommander in Chief,US Central Command

• Anticipation. Incidents that are likelyto provoke violence should beanticipated, and timely action taken toprevent them. A PK reserve force shouldbe prepared to position itself between thetwo sides before an incident can escalate.

• Consent. A PK force is invited by theparties or a HN government to a dispute.The PK force remains only with theirconsent. This consent includesrecognition of the host government’sauthority. While a PK force enjoyscertain immunities, its members willrespect the host country’s laws andcustoms.

• Integration. A PK force could beintegrated in two ways.

•• The national contingents may shareforce-wide responsibilities. This can beachieved, for example, by allocatingresponsibilities for logistic support,communications, and airlift to differentcountries so that no one contingent isperceived to exercise undue influence.

•• When a confrontation between the PKforce and one or more of the disputingparties is likely, interposing a smallgroup drawn from as many nationalcontingents as possible or a force reserveto demonstrate solidarity will be useful.

• Freedom of Movement. The PK forcewill usually be granted sufficient freedomof movement to car ry ou t i t sresponsibilities.

4. Peacekeeping Personnel andForces

US military personnel may perform a widevariety of functions in support of PKO. Theymay be detailed to serve on a multinationalstaff or in an observer group as militaryobservers (MILOBs). The United States mayalso participate in PKO by providing PKforces. These forces may include ground, air,maritime, space, or special operations forces.

“There is no doubt in my mind, that thesuccess of a peacekeeping operationdepends more than anything else onthe vigilance and mental alertness ofthe most junior soldier and hisnoncommissioned leader, for it is ontheir reaction and immediate responsethat the success of the operation rests.”

Brigadier M. HarbottleUN Forces, Cyprus

a. MILOBs are unarmed and observe,record, and report on the implementationand violations of a formal agreement. Theyserve as members of an observer group andcarry out such tasks as vehicle patrols insensitive areas, local negotiations betweenrival forces, and special investigations. Theirpresence is often sufficient to deterviolations. By providing accurate, up-to-date,and impartial reports, MILOBs help reducethe number of claims and counterclaims bythe disputing parties. The MILOBs relystrongly for defense on their impartial statusand execution of assigned duties.

b. The Secre ta ry o f the Army(SECARMY) is the DOD executive agent forthe administration of personnel support to:

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• UN Headquarters in New York;

• Multilateral observer missions; and

• Peace operations for which a combatantcommander is not assigned responsibility.

The US Military Observer GroupWashington (USMOG-W), acting on behalfof the SECARMY and in consultation withthe Under Secretary of Defense for Policy(USDP) and the Joint Staff, assumesresponsibility for implementation. Whendirected by the USDP, the SECARMY maydirect the Secretaries of other MilitaryDepartments and heads of Defense Agenciesto provide personnel to support PO. USMILOBs are under the command ofUSMOG-W. USMOG-W is responsible foradministrative and logistic support of USobservers. US MILOBs perform observerduties under the control of and report to theobserver group chief of staff or PK forcecommander designated by the sponsoringorganization. When detailed as MILOBs, USpersonnel do not normally report to thegeographic combatant commander.

c. The force size and mix will varydepending on the mission, mandate, andthreat in the operational area. At one endof the scale, the UN Yemen ObservationMission in 1963 utilized 189 personnel(primarily military) from 11 nations tosupervise the disengagement agreementbetween Saudi Arabia, the United ArabRepublic, and Yemen. At the other end of thescale, the UN’s peacekeeping operation inCambodia in 1993 included 22,000 military,police, and civilian personnel from 32 nations.Typically, PKO are conducted by forces thatare smaller and more lightly equipped thanthose that conduct PEO.

• PK forces will usually require tailoringto include units or personnel withspecialized abilities such as languageskills, engineering, decontamination,explosive ordnance disposal, PSYOP,and CA. The requirement for personnelwith special skills is mission-dependent.

• PK forces are generally lightly armedand should be mobile, capable of self-defense, and self-sufficient until logistics

Mine awareness is a serious concern in peacekeeping operations.

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resupply channels can be established.Contract logistics may serve to relievethe force of this requirement.

• Ground forces may supervise andassist in the separation of opposingsides and to establish a buffer zone(BZ) or demilitarized zone (DMZ).The PK force controls and surveys theline of demarcation, which facilitates thedisengagement and withdrawal of forces,discourages infiltration confrontations,and assists in resolving local disputes.The presence of the PK force helpsreassure each party to the dispute thatother parties are not violating theagreements. Ground operations mayinvolve observation and monitoring ofmilitary and paramilitary units withina specified area. This helps ensure thatauthorized units of the disputing partiesare not increased above the strengthlevels stipulated in the agreement,existing fortifications are neitherreinforced nor enlarged, no increase ofarms and supplies occurs apart from thoseagreed to, and no side violates the BZ orDMZ. Infantry, armored, armoredcavalry, military police (MP) forces(with augmentation) and SOF groundforces are capable of changing theirmission focus to support PKO afterproper training to maximize theirinherent characteristics of mobility,communications, self-protectioncapability, and training. MP units, inparticular, have a wealth of experiencein exercising authority in tensecircumstances without escalating tension.Their signature as a police force, ratherthan a combat force, often defusestensions. An analysis of the mandate,mission, and threat will be used todetermine the composition of the PKground force. Additional ground forcecapabilities include the supportcapabilities listed in Figure II-2.

• Air assets include both fixed- androtary-wing aircraft. Air operationsprovide the speed, range, and flexibilityto rapidly cover large areas. In PKO, airassets can meet a wide range ofoperational requirements. These include

Observing, monitoring, andreporting

Maintaining public order andprotecting civilians and publicofficials

Support to elections

Delivery and protection ofhumanitarian assistance

Manning of checkpoints

Patrolling

Demining operations

Supervising truces and cease-fires

Intelligence

Surveillance

Reconnaissance

Incident management and crowdcontrol

Negotiation and mediation

Interposition between parties to theconflict

Demobilization and disarmament

Inspection of facilities

GROUND FORCESUPPORT CAPABILITIES

Figure II-2. Ground ForceSupport Capabilities

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operational effectiveness of the PK force.The use of air assets can increase theprobability of detecting violations andcan be a deterrent to major violations.The increased probability of detectionprovided through air operationsencourages confidence among the partiesto the dispute and fosters compliancewith agreements.

“There are many times when platoonleaders and platoon sergeants atroadblocks, and company and battalioncommanders working in cordon andsearch operations, must negotiate andcommunicate with potentialbelligerents. Leaders need to knowthat they may be placed in a positionthat requires them to mediate ornegotiate on the battlefield.”

BGEN. L. Magruder, III, USACG, Joint Readiness

Training Center

• Maritime forces provide a secureenvironment ashore through credible,combat ready forces before, during, andafter the operation. Naval assets mayinclude supporting sealift, surface forces,submarine forces, amphibious forces, orindividual observers. Naval forcesestablish both a psychological andstabilizing effect by their physicalpresence. To be effective, naval forcesrequire free access to the territorial watersaround the countries involved in thedispute. Naval vessels may provide thesupport capabilities described in FigureII-4. Additionally, naval forces canprovide harbor movement control andport security to safeguard vessels,harbors, waterfront facilities, and cargo.Maritime forces may also conductoperations on inland waterways. Withspecial authorization the US Coast Guard(USCG), under the US Department ofTransportation, may provide thecapabilities listed in Figure II-5 in support

the support capabilities listed in FigureII-3. Air assets are especially usefulwhere the terrain is difficult to navigateor contains mines and unexplodedordnance. In response to rapidlydeveloping situations, air operations canbe highly effective in gatheringinformation regarding violations ofcease-fire and arms-limitationagreements, as well as in the rapidtransport of personnel and equipment.Information gathered by air assets canhelp commanders and staffs assesssituations, reduce risk, and enhance the

Airlift

Intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance

Command, control, communications,and information gathering

Aerial refueling

Search and rescue

Air traffic control support

Medical evacuation

Combat air patrol

Airspace control

Early warning of hostile actions

Delivery of humanitarian aid

Deterrence of hostile actions

Force protection

Logistics

Resupply

AIR ASSETS SUPPORTCAPABILITIES

Figure II-3. Air Assets Support Capabilities

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of PKO. See also “Maritime Forces”excerpt in Annex G (“HistoricalExamples”) to Appendix A, “KeyDocuments in Peace Operations.”

• Space capabilities are essential to PKOefforts largely in the area of forceenhancement operations supporting air,ground, and maritime forces. Spacemissions comprising force enhancementinclude the items listed in Figure II-6.

Tying all these systems together in theaterrequires the expertise provided by theforward-deployed space support teams.

•• Communications. In many areaswhere PKO are likely to occur, existingcommunications infrastructure maynot support the requirements of thePK force. PK forces must have thecapability to communicate among theassigned land, maritime, and air forces,

A staging and sustainment platform for amphibious forces,particularly in the initial stages of peacekeeping operations if navalforces are in position before significant land-based forces arrive.They may also be used in the reinforcement or evacuation ofpeacekeeping forces

Escort for neutral shipping in areas adjacent to territories of theparties to a dispute

A neutral location where representatives may meet for supervisednegotiations

Early warning of potentially dangerous or hostile actions

Protection of offshore assets (primarily petroleum-productionplatforms and deep water offshore port facilities)

Access to, or transit of, oceans and waterways

Search and rescue

Port visits

Coastal sea control

Monitor and enforce exclusive economic zones

Escort for vessels

Coastal patrol and surveillance

NAVAL VESSELS SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

Figure II-4. Naval Vessels Support Capabilities

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as well as to the combatant commander.Satellite communications support canbe provided by the Fleet SatelliteCommunications System, Ultra HighFrequency Follow-On Satellites, DefenseSatellite Communications System, andthe Air Force Satellite CommunicationsSystem. In addition, military satellitecommunications are augmented byl e a s e d c o m m e r c i a l s a t e l l i t ecommunications.

•• Navigation. Global positioningsystem (GPS) and other space-basedpositioning, velocity, and timing (PVT)systems support PKO by providinghighly accurate three-dimensionall oca t ion capab i l i t y, ve loc i t ydetermination, and time reference. SuchPVT systems allow PK forces to knowtheir exact location, which they canthen communicate to friendly forcesto determine the best routes formovement. This is extremely importantin areas where maps are out of date ornonexistent, physical landmarks aresparse, or local magnetic variations areunreliable. Space-based PVT systemsaid in the surveying of variousfeatures, including minefields, borders,and BZs. They may also providenavigation capabilities in areas whereother navigation aids are damaged ornonexistent.

•• Weather. Weather data from space-based systems is important to PKO. TheNat iona l Oceanograph ic and

Port security and port safetyservices

Coastal sea control and harbordefense services

Maritime law enforcement andmaritime interception operations

Environmental defense and pollutionprevention, mitigation, monitoring,and response

Escort of vessels

Vessel traffic control and aids tonavigation

Reflagging of merchant vessels

Training (law enforcement, searchand rescue, environmentalprotection, port safety and security,waterway management, and maritimesafety)

Port visits

Maritime search and rescue

Coastal patrol and surveillance

US COAST GUARDSUPPORT CAPABILITIES

Communications

Positioning, velocity, and timing

Weather

Global geospatial informationand services

Surveillance and reconnaissance

Theater ballistic missile attackwarning

SPACE FORCEENHANCEMENTCAPABILITIES

Figure II-5. US Coast GuardSupport Capabilities

Figure II-6. Space Force EnhancementCapabilities

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Atmospheric Administration operates aconstellation of weather satellites thatgives US forces global weather coverage.Timely and accurate weatherinformation is essential for missionplanning, route selection, communications,observation, and reporting.

•• Geospatial Information andServices (GI&S). GI&S assets canprovide hard- and soft-copy maps,gravity values, sea surface topographymeasurements, hydrographic charts, anddigital feature analysis. In addition,imaging systems can provide thecapabilities listed in Figure II-7.

•• Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance (ISR). Space systemsprovide a variety of ISR capabilities,which enhance a commander’ssituational awareness of the parties to adispute and their compliance withagreements.

•• Theater Ballistic Missile AttackWarning. The proliferation of theaterballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, is agrowing threat to US deployed forces

worldwide. In response to this threat,space continues to offer the perfectvantage point from which to view signsof a theater ballistic missile launch. TheDefense Support Program detectstheater ballistic missile launches;launch detection can be quicklydisseminated to geographic combatantcommanders via warning networks.

See JP 3-01.5, “Doctrine for Joint TheaterMissile Defense”

“I think all our conventional leaders andcommanders need to understand andwork more closely with SpecialOperations forces — Special ForcesOperational Detachments, Civil Affairs,and PYSOP teams. This marriagemust occur; we’ve got to force it. Wecannot succeed on the modernbattlefield without cooperation amongthese elements.”

BGEN. L. Magruder, III, USACG, Joint Readiness

Training Center

• SOF can play a significant role in PKObecause of their unique capabilities,training, and experience. SOF oftenhave detailed regional knowledge ofcultures and languages, as well asexperience working with indigenousforces. SOF are capable of the activitieslisted in Figure II-8. SOF can form small,versatile, self-contained units that canrapidly deploy, and provide a fullspectrum of air, ground, and maritimesupport with links to space-basedassets. SOF capabilities of PSYOP andCA are particularly important in PO fortheir understanding of the complexity ofoperating in cross-cultural environments.

See also JP 3-05, “Doctrine for JointSpecial Operations.”

•• PSYOP can assist in facilitatingcooperation between the disputing

Supplemental updates on portconditions

River stages

Recent construction

Vegetation analysis

Ice coverage

Other ground features

GEOSPATIALINFORMATION AND

SERVICES CAPABILITIES

Figure II-7. Geospatial Informationand Services Capabilities

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parties, their supporters, and the PKforce. PSYOP can help create favorableattitudes and behavior on the part ofdisputing parties and uncommittedsegments of the population. For example,PSYOP personnel may: (1) Provide thecapability to develop, produce, anddisseminate by radio, television,newspapers, leaflets, or loudspeakerbroadcasts a wide variety of products toinform all parties, including neutrals,about the role of the PK force, therequirements of the mandate, locationsof critical services, and information thatcan assist in bridging cross-cultural gapsbetween PKO forces and indigenouspopulations. If the PKO forcecommander does not pay attention tothese matters, the potential formisunderstanding, misinterpretation, andhostile propaganda is high; and (2) Assist

commanders in analyzing thepsychological effects of the operation.

For additional information on PSYOP, referto JP 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint PsychologicalOperations.”

“PSYOP is a tool that can enhancecontrol and security and should beintegrated into daily planning andoperations. It must be flexible andcapable of being delivered by varioustypes of media . . . [commander, jointtask force] can use these tools toreinforce policy directives anddisseminate any other information tothe population.”

Operation SEA SIGNALMigrant Camp Operations:

The Guantanamo ExperienceUSACOM

•• In PKO, CA personnel can: (1)Conduct area assessments of thepopulation, economy, culture, and soforth, to aid the commander in decisionmaking and planning; (2) Providetraining to familiarize PK personnel withthe dynamics of the political situation inthe operational area, local cultures,customs, mores, religions, and taboos—such training programs enhance theeffectiveness and credibility of the PKforce by improving understanding andrespect for the local populace; (3)Establish liaison and coordinationamong US, multinational, andindigenous forces such as NGOs, PVOs,and other agencies, as well as the HN;(4) Coordinate host-nation support(HNS) for the PK force and identify thelocal resources for use by the force; (5)Provide advice and assistance inhandling refugees and dislocatedcivilians; and (6) Establish CMOCs tocoordinate CMO and HA operations.Some CA activities require carefulconsideration because of the risk of

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCESSUPPORT CAPABILITIES

Psychological operations

Civil affairs

Gathering information

Providing detailed areaassessments

Conducting liaison with localpopulations, military forces,other national contingents, andagencies

Training and organizingsecurity forces

Operating fixed- and rotary-wing airlift

Figure II-8. Special OperationsForces Support Capabilities

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appearing partial to one or moredisputing parties. Such activities mayinclude advice or assistance to help theHN provide for public health, safety, andwelfare; food and agriculture; trade andcommerce; education; and administrationand finance.

For additional information on CA, refer toJP 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

For additional information on specialoperations, refer to JP 3-05, “Doctrine forJoint Special Operations,” and JP 3-05.3,“Joint Special Operations OperationalProcedures.”

d. PK members must wear distinctiveitems that clearly identify them as membersof the PK force or observer group. Such itemsinclude headgear (helmet liners or berets),badges, armbands, and identity cards. PKforce vehicles, boats, aircraft, and facilitiesmay be painted in the colors of the forceand will prominently display its insignia.PK force facilities and observation posts (OPs)will display the UN or force flag and willnormally be illuminated at night. In UN PKO,dismounted patrols normally carry a UN flag.The force commander may establishadd i t iona l gu ide l ines concern ingidentification requirements.

5. Peacekeeping Missions

PK missions will usually involve observing,monitoring, or supervising and assistingparties to a dispute (see Figure II-9).

a. Observation. Observation missions areperformed primarily by unarmed MILOBs,but may also be performed by PK forces. Ineither case, they help ensure the agreementsare followed by the parties to the dispute.UN observer groups may also use civilianpersonnel or police as observers. The successof these missions is dependent on the

willingness of the disputing parties tocooperate with the terms of the accord oragreement. This willingness may existbecause MILOBs have established a visiblepresence and are able to detect violations ofagreements. For the success of the mission,MILOBs establish and maintain goodrelations with the disputing parties. See, forexample, “MOMEP” in Annex G (“HistoricalExamples”) to Appendix A, “Key Documentsin Peace Operations.” Typical observationtasks include the following.

• Observing, monitoring, verifying, andreporting any alleged violation of thegoverning agreements. Agreementsmay include treaties, truces, cease-fires,arms control agreements, or any otherbinding agreements between thedisputing parties.

• Investigating alleged cease-fireviolations, boundary incidents, andcomplaints. This may include incidents,unauthorized troop movements, andconstruction or reinforcing of defensivepositions. An investigation providesevidence regarding violations of theagreements and may involve negotiationor mediation, to include direct dialoguebetween the disputing parties.

“. . . we should expect to participate ina broad range of deterrent, conflictprevention, and peacetime activities.Further, our history, strategy, andrecent experience suggest that we willusually work in concert with our friendsand allies in almost all operations.”

President Harry S. Truman

• Negotiating and mediating. MILOBsmay undertake negotiations on behalf ofthe disputing parties to mediate low-leveldisputes. Reconciliation of differencesat the lowest possible level oftencontributes to the overall success of thePKO.

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• Conducting regular liaison visitswithin the operational area. Disputesthrive on rumors, uncertainty, andprejudice. Therefore, liaison visitsmaintain personal contact and allow fora timely and routine exchange ofinformation with disputing parties, the

HN, local civilian officials, internationalagencies, PK force headquarters, andother national contingents.

• Maintaining up-to-date informationon the disposition of disputing forceswithin the operational area. This

Figure II-9. Peacekeeping Mission Activities

PEACEKEEPING MISSION ACTIVITIES

Observing, monitoring, verifying, and reporting any alleged violation ofthe governing agreements

Investigating alleged cease-fire violations, boundary incidents, andcomplaints

Negotiating and mediating

Conducting regular liaison visits within the operational area

Maintaining up-to-date information on the disposition of disputing forceswithin the operational area

Verifying the storage or destruction of certain categories of militaryequipment specified in the relevant agreements

Supervising cease-fires

Supervising disengagements and withdrawals

Supervising prisoner of war exchanges

Supervising demobilization and demilitarization

Assisting civil authorities

Assisting in the maintenance of public order

Assisting foreign humanitarian assistance operations

OBSERVATION

SUPERVISION ANDASSISTANCE

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requires periodically visiting forwardpositions to observe and report on thedisposition of forces of the disputingparties.

• Verifying the storage or destruction ofcertain categories of militaryequipment specified in the relevantagreements.

b. Supervision and Assistance.Supervision and assistance missions arenormally performed by lightly armed PKforces. The PK forces undertaking these tasksrequire, in most cases, large service supportorganizations, equipment, and finances. Inaddition to the tasks performed by MILOBsin observation missions, PK forces mayperform the following tasks when they arewithin the scope of the military mission,support the desired end state, and areauthorized by appropriate authority.

• Supervising cease-fires. Once a cease-fire is arranged, PK forces may observeand report on the disputing parties’compliance with a cease-fire. The forcemay have to deploy on the territory ofmore than one nation to perform itsmission. The tempo and outcome ofdiplomatic activities taken to establish acredible cease-fire are oftenunpredictable, and negotiations toconstitute and insert a PK force mayoccur simultaneously. Therefore, rapiddeployment of the PK force is generallyrequired.

• Supervising disengagements andwithdrawals. As diplomatic activityensues, agreement to establish a BZ mayrequire PK forces to supervise thedisengagement and withdrawal of hostileforces. Interpositioning of the PK forcebetween the disputing parties is generallya high priority to prevent a breakdownof the cease-fire and to help ensurean uneventful disengagement and

withdrawal. The inherent risksassociated with interpositioning can begreatly reduced by timely deploymentand implementation of well-conceivedand detailed plans that are understood byall parties. PK force personnel maymediate disagreements in the positioningof the disputing parties’ forces, verifytroop and equipment dispositions and, ifauthorized, provide assistance to thecivilian population in the BZ.

• Supervising prisoner of war (POW)exchanges. At any stage in the resolutionof a dispute, PK forces may supervise andassist in POW exchanges between theparties.

• Supervising demobilization anddemilitarization. The parties to thedispute may agree to demobilization ordemilitarization of their forces.Therefore, PK forces may supervise andassist in these activities and provideprogress reports to the sponsoringorganization.

• Assisting civil authorities. PK forcesmay assist civil authorities in suchfunctions as supervision of elections,transfer of authority, partitioning ofterritory, evacuation, convoy escort, orthe temporary administration of civilfunctions. The CMO Staff Officer, incoordination with the CMOC, canprovide advice and assistance in theexecution of these functions.

• Assisting in the maintenance of publicorder. PK forces may assist in thereestablishment or maintenance of publicorder. The responsibility for public orderrests primarily with the civil police.However, military assistance may berequired if there has been a breakdownin the civil police structure or situationsare beyond their capacity to control.

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• Assisting foreign humanitarianassistance (FHA) operations. AlthoughFHA is not a PO, it may be necessary forPK forces to provide security for and tosupervise the offloading and transloadingof relief supplies until FHA operationsare fully established. It may also benecessary for PK forces to providetransportation and security for NGOs,PVOs, and other agencies. CA personnelprovide to the commander a resource forthe planning and conduct of FHA.


Commanders have responsibility for the C2of the forces assigned to them. C2relationships are established prior to thePKO in the appropriate operation plan,order, directive, or other authoritativecorrespondence. With continual missionanalysis and revised plans, crucial in anymilitary operation, the C2 relationships maybe adjusted to the situation.

“One cannot succeed with peaceoperations if one allows subordinatecommanders and men in the field togive way to their natural inclinations,and act the way they are trained to actin war. With proper measures, goodcommanders can make the distinctionunderstood up and down the line, anddo so without losing the ability torespond fast and forcefully should therebe a situation which calls for it.”

Ambassador R. OakleyPresident’s Special Envoy

for Somalia

a. Force Headquarters. The organizationof a PK force headquarters in non-UNsponsored operations is normally ad hoc,but will generally be structured aroundcommon military staff functions such asadministration, intelligence, operations,logistics, communications, and CA functions.The commander will also have a personal staffand civilian staff. In UN-sponsored

operations national contingents performunder OPCON of the UN forcecommander. The UN Secretary-General(SYG) is responsible for implementing UNSecurity Council resolutions or mandates andfor monitoring all UN PKO. The UN forcecommander is responsible to the UN mission’sspecial representative for ensuring militaryactivities support other components of themission.

• The SYG will appoint a UN forcecommander and a UN SpecialRepresentative. The force commanderis a military officer from a nation notinvolved in the dispute, whosequalifications are acceptable to the UNSecurity Council. Additionally, the forcecommander must also be acceptable tothe HN and all the parties to the dispute.The force commander refers all policymatters to the UN Special Representative,normally a career diplomat, given the titleof the Special Representative to the SYG(SRSG). The SRSG is appointed as headof mission (HOM).

• There is no standard staff organizationcommon to UN PK force headquarters.The staff is ordinarily grouped into threemain categories:

•• The MNF commander’s personalstaff normally consists of a militaryassistant, a political adviser, a legaladviser, a public affairs officer (PAO),an interpreter, and LNOs from the armedforces of the parties to the dispute.

•• The military staff normally consistsof a chief of staff, a deputy chief of staff,and an operations staff (intelligence,plans, training, communications, airtraffic control, security, police operations,observer groups, administration, healthservice support [HSS], logistics, andCMO staff officer). Linguists may alsobe included to facilitate communications.

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•• The civilian staff, provided by the UNSecretariat in New York, at a minimumconsists of a chief administrative officer(CAO). The CAO is responsible for thedirection of all administrative mattershaving financial implications, as well asfor the overall direction of the force’sadministration.

Minor differences reflect local requirementsor the preferences of the officers who createdthe headquarters.

b. Units. The MNF commander may begiven OPCON over US and other militaryunits assigned to the PK force and ensuresthat the national contingent commandersperform assigned tasks consistent with themandate and the force’s mission.

• A national contingent consists of anation’s entire contribution (units as wellas staff officers at the force headquarters).National contingent commandersreport to the force commander and tothe national chain of command as well.

• National contingent commanders areresponsible for disciplinary actionwithin their own contingents inaccordance with their national militarylaw. The authority for nationalcontingent commanders to carry out theirnational laws in the HN’s territory shouldbe included in the SOFA and/or SOMAfor the PKO. The force commander maydiscuss a major disciplinary breach witha contingent commander or, if warranted,may refer the matter to the SRSG.

• Each contingent commander isresponsible for accomplishing assignedtasks, communicating changes in thesituation, and responding to the needsand the directives of the PK forcecommander. Contingent commandersmay recommend and advise the forcecommander on COAs.

• Figure D-1 in Appendix D, “Chains ofCommand,” shows a notional chain ofcommand for PKO. Figure D-2 showsthe chain of command for the MFO.

c. US Military Forces. Combatantcommanders exercise combatant command(command authority) (COCOM) over USforces assigned to them by the “Forces forUnified Commands Memorandum.” Thegeographic combatant commander exercisesOPCON of US forces attached to them. ThePK force commander, in turn, exercisesOPCON of US forces as delegated by thecombatant commander. US military forcesare attached to the PK force upon enteringthe operational area.

d. Commanders’ Directives. The forcecommander’s directive should clearly outlinewho is empowered to give orders tocontingents and under what circumstances.US contingent commanders may issue theirown directives based on their own missionanalysis and the force commander’s directive.Although each directive is unique, acommander’s directive should include theitems listed in Figure II-10.

7. Planning Considerations

No two PKO are exactly the same; each istailored to the unique situation, requiringa thorough mission analysis. Additionally,PKO are often initiated on short notice,requiring extraordinary efforts to develop acomplete plan, identify and build aheadquarters staff, and conduct training andorientation, if possible, before deployment.However, the planning process for PKO isthe same as for any other militaryoperation. The system designed to provideinteroperability is the Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System (JOPES).JOPES is, first and foremost, policies andprocedures that guide joint operation planningefforts. JOPES is the focus of the Joint Pub5-03 series.

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The degree of command and control the force commander has over nationalcontingents by covering such topics as:

Appointment and authority of the force commanderApplicability of national laws and regulations to personnel in thevarious contingentsSupport responsibilities and procedures

Appointment of subordinate commanders, especially those detached fromthe main body

Individuals authorized to issue directives and instructions to the unit, as wellas under what circumstances

Subunit operational areas and tasks

Methods of operation and deployment

Reserve forces

States of readiness

Succession to command

Location of forces and unit headquarters

Force composition

Identification; for example, the wearing of force distinctive identification(headgear, badges, and armbands), marking of vehicles and positions, andso forth

Duration of duty and policies on liberty and rest and recreation

Relationship with the host government and its local administration, armedforces, and police; and other organizations and agencies in the operationalarea

Powers of search and seizure and rights of entry

Media relations, including guidance on when and through whom operationalinformation may be provided

Force protection measures, to include information and communicationssecurity

Regulations and restrictions to be observed off duty

COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE ELEMENTS

Figure II-10. Commander’s Directive Elements

II-17


“The mission analysis and commandestimate processes are as critical inplanning for MOOTW as they are inplanning for war.”

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrinefor Military Operations

Other Than W ar

a. The mandate, TOR, and SOFA areimportant sources of information formission analysis and planning. Additionally,commanders and staffs may gain valuableinsights by reviewing the lessons learnedfrom previous PKO or training exercises.Commanders and staff may conduct theirreview using the Joint Electronic Library POdata base, as well as other lessons learned databases. See Appendix E, “References.”

b. While most military units use standingoperating procedures (SOPs), the durationof many PKO, number of participatingmultinational contingents, and rotationpolicies make SOPs especially useful in theseoperations. Annex E to Appendix A,“Standing Operating Procedures,” is a sampleformat for SOPs.

• SOPs standardize the conduct ofoperations and logistics and aretailored to the mission and situation.The headquarters staff drafts anddisseminates SOPs preferably beforearrival in the operational area. SOPsaddress basic information about the force,standard procedures, and explain issueswhich require guidance. The overallforce SOPs may be augmented bycontingent commanders and subordinateunit commanders. At a minimum, theSOPs might include the items listed inFigure II-11.

c. When practical, the force commandershould consider having the staff develop anarea information handbook to preparepersonnel for their PK responsibilities. The

purpose would be to orient PK forcemembers to the mission, operational area,history of the conflict and its parties, religiousand cultural factors, and other importantinformation about the environment in whichthey will be operating. Army special forces(SF), CA, and PSYOP personnel are trainedand experienced in the preparation of thisproduct. Public affairs and intelligence

Pertinent information from themandate and terms of reference

Rules of engagement

Observation and checkpoint routines

Communications links andprocedures

Reporting formats and procedures

Resupply procedures

Contingency or emergencyprocedures

Building, vehicle, and personnelsearch procedures

Health services information, toinclude medical evacuation requestprocedures

Guidance on the media and controlson photography

Lists of persons allowed to enterpeacekeeping areas

Procedures regarding refugees anddisplaced civilians

Possible restrictions on contact withlocal forces and the populace

STANDING OPERATINGPROCEDURES

Figure II-11. Standing OperatingProcedures

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personnel are other resources. Annex F (“AreaInformation Handbook”) to Appendix A,“Key Documents in Peace Operations,” is asample format for an area informationhandbook.

d. Successful planning and employmentrequires detailed coordination at all levelsin the PK force. Therefore, LNOs should beidentified to assist the commander and staffas they coordinate plans and actions amongthe PK contingents, UN or sponsoringorganizations, NGOs, PVOs, other agencies,and local authorities. The latter may includemilitary leaders, local officials, customs,transportation authorities, and police. ACMOC provides a venue for coordinationbetween the military and these personnel.

e. Logistics. In PKO, logisticsconsiderations are as important as operationalconsiderations, just as they are in any othermilitary operation. However, there are somedifferences in how logistic support is providedin PKO. Consequently, logisticians’involvement in the planning process from thevery beginning will help to ensure missionsuccess. The ad hoc and multinationalnature of PKO demands careful anddetailed logistics planning. This isparticularly true in UN-sponsored PKO.Logistic support in PKO includes, but is notlimited to, the categories listed in Figure II-12.

• In UN operations, the deployedelements of the UN FieldAdministration and Logistics Divisionmake arrangements for goods andservices common to all the contingents,such as for water, some food items, fuel,and billeting. However, the UN requirestime to contract for this support.Consequently, when PK forces initiallydeploy they should, to the extent possible,be self-sufficient for a minimum of 60-90 days. National contingents areresponsible for all logistic support thatis unique to their requirements.

Normally, US PK forces will besupported through a combination ofscheduled US resupply, contingencycontracting, HNS, and UN logisticsupport. Other logistic considerations formultinational operations include thepossibility of role specialization and alead nation provider for certain classesof supply or services.

• In non-UN-sponsored operations, asingle nation may be responsible forplanning and coordinating logisticsupport for the force. For example, inthe MFO in the Sinai, the United Statesis responsible for logistic support to allnational contingents, to includesupply, transportation, maintenance,commun ica t ions , sma l l a rmsmaintenance, movement control, finance,postal, HSS, explosive ordnancedisposal, and mortuary affairs. However,many of these requirements may besatisfied through commercial contracts

CATEGORIES OFLOGISTIC SUPPORT

FOOD AND WATER

SUPPORT SERVICES

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

SUPPLY

MAINTENANCE

TRANSPORTATION

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCEDISPOSAL

HEALTH SERVICES

ENGINEERING

Figure II-12. Categories of Logistic Support

II-19


and require reimbursements from theparticipating or requesting nations oragencies.

• In PKO, contracting for support willgenerally be necessary. Contractingmay include use of the Army’s logisticscivilian augmentation program(LOGCAP) , the Navy’s emergencyconstruction capabilities contractprogram (CONCAP) and the AirForce’s Air Force contractaugmentation program (AFCAP).HNS contracting may also be used.Consequently, effective advance partiesinclude finance, logistics, resourcemanagement, and contracting personnelto assure the necessary level of supportfor the PK force. Planners should alsobe aware that in some regions, reliabilityand timeliness of contractor performancemay not be the same as in developedareas. The task of the advance partymay be complex due to differences inlanguages, currencies, accountabilitysystems, sanitation systems, and hygienestandards. Veterinary personnel inspectfood sources for food safety andsanitation as well as inspect foodstuffs for quality assurance andwholesomeness. If bottled water is beingused by the PKO force, veterinarypersonnel will also inspect these supplies.Preventive medicine personnel inspectand monitor water sources and suppliesto include ice. When the United Statesparticipates in a UN PKO, directcoordination between US militaryplanning staffs and UN planners shouldbe authorized to ensure effective andresponsive support to US forces.

• For UN PKO, many of the costsincurred by the United States arereimbursable by the UN. The UNissues detailed guidance (in the form ofan aide-memoire) explaining the logisticsupport provided by the UN and the

procedures for participating nations tofollow to receive reimbursement for othersupport. US units that participate inUN PKO must provide a detailedaccounting for all costs incurred int h e operat ions to just i fy UNreimbursement. UN and US or US andcoalition standards for various types oflogistic support may be different andspecial costs and complications mayensue. Advanced determination of thesedifferences is important. In any case,specific agreements should spell outexactly who is to provide specifiedsupport to whom for what period inwhat quantities. CA and CMO staffshould be involved in any logisticsefforts involving HN or civilianpersonnel. For additional information onUN reimbursement procedures, referto Annex A (“United NationsReimbursement Procedures”) of AppendixC, “United Nations Involvement in PeaceOperations.”

• PKO are often conducted inlogistically austere theaters wherethere may be limited or inadequate airand seaport facilities. If the HN hasinsufficient capability or capacity tosupport offloading at their ports, USsupport personnel must deploy before thescheduled arrival of the force. In somecases, existing facilities may requireexpansion or new facilities constructedto handle incoming forces. Repositioningof additional materials-handlingequipment may also be necessary.

