Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan),Petitioners,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.R E S O L U T I O NBERSAMIN,J.:For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).AntecedentsThe property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.SO ORDERED.3The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5(Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6to support their argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.Petitioners Motion for ReconsiderationIn their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7Menguito v. Republic8and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.The Republics Motion for Partial ReconsiderationThe Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.RulingWe deny the motions for reconsideration.In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.Classifications of land according to ownershipLand, which is an immovable property,10may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.12Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17Classifications of public landsaccording to alienabilityWhether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification,25and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.Disposition of alienable public landsSection 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:(1) For homestead settlement;(2) By sale;(3) By lease; and(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;(a) By judicial legalization; or(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:x x x x(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28to wit:1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35As such, prescription can now run against the State.To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.37(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.1wphi1WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.SO ORDERED.LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief JusticeANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticePRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

I submitted my vote joining the Separate Opinion of Justice BrionTERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate JusticeIn the Result:See Separate OpinionARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERLATAAssociate JusticeMARIANO C. DEL CASTILLOAssociate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate JusticeMARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate JusticeJOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYESAssociate JusticeESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABEAssociate Justice

See separate concurring and dissenting opinionMARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONENAssociate JusticeC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court.MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice

Footnotes1Rollo, pp. 16-17.2Id. at 37-38.3Id. at 87.4G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183.5G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 442.6G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477.7G.R. No. 135527, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 716.8G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 128.9Supra note 6.10Article 415(1), Civil Code.11Article 419, Civil Code.12Article 420, Civil Code.13Article 421, Civil Code.14Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128, 165.15Section 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.16Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-71285, November 5, 1987, 155 SCRA 412, 419.17Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 291, 298.181935 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 1.19Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil. 461, 468 (1947). 20 Section 3 of Article XII, 1987 Constitution states:Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.21Id.22See Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, 2009 Ed., pp. 1188-1189.23Article 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or collectively. (345a)24Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. 32266, February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598, 608-609.25Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, No. L-27873, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69, 75.26Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L-58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689, 692.27Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127060, November 19, 2002, 392 SCRA 190, 201.28Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.x x x x29Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 509, 518. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee in Manila Electric Company v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, No. L-49623, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 799, 813.30Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-73002, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 509, 521.31Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, 428 (1925); Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90380, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 550, 560; Cruz v. Navarro, No. L-27644, November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 109, 115.32x x x WHEREAS, it has always been the policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to unregistered lands including alienable and disposable lands of the public domain in favor of qualified Filipino citizens who have acquired inchoate, imperfect and incomplete titles thereto by reason of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation and cultivation thereof under bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership for a number of years prescribed by law; x x x (Presidential Decree 1073)33An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents to Residential Lands (Approved on March 9, 2010).34Republic Act No. 10023 reduces the period of eligibility for titling from 30 years to 10 years of untitled public alienable and disposable lands which have been zoned as residential; and enables the applicant to apply with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources having jurisdiction over the parcel subject of the application, provided the land subject of the application should not exceed 200 square meters if it is in a highly urbanized city, 500 meters in other cities, 750 meters in first-class and second-class municipalities, and 1,000 meters in third-class municipalities.35Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:x x x x(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.36Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75042, November 29, 1988, 168 SCRA 165, 174.37Dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee in Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome, supra,Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaTHIRD DIVISIONREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,- versus -CARLOS R. VEGA, MARCOS R. VEGA, ROGELIO R. VEGA, LUBIN R. VEGA, HEIRS OF GLORIA R. VEGA, NAMELY:FRACISCO L. YAP, MA. WINONA Y. RODRIGUEZ, MA. WENDELYN V. YAP and FRANCISCO V. YAP, JR.,Respondents,ROMEA G. BUHAY-OCAMPO, FRANCISCO G. BUHAY, ARCELI G. BUHAY-RODRIGUEZ, ORLANDO G. BUHAY, SOLEDAD G. BUHAY-VASQUEZ, LOIDA G. BUHAY-SENADOSA, FLORENDO G. BUHAY, OSCAR G. BUHAY, ERLYN BUHAY-GINORGA, EVELYN BUHAY-GRANETA, and EMILIE BUHAY-DALLAS,Respondents-Intervenors.G. R. No. 177790Present:CARPIO MORALES,J.,Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO,JJ.Promulgated:January 17, 2011

