RURAL BANK OF ANDA, INC.,Petitioner, - versus -ROMAN CATHOLICARCHBISHOP OF LINGAYEN-DAGUPAN,Respondent. G.R. No. 155051 The Case This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66478. The Facts The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imeldas Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1. Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley. In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was already bothering the priests living in the seminary.[3] The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day.[4] On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and approved Resolution Nos. 104[5] and 105.[6] Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot. Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 with an area of 252 square meters.[7] In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped. On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and restore the concrete fence. On 20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736. On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan]: 1. Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent; 2. Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the concrete wall with iron railings, to cause to be removed the sawali fence, both at the expense of the defendants, jointly and severally, and 3. Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally, to the plaintiff the amount of P25,000.00 as litigation expenses, attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and the costs of this suit.SO ORDERED.[8] On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with the modification that the awards of litigation expenses, attorneys fees, and costs should be deleted. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda. The Ruling of the Trial CourtThe trial court found that Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in the name of respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court held that Lot 736 is public in nature. Since Lot 736 is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it adopted Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot and authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot 736 . The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Lot 736 is property of public dominion and is used by the public as a pathway. Respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley are mere claimants with no sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of Lot 736. The Court of Appeals held that property of public dominion is intended for the common welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation either by the state or by private persons. Since Lot 736 is for public use, it is a property of public dominion and it is not susceptible of private ownership. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void for being enacted beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley. The contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda is therefore void. The Court of Appeals also ruled that since neither the respondent nor the Municipality of Binmaley owns Lot 736, there is no basis for the monetary awards granted by the trial court. The IssueThe issue in this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid. The Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management Services in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their office.[9] Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the witnesses for respondent testified that Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway, parking space, and playground.[10] On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot 736 based on the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality of Binmaley, and the Lot Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. However, these documents merely show that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant of Lot 736. In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey[11] of Lot 736, which was surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been approved.[12] The cadastral survey was based on the Lot Data Computation[13] of Lot 736 which was likewise contracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989. The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.[14] Lot 736 was also used for parking and playground.[15] In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As held in Hong Hok v. David:[16] There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government. It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes follows: The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain. This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and waters of the public domain.[17] Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state. Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant from the government.[18] Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs.SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.R E S O L U T I O NPER CURIAM:Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4These provisions are:"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6Petitioners pray for the following:"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.D.R. Williams for appellee.JOHNSON, J.:From the record the following facts appear:First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 114299 September 24, 1999TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY and RAMON A. GONZALES, respondents.G.R. No. 118862 September 24, 1999PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY, and RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs.SPS. HONORATO D. SANTOS and MARIA CRISTINA S. SANTOS, SPS. CECILIO L. PE and JOSEFINA L. PE, FLORA LARON WESCOMBE, SPS. TELESFORO P. ALFELOR II and LIZA R. ALFELOR, SPS. DEAN RODERICK FERNANDO and LAARNI MAGDAMO FERNANDO, REMEDIOS OCA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.KAPUNAN, J.:The present controversy has its roots in a mortgage executed by the spouses Maximo and Patria Capay in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) pursuant to a loan extended by the latter to the former. The mortgage covered several properties, including a parcel of land, the subject of the presentdispute. 