Land Titles Doctrines

LAND TITLES CASE DOCTRINES

MODULE 1

REPUBLIC v. CA – “Possession of Public Land = No Appropriate” Possession of public forestral lands despite how long cannot ripen into private ownership. A public forestal land is not registrable, whether the title was issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system.

CHING v. MALAYA – Mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. There can be an exception to this rule; which is when it appears during the trial that, by the nature of the evidence presented, the issue of possession cannot be decided without deciding the issue of ownership. The certificate of title, in the absence of evidence that the issuance of the certificate of title was challenged, is presumed valid also when there is no encumbrance on the land, and there is no adverse claim or notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificate. Such registration, it may be added, is binding against the whole world unless annulled for cause in proper cases.

UMBAY v. ALECHA – Section 46 of the Land Registration Law, now section 47 of the Property Registration Decree, provides that “no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.” Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title.

PNB v. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK – “limited jurisdiction no more” Sec. 2 of PD 1529 simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the RTC the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was “unanimity among the parties” or none of them raised any “adverse claim or serious objection.” Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial case but even the contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.

PNB v. CA – “A Torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a final decree of registration” A person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, EXCEPT when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. In this case, PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were constituted it was not aware to any flaw (that it was part of a conjugal property with other heirs and co-owners i.e. children) on the title of Donata Montemayor, the widow mortgagor. In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title that Donata was the owner of the parcels of lands, and no more. In connection to this, PNB was also a purchaser for value in good faith, when the properties were sold at public auction. The children questioning the ownership of their mother and who are also the occupants and lessees are guilty of laches.

“Action to recover real property, bind only parties thereto” - At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and for partition are real actions, however, they are actions in personam that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by the said decisions.

Arcaina Austria Bañadera Caraan Cheng Coloquio Diploma Fajardo Layno Lim Villarin Villarin


BORNALES v. CA – Purchasers of a land cannot invoke good faith as a defense when they had full knowledge of the flaws and defect in the title of their vendors. The indefeasibility of a certificate of title under the Torrens system cannot be invoked by purchasers in bad faith, for it cannot be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner. The registration to be effective must be made in good faith. If at all, they only acquire the right which their vendors then had.

VIAJAR v. CA – Although Art. 457 gives the riparian owner the right to own the lands formed by accretion, it should be read together with Articles 45 and 46 of Act No. 496 which prohibits acquisition of originally registered lands. Thus only properties that were unregistered are those that can be acquired by the riparian owner through accretion under Art. 457

*Note Art. 457 contemplates a situation where there are two owners of land separated only by a bank of river

CORONEL v. IAC – The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included.

GOLLOY v. CA – Mere possession of certificate of title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's true ownership of all the property described therein. Any land that was illegally included in the certificate of title does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, make him the owner. Just because person A had his land surveyed and titled ahead of the rightful owner who has been in continuous possession in the concept of owner for 50 years, does not give him the right to claim ownership by virtue of the title ONLY.

REPUBLIC v. CA – “Action to recover registered lands does not prescribe” Sec. 6 of Act 496 provides that “no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.” The action to recover registered land does not prescribe. A land registration court is w/o jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already registered in an earlier registration case, & that the 2nd decree entered for the same land is null & void. It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the title. Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

TONGSON v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY – “Mangrove Swamps” are registerable lands and are NOT part of Forest Lands. The phrase “agricultural land” as used in the Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. Under the Act of Congress 1902, it classified the public lands in the Philippines as timber, mineral or agricultural and all public lands that are NOT timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands.

Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not commercial value as lumber, do not convert the land into public land. These are not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain.



AMPOLOQUIO v. CA – “Public Land = No title = No appropriate”“Inalienable and non-disposable land and public domain” cannot be acquired through private ownership.

REPUBLIC v. AYALA Y CIA – “foreshore, beach, or navigable water = no private ownership” The petitioner sought the annulment of titles allegedly obtained by the defendant over portions of the territorial waters of the public domain. The fact remained that the areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries) were found to be portions of the foreshore, beach, or of the navigable water itself. And, it is an elementary principle of law that such areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant.

