Jose Ferrater Mora's Thanatontology

8/2/2019 Jose Ferrater Mora's Thanatontology

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This is a draft; comments welcome.

THE VERY PROBLEM OF DEATH

On Ferrater Moras Thanatontology

BRAD ELLIOTT STONELoyola Marymount University

As I have discussed previously,1 20th century Spanish philosophy can be best

characterized by an attention to what I call very problems. The best definition of a very

problem would be the problem that something is problematic at all; a problem that is often

avoided or overlooked in favor of an easier problem, i.e., a problem that seems to have obvious

answers. Contemporary Spanish thinkers heavily focused on these very problems, primarily

due to the historical circumstances in which they found themselves: five radical changes of

government, exile, war, and the lack of intellectual freedom. The result was the birth of the very

problem, born in 1898 to be exact, of Spain. The very problem of Spain gave birth to many other

very problems.

In my previous exploration, I addressed the very problem of God. God names a very

problem, often overlooked in favor of an easier problem, viz. the problem of Gods

existence. In traditional philosophy of religion, there are three main solutions: theism,

atheism, and agnosticism. The problem, however, is that none of these positions eliminates the

very problem of God. Theists believe that God exists, and that there are rational proofs for such

existence; yet the God they prove fails to be the God that is worshipped, prayed to, etc. Atheists

believe that God does not exist, and that there are rational proofs against such existence; yet all

they succeed in proving is that God is something different than what philosophers claimthe

very problem still goes unresolved. Agnostics are not convinced by the theists proofs but also

1 Cf. Brad Elliott STONE, The Very Problem of the Problem of God in Zubiri and Unamuno, The Xavier

Zubiri Review 6 (2004): 73-88.


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do not want to claim that God does not exist. They are also trapped in the wrong problem, for

they think that they are undecided about Gods existence, when they could be seeking an

alternative to the false dichotomy of theism and atheism all together. The very problem of God

has nothing to do with Gods existence; it has to do with why it is that human beings are drawn

to talk and think about a higher power than themselves.

I will say a little more about what I mean by the term very problem. In Spanish, there

would be two ways of translating the very problem of death. One way, borrowing from the

British use of the word very, would be to say el problema verdadero de la muerte, the true

problem of death. This would differentiate the very problem of death from several

pseudoproblems of death. Just as the question of Gods existence, traditionally conceived, is a

deficient form of the very problem of God, there are several philosophical themes that seem to be

dealing with death, but not in the way that truly captures our concerns about death. I will argue

in this essay that one of the pseudoproblems of death is the question concerning immortality.

The second way would be to say el problema msmo de la muerte, the problem of death

itself. What the Spanish philosophers seek to explore is why it is that death is seen as a

problem, and what that problematization says about the essence of human beings. So, like with

the very problem of God, the very problem is actually not about death at all, but about being

human. Fleeing from this dimension in a bout of inauthenticity, we seek to create problems

about death (and God) that are impersonal. Everyproblema msmo, however, can and should be

subsumed under our ultimate problem: the very problem of being human. If being human were

not a very problem, it would be hard to see other things as problematic.

The very problem of death, which I call thanatontology (it could be shorted to

thanontology if one does not confuse it with thanatology, the metaphysics of death that often


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eludes the very problem of death; I use the longer form so that we will let ourselves get tongue-

tied by the very problem), is that we are defined by deathit is part of our essence as human

beings. What does it mean to be mortal? Thanatontology is an understanding of be-ing and of

beings in terms of mortality. Since human beings have ontological and ontical priority,2

and they

are mortal, all other things are authentically understood in light of human mortality, even be-ing

itself.3

One must not think of thanatontology as a critique ofvitalism. Vitalism is a major theme

in 20th century Spanish thought, and is understood in thanatontological terms. The real

opponents of thanatontology are what I call infinitism and eternalism. Infinitism holds that there

is something infinite about all beings, some beings, or even be-ing itself. A good example of

infinitism is Spinozas pantheistic monism. Eternalism holds that there is something eternal

about all beings, some beings, or even be-ing itself. A good example of eternalism is Platos

theory of the forms. Thanatontology refutes both of these claims, holding that all beings, and

even be-ing itself, are finite and temporal in naturein short, mortal.

