Torts Cases Batch-31) Bermudez v. Judge Amuerfina Melencio Herrera(**casedigestph)BERMUDEZ V MELENCIO-HERRERAG.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988Facts: A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case No. 92944 for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27, 1969 in the said criminal case A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action.On July 28, 1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages against Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan. Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action on the assumption that defendant Pontinos negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted aquasi-delict, the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the accident as a crime by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated.Issue:Whether or not the present action is based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore could proceed independently of the criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence.Ruling: In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employers defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasidelict. The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action. In fact, even without such a reservation, the Court allowed the injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.------------------------------------------------------------------(**full-text)G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT BERMUDEZpetitioners-appellants,vs.HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, DOMINGO PONTINO y TACORDA and CORDOVA NG SUN KWAN,respondents-appellees.YAP,J.:This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the Order of March 10, 1970 of the Honorable Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint in Civil Case No. 77188 entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and Adonita Yabut Bermudez, plaintiffs, versus Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, defendants," and from the Order of May 7, 1970 denying plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for Reconsideration.The background facts of the case are as follows:A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case No.92944 for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino by the Manila City Fiscal's Office. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27,1969 in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action."On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 77188, entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. et al., Plaintiffs vs. Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, Defendants." Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated. From said order, plaintiffs filed the present appeal, stating as their main reasons the following:I. The main issue brought before this Honorable Court is whether the present action is based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore could proceed independently of the criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence.II. The second question of law is whether the lower court could properly suspend the hearing of the civil action against Domingo Pontino and dismiss the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the fact that a criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence is pending in the lower court against Domingo PontinoIII. The last question of law is whether the suspension of the civil action against Domingo Pontino and the dismissal of the civil case against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the pending criminal case against Domingo Pontino for homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower court could be validly done considering that the civil case against said defendants-appellees also sought to recover actual damages to the jeep of plaintiffs-appellants."We find the appeal meritorious.The heart of the issue involved in the present case is whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict. The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, l969 constituted aquasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that case was pending,the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964."We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, the Court held:The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his employer's subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the criminal case against the employee is still pending?To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime and quasi-delict. According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from crime. With respect to obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161 of the New Civil Code provides:Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article 21 77, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary, Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this book, regulating damages.xxx xxx xxxIt is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be present: (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. (1 Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964])Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable.In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi- delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarity liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict.1The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which provide:Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil action. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.Section 2. Independent civil action.-In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule 111, provides that Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, we have allowed the injured party in the criminal 1 case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. In People vs. Ligon, G.R. No. 74041, we held:However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the appealed orders of the trial court, dated March 10, 1970 and May 7, 1970, and remand the case for further proceedings. No costs.SO ORDERED.Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.-----------------------------------------------------------------2) Reyes v. Sempio-Dy