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D E C I S I O NSERENO,J.:This is a Rule 45 Petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), questioning the Decision of the Court of Appeals,[1]which affirmed a lower courts grant of an application for original registration of title covering a parcel of land located in Los Baos, Laguna.The facts of the case as culled from the records of the trial court and the appellate court are straightforward and without much contention from the parties.On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega, Lubin R. Vega and Heirs of Gloria R. Vega namely, Francisco L. Yap, Ma. Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap and Francisco V. Yap, Jr. (respondents Vegas) filed an application for registration of title. The application covered a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Baos, Laguna, with a total area of six thousand nine hundred two (6,902) square meters (the subject land). The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 103-95-C and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92.Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mothers siblings (two brothers and a sister) died intestate, all without leaving any offspring.On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents Vegas application for registration on the ground,inter alia, that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the public domainand, as such, not subject to private appropriation.During the trial court hearing on the application for registration, respondents Vegas presented several exhibits in compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove respondents Vegas ownership, occupation and possession of the land subject of the registration. Significant was the testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baos, Laguna, under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). He attested to having conducted an inspection of the subject land[2]and identified the corresponding Report dated 13 January 1997, which he had submitted to the Regional Executive Director, Region IV. The report stated that the area subject of the investigation was entirely within the alienable and disposable zone, and that there was no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant or by any other person.[3]During the trial, respondents-intervenors Romea G. Buhay-Ocampo, Francisco G. Buhay, Arceli G. Buhay-Rodriguez, Orlando G. Buhay, Soledad G. Buhay-Vasquez, Loida G. Buhay-Senadosa, Florendo G. Buhay, Oscar G. Buhay, Erlyn Buhay-Ginorga, Evelyn Buhay-Grantea and Emilie Buhay-Dallas (respondents-intervenors Buhays) entered their appearance and moved to intervene in respondents Vegas application for registration.[4]Respondents-intervenors Buhays claimed a portion of the subject land consisting of eight hundred twenty-six (826) square meters, purportedly sold by respondents Vegas mother (Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega) to the formers predecessors-in-interest - the sisters Gabriela Gilvero and Isabel Gilverio - by virtue of a Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng Lupang Katihan dated 14 January 1951.[5]They likewise formally offered in evidence Subdivision Plan Csd-04-024336-D, which indicated the portion of the subject land, which they claimed was sold to their predecessors-in-interest.[6]In a Decision dated 18 November 2003, the trial court granted respondents Vegas application and directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in the name of respondents Vegas and respondents-intervenors Buhays predecessors, in proportion to their claims over the subject land.Petitioner Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court, arguing that respondents Vegas failed to prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales did not contain the date when the land was declared as such. Unpersuaded by petitioner Republics arguments, the Court of Appeals affirmedin totothe earlier Decision of the trial court.Aggrieved by the ruling, petitioner filed the instant Rule 45 Petition with this Court.Respondents Vegas, who are joined by respondents-intervenors Buhays (collectively, respondents), raise procedural issues concerning the filing of the instant Petition, which the Court shall resolve first. Briefly, respondents found, in the instant Petition, procedural deficiencies that ought to warrant its outright dismissal. These deficiencies are as follows: (a) petitioner Republic failed to include the pertinent portions of the record that would support its arguments under Rule 45, Section 4 (d) of the Rules of Court, specifically the Appellees Brief of respondents Vegas in the appellate proceedings; and (b) it raised questions of fact, which are beyond the purview of a Rule 45 Petition.[7]The Court is not persuaded by respondents arguments concerning the purported defects of the Petition.First, petitioner Republics failure to attach a copy of respondents Vegas Appellees Brief to the instant Petition isnota fatal mistake, which merits the immediate dismissal of a Rule 45 Petition. The requirement that a petition for review on certiorari should be accompanied by such material portions of the record as would support the petition is left to the discretion of the party filing the petition.[8]Except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment sought to be appealed from,[9]there are no other records from the courta quothat must perforce be attached before the Court can take cognizance of a Rule 45 petition.Respondents cannot fault petitioner Republic for excluding pleadings, documents or records in the lower court, which to their mind would assist this Court in deciding whether the Decision appealed from is sound. Petitioner Republic is left to its own estimation of the case in deciding which records would support its Petition and should thus be attached thereto. In any event, respondents are not prevented from attaching to their pleadings pertinent portions of the records that they deem necessary for the Courts evaluation of the case, as was done by respondents Vegas in this case when they attached their Appellees Brief to their Comment. In the end, it is the Court, in finally resolving the merits of the suit that will ultimately decide whether the material portions of the records attached are sufficient to support the Petition.Second, the Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic simply takes issue against the conclusions made by the trial and the appellate courts regarding the nature and character of the subject parcel of land, based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a review of the decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.InNew Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. v. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael Susan,[10]the Court reiterated the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact in this wise:We reiterate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; orwhen the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts orwhen the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. (Emphasis supplied)Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the evidence presented, specifically the testimony of Mr. Gonzales. It, however, questions whether the evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower courts conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Otherwise stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas in the proceedings below, were the trial and the appellate courts justified under the law and jurisprudence in their findings on the nature and character of the subject land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for a resolution of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of facts.Going now to the substantial merits, petitioner Republic places before the Court the question of whether, based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Was it erroneous for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed the trial courts grant of registration applied for by respondents Vegas over the subject land? We find no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides for the instances when a person may file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of land:Section 14. Who May Apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. x x x.Thus, pursuant to the afore-quoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove the following: (1) thatthe subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.