1 The loan became due on January 8, 1964 and the same having remained unpaid, TRB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgaged property.1wphi1.ntTo prevent the property's sale by public auction, the Capays, on September 22, 1966, filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. Q-10453) before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging that the mortgage was void since they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. The trial court initially granted the Capays' prayer for preliminary injunction.On March 17, 1967, the Capays caused to be filed in the Register of Deeds of Baguio City a notice of lis pendens over the disputed property. Said notice was entered in the Day Book, as well as in the Capays' certificate of title.Subsequently, the injunction issued by the trial court was lifted thus allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed. Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and on October 17, 1968, the property was sold to TRB which was the highest bidder at the auction sale. A sheriff certificate of sale was issued in its name on the same day. On February 25, 1970, the property was consolidated in the name of TRB, the sole bidder in the sale. TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was then cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16272, 2 was entered in the bank's name. The notice of lis pendens, however, was not carried over in the certificate of title issued in the name TRB.Thereafter, the Capays filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint praying for the recovery of the property with damages and attorney's fees. Trial in Civil Case No. Q-10453 proceeded and, on October 3, 1977, the CFI rendered its decision declaring the mortgage void for want of consideration. The CFI ordered, among other things, the cancellation of TCT No. T-16272 in the name of TRB and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the Capay spouses.TRB appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, TRB on March 17, 1982 sold the land to Emelita Santiago in whose name a new certificate of title, TCT No. 33774, 3 was issued, also, without any notice of lis pendens annotated thereon. Santiago in turn divided the land into six (6) lots and sold these to Marcial Alcantara, Armando Cruz and Artemio Sanchez, who became co-owners thereof. 4 Alcantara and his co-owners developed the property and thereafter sold the six (6) lots to seperate buyers who issued seperate titles, again, bearing no notice of lis pendens. 5On July 30, 1982, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision modifying the decision of the trial court as to the award of damages but affirming the same in all other respects.For having been filed out of time and for lack of merit, the petition for certiorari filed by TRB before this Court 6 was denied in a Resolution dated September 12, 1983. TRB's motion for reconsideration was similarly denied in a Resolution dated October 12, 1983. The Court's September 12, 1983 Resolution having become final and executory on November 9, 1983, the trial court issued a writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds of Baguio City to cancel TCT No. 16272 in the name of TRB, and to issue a new one in the name of the Capay spouses.Said writ, however, could not be implemented because of the successive subsequent transfers of the subdivided property to buyers who obtained separate titles thereto. Thus, a complaint for recovery of possession ownership dated 8 June 1985 was filed before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court against TRB and the subsequent transferees of the property, the respondents in G.R. No. 118862 (hereinafter, "the non-bank respondents"). Plaintiffs in said case were Patria Capay, her children by Maximo 7 who succeeded him upon his death on August 25, 1976, and Ramon Gonzales, counsel of the spouses in Civil Case No. Q-10453 who become co-owner of the property to the extent of 35% thereof as his attorney's fees (collectively, "the Capays"). On March 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants and ordering the Register of Deeds for Baguio to cancel TCT No. T-36177, Books 198, Page 177 in the names of defendants Spouses Honorato D. Santos and Maria Cristina Santos; to cancel TCT No. 36707, Book 201, Page 107 in the names of defendant Spouses Cecilio Pe and Josefina L. Pe; to cancel TCT No. T-36051, Book 198, Page 51 in the name of Flora Laron Wescombe, married to Kevin Lind Wescombe (now deceased); to cancel TCT No. 36147, Book 198, page 147 in the names of Spouses Telesforo P. Alfelor II and Liza R. Alfelor; to cancel TCT No. T-36730, Book 201, Page 130 in the names of Spouses Dean Roderick Fernando and Laarni Magdamo Fernando; to cancel TCT No. 37437, Book 205, Page 37 in the name of Remedios Oca, and issue new ones free from all liens and encumbrances, together with all the improvements therein in the names of plaintiffs sharing pro indiviso as follows: 