This essay focuses on the thanatontology of Jos Mara Ferrater Mora. Ferrater Mora

was born in Barcelona, Spain, in 1912.4 He received his licenciado (it is like our M.A.) in

philosophy from the University of Barcelona in 1936, and immediately enlisted into the Loyalist

Army, fighting in the Spanish Civil War. Once Francos forces were victorious in 1939, Ferrater

Mora left Spain. He taught in several Latin American countries until he came to the United

States in 1947. He became an American citizen in 1960. He taught philosophy and Spanish at

2 Cf. Martin HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, 5th ed. (Tbingen: Niemeyer, 1953), trans. Joan Stambaugh as

Being and Time (Albany: SUNY, 1994): 3-4. Future references to this text will be made as BT followed by the

standard German page number.3

Hence why one can talk about be-ings history (Seynsgeschichte). Cf. HEIDEGGER,Die Geschichte des

Seyns, Gesamtausgabe, Band 69 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998).4 A more complete biography, bibliography, etc. can be found at http://www.ferratermora.com, a website of

the Josep Ferrater Mora Foundation, which is run by Ferrater Moras widow, Priscilla Cohn, Professor Emeritus at

Penn State University (last consulted December 1, 2006).


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Bryn Mawr College from 1949 to 1980. He spent his retirement years publishing and speaking

at universities across Latin America and in Spain, receiving several honorary doctorates. He

died in Barcelona in 1991 while visiting his birthplace to release his last book. He authored

several works, including the impressiveDiccionario de filosofa, for which he wrote every entry.

This essay focuses on Ferrater Moras 1965 text Being and Death: An Outline of

Integrationist Philosophy.5

In this book, Ferrater Mora offers an ontology grounded on the

mortality of beings. Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the work is a conceptual expansion and

critique of Martin Heideggers fundamental ontology found inBeing and Time.6 I begin with a

quick summary of Heideggers account of Da-seins inauthentic response to being-toward-death,

which avoids understanding oneself as mortal. Ferrater Mora goes beyond Da-seins being-

toward-death by offering a more robust thanatontology, the analogia mortis, which accounts for

Da-sein as well as innerworldly things. Sections three through five deal with Ferrater Moras

account of inorganic beings, organic beings, and human beings. In the sixth section, I address

the question of human immortality as presented by Ferrater Mora, focusing on how the very

problem of death plays out throughout the other very problems of philosophy.

I

Heidegger on Death and De-mise

Heidegger argues in the first chapter of Division II ofBeing and Time that the ordinary

understanding of death

is a constant flight from death. Being toward the end has the mode ofevading

that endreinterpreting it, understanding it inauthentically, and veiling it.Factically ones own Da-sein is always already dying, that is, it is in a being-

5 Jos Mara FERRATER MORA, Being and Death: An Outline of Integrationist Philosophy (Berkeley:

California, 1965). References to this text will be made as BD followed by the page number. This text is an English

version of his El Ser y la muerte (Madrid: Aguilar, 1962) with many revisions and new sections. Ferrater Mora

states in the introduction that one must not think of the 1965 work as a translation of the 1962 book.6 The impact of Heidegger on 20th century Spanish thought merits more study of the Spanish contemporary

philosophers. Spanish-language Heidegger scholarship, shunned unilaterally from the Franco-Germanic continental

tradition, has developed in Spain and Latin America in philosophically interesting ways.


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toward-its-end. And it conceals this fact from itself by reinterpreting death as acase of death occurring every day with others, a case which always assures us still

more clearly that one oneself is still alive.7

The ordinary understanding of death fails to see that Da-sein is always, at every moment, dying.

Death is therefore not the same as the end of ones life (which Heidegger calls demise).

Entangled Da-sein always confuses the two, assuring itself that as long as it is not in the casket

or the urn, that it is free from death, that it is still alive.

In order to correctly understand death, one must differentiate it from demise. Demise is

literally that: de-mise, the un-put of Da-sein (nicht zu mehr Da-sein), the negation of thrownness

(how Da-sein is put or always already finds itself being-in-the-world). At the moment of our

demise, Da-sein becomes un-put; it shatters and is no more. This shattering can happen at any

time; it is inauthentic to assume that older people are more likely to meet their demise than

babies are. Demise is an immediate possibility of every Da-sein. It is a Faktum of Da-sein that

it will in the future no longer be. Any time one has before ones demise is simply time that

remains. However, one must not think of this remaining time as sands in an hourglass.