• Logistics planners will also determineif previously established bilateral HNSagreements contain logistic supportprovisions applicable to the sustainmentof US PK forces and, if necessary,recommend changes. If not in existence,then logisticians should be activelyinvolved in their formulation, a processthat may take 12-24 months. Activation

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of HNS agreements are not necessarilyautomatic during PKO. Approval by theconcerned governments may benecessary.

For detailed information on logisticsplanning, refer to JP 4-0, “Doctrine forLogistic Support of Joint Operations;” JP4-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Airlift Support to JointOperations;” JP 4-01.2, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for SealiftSupport to Joint Operations;” JP 4-01.3,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Movement Control;” and other pertinentpublications in the JP 4-series. See also,Appendix E, “References.”

f. Information Gathering ViceIntelligence Operations. Information iscritically important to a PK force, not onlyfor mission success, but to protect the force.However, sensitivities exist about use of theterm “intelligence” in PKO. Suchsensitivity includes the argument thatintelligence involves the collection ofinformation from those who do not wish toprovide it and that it is therefore a provocativeact. An extension of that argument is thatinformation collection by covert meansinvolves deceit and may destroy the trust thatdisputing parties should have in the PK force.Intelligence support for US forces in PKO willbe conducted in accordance with Joint Pub2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to MilitaryOperations.”

• The threat and situation influence thepriority of information gathered.During the initial phases of thedeployment of a PK force, collection isfocused on gathering information crucialto the security of the force.

• The methodology for collectinginformation is generally the same asthat for any other military operation.In war, information collection has

focused on the military capabilities,weapons systems, and intentions of theenemy. In PKO, however, types ofsources are different. The informationcollection effort is directed toward:

•• The leaders of the disputing parties;

•• Civilian populations (including theirexpected level of support, indifference,or hostility to the PK force, as well as thepotential for violence between differentsegments);

•• Insurgent elements;

•• Terrorists;

•• Police and paramilitary forces;

•• Criminal activity;

•• Historical background that led to thedispute;

•• Cultural, ethnic, and religious factors;

•• Economic conditions; and

•• Unique environmental and HSSthreats to the force and others in theoperational area.

• The mandate will normally requiretracking and recording the activities ofthe disputing parties and, in some cases,the weapons and systems they possess.CA and PSYOP forces can provideinformation about the attitudes and needsof the civilian populace.

• Given the nature of PKO, informationcollection may involve extensive use ofhuman intelligence (HUMINT). Allmembers of the PK force are potentialsources of information, particularly ifthey are fluent in the language spoken inthe region. If present, personnel from

II-21


NGOs, PVOs, internationalorganizations, and the UN may providegeneral information to corroborate othersources. Additionally, open-sourcemedia such as local newspapers, radio,television, and the Internet may be avaluable information source. However,local media sources may not provideneutral or objective points of view.Before relying on them, the PK forcesshould ascertain the political beliefs andmotives of the media source.

• Classified US information cannot bereleased to foreign nationals or otherPK contingents unless authorized.Under 18 USC 798 and 50 USC 421, itis unlawful to disclose classifiedinformation to foreign governmentswithout proper authorization. The releaseis governed by national disclosure policy(NDP). Guidance is available in NDP-1,“National Policy and Procedures for theDisclosure of Classified MilitaryInformation to Foreign Governments andInternational Organizations.” Releaseprocedures should be established inadvance to allow for transfer ofinformation to non-US PK forces whendeemed appropriate. A foreigndisclosure officer may be a usefuladdition to the US staff headquarters.

g. Force Protection. Force protection isa high priority for a deployed PK force.The impartiality of the force, as mentioned inChapter I, “Primer for Peace Operations,” mayenhance force protection. ROE are also anessential element of force protection andwill provide for appropriate action to protectthe force. The US contingent commander isresponsible for setting and enforcingminimum standards of physical security forUS forces in coordination with the PK forcecommander and the geographic combatantcommander. Some force protectionconsiderations include the following.

• Coordination with HN civil police,supporting military police, CA, andPSYOPs units. Peacekeepers shouldcoordinate information-gatheringoperations with local HN police andsupporting military police and determinewhether information received is formilitary intelligence versus criminalintelligence purposes. Coordination withsupporting CA and PSYOPs unitsprovides peacekeepers with informationon the local populace relative to theenvironment in which they are employed,i.e., support for the PKO and attitudetowards soldiers.

• Terrorism poses serious problems forpeacekeepers. Overt observation makespeacekeepers vulnerable to terroristattacks. Counterterrorism (offensivemeasures to prevent, deter, and respondto terrorism) may be outside the scopeof a PKO. However, antiterrorism(defensive measures used to reduce thevulnerability of individuals and propertyto terrorist acts, to include limitedresponse and containment by localmilitary forces) is essential to a forceprotection plan. Key PK personnel arepotential targets of terrorists. Terroristsmay also abduct members of a particularnational contingent in an attempt toundermine that nation’s support of thePKO. All personnel who visit theoperational area will receive forceprotection training prior to departureappropriate to the operational area, aswell as appropriate terrorist awarenesstraining upon arrival in the operationalarea and as required throughout thelength of deployment. Adequateprecautions will protect personnel,positions, headquarters, and all types oftransportation and billets.

• Criminal activity from a forceprotection point of view. PK forces may

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be significantly better off in a materialsense than the local population.Additionally, they provide a ready sourceof weapons and other high value itemsof interest to the black market. As aresult, the PK force may become thetarget of choice for criminal activity and/or a desperate populace.

• Peacekeepers are vulnerable to attackswith mines; truck, bus, and car bombs;rocket-propelled grenades; ormortars. Personnel should be billetedin secure areas, and the number of peoplebilleted in any one building should belimited. Buildings should have asufficient buffer zone around them tolimit the effectiveness of car bombs.Sufficient vehicular control and barriersto prevent unauthorized approach shouldbe provided. The possibility of suicideattacks should be considered. Postingpersonnel aboard ships should beconsidered when practical and whenconditions and mission requirementswarrant.

• PK forces have limited authority tocheck the backgrounds of localemployees. Since these employees maybe bribed or pressured to provideinformation about PK forces, theiractivities, and other sensitive matters,they may be a security threat. The PKforce staff should coordinate with localofficials to obtain a background checkon potential employees when possible.Regardless, care must be taken not todiscuss PK force matters or handlesensitive documents in the presence oflocal nationals.

• PK forces may have limitedcommunications-security capabilities.Additionally, allied or coalition membersmay have a significantly lower awarenessof the vulnerability of the PK force’scommunications system to hostile

intelligence efforts. Care must be takento determine the sensit iv i ty ofinformation prior to transmission over thePK force’s communications system.

h. Reserve Force. Although the UNutilizes multinational reserves, the UScontingent commander may also designatea US reserve if needed, i.e., for forceprotection. The US contingent reserve shouldbe sufficiently armed, trained, equipped,funded, advantageously located, and mobile.When deployed under normal circumstances,the reserve will deploy in a high profile, non-tactical manner with the UN or force flagclearly displayed. The contingent commanderwill commit the reserve in order toaccomplish the mission. In the event thecontingent reserve cannot resolve the incident,the commander may request the US reserveforce.

i. Special Equipment. Technologicallyadvanced equipment can improve the abilityof the PK force to perform its mission. Someexamples of advanced technology that haveapplication in PKO are listed in FigureII-13. The benefits of using advancedtechnology equipment in PKO are improvedefficiency and effectiveness of the PK force,improved probability of detecting violationsof agreements, enhanced force protection, andprovision of the means for dealing with threatsituations without resorting to lethal force.This latter benefit is especially important incountering the benefit to hostile parties of localand international adverse reactions to loss ofhuman life from the actions of the PK force.

j. Contingency Planning. These plansmay include states of readiness, evacuation,disaster plans, and procedures for handlingdisplaced civilians and requests for asylum.

• The PK force headquarters willestablish states of readiness. The statesof readiness may vary from force to force,but UN forces normally have three states

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of readiness: normal vigilance, increasedvigilance, and full alert (see Figure II-14).Each increase in the state of readiness willbe complemented by restrictions on restand recuperation (R&R), leave, pass,training, movement, and certainoperations. Changes in the states ofreadiness are normally implementedonly by the force commander. In anemergency, the US contingentcommander may order a higher state ofreadiness, but must immediately informthe force headquarters.

• A PK force may need to be evacuatedif war breaks out or the disputingparties withdraw consent. Evacuationof the entire PK force may be ordered bythe appropriate authority; e.g., the UNSecurity Council or the sponsoringorganization. If ordered to evacuate, theforce commander is responsible for the

safe and speedy evacuation of the PKforce, visitors, observer groups in thearea, and personnel affiliated with thesponsoring organization. The UScontingent commander will plan for thepossibility that the contingent may needto be evacuated unilaterally. In thisinstance, the commander will coordinatewith the force headquarters to determineif the contingent’s positions and tasks areto be handed over to another contingentor abandoned. The US contingentcommander will coordinate evacuationplans with the geographic combatantcommander who has responsibility toevacuate the US contingent. Evacuationplans include specific instructions fordestroying critical items, equipment, andother assets that cannot be removed.Every attempt must be made to evacuateHSS supplies and equipment. Thoseitems which cannot be evacuated will beabandoned; however, such abandonmentis a command decision. HSS suppliesand equipment are afforded protectionunder the provisions of the GenevaConventions and may not be intentionallydestroyed.

• US forces must be able to transition tofighting a major theater war from aposture of global engagement. TheUnited States may have to accept a

EXAMPLES OFADVANCED TECHNOLOGY

Night vision devices

Tactical force protectionequipment

Sensors (infrared, seismic, metaldetectors, and so forth)

Countermine equipment

Nonlethal technologies

Target acquisition radar

Global Positioning System

Spaceborne and airbornesurveillance systems

Secure communications, andintelligence fusion systems, wherepermissible

Figure II-13. Examples ofAdvanced Technology

STATES OF READINESS

NORMAL VIGILANCE

INCREASED VIGILANCE

FULL ALERT

Figure II-14. States of Readiness

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degree of risk to withdraw and redirectforces from major PO in order to reducethe greater risk it would incur if thenation failed to respond adequately tomajor theater wars. Contingency plansshould include plans to quickly replacewithdrawn US forces with an increasedcommitment of available ReserveComponent forces, coalition or alliedforces, host-nation capabilities,contractor support, or some combinationthereof.

• Disasters. Contingency plans addressprocedures to respond to potentialnatural or manmade disasters. CA andPSYOP forces can provide the interfacewith civilian authorities and the localpopulace.

• Dislocated civilians can posesignificant challenges. Therefore, theTOR and SOP should identifyprocedures for handling refugees anddisplaced civilians. Commanders mustdetermine the level of HSS required tosupport these operations, especiallypreventive medicine. A determinationmust be made on the eligibility ofpersonnel for care by the PKO force. CApersonnel are trained to assist in theseactivities.

• Granting requests for asylum cancompromise the impartiality of the PKforce. Handling of such requests shouldbe outlined in the PK force SOPs or otherdocument available to commanders.

k. Special Considerations. A number ofspecial considerations apply to the uniquenature of PKO. The following are examples.

• PK personnel will be required to conductmany independent actions involving ahigh degree of professionalism, self-discipline, flexibility, patience, and tact.

• PK personnel will encounter differencesin cultural norms, work ethics, andstandards of professionalism amongother national contingents, requiringunderstanding and respect on their part.

• The PK force will impact on the localeconomy. Although the presence of thePK force may stimulate growth in thelocal economy, commanders must alsobe aware of the potential negativeimpacts on the economy after the PKforce departs. Policies may be developedto reduce these impacts, such asregulating the amount of dollars USpersonnel are allowed to convert to localcurrency and paying local civilians hiredto support the PK force the prevailingwages for the area. The policy on leave,pass, liberty, and R&R should alsoconsider these economic impacts.

• PK forces may wish to avoid thedevelopment of elaborate base camps andsupport facilities that may lead to aperception of a permanent presence bythe local population and falseexpectations.

• Peacekeepers will encounter fast-movingsituations which require the evaluation andexecution of COAs. Timely anticipationof an incident may allow a seniorcommander time to go to the scene andtake action to prevent a major crisis.However, situations may develop so quicklythat the senior military member on thescene will take immediate action to preventa situation from becoming uncontrollable.When this occurs, a report will be submittedto the respective commander as soon aspossible.

• Coordination with other USGagencies, NGOs, PVOs, and UNagencies will be an important part ofthe PKO.

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“Unified combatant commanders arenow using that joint task force approachto command and control forces in thefield. That’s significant, because ifwe’re to use forces that way andcommand them that way, then we needto train them that way so you don’t havepickup games in the future.”

Admiral Paul D. Miller, USN (Ret)

• Assignment to a Specific OperationalArea.

•• The key advantage is that eachnational contingent develops indepthknowledge of the terrain andcommunity in its specific operationalarea. This results in continuity incollecting and processing information.Additionally, useful relationships aredeveloped with the local authorities ofthe host government, police, andleadership of the parties to a dispute.Peacekeepers become attuned to thenormal activities in the area andconsequently can quickly detect changesfrom normal routines. Peacekeepersbecome well-acquainted with the localforces and are able to recognize andprohibit military personnel of theopposing forces from passing throughcheckpoints. Additionally, the transferof information records for an operationalarea and its installations is easier whenthe relieving unit is of the samenationality.

•• The disadvantage is that nationalcontingents may become overlyfamiliar with the people in the area dueto habitual contact, and as a result mayliberally interpret agreements and PKforce policies in their operational area.This may lead to a perception ofpartiality and compromise missionaccomplishment. If actual or perceivedinequities exist, the parties to the disputemay request an exchange of PK forces.

• HSS assistance to the local populationor other contingents may become part ofthe mission, requiring advanced planningfor legality and procedures.

• Coordinate for special training in non-lethal weapons, munitions, andprocedures. Non-lethal capabilities givecommanders a wider array of capabilitiesin developing and implementingmeasured responses to a given situation.Non-lethal operations require specialtraining to ensure they are effectivelysynchronized with other operations.

8. Employment

PK missions include separation of theparties to the dispute, patrolling, and observingand reporting on compliance with orviolations of agreements. To successfullyperform their mission, peacekeepers musthave freedom of movement, open access toall areas in their operational area, and theability to freely patrol, observe, monitor,verify, and report their findings. Keyfactors in successfully employing MILOBsor PK forces in PKO include:

• Active patrolling;

• Rapid responses to alleged or actualviolations of agreements and otherincidents;

• Effective operation of checkpoints;

• Close liaison with all parties to thedispute; and

• Constant vigilance throughout theoperational area.

a. A PK force may be employed in one oftwo ways: each national contingent may beallocated to a specific operational area, or thenational contingents may rotate among theoperational areas.

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An additional risk is that the force maybecome complacent in its tactical missionexecution after remaining in the samearea over time.

• Rotation Among Operational Areas.

•• The key advantage is that eachcontingent obtains a working knowledgeof more than one area. The potential forpeacekeepers to become overlyfamiliar with parties to the dispute isalso reduced. Such familiarity mightlead to perceptions of partiality. Thispotential, however, could be reducedthrough command controls and emphasis.

•• There are several disadvantages. Anational contingent may not havesufficient time to acquire any depth ofknowledge of the area or community.Important background informationgathered by a national contingent maynot be effectively passed to succeedingnational contingents due to languagedifferences and different ways ofoperating. Rotation may also disruptlogistics operations and HUMINTcollection efforts. With each rotation ofnational contingents, even slightdifferences in how the peacekeepersoperate may cause distress for the localpopulace.

b. Separation of Parties to the Dispute.Many PKO will require the interpositioningof the PK force to supervise the orderlydisengagement and withdrawal of the partiesto the dispute. Interpositioning of the PKforce may be required to defuse sensitiveor potentially explosive situations. It willalso give the disputing parties the confidencethat their withdrawal will not be used to theadvantage of another disputing party orparties.

• Interpositioning places PK forcesbetween the disputing parties in an

effort to supervise the withdrawal ofthe disputing parties’ forces andestablish a BZ. This operation requirescareful and accurate timing to reduce theinherent risks to the PK force. The PKforce must be credible and completelyimpartial in order to interposesuccessfully. If possible, the PK forceshould take advantage of the lull inhostilities to interpose itself as theparties in the conflict disengage. Ifi n te rpos i t i on ing occurs a f te rdisengagement or withdrawal has begun,it should be accomplished quickly toprevent clashes that could lead to renewalof the conflict or a general breakdown inthe cease-fire.

• The possible sequence of separationmay be as follows.

•• After a truce or cease-fire is in effectand the disputing parties reachagreement on the trace of an armisticedemarcation line (ADL) as shown inFigure II-15, PKO can begin. In someUN PKO, this line may be called a cease-fire line.

•• Coordinate the deployment of PKforces with the disputing parties and theirforces.

•• PK forces deploy along the ADLbetween the disputing forces as shownin Figure II-16 and supervise thedisengagement and withdrawal of thedisputing forces behind their respectivesides of the ADL. The ADL becomesthe forward limit for the disputing forces.The purpose of the interpositioning is toestablish a presence and place a bufferforce between disputing forces.Interpositioning should be carefullypreplanned with the disputing forces. (1)Where possible, the trace of the ADLshould follow identifiable natural ormanmade terrain features. Promptly

II-27


surveying and physically marking theADL on the ground by an acceptablemeans such as the placement of paintedbarrels, oil drums, stakes, single strandwire, or coiled wire is important. GPSmay assist most units to conduct markingaccurately. Artillery or engineer survey-qualified PK force personnel should beresponsible for carrying out demarcationduties. Monitoring of the line is requiredto ensure that the markings are notmoved. ADL markers, which aredifficult to remove and have a GPSsignature, may be available for use. (2)The size of the interpositioning forcemust be sufficiently credible to providethe disputing parties with the confidenceneeded to disengage and withdraw safelyfrom their positions. (3) The utmostcare is needed during the initialinterpositioning because of thelikelihood of disagreements andmisunderstandings. Furthermore, mineclearance operations may be necessary

to safely deploy the PK force along theline. (4) Localized disagreements orpotential clashes should be promptlymediated at the lowest practical levelto prevent a recurrence of conflict.

•• Once there is agreement on theformation of a BZ, lines of demarcationare established on each side of theADL. The PK force then supervises thewithdrawal of the disputing forces topositions behind their respective lines ofdemarcation, as shown in Figure II-17,to prepare for the establishment of theBZ. The lines of demarcation are nowthe forward limits for the respectivedisputing forces.

•• PK forces establish the BZ and beginobservation and patrol activities asshown in Figure II-18. In some UN PKO,the BZ may be referred to as the area ofseparation (AOS). A BZ or AOS isnormally only a zone or area from which

ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE TRACE

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce A

Country or Territory A

Country or Territory B

ARMISTICE DEMARCATIONLINE

Figure II-15. Armistice Demarcation Line Trace

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the disputing forces have been excluded.(1) Observation Posts are established toprovide visual coverage within the BZ.Patrols supplement the OPs by patrollingareas out of effective visual coverage ofOPs. (2) Access to the BZ will normallybe restricted to the PK force orobserver group. Special arrangementsmay be negotiated between the disputingparties and the PK force to allowrestricted access to local civilians, suchas farmers or fishermen. At any pointwhere people or vehicle traffic may bepermitted by the agreement to pass into orthrough a BZ, access may be controlled atcheckpoints manned by peacekeepers andcould be restricted to daylight hours.Commanders will determine manning ofsuch checkpoints based on their analysisof the mission and other factors.

•• Subject to negotiated diplomaticagreements, the disputing parties may

agree to extended areas of supervisioncalled areas of limitation (AOLs), asshown in Figure II-19, wherepeacekeepers may inspect the strengthand fortifications of the disputingparties. The usual arrangement is forthe disputing parties to agree on equalnumbers of small, lightly armed forcesthat may be maintained in the areaimmediately adjacent to the BZ. Largerforces of the disputing parties may beallowed in other areas of the AOL, butthe agreement will specify an upperlimit for the number and type offormations, tanks, and antiaircraftweapons and artillery (by caliber)permitted. The PK force or observergroup will monitor each side’scompliance with the personnel andarmaments limitations. Lines ofdemarcation define outer boundariesof the AOLs. AOLs constitute anadditional measure for improving the

DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES ALONG ANARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND WITHDRAWAL OF

DISPUTING FORCES

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce A


= Peacekeeping Force ElementsCountry or Territory B PK

PK PK PKARMISTICEDEMARCATIONLINE

Figure II-16. Deployment of Peacekeeping Forces Along an ArmisticeDemarcation Line and Withdrawal of Disputing Forces

II-29


security of the BZ and increasing theconfidence of the disputing parties.

•• The BZ may eventually become aDMZ, following further diplomaticactivity. In contrast to BZs, DMZs arenot normally occupied by PK forces,but are observed and patrolled byobserver groups. DMZs are created toneutralize certain areas from militaryoccupation and activity. Generally, aDMZ is in an area claimed by two ormore of the disputing sides and wherecontrol by one party could constitute adirect threat to the others. Theboundaries of a DMZ are defined bylines of demarcation. These boundariesmust be easily recognizable and, ideally,should not run counter to locally acceptedpolitical and cultural divisions. Theairspace over a DMZ is also demilitarized

and is denied to aircraft of the disputingparties.

c. Observing and Reporting.Observing and reporting are thecornerstones of PKO. Observers (bothMILOBs or PK force observers) observeand report information on activities withintheir operational areas. Observers mustprovide timely and accurate reports onevery situation or incident that developsin their operational area. Factual andimpartial reporting constitutes the basis ofall successful PKO and, when required,includes maps, field sketches, diagrams,video tapes, photographs, and references tospecific agreements or instructions.Likewise, inaccurate and biasedreporting can adversely affect theoperational situation, thus damaging theimage and credibility of the PK force. A

WITHDRAWAL OF DISPUTING FORCES BEHINDLINES OF DEMARCATION

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce B


= Peacekeeping Force ElementsCountry or Territory B

ArmisticeDemarcation Line

PKPK

PK PK PK

Line ofDemarcation "A"

Line ofDemarcation "B"

Figure II-17. Withdrawal of Disputing Forces Behind Lines of Demarcation

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thorough analysis of these reports by theforce commander ’s staff is critical.Observation requires a completeunderstanding of the situation and thepolitical and military implications resultingfrom PKO actions.

• Observation tasks commonly cover:

•• The status of military installations;

•• Activities within the operational arearelated to personnel or weapons;

•• Violations of international agreements;

•• Observance of BZ and DMZrestrictions; and

•• Observance of local agreements thatwere approved by the parties to thedispute.

• Observers report any violations ofagreements such as:

•• Movements of the disputingparties’ forces (If unit identificationsand other information of a sensitivenature are observed, the OPcommander will record the time of

ESTABLISHMENT OF A BUFFER ZONE

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce B


= Peacekeeping Force Elements

= Patrol Route

= Observation Post

Country or Territory BPK

PK PKPKBufferZone

Figure II-18. Establishment of a Buffer Zone

II-31


the sighting and send the report bysecure means);

•• Shootings, hostile acts, or threatsmade against the PK force orcivilians;

•• Improvements to the defensivepositions of the disputing parties; and

•• Overflights by military or civilianaircraft when air movement in the BZ orAOS is restricted.

• Observers exercise discretion inofficial business. They do notcommunicate any official information,except in the course of their duties orwhen authorized by higher authority.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AREAS OF LIMITATION

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce A

DisputingForce B

DisputingForce B


= Peacekeeping Force Elements

= Patrol Route

= Observation Post

Country or Territory B

PK

PK PK BufferZone

AOL

AOL

PK

Figure II-19. Establishment of Areas of Limitation

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• OPs belong to either an observer groupor to a PK force. OPs should be locatedto give maximum visibility of an area, tohave effective radio and phonecommunications, and be clearly marked(painted in the force color and insigniaand force flag displayed). OPs areidentified by serial numbers, names, colorand number, or other suitable methodsdetermined by the PK force commanderor observer group chief of staff. The PKforce commander or observer group chiefof staff must approve locations and statuschanges of all OPs. Observer group OPsmay be staffed by military officers orcivilians; however, the on-duty observersare normally from different countries.

• Report formats will vary for eachPKO. Reports normally include thecategories listed in Figure II-20.Information concerning how to completethese reports should be contained in theforce SOP. Reports are normallysubmitted to the force commander or, inthe case of an observer group, the chiefof staff.

d. Patrolling. Another essential elementof most PKO is patrolling. Patrols gatherinformation, investigate problems, supervisethe implementation of a treaty or otheragreement, and establish a visible presence.The mere presence of a PK force patrol, orthe likelihood one may appear at any moment,helps deter violations of agreements.

• Patrolling may be conducted on footor by vehicle, naval vessel, aircraft, orhelicopter. Patrolling must be overtand easily recognized by all sides.Normally, vehicle and foot patrols willdisplay the UN or force flag or otherdistinctive markings or uniforms.Vehicles and helicopters and certain airand naval craft assigned to the PK forceare painted in the force color and bearthe force insignia.

• Patrolling may be confined to daylighthours in areas in which armedconfrontations continue to occur.When limited visibility makesidentification difficult, the opposing sidesmay be nervous and, therefore, apt to firewithout hesitation. Even so, the mandatemay require that patrols be dispatchedunder these conditions. Procedures andground rules under which patrols operateare clearly defined and known by all,including the parties to the dispute.

• Patrols are normally conducted to:

•• Gather information and complementthe reports of OP personnel, LNOs, andother day-to-day observations — in largeareas where the ground cannot beadequately covered by static OPs, patrolsmay be used, to ensure that possiblebreaches of the agreement are discovered;

•• Investigate reported activities thatmay violate the agreement;

REPORT FORMATS INPEACEKEEPING

OPERATIONS

SITUATION OR INCIDENT REPORTS

VIOLATION REPORTS

SHOOTING REPORTS

FIRING CLOSE TO OBSERVATIONPOST REPORTS

AIR ACTIVITY REPORTS

OTHER ROUTINE REPORTS

Figure II-20. Report Formats inPeacekeeping Operations

II-33


•• Separate disputing parties in anactual or potential localized confrontation;and

•• Escort farmers, fishermen, or otherswho are on their way to and from workwhere the route passes close to a hostileparty. Patrols may also escort dignitariesand visitors.

e. Checkpoints. A checkpoint is amanned point used as a means ofcontrolling movement and checkingvehicles and pedestrians, in order toenforce control measures, orders, andregulations. The peacekeeper’s right tosearch is defined in the mandate and in theSOFA and/or SOMA. Checkpoints maybe static or mobile and require the fullestmeasure of force protection considerations.Some checkpoints may be roadblocks.Checkpoints are established to:

• Show peacekeeping presence to allparties and to the population;

• Survey and report activities;

• Check and inspect persons and traffic intoand out of the operational area;

• Prevent infiltration and smuggling ofweapons, ammunition, and explosivesinto or out of the area;

• Act as, or work with, an observation post;and

• Block traffic.

f. Rules of Engagement. Well-conceived,clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminatedROE can make the difference betweensuccess and failure in PO. ROE in PKO aremore restrictive than in PEO and war. ROEare written to enable the PK force toaccomplish its mission without undue risk toitself and undue collateral damage to civiliansand civilian infrastructure. Sample ROE arefound in Annex D (“Rules of Engagement”)to Appendix A, “Key Documents in PeaceOperations.” Also refer to CJCSI 3121.01,“Standing Rules of Engagement for USForces.”

9. Conclusion

Although planned like any other militaryoperation, PKO present a significant challengeto commanders and staffs. PKO take place ina rapidly changing environment and have aninterrelated political dimension. To maintainthe consent of the parties to a dispute andguarantee the agreement, the PK force mustact overtly, with impartiality, and use orthreaten force only in self defense. The keyto successful PKO are well led, trained, anddisciplined forces able to apply their skillsunder highly restrictive ROE.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIPEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

III-1

1. General

US military forces may conduct PEOunilaterally or as a part of a multinationaloperation. Multinational PEO may besponsored by the UN, a regional organization,or other coalitions or alliances. Any large-scale PEO in which the US participates willmost likely be US-led and US forces willlikely be under US control. In some instances,the composition of the force will be largelymade up of US forces, but may includeregional contingent forces. Although thecontribution of forces by some nations maybe comparatively small, their contributiondemonstrates support and enhances thelegitimacy of the operation.

“Wars spring from unseen and generally insignificant causes, the first outbreakbeing often but an explosion of anger.”

ThucydidesHistory of the Peloponnesian Wars

404 BC

2. Description of PeaceEnforcement

“ . . . All mischief short of war.”

Sir Winston Churchill

The goal of PEO is to enforce theprovisions of a mandate designed tomaintain or restore peace and order. PEforces use force or the threat of force tocoerce or compel compliance withresolutions or sanctions. In PEO, force isthreatened against or applied to belligerentparties to terminate fighting, restore order, andcreate an environment conducive to resolvingthe dispute. Although PEO may require

Peace enforcers generally have full combat capability and have thenecessary support to accomplish their mission.

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combat, they are not wars and may have morerestrictive ROE than wars. Although PEOcannot solve the underlying problems thatcaused peaceful relations to dissolve, PEOmay help create the conditions in which theprocess of peaceful resolution of the disputemay proceed. Conflict, violence, disorder,and possibly even chaos, rather than peace,describe the environment surroundingenforcement operations. Moreover, one ormore of the parties to the conflict prefers itthat way. PEO may be conducted in interstateconflicts, but increasingly have involvedintrastate conflicts. In PEO, consent of theparties to the dispute is not a requirement,although some parties may extend it. Peaceenforcers generally have full combatcapabilities, although there may be somerestrictions on weapons and targeting,depending on the mandate, ROE, and tacticalsituation. PE forces strive to help create theconditions for conflict resolution. Theycannot solve the underlying problems thatcaused peaceful relations to dissolve. Theconsent of one or both belligerent parties toPE may not exist. PEO are likely to disregardstate sovereignty, and as such may beconsidered an act of war, particularly if themission takes place on the soil of a nation-state combatant that opposes peace and hasnot invited the peace enforcers into itsterritory.

3. Fundamentals

Certain fundamentals help guide theconduct of successful PEO. Thesefundamentals are listed in Figure III-1 anddescribed below.

a. The ultimate measure of success inPEO is political, not military. Therefore,commanders seek a clear understanding of thepolitical objectives and how militaryoperations support the attainment of thesepolitical objectives.

“Diplomacy is utterly useless wherethere is no force behind it.”

Theodore RooseveltJune 2, 1897

b. Impartiality is desirable but notnecessary, may not be attainable, and is notcentral to achieving success in PEO.However, the subsequent transition to peaceis often easier if the focus remains onestablishing the conditions for peace in animpartial manner. Specific attention must bepaid to creating conditions for achievingconsent of the belligerents toward the desiredpolitical end state. This will foster anenvironment conducive to transitioning to aPKO and engaging in subsequent peacebuilding actions.

c. Restraint in the use of force or, whereappropriate, the use of nonlethal force willbe required. ROE are likely to be morerestrictive than in war, but less restrictive thanin PKO. Inserting forces to stop combat maybe the essential first step in setting theconditions for peace, but military operationsin and of themselves cannot be the basis of alasting peace. Achieving the desired politicalobjectives is the goal of PEO.

d. Methods of coercion may be the rulerather than the exception for PE forces andoperations. Such coercion involves activitiesor objectives that make the political embraceof peace more attractive than continuance ofthe conflict.

e. Coordinate for special training innonlethal weapons, munitions, andprocedures. Nonlethal capabilities givecommanders a wider array of capabilities indeveloping and implementing measuredresponses to a given situation. Nonlethaloperations require special training to ensurethat they are effectively synchronized withother operations.

III-3

Peace Enforcement Operations

f. PE forces may have to fight their wayinto the conflict area and use force toseparate the combatants physically. Underthese conditions, certain considerations mustbe taken into account. First, the PE force willnormally retain the right to the first use ofappropriate force. Second, the threat ofoverwhelming force, while not proportionalto the requirement for protecting the PE forceunits, may be the best means of coercing thebelligerents into separating.

g. The operational area will normally becharacterized by some density of civilians.

This will pose special considerations forthreat identification, collateral damage,civilian casualties, and dislocated civilians.

h. If the threat of force fails, the PE forcemay have to engage in offensive actions.However, commanders must be aware thatinappropriate use of force could worsen theoverall situation. Inappropriate use of forcecould possibly undercut international and USdomestic support and the legitimacy of theforce in the eyes of the populace and others inthe operational area. Situations may developwhere the use of nonlethal force is appropriate.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONSFUNDAMENTALS

Impartiality is desirablebut not necessary, maynot be attainable, and isnot central to achievingsuccess in PEO.

Methods of coercion maybe the rule rather than theexception for peaceenforcement forces andoperations.

Peace enforcementforces may have to fighttheir way into the conflictarea and use force toseparate the combatantsphysically.

The area of operationswill normally becharacterized by somedensity of civilians.

If the threat of forcefails, the peaceenforcement forcemay have to engagein offensive actions.

Participation in PEOwith multinationalpartners involvesseveral unique factorsfor the commander andstaff to consider.

Restraint in the use offorce will be required.

The ultimate measure ofsuccess in PEO ispolitical, not military.

Coordinate for specialtraining in nonlethalweapons, munitions, andprocedures.

Figure III-1. Peace Enforcement Operations Fundamentals

III-4

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In these instances, the use of deadly forcemay not be justified but the use of nonlethal assetsmay allow for an appropriate response.

i. Participation in PEO withmultinational partners involves severalunique factors for the commander and staffto consider. Certain multinational partners,for example, may not have a vital nationalinterest at stake in the conflict or may evenface certain dilemmas in regard to theirinvolvement. Consequently, the partners’resolve may be reduced by factors such ascasualties, protracted involvement, orfinancial costs. Some multinational forcesmay not possess the same military capabilitiesto conduct PEO as US forces. Each partner’sobjectives, agendas, military capabilities,doctrine, equipment, discipline, and moralemust be considered carefully. The challengeto the PEO commander and staff is toconstitute a force capable of coordinated andsustained offensive operations.

4. Peace Enforcement Personneland Forces

Actual intelligence requirements are criticalto a comprehensive mission analysis whendetermining force structure, especially in PEoperations. Intelligence requirements aregreater in PEO than in PKO since normallythe potential for hostilities is higher and therequirement for force protection intelligenceis more vital. Accurate intelligence andcomprehensive mission analysis will be thebasis for determining the structure andcomposition of the force. See, for example,the lessons learned on use of tanks in peaceenforcement operations in Annex G(“Historical Examples”) to Appendix A, “KeyDocuments in Peace Operations.” Thecombat forces may range from a Marine air-ground task force to a multidivision JTF. TheUS commander will have the authority toemploy the force’s full range of combatcapabilities to achieve the mission objectivesand protect the force. Generally, the

capabilities of ground, air, maritime, space,and special operations forces, discussed inChapter II, “Peacekeeping Operations,” willapply to PEO. However, in some PEOscenarios it is possible that aerospace and/ormaritime forces may be able to meet missionobjectives without the introduction ofsignificant ground forces being necessary.Aerospace and/or maritime forces may be ableto coerce an adversary, enforce sanctions, and/or deny the use of territory (e.g., buffer orexclusion zones) through a combination of“presence, ISR, humanitarian airlift or sealift,punitive strikes, and aerial psychologicaloperations. PSYOP and CA are especiallyvaluable in PEO to help set the conditions forlong-term peaceful settlement. See, forexample, “Realizing CA in the CivilDimension” in Annex G (“HistoricalExamples”) to Appendix A, “Key Documentsin Peace Operations.” CA activities can alsomake substantial contributions before, during,or after PEO.