REPUBLIC v. LAT – Shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable. Thus, it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v. MUNOZ – If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid; that land is public forest land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated. Before private interests have intervened, the government may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest land. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO. INC. v. CA – “perfected mining claim” For all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the acquiring of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same.

HEIRS OF MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC – “Original registration proceedings under 14(1) and 14(2) of Property Registration Decree, distinguished” OCEaN possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier applies to the time of the filing, not the commencement of the case; lands must be declared no longer needed for public service if such is the case Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription.

Section 14(1), refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who “have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.” as persons included in who may file in the proper court for an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives.



As to prescription under Section 14 (2), it is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription (10 yrs., in good and with just title or 30 yrs. regardless of gf/jt). On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. But, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only upon such declartion that acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

Petitioners cannot invoke Section 14(2) when there is no competent evidence that the land is no longer intended for public use, service or development of national wealth, conformable with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the property as alienable and disposable does not change its status as property of the public domain under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisitive prescription.

CHAVEZ v. PEA AMARI – Private corporations are prohibited by the Constitution to acquire alienable land of the public domain. This is pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, which declares that all natural resources are owned by the state and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Private corporations can only hold these lands through lease. The mere reclamation of these lands do not convert them to alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be 2 conditions before these can be alienated after reclamation: (1) A classification that these are alienable and open to disposition; (2) A declaration that these lands are no longer needed for public service.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. IAC – Despite the 1973 Constitution prohibiting corporations from holding PUBLIC land, the said law is not transgressed in this case when Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. bought the lands of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and owners of said land since 1962. This is due to the fact that both Infiels acquired the right to register the land already under 48(b) of the Public Land Act by being in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the land through them and their predecssor-in-interest for at least 30 years.

It must be noted that the law recognizes that the conversion from public land to private under 48(b) is by OPERATION of law. This only means that 48(b) was not there to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." What Acme corporation then acquired was already private lands owned by Infiels by virtue of 48(b) so there was not violation of the Constitution.

The general rule is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.



(optional reading) NGA v. IAC – Under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law as existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world, including the government.

The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

MODULE 2

PON’S v. CA – Complaint to nullify and cancel the torrens titles in dispute is not the proper remedy under the Land Registration Act and the jurisprudence concerning the indefeasibility of the decrees of registration on which said titles are based after one year from their issuance. The titles here took place way back, at the latest in 1931. A suit for damages cannot prosper against a person who was not the original registrant but a mere second transferee. Moreover, the cause of action for damages generally alleged in the complaint has already prescribed, the impugned titles having been issued at the latest in 1931.

FRANCISCO v. CA – “Preventing notices to be sent to true owners as fraud in application for registration” The Land Registration Act commands that the applicant shall also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. Fraud in this case is to be understood under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific acts intended to deceive and deprive another of his right, or to in some manner injure him must be alleged and proven. The court held that the registration of land cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith.

LEYVA v. JANDOC – Although some laws apparently authorize any person claiming any kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, nevertheless, the opposition must be based on a right of dominion or some other real right independent of, and not at all subordinate to, the rights of the Government. The petitioners' right, that of being foreshore lessees of public land, is completely subordinate to the interests of the Government, and must necessarily be predicated upon the property in question being part of the public domain.

VDA. DE CAILLES v. MAYUGA – First Doctrine: Even assuming that Estanislao Mayuga did not have sole and exclusive title to the land and that he had been holding the shares corresponding to other co-owners in trust for them, his (Estanislao) application for registration of the land certainly was a renunciation of the co-ownership, and since that unilateral assertion of individual ownership was not opposed by the petitioners until considerably more than ten (10) years had lapsed, whatever claim the latter might have had as co-owners had ceased to exist, prescinding from the fact that since they are deemed to have had constructive notice of the registration case, a



proceeding in rem resulting from the publication of notice thereof in the Official Gazette on April 15, 1937, their omission to oppose the same can only be construed as an abandonment or non-existence of ground to contest it, and the judgment therein rendered had acquired immutability and incontestability when no appeal was taken therefrom within the period set therefor.