Demise does not have to wait for the sands to come down; demise can break the hourglass itself,

spilling sand everywhere. Demise is never to be understood as a kind of running out or

completeness, a ripening or a fading. Demise is always sudden, even if one is very aware

that ones demise might be very close to occuring. The time between being theDa and no longer

being thatDa is anAugenblickit is not really even a time at all.

Dying is the process of thrown projection. Da-seins greatest death happened at birth.

Upon conception, Da-seins possibilities are already set; none of which were Da-seins choice.

Da-sein is thrown into existence with a finite set of possibilities andhas only a time that remains

to actualize a smaller subset of those possibilities. To do this, Da-sein projects, i.e., makes plans.

7 BT 254.


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At every moment, Da-sein must decide which possibilities to explore, expand, and actualize.

Da-sein will never actualize all of its possibilities; its demise always interrupts its plans. Also,

choosing certain possibilities to realize causes other possibilities to no longer be possible.

Therefore, with every decision that Da-sein makes, Da-sein dies. Just as birth was a big death,

every decision is a kind of mini-death, the death of a possible Da-sein. For example, in pursuing

my Ph.D. in philosophy, I killed the Brad Stone that would have been an interpreter by the age of

thirty. Authentic being-toward-death means understanding that every decision matters; that one

must become who one is by using what possibilities are available in the limited amount of time

one has, a time that can end at any moment.

Inauthentic Da-sein does not understand its being-toward-death that way. In

inauthenticity one seeks to avoid dying, to live as if nothing matters, as if there will always be

tomorrow to begin living ones life. Inauthentic Da-sein decides to not decide, therefore

actualizing the possibility of Da-sein of doing nothing. It is often these people, Seneca reminds

us, that upon approaching their demise, always wish for more time, as if more time would make

a difference.8 This is inauthentic, for if they had more time they would waste it just as they did

the life they were originally allotted.

For Heidegger, it is equally inauthentic to presuppose that ones Da-sein consists of a

non-mortal part such that Da-sein actually avoids being-toward-death. Death is Da-seins

ownmost possiblility of being-a-whole; any other account of what it means to be a human being

does not phenomenologically square with our experiences of our own life. In fact, it is the

inauthentic attitude about death that causes Da-sein to think that time is in-finite, therefore

8 Cf. SENECA, On the Shortness of Life, The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca, trans. Moses Hadas (New

York: Norton, 1958), pp.47-73.


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holding the view that time is eternal.9 Infinitism and eternalism are the results of Da-seins

inauthentic understanding of its own mortality.

II

The Metaphysics of Mortals

Ferrater Mora was inspired by Heideggers understanding of death, although he did not

agree that only Da-sein dies. Expanding on Heideggers model, Ferrater Mora argues that

everything can be understood in terms of mortality. The analogia mortis that drives Ferrater

Moras thanatontology is summarized inBeing and Death as follows:

1. To be (to be real) is to be mortal.2.

There are various degrees of mortality, ranging from minimum mortalityto maximum mortality.

3. Minimum mortality characterizes the type of reality called inorganicnature.

4. Maximum mortality characterizes the type of reality called humanbeings.

5. Each type of being included in the notion of reality can be(ontologically) located within a continuum circumscribed by twocontrasting (ontological) tendencies: one that runs from the least mortal

to the most mortal and the other one that runs in the opposite direction.10

The first proposition is the explicit statement that for Ferrater Mora, nothing will count as a

being that cannot cease to be. There are three kinds of beings (mortal realities): inorganic

beings, biological organisms (organic beings), and human beings. All three of these kinds of

beings are to be understood in terms of mortality.

The second proposition establishes the continuum. For Ferrater Mora, to die is an

equivocal expression, i.e., it is true of different things but in different ways. Beings are always

less mortal, as mortal, or more mortal than other beings. Theoretically, there is therefore a

least mortal and a most mortal being, with all other beings fitting somewhere in the range

between those two.

9 Cf. BT 329-330.10 BD 64-65.


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Proposition three states that inorganic beings are minimally mortal. Regardless of how

mortal an inorganic being is, it will always be less mortal than an organic or human being.