[11]Section 14 (1) of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed.[12]Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land in the present Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first requisite: specifically, whether it has sufficiently been demonstrated that the subject land is alienable and disposable.Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation of the same in the concept of an owner - no matter how long -cannot ripen into ownership and result in a title; public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable lands remain part of the inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.[13]Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they call for proof.[14]To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as any of the following: a presidential proclamation or an executive order; other administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a legislative act or statute.[15]The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.[16]Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and disposable was sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.[17]However, inRepublic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[18]the Supreme Court overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO certification isnotenough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis supplied)Thus, as it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish that the land indeed is alienable and disposable.[19]To comply with the first requisite for an application for original registration of title under the Property Registration Decree, respondents Vegas should have submitted a CENRO certificationanda certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary that the land is alienable and disposable, together with their application. However, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, respondents Vegas failed to submit a CENRO certification -- much less an original classification by the DENR Secretary -- to prove that the land is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[20]If the stringent rule imposed inRepublic v. T.A.N. Properties,Inc., is to be followed, the absence of these twin certifications justifies a denial of an application for registration. Significantly, however, the Courts pronouncement inRepublic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,was issued after the decisions of the trial court[21]and the appellate court[22]in this case.Recently, however, inRepublic v. Serrano,[23]the Court affirmed the findings of the trial and the appellate courts that the parcel of land subject of registration was alienable and disposable. The Court held that a DENR Regional Technical Directors certification, which is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constitutessubstantial compliancewith the legal requirement:While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for,the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925.The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents' applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents. (Emphasis supplied)Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and disposable are a certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) and a certified true copy of the DENRs original classification of the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the ground of substantial compliance.Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has been substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record.First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO who testified that the subject land is alienable and disposable, and who identified his written report on his inspection of the subject land.In the Report,[24]Mr. Gonzales attested under oath that (1) the area is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on 31 December 1925;[25](2) the land has never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes; (3) the land is not within a previously patented/decreed/titled property;[26](4) there are no public land application/s filed by the applicant for the same land;[27]and (5) the land is residential/commercial.[28]That Mr. Gonzales appeared and testified before an open court only added to the reliability of the Report, which classified the subject land as alienable and disposable public land. The Court affirms the Court of Appeals conclusion that Mr. Gonzales testimony and written report under oath constituted substantial evidence to support their claim as to the nature of the subject land.Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as evidence by respondents-intervenors Buhays,[29]expressly indicates that the land is alienable and disposable. Similar toRepublic v. Serrano, Mr. Samson G. de Leon, the officer-in-charge of the Office of the Assistant Regional Executive Director for Operations of the DENR, approved the said subdivision plan, which was annotated with the following proviso: [T]his survey is insidealienable and disposable area as per Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on Dec. 31, 1925. Notably, Mr. De Leons annotation pertaining to the identification of the land as alienable and disposable coincides with the investigation report of Mr. Gonzales.Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas application for original registration, the LRA never raised the issue that the land subject of registration was not alienable and disposable. In the Supplementary Report submitted during the trial court proceedings,[30]the LRA did not interpose any objection to the application on the basis of the nature of the land. It simply noted that the subject subdivision plan (Psu-51460) had also been applied for in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505, but that there was no decree of registration issued therefor. Thus, the LRA recommended that should the instant case be given due course, the application in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505 with respect to plan Psu-51460 be dismissed. In addition, not only did the government fail to cross-examine Mr. Gonzales, it likewise chose not to present any countervailing evidence to support its opposition. In contrast to the other cases brought before this Court,[31]no opposition was raised by any interested government body, aside from thepro formaopposition filed by the OSG.Theonusin proving that the land is alienable and disposable still remains with the applicant in an original registration proceeding; and the government, in opposing the purported nature of the land, need not adduce evidence to prove otherwise.