“Any large scale participation of USforces in a major peace enforcementmission that is likely to involve combatshould ordinarily be conducted underUS command and operational controlor through competent regionalorganizations such as North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) or ad hoccoalitions.”

Joint Pub 0-2, Unified ActionArmed Forces (UNAAF)

5. Peace Enforcement Missions

PEO may include enforcement of sanctionsand exclusion zones, protection of HA,operations to restore order, and forcibleseparation of belligerent parties or parties toa dispute.

a. Enforcement of sanctions includes abroad range of possible missions.Commanders must understand that actions toenforce sanctions, while endorsed by the UNSecurity Council, have traditionally been

III-5


Unified Task Force in Somalia, US-led forcesprovided security for relief supplies from theair and seaports to the distribution sites. TheCMOC serves as the focal point for requestsfor support from US forces.

“The United States armed forces arebecoming increasingly involved inhumanitarian assistance operationsaround the world. Operations such asthose involving Cuban and Haitianmigrants, Kurdish and Rwandanrefugees, and internal disaster reliefare likely to continue . . . We haveadapted well to these challenges byforming joint task forces (JTFs) andusing our command and controlsystems, logistics, and rapiddeployment capabilities in innovativeways. We must build from theseexperiences as we prepare for futurechallenges.”

General J.J. Sheehan, USMCFormer Commander in Chief,

US Atlantic Command

c. Operations to restore order areconducted to halt violence and support,reinstate, or establish civil authorities. Theyare designed to restore stability to the pointwhere indigenous police forces can effectivelyenforce the law and reinstate civil authority.During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACYin Haiti, US forces (as a part of a multinationalforce authorized by UN Security CouncilResolution 940) confiscated weapons,suppressed or detained threatening elements,provided security, and assisted in the trainingof a new police force prior to transferring theresponsibility for long-term security to theUN.

d. Forcible Separation of BelligerentParties. This PE mission poses the highestrisk of any PEO. Forcible separation mayinvolve reducing the combat capability of oneor more of the belligerent parties. The PEforce will normally retain the right of first useof force. Forces conducting forcibleseparation require extensive offensive combat

considered acts of war and should posture theirforces accordingly. It may include:

• Restricting the flow of goods acrossinternational borders;

• Confiscating or destroying unauthorizedimports and exports;

• Denial of movement of military forcesor supplies;

• Enforcing air, land, or sea exclusionzones; and

• Guaranteeing rights of movement orpassage.

An example is Operation PROVIDECOMFORT in 1991, where US forcesprotected Kurds in northern Iraq with an airexclusion zone. See also “USCENTCOMs1994 Maritime and Air Operations” in AnnexG (“Historical Examples”) to Appendix A,“Key Documents in Peace Operations.”

“In the military operations off Cuba,President Kennedy did not look formilitary victory, he sought to change Mr.Khrushchev’s mind, and hesucceeded.”

VADM Sir Peter Gretton7 April 1965

b. PE forces may be tasked to provideprotection for HA. This mission mightinclude protection for NGOs, PVOs, USGagencies, and other military personnel whoare providing HA. Such protection mayinclude establishing secure base areas(normally air or sea ports), protecting routesor corridors for the transport of relief supplies,and providing security for distribution sites.If belligerent parties oppose the delivery ofrelief supplies by NGOs, PVOs, or otheragencies, PE forces may deliver the suppliesby providing airlift or other forms of logisticsupport to FHA operations. For example, in

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capability, as well as combat support (CS) andcombat service support (CSS). The goal is toforce the belligerent parties to disengage,withdraw and, subsequently, to establish a BZor DMZ. During Operation POWER PACKin the Dominican Republic in 1965, US forcesestablished a BZ to separate the belligerentparties and to preclude either side fromgaining an advantage over the other untilpeace was made.

e. Conduct internment/resettlement (I/R)operations. If PEO require forcible separationof belligerent parties (as stated insubparagraph d), then there will be arequirement to conduct I/R operations aspeacekeepers capture or detain parties to theconflict. Depending on the type of conflictthat results from forcible separation, I/Roperations will need to be conducted forenemy prisoners of war and/or civilianinternees or refugees and/or dislocatedcivilians. Forces responsible for conductingI/R operations must ensure that appropriateCSS assets, i.e., I/R units, are deployed tosupport this operation. The I/R operationswill become critical as peacekeeperstransition from the PEO phase to the PKOphase of peace operations.


In most cases, PEO mirror conventionalmilitary operations and possess many of thesame C2 characteristics.

a. For both unilateral and multinationaloperations, US forces will probably bestructured as a JTF. The composition ofthe forces in the JTF will depend on themission, political objectives, and the threat.

For information regarding JTForganization and planning, refer to JP 5-00.2,“Joint Task Force Planning Guidance andProcedures.”

“War is a process that pits the opposingwills of two commanders against eachother. Great victories of military forcesare often attributed to superiorfirepower, mobility, or logistics. Inactuality, it often is the commander whomakes good decisions and executesthese decisions at a superior tempowho leads his forces to victory.Therefore, victory demands thatcommanders effectively link decisionmaking to execution through theconcept of command and control.Warfare will continue to evolve andcommand and control processes,organization, and supporting systemswill continue to change, but the basicconcept of command and control willremain the key to the decisiveapplication of combat power. Morethan ever before, a command andcontrol system is crucial to success andmust support shorter decision cyclesand instantaneous flexibility acrossvast distances of time and space.”

Fleet Marine Force Manual 3Command and Control,

superseded by Marine CorpsDoctrinal Publication 6,Command and Control

b. For multinational operations, PEforces may operate under either a leadnation or a parallel C2 arrangement (seeFigure III-2).

• In the lead nation C2 arrangement,one nation’s commander directs orleads the multinational partners in theaccomplishment of the PE mission.The lead nation normally provides theforce commander, the basic staff, thepreponderance of the forces, and thecommand, control, communications, andcomputers system to control operations.This helps achieve unity of command andassures mutual understanding of themandate by all partners. If the US is thedesignated lead nation, the US

III-7


geographic combatant commander or asubordinate commander will normally bedesignated as the PE force commander.

• In the parallel commandarrangement, a force commander isselected by the sponsoringorganization. The staff is comprised ofstaff members from all contributingnations and is assembled on an ad hocbasis. OPCON of the coalition forcesmay be passed to the force commander,but the degree of control is generally lessthan that exercised in the lead-nationarrangement. A US commander couldbe designated to lead the force.

7. Planning Considerations

“. . . make plans to fit circumstances,but do not try to create circumstancesto fit plans.”

George S. Patton, Jr.War As I Knew It, 1947

Many planning considerations for PEwill be similar to those for PKO, asdescribed in Chapter II, “PeacekeepingOperations,” especially for UN operations(See Figure III-3). The planning process forPEO is the same as for any other combatoperation and begins with a comprehensivemission analysis. US PE forces are normally

PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONSCOMMAND AND CONTROL

PARALLEL

one nation's commander directs or leads the multinational partners

provides the force commander, the staff, preponderance of theforces, and the command, control, communications, and computerssystem to control operations

helps achieve unity of command and assures mutual understandingof the mandate

LEAD NATION

staff comprised of members from all contributing nationsand assembled on an ad hoc basis

force commander is selected by the sponsoringorganization

degree of control less than that of the lead-nationarrangement

Figure III-2. Peace Enforcement Operations Command and Control

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employed in accordance with a detailedcampaign plan which includes the desiredend state and a plan to transitionresponsibilities to a PK force. In multinationalPEO, the campaign plan will be coordinatedwith the other members of the force and theforce headquarters. The campaign plan forUS forces is the responsibility of thecombatant commander. A correspondinginteragency political-military plan willenhance achievement of a successful end stateand smooth transitions.

For information on campaign planning,refer to JP 5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Campaign Planning.”

“It is a bad plan that cannot be altered.”

Publilius SyrusSententiae

a. Mission Analysis. The mission analysisprocess is as critical in planning for PEO asin planning for war. However, in PEO there

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

MissionAnalysis

SpecialEquipment/

Interoperability

FireSupport

Logistics

IntelligenceRules ofEngagement

ForceProtection

Mobility andSurvivability

Figure III-3. Planning Considerations

III-9


may be increased sensitivity with regard topolitical factors and constraints. Mission-termination objectives, determined by thepolitical objectives and desired end state andfound in a mandate in UN operations, aim forthe maintenance or restoration of internationalpeace and security.

b. Intelligence. Intelligence is developedto support PEO using the same process usedin war. However, in addition to standard threatindicators and order of battle, an emphasismust be placed on determining the rootcauses of the problem and those factors thatwill help commanders influence thebehavior of the belligerents. Examples ofintelligence targets are:

• Belligerent leaders and their motives;

• Internal and external political factors;

• Economics;

• Civilian populations, including theirexpected level of support to the PE force;

• History of the conflict;

• Ethnic relationships;

• Cultural and religious factors; and

• The military and political context of theregion bordering the operational area,such as:

•• Police and paramilitary forces; and

•• Terrorist groups and organizationsoperating in the operational area.

The PEO commander requires predictiveintelligence that can give indications andwarning of a deteriorating situation orresumption of hostilities. Therefore, the PEOintelligence cycle must be thorough, accurate,and timely. A detailed collection plan that

leverages all of the unique capabilities of thePEO contingent — CA, MPs, NGOs, civilianagencies, and MILOBs — is the key tosuccessful information collection. See, forexample, the lessons learned on photosupport and the Area Assessment Checklistin Annex G (“Historical Examples”) toAppendix A, “Key Documents in PeaceOperations.”

“In BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA, some ofour best information came to be calledtransportation intelligence. Driversoften had the best information on theroad conditions, attitude of the localpopulations, locations of check-points,and our ability to get through.”

LTC R. Robinson, USAHQ AFCENT

c. Fire Support. The principles andplanning for fire support are the same in PEOas in war. However, in PEO, fire support isconstrained by more restrictive ROE, anda prime consideration is the need tominimize collateral damage to the fullestextent possible. Precision engagement usingprecision-guided munitions and precision firesupport help reduce collateral damage. Theobjective is to compel or coerce thebelligerents to disengage, withdraw, andcomply with the mandate. Therefore, firesupport may be directed more toward threatsto the belligerent parties and suppressionand neutralization than toward destructionof targets. Examples include the firing ofmarking rounds, smoke, and otherdemonstrations of accuracy and capability.Detailed coordination of fire-support plans,procedures, and targeting is essential,particularly in multinational PEO.

For additional information, refer to JP3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.” Seealso the lessons learned on suppression ofartillery in Annex G (“Historical Examples”)to Appendix A, “Key Documents in PeaceOperations.”

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d. Logistics. Logistic planning andsupport in PEO are the same as in war, butinclude as well the considerations addressedfor PKO in Chapter II, “PeacekeepingOperations.” The conduct of PEO, especiallywhere active combat takes place, maycomplicate the conduct of operations byother than military entities, such as the UNand NGOs and PVOs. Consequently, thedemand for food, water, billeting, wastedisposal, movement control, environmentaland safety concerns, and HSS supplies andservices may increase substantially abovethe force’s own requirements if largenumbers of refugees or displaced personsmust be supported until HA operations arefully established. CA forces and the CMOCcan enhance this effort and should be includedin the logistics planning effort.

“Seldom will all logistics principles exertequal influence; usually one or two willdominate in any given situation.Identifying those principles that havepriority in a specific situation isessential to establishing effectivesupport.”

Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine forLogistic Support of

Joint Operations

For detailed information on logisticsplanning, refer to JP 4-0, “Doctrine forLogistic Support of Joint Operations,” JP4-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Airlift Support to JointOperations,” JP 4-01.2, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for SealiftSupport to Joint Operations,” JP 4-01.3,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Movement Control,” JP 4-02, “Doctrinefor Health Service Support in JointOperations,” JP 4-02.1, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for HealthService Logistics Support in JointOperations,” JP 4-02.2, “Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for PatientMovement in Joint Operations,” and otherpertinent publications in the JP 4-0 series.

See also Appendix E, “References,” especiallyDA Pamphlet 700-30, “Commander’sHandbook, Peace Operations (A LogisticsPerspective).”

e. Special Equipment. Superiornavigation, sensor, and communicationsequipment provide US forces with adistinct advantage in most, if not all, PEO.Nonlethal equipment, munitions, andweapons can significantly increasecommander’s flexibility in responding tobelligerents. Equipment such as fire hoses,barriers, and water cannons can be obtainedlocally. Nonlethal munitions and weaponsprovide a more acceptable response to low-end threats than the use of conventionalmilitary force. Night-vision devices, GPS-navigation devices, superior communicationssystems, advanced sensors, and a wide rangeof current and emerging nonlethaltechnologies can dramatically enhance thecapabilities of US forces to achieveinformation superiority while conductingPEO. Information superiority hasextraordinary potential in PEO. Thecombination of IO with other advanced andnonlethal technologies that are integrated intoan overall operation plan can help to:

• Reduce the overall level of violencenecessary to achieve objectives;

• Minimize casualties on all sides;

• Reduce collateral damage and confoundbelligerent efforts to embarrass the PEforce, by displaying damage to media;

• Maintain legitimacy for the operation;

• Preempt violations of rules;

• Reduce the number of troops required foreffective enforcement; and

• Reduce the logistics tail of the PE force.

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Use of special equipment requires specialconsideration for the capabilities of allies andcoalition members.

“With respect to self-defense, ROE arepermissive, which means that you arenot required to take the full measure ofaction authorized. For example,assume that there has been a seriesof bomb threats in your area. A childruns toward a convoy with a box.Although authorized to fire (hostileintent) it may be prudent to hold fire.In Somalia, a beggar child was shot inthis situation but the rifleman was notcharged because he honestly believedthere was hostile intent shown.”

Colonel F.M. Lorenz, USMCUnified Task Force Somalia

f. Rules of Engagement. Well-conceived,clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminatedROE can make the difference betweensuccess and failure in PO. ROE in PEO areusually less restrictive than in PKO, but morerestrictive than in war. ROE are written toenable the PE force to accomplish its missionwithout undue risk to itself and unduecollateral damage to civilians and civilianinfrastructure. Sample ROE are found inAnnex D of Appendix A, “Rules ofEngagement.” Also refer to CJCSI 3121.01,

“Standing Rules of Engagement for USForces.”

g. Force Protection. Prior to deploymentensure that all personnel are briefed on theterrorist threat level. Ensure that appropriateantiterrorism awareness training isaccomplished prior to and upon arrival intheater and as required during missionexecution.

h. Mobility and Survivability. To ensurea mobile, survivable force, both engineer andchemical forces provide essential supportduring PO.

• Engineer Forces. Engineer forces in POwill face conditions that include rapiddeployment, austere living conditions,lack of appropriate maps, destroyedinfrastructure, extended lines ofcommunication, multiple air and seaportdevelopment, extensive countermine andforce protection operations, lack ofconstruction materials, civic actionprojects, and environmental cleaning andsupport to deployment of forces. Earlydeployment of an appropriatecombination of planning troop units andsupport personnel is essential. Engineersplay a major role in PO by developing

Logistic support to PE forces may require challenging engineering operations.

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achievable and supportable engineerend state options. These options identifythe essential missions to be executed, theforce package and construction materialsneeded, the proposed constructionstandard, the estimated time required toexecute the option, and any specialconsiderations such as civic actions.Planners consider all availableengineer capabilities, to include otherServices, coalition forces, contractors,and troop units, including ReserveComponents. (The latter requireactivation time not required of the Activecomponent engineers.) Planners considerthe specific capability and availability ofthe units when building the force alongwith facilities available for leasing andinfrastructure. The joint task forcecontingency engineer manager willnormally provide staff assistance to theJTF commander who controls engineerassets. Similar considerations apply tocoalition forces. Interoperability mustbe considered to ensure that assets arecomplementary, if not compatible.Engineer planners also considerpersonnel or material assets availablethrough contracts, local sources, and

private agencies including LOGCAP,CONCAP, and AFCAP. Engineeroperations require large amounts ofconstruction materials which may beacquired locally, regionally, and from thecontinental United States (CONUS).These materials may be obtained throughmilitary supply channels or by contract.Engineers identify, prioritize, andrequisition required constructionmaterials consistent with acquisitionregulations. Either supply units processthe requisition, acquire, receive, store,and transport construction materials, orthis support may be provided through acombination of engineer unit Class IVacquisition and storage with LOGCAPcontractor support. Engineerscontinuously track the status ofrequired construction materials inorder to keep pace with the operation.Thorough coordination between engineersand supply units is essential in obtainingconstruction materials in order tosuccessfully support PO missionaccomplishment. See, for example, lessonslearned in engineer support in Annex G(“Historical Examples”) to Appendix A,“Key Documents in Peace Operations.”

Engineering operations play a major role in successfullysupported peace operations.

III-13


• Chemical Units. Commanders considerthe requirement for chemical support ofPO if there is evidence that belligerentforces have employed agents or havethe potential for doing so. In addition,when properly authorized,commanders can employ riot controlagents as an alternative to deadly forcein certain PO. A mix of different units(decontamination units, NBCreconnaissance elements, and smokeunits) are often necessary to achieve theproper balance of capabilities.Additional capabilities include providinglocal security, spray, and storage,allowing a limited personnel shower anda firefighting capability. Chemical staffofficers may advise on commercialchemical threats, as well as on thecollection, packaging, storage, disposal,and clean-up of hazardous materials and/or wastes. This latter capability becameimportant in Operation JOINTENDEAVOR, where environmentalassessment and reconnaissance teamsencountered hazards associated with themisuse and improper disposal ofindustrial hazards and their by-products.In fact, the state of the environment inBosnia-Herzogovina was assessed asbeing worse than some of the developingthird-world countries.

8. Employment

Employment planning for PEO is the sameas for combat operations, since these mayoccur. Establishing phases for PEO providesan execution framework for staff planning.Typical phases for PEO are shown in FigureIII-4.

These phases and their sequencing may bedifferent for some PEO, but they provide astarting point for the employment planningprocess.

a. Preparation and Deployment.Preparation and deployment considerationsfor PEO differ little from those for war.Both operations involve movement frommarshalling areas, loading and departurefrom ports of embarkation , andsequenced movement of forces to theobjective area. Mission analysis, availableforces, and factors such as available HNSwill influence deployment decisions. Thecritical decision for the commander isselecting the proper units and time-phasing their entry to secure thelodgment. If sufficient forces are notalready forward-deployed in the theater,forces may be deployed from a variety oflocations, including those already deployedelsewhere.

b. Establishment of the Lodgment. Inthis phase, PE forces secure the lodgmentand establish security for follow-onelements.

• Preparation of operational area bySOF. SOF activities gain intelligence onthe situation in the lodgment area. Theyaccomplish this by:

•• Making contact with US andinternational agencies, local military andparamilitary organizations, and civilauthorities;

•• Establishing surveillance over theplanned points of entry;

•• Conducting operations to reduce therisk to the force; and

•• Depending upon agreed-upon ROEand SOFA, preparing people of the HNfor insertion of the lodgment through anaggressive PSYOP operation usingelectronic (radio and/or television) andprint (leaflets) media.

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SOF also provide up-to-the-minutesituation reports prior to the entry offorces.

• The situation will dictate the nature ofthe initial entry of forces. An unopposedentry of the force through diplomaticactions and coordination with HN orlocal authorities is preferred. In thiscase, special considerations for reception,

staging, onward movement, andintegration will be required. However,where the entry of forces may beopposed, forces conduct a forcibleentry to secure the lodgment. Initialobjectives are normally air and seaportsthat will facilitate the rapid buildup offorces. The nature of the threat and themission will dictate appropriate forces toinitiate a forcible entry.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONSEMPLOYMENT PHASES

PHASE 1

PHASE 2

PHASE 3

PHASE 4

PHASE 5

PREPARATION AND DEPLOYMENT

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LODGMENT

EXPANSION OF THE LODGMENT

ENFORCEMENT OF THE MANDATE

TRANSITION AND REDEPLOYMENT

Figure III-4. Peace Enforcement Operations Employment Phases

III-15


See JP 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for ForcibleEntry Operations.”

• Air or maritime forces conductoperations to provide protection forthe lodgment force and to set theconditions for establishing, securing,and expanding the lodgment. Theseoperations include offensive anddefensive counterair to achieve local airsuperiority, interdiction, close air support,surveillance, reconnaissance, and coastalpatrolling.

c. Expansion of the Lodgment. In thisphase, SOF expand their coverage to gaininformation on belligerent dispositions. Staffscontinue to update their information on thearea and revise their assessments foroperational requirements. Combat, CS, andCSS elements continue to arrive. The timenecessary for the buildup of forces dependson the capability of air or seaports; thetransportation infrastructure; staging,sustainment, and integration capabilities; andHNS. When possible, HNS contracting canbe used to offset the amount of logistic supportwhich must be deployed. Air and maritimeoperations continue and may involve theestablishment and enforcement of exclusionzones. In order to expand the lodgment, airoperations (specifically intertheater andintratheater airlift into and within theoperational area) require protection.

d. Enforcement of the Mandate. In thisphase, the provisions of the mandate areenforced. Some of the missions a PE forcemay conduct are listed in Figure III-5.

• Depending on the threat and the level ofcooperation by the belligerents, the PEforce conducts operations to force thebelligerents to disengage andwithdraw. This may involve show offorce, demonstrations, or force-on-forcecombat operations with synchronized air,ground, maritime, and SOF actions. The

PE force commander stays attuned to thewillingness or desire of the belligerentparties to be separated. The objective isto establish a BZ or DMZ between thebelligerents. As the belligerent forcesdisengage and withdraw, lines ofdemarcation will be marked to identifythe forward limits of the belligerentforces. The resulting space between theselines of demarcation constitutes a BZ. Ifthe belligerent parties show no inclinationto consent to the formation of a BZ, thePE force may establish one using combataction. In doing so, the PE forcecommander considers the belligerentforces’ dispositions and territorialadvantages or disadvantages, as well ashistorical or cultural considerations. Inorder to help set the conditions for apossible follow-on PKO, an impartialand evenhanded approach to theparties involved is desirable. Even afterthe situation has stabilized, belligerentparties may still demonstrate animosity

PEACE ENFORCEMENTFORCE MISSIONS DURING

THE ENFORCEMENT OFTHE MANDATE PHASE

Separation of belligerent parties

Support of political mediation

Establishment of a demilitarizedzone

Maintaining separation ofbelligerent parties

Disarming and demobilization ofbelligerent parties

Transition and redeployment

Figure III-5. Peace Enforcement ForceMissions During the Enforcement of theMandate Phase

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toward each other and perhaps the PEforce. Also, other organizations andfactions may not recognize theagreement. Therefore, the PE force mustremain prepared to engage in combat.

• The PE force commander will seek tothoroughly understand the politicalaims of the operation and the causeand effect relationship of all actionson the resolution of the conflict.Military actions may involve monitoringthe compliance of belligerent partieswith agreements, provisions of amandate, or other constraints, restraints,or provisions regarding their activities.Establishment of joint militarycommissions as in Operation JOINTENDEAVOR in Bosnia or mixedmilitary working groups (used inUNTAC) may assist in such efforts.

See Chapter IV, “Organization andCommand Relationships,” of JP 3-57,“Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

• Negotiations may eventuallytransform the BZ into a DMZ, asstipulated in a formal agreement. DMZsare created to neutralize certain areasfrom military occupation and activity.Generally, a DMZ is in an area claimedby two or more sides in the conflict andwhere control by one could constitute adirect threat to the others. The boundariesof a DMZ are defined by lines ofdemarcation. These boundaries must beeasily recognizable and, ideally, shouldnot run counter to locally acceptedpolitical or cultural divisions. Theairspace over a DMZ is also demilitarizedand is denied to the aircraft of thebelligerents.

• Security operations such as screening,combat and reconnaissance patrolling,cordon and search, and establishingcheckpoints and roadblocks to control

movement into and within the BZ orDMZ may be conducted to maintainthe separation of belligerent parties.Actions of the PE force may include:

•• Forcible suppression of violence bybelligerent parties;

•• Disarmament and incarceration ofbelligerent parties;

•• Support to indigenous authorities inmaintaining law and order; and

•• Deterrence of violence throughcredible threats.

• The mandate may require the PE forceto disarm or demobilize the belligerentparties. These tasks are complex,difficult, and often dangerous. The PEforce demonstrates a clear resolve andintent to disarm or demobilize designatedbelligerent parties according to theagreement. If these actions are takenprematurely, wi thout adequatepreparation and involvement of theparties, the situation may destabilize,leading to a reemergence of violence. Inaddition to collecting weapons fromcombatants, disarming may include:

•• Seizing ammunition stocks;

•• Collection and possibly thedestruction of stockpiles of weapons,munitions, and supplies;

•• Closing weapons and ammunitionfactories; and

•• Measures to prevent resupply.

• Other demobilization activities mightinclude:

•• The movement of forces togarrisons;

III-17


•• The stand down of military readiness;and

•• Demobilization and the return oftroops to civilian life.

e. Transition and Redeployment. Aneffective plan for PEO will include theconditions for the eventual exit of PE forces.This will usually be expressed as part of thedesired end state of the operation and will beas much of a political consideration as amilitary one. Once the belligerent partiesagree to stop fighting by a cease-fire or atruce, the stage is set for handover to a PKforce. As this agreement takes shape and thesituation stabilizes, the PE force commanderwill begin a phased withdrawal of combatforces, which may help to defuse tensions. Asthis withdrawal begins, PE forces assumethe role of a PKO force. However, wherecombat may have occurred, questions aboutactual or perceived impartiality will normallypreclude the PE force (particularly the combatforces) from successfully transitioning to PKO

except during the initial transition period. Thehandover of operations and facilities shouldoccur as a relief in place. It is important toestablish liaison with and carefullysynchronize the handover of operations to thePK force to facilitate the redeploymentprocess. In certain cases transition may be of adifferent nature as discussed in Chapter I, “Primerfor Peace Operations.” In either case the factorsnoted in Chapter I will be considered.

9. Conclusion

PEO are planned and executed like anyother combat operation. The key to successis well led, trained, and disciplined forces thatcan conduct PEO under ROE that are lessrestrictive than those of PKO but morerestrictive than those in effect during a war.The commander must use the appropriateforce required to accomplish the mission,while minimizing collateral damage. In PEO,the enemy is the dispute, not the belligerentparties. The ultimate objective is to set theconditions for a workable peace.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IVEDUCATION AND TRAINING

IV-1

1. General

Readying forces for PO requires buildingon the primary purpose of the Armed Forcesof the United States — to fight and win thenation’s wars. Forces cannot rely solely onService-unique training in PO operations. InPO operations, the forces used will be a uniquemixture of joint, combined, and possiblygovernmental and/or NGO agencies. In PO,military personnel adapt their warfightingskills to the situation. Credible warfightingskills are the foundation for successfulperformance in PO. Readying forces to

“A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon whichto build a peacekeeping force.”

LTG T. Montgomery, USASR MILREP to NATO

successfully conduct PO requires a two-pronged approach (see Figure IV-1).

a. The first prong is the professionalmilitary education (PME) of all officers andnoncommissioned officers. Formal POeducation begins with basic leadershiptraining and culminates at the highestappropriate PME level. The focus of POeducation is to ensure that leaders understandthe principles of MOOTW applied to PO, aswell as the characteristics of PO. Leaders willprepare to plan and conduct these operations.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING FORPEACE OPERATIONS

training of individuals, units,and staffs

professional military educationof all officers and

noncommissioned officers

TRAININGEDUCATION

FORCE PREPARATION

Figure IV-1. Education and Training for Peace Operations

IV-2

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and is tailored to the specific mission andsituation. See Annex G (“HistoricalExamples”) to Appendix A, “Key Documentsin Peace Operations,” for lessons learned intraining for peace operations.

“If you don’t understand the culturesyou are involved in; who makesdecisions in these societies; how theirinfrastructure is designed; theuniqueness in their values and in theirtaboos — you aren’t going to besuccessful.”

George WilsonCommentary in Air Force T imes

a. Members of a deploying force requireknowledge or proficiency in the followingareas.

• US objectives and the implications ofmilitary activities.

• Regional orientation such as geography,climate, ethnic groups, belligerent forcesor parties to a dispute and their weaponsand systems, a brief history of the area,and an overview of the political aspects.

• Customs and basic language phrases.Language instruction and basic survivallanguage materials may be minimal andconsist of only basic key phrases;however, each person must receiveinstruction on the customs of the localpopulation. This minimizes inadvertentprovocation of local populace throughdiscourteous actions or misinterpretationof their actions. Additionally, membersof a deploying US force need to befamiliar with the customs and courtesiesof other nations who are members of amultinational PO force. A familiaritywith other agency cultures and those ofspecific NGOs and/or PVOs may alsoprove valuable, especially for leaders andstaff.

b. The second prong is the training ofindividuals, units, and staffs. In anyoperation time to train for the specifics of themission is often short. A force trained andready for warfighting can adapt to POunder the leadership of officers andnoncommissioned officers educated in theconduct of PO. Adaptive leaders will thinkthrough and develop an effective trainingstrategy for the time available.

2. Education

Leadership education includes classroominstruction, discussions of lessons learnedand historical PO experiences, an exchangeof ideas, and situational exercises. In theclassroom environment, leaders learn aboutthe unique aspects of PO and consider howbest to adapt their warfighting skills in suchoperations. Leaders gain an understandingof the political process and the principlesthat guide PO. Additionally, the educationalprocess provides leaders with knowledge ofother organizations, both governmentaland nongovernmental, that are typicallyinvolved in PO. In many cases, Serviceschools will provide leaders with theopportunity to interact with interagencypersonnel who have experience in PO.

a. Given the unique aspects of PKO,education is particularly critical. PKrequires an adjustment of attitude andapproach by the individual to a set ofcircumstances different from those normallyfound in combat. Listings of pertinent schoolsfor peacekeepers are available (Appendix E,“References”).

b. PME includes individual study andreading (Appendix E, “References”).

3. Training

Training for a specific PK or PE mission isdone at both the individual and unit level

IV-3


• Negotiation and mediation skills.Leaders of the deployed force should beprepared to negotiate (in coalition oralliance partners’ or belligerents’language, or through the use ofinterpreters) issues such as the return ofcasualties and convoy clearance.

• Understanding roles and contributions ofNGOs and PVOs in meeting POobjectives.

• Organization, mission, and backgroundof the sponsoring body.

• Operating under more restrictive ROEand appropriate use of force.

• Information gathering and reporting suchas the types of information collected andstandard reporting formats (situation,shooting, overflight, and aircraftsighting).

• Vehicle, aircraft, water craft, weapon,uniform, and insignia identification, toinclude using graphic training aids, scalemodels, and flash cards.

• Media interaction.

• Detainee handling.

• Individual, vehicle, and building searchesto include procedures for searchingfemales.

• Riot control measures.

• Use of nonlethal technology.

• Antiterrorism measures.

• Counterintelligence measures. Emphasisis place upon recognizing hostileintelligence collection activities targetingthe PE and/or PK force and properreporting of these activities once identified.

• Sniper recognition and countermeasures.

• Reaction to hostage situations.

• Identification of mines and unexplodedordnance (UXO). All members of adeploying force should be aware of thethreat of mines and booby traps. Even ifthe operational environment is fairlybenign, mines and booby traps mayremain from previous conflicts. Everymember of the PO force must know howto identify, mark, and report the presenceof a mine or minefield. Even when thebelligerent parties have agreed to end thedispute and peaceful conditions exist,mines and booby traps remainoperational. Belligerent parties will oftenemplace mines without marking them,making no record of where they wereemplaced, thereby making it difficult todetect and clear them. This training willenable the individual to recognize, mark,and report unexploded military munitionsand to understand that unexplodedordnance is dangerous no matter how oldit appears.

• NBC identification, detection, andprotection.

• Driver education.

• Land navigation.

• Marksmanship.

• Survival skills (including actions ifkidnapped).

• First aid.

• Field sanitation.

• Physical security (prevention of pilferageand theft).

• HSS evacuation procedures.

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• Convoy operations.

• Airmobile operations.

• Checkpoint construction.

• ROE.

• Stress management.

b. Units preparing for deployment shouldtrain in collective tasks, to include thefollowing.

• OP operations. Small units must learnthe function and typical layout of an OP,be familiar with the general daily routine,and be prepared to operate isolated fromtheir parent unit.

• Patrolling. Knowledge of theorganization of patrols, selection of patrolroutes, and the patrol debriefing formatis important. Land navigation principlesand road marches can be integrated intothis training.

• Command post operations.

• Convoy operations to include actions oncontact with hostile forces and encounterswith mines.

• Preparations for Overseas Movementshould be included as a training event sothat PK and/or PE forces and theirfamilies are properly prepared prior todeployment.

c. Effective situational training exercisespresent members of the deploying PK or PEforce with situations they can expect toencounter during the mission. By reviewinglessons learned and after-action reports ofsimilar operations, leaders can identify uniquesituations that their units can expect toencounter. Unit leaders decide what theproper response is in each of these situationsand train the unit accordingly. This responsebecomes an immediate action drill, andshould be well rehearsed by members of thedeploying force. Some examples of situationsappropriate for predeployment training arewhen:

• Members of the belligerent parties orlocal populace request HSS assistance;

• The PO force apprehends a civiliancriminal;

• A crowd mobs a food distribution truckor center;

• Someone discovers a land mine;

• A sniper engages a patrol;

Every member of the Peace Operations Forcemust know how to identify, mark, and report

the presence of a mine field.

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• Someone finds a dead body;

• A relief worker requests transportationon military vehicles;

• A member of the PO force is takenhostage or kidnapped;

• A convoy encounters a belligerent partycheckpoint;

• A person or vehicle fails to stop whenordered to do so;

• A family approaches a checkpoint andmust be searched;

• A member of one of the disputing partiesis observed stealing something from a POforce member or vehicle;

• A large crowd of onlookers lingersoutside the entrance to the base camp andinterferes with movement into and outof the gate; and

• Other situations that cause members ofthe unit to decide how to respond withforce under the constraints of thepublished ROE.

d. Ideally, units selected for PK duty shouldhave several weeks of predeploymenttraining. Units may have to prioritize tasks tobe trained because of time constraints prior todeployment. All members of the unit shouldlearn how PK involves ideas and tactics differentfrom those for warfighting. The unit trainingprogram includes these and otherappropriate subjects:

• The nature of PK;

• Checkpoint operations (Personneloperating checkpoints along major roadsneed to know how to slow and observetraffic without stopping it, allowing thePK force to observe and report trafficpassing from one zone to another);

• Investigating procedures;

• Collecting information;

• Patrolling;

• Monitoring boundaries;

• Establishing a BZ;

• Supervising a truce or cease fire;

Effective situational training exercises prepare joint forces for situationsthey can expect to encounter during PK or PE operations.

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• Contributing to maintenance of law andorder;

• Escorting and securing a very importantperson and/or belligerent parties;

• Establishing and securing a truce and/ornegotiation site;

• Convoy security;

• Route and area reconnaissance; and

• Cordon and search.

e. When employed in PEO, forces conductmany of the same missions as they wouldin war. Units should train for probablemissions as identified by a thorough missionanalysis for the specific operation. Executingcombat operations is an important part ofunit training in preparation for a PEO.Normally, the most significant departure fromwarfighting skills is the degree of restraintrequired by the ROE. During training, leadersneed to stress how the ROE will cause a PEforce to act or react differently than in war.

f. Planning for sustainment training is partof a unit’s predeployment activities. If time isavailable and the resources are identified beforedeployment, leaders can prepare a detailedtraining schedule. Sustainment training shouldemphasize both leader development and basicsoldier skills as well as the maintenance oftactical-level unit skills.

• During PKO, the force continuestraining on individual and small-unit

warfighting skills in order to beprepared to transition to combatoperations. This sustainment trainingwill reduce the time required to returnthe force to a combat-ready status uponcompletion of the PKO. Leaders willdetermine how they can effectively trainfor warfighting without causing concernamong the parties to the dispute. Further,members of the PK force will understandthat although they are training forcombat, their actions in the PKOcontinue to be restrained by the ROE.Training during PKO may be restrictedby an agreement between the UnitedStates and parties to the dispute.

• During PEO, leaders attempt toconduct joint and combined armstraining whenever possible. Thistraining prepares the PE force for futureoperations. It may also serve as a credibledeterrent and a show of force ifcircumstances warrant.

g. Post-Mission Training. Warfightingskills can deteriorate significantly duringPO, particularly PKO. Before a PKO, thedeploying force trains in order to transitionthe combat-ready individual to oneconstrained in most, if not all, actions. Atthe conclusion of the PKO, training isnecessary to return the individual to acombat orientation and to return unitsto a combat-ready status. Unitcommanders will allow sufficient time aftera PKO for refresher training and forredeveloping skills and abilities affected bythe nature of PKO.

APPENDIX AKEY DOCUMENTS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

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There are several key documents that are important for the successful execution of PO. Someof these documents address crucial topics that include the political objectives of the PO,restrictions placed on members of the PO force, and legal status of the participants. Otherdocuments prepare members of the PO to conduct their mission and standardize their actions.The following documents are addressed in this appendix:

Annex A MandatesB Status-of-Forces AgreementsC Terms of ReferenceD Rules of EngagementE Standing Operating ProceduresF Area Information HandbookG Historical Examples

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Intentionally Blank

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX AMANDATES

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1. General

The PO force conducts operations basedon a mandate that describes the scope ofoperations. Generally, a mandate shouldaddress the following points.

a. Role of the PO.

b. Mission of the PO organization.

c. Tasks or functions to be performed.

d. Size and organization of the force ormission.

e. Appointment of the commander, anyspecial mediators and their TOR.

f. Nomination of the office responsible forthe supervision of the operation.

g. General arrangements for financial andlogistic support.

h. Division of sponsoring organization andnational responsibilities.

i. Time limit of the mandate.

j. Terms or conditions the HN intends toimpose on the presence of the force or mission.

k. Statements of the rights and immunitiesof force or mission members.

2. UN PKO Mandate

See Figure A-A-1 for a sample UN PKOmandate.

RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCILAT THE XXTH MEETING (DATE)

The Security Council, noting that the present situation with regard to (country[ies]) islikely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unlessadditional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durablesolution:

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the ‘peaceful intentions’signed at New York on (date):

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and itsarticle 2, para 4, which reads: ‘All members shall refrain in their international relationsfrom the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independenceof any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations:

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charterof the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen thesituation in ( ) and ( ), or to endanger international peace.

Figure A-A-1. Sample UN PKO Mandate

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2. Asks the Governments of ( ) and ( ), which have the responsibility for themaintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessaryto stop violence and bloodshed in their countries.

3. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Governments of ( ) and ( ),of a United Nations’ Peacekeeping Force in those countries. The composition and sizeof the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with theGovernments of ( ) and ( ). The Commander of the Force shall be appointed by theSecretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep theGovernments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the SecurityCouncil on its (the peacekeeping force’s) operation.

4. Recommends that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preservinginternational peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fightingand, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order anda return to normal conditions.

5. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months,all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by the Governmentsproviding the contingents and by the Governments of ( ) and ( ). The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose.

6. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with theGovernments of ( ) and ( ), a mediator, who shall use his or her best endeavors withthe representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid Governments, for thepurpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problemconfronting ( ) and ( ), in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having inmind the well-being of the peoples of ( ) and ( ) as a whole and the preservation ofinternational peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts.

7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, asappropriate for the remuneration and Expenses of the mediator and his or her staff.

Figure A-A-1. Sample UN PKO Mandate (cont’d)

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX ASTATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENT

A-B-1

1. The SOFA (or SOMA) proceeds fromthe mandate. PEO may not normallyinclude a SOFA, except with the hostcountry or countries from which operationsare staged. With the advice of theconcerned military commander, thediplomatic elements establish stationingagreements that are often referred to asSOFA. These agreements between the HN,sponsor, and contributors will establish thedetailed legal status of PO forces. Anyproposed SOFA affecting US forces mustbe reviewed by appropriate US legalauthorities to ascertain consistency with USlaw and policy. As a minimum, the SOFAfor a PO should include the following mainpoints.

a. The neutral status of the operation andits members (PKO only).

b. Entry and departure permits to and fromthe HNs.

c. Identity documents.

d. The right to carry arms as well as theauthorized type of weapons.

e. Freedom of movement, both on and offduty, for members of the PO force.

f. Legal jurisdiction over members of thePO force.

g. The use of airports, harbors, rail, androad networks in the HN.

h. The right for the PK force to operate itsown communications system.

i. Postal regulations and customs clearanceprocedures.

j. Authority to fly sponsoring organizationand national flags.

k. Uniform regulations.

l. Permission to operate vehicles withoutspecial registration.

m. Matters of jurisdiction.

n. Military police actions and authority.

o. Tax and duty regulations.

p. General supply and maintenance matters(imports of equipment; commodities; localprocurement of provisions; and petroleum,oils, and lubricants).

q. Matters of compensation (with respectto the HN’s property).

r. The force has authority to gather, record,and report such information as is necessary toensure the protection and security of the forceand to monitor all regional forces or activitiesand to record and evaluate their compliance andnoncompliance with the mandates oragreements being monitored by the force.

s. For operations sponsored by the UN,applicability of “The Convention of thePrivileges and Immunities of the UnitedNations.”

t. Provisions that make clear that US forcescan, and will, exercise their right to use

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reasonable force in self-defense in responseto terrorism or other threats.

u. Use of electromagnetic frequencies fordistribution of radio and television productsin support of the operation.

2. See Figure A-B-1 for an example of aSOFA. This figure is the verbatim text of aproposal made by Canada as a standardSOFA for use by the UN. As such, the textmay use different spelling, punctuation,capitalization, and terminology from thatused in US documents.

PROPOSED STANDARD UN SOFA

Introduction

1. The purpose of a status of forces agreement is to establish the legal position of apeacekeeping force and of its members in a host country, and to define the relationshipof the force and of its members with the government and the citizens of the host country.On the basis of a status of forces agreement between the United Nations and a particularhost country, appropriate detailed regulations can be drawn up to cover the special needsand circumstances of the situation affecting the status of forces in that country. Such setsof regulations, to cover administrative and operative activities of the peacekeeping force,are supplementary to the status of forces agreement itself.

2. The elaboration of, and attainment of, a general understanding on a standard statusof forces agreement now would have considerable advantages in terms of ensuring efficientarrangements for the organization of future peacekeeping operations. In addition, MemberStates would be aware in advance of the sort of arrangements that could affect themdirectly if they had occasion to be involved with a peacekeeping operation, either as ahost country or as a country contributing personnel to such an operation.

Definitions

3. Definitions.

a. Civil Authorities means all state and local, civil authorities of the government ofthe host country who may be required or called upon to perform functions relating to theForce.

b. The Commander means the Commander of the United Nations PeacekeepingForce.

c. The Force means a United Nations Peacekeeping Force.

d. The Government means the government of the host country.

e. Host country means a country the government of which has consented to thepresence of the Force on its territory.

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA

A-B-3

Status-of-Forces Agreement

f. Member of the Force means a member of the military service of the ParticipatingState placed under the command of a commander by that State, or a civilian who is nota national of, nor ordinarily resident in, the host country, who is placed under the commandof the commander by a Participating State, or the United Nations.

g. Participating State means a member of the United Nations that contributes militaryor civilian personnel to the Force.

International Status of the Force and its Members

4. Members of the Force shall respect the laws and regulations of the host countryand shall refrain from any political or other activity in the host country incompatiblewith the international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the spirit for theseArrangements or any subsequent Arrangements which may be entered into between thehost country and the United Nations or any authority duly authorized by the UnitedNations. The Commander shall take appropriate measures to ensure the observance ofthe obligations.

5. The Government undertakes to respect, and to ensure respect of, the exclusivelyinternational character of the Force and the international nature of its command andfunctions.

Entry and Exit - Identification

6. Members of the Force shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations andimmigration inspection and restrictions on entering or departing from the host country.They shall also be exempt from any regulations governing the residence of aliens in thehost country, including registration, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right ofpermanent residence of domicile in the host country. For the purpose of such entry ordeparture each member of the Force will be required to have only:

a. An individual or collective movement order in the language of the ParticipatingState and in French or in the English language issued by the Commander or an appropriateauthority of the Participating State to which such a member belongs; and

b. A personal identity card issued by the Commander under the Authority of theUnited Nations showing the full name, date of birth, rank and number (if any), serviceand photograph of the member concerned.

Provided, however, that in the case of the first entry, a personal military identity cardissued by the appropriate authorities of the Participating State concerned will be acceptedin lieu of the Force identity card mentioned in b of this paragraph.

7. A member of the Force may be required to present, but not to surrender, his identitycard upon demand of such host country authorities as may be mutually agreed between

Figure A-B-1. Canadian Proposal for Standard UN SOFA (cont’d)

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the Commander and the Government. Except as provided in paragraph 6 of this agreementthe identity card will be the only document required for a member of the Force.

8. If a member of the Force leaves the service of the Participating State to which hebelongs and is not repatriated, the Commander shall immediately inform the Government,giving such particulars as may be required. The Commander shall similarly inform theGovernment if any member of the Force has absented himself for more than twenty-onedays. If an expulsion order against an ex-member of the Force has been made, theCommander shall be responsible for removing the person concerned from the host country.

Arms

9. Members of the Force may possess and carry arms in accordance with an orderissued by the Commander.

Freedom of Movement

10. The Force and its members together with its service vehicles, vessels, aircraft, andequipment shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the host country. TheCommander, shall, to the extent he considers practical, consult with the Governmentwith respect to large movements of personnel, stores, or vehicles to be made on roadsused for general traffic. Upon receipt or a request made by or on behalf of the Commander,the Government will supply the Force with such maps, and other information, includinglocation of dangers and impediments, as may be useful in facilitating movements of theForce. The Government will not establish restricted areas which inhibit the freedom ofmovement of the Force and thereby prevent it from carrying out the mission for which itwas established. Buffer and demilitarized zones will be established where necessaryand they will be clearly described in agreements between the Force Commander andappropriate authorities of the host country.

Use of Roads, Railways, Waterways, Port Facilities, and Airfields

11. The Force shall have the right to use roads, bridges, canals, and other waters, portfacilities, and airfields without the payment of dues, tolls, or charges either by way ofregistration or otherwise, throughout the host country.

12. The provisions of para 10 and 11 shall apply to aircraft and vessels owned orchartered by Participating States when being used to obtain or to transport personnel orequipment destined for or being removed from duty with the Force. The Force shallhave the right, without interference, to make provision for such additional facilities asare required by the Force to effectively conduct its operations and maintain the Force inbeing.


A-B-5


Communications and Postal Services

13. The Force enjoys facilities in respect of communications provided in Article III ofthe Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Commandershall have authority to install and operate a radio sending and receiving station or stationsto connect at appropriate points and exchange traffic with the United Nations RadioNetwork, and to authorize the installation and operation of communications betweennational contingents and their home governments for the purpose of maintaining directcommunications on national administrative matters, subject to the provisions of Article47 of the International Telecommunications Convention relating to harmful interference.The frequencies on which any such station may be operated will be duly communicatedby the United Nations to the Government and to the International Frequency RegistrationBoard. The right of the Commander is likewise recognized to enjoy the priorities ofgovernment telegrams and telephone calls as provided by the United Nations in Article39 and Annex 3 of the latter Convention and in Article 62 of the Telegraph Regulationsannexed thereto.

14. The Force shall also enjoy, within its area of operations, the right of unrestrictedcommunications by radio, telephone, telegraph, or any other means, and of establishingthe necessary facilities for maintaining such communications within and between premisesof the Force, including the laying of cables and land lines and the establishment of fixedand mobile radio sending and receiving stations. It is understood that the telegraph andtelephone cables and lines herein referred to will be situated within or directly betweenthe premises of the Force and the area of operations, and that connection with the hostcountry’s system of telegraphs and telephone will be made in accordance witharrangements with the appropriate authorities of the host country.

15. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to make arrangements throughits own facilities or through those of national channels for the processing and transportof official and private mail including parcels addressed to or emanating from the Forceand its members. The Government will be informed of the nature of such arrangements.No interference shall take place with, and no censorship shall be applied to, the officialand private mail addressed to or emanating from the Force and its members, by theGovernment. In the event that postal arrangements applying to private mail of membersof the Force include operations involving transfer of currency, or transport of packagesor parcels from the host country, the conditions under which such operations shall beconducted in the host country will be agreed upon between the Government and theCommander.

United Nations Flag

16. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to display within the host countrythe United Nations Flag on its headquarters, camps, posts, or other premises, vehicles,vessels, and otherwise as may be decided by the Commander. Other flags or pennants


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may be displayed only in exceptional cases and in accordance with conditions prescribedby the Commander. Sympathetic consideration will be given to observations or requestsof the Government concerning this last-mentioned matter.

Uniform

17. Uniform wear.

a. Members of the Force shall normally wear their national uniform with suchidentifying United Nations insignia as the Commander may prescribe.

b. Members of the Force may wear civilian dress at such times and on such conditionsas may be authorized by the Commander. Instructions relating to the wearing of civiliandress shall be notified to the Government by the Commander who shall give sympatheticconsideration to observations or requests made by the Government concerning this matter.

Vehicle, Vessel, and Aircraft Markings, Registration and Operation Permits

18. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft belonging to or used by the Force shall carry adistinctive United Nations identification mark and license which shall be notified by theCommander to the Government. Such vehicles, vessels, and aircraft shall not be subjectto registration and licensing under the laws and regulations of the host country. Hostcountry authorities shall accept as valid, without a test or fee, a permit or license issuedby the Commander for the operation of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft belonging to orused by the Force.

Privileges and Immunities of Members of the United Nations Secretariat

19. Members of the United Nations Secretariat detailed to serve with the Force remainofficials of the United Nations entitled to the privileges and immunities of Articles Vand VII of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Withrespect to the locally-recruited personnel of the Force, however, who are not members ofthe Secretariat, the United Nations will assert its right only to the immunities concerningofficial acts, and exemption from taxation and national service obligations provided insections 18 (a), (b), and (c) of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of theUnited Nations.

Privileges and Immunities of the Commander and the Officers of His Headquarters Staff

20. The Commander shall be entitled to the privileges, immunities, and facilities ofsections 19 and 27 of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the UnitedNations. Officers serving on the Commander’s Headquarters Staff and such other seniorfield officers as he may designate, are entitled to the privileges and immunities of ArticleVI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.


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Privileges and Immunities of the Force

21. Privileges and immunities of the force.

a. The Force, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the status, privilegesand immunities of the Organization in accordance with the Convention on the Privilegesand Immunities of the United Nations. The provisions of Article II of the Conventionshall also apply to the property, funds, and assets of Participating States used in theForce. The Government recognizes the right of the Force to import free of duty equipmentfor the Force, and provisions, supplies, and other goods for the exclusive use of membersof the Force and members of the United Nations Secretariat detailed to serve with theForce, excluding locally recruited personnel; such right includes the right of the Force toestablish, maintain, and operate at headquarters, camps, and posts, service institutesproviding amenities for such members. The amenities that may be provided by serviceinstitutes include goods of a consumable nature such as confectionery, tobacco, tobaccoproducts, and spirits, and articles of a non-consumable nature normally sold in militarycanteens notwithstanding the availability of such merchandise in local commercial outlets.In order that duty-free importation for the Force may be effected with the least possibledelay, having regard to the interests of the Government, a mutually satisfactory procedure,including documentation, shall be arranged between the appropriate authorities of theForce and the Government. The Commander shall take all necessary measures to preventany abuse of the exemption and to prevent the sale and resale of such goods to personsother than those aforesaid. Sympathetic consideration shall be given by the Commanderto observations or requests of the Government concerning the operation of serviceinstitutes.

b. Amenities by way of gifts or free issues of a consumable nature sent to nationalcontingents by Participating States and gift parcels sent by relatives and friends as soldiers’comforts shall be imported free of duty into the host country and shall not affect thequotas, if any, established by agreement between the Commander and the Government.

c. Movement Control Staffs of the Force or Participating States shall have the rightto board and inspect vessels and aircraft used by the United Nations in connection withthe transportation of personnel and equipment of the Force.

Jurisdiction

22. The following arrangements, paragraphs 22 to 32 inclusive, respecting criminaland civil jurisdiction shall apply having regard to the special functions of the Force andto the interests of the United Nations, and not for the personal benefit of the members ofthe Force.


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Criminal Jurisdiction

23. The military authorities of the Participating State shall have the right to exercisewithin the host country all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them bythe law of the Participating State over all persons subject to the military law of that State,and the military authorities of the Participating State shall have exclusive jurisdictionover persons subject to the military law of the State with respect to any criminal offensescommitted by such person in the host country.

Civil Jurisdiction — Claims

24. Civil jurisdiction — claims.

a. Any claim made by:

(1) A resident of the host country in respect of any damage alleged to result froman act or omission of a member of the Force relating to his official duties;

(2) The Government against a member of the Force; or

(3) The Force or the Government against one another, that is not covered byparagraphs 30 and 31 of this agreement, shall be settled by a Claims Commissionestablished for that purpose. One member of the Commission shall be appointed by theSecretary-General, one member by the Government, and a chairman jointly by theSecretary-General and the Government. If the Secretary-General and the Governmentfail to agree on the appointment of a chairman, the President of the International Courtof Justice shall be asked by either to make the appointment. An award made by theClaims Commission against the Force or a member thereof or against the Governmentshall be notified to the Commander or the Government, as the case may be, to makesatisfaction thereof in the currency of the host country.

b. Members of the Force shall not be subject to the civil jurisdiction of the courts ofthe host country or to other legal process in any matter relating to their official duties.

c. The United Nations and Government shall make provision for the appropriatemode of settlement of disputes or claims arising out of contract or other disputes orclaims of a private law character to which the United Nations is a party other than thosein this paragraph and in paragraphs 30, 31, and 46.

25. The Claims Commission, established under paragraph 24, shall settle claims inaccordance with the law of the host country. The adjudication of a claim by the ClaimsCommission shall be conclusive and binding on all parties concerned.


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26. Any person who has a claim against a member of the Force arising out of an act oromission in the host country not done in the performance of official duty, may refer hisclaim to the Claims Commission established pursuant to paragraph 24.

Similarly, a member of the Force who has a claim against a resident of the host countryarising out of an act or omission in the host country, may also refer his claim to theClaims Commission. Such a claim or other non-duty claims of which the ClaimsCommission becomes aware shall be reported to the Force or the Government, asappropriate, by the Claims Commission together with an opinion as to the liability of amember of the Force or of a resident of the host country, and the reasonableness of theamount claimed. Where appropriate, the Force or the Government, as the case may be,shall co-operate in obtaining a settlement of such claims.

27. Subject to agreement between the United Nations and the Government, cases notfalling under paragraph 24 and those not referred to the Claims Commission underparagraph 26 may be decided by the courts of the host country.

28. With respect to claims against members of the Force:

a. The courts, the Claims Commission, or other authority of the host country shallgrant members of the Force sufficient opportunity to safeguard their rights. If theCommander certifies that a member of the Force is unable because of official duties orauthorized absence, to protect his interests in a civil proceeding in which he is a participant,the court, the claims agency, or other authority shall, at the request of the Commander,suspend the proceeding until the disability has been eliminated. Unless the court, theclaims agency, or other authority of the host country in its or his discretion ordersotherwise, a suspension made pursuant to this paragraph shall not exceed 90 days.

b. Where a judgment made against a member of the Force by a court of the hostcountry has not been satisfied, or an opinion as to the liability of a member of the Force,given by the Claims Commission, under paragraphs 24 and 26 of this agreement has notbeen acted upon within a reasonable time, the Government may, without prejudice to theclaimant’s rights, seek the good offices of the Secretary-General to obtain satisfaction.

c. Property belonging to a member of the Force which is certified by the Commanderto be needed by such member for the fulfillment of his official duties shall be free fromseizure for the satisfaction of a judgment, decision, or orders. Other property belongingto a member of the Force which is not subject to seizure under the law of the host countryshall also be free from such seizure.

d. The personal liberty of a member of the Force shall not be restricted by a court orother authority of the host country in a civil proceeding, whether to enforce a judgment,decision, or order, to compel an oath of disclosure, or for any other reason.


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29. With respect to claims by members of the Force, where a judgment made againsta resident of the host country has not been satisfied, or an opinion as to the liability of theresident of the host country, given by the Claims Commission under paragraph 26 of thisAgreement, has not been acted upon within a reasonable time, the Secretary-Generalmay, where appropriate and without prejudice to the claimant’s rights, seek the goodoffices of the Government to obtain satisfaction.

30. All differences between the United Nations and the Government arising out of theinterpretation or application of these Arrangements which involve a question of principleconcerning the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations shallbe dealt with in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 30 of the Convention.

31. All other disputes between the United Nations and the Government concerningthe interpretation or application of these Arrangements which are not settled by negotiationor other agreed mode of settlement shall be referred for final settlement to a tribunal ofthree arbitrators, one to be named by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, oneby the Government, and an umpire to be chosen jointly by the Secretary-General and theGovernment. If the two parties fail to agree on the appointment of the umpire within onemonth of the proposal of arbitration by one of the parties, the President of the InternationalCourt of Justice shall be asked by either party to appoint the umpire. Should a vacancyoccur for any reason, the vacancy shall be filled within 30 days by the method laid downin this paragraph for the original appointment. The tribunal shall come into existenceupon the appointment of the umpire and at least one of the other members of the tribunal.Two members of the tribunal shall constitute a quorum for the performance of its functions,and for all deliberations and decisions of the tribunal a favorable vote of two membersshall be sufficient.

Notification and Certification

32. Where any civil procedure is instituted against a member of the Force before anycourt of the host country having jurisdiction, notification thereof shall be given to theCommander who shall certify to the court whether or not the matter giving rise to theproceeding is related to the official duties of such member. Where the Commandercertifies that the matter is related to the official duties of such member such proceedingsshall be terminated.

Military Police — Arrest — Transfer of Custody — Mutual Assistance

33. The Commander shall take all appropriate measures to ensure maintenance ofdiscipline and good order among members of the Force. To this end, military policedesignated by the Commander shall police the premises referred to in paragraph 42 ofthese Arrangements, areas where the Force is deployed in the performance of its functions,and other areas as the Commander deems necessary to maintain discipline and orderamong members of the Force. For the purpose of this paragraph, the military police ofthe Force shall have powers of arrest over members of the Force.


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34. Military police of the Force may take into custody any person who is not a memberof the Force who is found committing an offense or causing a disturbance on the premisesreferred to in paragraph 42, without subjecting him to the ordinary routine of arrest, inorder immediately to deliver him, together with any weapons or items seized, to thenearest appropriate authority of the host country for the purpose of dealing with suchoffense or disturbance.

35. The authorities of the host country may take into custody a member of the Force,without subjecting him to the ordinary routine of arrest, in order immediately to deliverhim, together with any weapons or items seized, to the nearest appropriate authorities ofthe Force:

a. When so requested by the Commander; or

b. In cases in which the military police of the Force are unable to act with thenecessary promptness when a member of the Force is apprehended in the commission orattempted commission of a criminal offense that results or might result in serious injuryto persons or property, or serious impairment of other legally protected rights.

36. When a person is taken into custody under paragraph 34 or paragraph 35b, theCommander, or the authorities of the host country, as the case may be, may make apreliminary interrogation, but may not delay the transfer of custody and shall immediatelyinform the Commander or the authorities of the host country, as the case may be, that theperson is in custody. Following the transfer of custody, the person concerned shall bemade available upon request for further interrogation. However, such an interrogationwill be done in the presence of a military policeman of the Force or a responsible memberof the Force.

37. The Commander and the authorities of the host country shall assist each other inthe carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses in respect of which either orboth have an interest, in the production of witnesses, and in the collection and productionof evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over, of thingsconnected with an offense. The handing over of any such things may be made subject totheir return within the time specified by the disposition of any case in the outcome ofwhich the other may have an interest or in which there has been a transfer of custodyunder the provisions of paragraphs 34 and 35 above. The Government will ensure thatprivate and public buildings may be searched by the police of the host country who willsearch for property stolen from the Force and its members and the Government willensure the prosecution of persons subject to its criminal jurisdiction who are accused ofacts in relation to the Force or its members which, if committed in relation to the hostcountry armed forces or their members, would have rendered them liable to prosecution.The Secretary-General will seek assurances from Governments of Participating Statesthat they will be prepared to exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offenseswhich may be committed against citizens of, or other persons in the host country, bymembers of their national contingents serving with the Force.


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Joint Pub 3-07.3

Members of the Force — Taxation, Customs, and Fiscal Regulations

38. Members of the Force shall be exempt from taxation on the pay and emolumentsreceived from their national government or from the United Nations. They shall also beexempt from all other direct taxes except municipal rates for services enjoyed, and fromall registration fees and charges.

39. Members of the Force shall have the right to import free of duty their personaleffects in connection with their arrival in the host country. They shall be subject to thelaws and regulations of the host country governing customs and foreign exchange withrespect to personal property not required by them by reason of their presence in the hostcountry with the Force. However, the Government shall waive or refund customs dutyon reasonable quantities of personal property imported by members of the Force forexport as gifts or to be taken with the member when he completes his tour of duty in thehost State. Members of the Force on departure from the host country may, notwithstandingthe foreign exchange regulations, take with them such funds as the appropriate payofficer of the Force certifies were received in pay and emoluments from their respectivenational Governments or from the United Nations and are a reasonable residue thereof.Special arrangements between the Commander and the Government shall be made forthe implementation of the Government and members of the Force. Particulars of theregulations of the host country concerning the rights of members of the Force to importduty-free articles for the personal use of the individual are set out at Appendix (to beprovided by host country).

40. The Commander will co-operate with customs and fiscal authorities of the hostcountry in ensuring the observance of the customs and fiscal laws and regulations of thehost country by members of the Force in accordance with these or any relevantsupplemental arrangements.

Disposal of Nationally-Owned Materiel

41. Materiel owned by the Force or by a Participating State may be removed from thehost country as a right, but it may be disposed of in the host country only in accordancewith such arrangements as may be made in that regard between the Commander and theGovernment.

Premises of the Force

42. The Government, in agreement with the Commander, shall provide to the Forcewithout cost such areas or buildings in reasonable condition for headquarters, camps, orother uses as may be necessary for the accommodation and the fulfillment of the functionsof the Force. The Force shall have the right to effect such construction, alterations,repairs, and improvements as are necessary. Without prejudice to the fact that all suchpremises remain the territory of the host country, they shall be inviolable and subject tothe exclusive control and authority of the Commander. The entry upon such premises


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by any person including civil authorities shall only be permitted by or under the authorityof the Commander. Under normal conditions areas and buildings vacated by the Forceshall be left in a reasonable state of repair. However, this last condition shall not applyif the Force is required to vacate the areas or buildings through circumstances beyond itscontrol.

Water, Electricity, and Other Public Utilities and Services

43. The Force shall have the right to use water, electricity, and other public utilitiesand services at rates not less favorable to the Force than those to comparable consumers.The Government shall, upon the request of the Commander, assist the Force in obtainingwater, electricity, and other public utilities and services required, and in the case ofinterruptions or threatened interruptions of service, will give the same priority to theneeds of the Force as to essential Government services. The Force shall have the right,where necessary, to generate, within the premises of the Force, either on land or onwater, electricity for the use of the Force, and to transmit and distribute such electricityas required by the Force. To the extent necessary to provide for the Force and/or thelocal population the Force shall have the right to operate waterworks and other publicutilities and services.

Provisions, Supplies, and Services (Local)

44. The Government will, upon the request of the Commander, assist the Force inobtaining equipment, provisions, supplies, and other goods and services required fromlocal sources for its subsistence and operation. Sympathetic consideration will be givenby the Commander to requests or observations of the Government respecting purchaseson the local market in order to avoid an adverse effect on the local economy. Membersof the Force and United Nations officials may purchase locally goods as necessary fortheir own consumption, and such services as they need, under conditions not less favorablethan for citizens of the host country.

Locally-Hired Personnel

45. The Force may hire local personnel as required. Where necessary, the Governmentshall be responsible for obtaining the personnel to fulfill the labor requirements of theForce. The terms and conditions of employment for locally-hired personnel shall beprescribed by the Commander and shall generally, to the extent practicable, follow thepractice prevailing in the locality. The Government shall not require such employees toperform any duties inconsistent with the United Nations mission during their period ofemployment with the Force.

46. Disputes concerning terms of employment and conditions of service of locally-employed personnel shall be settled by administrative procedures to be established bythe Commander after coordination with appropriate authorities of the host country.


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Joint Pub 3-07.3

Medical, Sanitary, and Health Measures

47. Where medical or dental facilities of the Force are inadequate, the Commandermay enter into arrangements with the Government for the provision of such facilitieslocally. The Commander and the Government will co-operate with respect to sanitaryservices and health, particularly with respect to the control of communicable diseasesand occupational/industrial health hazards in accordance with international conventions,and such co-operation shall extend to the exchange of relevant information and statistics.

Deceased Member’s Disposition of Personal Property

48. The Commander shall have the right to take charge of and repatriate a deceasedforce member who dies in the host country. The commander shall turn over the decedent’spersonal effects to authorities of the decedent’s participating state for proper disposition.

Supplemental Arrangements

49. Supplemental details for the carrying out of this agreement shall be made as requiredbetween the Commander and appropriate authorities designated by the Government.


ANNEX C TO APPENDIX ATERMS OF REFERENCE

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1. Based on the mandate and the situation,TOR are developed to govern implementationof the PO. TOR, which may be subject toapproval by the parties to the dispute, describethe mission, command relationships,organization, logistics, accounting procedures,coordination and liaison, and responsibilitiesof the military units and personnel assignedor detailed to the PO force. The draft TOR iscoordinated with the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff before it is forwarded throughthe Department of Defense to DOS for finalapproval. After NCA approval, an executivedirective is issued.

2. It is important to note in PKO that althoughthe parties to the dispute may agree to themandate, truce, and the TOR because it ispolitically and militarily expedient for them todo so, they may have different or hidden agendas.They may interpret the TOR to suit their ownpurposes. Consequently, the PK force may finditself deployed in a situation where the TOR arefar less precise than is desirable from a militarypoint of view; therefore, commanders shouldensure that the SOPs provide sufficient detail toaugment the TOR.

3. The TOR may be in either letter or messageformat and are sent from the UN SYG or thesponsoring organization to the Commanderof the Mission when a Commander isappointed. The TOR must be reviewed byappropriate US legal authorities prior toacceptance by US forces. The TOR shouldaddress the following points:

a. Authority under which the mission wascreated. This may be a quotation from theresolution relevant to the task of the mission;e.g., to ensure the supervision of the armisticeand the withdrawal of all armed personnel tothe national boundaries that existed beforethe conflict.

b. Statement explaining the type ofmission to be accomplished; e.g., observation,mediation. In addition, the statement maydetail the primary duties of the force; e.g.,“UNXYZ” is an observation mission with theprimary duty of observing and reporting.

c. Statement of secondary duties andappropriate guidance. For example, themilitary observers, in supervising theobservance of the armistice, will do all thatthey reasonably can to persuade localcommanders to restore the armistice in caseswhere fighting has occurred. Observers haveno power or authority to order an end to thefighting. Where their persuasive efforts fail,their recourse is to report fully on the entirecircumstances, their efforts, and the results.

d. Instructions as to the method of reportingto the sponsoring organization, channels ofcommunications to use, and other relatedareas.

e. Information regarding provision oflogistic support and administration of themission; e.g., the logistic, communications,and administrative needs of the missionwill be provided by a representative of theUN Field Administration and LogisticsDivision.

f. Instructions concerning relations withany other UN Missions or agencies in the area.

g. Statement regarding the current statusof negotiations with host countries concerningfreedom of movement, immunities, and otherrelated areas.

h. Specific instructions on methods ofoperation such as:

• Uniform;

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Annex C to Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-07.3

• Use of weapons;

• Chain of command; and

• Advice or guidance on deployment.

i. Instructions, including public relationsand contact with the people of the hostcountry.

j. Miscellaneous points regarding thesituation; e.g., the need for NBC protectiveequipment.

4. As an example, the TOR for US Forces inthe MFO, as depicted in Department of the ArmyCircular 11-90-4, “The Sinai MultinationalForce and Observers,” Appendix C, are includedhere as Figure A-C-1.

TERMS OF REFERENCEFOR

US MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN AND SUPPORT TOTHE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS

1. Purpose. These TOR govern the implementation of US military participation in theMFO that was established by Protocol on 3 August 1981 to supervise the securityarrangements as delineated by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, dated 26 March 1979.

2. Mission. The primary mission of the Department of Defense is to provide USmilitary units and/or personnel to serve as elements and/or members of the MFO and toprovide logistic support to the MFO as a whole. The primary mission of the Departmentof the Army, as DOD’s Executive Agent, is to provide the most qualified military unitsand personnel available to accomplish those tasks as specified. The secondary missionof the Executive Agent is to function as the organization responsible for arrangingadministrative, operational, logistic, and associated C3 support for the US military unitsand personnel authorized and/or required by DOD regulations but not provided for bythe MFO.

3. Command Relationships

a. US military units designated to participate in the MFO will be placed under theOPCON of the Commander, MFO upon entering his area of responsibility (Sinai).Combatant command of US military units will be retained by the appropriate combatantcommander as recommended by the Executive Agent and approved by the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Commanders of US military units under the OPCON of the Commander, MFO,will retain command of their subordinate and attached elements. As specified by paragraph7, of the annex to the Protocol, the US military contingent commander is charged withresponsibility for disciplinary actions under his command. Accordingly, each UScommander will retain full authority to implement disciplinary actions under the

Figure A-C-1. Terms of Reference for US Participation In and Support to the MFO

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Terms of Reference

specifications of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), to include expandedauthorities as may be deemed appropriate by the Executive Agent.

c. US military personnel assigned to serve with the MFO but who are not members ofspecific military units (e.g., personnel assigned as members of the MFO Commander’sstaff), should be assigned to the appropriate US unit for administration, quarters andrations, and, where appropriate and commensurate with their grade, UCMJ. At thediscretion of the Executive Agent, such personnel may be placed under command of thesenior US military member of the MFO Commander’s staff.