Corresponding to the third proposition is proposition four: human beings are maximally

mortal. Nothing is more mortal than human beings (be-ing itself would be, Heideggerian

speaking, as mortal as human beings).

So, as proposition five states, there are two tendencies that account for the mortality of

a given being. One tendency is the movement from least mortal to most mortal. But this

would not be sufficient for the ontology that Ferrater Mora seeks to present. As he puts it,

Those metaphysical systems which introduced the notions of process and changeclearly recognized that there is something in reality which is explicable primarily

in terms of process, but they paid little or no attention to the dual direction of this

process. For this reason, reality was often measured (ontologically) on the basisof a single direction, particularly that which leads toward Being, perfection,

plenitude, and so forth. The further an entity was from one of the poles of the

ontological line, the less real it was supposed to be This was achieved

primarily by identifying the other possible pole of the line as a signpost ofnonexistence [our ontology] employs two opposing yet complementary points

of view in order to speak about any reality.11

Every being, therefore, will be a mixture of the least mortal and the most mortal. Inorganic

beings, for example, might be least mortal, but they are not less real because of it. There is

still something very mortal in inorganic life. Likewise, human beings are not more real

because they are more mortal because there is something in human beings that resists, albeit in

a very weak way, that mortality.

Ferrater Mora calls this non-perfectionist view integrationism. As he describes it,

integrationism holds that [w]hat is real is only what exists, lives, and moves between

polarities, without ever being transformed into any of them, that is, without ever being petrified,

11 BD 72-73.


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so to speak, into absolutes.12

The two poles in Being and Death are total mortality and

total immortality. No being actually finds itself at either of these poles. Every entity has an

ontological situation between these two poles. Human beings, for example, are

ontologically situated closer to the total mortality pole than atoms. Therefore, death makes up

a larger part of the essence of a human being than it does of an atom. However, atoms are not

immortal, so the total mortality pole still exerts some influence, although that influence is

weaker in an atom than it is in a human being. Human beings likewise have inklings of

immortality, because the total immortality pole influences them, although in a very weak way.

The rest of the book is Ferrater Moras analysis of the ontological situation of the three

categories of beings. For each category, there is a description of what it means to be that kind of

being (often refuting other descriptions of what it means to be those things, while nonetheless

integrating them into his view), an explanation of how it has mortal tendencies, and an

explanation of how it has immortal tendencies. Following Ferrater Moras layout, we will

begin with inorganic beings, continue with organic beings, and end with human beings.

III

Inorganic Beings

According to Ferrater Mora, there have been three main tendencies in philosophy and

science when it comes to describing inorganic beings: hylomorphism, substantialism, and

processualism. All three of these tendencies have something right about them, yet none of them

fully capture what inorganic beings are from a thanatontological point of view. Hylomorphism

is rejected by Ferrater Mora because of its failure to harmonize with the present state of

physical theory.13

Substantialism say[s] both too much and too little about inorganic reality

12 BD 7.13 BD 36.


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(e.g., is a rock a substance? an atomic particle?).14

Processualism, although closer to what

scientists are currently doing than the previous two tendencies, cannot offer a process which

consists solely of not being what it is that would account for the mortality of an inorganic

being.15

Ferrater Moras suggestion is to explain inorganic beings in terms of structures.

Structures are the ways in which elements are interrelated. It would be tempting to define

inorganic beings as structured elements, which would borrow from hylomorphism. It would

also be tempting to think of elements as properties, which would turn structures into

substances. Structure could also be understood as the process of organizing given elements.

Ferrater Mora resists any of these temptations. The reason he resists these views is that although

there is a logical priority of elements over structures, elements per se do not really exist qua

elements: in inorganic nature only structures exist, and thus what we call an element proves in

the last analysis to be only a structure viewed (temporarily or for some well-defined purposes)

as an element.16 Every structure is an organization of elements, but there is no such thing as

an unstructured element: notcontrary to hylomorphistsbecause it would require an

abstraction, but because every element is actually a structure. For this reason, not only are there

actually no such things as elementsper se, there cannot be singles (a structure with only one

element) either.

Inorganic beings are mortal insofar as structures can be changed, altered, etc. Insofar as

inorganic beings are always interacting with other things (at least at the level of physical

chemistry), they are changing, and are therefore dying. There is also, however, a death, a

14BD 37.