Second Doctrine: In this case, the original record were destroyed. The Court held that secondary evidences such as paying property taxes, a deed of sale to the person, an attorney swore that he applied for the registration of the land, would suffice since there are records of public officers who in their duties conducted the surveys and approved of such registration and are prima facie evidence of facts stated and without proof to the contrary are factual.

LARANGAN v. CA – The presumption is that the land pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors claim an interest in the same, by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for the required number of years. It is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered in his name simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of the land. He must show, even in the absence of opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny registration of the land under the Torrens system, if the facts presented do not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he seeks to register.

LEE v. PUNZALAN – “Petition for Reopening or Review” presupposes judgment made by the court, and in the absence of such, this remedy cannot be availed of. Section 38 of Act 496 provides that: “x x x any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. x x x.”

This petition for review contemplates the issuance of a decree of registration and presupposes the rendition of court decision. Absent any decision or decree, there is nothing to be reviewed.

GUTIERREZ HERMANOS v. CA – The burden of proof in land registration cases is upon the applicant. In order that the petitioner for registration of his land under the Torrens system shall be permitted to have the same registered and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title finally issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple of the lands which he is attempting to have registered. In light of this case, the Land Registration Act, Act 496 requires the presentation of muniments of title for registration under the regular provisions of said law. The applicant, which alleged ownership in fee simple since Spanish times, could have presented old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase or even a titulo posesorio or possessory information title, which is not a title in fee simple but is nonetheless prima facie evidence of possession under concept of ownership from the date of the title and for the required period under the law.

REPUBLIC v. CA – The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the



claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the state.

HEIRS OF CRISTOBAL MARCOS v. DE BANUVAR – The judgment rendered in a land registration case becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the date on which the party appealing receives notice of the decision.

REPUBLIC v. ASSOCIACION DE BENEVOLA DE CEBU – “adjudication not final until 1 year after entry of the final decree” The adjudication of the land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. An oppositor is still allowed to present evidence to prove ownership of the disputed land despite the declaration of general default against him provided that a decision has not been rendered or that a decree of registration has not been issued. Moreover, the prescribed period for appeal is fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the copies of the decisions (See Sec. 39, BP 129).

LUCERO v. LOOT – The Land Registration Act provides that where there was a final decree in a land registration case, the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past had been issued in favor of the registered owner. The writ is part of the registration proceedings and is supposed to end the proceedings. No period of prescription exists as to the issuance of a writ of possession for the avoidance of the inconvenience and the further delay to which a successful litigant would be subjected if he were compelled to commence other actions to secure the fruits of his victory – the possession of the land. It may be issued not only against the person defeated in the case, but also anyone who adversely occupies the land or any portion thereof.

RODIL v. BENEDICTO – *Note: In the book, it is stated that a writ of possession may not be issued to those who are not parties to the case since they must be given a chance to have a day in court to protect their rights.

The argument that respondent heirs of Alejandro Abes were deprived of their right when they were issued writs of possession despite not being a party to the registration proceedings is untenable. A cadastral proceeding is a proceeding in rem and against everybody, including the respondents herein, who are deemed included in the general order of default entered in the case. Besides, it appears that the said respondents heirs of Alejandro Abes filed a petition for the review of the decree of registration, thereby becoming a direct party in the registration proceedings by their voluntary appearance.

(optional reading) STA. ANA v. MENLA – Act No. 3110, which governs the reconstitution of lost or destroyed records, provides that records of judicial proceedings in the office of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance may be reconstituted as soon as practicable, after the occurrence of any fire or other public calamity resulting in the loss of all or part of the records of judicial proceedings. (Sec. 1)

After a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment may be



enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case.

In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

There is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is what is stated in the consideration of the second assignment error, that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land. Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefore has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.

MODULE 3

FULE v. DE LEGARE – “When a fraudulent document may become a root of a valid title” Under Section 55 of Act 496, as amended, John's possession of the certificate and his subsequent production of it to the herein petitioners operated as a “conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a new certificate.”

A forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. However, the Court has also laid down the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.

BALBIN v. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR – In every conveyance of titled properties, duplicates should all be presented and the copies thereof should contain the same information. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity (of the whole title) may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others.