[32]In this case though, there was no effective opposition, except thepro formaopposition of the OSG, to contradict the applicants claim as to the character of the public land as alienable and disposable. The absence of any effective opposition from the government, when coupled with respondents other pieces of evidence on record persuades this Court to rule in favor of respondents.In the instant Petition, petitioner Republic also assails the failure of Mr. Gonzales to testify as to when the land was declared as alienable and disposable. Indeed, his testimony in open court is bereft of any detail as to when the land was classified as alienable and disposable public land, as well as the date when he conducted the investigation. However, these matters could have been dealt with extensively during cross-examination, which petitioner Republic waived because of its repeated absences and failure to present counter evidence.[33]In any event, the Report, as well as the Subdivision Plan, readily reveals that the subject land was certified as alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and was even classified as residential and commercial in nature.Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents Vegas, coupled with the absence of any countervailing evidence by petitioner Republic, substantially establishes that the land applied for is alienable and disposable and is the subject of original registration proceedings under the Property Registration Decree. There was no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the appellate court in granting the registration.Respondents-intervenors Buhays title to that portion of the subject land is likewise affirmed, considering that the joint claim of respondents-intervenors Buhays over the land draws its life from the same title of respondents Vegas, who in turn failed to effectively oppose the claimed sale of that portion of the land to the formers predecessors-in-interest.It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance appliespro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings inRepublic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were rendered prior to these rulings.[34]To establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must includeboth(1) a CENRO or PENRO certificationand(2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application,pro hac vice, on the ground ofsubstantial complianceshowing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registrationcurrently pendingbefore the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition isDENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 30 April 2007 and the trial courts Decision dated 18 November 2003 are herebyAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOAssociate JusticeWE CONCUR:CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate JusticeChairpersonARTURO D. BRIONLUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate JusticeAssociate JusticeMARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate JusticeA T T E S T A T I O NI attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Courts Division.CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate JusticeChairperson, Third DivisionC E R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice

[1]Rolloat 28-40.[2]TSN, 24 July 2000, at 5-6.[3]Exhibit CC (Report dated 13 January 1997), Regional Trial Court records at 125.[4]Motion for Intervention dated 14 August 1998 and Opposition dated 14 April 1998 (Exhibits 7 and 8), Regional Trial Court records, at 158-170.[5]Exhibit 1, Regional Trial Court records, at 167-168.[6]Exhibit 5, Regional Trial Court records, at 418.[7]Comment dated 03 September 2007,rolloat 44-55.[8]Rule 45, Sec. 4 (d) of the Rules of Court.[9]The petition shall (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; (Rule 45, Sec. 1 [d] of the Rules of Court)[10]G.R. No. 161818, 20 August 2008, 562 SCRA 503.[11]Republic v. Hanover Worldwide TradingCorporation, G.R. No. 172102, 02 July 2010;Lim v. Republic,G.R. Nos. 158630 & 162047, 04 September 2009, 598 SCRA 247;Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, 23 December 2008, 575 SCRA 51;Llanes v. Republic, G.R. No. 177947, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 258;Republic v. Diloy, G.R. No. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413;Ong v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746, 12 March 2008, 548 SCRA 160;Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, 01 July 2003, 405 SCRA 291.[12]Republic v. Diloy, G.R. No. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413;Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.[13]Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, 23 December 2008, 575 SCRA 51;Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775, 08 October, 2008, 568 SCRA 164.[14]Republic v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, 24 January 2006, 479 SCRA 585, citingDirector of Lands v. Funtilar, 142 SCRA 57 (1986).[15]Republic v. Candymaker, Inc.,G.R. No. 163766, 22 June 2006, 492 SCRA 272, citingRepublic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697, 710-711 (2002);Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 177797, 04 December 2008, 573 SCRA 89;Buenaventura v. Pascual, G.R. No. 168819, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 143;Republic v. Muoz, G.R. No. 151910, 15 October 2007, 536 SCRA 108.[16]Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 91;Zarate v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 131501, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 322.[17]Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 177797, 04 December 2008, 573 SCRA 89;Spouses Recto v. Republic, G.R. No.160421, 04 October 2004, 440 SCRA 79.[18]G.R. No. 154953, 26 June 2008, 555 SCRA 477.[19]SeeRepublic v. Heirs of Fabio, supra note 11;Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172102, 02 July 2010;Republic v. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, 06 July 2010.[20]CA Decision, at 12;rolloat 39.[21]RTC Decision dated 18 November 2003.[22]CA Decision dated 30 April 2007;rolloat 28-40.[23]G.R. No. 183063, 24 February 2010.[24]Exhibit CC, Regional Trial Court records, at 125.[25]Exhibit CC-1, id.[26]Exhibit CC-2, id.[27]Exhibit CC-3, id.[28]Exhibit CC-4, id.[29]Exhibit 5, Regional Trial Court records at 418.[30]Exhibit AA, Regional Trial Court records at 107-108.[31]InRepublic v. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, 06 July 2010, the Laguna Lake Development Authority also opposed Roche's application on the ground that, based on technical descriptions, her land was located below the reglamentary lake elevation of 12.50 meters and, therefore, may be deemed part of the Laguna Lake bed under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 4850. InRepublic v. Hanover, supra note 19, the Republic was represented by the OSG and the DENR in opposing the application for registration.[32]Republic v. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, 06 July 2010.[33]Decision dated 18 November 2003, Regional Trial Court records at 442-443.