15 BD 39.16 BD 45. The example Ferrater Mora gives earlier is the atom, which for centuries was considered to be an

element, although we now understand atoms as structures made up of elements that are also actually

sturctures, ad infinitum. Cf. BD 42.


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moment in which that inorganic being ceases to be that being. Ferrater Mora writes that [s]ince

inorganic nature continuously undergoes changes it may be said that it ceases continuously, but

never completely. Death in inorganic nature could be defined as permanent structural

damage.17

For example, a book qua book dies when its cover, spine, and pages are un-

structured into a mess of cardstock, glue, and paper (all of which are still structures). A falling

vase dies upon shattering into pieces when it hits the floor. Although each piece of glass is

still a structure, the vase qua vase is no more. We see that there is analogia mortis even

among inorganic beings: books and vases are more mortal than paper, glue, cardstock, glass,

etc. Quarks, superstrings, etc. are less mortal than paper and glue, and so forth.

An interesting fact emerges, however. Since every structure, upon its death, yields

more structures,

[w]hat we call cessation of an inorganic entity is, at bottom, not a real

cessation but a change, a structural change. In other words, O ceases to existmeans O as a structure ceases to exist, but there is something in O that endures

When [O] eventually ceases to exist, there will still be something that for thetime being at least is held to be invariable. This process may continue adinfinitum. There will always be something remaining that will never cease.18

This never ceasing is not the same as immortal, but it is definitely least mortal. Since

simples do not exist, every structure can be broken into its elements ad infinitum. This is the

closest anything (inorganic, organic, or human) gets to immortality.

Finally, we need to describe the ontological situation of inorganic beings as such.

Inorganic beings are the least mortal beings in the continuum, and that is why their death

seems very external to it. The more mortal something is, the more interior its death is. In

theory, an inorganic being can only cease to be when radically affected by something else. I

must drop the vase for it to break (or the wind can blow it over perhaps). If there was a way to

17Ibid.18Ibid.


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limit the potentiality of breaking, the vase could exist forever. Since inorganic beings death is

external to them, there could be a state of affairs such that a given structure would never cease to

be. Nonetheless, it is still mortal; it has the potential of cessation. So, if we are going to say that

inorganic beings are ultimately eternal using the law of conservation of energy and mass

(which would therefore make every being eternal), we would have to append yet still

susceptible to coming to an end.

IV

Organic Beings

There are four main tendencies in philosophy and science when it comes to describing

organic beings: radical vitalism, strict vitalism, organicism, and mechanism. Like with his

treatment of inorganic beings, Ferrater Mora will offer a refutation of each, followed by his own

proposal. Radical vitalism is outright rejected; if inorganic beings are themselves organic (as the

radical vitalist claims), it would make no sense to say that organic beings are more mortal than

inorganic beings. Strict vitalism, also called neovitalism, although it acknowledges that there is

a fundamental difference between organic beings and inorganic beings such that organic beings

cannot be totally reduced to inorganic beings, also fails, for neovitalism has become a doctrine

that has found little support in the developments of contemporary biology.19

Organicism claims

that although organic beings can be described in terms of inorganic beings, one cannot start from

inorganic beings and get organic ones; although this ensures that organic beings are understood

as something different from inorganic beings (even if only on a conceptual level), it lacks the

explanatory power held by more reductivist accounts of organic reality. Mechanism, like strict

vitalism, suffers from the lack of difference between organic and inorganic beings since it holds

19 BD 102.


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that organic beings should simply be understood as inorganic beings; to hold this view would

result in there being no thanatontological difference between the two.

Although it is true that organic beings are made up of inorganic materials, and is

therefore to be understood in one sense as a kind of structure of elements, it would be quite

problematic to say that understanding fully captures what it means to be organic. Mora focuses

on five characteristics of organic beings that are not present in inorganic ones: (1) indecisiveness,

(2) being for itself, (3) spontaneity, (4) specificity, and (5) individuality. Indecisiveness points

to organic beings blending of both the inorganic and the psychical. Living things are made up

of inorganic matter, but they are not reducible to that matter; they also have psych, but they are

not reducible to that. Every organic being, just as it can be situated as more mortal or less

mortal in comparison to other organic beings (they are collectively more mortal than any

inorganic being), is more material or more psychical. Ferrater Mora calls this oscillation.

By being for itself Ferrater Mora means that organic beings tend to look out for their

own existence and survival, or what he calls a utilitarian orientation: the activities of

organisms are directed toward a kind of self-satisfaction: satisfaction of their inclinations,

appetites, [and] instincts.20 Organic beings are also spontaneous insofar as they adapt to new

situations. Evolutionary biology is the paradigm example of observing organic spontaneity; it

would seem strange to think that a vase adapts to the room in which it is placed. This connects

to the fourth characteristic, specificity, insofar as organic beings will adapt in order to save

whatever is specific to that being. As Ferrater Mora writes, [i]t is as if a living being had only

the following purpose: to develop a structure, its own structure, and maintain itself in this

structure by reproducing it.21

20 BD 116.21 BD 118.


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The fifth characteristic, individuality, is to be differentiated from particularity.

Individuality is not that something or someone is one thing instead of another thing (that would

be particularity; rather, individuality is the way in which an organic being plays out its

specificity. Not every organic being plays out its specificity in the same way; therefore it can be

said that some organic beings may be more individual, and, therefore more strongly

individuated, than others.22

Ferrater Mora thinks that individuality is a kind of interior

dimension of organic beings, although it cannot be absolute (rather, more mortal organic

beings are more interior, hence more individual).

It is the interior individuality that factors into the death of organic beings. The major

difference between organic death and inorganic death is that death seems to be internal and

essential to organic beings compared to the exterior, accidental nature of inorganic death. The

vase, if it is never disturbed, will never die. It is hard to say the same about fish. Some

organic beings, like paramecia, live quite indefinitely, but the principle of their death are not

accidental. Trees can be very old, but when they do die, they die from the inside. In fact,

Ferrater Mora says that death is an essential ingredient of organic life, to the point that organic

life is not even conceivable without death if organic beings cannot live indefinitely, then it is

because death is a necessity for them.23 This differentiates organic beings from inorganic ones:

although one can slow down the dying process by keeping the structured elements free from

permanent structural damage, the organic being still dies down the road; a perfectly preserved

dead body, for example, is not alive qua organic being, even if all of the parts are intact.

Organic beings have two possibilities of death. As organic being, the cessation of vital

functions constitutes death. This death can come about, even if vital functions are working fine,

22 BD 119.23 BD 122.


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by means of inorganic death, permanent structural change. Cutting a chickens head off

creates a permanent structural change which leads to cessation of vital functions. This captures

the dual, oscillating nature of organic beings.

As in his discussion of inorganic beings, Ferrater Mora discusses theories concerning the

potential for organic immortality. Like with the conservation of energy and mass, which gives a

kind of immortality to organic beings, unicellular organisms seem to be immortal when kept

free from external causes of death. However, Ferrater Mora denies such immortality in any

absolute sense, for it is only a makeshift immortality; what makes death essential for organic

beings is not that they will some day die (although that is mostly true) but rather that they can

die. To be mortal, Ferrater Mora argues, is not that something dies, but that it is capable of

dying. The more complex the organic being, the more mortal it is, due to the potential death of

the central system that coordinates all of the other organ groups. This is due to the fact that, as

Ferrater Mora points out,

[a] higher biological organism becomes increasing complex the more its

component parts (the tissues) are differentiated and, at the same time, the more

effectively they are subordinated to a central system to say that aging anddeath in an organism is due to the latters complexity is equivalent to saying that

such an organism can be greatly affected through the growing centralization of its

functions. In this case, aging is not a process that extends uniformly throughoutthe entire organism Similarly, death does not equally or simultaneously affect

all the parts of an organism.24

V

Human Beings

In patented style, Ferrater Mora starts his analysis of human beings by addressing the

traditional positions on the issue. There are three main tendencies: spiritualism, dualism, and

epiphenomenalism. The spiritualist believes that what makes a human being a human being is

that human beings have souls, souls that upon the death of the body will carry on the essence of a

24 BD 136-137.


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human being. Ferrater Mora believes that this view is problematic, because it fails to account for

the significance of the body to human beings. Dualists grant the significance of the body, yet

also see them as two different substances, such that, like the spiritualist, there will be a

separation of the substances at death. This leads to the many problems surrounding mind-body

interaction, problems that only arise due to the assumption that the body and the mind are

different substances, therefore lacking a common communicative possibility. Epiphenomenalists

reduce all human activity to inorganic and organic activity, seeing the human mind as

epiphenomena of the physical body. This view, however, would eliminate the claim that human

beings are more mortal than other beings because they would then have the same ontological

amount of mortality.