35% to Ramon A. Gonzales, married to Lilia Y. Gonzales, of legal age, with postal address at 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City 37.92% to Patria B. Capay, of legal age, widow, Filipino; 5.41% each to Ruby Ann Capay, of legal age, Filipino married to Pokka Vainio, Finnish citizen; Chona Margarita Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Waldo Flores; Rosario Capay of legal age, Filipino, married to Jose Cuaycong, Jr.; Cynthia Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Raul Flores; Linda Joy Capay, of legal age, Filipino, married to Pedro Duran, all with postal address at 37 Sampaguita St., Capitolville Subd., Bacolod City, ordering said defendants to vacate the premises in question and restoring plaintiffs thereto and for defendant Traders Royal Bank to pay each of the plaintiffs moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, P40,000.00 in exemplary damages and P40,000.00 as attorney's fees, all with legal interest from the filing of the complaint, with costs against defendants.SO ORDERED. 8TRB and the non-bank respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision promulgated on February 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. 9 It ruled that the non-bank respondents cannot be considered as purchasers for value and in good faith, having purchased the property subsequent to the action in Civil Case No. Q-10453 and that while the notice of lis pendens was not carried over to TRB's certificate of title, as well as to the subsequent transferees' titles, it was entered in the Day Book which is sufficient to constitute registration and notice to all persons of such adverse claim, citing the cases of Villasor vs. Camon, 10 Levin vs. Bass 11 and Director of Lands vs. Reyes. 12As regard TRB, the Court of Appeals said that the bank was in bad faith when it sold the property knowing that it was under the litigation and without informing the buyer of that fact.On April 26, 1994, TRB filed with this Court a petition for review to set aside the CA decision, docketed herein as G.R. No. 114299, invoking the following grounds:I.THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN PROMULGATING THE DISPUTED DECISION AND THEREBY DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHOLLY CONTRARY TO SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND TOTALLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.II.THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED SO GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN SANCTIONING A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.a) The public respondent has plainly and manifestly acted whimsically, arbitrarily, capriciously, with grave abuse of discretion, in excess of jurisdiction tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.xxx xxx xxxb) The public respondent erred in not finding that it was not the fault of petitioner when the notice of lis pendens was not carried over to its new title.xxx xxx xxxc) The public respondent erred in not finding that PD No. 1271 had legally caused the invalidation of the Capay's property and the subsequent validation of TRB's title over the same property was effective even as against the Capays. 13Meanwhile, the non-bank respondents moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision. Convinced of the movants' arguments, the Court of Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on August 10, 1994 granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the complaint as against them. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions and finding merit in the motion for reconsideration, the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the decision of this Court, promulgated on February 24, 1994, is hereby RECONSIDERED. The complaint filed against defendants-appellants with the court a quo is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the certificate of titles originally issued to them in their individual names are hereby ordered restored and duly respected. We make no pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. 14The Capays thus filed with this Court a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 118862 to set aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals raising the following errors:ITHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT TUAZON VS. REYES, 48 PHIL. 814 AND RIVERA VS. MORAN, 48 PHIL. 836 ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREOF, WHILE PINO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 198 SCRA 436, IS APPLICABLE.IITHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT ATUN VS. MUNOZ, 97 PHIL. 762 AND LAROZA VS. GUIA, 134 SCRA 34, ARE NOT APPLICABLE.IIITHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT LEVIN VS. BASS, 91 PHIL. 419 VILLASOR VS. CAMON, 89 PHIL. 404 AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. REYES, 68 SCRA 73, ARE NOT APPLICABLE HEREOF.IVTHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES.VTHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO DISTINCTION IN THE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS VIS-A-VIS INVOLUNTARY INSTRUMENTS.VITHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF BY NOW HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS WHO ARE LAWYERS, RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS AND WELL-RESPECTED RESIDENTS IN THE COMMUNITY, ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE EFFECTS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE ARISING FROM REGISTRATION.VIITHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITSELF WITH REGARDS TO TRADERS ROYAL BANK, AFTER THE LATTER HAS PERFECTED ITS APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT.VIIITHE COURT OF APPEALS PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE COUNTER-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THAT:B) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS ARE BOUND BY THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-10453.Subsequently, G.R. No. 118862 was consolidated with G.R No. 114299, pursuant to this Court's Resolution dated July 3, 1996. 