DBP v. MANGAWANG – In the case of a double sale, the law adjudicates the property to the purchaser in good faith who first registers the transaction in his name in the Registry of Deeds.

Applying this principle, the Court concluded that the title should be given to DBP as his predecessors-in-interest has acquired and registered the property much ahead in point of time



than Mangawang Brosthers. Considering that when Amposta sold the same land to the Mangawang bros after the 1st sale to Santos, he had nothing more to sell even if the title he surrendered to them is one issued covering the same property.

*Note: In this case, Amposta (the seller) was able to acquire two titles (under Homestead Law and Cadastral proceeding) over the sameland because of non-communication of the different departnments of government.

GATIAON v. GAFFUD – “Innocent Purchasers” under Act. 496 should be limited only to cases where unregistered lands has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the Torrens system. When land is once brought to the Torrens sytem, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers is notice to all the world. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the owner’s certificate of title. He is in no sense an innocent purchaser. Knowledge of defect or lack of title is lack of good faith; the same rule should apply to one who has knowledge of said facts which should have put him upon inquiry and investigations.

BERGARDO v. CA – As a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings, except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. Also, when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon; and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced.

HEIRS OF CLARO LAURETA v. IAC – *To understand doctrine read facts*

It is erroneous to assume that the trial court’s decision in Civil Case No. 3083 consists of distinct and separate rulings for each of the defendants, which could be capable of partial execution, just because separate appeals were ultimately taken by said defendants when said decision a quo was affirmed by respondent court. The validity of a title depends on the knowledge, actual or constructive, of the prior sale.

The Court referred specifically to and relied on the first sale made in favor of Claro Laureta in ruling against the legality of the subsequent sale to Fermin Caram, Jr. Precisely, the validity of Caram’s title depends largely on whether he had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the prior sale to Laureta.

Hence, whatever would be the decision of the Court in G.R. No. L-28740 (which eventually turned out to be a reaffirmance of the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 3083) would necessarily have a direct bearing on the judgment of said trial court declaring that the sale to Laureta prevails over that made to Caram, as well as its mandates therein for the cancellation of the title of Caram and the issuance of another one in the name of Laureta.

ROXAS v. DINGLASAN – In case of sale of a piece of land titled under the Torrens system, it is the act of registration and not tradition, which transfers the ownership of land sold. Moreover, when the vendor fails to deliver to the vendee the duplicate certificate of title, the vendee should have filed



immediately with the Office of the Register of Deeds on adverse claim under Section 110 of Act 496.

PNB v. IAC – The Torrens title certificate of ownership is a declaration that the real property free from all liens and encumbrances except if provided by law. When there is nothing on the face of the title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property or any encumbrances thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto and where innocent third persons like the mortgagees relying on the certificate of title acquire rights over the property, their rights cannot be disregarded.

NATALIA REALTY CORP. v. VALLEZ – The certificates of title issued in the name of the plaintiff in accordance with the Land Registration Act is indefeasible after the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. After the lapse of one year, the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible and is binding upon and conclusive against all persons whether or not they were notified of or participated in the registration proceedings. Under the existing law, Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree 20 expressly provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

JM TUASON CO. INC. v. CA – “no acquisitive prescription of registered land” Mere possession of whatever length cannot defeat the imprescriptible title to the holder of registered Torrens Title to real property, and that registered real property under the Torrens system cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. In this case, the petitioner J.M. Tuason & Co., who is the registered owner of the disputed, land has a right to possess and recover the same, as against private respondent Reñosa who merely claims a right to possess from his predecessor-in-interest Capt. Cruz who likewise never acquired any right to possess the disputed propert. Moreover, they are in bad faith when both of them knew at the time they entered into possession that petitioner was the registered owner of the disputed land. Thus, as registered owner of the land and in the absence of any equal or better right on the part of respondent Reñosa to possess the disputed land, petitioner is entitled to possession and to bring a civil action for the recovery of possession through the ejectment case.