[34]As earlier stated, the RTC and CA Rulings were promulgated beforeRepublic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC.,respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseBefore the Court is a petition for review1assailing the 21 August 2002 Decision2of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of Appeals affirmedin totothe 16 December 1999 Decision3of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case No. T-635.The Antecedent FactsThis case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to 6794,4and in the 18 October 1999 issue of Peoples Journal Taliba,5a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the land.6All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices concerned were notified of the initial hearing.7On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing, there was no oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner). On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order8of General Default against the whole world except as against petitioner.During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang) appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999 within which to file his written opposition.9Carandang failed to file his written opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order10dated 13 December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default.During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondents Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.The testimonies of respondents witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of Antonios children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting).11On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.The Ruling of the Trial CourtIn its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondents predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the land to private property.The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the name of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal office at 19thFloor, PDCP Bank Building, 8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.SO ORDERED.12Petitioner appealed from the trial courts Decision. Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied with the period of possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature. Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses should have been presented to corroborate Evangelistas testimony.The Ruling of the Court of AppealsIn its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmedin totothe trial courts Decision.The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of the possession and occupation of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On Evangelistas failure to mention the name of his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle when he testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunatos relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelistas statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroys death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and disposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole witness testimony.The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since he was only testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of the application for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. Petitioner raises the following grounds in its Memorandum:The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to applicant corporation despite the following:1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land.13The IssuesThe issues may be summarized as follows:1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.The Ruling of this CourtThe petition has merit.Respondent Failed to Provethat the Land is Alienable and DisposablePetitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public domain. Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part of the public domain.The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State.14Theonusto overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.15In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,16certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The second certification17in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20,18dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38,19dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.20In this case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure projects; and5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereofor by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputyx x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication21of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:Sec. 23.Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar22in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ships logbook.23The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public documents.24The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value.25Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.26Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.27Here, Torres, a private individual and respondents representative, identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value.28The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications.29Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved."30It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the lands classification.31However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineers certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications submitted by respondent.There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and NotoriousPossession and Occupation in the Concept of an OwnerPetitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelistas statement that the possession of respondents predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.We agree with petitioner.Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years. Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroys land. The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelistas knowledge of Kabesang Puroys possession of the land stemmed "not only from the fact that he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically neighbors."32The Court of Appeals observed:In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it is not difficult to understand that people in the said community knows each and everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of public knowledge to them.33Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the relationship between Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelistas testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of Antonios children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelistas testimony.The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of respondents acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership.34Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.Land Application by a CorporationPetitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain in this case.We agree with petitioner.Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. InChavez v. Public Estates Authority,35the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.36The Court explained inChavez:The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiringany kind of alienable land of the public domain.Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domainonly through lease. x x x x[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.37InDirector of Lands v. IAC,38the Court allowed the land registration proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which Acme acquired from members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which prohibited private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court ruled thatthe land was already private land when Acme acquired it from its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more than 144 hectares.39InDirector of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period,ipso jureand without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would notoriginallyconvert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts,the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title,there being at the time no prohibition against said corporations holding or owning private land. x x x.40(Emphasis supplied)Director of Landsis not applicable to the present case. InDirector of Lands, the "land x x x was already private property at the time it was acquired x x x by Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired the land from Porting, the land was not yet private property.ForDirector of Landsto apply and enable a corporation to file for registration of alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner