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G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, whichordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infielmembers of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up thefindings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippinesand registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporationparticularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel andAcer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan asthe ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of theInfiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-ChristianTribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements wereseen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials oMaconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board oDirectors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') oNovember 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, theregistration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correc tly applicable law; and since section11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not foundin the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titlehave not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is loca ted for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of acertificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agriculturalands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation oftitle except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall beentitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notoriouspossession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years sha ll beentitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longecontrovert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minoritie

who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason

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thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interesof the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions o f the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedingsinstituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except inlease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, imust be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associationsobviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, adomestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had beenpossessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralcoapplied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on theground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for reg istration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to applyfor judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b).Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given duecourse or has to be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant hasan imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to wh ich a Torrenstitle may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967,20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2thru Susiin 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed andreaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, uponcompletion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what isthe better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in thePhilippine Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that thismeans may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly iwas not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration wa

expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, butsimply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all thenecessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, oan agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisionsof Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant,but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an applicationtherefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it hadalready ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of LandsConsequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thusmade was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any righ t. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeofLacaste vs. Director of Lands,7Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9Miguel vs. Court oAppeals10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupationand cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land fromthe mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of lawa right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond theauthority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would b

evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.12

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Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of anexpress grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to aGovernment grant and shall be en titled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little morethan a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, busimply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originallyconvert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operatioof law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but nonesufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as alreadyconferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from sa iowners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed iappropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitutiothat might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or"imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidentacircumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat aright already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that theConstitution cannot impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired avested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations topurchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights inconstitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequentrepeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed andestablished and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation'sright to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardlymore than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlemento the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed andregistered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correcrule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously andexclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ips

jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acmethereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is noqualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons toapply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed theapplication for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land

to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (assuch natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusivepresumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names andadding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of theoriginal persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of thePublic Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting theapplications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s otitle in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with noprejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re -established, as it were, doctrine

the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring

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opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying foconfirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited toa brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby a ffirmed, without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 180067 June 30, 2009

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Trustee and APPLICANT, with its Executive Minister ERAO MANALO as Corporate Sole Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the Republic of the Philippines assails the October 11, 2007 Decisio n1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348which affirmed the April 26, 2005 Decision2of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) in Paoay-Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in Land Registration Case No. 762-C for Application fo

Registration of Title, entitled Iglesia Ni Cristo, Trustee and Applicant with its Executive Minister Erao Manalo as Corporate Sole v. Republic of the Philippines as oppositor.

The Facts

Subject of the instant controversy is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre, particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land (Plan Swo-I-001047, L.R.C. Rec. No. ______) situated in the Barrio of Baramban, Municipality of Currimao, Province of Ilocos Norte, Island of Luzon. Bounded on theSE., along line 1-2 by the National Road (20.00 m. wide); on the SW. & NW., along lines 2-3-4 by lot 3946, Cads-562-D, Currimao Cadastral Sketching, Bernardo Badanguio; on the NE.along line 4-1 by lot 3947, portion, Cads-562-D; (Pacita B. Lazaro) and lot 3948, Pacita B. Lazaro, Cads-562-D, Currimao Cadastral Sketching x x x containing an area of FOURTHOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND ONE (4201) SQUARE METERS. x x x

On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G. Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title before the MCTC in Paoay-Currimao.Appended to the application were thesepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, the technical description of subject lo t,3the Geodetic Engineers Certificate,4Tax Declaration No. (TD5080265covering the subject lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed o f Sale6executed by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed anOpposition to INCs application.

The Ruling of the Cadastral Court

After the required jurisdictional publication, notification, and posting, hearing ensued where the INC presented three testimonial witnesses,7the MCTC, acting as cadastral court, renderedits Decision on April 26, 2005, granting INCs application. The decretal portion reads:

Wherefore, the application for registration is hereby granted. Upon finality of this decision, let an Order be issued directing the Land Registration Authority to register and issue an OriginaCertificate of Title to the applicant Iglesia Ni Cristo, as Corporation Sole, with official address at No. 1 Central Avenue, New Era, Diliman Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.

The cadastral court held that based on documentary and testimonial evidence, the essential requisites for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over the subject lot have been compliedwith.

It was established during trial that the subject lot formed part of a bigger lot owned by one Dionisio Sabuco. On February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INCwhich built a chapel on the lot. Saturnino Sacayanan, who was born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948, testified to the sale by Sabuco and the erection of the small chapel byINC in 1952. Subsequently, Sabuco sold the bigger lot to Bernardo Badanguio less the small portion where the INC chapel was b uilt.

Badanguio in 1954 then declared the entire bigger lot he purchased from Sabuco for tax purposes and was issued TD 006114.8In 1959, Badanguio also sold a small portion of the biggelot to INC for which a Deed of Absolute Sale9was executed on January 8, 1959. Jaime Alcantara, the property custodian of INC, testified to the purchases constituting the subject lot andthe issuance of TDs covering it as declared by INC for tax purposes. Thus, these two purchases by INC of a small portion of the bigger lot originally owned by Sabuco, who inherited itfrom his parents and later sold it to Badanguio, constituted the subject lot.