Concerning the interaction of mind and body, Ferrater Mora leans closer to Aristotle and

Augustine, who never understood the soul and the body as distinct elements of a human being

(as if human beings were merely structures of elements). Aristotle holds that the soul is the

form of the organic body having the power of life, and Augustine says that human beings can be

defined as the way in which the body attaches to the soul.25 The advantage of these definitions

is that they both understand that human beings cannot be one without the other; the disadvantage

is that the tradition reads these quotations in a spiritualist way, so their impact is not as clear as

hoped.

Jettisoning the question of mind/body interaction (which is not a very problem at all, but

rather a distraction away from more pressing questions), Ferrater Mora states the following:

man does not have a body, but is his bodyhis own body Man is a way of being a body

what I contend is that nothing can be detected in man that absolutely transcends his body; and

25 Cf. BD 146. Ferrater Mora is citing ARISTOTLE,De Anima II.1, 412a27ff and AUGUSTINE,De

Civitate Dei XXI, 10.


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that man is not reducible to a material substance Man can be defined tentatively as his

living.26 The way humans live their lives reveals the meaning of being human. Humans are

neither embodied souls nor animated bodies; they are the lives they live, their hopes and

dreams, their heritage and their destiny.

Needless to say this differentiates human beings from other organic beings. The

distinction is between zoand bios, between mere animation (life in the biological sense, zo)

and ones distinctive path of living (life in the biographical sense, bios). Animals havezobut

not bios. As Ferrater Mora puts it, [m]aking ones own life is then something different from,

although somehow correlated to, the biological processes of growing and developing.

27

Furthermore, human beings are not things in any normal sense of the term. Ferrater

Mora believes that both inorganic and organic beings are what they are, whereas human beings

are incomplete and are always working toward themselves: [h]uman life can be defined as a

kind of unceasing march toward oneself, which can often become a march against oneself.

Paradoxically, not being oneself is as good an attribute of human life as being oneself. 28 One of

the ways humans can live their lives is by not living them, by simply bumming around. This is a

making of ones own life nonetheless.

This understanding of what it means to be a human being, that humans are ways to be

bodies, must be thanatontologically grounded. Humans are maximally mortal; their deaths are

more interior than either inorganic or organic beings. It is not that humans die more from the

inside than animals do, but rather that the very heart of human bios is death, that without death

there could possibly bezo, but it would be impossible to have a bios. As Ferrater Mora writes,

human life calls for and, as it were, necessarily implies death, which is nearly the same as

26 BD 147, emphasis his.27 BD 159.28 BD 165.


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saying that human life would become meaningless without death, and indeed without his own

death.29 This makes death something different than just the cessation of the biological

organism. The death must give meaning to life. It must also capture the ownness of human life

such that everyones death is her own. The paradox, of course, is that death, devoid of life, is

actually meaningless, i.e. dead.

Human death can be thought about on three levels. Humans die qua human when they

are no longer making their lives, when there are no possibilities left to explore. When this

happens, Ferrater Mora states, man ceases to be a man; he is then only a member of a

biological species The man contemplating suicide, who sees his future as completely devoid

of any and all possibilities and no longer finds any meaning in his life does not really need

to carry out the final and supreme act: he is already dead.30 For those who are living their lives,

human death happens along with the death of their organic being: vital functions shut down,

catabolic processes completely overtake metabolic ones, etc. If that is not happeningnot to

sound too grossone can die by means of inorganic death: severe dismemberment, being

crushed, permanent structural change.

VI

Human Immortality

What about immortality? As most mortal, the possibilities for immortality are quite

slim. It would be very difficult to think of ones bios surviving ones death in any real way.