15The consolidated cases primarily involve two issues: (1) who, as between the Capays and the non-bank respondents, has a better right to the disputed property, and (2) whether or not TRB is liable to the Capays for damages.On the first issue, we rule for the non-bank respondents.IFirst, when TRB purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, the notice of lis pendens that the Capays caused to be annotated on their certificate of title was not carried to the new one issued to TRB. Neither did the certificate of title of Emelita Santiago, who purchased the property from TRB, contain any such notice. When Santiago caused the property to be divided, six (6) new certificates of title were issued, none of which contained any notice of lis pendens. Santiago then sold the lots to Marcial Alcantara and his co-owners who next sold each of these to the non-bank respondents. The non-bank respondents, therefore, could not have been aware that the property in question was the subject of litigation when they acquired their respective portions of said property. There was nothing in the certificates of title or respective predecessors-in-interest that could have aroused their suspicion. The non-bank respondents had a right to rely on what appeared on the face of the title of their respective predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound to go beyond the same. To hold otherwise would defeat one of the principal objects of the Torrens system of land registration, that is, to facilitate transactions involving lands.The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. 16Second, the foregoing rule notwithstanding, the non-bank respondents nevertheless physically inspected the properties and inquired from the register of Deeds to ascertain the absence of any defect in the title of the property they were purchasing an exercise of diligence above that required by law.Thus, respondent Aida Fernando Meeks, who bought Lot 5 for her son Dean, testified:Q How did you come to live in Baguio City, particulary in Kim. 2.5 San Luis, Baguio City?A In one of my visits to my sister who has been residing here for twelve (12) years now, I got interested in buying a property here.Q How did you come to know of this property at Asin Road where you now reside?A My sister, Ruth Ann Valdez, sir.Q When this particular property was bought by you, when was that?A I do not remember the exact date, but it was in 1984, sir.Q At the time when you went to see the place where you now reside, how did it look?A This particular property that I bought was then a small one (1) room structure, it is a two (2)-storey one (1) bedroom structure.Q What kind of structure with regards to material?A It is a semi-concrete structure, sir.Q And aside from this two (2)-storey one (1)-room structure, how did the surrounding area look like at the time you visited?A There were stone walls from the road and there were stone walls in front of the property and beside the property.Q At the time you went to see the property with your agent, rather your sister Ruth Ann Valdez did you come to know the owner?A We did because at the time we went there, Mr. Alcantara was there supervising the workers.Q And who?A Amado Cruz sir.Q After you saw this property, what else did you do?A My first concern then was am I buying a property with a clean title.Q In regards to this concern of yours, did you find an answer to this concern of yours?A At first; I asked Mr. Alcantara and I was answered by him.Q What was his answer?A That it was a property with a clean title, that he has shown me the mother title and it is a clean title.Q Aside from being informed that it is a property with a clean title, did you do anything to answer your question?A Yes, sit.Q What did you do?A Well, the first step I did was to go to the Land Registration Office.Q Are you referring to the City Hall of Baguio?A Yes, the City Hall of Baguio.Q And what did you do in the Registry of Deeds?A We looked for the title, the original title, sir.Q When you say we, who was your companion?A Mr. Alcantara and my present husband, sir.Q The three (3) of you?A Yes, sir.Q What title did you see there?A We saw the title that was made up in favor of Amado Cruz, sir.Q And what was the result of your looking up for this title in the name of Amado Cruz?A We had to be reassured that it was a genuine one, so we asked Atty. Diomampo who heads the office. We showed him a copy of that title and we were also reassured by him that anything that was signed by him was as good as it is.Q Did this Atty. Diomampo reassure you that the title was good?A He did.Q After your conversation with the Register of Deeds, what did you do?A The second step we did was to confer with our lawyer, a friend from RCBC Binondo, Manila this is Atty. Nelson Waje.Q What is your purpose in going to this lawyer?A We wanted an assurance that we were getting a valid title just in case we think of buying the property.Q What was the result of your conference with this lawyer?A He was absolutely certain that was a valid title.Q Mrs. Meeks, after looking at the place, going to the Register of Deeds, looking at the title and seeing your lawyer friend, what decision did you finally make regarding the property?A We wanted more reassurances, so we proceeded to Banaue, as advised by that same lawyer, there is another office of the Bureau of Lands. I cannot recall the office but it has something to do with registration of the old.Q What is your purpose in going to this Office in Banaue?A I wanted more reassuances that I was getting a valid title.Q What was the result of your visit to the Banaue Office?A We found the title of this property and there was reassurance that it was a clean title and we saw the mother title under the Hilario family.Q Mrs. Meeks, when you say Banaue, what particular place is this Banaue?A It is in Banaue Street in Quezon City, sir.Q And when you saw the title to this property and the mother title, what was the result of your investigation, the investigation that you made?A We were reassured that we were purchasing a valid title, we had a genuine title.Q When you were able to determine that you had a valid, authentic or genuine title, what did you do?A That is when I finally thought of purchasing the property. 17Telesforo Alfelor II, the purchaser of Lot 4, narrated going through a similar routine:Q How did you come to know of this place as Asin Road where you are presently residing?A It was actually through Mrs. Flory Recto who is presently the Branch Manager of CocoBank. She informed my wife that there is a property for sale at Asin Road, and she was the one who introduced to us Mr. Alcantara, sir.Q When you were informed by Mrs. Recto and when you met with Mr. Alcantara, did you see the property that was being offered for sale?A Yes, sir.Q When did you specifically see the property, if you can recall?A I would say it is around the third quarter of 1983, sir.Q When you went to see the place, could you please describe what you saw at that time?A When we went there the area is still being developed by Mr. Alcantara. As a matter of fact the road leading to the property is still not passable considering that during that time it was rainy season and it was muddy, we fell on our way going to the property and walked to have an ocular inspection and physical check on the area, sir.xxx xxx xxxQ What was the improvement, if any, that was in that parcel which you are going to purchase?A During that time, the riprap of the property is already there, the one-half of the riprap sir.Q Do you know who was making this improvement at the time that you went there?A I would understand that it was Marcial Alcantara, sir.Q After you saw the place riprap and you were in the course of deciding to purchase this property, what else did you do?A First, I have to consider that the property is clean.Q How did you go about determining whether the title of the property is clean?A Considering that Marcial Alcantara is a real estate broker, I went to his office and checked the documents he has regarding the property.Q And what was the result of your checking as to whether the title of the property is clean?A He showed me the copy of the title and it was clean, sir.Q Aside from going to Mr. Alcantara to check up the title of the property, what else did you do?A Well, the next thing is I requested his wife to accompany me to the Bureau of Lands or rather the Registry of Deeds, sir.Q What registry of Deeds are you referring to?A The Registry of Deeds of Baguio City, sir.Q And were you able to see the Register of Deeds regarding what you would like to know?A Yes, and we were given a certification regarding this particular area that it was clean, sir.Q What Certification are you referring to?A It is a Certification duly signed by the employee of the Registry of Deeds Adelina Tabangin, sir.Q Do you have a copy of that Certification?A Yes, I have, sir. 18The testimonies of Honorato Santos 19 and Josefina Pe 20 were to the same effect.The non-bank respondent predecessor-in-interest, Marcial Alcantara, was less thorough:Q And will you give a brief description of what you do?A I normally acquire land, quite big tract of land and subdivide it into smaller lots and sold it to some interested parties.Q Specifically, Mr. Alcantara will you please inform the Court in what place in Baguio have you acquired and subdivided and sold lots?A Dominican Hill, Leonila Hill, Cristal Cave and Asin Road, sir.Q You mentioned Asin Road, what particular place in Asin Road are you referring?A That property I bought from Emelita Santiago, sir.Q When you say you bought it from Emelita Santiago, how did you come to know that Emelita Santiago is disposing of the property?A Because of the father, he is the one who offered me the property, sir, Armando Gabriel.Q Is he also a resident of Baguio?A He is from Buyagan, La Trinidad sir,Q How did you come to know of this Armando Gabriel wanting to sell a property in Asin?A He approached me in the house, sir. He has acquired a title from the Traders Royal Bank.Q Can you inform the Honorable Court when you had this conversation with Armando Gabriel on the sale of the property at Asin Road?A Later part of March, 1983, sir.Q Now, when this Armando Gabriel informed you that he wants his property to be sold, what did you do?A I went to the place with the agent, sir.Q When you say you went to the place with the agent, what place?A Kilometer 2, Asin Road sir.Q And when you went there to see the place, did you actually go there to see the place?A By walking, I parked my car a kilometer away, sir.Q Is it my understanding that when you went to see the property there were no roads?A None, sir.xxx xxx xxxQ Mr. Alcantara, when you went to see this place at Asin Road last week of March, 1983, will you please briefly describe how this place looked like at that time?A The place was mountainous, grassy, there were cogon trees, some of the roads were eroding already, so we cannot possibly enter the property, sir.Q At the time you entered the place, was there any visible sign of claim by anyone?A None, sir.Q In terms of fence in the area?A There is no such, sir.xxx xxx xxxQ Aside from looking or going to the property, what else did you do to this property prior to your purchase?A I investigated it with the Register of Deeds, sir.Q What is your purpose in investigating it with the Register of Deeds?A To see if the paper in clean and there are no encumbrances, sir.Q To whom did you talk?A To Atty. Ernesto Diomampo, sir.Q And when you went to the Registry of Deeds to investigate and check, did you have occasion to talk with Atty. Diomampo?A Yes, sir.Q And what was the result of your talk with Atty. Diomampo?A The papers are clean except to the annotation at the back with the road right of way, sir.Q After making this investigation with the Register of Deeds and talking with Atty. Diomampo, what else transpired?A We bought the property, sir.Q After purchasing the property from Emelita Santiago, could you please tell the Honorable Court what you did with that deed of sale?A We registered it with the Register of Deeds for the Certificate of Title because at that time when we bought the property, Emelita Santiago had it subdivided into six (6) lots, sir.Q Is it our understanding that prior to your purchase the property was subdivided into six (6) parcels?A Yes, sir.Q Could you please inform the Honorable Court if you have any buyers in the subdivision of this property prior to your purchase?A Yes, I have.Q This subdivision of this property, to what office was it brought for action?A Bureau of Lands, San Fernando, La Union, sir.Q Now, Mr. Alcantara, at the time that you had this property subdivided by the owner, could you please inform the Court if there was any claim by any other party opposing the subdivision or claiming the property?A None, sir.Q When the Deed of Sale was executed and you said that you presented it to the Register of Deeds and after the subdivision already, what action did the Register of Deeds have regarding the matter?A They approved it and registered it already in six (6) titles, sir.Q In whose names?A One (1) title under my name, Amado Cruz and Dr. Sanchez, sir.Q Initially, Mr. Alcantara, you said that you are the sole purchaser of this entire area of One Thousand Five Hundred Ninety One (1,591) Square Meters. Now, you are informing this Honorable Court that one Amado Cruz and one Dr. Sanchez were also issued two (2) titles. Could you explain how these titles came into their possession?A Actually, two (2) are our co-owners, sir.Q So, is it our understanding that the Deed of Sale from Emelita Santiago is in favor of these two (2) Atty. Cruz and Dr. Sanchez?A Yes, sir. 21Third, between two innocent persons, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. 22 The Capays filed the notice of lis pendens way back on March 17, 1967 but the same was not TRB's title. The Capays and their counsel Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales knew in 1968 of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property to TRB and the consolidation of title in the bank's name following the lapse of the one-year period of redemption. But in the next fifteen (15) years or so, they did not bother to find out the status of their title or whether the liens noted on the original certificate of title were still existing considering that the property had already been foreclosed. In the meantime, the subject property had undergone a series of transfers to buyers in good and for value. It was not until after the land was subdivided and developed with the buyers building their houses on the other lots when the Capays suddenly appeared and questioned the occupants' titles. At the very least, the Capays are guilty of laches. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 23Verily, the principle on prescription of actions is designed to cover situations such as the case at bar, where there have been a series of transfers to innocent purchasers for value. To set aside these transactions only to accommodate a party who has slept on his rights is anathema to good order.Independently of the principle of prescription of actions working against petitioners, the doctrine of laches may further be counted against them, which latter tenet finds application even to imprescriptibleactions. . . . 24In De La Calzada-Cierras vs. Court of Appeals, 25 we held:While it is true that under the law it is the act of registration of the deed of conveyance that serves as the operative act to convey the land registered under the Torrens System (Davao Grains, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 612), the petitioners cannot invoke said dictum because their action to recover Lot 4362 is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.The act of registering the conveyance to Rosendo was constructive notice to the whole world of the fact of such conveyance (Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 253).But the petitioners' complaint to recover the title and possession of Lot 4362 was filed only on July 21, 1981, twelve (12) years after the registration of the sale to Rosendo. The petitioners failed and neglected for an unreasonably long time to assert their right, if any, to the property in Rosendo's possession.Being guilty of laches, the Capays cannot invoke the ruling in Villasor vs. Camon Levin