On September 7, 1970, a Deed of Sale was executed by Badanguio in favor of INC formally ceding and conveying to INC the subject lot which still formed part of the TD of the bigger lounder his name. This was testified to by Teofilo Tulali who became a tenant of the bigger lot in 1965 and continued to be its tenant under Badanguio. Tulali testified further that theownership and possession of Sabuco and Badanguio of the bigger lot were never disturbed.

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Subsequently, TD 648510was issued in 1970 in the name of INC pursuant to the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale. This was subsequently replaced by TD No. 40605611 in 1974, TD508026 in 1980, and TD 605153 in 1985.

For the processing of its application for judicial confirmation of title, subject Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre was surveyed and consisted of 4,201 square meters. With thepresentation of the requisite sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, technical description of the subject lot, Geodetic Engineers Certificate, and Report given by the CityEnvironment and Natural Resources Office special investigator showing that the subject lot is within alienable and disposable public zone, the MCTC found and appreciated thecontinuous possession by INC of the subject lot for over 40 years after its acquisition of the lot. Besides, it noted that Badanguio and Sabuco, the predecessors-in-interest of INC, werenever disturbed in their possession of the portions they sold to INC constituting the subject lot.

Aggrieved, the Republic seasonably interposed its appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 85348.

The Ruling of the CA

On October 11, 2007, the appellate court rendered the assa iled Decision affirming the April 26, 2005 MCTC Decision. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

In denying the Republics appeal, the CA found that the documentary and testimonial evidence on record sufficiently establish ed the continuous, open, and peaceful possession andoccupation of the subject lot in the concept of an owner by INC of more than 40 years and by its predecessors-in-interest prior to the conveyance of the lot to INC.

Hence, we have this petition.

The Issue

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE [MCTC] DECISION GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITEEVIDENCE THAT THE LAND WAS DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ONLY ON MAY 16, 1993, OR FIVE (5) YEARS BEFORE THEFILING OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION ON NOVEMBER 19, 1998.12

The Courts Ruling

May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject property has been declared as alienable only after June 12, 1945? This is the sole issue to be resolved.

The petition is bereft of merit. The sole issue raised is not novel.

The Republics Contention

The Republic contends that subject Lot No. 3946 was certified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain only on May 16, 1993. Relying on Republic v. Herbieto,13it arguethat prior to said date, the subject lot remained to be of the public dominion or res publicae in nature incapable of private appropriation, and, consequently, INC and its predecessors-ininterests possession and occupation cannot confer ownership or possessory rights and "any period of possession prior to the date when the lot was classified as alienable anddisposable is inconsequential and should be excluded in the computation of the period of possession."14

The Republic maintains further that since the application was filed only on November 19, 1998 or a scant five years from the declaration of the subject lot to be alienable and disposableland on May 16, 1993, INCs possession fell short of the 30-year period required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.

The Argument of INC

Respondent INC counters that the Court has already clarified this issue in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Naguitcase), in which we held that what is merely required by Sec. 14(1) oPresidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, is that the "property sought to be registered [is] alread y alienable and disposable at the time othe application for registration of title is filed."15Moreover, INC asserts that the Herbietopronouncement quoted by the Republic cannot be considered doctrinal in that it is merely an obitedictum, stated only after the case was dismissed for the applicants failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of publication.

Necessity of declaration of public agricultural land as a lienable and disposable

It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the persons claiming title toa public land should show that their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.16In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot hasalready been declared alienable and disposable by the government on May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for registration was filed by INC.

Conflicting rulings in Herbieto and Naguit

It must be noted that this Court had conflicting rulings in Naguitand Herbieto, relied on by the parties contradictory positions.

Herbieto essentially ruled that reckoning of the possession of an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title is counted from the date when the lot was classified as alienable anddisposable, and possession before such date is inconsequential and must be excluded in the computation of the period of possession. This ruling is very stringent and restrictive, for therecan be no perfection of title when the declaration of public agricultural land as alienable and disposable is made after June 12, 1945, since the reckoning of the period of possessioncannot comply with the mandatory period under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.

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In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning for the period of possession is the actual possession of the propertand it is sufficient for the property sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable a t the time of the application for registration of title is filed.

A review of subsequent and recent rulings by this Court shows that the pronouncement in Herbieto has been applied to Buenaventura v. Republic,17Republic v. Diloy,18Ponciano, Jr. vLaguna Lake Development Authority,19and Preciosa v. Pascual.20This Courts ruling inNaguit, on the other hand, has been applied toRepublic v. Bibonia.21

Core issue laid to rest in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic(Malabanan),22the Court upheld Naguitand abandoned the stringent ruling in Herbieto.

Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 pertinently provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personallor through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposablelands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that which was adopted in Naguit, the Court ruled that "the more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD1529 is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed."

The Court in Malabanan traced the rights of a citizen to own alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as granted under CA 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, asamended by PD 1073, and PD 1529. The Court observed that Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 are virtually the same, with the latter law specifically operationalizing theregistration of lands of the public domain and codifying the various laws relative to the registration of property. We cited Naguitand ratiocinated:

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one toacquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possessionunder a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGsapproach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of thePublic Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been establ ished since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out bythe plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifyingwords restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisimpediatur sentencia.lavvphi1.net

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all l ands othe public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length o f unchallenged possessioby the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassifypublic agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yeeven considered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguitexplained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application forregistration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that thegovernment is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusiveprerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limitthe application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessois able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguitinterpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasibleunderHerbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place dueto lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the pa rticular line oargument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.

Naguitas affirmed in Malabanan more in accord with the States policy

Moreover, we wish to emphasize that our affirmation ofNaguitin Malabananas regards the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 relative to the reckoning of possession vis-vis the declaration of the property of the public domain as alienable and disposableis indeed more in keeping with the spirit of the Public Land Act, as amended, and of PD 1529. Thesestatutes were enacted to conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public land s to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal osocial justice.23The statutes requirements, as couched and amended, are stringent enough to safeguard against fraudulent applications for reg istration of title over alienable anddisposable public land. The application of the more stringent pronouncement in Herbietowould indeed stifle and repress the States policy.

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Finally, the Court in Malabanan aptly synthesized the doctrine that the period of possession required under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1527 is not reckoned from the time of the declaration of theproperty as alienable and disposable, thus:

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through theipredecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entireperiod of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframeimposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

INC entitled to registrable right over subject lot

With the resolution of the core issue, we find no error in the findings of the courts a quo that INC had indeed sufficiently established its possession and occupation of the subject lot inaccordance with the Public Land Act and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, and had duly proved its right to judicial confirmation of imperfect title over subject lot.

As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive on, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as they are borne out by therecord or are based on substantial evidence. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lowercourts.24This is applicable to the instant case.

The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked on to the possession of itspredecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, fromhis parents. These possessions and occupationfrom Sabuco, including those of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INChad been in the concept of owners: opencontinuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of property. These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondentwitnesses.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the October 11, 2007 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a)Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor o

Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation o f the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the la tter to payplaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the

Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the landannulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. Fromthis judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff anddefendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulmenof the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon byvirtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.

The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving theright to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendozaon September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paidits price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possessioand occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruptionexcept during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover thepossession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon,

dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the

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purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the landfor twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela RazonBy virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon requiredValentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga,which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

With these facts in view, we shall p roceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his assignments of error. lawphi1.net

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through hispredecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case doenot affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied

for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account thaNemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of timebeing so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These be ing the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of thePhilippine Islands (212 U. S., 4491), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally andthrough his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said landunder the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to agrant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore issufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be thepublic domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to

Angela Razon, the D irector of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of n o effect, and Angela Razon did nothereby acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of histitle, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.Johnson, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.

JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CVNo. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,1which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,2granting the application for landregistration of the respondents.

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels oland, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from theirparents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.3Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:

(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan o f Lot No. 8423, in the name o f respondent David;4

(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5

(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots;6

(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;7

(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, byvirtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;8

(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No.941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994;9and

(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sonsand respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.10

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On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1)Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitutecompetent and sufficient evidence ofbona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were n ot subject toprivate appropriation.11

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m .12All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lo ts were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.13A copy of theNotice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the SubjectLots were located.14Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 199915and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.16

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default,17with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject LotsThe respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further

evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David oveLot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the LandRegistration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.18

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of Appeals .19The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed theappealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:

In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that "All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwiseprovided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights oveimmovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."

As testified to by the appellees in the case a t bench, their parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands, sub ject matter of this application, since 1950 and that theycultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that hereinappellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, evenassuming arguendo that appellees' possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable anddisposable zone, still the argument of the appellant does not hold water.

As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thususceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of anowner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of thecourt a quo.20

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:

First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners

since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periodof possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, inapplying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling inRepublic v. Doldol,21where this Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as thePublic Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquiredthrough judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants.Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the applicationfor registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While an application may cover twoparcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within thesame province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or theproceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before theMTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

I

Jurisdiction

Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasondifferent from those presented by petitioner Republic.

A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration.

Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individuaand separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear theirapplication for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,22to wit:

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. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court withthe authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not beenstrictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.

This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed withand hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots.

The Property Registration Decree23recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners othe parcel of land sought to be registered;24and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the sameprovince.25The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking theseparate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their respective names.

Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of theProperty Registration Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastracases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient."

Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application forregistration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremiasand David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case .26They are not even accepted grounds for dismissathereof.27 Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the courtacting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder ocauses of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, howeverthat the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of theMTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.

B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a landregistration court.

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, hadiscovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for reg istration.

A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of no tice.29

Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the applica tion for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailingand (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:

1. By publication.

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once inthe Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient toconfer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far asknown, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer ofsaid application shall not be granted.

Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confejurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declara tion inDirector of Lands v. Court of Appeals30that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory fothe land registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail therequirements of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, isessential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in anewspaper of general circulation, thus

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the OfficiaGazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the OfficiaGazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interestedparties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any o ther real estate. In sum, the all encompassing irem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manneas possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.31

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the OfficialGazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in theprovince and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months a fter the initial hearing.

Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in TheFreeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing tooppose respondents' application for registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail toappear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application for registration and even the registratio

decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.

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