4. Organization. US military units assigned to participate in the MFO will be drawnfrom Service rolls; MFO-only units will not be created as special entities. This does notpreclude, however, task organizing existing units, to meet specific operation requirementsand/or political restrictions that exist or which may be imposed.

a. Current requirements (as of August 1990), are for the United States to provide aninfantry battalion task force and a logistic support element with a total aggregate strengthof approximately 1,015 military personnel. Exact task organization of these elementswill be agreed between the Executive Agent and the MFO, and with the concurrence ofthe Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD[ISA]).

b. No DOD personnel will agree to additional restrictions on US military participationas to personnel strengths, organization, and/or equipment without the express concurrenceof the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ASD(ISA).

5. Logistics. US logistics requirements are to provide logistics support to the entireMFO. The level of logistics support provided by the US logistics support element willbe agreed between the Executive Agent and the MFO. Every effort will be made tomaintain the logistics readiness posture of the deployed US military units at a levelconsistent with their normal CONUS posture. In all cases, normal supply and supportprocedures should be used to the maximum extent possible.

6. Budget. Those costs normally attributed to and budgeted for US units and personnelparticipating in the MFO will be absorbed by the unit’s parent Service budget. Thoseextraordinary costs incurred by the Service to deploy and support their participatingunits to and in the Sinai will be reimbursed by the MFO through the Executive Agent.Those costs incurred by a Service to deploy and/or support non-US elements participatingwill be reimbursed by the MFO budget through the Executive Agent. The ExecutiveAgent will establish the necessary budgeting, billing, and accounting procedures as agreedbetween the Executive Agent and the Comptroller, in accordance with DOD fiscalinstructions.

7. Training of Other National Contingents. The Executive Agent is authorized toprovide training to other national contingents of the MFO as may be requested by theDirector General.

Figure A-C-1. Terms of Reference for US Participation In and Support to the MFO (cont’d)

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Annex C to Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-07.3

8. Other Services. The Executive Agent is authorized to provide administrative andtechnical support and services to the MFO as deemed necessary to ensure adequatesupport to the MFO in general and to US military units and personnel in particular.

9. Coordination and Liaison.

a. The Executive Agent is authorized direct coordination with those USG agenciesand commands as deemed necessary and appropriate.

b. Liaison with the MFO headquarters will be established as agreed between theExecutive Agent and the Office of the Director General with the concurrence of ASD(ISA)and the DOS.

10. Responsibilities of US Military Personnel.

a. US military personnel assigned to the MFO will perform such duties as assignedby the Commander, through their US unit commander as appropriate, and in consonancewith the rules and regulations as established by the MFO Commander in consultationwith the contributing countries.

b. No classified US military information of any nature, the release for which is notcontained in appropriate directives, will be released to foreign nationals by US personnelassigned to the MFO.

11. Public Affairs. DOS will remain the lead US agency for PA activities regarding allaspects of the MFO. The Executive Agent’s PA offices may conduct routine PA activities(respond to news media inquiries, internal and troop information programs, etc.) relatingonly to previously released aspects of US military participation in the MFO. Key personneland construction announcements, or other significant new material will be coordinatedin advance with the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)(OASD(PA)) and the DOS PA.

Figure A-C-1. Terms of Reference for US Participation In and Support to the MFO (cont’d)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOROPERATION RESTORE HOPE

1. Situation. Basic operation plan (OPLAN)/operation order (OPORD).

2. Mission. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of the Operation.

(1) If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders ofyour leaders.

(2) Nothing in these rules negates your inherent right to use reasonable force todefend yourself against dangerous personal attack.

(3) These rules of self-protection and rules of engagement are not intended toinfringe upon your right of self-defense. These rules are intended to prevent indiscriminateuse of force or other violations of law or regulation.

(4) Commanders will instruct their personnel on their mission. This includes theimportance of proper conduct and regard for the local population and the need to respectprivate property and public facilities. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply in anoverseas area. Expect that all missions will have the inherent task of force security andprotection.

(5) ROE cards will be distributed to each deploying soldier (see Appendix I to thisannex).

b. Rules of self-protection for all Soldiers.

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX ARULES OF ENGAGEMENT

A-D-1

1. The Standing Rules of Engagement(SROE) found in CJCSI 3121.01, “StandingRules of Engagement for US Forces,” applyto US forces during all military operations andcontingencies, to include PO. The SROE maybe augmented for specific operations.Commanders must assess the capabilities and

intent of other forces and makerecommendations for supplemental ROEthrough the chain of command. ROE mustbe clearly stated in simple language.

2. The ROE for Operation RESTORE HOPEare included as an example in Figure A-D-1.

Figure A-D-1. Rules of Engagement for Operation RESTORE HOPE

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Annex D to Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-07.3

(1) US Forces will protect themselves from threats of death or serious bodily harm.Deadly force may be used to defend your life, the life of another US soldier, or the life ofpersons in areas under US control. You are authorized to use deadly force in self-defense when:

(a) You are fired upon;

(b) Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human life;

(c) There is a clear demonstration of hostile intent in your presence.

(2) Hostile intent of opposing forces can be determined by unit leaders or individualsoldiers if their leaders are not present. Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use offorce against US Forces or other persons in those areas under the control of US Forces.Factors you may consider include:

(a) Weapons: Are they present? What types?

(b) Size of the opposing force.

(c) If weapons are present, the manner in which they are displayed; that is, Arethey being aimed? Are the weapons part of a firing position?

(d) How did the opposing force respond to the US forces?

(e) How does the force act toward unarmed civilians?

(f) Other aggressive actions.

(3) You may detain persons threatening or using force which would cause death,serious bodily harm or cause interference with mission accomplishment. You may detainpersons who commit criminal acts in areas under US control. Detainees should be givento military police as soon as possible for evacuation to central collection points (seeparagraph d below).

c. Rules of Engagement. The relief property, foodstuffs, medical supplies, buildingmaterials and other end items, belong to the relief agencies distributing the supplies untilit is actually distributed to the populace. Your mission includes safe transit of thesematerials to the populace.

(1) Deadly force may be used only when:

(a) Fired upon;

Figure A-D-1. Rules of Engagement for Operation RESTORE HOPE (cont’d)

A-D-3

Rules of Engagement

(b) Clear evidence of hostile intent exists (see above for factors to consider todetermine hostile intent);

(c) Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human life, sensitive equipmentand aircraft, open and free passage of relief supplies.

(2) In situations where the deadly force is not appropriate, use the minimum forcenecessary to accomplish the mission.

(3) Patrols may use deadly force if fired upon or if they encounter opposing forceswhich evidence a hostile intent. Nondeadly force or a show of force should be used ifthe security of US forces is not compromised by doing so. A graduated show of forceincludes:

(a) An order to disband or disperse;

(b) Show of force/threat of force by US forces that is greater than the forcethreatened by the opposing force;

(c) Warning shots aimed to prevent harm to either innocent civilians or theopposing force;

(d) Other means of nondeadly force;

(e) If this show of force does not cause the opposing force to abandon its hostileintent, consider if deadly force is appropriate.

(4) Use of barbed wire fences is authorized.

(5) Unattended means of force (e.g., mines, booby traps, trip guns) are NOTauthorized.

(6) If US forces are attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile elements, mobs,and/or rioters, US forces will use the minimum amount of force reasonably necessary toovercome the threat. A graduated response to unarmed hostile elements may be used.Such a response can include:

(a) Verbal warnings to demonstrators in their native language;

(b) Show of force, including the use of riot control formations (see below forrules about using RCAs);

(c) Warning shots fired over the heads of the hostile elements;


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Joint Pub 3-07.3

(d) Other reasonable uses of force, to include deadly force when the elementdemonstrates a hostile intent, which are necessary and proportional to the threat.

(7) All weapons systems may be employed throughout the area of operations unlessotherwise prohibited. The use of weapons systems must be appropriate and proportionalconsidering the threat.

(8) US forces will not endanger or exploit the property of the local populationwithout their explicit approval. Use of civilian property will usually be compensated bycontract or other form of payment. Property that has been used for the purpose ofhindering our mission will be confiscated. Weapons may be confiscated and demilitarizedif they are used to interfere with the mission of US forces (see rule (10) below).

(9) Operations will not be conducted outside of the landmass, airspace, and territorialseas of Somalia. However, any United States Central Command force conducting asearch and rescue mission shall use force as necessary and intrude into the landmass,airspace, or territorial sea of any country necessary to recover friendly forces.

(10) Crew-served weapons are considered a threat to US forces and the relief effortwhether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to useall necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew-served weapons in their area ofoperations.

(a) If an armed individual or weapons crew demonstrate hostile intentions, theymay be engaged with deadly force.

(b) If an armed individual or weapons crew commit criminal acts but do notdemonstrate hostile intentions, US forces will use the minimum amount of force necessaryto detain them.

(c) Crew-served weapons are any weapon system which requires more than oneindividual to operate. Crew-served weapons include, but are not limited to, tanks, artillerypieces, antiaircraft guns, mortars, and machine guns.

(11) Within those areas under the control of US forces, armed individuals may beconsidered a threat to US forces and the relief effort, whether or not the individualdemonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force todisarm and demilitarize groups or individuals in those areas under the control of USforces. Absent a hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated vehicles will bereleased after any weapons are removed/demilitarized.

d. Use of Riot Control Agents (RCAs). Use of RCAs requires the approval of CJTF.When authorized, RCAs may be used for purposes including but not limited to:


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Rules of Engagement

(1) Riot control in the division area of operations including the dispersal of civilianswho obstruct roadways or otherwise impede distribution operations after lesser meanshave failed to result in dispersal;

(2) Riot control in detainee holding areas or camps, in and around materialdistribution or storage areas;

(3) To protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists or paramilitary groups.

e. Detention of Personnel. Personnel who interfere with the accomplishment of themission or who use or threaten deadly force against US forces, US or relief materialdistribution sites, or convoys may be detained. Persons who commit criminal acts inareas under the control of US forces may likewise be detained.

(1) Detained personnel will be treated with respect and dignity.

(2) Detained personnel will be evacuated to a designated location for turn-over tomilitary police.

(3) Troops should understand that any use of the feet in detaining, handling orsearching Somali civilians is one of the most insulting forms of provocation.

4. Service Support. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

5. Command and Signal. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

AcknowledgeARNOLDMG

OFFICIALSMITHStaff Judge AdvocateAppendixes1-ROE Card


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Joint Pub 3-07.3

APPENDIX 1 (ROE Card) to ROE FOR OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

Joint Task Force for Somalia Relief OperationsGround Forces Rules of Engagement

Nothing in these rules of engagement limits yourright to take appropriate action to defend

yourself and your unit.

1. You have the right to use force to defendyourself against attacks or threats of attack.

2. Hostile fire may be returned effectively andpromptly to stop a hostile act.

3. When US forces are attacked by unarmedhostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forcesshould use the minimum force necessary underthe circumstances and proportional to the threat.

4. You may not seize the property of others toaccomplish your mission.

5. Detention of civilians is authorized for securityreasons or in self-defense.

Remember:

The United States is not at war.

Treat all persons with dignity and respect.

Use minimum force to carry out the mission.

Always be prepared to act in self-defense.


ANNEX E TO APPENDIX ASTANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

A-E-1

1. SOPs may also be referred to as the forcecommander’s directive, or force standingorders. SOPs are developed for eachoperation, since each PO is unique. The UNhas standardized the major subject headingsof SOPs for use in UN PO; this format isappropriate for any PO.

2. Figure A-E-1 depicts an SOP format forPKO using the major subject headingsestablished by the UN.

SAMPLE SOP FORMAT FOR UN PKO

1. Command and Control.

a. Status, authority, and responsibilities of the force commander, subordinatecommanders (if applicable), national contingent commanders, sector commanders, andunit commanders.

b. National contingent commanders’ responsibilities to the force commander and toeach of the national contingent commander’s government authorities on national matters.

c. Responsibilities of key civilian personnel.

d. Scheduled times as well as attendance requirements for operational briefings andlogistics meetings.

e. NBC warning and reporting systems.

2. Organization.

a. Structure of the PK force headquarters.

b. Structure and TOR for operations, personnel, administrative, logistics,communication, and civilian personnel.

3. Operations.

a. Mandate

(1) Aim. Role and purpose of the PK force as it relates to the specific mandate.

(2) Scope. Limits within which the force must operate.

Figure A-E-1. Sample SOP Format for UN PKO

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Annex E to Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-07.3

b. Tasks. Authorized methods for interposition of forces, buffer zone operations,patrolling, observing, and reporting. (Details may be included as appendixes to theSOPs, such as Appendix 1, “Hand Over Procedures,” in this sample SOP format.)

c. Freedom of Movement. Rights of the PK force members as well as any restrictionsconcerning their movements in the PK area of operations. Specifics may include:

(1) Restrictions on movement and specific circumstances under which restrictedareas may be visited.

(2) Identification requirements.

(3) Procedures to follow in the event a PK force member is stopped. Also, actionsto take at a roadblock.

(4) Instructions for patrols operating in the buffer zone if they are stopped orotherwise prevented from performing their duties.

(5) Actions PK force personnel may take if members of the disputing parties attemptto search them or their vehicles.

(6) Authorities for transporting nonpeacekeeping force individuals in the force’svehicles; e.g., for emergency medical care.

(7) Procedures used during hijack situations.

(8) Incident reports that must be submitted if a violation occurs concerning theforce’s freedom of movement.

d. Weapons and Ammunition

(1) Authority to carry weapons while patrolling, performing escort duty, protectingproperty, etc.

(2) The amount of ammunition each individual may carry (usually one 20-roundmagazine), how the ammunition will be carried (e.g., in the pouch), and when a loadedmagazine may be attached to the weapon.

e. Use of Force. The following points may be appropriate:

(1) Definitions of force and use of force.

(2) Situations when PK force members may use force.

(3) The manners in which firearms are to be used.

Figure A-E-1. Sample SOP Format for UN PKO (cont’d)

A-E-3

Standing Operating Procedures

f. Entry, Search, and Arrest. Since most PK forces have military and/or civil policeunits, explain the circumstances when these police powers may be used.

g. Night Operations. A reminder to be overt, whom to inform and the method to use,and what actions to take if stopped while conducting PK duties at night.

h. States of Readiness. What they are and how they are announced.

i. Reports. The who, what, when, where, and how of each report format. One reportformat is SALUTE, which means the following subjects are included in the report: size,activity, location, unit, time, and equipment.

j. Protest Procedures. How the PK force notifies one of the disputing parties of aninfringement, the channels of communications to use, and which report to send to higherheadquarters.

k. Naval and Water Operations. Overall defensive plan; contingency plans forsituations where tide, current, or weather affects the afloat base; base patrols; and securityof berths and anchorages.

l. Special Instructions. Force, contingent, or unit headquarters may require PK forcemembers to carry cards with instructions on what to do in the event of:

(1) Entry into the buffer zone by a member of a non-PK military force or by civilians.

(2) Rules for the use of force in self-defense.

4. Information (or Intelligence). Detail the collection, collating, analyzing, and assessingof information and how it is to be disseminated. Provide information estimates detailingthe current situation, history, belligerents, conflict trigger events, theater weapon systemsand/or capabilities, political, cultural, and/or religious dynamics and terrain and/or weatherinformation.

5. Air Operations. Flight notification and clearance procedures, tasking procedures,flying restrictions, and accident investigation procedures.

6. Operations Economics. Any special accounting procedures required by the forceheadquarters.

7. Communications. Use of communications systems provided by the UN or PK forceheadquarters, the host government, or national contingents. Also, frequency allocationpolicy, relay and rebroadcast facilities, call signs, cryptography, message forms, andmessage traffic handling.


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Joint Pub 3-07.3

8. Personnel and Logistics.

a. Logistics. List the subjects for which the chief logistics officer will publish directives.

b. Identification. Distinctive dress, vehicle markings, and how to carry the UN orforce flag.

c. Personnel Services. Procedures for strength reporting, leaves, jurisdiction forcourts-martial, and graves registration.

d. Casualty Reporting. Missing persons, hostages, deaths, etc.

e. Internal Information. Arrangements for the reception and distribution of ArmedForces Radio and Television Service signals or other electronic news source signals; theproduction, printing, and distribution of a force newspaper, newsletter, or magazine; andprocurement of any other form of internal information deemed necessary by the USnational contingent commander.

9. Public Information. Media relations including clearance for press visits, briefing andinterview policies, etc.

Appendixes: commander’s signature block1-Hand Over Procedures


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Standing Operating Procedures

APPENDIX 1 (Hand Over Procedures) to SAMPLE SOP

The following are suggested procedures for accomplishing the hand over of POWs,human remains, and parcels and mail.

1. The hand over of POWs must be carefully coordinated and well-organized to preventconfusion and delay. A disruption in the hand over could result in the PO force feedingand accommodating several hundred POWs. A narrow section of the buffer zone shouldbe chosen so that the prisoners can be transferred on foot for better control. Thesupervisory authority should:

a. Contact the intermediary (a PO force member or other neutral persons agreed to byall sides) to ascertain the number of prisoners to be handed over. Determine if there areany sick or wounded prisoners who need an ambulance or other form of transport.

b. Inform the force commander of the number of escorts, ambulances, and vehiclesrequired.

c. Ensure that the receiving party has the necessary transport marshaled just outsidethe buffer zone in the vicinity of the agreed checkpoint. The receiving party’s authorizedrepresentatives will be allowed inside the buffer zone to proceed to the hand over point.

d. Secure the area with armed personnel who will remain at a discreet distance.

e. Close the checkpoints, and the road between them, to all unauthorized traffic andvisitors.

f. Meet the prisoners with the intermediary at the arrival checkpoint, organize theminto groups of 10, separate those requiring transport from those able to walk, obtain thenecessary documentation (nominal roll of prisoners), and sign a receipt for them.

g. Escort the marching prisoners with unarmed personnel across the buffer zone tothe receiving party at the agreed hand over point (usually near a checkpoint). Unarmedescorts will accompany the ambulances and vehicles transporting prisoners who areunable to walk.

h. Hand over the prisoners, and a copy of the nominal roll, to the receiving party’srepresentatives in the presence of the intermediary. Obtain a receipt.

2. The hand over of human remains should be carried out quickly, efficiently, and withdue respect for the dead. If POWs are to be handed over in the same operation, the deadshould be transferred first. However, to avoid emotional scenes and possibledemonstrations, the two should not be handed over simultaneously. The supervisorystaff ensures that:


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Joint Pub 3-07.3


a. The receiving party has a suitable vehicle at the checkpoint just outside the bufferzone.

b. The PO force keeps the checkpoints on either side of the hand over area clear ofvehicles and visitors not connected with the hand over.

c. The PO force provides a work detail if necessary.

d. The supervisory staff and the intermediary meet the vehicle bringing the remainsto the checkpoint.

e. After the intermediary has signed a receipt for the remains and completed otherrequired documentation, the work detail will transfer the remains to a force vehicle.

f. The force vehicle, accompanied by the supervisor’s staff and the intermediary, drivesacross the buffer zone to the checkpoint and the receiving party’s vehicles.

g. The work detail transfers the remains to the receiving party’s vehicle and theintermediary obtains a receipt.

h. The transfer is recorded on the logbooks at each checkpoint. Also recorded are thenames of the supervising officer and the intermediary.

3. Although the hand over of parcels and mail is a relatively simple operation, it must beplanned in detail. The intermediary will normally send a vehicle from each side to aparking lot at one of the checkpoints where the mail will be transferred from one vehicleto the other by a work detail provided by the PO force. A record of the number of lettersor parcels handed over should be obtained from the intermediaries to guard againstsubsequent claims. If the exchange of parcels and mail is part of a larger hand overoperation, no attempt should be made to conduct both simultaneously.

ANNEX F TO APPENDIX AAREA INFORMATION HANDBOOK

A-F-1

1. The purpose of an area informationhandbook is to assist personnel in transitioningto their assignment as members of a PO.

2. Figure A-F-1 contains the table of contentsof the Sinai Area Information Handbookdistributed to members assigned to the MFOon the Sinai Peninsula. This exampleillustrates the types of items appropriate foran area information handbook.

3. In addition to the example provided,various personnel topics may also beappropriate for an area information handbook.These other topics include: tour length;passport and visa requirements; deployedmailing address; leave policy; morale, welfare,and recreation opportunities; Red Crossnotifications; etc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SINAI AREA INFORMATION HANDBOOK

1. Maps.

a. Transatlantic route.

b. Persian Gulf area.

c. Sinai Peninsula.

2. Multinational Force and Observers.

a. Organization.

b. Functions and responsibilities.

c. Size and organization.

d. Criminal jurisdiction.

e. Military police.

3. Location and Topography.

a. Geographical location.

b. Terrain.

c. Effect of the terrain on MFO operations.

Figure A-F-1. Table of Contents, Sinai Area Information Handbook

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Annex F to Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-07.3

4. General Climatic Data.

a. Climatic regions.

b. Seasons.

c. Precipitation.

d. Temperatures.

e. Sky conditions.

f. Visibility.

g. Surface winds.

h. Severe weather.

i. Sandstorms.

j. Flash floods.

k. Effects of weather on MFO operations.

5. Sinai Peninsula.

a. General information.

b. Bedouin population in Zone C.

6. Desert Operations.

a. General.

b. Acclimatization.

c. Camouflage.

d. Noise and light discipline.

e. Navigation.

f. Maintenance.

Figure A-F-1. Table of Contents, Sinai Area Information Handbook (cont’d)

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Area Information Handbook

7. Desert Survivability.

a. General.

b. Sun, wind, and sand.

c. Buddy system.

d. Water conservation.

e. Dangerous insects and animals.

f. Desert hazards.

g. Treatment of specific medical problems.

h. Field sanitation.

i. Personal hygiene.

8. Egyptian Armed Forces.

a. General information.

b. Organizational diagrams.

c. Uniforms; rank and branch insignia.

d. Egyptian military equipment identification charts.

(1) General information.

(2) Armor.

(3) Armored personnel carriers (APCs).

(4) Artillery.

(5) Air defense artillery.

(6) Helicopters.

(7) Fixed-wing aircraft.


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Joint Pub 3-07.3

(8) Small arms.

(9) Antitank weapons.

e. Arabic culture and customs.

f. Basic Arabic phrases.

9. Israeli Armed Forces.

a. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

b. Organizational diagrams.

c. Uniforms; rank and branch insignia.

d. Israeli military equipment identification charts.

(1) General information.

(2) Armor.

(3) APCs.

(4) Artillery.

(5) Air defense artillery.

(6) Helicopters.

(7) Fixed-wing aircraft.

(8) Small arms.

(9) Antitank weapons.

e. Hebrew culture.

f. Hebrew phrases.


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Area Information Handbook

10. Nations and Organizations Supporting the MFO.

11. Rules of Engagement.

12. Minefields.

13. OPSEC.

14. Predeployment Training.

15. Notes (this section allows each person to record notes).


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Joint Pub 3-07.3

Intentionally Blank

EXCERPT FROM: “Wings For Peace: Airpower in Peacemaking Operations” byMajor Bruce Rember, USAF (Note also that the current terminology for these operationsis Peace Enforcement).

Immediately following World War I, Britain successfully used its Royal Air Force (RAF) ina primary role of “policing the empire.” The British government found the air force particularlysuited to enforcing the peace throughout sparsely populated areas of the Middle East:

The airplane can be regarded as a primary weapon in wild unadministered country, andas a secondary weapon in cooperation with the Army wherever a strong and settledadministration exists. It is fairly obvious why this should be so, for when trouble breaksout in a settled country...the guilty and innocent parts of the population are living closetogether, antigovernment forces rarely come out into the open, and the chief requirementis to separate the combatants or to give physical protection to property and to the manyimportant and vulnerable points which exist in any organized community: the wholething is on too small a scale to give scope for the characteristics of the aeroplane....

The minimum political objectives for these air control operations were to ensure Britishofficials could “travel unmolested” anywhere they wanted to go, to preserve the “sanctity ofthe trade routes,” and to ensure that any fighting between tribes did not interfere “with therights of third parties.” The first such example of British air control occurred in 1919, whenthe RAF’s “Z” Unit deployed with its DH-9s to Somaliland to compel Mohammed binAbdullah Hassan, the “mad” mullah, to stop raiding friendly tribes. The first raid of sixaircraft scored a direct hit on the mullah himself. Subsequent raids forced the mullah and hisdervishes to evacuate their villages. Less than a month later, after a combined pursuit byground forces and “Z” unit, the operations concluded with the mullah fleeing the country dueto his loss of face after most of his personal following was killed or captured. (Quotes arefrom British military journal articles in the 1930s.)

EXCERPTS FROM: A DOD News Briefing: “Information Dominance for OperationJOINT ENDEAVOR”

Dr. Paul Kaminski, USD (Acquisition and Technology): What we’re talking about here isdeploying advanced command and control capabilities in support of the US EuropeanCommand and operations in Bosnia, thereby further enhancing our coalition forces’ significantinformation advantage. This system will provide better communications connections betweenUS-based information sources into the theater, and among rear and forward deployedcommanders. We are using commercial satellite technology protected at the Secret levelthrough the use of encryption devices to directly broadcast information to operation centersand to deployed forces.

COL Ed Mahan, USAF, Technical Assistant to the Director of the Advanced ResearchProjects Agency: The information dominance vision really is a transition from how we look

ANNEX G TO APPENDIX AHISTORICAL EXAMPLES

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Annex G to Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-07.3

at information today in a single thread — from the source of the information through thedistribution system to the user — and transforming that into information geographicallyoriented or oriented in the way the soldier sees it in his battle space. Being able to takeinformation from a number of different sources, organize it into this geographical orientation,and provide it to all the commanders at one time to provide this common operational picture.For this concept to be successful, one needs a unified integrated communication networkingsystem, and that’s really the objective of this Bosnian Command and Control AugmentationProgram.

What this program will provide for the warfighter primarily is a lot more communicationcapacity to places where he really doesn’t have it today. The last mile, as we refer to it, tendsto be a very difficult place to get a lot of communications. We have a lot of luxury in thiscountry because we can pick up the phone and get a lot of connectivity. Forward-deployedtroops don’t have that kind of connectivity or bandwidth. The use of these commercial directbroadcast capabilities allows it to put a lot of this connectivity and capacity down to the verydistant end of the soldier in the field.

MG David Kelley, USA, Vice Director, Defense Information Systems Agency: We havea large command and control infrastructure in Bosnia, primarily focused on core C2requirements. The nature of the terrain here, as we often find when we go into an area on anoperation, the infrastructure simply is not there to let us do terrestrial extensions. When youcouple that with the terrain in Bosnia, which is highly compartmented and mountainous, andthen you throw in the mine situation where there are literally thousands of mines in unmarkedlocations, the thrust within country has been to use space assets to establish the backbone ofcommunications. Largely military satellites. That means we’ve used a lot of the capacity inmilitary satellites. We also have the grid communications in the nations that are cooperatingwith us, and we have connections from the European continent back to the United Statesthrough undersea fiber optic cable.

What this initiative is going to do is really add to the capability of the forces in a dramaticfashion. This broadcast satellite has the ability to see the entire theater. We have the potentialnow, for example, to put a Predator UAV flying over Bosnia, downlink that information to asatellite station, uplink it back into the broadcast location, and put it out to multiple locationson the battlefield.

One of the biggest problems we had in DESERT STORM was disseminating large bandwidthinformation. This broadcast capability is going to allow us to do that. Additionally, we can,on the broadcast, put the intelligence summaries. We can have the soldiers in the field pull theinformation that they need. The commanders can pull the information from data bases in theUnited States.

Another initiative that’s tied in very closely with the American forces in Tuzla is thetelemedicine capability. This initiative will allow us to connect Landstuhl Hospital to deployedhospitals in the Tuzla area where medical expertise can be called upon. If the answer’s notgood enough in Landstuhl, we have connectivity back to the United States to San Antonio,where from there we have a hub that can reach every hospital in the United States that’s tiedinto the telemedicine network. So that way, we can have the specialists on call at any time

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Historical Examples

across time zones. The thing that it brings to the table primarily is improved situationalawareness — the common operational picture that was mentioned earlier. From that commonpicture, the commanders can make a decision taking into account the variables and the differentaspects of the operation.

Finally, it allows the commanders to synchronize their forces. That is one of the most complexproblems our commanders say in any deployment: the ability to synchronize the differentservices and the different forces. In this case, the allied forces as well. So this initiative isgoing to provide us a real look-ahead to the 21st century and the capabilities of command andcontrol we see on the horizon.

EXCERPT FROM: “Responding to Civil Disturbances in Bosnia,” by CPT FredJohnson, CALL Publication, Chapter 3, Sep-Oct 96:

“On several occasions, civil disturbances could not be avoided and units found themselvescaught between two hostile crowds. Tactical PSYOP teams and civil affairs personnel provedto be very effective assisting units in literally talking themselves out of a crisis.”

EXCERPT FROM: “A Task Force Eagle Brigade Commander,” CALL Newsletter96-11, Section IV:

“The factions get real nervous around the press, they get real nervous around cameras…itdefinitely makes things happen. I can say I have close air support — that’s obvious. I haveattack helicopters — that’s obvious. I have “x” number of MK 19s, I outnumber you. ButI've also got Time, Newsweek, and CNN, and that has a big impact on their behavior.”

EXCERPT FROM: Call Newsletter 96-11, Section IV:

“The Public Affairs Office and Information Operations (including PSYOP) ensured TFE(Task Force Eagle) beat the factions to the media (both international and indigenous) with thecorrect information before the factions could launch a propaganda campaign of biased anderroneous press reports.”

EXCERPT FROM: General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,4 May 1995:

“As Commander of Joint Task Force 180 during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, it ismy belief that the integration of psychological operations (PSYOP) early in the planningprocess was critical to the successful execution of the operation. Long before any Americanmilitary forces stepped ashore, PSYOP helped us quickly to accomplish our political andmilitary objectives by laying the foundation for transition from forced entry to semi-permissiveoperations. Without a doubt, PSYOP won the hearts and minds of Haiti’s citizens, as well assetting the stage for the peaceful accomplishment of the Joint Task Force’s mission. There is

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Joint Pub 3-07.3

no question PSYOP saved lives on both sides during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.It proved to be an unsung, yet vitally important, factor in this operation — a true forcemultiplier.”

EXCERPT FROM: General (Ret.) George A. Joulwan, Former NATO Supreme AlliedCommander Europe, 10 September 1996:

“The information you (PSYOP soldiers) have put out to the Former Warring Factions (inBosnia), the Coalition Force, as well as the civilian agencies allows us to speak with onevoice and has promoted cohesion and solidarity among all the forces.”

EXCERPT FROM: Public Affairs Update, Summer 1996:

The top ten technologies of media war coverage are:

• Electronic mail and computer-to-computer communications.• Digital transmission of still photographs.• Facsimile transmission.• Portable satellite telephones.• Remotely sensed satellite imagery.• Frame capture of video images to print.• Portable laptop computers.• International data transmission networks.• Flyaway satellite uplinks.• Computer graphics analysis.

“Today one of our biggest challenges is keeping pace with all the technology at our disposal.We produce a 12-page, glossy, four-color, weekly publication in a totally digital environment.Each forward-deployed public affairs team has a Pentium computer and a top-of-the-linedigital camera....our printer picks up everything he needs in one 230 MG optical disk....Wealso exchange photos and stories via e-mail with US Army community newspapers in Germany.In addition we transmit the finished paper to ...BosniaLINK, the DOD World Wide Website..... I’m sure PA veterans of DESERT STORM, Somalia and Haiti wish they would havehad these capabilities. Connectivity has been a boon to the entire public affairs apparatus.The Early Bird is downloaded...and placed on a local network....specialists stay abreast ofbreaking coverage though the major network’s websites on the Internet....” National GuardCPT John Goheen, OIC, The Talon.

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EXCERPTS FROM: “The Employment of Maritime Forces in Support of UnitedNations Resolutions” Strategy and Campaign Department, Naval War College, ResearchReport 6-93 Dated 11 Aug 93:

PREVIOUS UN MARITIME OPERATIONS

It was in 1947, just two years after the United Nations was established, that the amphibioustransport, USS Renville, became the headquarters ship for the UN Truce Commission whichsupervised the negotiation of the terms of a settlement between the Dutch colonialists and theIndonesian nationalists. The subsequent agreement was a precursor to the Netherlands’recognition of the Republic of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign state and wasdenoted “The Renville Truce”. In the next year, a number of naval units from several countrieswere at the organization’s disposal during the Palestinian crisis. In addition, naval and marineobservers were deployed ashore and the US Marine Corps (USMC) landed at Haifa withcommunications equipment to assist the UN officers in what was to become the UnitedNations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). On 17 June 1947, the Commander ofthe Sixth Task Fleet loaned three destroyers to the UN mediator, USS Putnam, USS Henley,and USS James C. Owens. The French Navy contributed a corvette. All four warships flewthe UN flag on the same halyard as the national ensign and immediately below it.

UNTSO, which remains in operation today, enjoyed other examples of maritime support.For instance, on 2 November 1956, USS Cambria evacuated 21 UN observers from Gazaand provided a show of force enabling the seven remaining UNTSO personnel to continuenegotiations with the Egyptians.

In the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the subsequent establishment of the United Nations EmergencyForce (UNEF I) whose mandate was to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities andwithdrawal of French, Israeli and United Kingdom forces from Egyptian soil, maritimecapabilities were again widely exploited. A Landing Ship Tank (LST) was loaned by the USgovernment to the force and manned by UN personnel for some years “to give practice totroops in loading and unloading personnel and vehicles from beaches”. In addition, units ofthe US Sixth Fleet sealifted 4000 UN troops at the start of the operation and later providedlogistic support.

Sealift is perhaps the most obvious use of maritime assets, but the transportation in theater ofpersonnel and materials in connection with the operation ashore is a complementary andequally well-practiced task. Observation and reporting tasks have also been widely exercised.The ability of maritime forces to poise offshore has allowed evacuation operations to betimed to meet the circumstances, and both beleaguered nationals and UN servants havebenefited from a seaborne escape route. The use of platforms afloat to launch humanitarianoperations has enjoyed considerable success and, on occasion, obviated the need for muchmore than the most rudimentary infrastructure ashore. Postconflict mopping-up operationsunder UN direction have ensued from a number of conflicts, and multi-national forces havesuccessfully worked together in often dangerous circumstances. On several occasions, embargooperations have been instituted, including the need to board and search suspect vessels.

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Joint Pub 3-07.3

Military Observer Mission-Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP) and JTF Safe Border

In March 1995 soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A), US Army South(USARSO), and USSOCOM deployed to Patuca, Ecuador, to assist the countries of Ecuadorand Peru with the observance of a cease fire along their eastern border. The dispute is primarilyterritorial, neither country being willing to relinquish land they believe is sovereign.

The MOMEP observer force is composed of personnel from the countries of Brazil, Chile,Argentina, and the United States. Each country provides ten observers. The mission ofMOMEP is to supervise the cease-fire agreement and assist in the maintenance of peacebetween Ecuador and Peru. The force is led by a Brazilian general, known as the CoordinatorGeneral. Each country also provides a colonel as its senior representative, who serves as asenior staff officer on the Coordinator General’s staff as well as the senior observer for hiscountry.

The MOMEP mission occurred in phases:

• Phase 1 included the signing of the peace treaty, a cease fire by both countries, thesuspension of military operations, and the signing of a Declaration of Procedures.

• Phase 2 consisted of a continuation of the cease fire, Ecuador and Peru providing MOMEPtheir order of battle by outlining where their forces were arrayed on the battlefield, andrelinquishing control of airspace within the conflict zone to MOMEP.

• Phase 3 of the initial operation involved separation of the forces and their removal fromthe conflict zone. This phase was the most tenuous as the forces had become intertwinedin the jungle and had to be removed without causing an incident that would reignite thehostilities. MOMEP provided planning assistance and recommendations to the Ecuadorianand Peruvian leadership as the extraction plan was developed to give the countries asense of ownership in the process. Phase 3 lasted approximately 30 days as MOMEPensured that the units remained separated.

The mission for the observers is to observe, verify, and report. In short, they observe that theconditions of the peace treaty within the established conflict zone are being met and, in theevent that a violation occurs, they verify (or confirm) that an incident occurred and report thecircumstances and the agreed-upon corrective actions to the coordinator general. The MOMEPstaff goes to great lengths to maintain its neutrality and recommends solutions to the violationrather than directing what actions will be taken to maintain the cease-fire. To provide MOMEPdedicated support, such as transportation and communications, the United States agreed toprovide the support structure creating JTF Safe Border. JTF Safe Border is mainly comprisedof soldiers from 3/7 Special Forces Group (A) and USARSO’s 1-228 Aviation, based at FTKobbe, Panama. 1-228 provides UH-60 support. Along with transporting observers to theoutposts, the aviation task force flies reconnaissance missions over the conflict zone. Thesemissions assist in projecting MOMEP’s presence in the conflict zone, and they allow theobservers to verify that the cease fire agreement is being maintained. The future of peacealong the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border is promising. The next planned phase of MOMEP isa transition of oversight of the process to Ecuador and Peru.

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Adapted from “News from the Front,” The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Jan-Feb 96, by CPT Steve Hiller

EXCERPTS FROM: A Speech By The Hon. H. Allen Holmes, Asst. Sec. of Defense forSpecial Operations/Low Intensity Conflict “Realizing CA in the Civil Dimension”:

In Rwanda, CA units ran three Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC’s) throughout thecountry. They coordinated and ensured the secure distribution of food, shelters for the refugees,and their ultimate repatriation.

In Haiti, the CA-managed CMOC acted as the nerve center for coordination with US civilianagencies and for requests for military support from US and international nongovernmentorganizations, the Haitian government and its population.

CA personnel also provided invaluable assistance in restoring the legitimate government topower. Thirty-four CA officers served as ministerial advisors in twelve ministries, whichincluded Education, Public Works, Transportation, Commerce, and Public Health. Theycreated, often from scratch, institutional guidelines for the ministries which they supported—establishing emergency preparedness systems, developing budgets, and creating a model fora working government. CA also worked exceptionally well as part of the Special ForcesA-teams. CA soldiers accompanied many Special Forces detachments into the Haitiancountryside and coordinated many civic action projects. For example, they helped restoreelectric power to a number of towns and organized the local citizenry to rebuild road andbridges.

CA activities in the Sarajevo and the French/British sectors have been unparalleled successes.CA soldiers got the water restarted in Sarajevo. They reopened the phone lines betweenSerbia and the war-torn areas of the Bosnian Federation. They are encouraging civil industryback into the area and are facilitating the election process. CA units also fixed an electricalconnection which repaired the “odorizer” at Sarajevo’s natural gas plant. This put an end tothe frequent gas explosions caused by undetected gas leaks which were killing dozens ofinnocent civilians.

Landmines are an enormous problem in Bosnia. It will likely take 20 years to clear theestimated 6 million land-mines in that country. The role of CA in demining in Bosnia istwofold. First, CA soldiers are providing information about the whereabouts of minefields tothe Mine Action Center in Sarajevo. Second, CA units, alongside PSYOP forces, are supportinga substantial Mine Awareness campaign as part of IFOR to reach and inform large audiencesof young people about the land mine threat. The campaign involves the distribution ofarticles with mine awareness slogans and the future distribution of a comic book with a mineawareness theme using the “Superman” character.

In Cambodia, CA are doing much more than assisting with demining operations. For example,finance teams are working with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to establish payscales,software programs, accounting systems, and budgets. A CA unit has also supported a Khmer

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Joint Pub 3-07.3

Rouge defector program. A US-trained Cambodian CA unit orchestrated the recent transportand distribution of 23 tons of US humanitarian assistance to former Khmer Rouge soldiersand their families.

EXCERPTS OF: USCENTCOM’s 1994 Operations:

• MARITIME INTERCEPT OPERATIONS

Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) enforcing United Nations Sanctions against Iraqcontinued through 1994. The sanctions provide for an embargo of certain goods destined forIraq until it complies with a series of UN Security Council resolutions addressing weapons ofmass destruction and other issues stemming from the Gulf War. MIO is being conducted bymultinational naval forces which patrol assigned areas and monitor, query, board and inspectif necessary those vessels which are suspected of violating UN sanctions. Warships from theUnited States, France, and the United Kingdom participated in the 1994 operations in theNorth Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. Maritime Intercept Operations underwent significantchanges during 1994. In September, 1994, North Red Sea UN Sanction EnforcementOperations shifted from “at-sea” to “shore-based” inspections. Inspection responsibility wasshifted by contract from the UN to Lloyds’ Register of London. Additionally, at-sea commandof MIO forces shifted from the US Coast Guard back to the US Navy, with the primary areaof responsibility moving to the Arabian Gulf. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments(LEDETs) continue to remain aboard Navy ships enforcing the sanctions. In March 1994,one vessel attempted to export unauthorized foodstuffs from Umm Qasr but was interceptedand diverted by MIO forces. In October 1994, two merchant tankers suspected of transportingIraqi oil in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions were diverted to ports in GCCstates.

• AIR OPERATIONS — OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH

Since the end of the Gulf War, Iraq has aggressively tried to suppress the Kurds in northernIraq and Marsh Arabs in the south. Saddam Hussein has directed major division-levelcounterinsurgency operations against the population in the marshes northwest of Basra.Brigade-sized ground and air forces using combined arms tactics carried out search anddestroy operations. Additionally, large-scale engineering efforts have been used to divertwaters away from the marshlands to facilitate combat operations. In response to thesedevelopments, the United Nations Security Council in 1992 passed Resolution 688 condemningIraq’s repression of its civilian population. To allow monitoring of compliance with Resolution688, an Iraqi no-fly zone south of the 32nd parallel was established. Named operationSOUTHERN WATCH, the coalition effort to enforce that ban against both military andcivilian Iraqi aircraft in the no-fly zone, as well as any surface-to-air weapons presenting athreat to aircraft conducting the monitoring mission, has been in operation since August1992. The United States, France, United Kingdom, and others have contributed forces orsupport for SOUTHERN WATCH.

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EXAMPLE LESSONS LEARNED, CALL

• TOPIC: Use of Tanks in Peace Enforcement Operations.

• DISCUSSION: While infantry forces are best suited for peace enforcement operations,armor forces can make significant contributions to the operations. Tanks are potentweapons systems when performing traditional functions, but they also make excellentinfantry support weapons. Some of their capabilities are:

•• Antitank and antiarmor.

•• Intimidation of belligerent forces.

•• Heavy weapons support to infantry fighting vehicles.

•• Target acquisition especially at night using thermal sights.

•• Survivable to mines and light antiterrorism weapons.

•• Provide advanced guard support to convoys.

•• Provide support during search and attack operations.

•• Protect infantry against automatic weapons fire.

Some advantages to using tanks during peace enforcement operations are:

•• Armor/Mech can be rapidly emplaced at decisive points throughout sectorto support threatened UN forces.

•• Heavy forces have extremely high visibility and can deter aggression by belligerentforces (consider firepower demonstrations as a show of force).

Some disadvantages of using armor during peace enforcement operations are:

•• The enemy can focus on, isolate, and destroy armor forces in a piecemeal fashion.

•• Tanks have limited bunker and building destruction capability.

•• Tanks and other armored vehicles destroy the secondary roads and main supply routes.

•• The size of armored vehicles often block narrow country roads and can destroy privateproperty during movement (may offset attempts to gain support of local civilians).

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Joint Pub 3-07.3

LESSON(S):

•• There is no pure “heavy” or “light” scenario in peace enforcement operations. Thebest way to achieve success is to balance the array of tactical capabilities in accordancewith mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available.

•• The combined arms concept requires teamwork, mutual understanding, and therecognition by everyone involved with the critical roles performed by other arms.

•• There is no place for parochialism or ignorance; the success of the mission and thelives of soldiers will depend on the ability to understand and synchronize the complexitiesof the light/heavy force.

• TOPIC: Armor Considerations for Built-up Areas.

• DISCUSSION: There are several difficulties in using tanks in built-up areas. Tanks canprovide effective support to infantry operations in built-up areas, but infantry teamsmust be assigned to protect each tank from short-range antitank weapons.

LESSON(S):

•• Mobility is restricted because tanks are confined to roads or streets that often requireclearance of debris, and possibly mines.

•• Where possible, tanks should take advantage of parks and gardens which offer thebest fields of fire.

•• Buildings will restrict the full traverse of the turret and the elevation of the mainarmament may be insufficient to reach top floors and rooftops. However, the commander’smachine gun is not so restricted.

•• Tanks are particularly vulnerable to short-range antitank weapons. Their crews, ifexposed, may become casualties from snipers. Tanks must, therefore, move throughbuilt-up areas buttoned up. They must move in short bounds using suppressive fire andbe supported by other tanks.

• TOPIC: Engineer Support.

• DISCUSSION: Operation RESTORE HOPE demonstrated the usefulness of engineersin operations other than war. Somalia’s austere landscape and climate posed challengessimilar to or greater than the ones encountered during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM including a harsh desert environment, resupply over great distances, limitedresources, and a devastated infrastructure.

The deployed engineer force was a joint and combined effort, building on the engineercapabilities found with each service component and coalition partner. Engineers provided

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Historical Examples

standard maps and imagery products; detected and cleared hundreds of land mines andpieces of unexploded ordnance; built base camps for US and coalition forces; and drilledwater wells. They constructed and improved over 2,000 kilometers of roads; built andrepaired several Bailey bridges; upgraded and maintained airfields; and participated inlocal civic action projects that helped open schools, orphanages, hospitals, and localwater supplies.

Army engineers cooperated fully with and complemented engineer capabilities foundwithin the US Marine Corps, US Navy, and US Air Force. In addition, coalition forceengineer efforts were fully coordinated with US and UN goals for the area.

• TOPIC: Suppression of Artillery.

• DISCUSSION: The suppression of artillery used to harass population centers and airfieldswill be a formidable task during peace operations. It cannot be suppressed by air poweralone. When faced with an air threat and counter-battery threat, belligerents will seek toprotect their artillery by exploiting its high mobility (especially the mortars) and usingconcealment offered by terrain. Weapons may be deployed individually, rather than inbatteries. Weapons may re-deploy from one camouflaged position to another after firinga few rounds. Weapons may be located in populated areas such as near schools, hospitalsor other restricted fire areas. This complicates the delivery of counter-battery fire throughfear of inflicting civilian casualties and collateral damage.

LESSON(s):

•• Use precision-guided munitions or attack helicopters to conduct counter-battery fireto reduce unnecessary collateral damage.

•• Deploy artillery with the withdrawal force. Besides counter-battery fire, it can fireillumination and smoke rounds if needed.

•• Deploy firefinder radars to support suppression of combatant artillery and to documentviolations of cease-fire agreements and fix blame for damage and civilian casualties.This information can be passed to the media (if approved by commander) to give anaccurate portrayal of the situation to the world.

• TOPIC: Photo Support.

• DISCUSSION: Ground and aerial photographs of urban areas enhance the commander’sintelligence picture. If taken well ahead of time, photos of key facilities, intersections,staging areas and potential trouble spots from both air and ground levels can be storedand later disseminated to all levels of command for planning purposes. Prior to OperationJUST CAUSE in Panama, US patrols used video cameras to document hostile actionsby the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) soldiers. The presence of the video camerahelped to discourage hostile acts and harassment of US forces. If there is a need to takephotographs to enhance intelligence efforts, take them discreetly.

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Joint Pub 3-07.3

LESSON(S):

•• Use photo assets to give commanders updated views of areas of operation. This willassist them and their staffs in the planning process.

•• Helicopters are good platforms for photography and route reconnaissance missions.

•• Use video cameras to film convoy routes and use the film during convoy briefingsand rehearsals.

•• Consider using remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) instead of helicopters during peaceenforcement operations because of the threat of hostile fire.

•• Use video cameras to document violations of peace agreements.

• TOPIC: Area Assessment Checklist.

• DISCUSSION: A standardized checklist can enhance the intelligence collection effortand minimize trainup time for S2 sections. The area assessment checklist below wasdeveloped by US forces during Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia to enhance theintelligence collection effort during MOOTW. For additional guidance, see AppendixB, FM 41-10, “Civil Affairs Operations.”

LESSON(s): Use the following checklist as a guide to develop a standardized checklist.

• Where are the refugees originally from?• What is the size of the original population?• What is the size of the area and population that the village services in the surrounding

countryside?• What is the size of the refugee population?• Why did they come here?• What is the relationship of the village with the surrounding villages?• Are they related?• Do they support each other?• Are they hostile towards each other?• Is any portion of the village population discriminated against?• What is the food and water status of the village?• Where do they get their food?• What other means of subsistence is available?• Are the villagers farmers or herders?• What is the status of their crops/herds?• What is the quality of the water source?• What is the medical status of the village?• What services are available in the village?• What is the location of the nearest medical facility?• Is there evidence of illness and/or starvation?• What portion of the population is affected?

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• What is the death rate?• What diseases are reported in the village?• What civilian organization exist in the village? Who are their leaders?• What civil/military organizations exist in the village?• Who are their leaders?• What organization/leadership element does the general population seem to support or

trust the most?• Which organization seems to have the most control in the village?• What UN relief agencies operate in the village?• Who are their representatives?• What services do they provide?• What portion of the population do they service?• Do they have an outreach program for the surrounding countryside?• What is the security situation in the village?• What element(s) is the source of the problems?• What types and quantities of weapons are in the village?• What are the locations of minefields?• What commercial or business activities are present in the village? What services or

products do they produce?• Determine the groups in the village that are in the most in need.• What are their numbers?• Where did they come from?• How long have they been there?• What are their specific needs?• What civic employment projects would the village leaders like to see started?• Determine the number of families in the village.• What are their names (family)?• How many in each family?• What food items are available in the local market?• What are the cost of these items?• Are relief supplies being sold in the market?• If so, what items, what is their source, and what is the price?• What skilled labor or services are available in the village (non-HRA)?• What is the size of any transient population in the village? Where did they come from

and how long have they been there?

EXCERPTS FROM: “Selection & Training of Military Observers: Lessons Learnedfrom the Naval Experience, Maritime Command,” LT (N) G. Shorey, Canadian ArmedForces (Based on Experience in Cambodia, El Salvador, Former Yugoslavia):

Peacekeeping has entailed:

• Providing refugee security during repatriation along river routes.• Mediating sea boundary/patrol area disputes.• Organizing coastal search and rescue.• Conducting medevacs.• Smuggling Interdiction.

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Joint Pub 3-07.3

• Vessel boardings.• Patrolling coasts and inland waterways.

Exercise Venom Strike Combined US/Canadian Peacekeeping Training, LessonsLearned, Center for Army Lessons Learned, October 1995

Observation: Rules of Engagement in Combined Forces Operations.

Discussion:

Task organizing with units from other countries is complicated by restrictions imposed bytheir national ROE.

In the VENOM EDGE exercise, Canadian ROE was more restrictive than the US ROE. ACanadian unit was task organized within a notional US division. The division plancontemplated offensive operations, yet Canadian ROE was self-defense oriented.Notwithstanding execution of the US OPORD, Canadian forces could not comply with theOPORD’s direction to utilize more permissive US ROE because Canadian forces had tocomply with their national ROE.

What follows is an illustration of the observation:

Background: The training scenario WAS the rescue of UN Forces who had been conductingpeacekeeping operations between warring territories. NATO Forces were tasked with themilitary mission of extracting UN Forces, but only if diplomatic measures failed to securetheir release. The US-led NATO Forces arrived in-theater under the invitation of one of thewarring territories. Therefore, NATO ROE were restrictive and self-defensive in nature.Offensive combat operations were not authorized unless and until NATO Forces were directedto execute their military mission.

ROE: To meet the dual requirements of facilitating diplomatic negotiations initially, andlater executing the military extraction mission if necessary, the exercise ROE had two tiers:Tier I was self-defensive and effectively prohibited offensive operations; Tier 2 was morepermissive and authorized preemptive attacks when approved by the authorized NATOCommander.

National implementation of the ROE differed only slightly under Tier 1; however, under Tier2, US forces could use deadly force and reemptive artillery fires against defending forces inzone.

The US Division OPORD ordered an “attack.” Based upon the US ROE, defending enemyformations could be fired upon with artillery and direct fire weapons. The Canadians couldnot use artillery. They also could only use direct fire weapons if the defending enemydemonstrated hostile intent or committed a hostile act. The Canadians could initiate deadlyforce only upon approval by its national headquarters.

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Historical Examples

IMPLICATIONS:

Training: Before a peace operation begins, senior commanders from the coalition forcesmust strive to resolve the differences in the interpretation of ROE. Vignettes that train allcoalition soldiers to understand other national responses to the ROE must be developedbefore the operation begins.

EXCERPTS FROM: Enhancing US and Russian Relations Through CombinedPeacekeeping Exercises, Call “News from the Front,” March-April 1996 (MG RandolphW. House and MAJ Mark R. Pires):

Peacekeeper 95 (PK 95), a US and Russian peacekeeping exercise, was conducted from 22October to 4 November 1995 at Ft Riley, Kansas. It marked the first time that Russian soldierstrained with American soldiers in the continental United States. The exercise enabled soldiersfrom both countries to practice interoperability in peacekeeping operations and to share anddevelop tactics, techniques and procedures for peacekeeping tasks. Perhaps more importantly,the exercise allowed US and Russian soldiers to develop personal relationships based ontrust and mutual understanding.

Peacekeeper 95 was a follow-on exercise to Peacekeeper 94, held in Totskoye, Russia. The1st Infantry Division, Mechanized, received a directive from OSD and JCS in February 1995to plan and execute a combined peacekeeping exercise with the 27th Guards Motorized RifleDivision (GMRD), Totskoye, Russia, and 3rd Infantry Division, Mechanized, Wurzburg,Germany.

The training scenario for PK 95 was designed to replicate actual peacekeeping operations asrealistically as possible. The scenario was set in “Kanza,” a fictitious country attempting toestablish a new government after undergoing a devastating civil war. The war was foughtbetween two factions. Elements of the factions, splinter groups, refugees, and the media wereintermingled in the buffer zone when the peacekeepers arrived.

The scenario was developed to replicate a peacekeeping operation in which there exists formalconsent by all parties on the presence and mission scope of the peacekeeping forces ¾ ChapterVI of the United Nations charter. Hence, the peacekeepers deployed into a region in whichthe belligerents had already separated and the buffer zone was mutually agreed upon and ineffect at the outset of the CPX/FTX. The mission statement of the peacekeeping forces wasas follows:

US and Russian contingents from the 1ID(M)(-) and the 27th GMRD(RU)(-), as part of UNCombined Peacekeeping Forces - Kanza, conduct combined peacekeeping operations in theestablished buffer zone to supervise, monitor, and verify observance of the truce betweenbelligerents and help maintain a secure environment conducive to political stability and process.

The scope of the peacekeeping mission was limited to verifying and, where necessary, enforcingthe terms of the peace agreement, within the buffer zone. The mission statement also included

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Joint Pub 3-07.3

one of the gray areas of peacekeeping, “maintain a secure environment conducive to politicalstability and process.” This part of the mission challenged the peacekeepers and stressed theemployment of the rules of engagement (ROE). The scenario and events portrayed duringthe 4-day CPX/FTX were developed using various sources including publications from theCenter for Army Lessons Learned, the “Russian- US Guide for Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures of Peacekeeping Forces During the Conduct of Exercises,” and the experiencesof both Russian and US past operations. The scenario and events were developed from across section of peacekeeping operations and were not based on events in Bosnia, or anyother single area.

All participants learned valuable lessons at the small unit and individual soldier level. Soldiersfrom both nations improved interpersonal skills when dealing with civilians and members offactions. At the beginning of the exercise, both US and Russian soldiers tended to treatcivilians and faction members as enemies. During the course of the exercise, soldiers fromboth nations learned that they needed to change their mindset. The peacekeepers learned todisplay a friendly demeanor while still maintaining vigilance and force protection. Small unitleaders learned to use negotiation prior to using force. Early in the exercise, the peacekeepersfailed to use controlled escalation of force which resulted in soldiers shooting into crowds orother undesired outcomes. However, during the course of the exercise, the peacekeeperslearned to control events without having to resort to the use of force.

Civil Aspects of the Dayton Accords

The implementation of the civil aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace,know as the Dayton Accords, is essential to NATO’s exit strategy for Operations JOINTENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD and the return to normalcy for the people of Bosnia andHerzegovina (BiH).

The Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation (CJCIMIC) is the vital link between militaryand civilian organizations operating in theater. NATO has deployed more than 400 CApersonnel to support these efforts.

In BiH, CJCIMIC has been instrumental in facilitating a wide variety of activities in supportof NATO’s Office of the High Representative (OHR) and other organizations such as theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, European Union, InternationalCommittee for the Red Cross, and others.

Activities include:

Participation in Joint Civil Commissions to facilitate civil actions throughout BiH.Coordination with local organizations and utilities for assessments and improvements ofpublic infrastructure projects. Successes in this aspect of operations included: Securityfor shipment of equipment needed for electrical, coal, and natural gas power generationand facilitation of construction of facilities in coordination with the Office of DisasterAssistance and local officials.

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Facilitating the repair or reconstruction of roads and bridges through coordinating withthe World Bank, NATO engineers, and local agencies and conduct of bridge, overpassand road surveys.

Transit of commercial aircraft and more frequent operation due in part to brokering ofthe over flight policy and the installation of an instrument landing system.

Monitoring and facilitating the development of telecommunications legislation,regulations and plans for privatization that are being led by the European Bank forReconstruction and Development.

Environmental inspections of potable water and facilitation of shipment of laboratorymaterials for water analysis.

Support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Thisincludes the provision of security and logistic support to ICTY investigative teams, andsurveillance and ground patrolling of alleged mass grave sites.

Providing liaison, guidance and support in the areas of logistics, operations and trainingto the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The CJCIMIC Police Working Groupwas instrumental in generating the plan and subsequent employment of the IPTF withpolice throughout the country and developing plans for the reorganization of policeforces.

Support prior, during and after the election process. CJCIMIC provided computer trainingto staff members who are helping to manage the voter data base and helped coordinateinformation programs among OSCE, USAID, the NATO force, and other internationalorganizations.

Support to UNHCR to the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and developmentof a process for enhanced communications between the military and civilian agenciesinvolved. These include the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission forReal Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, as well as the Human RightsTask Force Property Subcommittee concerning legal and property rights.

CJCIMIC has worked closely with the OHR and International Federation of Journalists todevelop the Open Broadcast Network. This included site surveys, lease agreements for propertyand equipment, and shipment and distribution of transmission and production equipment.Another initiative is the development and implementation (in conjunction with OSCE) of anInter-Entity Editors Working Forum.

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APPENDIX BUS GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS

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1. General

PO normally require significant coordinationwithin the USG structure in an effort toemploy all instruments of national power.This appendix describes agencies andelements of the USG which are typicallyinvolved in PO. Additionally, this appendixbriefly discusses USG support to PO notsponsored by the UN.

2. National CommandAuthorities

The NCA consists of the President and theSecretary of Defense together, or their dulydeputized alternates or successors. Both themovement of troops and execution of militaryaction must be directed by the NCA; no oneelse in the chain of command has suchauthority. The NCA direct armed forcesinvolvement in operations. Orders given tothe US forces commander must include theappropriate NCA mandate (instructions) forthe operation.

3. National Security Council

The first step in translating national-leveldecisions and guidance into operational plansand specific guidance to government agenciesand departments begins with the NationalSecurity Council (NSC). The DeputiesCommittee of the NSC (NSC/DC) issupported by a core group as well as regionaland functional committees. The NSC/DCmay activate an interagency response groupto coordinate US activities if the situationwarrants.

4. Department of State

The DOS is the lead government agency inexecuting US foreign policy. It also has the

lead management and funding responsibilityfor traditional PKO and other diplomaticactions that do not involve US combat units.

a. Authority and Responsibilities. In agiven country, DOS authority is delegated toone of several principal staff assistants. TheSecretary of State (SECSTATE) provides asenior DOS representative to any interagencyor interdepartmental PO primary policyguidance in the following areas.

• Matters having an impact on US relationswith other countries.

• The extent to which commandersinterfere in the government of a particularcountry.

• The level at which the economy of acountry is maintained.

• Matters involving informationalprograms, supporting psychologicalaspects, and attitudes of the indigenouspopulation.

• The level of subsistence for civilians in acountry in which US forces are stationedor employed and by whom suchsubsistence in part or in whole must beprovided.

• Plans or procedures for the return of civilgovernment functions to civilian control.

• Efficiency and costs of programsundertaken to gain the understanding,acceptance, confidence, and support ofcivil populations.

• Embassy or consulate emergency actionplans for the city or area under theircognizance. These plans and photographs

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Joint Pub 3-07.3

could be beneficial to the forces involvedin missions. The information theyprovide includes evacuation sites,landing zones, ports, and beaches; thenumber of evacuees (if required);assembly areas; and command posts.

• Acts of terrorism. If the HN is unableto adequately protect itself from acts ofterrorism, the DOS can provide supportthrough its antiterrorism assistanceprogram to teach HN officialsgovernance and law enforcement. Thelatter should include how to maintain theinternal security of the nation. Inparticular, Federal Aviation Administrationinstruction on airport procedures andsecurity could be included.

b. Important State DepartmentEmbassy Positions. Commanders involvedin PO should be familiar with the duties ofthe following State Department officials andorganizations normally found at USembassies.

• Ambassador and/or Chief of Mission.

•• The ambassador is the chief of missionand is the senior US official, military orcivilian, in country. The ambassadorusua l ly has overa l l d i rec t ion ,coordination, and supervision of USGactivities and personnel in a host country.This authority does not extend topersonnel in other missions or thoseassigned to either an international agencyor to a combatant commander. A crisismay arise where the United States hasno diplomatic mission. In such asituation, the President may send arepresentative with instructions that varyfrom the standard authorities andresponsibilities of a chief of mission.

•• During cross-border emergencies, theUS ambassador to the HN normallyexercises authority in the interagency

environment. However, this control maybe complicated when cross-borderemergencies such as civilians crossinginternational borders or attacks againstrefugee camps take place. Therefore,interagency working groups shouldestablish procedures on cross-bordersituations.

• Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). TheDCM is the senior diplomatic official inan embassy below the rank ofambassador. The DCM has thediplomatic title of minister, minister-counselor, or counselor (depending uponthe size of the mission) and is nearlyalways a career foreign service officer(FSO). The DCM usually chairs theCountry Team meetings and coordinatesthe embassy staff.

• Chief of Military Mission. The chiefof military mission is the senior militaryperson at the embassy. The chief ofmilitary mission maintains liaison withthe HN’s military forces. The chief ofmilitary mission is authorized by law toperform certain military functions withhost country military barred to others.The chief of military mission is cognizantof the advance party forward commandelement.

• Defense Attaché Officer (DAO). TheDAO is the military person attached tothe embassy in a diplomatic statusrepresenting the Department of Defense.All military personnel, even those notassigned to the embassy or under directcontrol of the ambassador, mustcoordinate their activities through theDAO.

• Security Assistance Officer (SAO).The SAO is the person assigned to carryout security assistance managementfunctions, primarily logistics management,fiscal management, and contract

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US Government Involvement in Peace Operations

administration of country securityassistance programs.

• Administration Officer (AO). The AOis responsible for various activities at theembassy compound, which may includeproviding security at small posts; runningthe commissary, motor pool, andmaintenance activities; and handlingmonetary aspects of the embassybusiness, including foreign servicenational payroll, cash collection, andbudget. The AO is the third in commandin the embassy hierarchy. In a small postwith no security officer assigned, the AOassumes the functions of the securityofficer.

• Political Officer. A political officer isan FSO who reports on politicaldevelopments, negotiates withgovernments, and represents views andpolicies of the USG to his or her contacts.The political officer maintains regularcontact with host government officials,political and labor leaders, and otherinfluential citizens of a country, as wellas third country diplomats.

• Economic Officer. The economicofficer analyzes, reports on, and advisessuperiors and DOS personnel oneconomic matters in the host country.Economic officers also negotiate with thehost government on trade and financialissues. They may also work in closecontact with relief organizations.

• Consular Officer. The main functionof the consular officer is to screen,process, and grant US passports andvisas. Other duties include attending tothe welfare of US citizens and performingadministrative tasks such as maintaininga count of US nationals within the hostcountry. The consular officer providesappropriate personnel to screendocuments of all potential evacuees

during noncombatant evacuationoperations and provides any necessaryinstructions that personnel may need toeffectively staff processing stations.

• Medical Officer. The medical officer isqualified for general practice andresponds to and sets up triage, trauma,and mass casualty operations. Themedical officer also advises onindigenous disease vectors and properprophylaxis necessary for forcesintroduced into the country.

• Public Affairs Officer. The member ofthe Country Team that represents the USInformation Agency (USIA) or USInformation Service (USIS) overseasnormally serves as the PAO to providepublic affairs advice to the ambassadorand coordinate information efforts withother agencies.

• Regional Security Officer (RSO). TheRSO is a security officer responsible forthe security functions of US embassiesand consulates in a given country orgroup of adjacent countries.

• Post Security Officer (PSO). The PSOhas general security duties at a specificembassy (or consulate). The PSO is aspecial staff officer under the control ofthe AO.

• Special Security Force. The specialsecurity force consists of DOS employeeswho respond to crises in foreigncountries. They work for the RSO andprovide additional bodyguard security forthe ambassador, the DCM, and others.

• General Services Officer. The generalservices officer performs many of thesame functions as a military logistics staffofficer. This individual is normallyresponsible for buildings, grounds,construction, vehicles, and maintenance.

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• Marine Security Guard (MSG)Detachment. The MSG Detachment isresponsible to the PSO for internalsecurity, protection of classified material,and American lives. An MSGdetachment normally has 5 to 35personnel assigned. The detachment isnot available for duty with incomingforces, except with the express consentof the ambassador.

• Country Team. The Country Teamconsists of the ranking representatives ofembassy sections and other USGagencies operating within a country.Chaired by the ambassador or the DCM,the Country Team meets regularly toadvise the ambassador on US matters andto review current developments in thecountry. The Country Team facilitatesinteragency action on recommendationsfrom the field and implements effectiveexecution of US programs and policies.Included in the Country Team are thefollowing personnel:

•• Ambassador;

•• DCM;

•• Chief of political section;

•• Political and military affairs officers;

•• Consular officer;

•• AO;

•• Economics officer;

•• USIS representatives;

•• Drug Enforcement Administration(DEA), US Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), and Peace Corpsrepresentatives;

•• DAO and military assistance group;and

•• SAO.

c. United States Agency ForInternational Development. USAID is anagency under the policy direction of the DOSthat coordinates US foreign assistance efforts.In a PO, armed forces work closely withUSAID staff. Foreign economic assistanceprovided by USAID is normally in the formof development assistance loans and grantsto improve the quality of life of the poorestpeople in less developed countries. It alsoincludes the Economic Support Fund, part ofthe Security Assistance Program. TheSECSTATE and the USAID administratormake policy decisions concerning theEconomic Support Fund Program. The fundincludes balance of payment support andfinancing of infrastructure and other capitalprojects. Food is administered in closecooperation with the US Department ofAgriculture (USDA). USAID emphasizes:

• Stimulation of market economies andinvestment by US companies indeveloping nations;

• Improvement of schools, colleges,training organizations, supportivegovernment ministries, and otherinstitutions to support economic growth;

• Policy reform to advance development;and

• Transfer of technology to help countriesproduce their own resources.

d. United States Aid Office of ForeignDisaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA is thefederal agency responsible for providingprompt nonmilitary assistance to alleviate lossof life and suffering of foreign disaster victims.

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OFDA may request DOD assistance duringHA operat ions. Coordinat ion anddetermination of required forces is normallyaccomplished through the Assistant Secretaryof Defense (International Security Affairs) andthe Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. United States Information Agency.The USIA, or USIS overseas, helps to achieveUS foreign policy objectives by influencingpublic attitudes overseas. The agency advisesthe President and US departments outsideCONUS on the possible impact of policy,programs, and official statements on foreignopinion. USIA monitors the impact of PO onlocal attitudes and aids PO forces by gainingpopular support for them. To encouragepublic support for US policy objectives andto counter hostile attempts to distort andfrustrate US programs, USIA conducts a widerange of information activities.

5. Department of Defense

The Department of Defense has leadmanagement and funding responsibility forPO that involve US combat units and thosethat are likely to involve combat.

a. The Office of the Secretary of Defensehas several assistants who may be involvedin the conduct of PO.

• Assistant Secretary of Defense(Strategy and Requirements)(ASD[S&R]). ASD(S&R) is theprincipal staff assistant and advisor to theUSDP and the Secretary of Defense onDOD policy and planning for USparticipation in international PK and PEoperations. In these capacities, theASD(S&R) shall develop, coordinate,and oversee the implementation of policyand plans for matters related to theparticipation of Armed Forces of theUnited States and other DOD resources

in UN and other international PK or PEactivities. This includes the developmentof policy related to creating, identifying,training, exercising, and committingmilitary forces for such purposes.

• Assistant Secretary of Defense (SpecialOperations and Low IntensityConflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]). ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal staff assistant andcivilian advisor to the Secretary ofDefense and the USDP and planning-related special operations (SO) andMOOTW within the Department ofDefense. SOF, especially CA, PSYOP,and SF units, have unique capabilities andresponsibilities for peace operations. ADeputy Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Peacekeeping and HumanitarianAssistance serves under the ASD(SO/LIC). Among other responsibilities,ASD(SO/LIC):

•• Provides policy guidance and overseesplanning, programming, resourcing, andexecution of SO and MOOTW activities;

•• Provides policy concerning PSYOPforces, plans, and programs;

•• Oversees integrated development andrefinement of doctrine, strategies, andprocesses for SO and MOOTW, toinclude supporting studies and analyses;

•• Reviews and evaluates policies,processes, and programs of DODcomponents to plan, resource, prepareforces, and execute SO and MOOTWand initiate and coordinate action toenhance readiness;

•• Supervises overall preparation andjustification of program recommendationsand budget proposals for SO activitiesin the Five Year Defense Plan;

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•• Advises the Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition) on acquisitionpriorities and requirements for SO- andMOOTW-related materiel andequipment, to include participation inappropriate boards and committees; and

•• Serves as principal staff assistant andadvisor to the USDP and Secretary ofDefense.

• Defense Security Assistance Agency(DSAA). DSAA directs, administers,and supervises the execution of securityassistance programs. This involvesproviding guidance to Military Services,unified commands, and in-countrysecurity assistance officers in their effortsto assist foreign governments obtain USequipment, training, and other defense-related services authorized by the FAA,as amended, and the Arms ExportControl Act.

b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffprovides overall guidance to combatantcommanders and the Chiefs of the Servicesthrough the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.The entire Joint Staff monitors aspects of PO.The Strategic Plans and Policy Directorateprovides PO guidance, and the OperationsDirectorate monitors current PO. Often, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directsthat a joint action cell be formed to organize,coordinate, and monitor the support required.This cell will develop written taskings andcoordinate these taskings with affectedcombatant commanders, Service Chiefs, andthe heads of other DOD agencies.

c. Combatant Commanders

• MCM-144-93, “Implementation of theUnified Command Plan” stipulates that:

“The commander of a unified commandthat includes a general geographic areaof responsibility is responsible forcommanding US forces conductingpeacekeeping operations within thecommander’s geographic area ofresponsibility, whether as a unilateral USaction or as part of a multinationalcoalition; and, unless otherwise directedby the NCA, supporting US forces underthe direction of a multinationalpeacekeeping organization.”

Note: The term “peacekeeping,” as usedin MCM-144-93, “Implementation of theUnified Command Plan,” is intended toinclude all PO, not just peacekeeping.

• A geographic combatant commander(CINC) exercises COCOM overassigned forces. The tasked CINC willnormally exercise OPCON over attachedforces. Combatant commanders willprovide or receive support from othercombatant commanders in accordancewith NCA orders. This support may alsoinclude assisting forces of other nationswhen such support is in accordance witha diplomatic agreement. Because of thebroad nature of PO, the entire geographiccombatant command staff may beinvolved in planning, monitoring, orcoordinating support to PO activities.

d. Executive Agent (EA). The Secretaryof Defense may appoint a Service as an EAto act on behalf of the Department of Defense.The exact nature and scope of the authoritydelegated must be stated in the documentdesignating the EA. An EA may be limitedto providing only administration and supportor coordinating common functions, or it maybe delegated authority, direction, and controlover specified resources for specifiedpurposes. The Department of the Army is

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the EA for all US personnel assigned to dutyas MILOBs. Through the USMOG-W, theDepartment of the Army providesadministrative and logistic support of USobservers, to include personnel recordsmanagement (including efficiency reports andnotification of personnel actions), finance, andensuring the well-being of deployedpersonnel.

6. Department ofTransportation

a. The Department of Transportation(DOT) has technical capabilities and expertisein public transportation that may be availableupon request to assist specific HA operations.The primary organization with which POforces may work is the USCG.

b. The USCG is an agency of the DOT andis a military Service with law enforcementauthority. In CONUS, the USCG isresponsible for assuring the safety and securityof US ports and waterways, and provides thefollowing services: enforcing vessel cargo andwaterfront facility regulations; inspectingvessels, including vessels of the ReadyReserve Force; licensing of mariners;enforcing customs laws; establishing andservicing aids to navigation; regulating andadministering bridges over navigablewaterways; port emergency response;maritime search and rescue (both within andbeyond CONUS); and operation of vesseltraffic services in selected ports andestablishing safety and security zones.Outside of CONUS, the USCG operates insupport of geographic combatantcommanders.

7. Department of Agriculture

The USDA has projects and activitiesongoing in foreign countries and can providetechnical assistance to PO forces, if requested.The USDA may provide important supportto nation assistance programs.

8. Department of Justice

Department of Justice (DOJ) agencieswith which FHA forces may come intocontact include the International CrimeInvestigative Training Assistance Program(ICITAP), DEA, and Community RelationsService (CRS).

a. The ICITAP was established within theDOJ in 1986 to enhance investigativecapabilities in democracies throughout LatinAmerica. The ICITAP is funded through theEconomic Support Fund appropriations toUSAID. The DOS provides policy guidanceand oversight, while design, development, andimplementation of projects rests with the DOJ.The ICITAP directs its assistance primarilyat police agencies, but an important focus isthe relationship between the police, judges,and prosecutors. Through training courses,conferences, and seminars, greatercoordination among the three criminal justicesectors is sought.

b. Drug Enforcement Administration.DEA programs and projects can be developedfor specific countries and regions. The DEAcan:

• Assist in providing legal, self-sustaining,income-earning alternatives tounderdeveloped, agriculturally basednations; and

• Improve international exchange ofinformation about successful drugprevention and education programs.

c. Community Relations Service. CRSis under the general authority of the attorneygeneral. CRS provides on-site resolutionassistance through a field staff of mediatorsand conciliators. CRS not only aids inresolving difficulties as they erupt but alsoseeks to assist and support communities indeveloping mechanisms to address futureproblems.

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Joint Pub 3-07.3

9. Office of InternationalAffairs

The Office of International Affairscoordinates and supports DOJ internationalefforts and supports the DOS duringinternational treaty negotiations.

10. Public Health Service

Public Health Service (PHS) promotesthe protection and advancement of anation’s physical and mental health. POforces are most likely to work with PHSwhen bringing migrants or refugees intothe United States or US territories. PHSensures that no health threat is posed bysuch immigrations.

11. Immigration andNaturalization Service

The Immigration and NaturalizationService (INS) provides information andservice to the general public while enforcingimmigration control. The INS:

a. Facilitates the entry of persons legallyadmissible as visitors or as immigrants of theUnited States;

b. Grants benefits under the Immigrationand Nationality Act, including assistance tothose seeking permanent resident status ornaturalization;

c. Prevents unlawful entry to the UnitedStates; and

d. Apprehends and removes aliens whoenter or remain illegally in the United Statesor whose stay is not in the best interests ofthis nation.

12. Non-UN Sponsored PeaceOperations

The United States may participate in POsponsored by the UN, regional organizationsor friendly countries, or as a unilateral action.Participation in PO not sponsored by the UNis more likely in PKO than in PEO. PEOwould normally only be conducted when thereis broad international consensus legitimizingsuch actions. Thus the UN would be theappropriate forum.

a. PKO depend on the consent of the partiesto a dispute, the HN, and the agreement ofother powers that perceive their interests maybe affected. Consequently, the UN is notalways an acceptable or practicable sponsorof PKO, as was the case leading to theestablishment of the MFO.

b. Some of the reasons the United Statesmay participate in a PKO outside of UNsponsorship are as follows.

• Lack of agreement in the UN SecurityCouncil that would lead at least one ofthe five permanent members to veto theestablishment of the operation. Any oneof the five permanent members mayblock approval with a veto. For example,the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treatypresumed that a UN force and UNobservers would monitor the securityarrangements. However, faced with Arabopposition and a threatened Soviet veto,the mandate for UN Emergency Force IIexpired and the force and observersbegan to withdraw. On 18 May 1981,Egypt and Israel, with the assistance ofthe United States, opened negotiationsleading to the creation of the MFO on 3August 1981.

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• The attitude of some developing nationstoward a UN PK force might favor anotherorganization to sponsor the effort. Whiledeveloping nations often find a UN PKforce a convenient means of controlling adangerous local conflict, they also havereservations. For example, some Africannations regarded the UN operation in theCongo as thinly disguised westerninterference, and are now inclined to favorthe OAU as a sponsor for PK.

• An existing treaty, agreement, orregional organization may call for USparticipation without the involvement ofthe UN. For example, when the borderdispute between Peru and Ecuadorerupted in 1995, the United Statesparticipated in the Military ObserverMission Ecuador-Peru along with theother Guarantor nations (Argentina,Brazil, Chile) of the 1947 Treaty ofInmarty.

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CUNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS

C-1

Annex A United Nations Reimbursement Procedures

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Appendix C

Joint Pub 3-07.3

1. General

The primary responsibility of the UN is themaintenance of international peace andsecurity. The UN Charter provides the TORfor the various elements of the UN in fulfillingthis responsibility. Article 29 of the UNCharter is generally agreed to be the basis ofauthority for the UN to conduct PKO. Article42 of the UN Charter provides the authorityfor UN PEO. This appendix provides ageneral description of UN organization andfunctions, and includes pertinent extracts ofthe UN Charter.

2. UN HeadquartersOrganization

a. Security Council. The Security Councilis vested with the authority from the UNCharter to investigate any situation or conflictthat threatens international peace and security.It will usually task the SYG to prepare a planto deal with the crisis and will be the approvingauthority for that plan. The Security Councilmay either decide to take action or refer thematter to the UN General Assembly forconsideration. The Council’s decisions aretheoretically binding on all member states ofthe UN.

b. Secretary General. The SYG isresponsible to the security council for theorganization, conduct, and direction of UNPKO. The office is responsible for conductingnegotiations with the HNs, belligerents, andcontributing states, preparing the operationalplan and presenting it to the Security Councilfor approval.

c. General Assembly. The GeneralAssembly may consider any matter referredto it by the Security Council or may considerany other situation or conflict it feels impairsthe general welfare or friendly relations among

nations. The recommendations of theGeneral Assembly are not binding on theSYG, the Security Council, or its ownmembers. Its powers in conflict resolutionare not well-defined.

d. Military Staff Committee (MSC). TheMSC was originally designed to advise andassist the Security Council and the SYG onmatters of military concern. It is composedof the chief of staff of the permanentrepresentatives of the Security Council or theirrepresentatives. Although envisioned as aninternational joint staff to plan, organize, andcommand UN PKO, various factors precludedits development in that direction. From timeto time, a military advisor or assistant has beenappointed to advise and assist the SYG onmilitary matters.

e. Secretariat

• The UN Secretariat is headed by theSYG and is the permanentorganization responsible for theestablishment, coordination, andadministration of PKO. Severalsecretariat departments are involved inPKO and may interface directly withthe SRSG (see Figure C-1).

• The Under SYGs (USYGs) areresponsible to the SYG for policyconcerns with respect to PKO. The twoUSYGs for Political Affairs oversee PObased on their geographic location.

• The USYG for Peacekeeping isresponsible to the SYG for the day-to-day operational matters affecting PO.Under the USYG for Peacekeeping is themilitary advisor to the SYG as well asthe Director, Field Administration andLogistics Division, who is responsible forlogistic support of PO.

UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS

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United Nations Involvement in Peace Operations

• The USYG for Administration andManagement is responsible to the SYGfor the administration and financialsupport of PKO.

• The USYG for Humanitarian Affairsmay also provide guidance to the SRSGwith respect to the humanitarian aspectsof a specific PO and interface with PVOsand NGOs.

• The Department of Political Affairs is thepolitical arm of the SYG in mattersrelating to the maintenance ofinternational peace and security and thecontrol and resolution of conflicts withinstates. As such, it advises on policy inthose areas and is responsible for politicalresearch and analysis. It also hasexecutive responsibilities in the fields ofpreventive diplomacy and peacemaking,

including negotiations and otherdiplomatic activities. All these functionsand responsibilities as they relate to fieldoperations are prepared and carried outby the department under the overalldirection of the SYG.

• The Department of PeacekeepingOperations is the operational arm of theSYG for the day-to-day management ofPKO. In this capacity, the departmentacts as the main channel of communicationbetween UN headquarters and the field.However, the Department of PoliticalAffairs (on strictly political matters),the Department of HumanitarianAffairs (on humanitarian policymatters), and the Department ofAdministration and Management arealso in regular contact with the field(see Figure C-2).

Department ofPolitical Affairs

Department ofDevelopment,Support andManagement

Department ofAdministration

and Management

SeniorPoliticalAdvisor

Office ofLegalAffairs

Department ofPublic Information

Executive Officeof the Chief of

Staff

Department ofEconomics and

Social Informationand PolicyAnalysis

FieldAdministrationand Logistics

Division1

Department ofPolicy

Coordination andSustainable

Development

Department ofPeacekeeping

Operations

Department ofHumanitarian

Affairs

SeniorPoliticalAdvisor

UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

1 Previously titled Field Operations Division

SECRETARY GENERAL

Figure C-1. United Nations Secretariat

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Appendix C

Join

t Pu

b 3

-07

.3

DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Office ofPlanning & Support

Assistant Secretary General

Office ofOperations

Assistant Secretary General

PlanningDivision

TrainingUnit

DeminingUnit

Civilian PoliceUnit

MissionPlanning

Logistics &Communication

Finance

UNPROFOR UNOSOM

ONUSAL UNAVEM

UNMIH ONUMOZ

UNOMIG MINURSO

UNOMUR

UNAMIR

UNMOGIP

UNIKOM

UNTSO

UNIFIL

UNFICYP

UNDOF

UNOMIL

PersonnelService

Office of theUnder Secretary General

Executive Office

Situation Center

Military Advisor1

Policy and Analysis Unit

1 Also acts as the Head of the Planning Division2 Previously titled Field Operations Divisions3 The missions are listed here for illustrative purposes

FieldAdministrationand Logistics

Division 2

Europe andLatin America

Division3

AfricaDivision

3

Asia andMiddle East

Division3

Figure C-2. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

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• The Department of HumanitarianAffairs is responsible for thecoordination of humanitarianoperations, particularly for making thenecessary arrangements for the timelyand effective delivery of assistance byUN relief organizations. As the focalpoint of the SYG for HA, itsresponsibilities also include earlywarning of potential conflicts andnegotiations for access to populationsin need. In most recent complexoperations, the Department hasappointed a field-based humanitariancoordinator, who works under theauthority of the SRSG and is in directcontact with the Department ofHumanitarian Affairs. In some cases,the humanitarian coordinator is withan agency or program, while in othersthe coordinator is independent.

f. Field Administration and LogisticsDivision

• Each UN PO will have a UN official onstaff. This official will command thedeployed elements of the FieldAdministration and Logistics Divisionand be responsible for all matters relatedto the operation. The official is usually acareer UN civil servant. The FieldAdministration and Logistics Division,in coordination with selected militarystaff officers, is also responsible fornegotiating the SOFA, receiving anddispatching UN personnel, andestablishing administrative and logisticSOPs (see Figure C-2).

• The Field Administrative and LogisticsDivision is responsible for the supportof UN-sponsored POs, includingcontracting. The UN procures on theworld market and uses internationaltransportation to ship directly to the forcearea. If UN-contracted transportationassets are inadequate or not available, the

UN has historically requested US liftassets. Intratheater lift forces may beplaced under the OPCON of the PO forcecommander. Intertheater lift is a majorUS contribution to UN-sponsored PO.However, US intertheater lift assetsalways remain under the COCOM of USTransportation Command.

3. Subordinate UNOrganizations

UN organizations primarily concerned withPO include the following.

a. United Nations Office of the HighCommissioner For Refugees (UNHCR).

• The UNHCR has a major role incoordinating aid to refugees, returnees,and displaced persons. Except in specialcircumstances, its material assistanceactivities are conducted through nationalor local authorities of the countryconcerned, other organizations of the UNsystem, NGOs, or private technicalagencies.

• Coordination with the UNHCR is criticalfor any humanitarian relief effort. Failureto coordinate with UNHCR before andduring the operation, or failure to meetUNHCR standards, may preclude theUNHCR from accepting transfer ofequipment, supplies, and facilities as themilitary disengages. To preclude this, aworking relationship should beestablished with UNHCR immediatelyupon notification of a mission withUNHCR. A copy of the UNHCR text thatoutlines specifications for refugee campconstruction should be available.

b. United Nations Disaster ManagementTeam (UN-DMT). The UN-DMT is theprimary agency responsible for coordinatingassistance to persons compelled to leave their

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homes as a result of disasters, natural andotherwise.

c. United Nations Department OfHumanitarian Affairs (UNDHA).

• UNDHA is the focal point for disastermanagement in the UN system. Itmobilizes and coordinates internationaldisaster relief, promotes disastermitigation (through the provision ofadvisory services and technicalassistance), and promotes awareness,information exchange, and the transferof knowledge on disaster-related matters.

• UNDHA is responsible for maintainingcontact with disaster management entitiesand emergency services worldwide andis able to mobilize specialized resources.The appointed UNDHA residentcoordinator has a crucial role in providingleadership to the UN team at countrylevel, and also coordinates locallyrepresented PVOs and NGOs as required.The resident coordinator convenes theUN-DMT at country level, seeking unityof effort among all the various PVOs,NGOs, and agencies. The following UNprograms help form the UN-DMT whenthe UN system has been mobilized toassist in an emergency.

d. United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP). UNDP promotes theincorporation of disaster mitigation indevelopment planning and funds technicalassistance for all aspects of disastermanagement. Work is long range. The UNDPsenior member may be appointed as a regionalcoordinator or may also serve as the UNDHAin-country coordinator. UNDP also providesadministrative assistance support to theresident coordinator and to the UN-DMT.

e. World Food Programme (WFP).WFP is an operational, relief-orientedorganization. It provides targeted food aid

and supports rehabilitation, reconstruction,and risk-reducing development programs.Targeted food aid is special subsistencealigned to a special segment of the population.This organization mobilizes and coordinatesthe delivery of complementary emergency andprogram food aid from bilateral and othersources.

f. United Nations Children’s Fund(UNICEF). UNICEF is a relief-orientedorganization. It attends to the well-being ofchildren and women, especially child healthand nutrition. The activities of thisorganization may include social programs,child feed (in collaboration with WFP), watersupplies, sanitation, and direct healthintervention (in coordination with the WorldHealth Organization [WHO]). UNICEFprovides related management and logisticsupport.

g. World Health Organization. WHO isprimarily involved in long-range programs.It provides advice and assistance in all aspectsof preventive and curative health care. Thisassistance includes the preparedness of healthservices for rapid response to disasters.

h. Food and Agriculture Organization(UN) (FAO). FAO is an organization alsoinvolved in long-range programs. It providestechnical advice in reducing vulnerability andhelps in the rehabilitation of agriculture,livestock, and fisheries. The organizationemphasizes local food production. It alsomonitors food production, exports andimports, and forecasts any requirements forexceptional food assistance.

4. Planning Process

While no formal planning process exists forUN PKO, the planning unit in the Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations is responsible fordeveloping plans for approved operations.Each operation is unique and individuallyauthorized, planned, and controlled. Instead

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of a universal checklist, a general patternbased on past experience is utilized for UNplanning.

a. Situational Analysis. On the outbreakof a conflict, the Security Council or GeneralAssembly may perceive this as a threat tointernational peace and security. The situationmay be debated, and if a permanent memberof the Security Council does not use its veto,a resolution may be passed.

b. Security Council Resolutions. ASecurity Council resolution will usually callfor a cease fire and may appoint a specialrepresentative, ambassador, or mediator to besent to the conflict area to report on the crisis.The resolution may also require the SYG toprepare a plan to deal with the conflict bycreating a PO. The SYG will then beresponsible for informal negotiations and thepreparation of a mandate. Mandates aretypically established for a 6-month period andmust be renewed by the Security Counciltwice per year.

c. Informal Preparations. Based on thedirection the SYG receives from the SecurityCouncil, informal negotiations willcommence. This will involve negotiationswith member states to establish the tentativecontributions (personnel, financial, logistic)that can be provided to a UN force. Therequirements, balanced with the scale ofcontribution, will determine the generalcomposition and organization of the force.The SYG will approach the disputing partiesand draft a mutually acceptable andenforceable mandate which will also beacceptable to contributing members. The finalproduct of these negotiations should be aviable mandate. From this mandate will bederived the role, mission, and tasks of theoperation.

d. Mandate. The SYG will submit a planfor the PKO and a proposed mandate forapproval by the Security Council. If the

council approves the plan and the mandate,the SYG will commence formal preparations.The mandate will provide the internationallegal authority for the operation. A secondand equally important document is the budgetplan which must be accepted to ensure thatthe operation can be funded.

e. Formal Preparations

• With the approval of the mandate and thebudget, the SYG will ensure thatnegotiations are commenced with thedisputing parties and the HN forpreparation of the SOFA. The SYG willselect the key appointments for the force.They are the force commander, a militaryofficer from a nation not involved in theconflict, and the UN political advisor(often titled the SRSG), normally a careerdiplomat. These appointments haveusually been agreed to by the belligerentsprior to the formal announcement to themedia. The appointment of HOM maybe either the force commander or theSRSG.

• The SYG will make informal requestsfor military forces and equipment to thecontributing members in the form of averbal request. The requests at this stagewill still be general in nature, allowingsome flexibility to contributing members,until the exact scale of the force andinternational composition is determined.Once the UN has an acceptable forcecomposition, it will issue formal requestsfor troops and equipment services in theform of notes, verbals, or letters ofassistance.

f. Participating Member-State Preparations

• Participating member states willnegotiate the extent of their contributionto the operation with the UN and the HNfor memoranda of understanding(MOUs) to secure those services or

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support from the HN that are notprovided by the UN. It is not unusualfor the UN to place limits on nationalcontributions due to nonmilitary factorssuch as financial limitations.

• The UN should finalize the SOFA withthe HN prior to deployment of the force.Until the SOFA is finalized, a memberof the PO force will be subject to the locallaws or granted diplomatic status.

g. Reception and Service Support

• The Field Administration andLogistics Division will usually deployan advance party to establish receptionand service support arrangements forthe operation. The UN will plan,organize, and direct the deployment ofthe force to the theater.

• National contingents will conducttraining and administrative preparationsrequired for deployment to the operation.National reconnaissance may not beallowed prior to deployment.

h. End Survey. The key action at the startof operations with the UN is the conduct ofthe “end survey.” The end survey is performedby the UN command after the arrival of anational force. The survey is the UN militarystaff identification of the equipment, supplies,and personnel that the member country hasdeployed in support of the mission. Based onthat survey, the UN command can identifymember nation capabilities and what items theUN is responsible to support or providereimbursement for costs associated withoperational use. The UN normally pays forequipment deployment and the costs tomaintain equipment for operational use. TheUN normally also pays for personnel rotationstwice annually, usually on a 6-month basis.For additional information on UNreimbursement procedures, refer to Annex A

of this appendix, “United NationsReimbursement Procedures.”

i. Terms of Reference. This documentis described in Annex C (“Terms ofReference”) to Appendix A, “Key Documentsin Peace Operations.” If a US force isdeployed without being tasked in the TOR,the UN will not provide resources orreimbursement to support that force.

j. Deployment. Deployment is usually aUN responsibility. It may be delegated tonations which possess a self-deploymentcapability. In the absence of this capability, athird nation such as the United States may,under UN arrangements, assist in deploymentof national contingents. Upon arrival in theoperational area, the national contingents areplaced under OPCON of the forcecommander.

k. Operational Control. The operationalchain of command for PKO will be from theunit commander to the force commander tothe HOM; if not the force commander, to theSYG, who will report to the Security Council.In certain cases, the US forces may be placedunder OPCON of a foreign commander, butcommand is exercised only in the US chainto the NCA.

5. UN Documents

a. United Nations Mandate. The SecurityCouncil or General Assembly resolutionauthorizing and defining a PO is referred toas “the mandate.” The mandate is theauthority under which an operation isconducted. It may be subject to periodicrenewal. Mandates are described in AnnexA (“Mandates”) to Appendix A, “KeyDocuments in Peace Operations.”

b. UN Secretary-General Directive. TheUN SYG, upon appointing the force ormission commander, will issue a formal

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written directive outlining the TOR.Subsequent direction will be issued insupplementary directives.

c. UN Regulations. The forcecommander will issue specific forceregulations once a force has been established.These regulations will cover such subjects as:

• General provisions such as regulations,definitions, instructions, amendments.

• International character such as uniform,insignia, privileges, immunities.

• Authority of the force commander suchas command authority, chain ofcommand, delegation, discipline, andemployment of military police.

• General administrative, executive, andfinancial arrangements such as authorityof the SYG and the force commander,finance and accounting, personnel, food,accommodations, amenities, transportation,supplies, equipment, communications,maintenance, medical, dental, sanitation,contracts, and public informationservices.

• Rights and duties of members of theforce, such as respect for local law,conduct, legal protection, informationhandling, honors and awards,jurisdiction, customs duties, foreignexchange regulations, identity cards,driving privileges, pay, overseas serviceallowances, service-related death, injuryor illness, dependents, leave, andpromotions.

• Observance of international conventionsapplicable to military personnel.

d. Force Commander’s Directive. Thisis also referred to as SOPs or force standingorders. Upon receipt of the UN regulations,

the force commander will prepare moredetailed regulations and operating procedureswhich will be issued to the force. All keymembers of the force must be completelyknowledgeable of them since all operationswill be conducted in accordance with them.Although each operation is unique and hasits own SOPs, the UN has standardized themain subject headings, as outlined in AnnexE (“Standing Operating Procedures”) toAppendix A, “Key Documents in PeaceOperations.” SOPs are designed and issuedfor each force.

e. Memoranda of Understanding.MOUs may be reached between the forcecommander, the UN, other PO forcecontingents and the HN. These will beconcerned primarily with administrativematters such as use of airports for rotation,national visitors, and similar matters requiringcoordination.

6. Mine Clearance

The need for mine clearance has grownsignificantly in a number of regions aroundthe world. There are an estimated 110 millionlandmines affecting at least 70 countries,killing and wounding some 20,000 peopleeach year. As a result, the UN is increasinglycalled upon to operate mine clearanceprograms in areas that are completely infestedwith landmines and UXO. Consequently,prior to any large deployment of personnel orequipment to a given area, the UN mustprepare for a safe working environment byinitiating preliminary mine clearance activitiesin localized areas. Once this has beencompleted, a broader operation can beaccommodated to conduct mine clearanceactivities on a more comprehensive scale.

a. The clearance of areas for use by asupported nation is undertaken only whenspecially mandated by the Security Council.It is standard procedure for the UN to not only

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perform mine clearance but also to assist asupported nation in the development of itsown sustainable clearance capacity.

• The UN program may include suchtopics as mine awareness, mine marking,mine survey, and mine clearance as wellas UXO disposal. Additionally, theprogram’s overall efforts may go beyondmine-specific issues to cover relatedareas, such as management and logistics,training, and support.

• The UN may vary its approach to eachsituation as there are currently nostandardized templates or universalprocedures established for mineclearance activities worldwide.

• Mine clearance in the UN is presentlydivided into two areas:

•• The Demining Unit (Department ofPeacekeeping Operations) which plansand advises on mine clearing activitiescarried out under UN auspices as well asmaintains contact with governments andorganizations that participate in orcontribute to these activities; and

•• The Mine Clearance and Policy Unit(Department of Humanitarian Affairs)which serves as the focal point forcoordinating all humanitarian mineclearance and related activities.

These two units work together to ensurea seamless approach to United NationsMine Clearance Activities.

b. The UN also maintains a demining database. Established by a General Assemblyresolution in 1994, the data base is a regularlyupdated repository designed to keep the globalpublic informed about the problem ofuncleared landmines. The data base can beaccessed on the Internet at http:// www.un.org/

Depts/Landmine/. Topics include thefollowing.

• Demining Reports.

• “Landmines” Newsletter.

• Conferences.

• Other Landmine Links.

• Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

• International Committee of the RedCross.

• Human Rights Watch Arms Project.

• Arms Trade Data Base.

• Landmine Awareness Education.

• University of Pittsburgh.

• Vietnam Veterans of AmericaFoundation.

• Norwegian People’s Aid.

• Handicap International.

• US Department of Defense HumanitarianDemining.

• US Department of State — Mine Web.

• The Canadian International DeminingCenter.

• Documents.

•• General Assembly Resolution 51/149:“Assistance in Mine Clearance.”

•• Resolution adopted by the 96th Inter-parliamentary Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union: “Worldwide Ban

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on Anti-personnel Mines and the Needfor Mine Clearance for HumanitarianPurposes.”

•• Strengthening of the Coordination ofEmergency Humanitarian Assistance ofthe United Nations: Mine Clearance andRelated Activities.

•• SG Report on Assistance in MineClearance.

•• SG Report on Moratorium on Exportof Landmines.

•• Impact of Armed Conflict onChildren: Landmines and UnexplodedOrdnance.

•• Latest News.

• International Standards forHumanitarian Mine ClearanceOperations.

7. UN Volunteers

This program is administered by the UNDP,which maintains a roster of some 5,000specialists that may be available to assistmissions in a variety of activities, includingbut not limited to the following:demilitarization and demobilization; electoralactivities and training; camp construction andmanagement; conflict resolution training;human rights; epidemiology; food aiddistribution; public information; sanitation;and crime prevention.

8. UN Charter

See Figure C-3 for extracts of the UNCharter that contains Articles pertinent to PO.

EXTRACTS FROM THE UN CHARTER

CHAPTER VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for theperformance of its functions.

Article 33

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenanceof international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry,mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies orarrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle theirdispute by such means.

Figure C-3. Extracts from the UN Charter

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Joint Pub 3-07.3

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE,BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of thepeace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendation, or decide what measures shallbe taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace andsecurity.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force areto be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the UnitedNations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption ofeconomic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means ofcommunication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would beinadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forcesas may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action mayinclude demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Membersof the United Nations.

Figure C-3. Extracts from the UN Charter (cont’d)

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX CUNITED NATIONS REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES

C-A-1

1. The United States normally providessupport to the UN on a reimbursable basis.During all UN operations, commandersshould comply with national and UNprocedures to ensure that all reimbursableexpenses are captured and charged to theUN.

2. Prior to providing support to a UNoperation, the Department of Defensenormally negotiates an agreement underprovisions of Section 607 of the FAA. Thisagreement ensures that UN reimbursementsare returned to the Department of Defensevice the US Treasury.

3. The UN automatically pays troopreimbursements ($988 per soldier per month,plus usage factor per soldier), plussupplemental pay for specialists. The UNconstrues the numbers of specialists as 25%of the logistic (support) contingents and 10%of other (infantry etc.) contingents, somonthly personnel strength reports for theUN must indicate unit type and follow UNguidance.

4. Reimbursements for all other categoriesare based upon authorization and submissionof proper documentation of expenses.

a. The general rule is that the UN mustauthorize the expenditure before it is incurred.

b. Specific procedures differ from missionto mission and will be included in the mission“Guidelines for Contributing Nations.”

5. The UN authorizes expenditures througha letter of assist (LOA) issued by UNHeadquarters to the United Statesgovernment.

a. Expenditures are generally notreimbursable unless an LOA has been issued.

b. While the LOA authorizes theexpenditure, the USG must present a bill forservices or supplies provided pursuant to theLOA before any payment is made.

6. While the UN normally provides logisticsupport to contingents in PKO, there areoccasions when contributing states mustprovide their own logistic support forreimbursement by the UN.

a. Self support must be authorized by aLOA.

b. The mission will specify procedures fordocumenting self support costs andsubmitting bills for reimbursement.

7. With the general exception of watercraftand aircraft, the UN reimburses memberstates for depreciation of equipment deployedin support of UN operations.

a. To obtain reimbursement, the deployedforce must conduct a comprehensive jointinventory with UN officials upon arrival anddeparture in the mission area. Theseinventories are known as “in surveys” and“out surveys.”

b. It is important that these inventories beconducted in accordance with missiondirectives and promptly submitted to themission headquarters and the Joint Staff toensure prompt reimbursement.

c. In missions where the United Statesprovides forces, precertification of US billsin the field by the mission CAO will greatly

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Annex A to Appendix C

Joint Pub 3-07.3

speed up the process of validating bills uponsubmission by the Defense Finance andAccounting Service (DFAS).

8. Components are responsible for capturingand reporting costs of goods and servicesprovided to the UN. This information shouldbe reported through Service channels to theDFAS for billing to the UN.

9. Within the UN mission headquarters, theCAO (or Director of Administration [DOA]

in larger missions) is responsible for alllogistics and financial issues.

a. The CAO or DOA establishes detailedprocedures for validating requirements andauthorizing reimbursements within themission.

b. Logistics and financial managers mustwork closely with the CAO or DOA to ensurethat logistics and accounting systems capturesufficient detail to support billings.

APPENDIX DCHAINS OF COMMAND

D-1

SECRETARY GENERAL (IF UN-SPONSORED)OR

DIRECTOR (IF NON-UN-SPONSORED)

MILITARYSTAFF

3

PERSONALSTAFF

4

CIVILIANSTAFF

5

OBSERVERS

NOTIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR APEACEKEEPING OPERATION

NON-US NATIONALCONTINGENTCOMMANDER

NON-US SECTORCOMMANDERS

NON-US SECTORCOMMANDERS

US SECTORCOMMANDER(S)

US UNITCOMMANDERS

NON-US UNITCOMMANDERS

NON-US UNITCOMMANDERS

1. May or may not be US command2. Will always be US command3. Normally consists of a Chief of Staff, a Deputy Chief of

Staff, and an operations staff4. Normally consists of a military assistant, a political advisor,

a legal advisor, a public affairs officer, an interpreter(s),and liaison officers from the armed forces of the partiesin the conflict

5. Provided by the UN Secretariat for UN-sponsored operations

US NATIONALCONTINGENTCOMMANDER

NON-US NATIONALCONTINGENTCOMMANDER

Peacekeeping Operational ControlCombatant Command (command authority)Coordination/Liaison (as required)

EXECUTIVE AGENT AND/ORGEOGRAPHIC

COMBATANT COMMANDER2

PEACEKEEPING FORCECOMMANDER

1

Figure D-1. Notional Chain of Command for a Peacekeeping Operation

D-2

Appendix D

Joint Pub 3-07.3

OFFICE OF THEDIRECTOR GENERAL

FORCEHEADQUARTERS

THE FORCE

MFO HEADQUARTERS ROME ITALY

COMPTROLLER

COLOMBIANBATTALION

PERSONNELAND PUBLICATIONS

TRANSPORT ANDENGINEERING UNIT

URUGUAY

GENERAL CONSUL

FIJIANBATTALION

ADMINISTRATION

FORCE SIGNALS UNITFORCE MILITARY POLICEUNIT,THE NETHERLANDS

POLITICAL ANDPRESS AFFAIRS

USBATTALION

LOGISTICS, FACILITIES,AND CONTRACTS

SUPPORT CONTRACTORHOLMES AND NARVER

SERVICES, INC.

POLICY, PLANNING,AND OPERATIONS

1ST SUPPORTBATTALION USA

CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR MULTINATIONALFORCE AND OBSERVERS

CIVILIAN OBSERVERUNITUSA

FIXED-WINGAVIATION UNIT

FRANCE

TRAINING ANDADVISORY TEAMNEW ZEALAND

Note: US forces performing peacekeeping operations under thedirection of multinational peacekeeping organizations will beassigned to a combatant commander unless otherwise directedby the National Command Authorities.

COASTAL PATROLUNITITALY

HEADQUARTERS UNITUNITED KINGDOM

CANADIAN CONTINGENT

Figure D-2. Chain of Command for Multinational Force and Observers

APPENDIX EREFERENCES

E-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-07.3 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Strategy and Policy Documents

a. UN Participation Act of 1945 as amended (PL 79-264).

b. UN Charter.

c. An Agenda For Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping, Reportof the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali.

d. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Position Paper of the Secretary-General on theOccasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations.

e. Executive Order 10206, “Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes.”

f. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (PL 87-195), Part II, Chapter 6.

g. Title 10, United States Code.

h. “National Security Strategy.”

i. “National Military Strategy.”

j. NDP-1 “National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified MilitaryInformation to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.”

k. Presidential Decision Directive 25 on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.

l. CJCSI 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces.”

m. CJCSM 3500.04A, “Universal Joint Task List”.

n. CJCS Handbook 5260, “Commander’s Handbook for Antiterrorism Awareness.”

o. UN “Manual of Policies and Procedures Concerning Reimbursement and Control ofContingent Owned Equipment of Troop-Contributing Countries Participating in Peace-Keeping Missions.”

p. Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Athens, Greece, 11 June 1993:Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.

q. Follow-On to the Athens Report.

E-2

Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.3

r. Presidential Decision Directive 56 on Managing Complex Contingency Operations.

s. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.3, “Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons.”

2. Joint Publications

a. “Peace Operations Sourcebook,” Inspector General DOD.

b. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

c. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

d. Joint Pub 2-0, “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

e. Joint Pub 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.”

f. Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forCounterintelligence Support to Operations.”

g. Joint Pub 2-02, “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.”

h. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

i. Joint Pub 3-01.5, “Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense.”

j. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.”

k. Joint Pub 3-05.3, “ Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures.”

l. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

m. Joint Pub 3-07.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense(FID).”

n. Joint Pub 3-07.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.”

o. Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I.”

p. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.”

q. Joint Pub 3-10.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.”

r. Joint Pub 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.” (In Development)

s. Joint Pub 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.”

t. Joint Pub 3-33, “Joint Force Capabilities.”

E-3

References

u. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”

v. Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

w. Joint Pub 3-56, “Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

x. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

y. Joint Pub 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”

z. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

aa. Joint Pub 4-01.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airlift Support toJoint Operations.”

bb. Joint Pub 4-01.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support toJoint Operations.”

cc. Joint Pub 4-01.3, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.”

dd. Joint Pub 4-01.5, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Water TerminalOperations.”

ee. Joint Pub 4-01.7, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Use of IntermodalContainers in Joint Operations.”

ff. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support to Joint Operations.”

gg. Joint Pub 4-02.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service LogisticsSupport in Joint Operations.”

hh. Joint Pub 4-02.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement inJoint Operations.”

ii. Joint Pub 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”

jj. Joint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.”

kk. Joint Pub 5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning.”

ll. Joint Pub 5-00.2, “Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.”

mm. “Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations.”

nn. JS Guide 5260, “Service Member’s Personal Protection Guide: A Self Help Handbookto Combating Terrorism.”

E-4

Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.3

3. Multiservice Publications

a. MCM-144-93, “Implementation of the Unified Command Plan.”

b. USSOCOM Pub 1, “Special Operations in Peace and War.”

c. USACOM Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide (MTG), Training andAssessment Outline, “Plan/Integrate Peace Operations.” 1 May 1996.

d. FM 100-23-1/FMFRP 7-16/NDC TACNOTE 3-07.6/ACCP 50-56/USAFEP 50-56/PACAFP 50-56. “MultiService Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations”

e. FM 100-20,. “Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.”

f. Lessons Learned, Elder Brave 95, USPACOM.

g. Chapter 22, Military Operations Other Than War, AJP-1, “Allied Joint OperationsDoctrine.”

h. FM 90-40, NWP 3-07.2, USCG Pub 3-07.2, “Multiservice Procedures for the TacticalEmployment of Non-Lethal Weapons.”

4. Multinational Publications

a. Chapter 35, Peacekeeping Operations, Australian Defense Force Publication 1,“Doctrine.”

b. “Austrian Experiences and Concrete Lessons Learned in Peacekeeping Operations:(PKO),” North Atlantic Cooperation Council/Partnership for Peace (NACC/PfP) PoliticalMilitary Steering Committee/Ad Hoc Group (PMSC/AHG) on Cooperation in Peacekeeping,August, 1996.

c. “Peacekeeping Lessons Learned. Belgian National Paper,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG onCooperation in Peacekeeping, August, 1996.

d. Peacekeeping Operations, IP 100-30, Brazilian Army, 1995.

e. Chapter 10, Operations Other Than War, CFP 300-1 (Draft) “Conduct of LandOperations.” Canadian Force Publication.

f. “Training for Operations,” Dispatches, Army Lessons Learned Centre. Canadian LandForces, February 1996.

g. “Mine Warfare During Peace Support Operations,” Dispatches, Army Lessons LearnedCentre. Canadian Land Forces, April 1995.

h. In The Line of Duty: Canadian Joint Forces, Somalia, (Quebec: Canada, NationalDefense, 1994).

E-5

References

i. “Czech Experience Gained From Participation in Peacekeeping,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, September, 1996.

j. “Peacekeeping Lessons Learned: Dutch National Paper,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG onCooperation in Peacekeeping, 12 Sep, 1996.

k. “Concept of Finland’s Participation in Peacekeeping Activities and Factors EffectingIt,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, 11 Sep, 1996.

l. “General Concept of Peace Operations” in Roles and Tasks of Land Forces in WEUOperations. French Army, 1996.

m. Operation Turquoise, Rwanda, June 23-August 22, 1994, French Army Briefing.“Strawman, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Enforcement, Peacemaking,Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, Joint and Combined and Interagency Operations.”Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC).

n. Draft German Army Manual, HDV 100/100, Chapters 38 and 39, Peace SupportOperations, 1996.

o. “IFOR Lessons Learned: Hungarian Presentation,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG onCooperation in Peacekeeping, 13 Sep 1996.

p. “Italian Military Interventions in Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons Learned,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, 15 Jul 1996.

q. “Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned. Logistic Support of Peacekeeping Operations,”NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, 30 Aug 1996.

r. “Nordic UN Tactical Manuals.” Volumes 1 and 2, 1992.

s. Pacific Armies Management Seminar XVII, “United Nations Peacekeeping OperationsConference Papers,” New Delhi, India, 21-30 January 1993.

t. “Romania’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operations,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG onCooperation in Peacekeeping, September 1996.

u. “Lessons Learned: Russian Paper,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation inPeacekeeping, September 1996.

v. “Lessons Learned: Russian Paper,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation inPeacekeeping, September 1996.

w. Colonel-General Edward A. Vorob’yev “On Russia’s Conceptual Approach toPeacekeeping;” General-Major Alexander F. Arinakhin, “Experience in the Use of RussianPeacekeeping Forces for Peacekeeping Operations in the CIS;” and Colonel Vladimir L.Krysensko, “Military Aspects of Peacekeeping in Areas of Armed Conflict on the Territoryof the CIS and Russia, Logistics Support of Peacekeeping Operations,” in Robert R. Love,

E-6

Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.3

Translator, Peacekeeping: Translated Texts of Three Oral Presentations Given by Membersof the Russian Federation Armed Forces, (Fort Leavenworth, KS.: Foreign Military StudiesOffice, March 1994).

x. Orientations on Peacekeeping Operations, OR 7-001. Spanish Army, 1993.

y. Basic Information: Spanish Contingent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 1993.

z. “Lessons Learned and Swedish Views on Peace Support Operations,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, 8 Aug 1996.

aa. “National Document of Ukraine on its Experience of Participation in the UN Peace-keeping,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, September 1996.

bb. Army Field Manual, “Wider Peacekeeping,” United Kingdom.

cc. 1st Battalion, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, “White Dragon, The Royal Welsh Fusiliers inBosnia,” November, 1995.

dd. “Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned. UK National Paper,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG onCooperation in Peacekeeping, 9 Sep 1996.

ee. “IFOR Civil Military Cooperation Brief,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation inPeacekeeping, 8 July 1996.

ff. “Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned: UN Paper on UN-IFOR Cooperation in the formerYugoslavia,” NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, 12 Sep 1996.

gg. Veronique Le Blanc, “Cooperation Between Peacekeeping/Military Forces andUNHCR,” Presentation NACC/PfP PMSC/AHG on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, 8 July1996.

hh. “The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping,” Second Edition.

ii. “UN Training Guidelines,” UN.

jj. “General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations,” UN.

kk. “Peacekeeper’s Handbook,” International Peace Academy.

ll. “Engineer Contingency Handbook (Former Yugoslavia).”

mm. “Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations.” MC-319,“NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics.”

nn. MCM-CIJ-001-94, “ NATO Commanders Authority Over Logistics Resources.”

E-7

References

oo. MC 327, “NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations.” (For Official UseOnly).

pp. “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace and Humanitarian Assistance Operationsin Former Republic of Yugoslavia,” (CLIC).

qq. “Civil Affairs in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort, 1990-1991: Employment, Redeployment, (CLIC).”

rr. “After Action Review: Operation Support Hope 1994,” USEUCOM.

ss. Roxanne D.V. Sismanidis, “Police Functions in Peace Operations: Report from aWorkshop Organized by the United States Institute for Peace,” (Wash. DC: United StatesInstitute for Peace, March 1997).

tt. Lutz Edzard, “United Nations Electoral Assistance: Current Issues,” (New York, NY:United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1992).

uu. John Mackinlay, Ed., “Peace Support Operations: A Manual,” (Prov. R.I.: The ThomasJ. Watson, Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1995). Note that thismanual addresses a host of posthostilities considerations.

vv. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publication 90-9, CMTC TrendsCompendium, Stability and Support Operations, Mountain Eagle Exercises I, III, IV, and V,Apr 98.

5. Service Publications

a. AFP 110-31, “International Law — The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations.”

b. AFP 51-4001, “Training and Reporting to Insure Compliance with the Law of ArmedConflict.”

c. DA Circular 11-88-2, “Policies for the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers.”

d. DA Circular 11-90-4, “The Sinai Multinational Force and Observers.”

e. DA Pamphlet 700-15, “Logistics Support of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces.”

f. DA Pamphlet 700-30, “Commander’s Handbook, Peace Operations (A LogisticsPerspective).”

g. FM 100-23, “Peace Operations.”

h. NAVMC 2890, “Small Wars Manual.”

E-8

Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.3

i. FMFRP 7-8-2, “Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.”

j. NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, “The Commander’s Handbook onthe Law of Naval Operations.”

k. The Judge Advocate General’s School, US Army, Publication JA-422, “OperationalLaw Handbook.”

l. FM 5-114, “Engineer Operations Short of War.”

m. FM 7-98, “Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.”

n. FM 8-10, “ Health Services Support in a Theater of Operations.”

o. FM 8-42, “Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations.”

p. FM 8-55, “Planning for Health Service Support.”

q. FM 20-32, “Mine/Countermine Operations.”

r. FM 21-10, “Field Hygiene and Sanitation.”

s. FM 21-10-1, “Unit Field Sanitation Team.”

t. FM 21-11, “First Aid for Soldiers.”

u. FM 27-10, “Law of Land Warfare.”

v. FM 33-1, “Psychological Operations.”

w. FM 34-130, “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.”

x. FM 41-10, “Civil Affairs Operations.”

y. FM 46-1, “Public Affairs Operations.”

z. FM 63-6, “Combat Service Support in Low Intensity Conflict.”

aa. FM 100-5, “Operations.”

bb. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-56, “Planners Guide for Military Operations Other ThanWar.”

cc. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter. “Operations Other Than War:Peace Operations.”

dd. CALL Lessons Learned Report: “Operation Restore Hope.” (For Official Use Only).

E-9

References

ee. CALL Lessons Learned Report: “Logistics in a Peace Enforcement Environment.”

ff. CALL Lessons Learned Report: “Bosnia Contingency Planning and Training.”

gg. CALL Lessons Learned Report: “Exercise Venom Strike: Combined US/CanadianPeacekeeping Training,” October 1995.

hh. CALL Initial Impressions, Haiti, Vols. I, II, III. December 1994-July 1995.

ii. CALL Initial Impressions Report, “Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.” (For Official UseOnly).

jj. CALL Lessons Learned Report: “US Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II.”(For Official Use Only).

kk. CALL Special Edition: “Handbook for the Soldier in Operations Other Than War(OOTW).”

ll. CALL Newsletter: “Peace Operations Training Vignettes with Possible Solutions.”

mm. CALL Newsletter: “Supporting the Peace: Bosnia-Herzegovina, an Area Study,Language and TTP Guide.”

nn. CALL Newsletter, “ROE Training: An Alternative Approach.”

oo. CALL Newsletter, “Drawing A Line in the Mud: Establishing A Zone of Separation.”

pp. CALL Newsletter NO 96-11, “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CivilDisturbance, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.”

qq. CALL News From the Front, Jan-Feb 96, “The Joint Military Commission,” MilitaryObserver Mission-Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP) and JTF Safe Border.

rr. CALL News From the Front, Mar-Apr 96, “Operation MOUNTAIN EAGLE Lessons-Stability Operations, Synchronization in Peace Operations, Enhancing US and RussianRelations through Combined Peacekeeping Exercises.”

ss. CALL News From the Front, May-Jun 96, “Focus Bosnia.”

tt. CALL Draft “Techniques and Procedures for Joint Military Commissions,” August1996.

uu. CALL Newsletter 98-6, “Fighting the Mine War in Bosnia.”

vv. CALL Newsletter 97-1, “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation JOINTENDEAVOR.”

E-10

Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.3

ww. CALL News from the Front, “Demining Operations Using the Minebreaker 2000System in Bosnia,” Mar-Apr 98.

xx. CALL News from the Front, “The Bosnia-Herzegovina Resettlement Challenge,” Sep-Oct 97.

yy. CALL News from the Front, “Operation BALKAN RUSH and TF 1-41’s Deploymentto Operation JOINT GUARD,” Jul-Aug 97.

zz. “Emerald Express ‘95 Conference Report.”

aaa. LTCOL Larry J. Bockman, USMC, CDR Barry L. Coombs, USN, CDR Andrew W.Forsyth, RN, “The Employment of Maritime Forces in Support of United Nations Resolutions:Research Report 6-93,” Naval War College Strategy and Campaign Department, 11 August1993.

bbb. Jeffrey I Sands, “Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the UnitedNations,” Center for Naval Analysis, July 1993.

ccc. MAJ W. Bruce Member USAF, “Wings for Peace: Airpower in PeacemakingOperations,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS.: School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS),Monograph, 17 December 1992).

ddd. LT (N) G. Shorey, “Selection and Training of Military Observers: Lessons from theNaval Experience,” Canadian Maritime Command Technical Note 1-94.

eee. J.E. Condrill, “Civilians in Support of Military Field Operation,” US Army War CollegeStudy Project, 15 April 1993.

fff. MAJ Brooks L. Bash, USAF, “The Role of United States Air Power in Peacekeeping,”School of Advanced Military Studies Thesis, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, June1994.

ggg. “Russian-US Guide for Tactics, Techniques and Procedures of Peacekeeping ForcesDuring the Conduct of Exercises.”

hhh. “Operation Support Hope Risk Management Leader’s Guide,” US Army Safety Center.

iii. Combined Arms Center Training Support Package for Operations Other Than War,Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, (Draft).

jjj. “Brigade and Battalion Operations Other Than War Training Support Package (TSP)Draft.” US Army Infantry School. Fort Benning, Georgia.

kkk. “XVIII Airborne Corps SOP in Support of the MFO.”

E-11

References

lll. US Army Infantry School White Paper, “The Application of Peace EnforcementOperations at Brigade and Battalion.”

mmm. Major D. M. Last, Canadian Armed Forces and Mr. Don Vought, DAC, “InteragencyCooperation in Peace Operations: A Conference Report,” (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, US ArmyCommand and General Staff College, 1994).

nnn. USAWC “Peacekeeping: A Selected Bibliography.”

ooo. US Army Peacekeeping Institute: “Success in Peacekeeping, United Nations Missionin Haiti: The Military Perspective.”

ppp. Training Circular 31-34, “Humanitarian Demining Operations Handbook,” DA.

qqq. Bruce B. G. Clarke, Conflict Termination: A Rational Model, (Carlisle Barracks,PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, May 1992).

rrr. James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning,”Parameters, Summer 1993, p. 41.

sss. Major Kenneth O. McCreedy, USA, “Winning the Peace: Postconflict Operations,”and “Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany,” (FortLeavenworth, KS: School of Advance Military Studies (SAMS), Monographs, 17 December1994 and 19 May 1995).

ttt. MAJ Thomas G. Pope, USA, “From Camouflage Helmets to Blue Berets - TheTransition from Peace Enforcement to Peacekeeping,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SAMSMonograph, 17 December 1993).

uuu. COL Alexander W. Waiczak, USA, “Conflict Termination - Transitioning from Warriorto Constable: A Primer,” US Army College Study Project, 15 April 1992.

vvv. Kevin C.M. Benson, Christopher B. Thrash, “Declaring Victory: Planning ExitStrategies for Peace Operations,” Parameters, Autumn 1996, p. 69.

www. Dominic J. Caraccilo, “Posthostilities Training,” Military Review, Nov-Dec 97.

xxx. Dominic J. Caraccilo, “Terminating the Ground War in the Persian Gulf: AClausewitzian Examination,” The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of Land Warfare,26 Sep 1997.

yyy. James H. Anderson, “End State Pitfalls: A Strategic Perspective,” Military Review,Sep-Oct 97.

zzz. James J. Carafano, “Swords Into Plowshares: Postconflict Arms Management,”Military Review, Nov-Dec 97.

E-12

Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.3

6. Internet Sites

a. Joint Doctrine Home page: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine

b. Defense Link Home page: http://www.defenselink.mil

Defense Link is an entry point for Internet sites for Services, SecDef, and related agencies.Includes information about combatant commands and selected peace operations.

c. International Peacekeeping News Home page: http://csf.colorado.edu/dfax/ipn/

Published every 6 weeks; summarizes by region, major peacekeeping issues as documentedin international publications; itemizes recent UNSC resolutions; reviews current ongoingUN peacekeeping missions.

d. Center for Defense Information Home page: http://www.cdi.org

Publishes a bi-weekly listing recent publications on peacekeeping and multilateral militaryoperations.

e. United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) Home page:http://www.un.org

Joint Staff (J-34) Combating Terrorism SIPRNET homepage contains links to all CINCHomepages: nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/’~dj3cleap/j34.html.Department of State Homepage: travel.state.gov/travel warnings.html

DPKO, Training Unit develops and distributes all UN approved training material. This rangesfrom VCR-based training programs to books and other publications supporting UN missiontraining programs. (Includes a booklet, Mission Readiness and Stress Management, preparedby the Office of Human Resources Management, published in 1995. This booklet containsdetailed checklists for civilian UN employees assigned to a UN PK mission, many of whichmay be of interest to military practitioners.)

f. International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers Home page:http:www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca

The Lester Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center provides instructionon an array of peacekeeping related disciplines, ranging from legal and logistical challenges,to leader preparation and lessons-learned. The Center recently assumed the role as thesecretariat for the International Association.

g. Watson Institute: The Humanitarianism and War Project Home Page:http://www.brown.edu/Department/Watson Institute/H W/H W ms.shtml

The Humanitarianism and War Project is an independent policy research initiative whichreviews the experience of the international community in responding to recent complexemergencies around the world. The Project works at the interface between humanitarian

E-13

References

action and political-military forces. Relying primarily on data gathered from interviewswith those involved in crises, it frames recommendations to improve the functioning of theworld’s humanitarian system. Since its inception in 1991, the Project has received resourcesfrom a wide range of largely practitioner organizations, including UN, governmental, andnongovernmental agencies and private foundations. In addition to country monographs andtraining materials, the Project publishes an array of books and articles.

h. United States Institute of Peace Home Page: http://www.usip.org

This site contains information by and about the United States Institute of Peace and a collectionof links to Internet resources relating to international conflict resolution, negotiation theory,and peace studies.

i. United Nations Demining Data Base: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/

j. Joint Warfighting Center Homepage: http://www.jwfc.js.mil

The JWFC homepage contains the “Peace Operations Database.” This data base containsinformation regarding peace operations doctrine and policy, humanitarian issues, researchpapers, etc. The data base is updated quarterly, and is a more robust version of the data baseoriginally published as the “JEL Peace Operations CD-ROM.”

E-14

Appendix E

Joint Pub 3-07.3

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX FADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

F-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theUnited States Atlantic Command Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division,Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor forthis publication is the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-07.3, 29 April 94, “Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations.”

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: DA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-SSP (DOCTRINE)//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

F-2

Appendix F

Joint Pub 3-07.3

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

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GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ADL armistice demarcation lineAFCAP Air Force contract augmentation programAO Administration OfficerAOL area of limitationAOS area of separationASD(ISA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)ASD(S&R) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements)ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low

Intensity Conflict)

BZ buffer zone

C2 command and controlCA civil affairsCAO chief administrative officerCINC commander in chiefCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff InstructionCMO civil-military operationsCMOC civil-military operations centerCOA course of actionCOCOM combatant command (command authority)CONCAP construction capabilities contract programCONUS continental United StatesCRS Community Relations ServiceCS combat supportCSS combat service support

DAO defense attaché officerDCM Deputy Chief of MissionDEA Drug Enforcement AdministrationDFAS Defense Finance and Accounting ServiceDMZ demilitarized zoneDOA Director of AdministrationDOD Department of DefenseDOJ Department of JusticeDOS Department of StateDOT Department of TransportationDSAA Defense Security Assistance Agency

EA executive agent

FAA Foreign Assistance ActFAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)FHA foreign humanitarian assistance

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07.3

FSO foreign service officer

GI&S geospatial information and servicesGPS global positioning system

HA humanitarian assistanceHN host nationHNS host-nation supportHOM head of missionHSS health service supportHUMINT human intelligence

ICITAP International Crime Investigative Training Assistance ProgramINS Immigration and Naturalization ServiceIO information operationsI/R internment/resettlementISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJTF joint task force

LNO liaison officerLOA letter of assistLOGCAP logistics civilian augmentation program

MFO multinational force and observersMILOB military observerMNF Multinational ForceMOE measures of effectivenessMOOTW military operations other than warMOU memorandum of understandingMP military policeMSC Military Staff CommitteeMSG Marine Security Guard

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNDP national disclosure policyNGO nongovernmental organizationNMS national military strategyNSC National Security CouncilNSC/DC Deputies Committee of the National Security CouncilNSS national security strategy

OAS Organization of American StatesOAU Organization of African UnityOFDA Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance

GL-3

Glossary

OP observation postOPCON operational controlOPLAN operation planOPORD operation order

PA public affairsPAO public affairs officerPDD Presidential Decision DirectivePE peace enforcementPEO peace enforcement operationsPHS Public Health ServicePK peacekeepingPKO peacekeeping operationsPME professional military educationPO peace operationsPOW prisoner of warPSO post security officerPSYOP psychological operationsPVO private voluntary organizationPVT positioning, velocity, and timing

R&R rest and recuperationROE rules of engagementRSO regional security officer

SAO security assistance officerSECARMY Secretary of the ArmySECSTATE Secretary of StateSF special forcesSO special operationsSOF special operations forcesSOFA status-of-forces agreementSOMA status of mission agreementSOP standing operating procedureSROE standing rules of engagementSRSG Special Representative to the Secretary-GeneralSYG Secretary General (UN)

TOR terms of reference

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military JusticeUN United NationsUNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian AffairsUN-DMT United Nations Disaster Management TeamUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti

UNPA United Nations Participation ActUNTAC United Nations Transition Authority in CambodiaUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentUSC United States CodeUSCG United States Coast GuardUSDA United States Department of AgricultureUSDP Under Secretary of Defense for PolicyUSG United States GovernmentUSIA United States Information AgencyUSIS United States Information ServiceUSMOG-W United States Military Observer Group — WashingtonUSYG Under Secretary GeneralUXO unexploded ordnance

WFP World Food ProgrammeWHO World Health Organization

GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07.3

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used toreduce the vulnerability of individuals andproperty to terrorist acts, to include limitedresponse and containment by local militaryforces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of limitation. A defined area wherespecific limitations apply to the strength andfortifications of disputing or belligerentforces. Normally, upper limits areestablished for the number and type offormations, tanks, antiaircraft weapons,artillery, and other weapons systems in thearea of limitation. Also called AOL. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

area of operations. An operational areadefined by the joint force commander forland and naval forces. Areas of operationdo not typically encompass the entireoperational area of the joint forcecommander, but should be large enough forcomponent commanders to accomplishtheir missions and protect their forces. Alsocalled AO. ( Joint Pub 1-02.)

area of separation. See buffer zone. Alsocalled AOS. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

armistice. In international law, a suspensionor temporary cessation of hostilities byagreement between belligerent powers.(Joint Pub 1-02)

armistice demarcation line. Ageographically defined line from whichdisputing or belligerent forces disengageand withdraw to their respective sidesfollowing a truce or cease fire agreement.Also called cease fire line in some UnitedNations operations. Also called ADL.(This term and its definition are approved

for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

buffer zone. A defined area controlled bya peace operations force from whichdisputing or belligerent forces have beenexcluded. A buffer zone is formed tocreate an area of separation betweendisputing or belligerent forces and reducethe risk of renewed conflict. Also calledarea of separation in some UnitedNations operations. Also called BZ.(This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

cease fire line. See armistice demarcationline. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

civil affairs. The activities of a commanderthat establish, maintain, influence, or exploitrelations between military forces and civilauthorities, both governmental andnongovernmental, and the civilian populacein a friendly, neutral, or hostile area ofoperations in order to facilitate militaryoperations and consolidate operationalobjectives. Civil affairs may includeperformance by military forces of activitiesand functions normally the responsibilityof local government. These activities mayoccur prior to, during, or subsequent to othermilitary actions. They may also occur, ifdirected, in the absence of other militaryoperations. Also called CA. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

civil-military operations center. An ad hocorganization, normally established by thegeographic combatant commander orsubordinate joint force commander, to assist

PART II — US TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-5

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07.3

in the coordination of activities of engagedmilitary forces, and other United StatesGovernment agencies, nongovernmentalorganizations, private voluntaryorganizations, and regional andinternational organizations. There is noestablished structure, and its size andcomposition are situation dependent. Alsocalled CMOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, includingantiterrorism (defensive measures taken toreduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) andcounterterrorism (offensive measures takento prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism)taken to oppose terrorism throughout theentire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gatheredand activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities,sabotage, or assassinations conducted by oron behalf of foreign governments orelements thereof, foreign organizations, orforeign persons, or international terroristactivities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures takento prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Country Team. The senior, in-country,United States coordinating and supervisingbody, headed by the Chief of the UnitedStates diplomatic mission, and composedof the senior member of each representedUnited States department or agency, asdesired by the Chief of the US diplomaticmission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving athreat to the United States, its territories,citizens, military forces, possessions, orvital interests that develops rapidly andcreates a condition of such diplomatic,economic, political, or military importancethat commitment of US military forces and

resources is contemplated to achievenational objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

demilitarized zone. A defined area in whichthe stationing, or concentrating of militaryforces, or the retention or establishment ofmilitary installations of any description, isprohibited. Also called DMZ. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

dislocated civilian. A broad term thatincludes a displaced person, an evacuee, anexpellee, or a refugee. (Joint Pub 1-02)

executive agent. A term used in Departmentof Defense and Service regulations toindicate a delegation of authority by asuperior to a subordinate to act on behalfof the superior. An agreement betweenequals does not create an executive agent.For example, a Service cannot become aDepartment of Defense Executive Agent fora particular matter with simply theagreement of the other Services; suchauthority must be delegated by theSecretary of Defense. Designation asexecutive agent, in and of itself, confers noauthority. The exact nature and scope ofthe authority delegated must be stated inthe document designating the executiveagent. An executive agent may be limitedto providing only administration andsupport or coordinating common functions,or it may be delegated authority, direction,and control over specified resources forspecified purposes. Also called EA. (Thisterm and its definition modify the existingterm and its definition and are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

force protection. Security program designedto protect Service members, civilianemployees, family members, facilities, and

GL-7

Glossary

equipment, in all locations and situations,accomplished through planned andintegrated application of combattingterrorism, physical security, operationssecurity, personal protective services,and supported by intel l igence,counterintelligence, and other securityprograms. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation bycivilian and military agencies of agovernment in any of the action programstaken by another government to free andprotect its society from subversion,lawlessness, and insurgency. Also calledFID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives theforces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, tooperate in, or to transit through its territory.Also called HN. (Joint Pub 1-02.)

humanitarian assistance. Programsconducted to relieve or reduce the resultsof natural or manmade disasters or otherendemic conditions such as human pain,disease, hunger, or privation that mightpresent a serious threat to life or that canresult in great damage to or loss of property.Humanitarian assistance provided by USforces is limited in scope and duration. Theassistance provided is designed tosupplement or complement the efforts ofthe host nation civil authorities or agenciesthat may have the primary responsibility forproviding humanitarian assistance. Alsocalled HA. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

line of demarcation. A line defining theboundary of a buffer zone or area oflimitation. A line of demarcation may alsobe used to define the forward limits ofdisputing or belligerent forces after eachphase of disengagement or withdrawal has

been completed. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

logistic assessment. An evaluation of: a. Thelogistic support required to supportparticular military operations in a theaterof operations, country, or area. b. Theactual and/or potential logistics supportavailable for the conduct of militaryoperations either within the theater, country,or area, or located elsewhere. (Joint Pub1-02)

National Command Authorities. ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates orsuccessors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub1-02)

operations to restore order. Operationsintended to halt violence and support,reinstate, or establish civil authorities. Theyare designed to return an unstable andlawless environment to the point whereindigenous police forces can effectivelyenforce the law and restore civil authority.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

peace building. Post-conflict actions,predominately diplomatic andeconomic, that strengthen and rebuildgovernmental infrastructure andinstitutions in order to avoid a relapseinto conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peace enforcement. Application ofmilitary force, or the threat of its use,normally pursuant to internationalauthorization, to compel compliance withresolutions or sanctions designed tomaintain or restore peace and order. Alsocalled PE. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

peacekeeping. Military operationsundertaken with the consent of all majorparties to a dispute, designed to monitor andfacilitate implementation of an agreement(ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement)and support diplomatic efforts to reach along-term political settlement. Also calledPK. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

peacemaking. The process of diplomacy,mediation, negotiation, or other forms ofpeaceful settlements that arranges an endto a dispute, and resolves issues that led toit. (Joint Pub 1-02)

peace operations. A broad term thatencompasses peacekeeping operations andpeace enforcement operations conducted insupport of diplomatic efforts to establishand maintain peace. Also called PO. (Thisterm and its definition modify the existingterm and its definition and are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JointPub 1-02.)

preventive deployment. The deployment ofmilitary forces to deter violence at theinterface or zone of potential conflict wheretension is rising among parties. Forces maybe employed in such a way that they areindistinguishable from a peacekeepingforce in terms of equipment, force posture,and activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

preventive diplomacy. Diplomatic actionstaken in advance of a predictable crisis toprevent or limit violence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Plannedoperations to convey selected informationand indicators to foreign audiences to

influence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreign governments, organizations,groups, and individuals. The purpose ofpsychological operations is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behaviorfavorable to the originator’s objectives.Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sabotage. An act or acts with intent to injure,interfere with, or obstruct the nationaldefense of a country by willfully injuringor destroying, or attempting to injure ordestroy, any national defense or warmaterial, premises or utilities, to includehuman and natural resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreementwhich defines the legal position of a visitingmilitary force deployed in the territory of afriendly state. Agreements delineating thestatus of visiting military forces may bebilateral or multilateral. Provisionspertaining to the status of visiting forcesmay be set forth in a separate agreement,or they may form a part of a morecomprehensive agreement. These provisionsdescribe how the authorities of a visitingforce may control members of that forceand the amenability of the force or itsmembers to the local law or to the authorityof local officials. To the extent thatagreements delineate matters affecting therelations between a military force andcivilian authorities and population, theymay be considered as civil affairs agreements.Also called SOFA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawfulviolence or threat of unlawful violence toinculcate fear; intended to coerce or tointimidate governments or societies in thepursuit of goals that are generally political,religious, or ideological. (Joint Pub 1-02)

GL-8

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07.3

UN*

Peace-building is critical in the aftermath ofconflict. Peace-building includes theidentification and support of measures andstructures which will promote peace and buildtrust and interaction among former enemies,in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Peace-enforcement may be needed when allother efforts fail. The authority forenforcement is provided by Chapter VII ofthe Charter, and includes the use of armedforce to maintain or restore internationalpeace and security in situations in whichthe Security Council has determined theexistence of a threat to the peace, breach ofthe peace or act of aggression.

Peace-keeping is a United Nations presencein the field (normally involving military andcivilian personnel), with the consent of theconflicting parties, to implement or monitorthe implementation of arrangementsrelating to the control of conflicts(cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) andtheir resolution (partial or comprehensivesettlements) or to ensure the safe deliveryof humanitarian relief.

Peace-making is diplomatic action to bringhostile parties to a negotiated agreementthrough such peaceful means as thoseforeseen under Chapter VI of the UnitedNations Charter.

Preventive Diplomacy is action to preventdisputes from developing between parties,to prevent existing disputes from escalatinginto conflict and to limit the expansion ofconflicts when they occur.

*From General Guidelines for Peace-keeping Operations, Department of Peace-keeping Operations, (N.Y.: The UnitedNations, October 1995). The document

notes that “peace-enforcement is beyond thescope of this document.”

NATO*

Conflict Prevention. Activities aimed atconflict prevention are normally conductedunder Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Theyrange from diplomatic initiatives topreventive deployments of forces intendedto prevent disputes from escalating to armedconflicts or from spreading. Conflictprevention can also include fact-findingmissions, consultations, warnings,inspections and monitoring.

Humanitarian Operations. Humanitarianoperations are conducted to alleviate humansuffering. Humanitarian operations mayprecede or accompany humanitarianactivities provided by specialized civilianorganizations.

Peace Building. Peace Building coversactions which support political, economic,social and military measures and structuresaiming to strengthen and solidify politicalsettlements in order to redress the causesof a conflict. This includes mechanisms toidentify and support structures which tendto consolidate peace, advance a sense ofconfidence and well-being and supporteconomic reconstruction.

Peace Enforcement (PE). PE operations areundertaken under Chapter VII of the UNCharter. They are coercive in nature andare conducted when the consent of allParties to a conflict has not been achievedor might be uncertain. They are designedto maintain or re-establish peace or enforcethe terms specified in the mandate.

Peacekeeping (PK). PK operations aregenerally undertaken under Chapter VI ofthe UN Charter and are conducted with the

PART III — UN AND NATO TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-9

GL-10

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-07.3

consent of all Parties to a conflict to monitorand facilitate implementation of a peaceagreement.

Peacemaking. Peacemaking covers thediplomatic activities conducted after thecommencement of a conflict aimed atestablishing a cease-fire or a rapid peacefulsettlement. They can include the provisionof good offices, mediation, conciliation andsuch actions as diplomatic pressure,isolation or sanctions.

Preventive Deployment. Preventivedeployments within the framework ofconflict prevention is the deployment ofoperational forces possessing sufficientdeterrence capabilities to prevent anoutbreak of hostilities.

*From Bi-MNC Directive for NATODoctrine for Peace Support Operations, 11December 1995. (PfP Unclassified).

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the puband begin to assess it duringuse

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each pub and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications. Thediagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-07.3 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 2-0 JOINT PUB 3-0

PERSONNEL

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS,Services, and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

JOINT PUB 1

JOINTWARFARE

JOINT PUB 0-2

UNAAF