Bass and Director of Lands vs. Reyes 26 to the effect that entry of the notice of lis pendens in the day book (primary entry book) is sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such adverse claim. Certainly, it is most iniquitous for the Capays who, after sleeping on their rights for fifteen years to assert ownership over the property that has undergone several transfers made in good faith and for value and already subdivided into several lots with improvements introduced thereon by their owners.In the same vein, the cases cited by the Capays in their first two (2) assignment of errors, do not help them any, as the transferees in said cases were not innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. In Tuazon vs. Reyes andSiochi, 27 where the land involved therein was sold by Petronilo David to Vicente Tuazon, it was with a deed containing the recital that the land was in dispute between the vendor and Roberto Siochi. Tuazon, who was merely subrogated to the rights of the vendor was aware of the dispute and, furthermore, David did not warrant the title to the same. In Rivera vs. Moran, 28 Rivera acquired interest in the land before the final decree was entered in the cadastral proceedings. Rivera, the transferee, was aware of the pending litigation and, consequently, could not have been considered a purchaser in good faith. Similarly, in Atun, et al. vs. Nuez, et al. 29 and Laroza vs. Guia, 30 the buyers of the property at the time of their acquisition knew of the existence of the notice of lis pendens. In contrast to the cited cases, the non-bank respondents in the case at bar acquired their respective portions of the land with clean title from their predecessors-in-interest.IIWe come now to TRB's liability towards the Capays.The Bank unconvincingly tries to wash its hands off the present controversy, and attempts to shift the blame on the Capays, thus:xxx xxx xxx23. The petitioner Bank, during all the time that it was holding the title for over fourteen (14) years that there was no legal impediment for it to sell said property, Central Bank regulations require that real properties of banks should not he held for more than five (5) years:24. The fault of the Register of Deeds in not carrying over the Notice of Lis Pendens to the new title of the petitioner Bank should not be absorbed by the latter considering that in all good faith, it was not aware of the existence of said annotation during all the time that said title was in its possession for almost fourteen (14) years before the property was sold to Emelita G. Santiago. . . . 31TRB concludes that "(t)he inaction and negligence of private respondents allowing ownership to pass for almost 15 years constitute prescription of action and/or laches." 32Sec. 25 of the General Banking Act, 33 provides that no bank "shall hold the possession of any real estate under mortgage or trust, deed, or the title and possession of any real estate purchased to secure any debt due to it, for a longer period than five years." TRB, however, admits hoding on to the foreclosed property for twelve (12) years after consolidating title in its name. The bank is, therefore, estopped from involving banking laws and regulations to justify its belated disposition of the property. It cannot be allowed to hide behind the law which it itself violated.TRB cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lis pendens because when the property was foreclosed by it, the notice of lis pendens was annotated on the title. But when TCT No. T-6595 in the name of the Capay spouses was cancelled after the foreclosure, TCT No. T-16272 which was issued in place thereof in the name of TRB did not carry over the notice of lis pendens.We do not find the Capays guilty of "inaction and negligence" as against TRB. It may be recalled that upon the commencement of foreclosure proceedings by TRB, the Capays filed an action for prohibition on September 22, 1966 against the TRB before the CFI to stop the foreclosure sale. Failing in that attempt, the Capays filed a supplemental complaint for the recovery of the property. The case reached this Court. Prescription or laches could not have worked against the Capays because they had persistently pursued their suit against TRB to recover their property.On the other hand, it is difficult to believe TRB's assertion that after holding on to the property for more than ten (10) years, it suddenly realized that it was acting in violation of the General Bank Act. What is apparent is that TRB took advantage of the absence of the notice of lis pendens at the back of their certificate of title and sold the property to an unwary purchaser. This notwithstanding the adverse decision of the trial court and the pendency of its appeal. TRB, whose timing indeed smacks of bad faith, thus transferred caused the property without the lis pendens annotated on its title to put it beyond the Capays' reach. Clearly, the bank acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy and should be held liable for damages. 34Considering however, that the mortgage in favor of TRB had been declared null and void for want of consideration and, consequently, the foreclosure proceedings did not have a valid effect, the Capays would ordinarily be entitled to the recovery of their property. Nevertheless, this remedy is not now available to the Capays inasmuch as title to said property has passed into the hands of third parties who acquired the same in good faith and for value. Such being the case, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago, the transferee of TRB.WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated Frebruary 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, as modified by its Resolution dated August 10, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, Traders Royal Bank is ordered to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita Santiago.This Decision is without prejudice to whatever criminal, civil or administrative action against the Register of Deeds and or his assistants that may be taken by the party or parties prejudiced by the failure of the former to carry over the notice of lis pendens to the certificate of title in the name of TRB.1wphi1.ntSO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164687 February 12, 2009SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, vs.ANGELA V. MADAYAG, Respondent.D E C I S I O NNACHURA, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 19, 2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004, which set aside the lower courts order to suspend the proceedings on respondents application for land registration.On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 1,492 square meters located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.2 Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City.On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional Survey Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the respondents survey plan because the lot encroached on the properties it recently purchased from several lot owners and that, despite being the new owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8, 2001.3Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondents application for registration. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their respective oppositions.On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that it had recently bought seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta, delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No. (LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the Land Registration Commission on August 26, 1976, and previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090 approved by the Bureau of Lands on December 29, 1970. These parcels of land are covered by separate certificates of title, some of which are already in the name of the petitioner while the others are still in the name of the previous owners.On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except as to the petitioner, the Republic, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas. Thereafter, respondent commenced the presentation of evidence.Meanwhile, acting on petitioners request for the cancellation of the respondents survey plan, DENR Assistant Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, Allan V. Barcena, advised the petitioner to file a petition for cancellation in due form so that the DENR could properly act on the same.4 Accordingly, petitioner formally filed with the DENR a petition5 for cancellation of the survey plan sometime in March 2002, alleging the following grounds:I.THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT LOT IN THIS CASEII.NO NOTICE WAS MADE UPON PETITIONER (AS ADJOINING LANDOWNER AND WHO BEARS INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT LOT) MUCH LESS THE OWNERS OF ADJOINING LANDS.III.THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENTLY SHOW THAT BAD FAITH AND/OR MALICE ATTENDED THE APPROVAL OF (PLAN WITH PSU NO. 01-008438).6On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings7 in the land registration case, alleging that the court should await the DENR resolution of the petition for the cancellation of the survey plan "as the administrative case is prejudicial to the determination" of the land registration case.On October 8, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion, thus:WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant motion and suspends the proceedings herein. In the meantime, and until receipt by this Court of a copy of the resolution of the petition for cancellation by the DENR, the instant case is hereby ARCHIVED.SO ORDERED.8Emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in land registration proceedings, the RTC agreed with the petitioner that the cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to the petition for land registration.9On February 13, 2003, the RTC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration of its order.10 Respondent thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the order suspending the proceedings.On March 19, 2004, finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings, the CA granted the petition for certiorari, thus:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Orders dated October 8, 2002 and February 13, 2003 of the respondent Court are declared NULL and VOID.The Court a quo is directed to continue the proceedings until its final determination. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.11The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power to hear and determine all questions arising from an application for registration.12On July 15, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution13 denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner was, thus, compelled to file this petition for review, ascribing the following errors to the CA:I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE IS LEGAL AND PROPER PENDING THE DETERMINATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-REGION 1.II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT HAVE PROPER AND SUFFICIENT BASES IN FACT AND IN LAW.III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSPENDING THE PROCEED