Ones bios might be written down, or a documentary might be made about it, but that would not

be the person continuing to make her life. As an organic being, humans have a kind of

immortality insofar as certain cells survive the cessation of the organism; for example, hair and

nails continue to grow on corpses. As made up of inorganic structures, humans have a kind of

29 BD 171.30 BD 201.


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immortality insofar as matter is neither created nor destroyed. The problem with these kinds

of immortality is that what humans want most of all is not the persistence of their organisms or

their material constitution but their lives. Simply having an organism, but nothing to do, would

not make a good immortality. Simply not having ones material constitution permanently

changed would not make a good immortality. Ironically, since all matter can undergo a

permanent structural change, human immortality is hindered if ones material constitution

changes in fundamental ways (for example, being immortal would not be an option for a

decapitated body). Similarly, since organic bodies can perish, human immortality is hindered if

ones organic system is dead (for example, being immortal would not be an option for a dead

body). Is there a possibility for human beings to be by essence immortal?

Scientifically speaking, no. Philosophically speaking, no. If human beings are immortal,

it would be contrary to our essence as human beings. Being mortal means that death is part of

who we are; this fact is unavoidable. However, human beings feel very confident about the

chance of overcoming death. Even if this confidence is misguided, illogical, or flat-out self-

delusional, there is something about this confidence that is important to what it means to be a

human being. This is why death is a very problem: death is an essential part of human existence,

yet humans do not want to die, yet they still want to remain humans. The very problem of death

has to do with why mortals, wishing to be themselves, wish not to be themselvesthe very

problem of being human. In the final chapter, Ferrater Mora traces the origins of the theories of

immortality that have occurred in human history, from the primitive cults of the dead to the

philosophical concept of the soul.

The very problem of the soul is the direct result of the very problem of death. Why do

we insist on arguing that we have souls? Every argument in favor of souls presupposes that we


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have something like souls, as if soul were simply a tag to put onto something already existent.

This is akin to the and this is what we call God arguments Aquinas uses to prove Gods

existence via The Five Ways. As Ferrater Mora writes:

The rational proofs are almost always based on certain previous conceptionsconcerning the nature of the soul. Let us consider a typical rational proof: Platos

third proof for the immortality of the soul in Phaedo. According to Plato, realities

can be either simple (indivisible) or composite (divisible into their constituent,

simple elements). Simple realities are imperishable The soul is simple, henceimperishable, that is, immortal.

Platos proof is irrefutable only if we accept the definition of the soul as a

simple reality. If the soul is simple, and if simple means both indivisibleand immortal, then there is no doubt that the soul is immortal. But the proof is

deceptive insofar as it says very little, if anything at all, about the soul We

have demonstrated that the soul is immortal, but we wonder whether we haveeven talked about a soul; we might just as well have talked about a geometrical

point.31

The very problem of the soul is a much scarier question than whether or not our souls are simple

or composite. The very problem of the soul is this: if humans were indeed immortal, we would

not need such a thing as a soul. The soul is the human response to the problem of death;

the soul is for humans what life is to Bichats biological organisms, the sum total of the

functions which resist death.32

VII

From the Very Problem of Death to Other Very Problems

The very problem of the soul is not the only very problem that results from the fact that

we are mortal although we wish we were not. The Spanish philosophical tradition derives most

of the very problems from the very problem of death. The primary reason for this is that most

20th century Spanish philosophers offer an account of how human beings are material, organic,

and human. As a result of seeing human beings in this triple way, death becomes a real theme

31 BD 228-229.32 BD 121; the quotation from Xavier BICHAT comes fromRecherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort

(Paris, 1882), p. 2.


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for them. Why is a human being not just another organic being? The answer has to do with how

human beings die, and, therefore, how they live. Let us call this problem the very problem of

human life. The very problem of the soul connects directly to the very problem of human life

seen through the very problem of death. Since life is so problematic, one must philosophize.

The very problem of philosophy is metaphilosophical in nature, but nonetheless important: if

human beings did not die, there would be no need for philosophy. The real starting-point of

philosophy, Unamuno states, is the tragic sense of life, the very problem of immortality.

Similarly, if humans were immortal, it would be hard to understand how religions got started.

This is the very problem of religion.

As one can see, all of these very problems lead to what I present as the main very

problem, equiprimordial to the very problem of death: the very problem of God. It could be the

case that humans are necessarily mortal so that they can come to understand God by means of

the other very problems. This is why I argue that atheism is an impossible position: how can one

truly approach the other very problems without seeing God as problematic? The theist is the

person who is willing to see human life and death as a kind of problem, one that is not solvable

by simple solutions.

Documents

Jose Ferrater Mora's Thanatontology