MODULE 4

DIRIGE v. BIRANYA – Sec. 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides the time of filing a petition for relief from an adverse judgment, which must be within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than 6 months after such judgment was entered or such proceeding was taken. The entry of judgment sets the 6-month period in motion, which is the time when the judgment or order shall be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgment, when no appeal or motion for new trial is filed within the period prescribed by the rules. Relief though is premised on equity, and a petition filed beyond the period prescribed may be entertained upon a good and substantial defense or excusable negligence.

RUBLICO v. ORELLANO – “allowing the reopening or review of a decree” It will be noted that the essential requisites or elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree are: (a) that the petitioner has a real or dominical right; (b) that he has been deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the



property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser; ANY PERSON MAY FILE, NOT NECESSARILY ONE CLAIMANT; must show actual fraud and not just constructive fraud; should aver facts and not mere conclusions of law. The order of dismissal is substantially correct for the reason that the petition for review failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

FRIAS v. ESQUIVEL – To justify the setting aside or review of a decree of registration under Section 38 of Act No. 496, the party seeking relief must allege and prove, inter alia, that the registration was procured through fraud — actual and extrinsic. It has been held in this connection that if the fraud alleged in the petition to set aside the decree is involved in the same proceedings in which the party seeking relief had ample opportunity to assert his right, to attack the document presented by the applicant for registration, and to cross-examine the witnesses who testified relative thereto, then the fraud relied upon is intrinsic. The fraud is extrinsic if it was employed to deprive a party of his day in court, thus preventing him from asserting his right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.

REPUBLIC v. DE KALINTAS – Act of 1948 amended by RA 2613. Section 88 of the law allows Justices of the peace to sit as Cadastral courts, saying:“xxx That justices of the peace may, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice, be assigned by the respective district judge in each case to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the value of which does not exceed P 5,000...”

*Note 1: Motion for review is aimed at the decree entered by the Land Registration Commission. A Motion to set aside is against the decision of the CFI. Despite the decree being a consequence of a judgment, both concepts are distinct from each other.

*Note 2: Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (made applicable to Cadastral proceedings by section 11 of Act 2259) requires that all petitions and motions after original registration “shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered”, the purpose being to avoid confusion and difficulty in tracing the origin of the entries in the registry. The filing for review should be made in the same action and not in a seperate action.

RURAL BANK OF SARIAYA v. YACON – The Rural Bank was in bad faith and NEGLIGENT when it failed to duly investigate who are the true owners of the land that was to be mortgaged. The rule is where the certificate of title is in the name of the mortgagor when the land is mortgaged, the innocent mortgagee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, said mortgagee is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of said certificate. Although Article 2085 of the Civil Code provides that absolute ownership of the mortgaged property by the mortgagor is essential, the subsequent declaration of a title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the mortgage right of a mortgagee in good faith.

The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the



correctness of the certificate thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights.

MAQUILING v. UMADHAY – “What constitutes good faith and the reliance of title gained by predecessors in interest” Respondent Umadhay could not claim conclusiveness of what appeared on the face of the certificate of title; it was not in Eriberto's name and his self-serving declaration that he was Maquiling's sole heir could not be availed of by them where it prejudices the share of the other heir Gumban or of the latter's transferree, petitioner. Good faith affords protection only to purchasers for value from the registered owners. The petitioner's grantor was not a registered owner, since the land was still in the name of Casimiro Evangelista. A person who purchased the land when the title was already in the vendor had the right to rely on what appeared on the title. Gumban's reliance is valid as there were no other circumstances which should put her on guard and cause her to inquire beyond the certificate.

ESCONDE v. BARLONGAY – Under Section 38 of Act 496, every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation or included in the general description “To all whom it may concern.” Under said section, this decree became conclusive after one year from the date of the entry.

Hence, it was established that when no answer in writing nor any opposition is made to an application for registration of property in Court, all the allegations contained in the application shall be held as confessed by reason of the absence of denial on the part of the opponent. A person who has not challenged an application for registration of land even if the appeal afterwards interposed is based on the right of dominion over the same land, cannot allege damage or error against the judgment ordering the registration inasmuch as he did not allege or pretend to have any right to such land.

CABRERA v. CA – The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the patents and titles. Also; prescription applies when the person claiming to be the owner is NOT in actual possession of the land.

GICANO v. GEGATO – An action to recover an immovable from a defendant allegedly holding it under a constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years, counted from the issuance of title to said defendant. In this case, The action to recover property which was filed only after 23 years from the issuance of the title to the property on the supposedly fraudulent sale, had been extinguished by prescription.

SOTTO v. TEVEZ – Co-ownership is a form of trust. From the very nature of a trust relation which existed between Carmen Rallos and her co-owners, she cannot obtain and secure a Torrens title to the properties in her name much less dispose of them by testament to her husband (Atty. Sotto), a constructive trustee, to the prejudice and deprivation of the rights and interests of said co-heirs. The registration consolidation of the lots to Carmen Rallos' name alone in a manner shown to be fictitious, fraudulent and secretive, thereby keeping the beneficiary of the trust in the dark did not constitute acts of repudiation of the express trust. Such registrations were ineffective and not binding upon the beneficiary of the trust.



MANARPAAC v. CABANATAN – The remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

VDA. DE CARREON v. CARTAGENA – “Quieting of Title; Ownership and fraud better illustrated; Fictitious court orders, not evidence” Defendants filed for an action to quiet title to which the petitioners contest because of not having been raised the issue of ownership and fraud in the trial court. However, it cannot be credited for the fact that the counter-claim of the defendants asserts the petitioner’s ownership and title is gotten through fraud. The words ‘ownership’ and ‘fraud’ are not magic incantations the absence of which renders a pleading worthless. Ownership and fraud are better expressed in entire sentences and paragraphs illustrating these concepts. Thus that subject matter of the case is petitioner late Feliciano Carreon claiming to have derived his rights over the property part of Mati Cadastre from his brother, Pantaleon Carreon. But Pantaleon Carreon had transferred his rights over the property to Antonio Maguinsawan, and passed to the defendants herein as heirs. So, when Feliciano Carreon claimed this lot by filing his Answer in 1959 in a cadastral case, he had no right over the same. It is alleged by the petitioner that court orders adjudicated the land in his favour but the court orders presented could not have been issued because a cadastral case over the property is still pending and thus merely fictitious and cannot prove anything.

TREASURER OF THE PH v. CA – Section 101 of Act No. 496 (before PD 1529) provides that any person may recover from the Treasurer of the Philippine Archipelago for recovery of damages out of the assurance fund when: (1) he sustains loss or damage with the following conditions:

(a) there was no negligence on his part(b) the loss or damage was sustained through any omission, mistake, misfeasance of the clerk of court or register of deeds; OR

(2) he was deprived of any land or any interest under the following conditions:(a) there was no negligence on his part(b) he was deprived as a consequence of bringing his land or interest therein under the Property Registration Decree or by registration by any persons as owner of the land, or by any mistake, omission, misdescription in any certificate or owner's duplicate, or any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book or by any cancellation(c) he is barred from claiming or recovering the same.

Recovery under this provision is barred if one has obtained the land at issue from someone who had not title or interest over the land, like an impostor or posing as the owner. The party recovering must not be negligent, meaning proper diligence must be exercised to ascertain that the documents are genuine and they were not fraudulently obtained. This is for the reason that the government is not an insurer of an unwary's citizen's property against scoundrels.

(optional reading) YABUT LEE v. PUNZALAN – The decree of registration presupposes the rendition of a Court's decision. In fact, it “may be filed at any time after the rendition of the Court's decision and before the expiration of the one year from the entry of the final decree of registration.”



(optional reading) REPUBLIC v. ASSOCIACION BENEVOLA DE CEBU – “adjudication not final until 1 year after entry of the final decree” The adjudication of the land in a registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. An oppositor is still allowed to present evidence to prove ownership of the disputed land despite the declaration of general default against him provided that a decision has not been rendered or that a decree of registration has not been issued. Moreover, the prescribed period for appeal is fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the copies of the decisions.

Section 39 of BP 129 provides: “The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or decisions of any court in all cases shall be 15 days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, judgment or decision appealed from.”


Documents

Land Titles Doctrines