G.R. No. L-71914 January 29, 1986ZENAIDA CRUZ REYES, petitioner, vs.HON. JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIO-DIY, 'Vacation' Judge of RTC, BRANCH 170, Malabon, Metro Manila, and SPS. CRISTINA MALICSI and DANILO MALICSI, respondentsFACTS:In Criminal Case No. 23633 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Metro Manila, Cristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. The aggrieved party therein was Zenaida Cruz Reyes, the herein petitioner. In said case Zenaida Cruz Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor, Atty. Barayang. The accused pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced by the Court to a fine of P50.00. Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party was unable to present evidence to prove damages against the accused. Neither was she able to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Instead, she filed a new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the Regional Trial Court for damages arising from the defamatory words uttered against her by Cristina Malicsi which was the subject of the information filed against the latter for intriguing against honor. Said case is Civil Case No. 357-MN.At the pre-trial plaintiff admitted that she was represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case against defendant Cristina Malicsi and in said case she did not reserve the right to file a separate action for damages. She further admitted that the appearance of said private prosecutor was for the purpose of proving damages against the accused. After said admission made by plaintiff, the parties agreed to have the Court rule on the question of whether or not plaintiff by her being represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case and her failing to make a reservation in said case to file a separate action was barred from filing a separate civil action for damages against the accused Cristina Malicsi. On said issue, the Court a quo ruled in favor of the defendants, relying principally upon Roa vs. dela Cruz, 107 Phil. 8, and dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rule laid down in the Roa case should govern this one

HELD:NO. In the instant case the criminal action against defendant Luat did not proceed to trial, as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment. The mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party did not constitute such active intervention as could only import an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action. It is as reasonable to indulge the possibility that the private prosecutors appeared precisely to be able to make a seasonable reservation of the right to file a separate civil action which, even if unnecessary at the time would nevertheless have been the prudent and practical thing to do for the purpose of better protecting the interest of their clients. But as matters turned out, the accused pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced. Thereafter there was no chance to enter such a reservation in the record.We do not believe that plaintiffs' substantive right to claim damages should necessarily be foreclosed by the fact at best equivocal as to its purpose that private prosecutors entered their appearance at the very inception of the proceeding, which was then cut short at that stage. It cannot be said with any reasonable certainty that plaintiffs had thereby committed themselves to the submission of their action for damages in that action. The rule laid down in Roa vs. De la Cruz, supra, does not govern this case. The ends of justice will be better served if plaintiffs are given their day in court. (pp. 457-458)Upon authority, therefore, of Meneses vs. Luat We find and so hold that the mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private respondents did not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Because the accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in support of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil action.------------------------------------------------------------------

3) Castillo v. CA(**J.C.Sangco)In the case ofCastillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.Facts:This is a petition for review on certiorari where petitioners seek for the renewal of the Court of Appeals decision affirming the dismissal of the Court of First Instance of the complaint for damages filed by petitioners against the respondents Juanito Rosario and Cresencia Rosario.On May 2, 1965, petitioner Bernabe Castillo (in his own behalf, and in behalf of Serapion Castillo who has since then become deceased, and Eulogio Castillo, his minor child) and Generosa Galang Castillo figured in a vehicular accident with private respondents Juanito Rosario and Cresencia Rosario at Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan causing injuries to their persons and damages to their respective vehicles.

The parties have their own version of what actually happened on that fateful day. Each party is pointing to the negligence by the other as the proximate cause of the accident.While the case was pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan file an information dated September 29. 1965 against Juanito Rosario for double physical injuries, double less serious physical injuries, and damage to property thru reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Urdaneta. Rosario was prosecuted and convicted in the criminal case. Castillo then appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision acquitting him from the crime charged on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision on the basis of the testimonies and evidence submitted by the petitioners as well as the records of the case, dismissing the complain of the petitioners against private respondents as well as the counterclaim of private respondents against the petitioners. On January 24, 1973, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which then affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila as it found no negligence committed by Juanito Rosario to warrant an award of damages to the petitioners. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:Whether or not the judgement of acquittal extinguishes civil liability based on the same incident.

Ruling:Yes. The Court of Appeals' findings that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanito Rosario but Bernabe Castillo's own act of driving was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With such findings and citing the cases Corpus vs Paje, 28 SCRA 1062, 1064, 1067; Faraon vs Priela, 24 SCRA 582, 583; De Soriano vs Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, 787788; Tan vs Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672, 675, the Court of Appeals exonerated Rosario from the civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist.------------------------------------------------------------------(**full-text)G.R. No. 48541 August 21, 1989BERNABE CASTILLO (In his own behalf, and in behalf of SERAPION CASTILLO, who has since then become deceased, and EULOGIO CASTILLO, his minor child) and GENEROSA GALANG CASTILLO,petitioners-appellants,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITO ROSARIO and CRESENCIA ROSARIO,respondents-appellees.Lino R. Eugenio for petitioners.Eduardo G. Rosario for private respondents.FERNAN,C.J.:In this petition for review oncertiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the February 13, 1978 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52567-R, entitled"Bernabe Castillo, et al. v. Juanita Rosario, et al,"affirming the dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the complaint for damages filed by petitioners against private respondents. Said dismissal was decreed on the basis of the evidence before the trial court as well as the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, entitled"People v. Juanito Rosario."Petitioners and private respondents figured in a vehicular accident on May 2, 1965 at Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan, which caused injuries to their persons and damage to their respective vehicles.The parties have conflicting versions as to what actually transpired on that fateful day; each party pointing to the negligence of the other as the proximate cause of the accident. Thus, as expected in cases like this, the main issue is: Who was at fault? According to the petitioners, the accident happened as follows:1On May 2, 1985, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner Bernabe Castillo was driving his jeep with Plate No. J-4649 '64 Manila on the right lane of the McArthur Highway with Generosa Castillo, his wife, father Serapion Castillo, seated in front and Eulogio Castillo, then a minor child, as passengers, bound and northward for Binmaley, Pangasinan at the rate of 25 kilometers per hour. Just past San Nicolas bridge, Villasis, he noticed, from a distance of 120 meters more or less, a speeding oncoming car with Plate No. L-27045 '64 Cavite, along the same lane (facing north) he was driving, overtaking a cargo truck ahead of it. He switched on his headlights to signal the car to return to its own right lane as the way was not clear for it to overtake the truck.The car turned out to be driven by the private respondent, Juanito Rosario, with his wife, Cresencia Rosario. The signal was disregarded, as the car proceeded on its direction southward on the right lane (facing north).lwph1.tIn order to evade the impending collision, petitioner Bernabe Castillo swerved his jeep to the right towards the shoulder and applied on the brakes, and leaving his feet on it, even, immediately after the impact. The car rested on the shoulder of the right lane. The jeep's rear left wheel was on the road, leaving short tiremarks behind it; while the car left long tire-marks, specially its left rear wheel. The jeep suffered a shattered windshield, pushed-in radiator. The left mid-portion of its bumper badly dented. The car had a flat tire on its right front wheel; its right fender badly dented as the headlamp on top of it. The bumber stooped downward, because it went thru under the bumper of the jeep.The driver of the jeep, including his passengers suffered physical injuries. Bernabe Castillo, with the patella of his right knee, fractured, suffered serious physical injuries, in other parts of his body. Serapion Castillo whose head crushed through the windshield, was nearly beheaded, while the other two passengers suffered multiple slight and less serious injuries.Private respondents, on the other hand, have their own version of the accident and thus asseverate as follows:2Sometime in the early afternoon of May 2, 1965, the private respondents, together with their small daughter, were on their way from San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to Olongapo City where they resided at the time and where Juanito Rosario, a member of the US Navy, had been temporarily stationed. They rode in the family car. (TSN, C. Rosario, p. 35; J. Rosario, pp. 2, 12 Annex "D", "Request for Admission")At or about 2:30 p.m. of the same date, as Juanito Rosario who was driving the car, and his two passengers, were along MacArthur Highway in Barrio Bacag, Villasis, Pangasinan, going towards the south, they saw ahead of them a big heavily loaded cargo truck. (TSN, B. Castillo, p. 532, Annex "B", "Request for Admission") The truck was moving very slowly because of its heavy load so that Juanito Rosario decided to overtake it. But before doing so, he first saw to it that the road was clear and as additional precautionary measure, he blew his horn several times at the time he was overtaking the truck. (TSN, Juanito Rosario, pp. 4, 11; C. Rosario, pp. 31-41, Annex "B", "Request for Admission")Then as the car was about to overtake the slow moving cargo truck, the car's front left tire suddenly burst due to pressure causing the car to swerve to the left and naturally making steering and control difficult. Because of the tendency of the car to veer towards the left due to the blown out tire, the driver steered the car towards the direction where he could find a safe place to park and fix the tire. He finally brought the car to a halt at the left shoulder of the road (facing south). (TSN, C. Rosario, p. 31; J. Rosario, pp. 4, 17, Annex "D", "Request for Admission")But barely had the said defendant parked his car on the left shoulder of the road and just as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the jeep driven by Bernabe Castillo which came from the opposite direction. (TSN, C. Rosario, p. 32; J. Rosario, p. 6, "Request for Admission") Both vehicles were damaged, the car suffering the heavier damage. (Please see Annex "C", "Request for Admission") Passengers of the jeep sustained injuries while those of the car were badly shaken.On June 30, 1965, a civil case for the recovery of damages for the injuries sustained by petitioners and for the damage to their vehicle as a result of the collision, was instituted by the petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila. While this case was pending, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed an information dated September 29, 1965 against Juanito Rosario, private respondent herein, for double physical injuries; double less serious physical injuries; and damage to property thru reckless imprudence, in the Court of First Instance of Urdaneta. Respondent Juanito Rosario was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court in the criminal case. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a decision3acquitting him from the crime charged on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.In the meantime, private respondents thru counsel, filed a "Request for Admission"4on April 3, 1972 in the civil case, requesting petitioners to admit the truthfulness of the facts set forth therein as well as the correctness and genuineness of the documents attached thereto. On May 5,1972, petitioners filled a "Manifestation",5admitting the allegations in the "Request for Admission" with some qualifications. Later, both parties submitted their respective memoranda.On the basis of the testimonies and evidence submitted by the petitioners, as well as the records of the criminal case attached in the "Request for Admission" of the private respondents, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision6on December 28, 1972, dismissing the complaint of the petitioners against private respondents as well as the counterclaim of private respondents against the petitioners. On January 24, 1973, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision7of the Court of First Instance of Manila.Hence, the present petition for review oncertiorari.8The petitioners-appellants raise in issue before Us the following questions, to wit:1) Is the decision of the Court of Appeals, where its dispositive part, or "fallo", states that the guilt of the (appellant) accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt final and conclusive, on an action for damages based on quasi-delict?;2) Are the testimonies given in a criminal case, without strict compliance with Section 41 Rule 130 and without opportunity to cross examine the witnesses who made these testimonies, admissible evidence in a subsequent case and can be the basis of a valid decision?;3) Is an action for damages based on quasi-delict barred by a decision of the appellate court acquitting the accused, the body of which lays the blame on the plaintiff but in its dispositive part, declares the guilt of the accused not proved beyond reasonable doubt ?9The main thrust of this petition for review which stems from a cause of action based on quasi-delict orculpa aquiliana(being a recovery for damages arising from the vehicular accident), is that petitioners were deprived of due process because their civil action was decided on the basis of private respondent Juanita Rosario's acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence.There is no dispute that the subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is separate and distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence. According to a number of cases,10a quasi-delict orculpa aquilianais a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantively all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts orculpaextra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictos orculpaextra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case.11In the case ofAzucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 468, 470-471, this Court held:... in the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries ..., the judgment of acquittal does not operate to extinguish the civil liability of the defendant based on the same incident. The civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides:Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist.In a previous case, CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR,People v. Rosario, the Court of Appeals after a painstaking analysis of. (a) the testimonial evidence; (b) the relative positions of the two vehicles as depicted in the sketches; (c) the distance of each of the two vehicles from the cemented edge of the road; (d) the point of impact; (e) the visible tire marks, and (f) the extent of the damage caused upon each of the two vehicles, ruled that it was the driver of the jeep and not the accused driver of the car who was negligent and accordingly acquitted the latter.12Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the recovery of damages. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that no negligence was committed by Juanito Rosario to warrant an award of damages to the petitioners.Respondent Appellate Court states:In acquitting defendant-appellee Juanito Rosario in CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR on October 28, 1968, this Court held that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanito Rosario but it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder [of the road] where the car was that was actually the proximate cause of the collision.' (Ibid., p. 183) With this finding, this Court actually exonerated appellee Juanito Rosario from civil liability. Since plaintiffs-appellants' civil action is predicated upon Juanito Rosario's alleged negligence which does not exist, it follows that his acquittal in the criminal action, which is already final, carried with it the extinction of civil responsibility arising therefrom. (Corpus vs. Paje, 28 SCRA 1062, 1064, 1067; Faraon vs. Priela, 24 SCRA 582, 583; De Soriano vs. Albornoz, 98 Phil. 785, 787788; Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672, 675).13It was the Court of Appeals findings that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanita Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was, which was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With this findings, the Court of Appeals exonerated Juanito Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist.As earlier stated, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals was an affirmation of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the trial of the case before the Court of First Instance, the private respondents were not present, in view of the fact that they were out of the country at that time. Their counsel introduced as part of their evidence, the records in the criminal case, in accordance with Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14These records were attached to their "Request for Admission" and were substantially admitted by petitioners. The said records were mostly composed of transcripts of the hearing in the criminal case. Petitioners raised, as one of their objections, the propriety and correctness of admitting and adopting these transcripts as part of the record in the civil case. According to them, this is a violation of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on the ground that petitioners were not given the opportunity to cross-examine. We have to disagree. A careful reading of the transcripts would reveal that then counsel for petitioners, Atty. Nicodemo Ferrer, actively participated during the proceedings of the criminal case. He raised various objections,15in the course of the trial. Petitioners, therefore, thru counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.Thus, the admission of the said testimonies cannot be set aside.Finally, in a long line of decisions, this Court has held time and again that the findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable by the Supreme Court.16InMacadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 andTolentino v. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167, it was held that:Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record.Finding that the questioned decision does not fall under any of the exceptions cited above, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby denied. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.4) Azucena v. Potenciano

(**J. Cesar Sangco)InAzucena vs. Potenciano, the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, (t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.If the civil action for damages based on quasi-delict is entirely independent of the criminal case and may proceed regardless of the result of the latter, what justification is there for the provision in Sec 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure mandating the implied institution of such civil action with the criminal case and requiring that the right to institute it separately be reserved in violation of that provision of law? The Court may thus ignore substantive provisions of law, but such violation does not become lawful because it did so for that would be vesting in itself legistlative power to repeal or modify existing laws.------------------------------------------------------------------(**full-text)G.R. No. L-14028 June 30, 1962NEMESIO AZUCENA,plaintiff-appellant,vs.SEVERINO POTENCIANO AND LAGUNA TRANSPORTATION CO.,defendants-appellees.Jose A. Lozada and Alvero, Brion and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.Yatco and Yatco and A. R. Narvasa for defendants-appellees.MAKALINTAL,J.:Before us on appeal is the order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, San Pablo branch, dated January 10, 1950, dismissing the complaint on motion of defendants-appellees. The action is for recovery of damages allegedly sustained, as a result of a collision between plaintiff-appellant's scooter and a bus of appellee Laguna Transportation Company, then driven by its co-appellee Severino Potenciano. Negligence is imputed to the driver, and to the company itself with respect to the choice and supervision of its employees. The allegations send to make out a case of quasi-delict, orculpa aquiliana, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.The complaint was filed September 3, 1957. Defendants answered September 9, with a counterclaim also for damages. On December 10 they filed a supplemental pleading with a prayer for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that in the criminal action against Severino Potenciano for serious physical injuries with damage to property through reckless imprudence, involving the same accident which gave rise to the civil action, the accused was acquitted in the decision rendered the previous November 6 by the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Bian branch. The San Pablo court then issued the order now under review, holding that since the acquittal of the accused was based on a finding that he did not act recklessly or negligently the judgment in the criminal case is a bar to the civil action. Reliance is placed squarely on Rule 107, which provides,inter alia, that when a criminal action is instituted the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it, and that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact front which the civil might arise did not exist.The issue here presented is not a novel one in this jurisdiction.Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Santiago D. Gamboa, G.R. No. L-10296, May 21, 1957;Leoncio Dyogi, et al. vs. Nicasio Yatco, et al., G.R. No. L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957;Maria C. Roa vs. Segunda de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-13134, Feb. 13, 1960;Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Anita Tan, et al., G.R. No. L-13048, Feb. 27, 1960;Quirino Pacheco vs. Agripina Tumanpay, et al., G.R. No. L-14500, May 25, 1960;Hermenegildo Calo, et al. vs. Luis Peggy, G.R. No. L-10756, March 29, 1958. It involves a determination of which law should govern: Rule 107, which states a general rule, or the more specific provisions of Articles 31, 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.1wph1.tART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff can not recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.This Court inDyogi vs. Yatco, supra, stated that Article 33 constitutes a partial amendment of Rule 107. InCalo vs. Peggy, supra, substantially the same situation as the one now before us was passed upon by this Court. A minor son of the defendant there, while driving a jeep belonging to the father, bumped and injured plaintiff Romeo Calo. A criminal action for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was instituted. While it was pending a civil action to recover damages on the theory of quasi-delict was filed against the father of the accused. After a judgment of acquittal was rendered, where it was intimated that the victim of the accident was the one at fault, the defendant in the civil action moved for its dismissal, alleging that since in the criminal case there was no reservation of the right to file a separate civil action for damages the judgment of acquittal operated to extinguish the civil liability of the defendant based on the same incident. The trial Court granted the motion to dismiss, but on appeal this Court reversed the ruling on the ground that the civil action was entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action "may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." To be sure, an exception to this principle of separation and independence of the two classes of actions from each other has been recognized, namely, when the offended party not only fails to reserve the right to file a separate civil action but intervenes actually in the criminal suit by appearing through a private prosecutor for the purpose of recovering indemnity for damages therein, in which case a judgment of acquittal bars a subsequent civil action.Maria Roa vs. Segunda de la Cruz, et al., supra. The case at bar, however, does not fall under the exception, for the plaintiff here did not so intervene in the criminal action against defendant Potenciano.Appellees contend that the civil action referred to in Article 33 of the Civil Code is that which arisesex delicto, or from the commission of the offense involving defamation, fraud or physical injuries, and consequently, pursuant to Rule 107, section 1 (a), the right to file it must be expressly reserved in the criminal action if it is to prosper at all. The contention is erroneous.Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Gamboa. It presupposes that there must first be a conviction for the crime, for without conviction there can be no offense to speak of from which civil liability could arise. Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. This is the reason why only a preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond reasonable doubt is deemed sufficient.WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against defendants-appellees.------------------------------------------------------------------5) People v. Ligon(**Beda Alabang digests)

People vs. Ligon 152 SCRA 39 (July 29, 1987) Facts: Accused Fernando Gabat was riding a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando called a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales to buy some cigarettes. While the transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the car suddenly moved forward. While the car was moving, Rosales was clinging to the window but lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. The bystanders rushed Rosales to PGH where he was treated for multiple physical injuries until his death. Since Ligon did not stop the car, Castillo, a taxi-driver chased him and sought the assistance of two police officers in an owner-type jeepney. At an intersection, Castillo was able to overtake the car and blocked it, while the jeep pulled up right behind. The police officers drew their guns and told them to alight from the car. They were brought to the police station. Ligon was then charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. A charge of robbery with homicide was likewise charged to Ligon and Gabat, since there was an allegation that Gabat forcibly took the cigarette box of the victim. Ligon however was never apprehended after the police released him, so only Gabat was convicted by the RTC. An appeal was then brought to the SC, which ruled that the guilt of the accused was not established beyond reasonable doubt.Issue: Whether or not accused may be held civilly liable despite the finding of the Court of Appeals that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Held: Yes. When a person was acquitted of a crime, it does not follow that he is free from civil liability, since only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The judgment of acquittal can extinguish the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In the instant case, a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of Gabat arises. Gabat, by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabats willful act of calling the victim to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the death of the victim. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help the victim while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the drivers act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim.------------------------------------------------------------------PEOPLE vs. LIGON152 SCRA 419July 29, 1987Facts:Accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat was convicted of the crime of Robbery with homicide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Gabat allegedly robbed Jose Rosales Ortiz, a 17 year old working student, who was a cigarette vendor. According to Prudencio Castillo, a taxi driver, who allegedly saw the incident that transpired on the night Ortiz died. According to Castillo, he was at a distance of about 3 meters travelling on the same lane and was behind the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon together with Gabat. Castillo, in his testimony, said that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales. That while waiting for the traffic light to change from red to green, Castillo idly watched the Volkswagon Kombi and saw Gabat signal to Ortiz. While Ortiz was handling the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light changed to green and as the Kombi moved forward, Gabat grabbed the box from Ortiz. Ortiz ran beside the Jombi and was able to hold on to the windowsill with his right hand. Howeverm as the Kombi continued to speed towards the C.M. Rector underpass, Gabat forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the said windowsill and as a result fell face down on the ground. On the other hand, according to Gabat, after Ortiz handed the two sticks cigarettes Gabat in turn paid him a 5 peso bill. In order to change the said bill, Ortiz placed his box between the arm of Gabat and the window frame. When the traffic light changed to green, Ligon moved the vehicle forward. That in spite of Gabats order to stop the vehicle, Ligon said that it could not be done due the the moving vehicular traffic. When Ortiz fell down, Gabat shouted at Ligon but the latter replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to the parents of Gabat and that later they would come back to the scene of the incident. At this point, the Kombi was blocked by Castillos taxi and the jeep driven by the policeman. The trial court gave full credence to Castillos testimony and dismissed Gabats testimony on the ground that it is of common knowledge that cigarette vendors do not let go of their cigarette. Gabat was convicted by the trial court; Hence, this appeal.Issue:Whether a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability.Held:According to the Court of Appeals, although Castillo is a disinterested witness, his testimony even if not tainted with bias is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty. Castillos taxi was driving a car lower in height compared to the Kombi. The windshield of the Kombi (1978 model) is occupying approximately 1/3 of the rear end of the vehicle making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe what clearly transpired. Also, Castillos statement given to the police on the evening of the incident did not mention that he saw Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of Rosales from the windowsill though such appeared in the police report. Given the circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of Gabat was established beyond reasonable doubt. As such he is acquitted. However, such does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability as such only requires a preponderance of evidence and such evidence is sufficient to establish Gabats liability. The Court finds Gabats act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Ortiz. That he failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed; He failed to help Ortiz while the latter clung to the moving vehicle; e did not enforce his order to Ligon to stop; and that he acquiesced in the drivers act of speeding away instead of stopping and picking up Ortiz.His acquittal in the criminal prosecution does not bar the heirs of Ortiz from recovering damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.Wherefore, Gabat is sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Ortiz the amount of P15,000 for the latters death, P1,733 for hospital and medical expenses, 4,100 for funeral expenses, and the alleged loss of income amounting to P20,000.