LEBANESE SHI‘ITE LEADERSHIP, 1920–1970S

Personalities, Alliances,and Feuds

Omri Nir

Lebanese Shi‘ite Leadership, 1920–1970s

Omri   Nir

Lebanese Shi‘ite Leadership, 1920–1970s

Personalities, Alliances, and Feuds

ISBN 978-3-319-43013-3 ISBN 978-3-319-43014-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43014-0

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Omri   Nir Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies Hebrew University Jerusalem , Israel

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Map of Lebanon

vii

1 Introduction 1

2 Main Classes in the Traditional Lebanese Shi‘ite Community 15

3 The Centers of Power 35

4 The Speakership of the Parliament 79

5 The Intellectuals and the Power Centers 87

6 The Decline of the Zu‘ama 95

Conclusions 117

Bibliography 121

Index 127

CONTENTS

1© The Author(s) 2017O. Nir, Lebanese Shi‘ite Leadership, 1920–1970s, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43014-0_1

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract The chapter introduces the background required to understand the Shi‘ite leadership in Lebanon from 1920 to the 1970s. It provides a brief history of Shi‘ies in Lebanon and explains the differences, relevant to the book, between the Shi‘ies of Jabel-‘Amil (south Lebanon) and those of the Lebanese Biqa‘ (eastern valley). It also explains the infl uence of certain elements of Shi‘ite life in Lebanon, such as communal elites, back-wardness and poverty versus modernity, as well as geographical and demo-graphic impacts.

Keywords Jabel-‘Amil • al-Biqa‘ • The Lebanese question

This book deals with the leadership of the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon, in the period between the establishment of the Lebanese State in 1920 and the late 1970s. During these years, Lebanon evolved from a French mandate to an independent state, struggling with internal problems and regional challenges. The book focuses on the structure of power groups and alliances within the Lebanese Shi‘a leadership, including key person-alities. It does not deal with the role of the Shi‘ite leadership in issues on the Lebanese agenda or its infl uence on Lebanese politics.

The Lebanese Shi‘ies belong to Twelver Shi‘ism, which is the main-stream of Shi‘ite Islam. It considers itself a continuation of the dynasty of ‘Ali Iben Abu Talib, the fourth Islamic Khalifa and the fi rst Shi‘ite

Imam . The Twelver Shi‘ies believe in the dynasty of Imams , ending with the twelfth and last Imam , Muhammad al-Mahdi, who disappeared in 874 CE . In the past, the Lebanese Shi‘ies were called “Mutuala”, a term that apparently originated from the letters ‘A.l.i, which stand for loyalty, reliability, sponsorship, kinship and ally. The term Mutawila became com-mon after the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750), based on the appellation “Tawilat Aahl al-Bayt”, meaning trustees or representatives of Islam. It was a common term among the Shi‘ies, who used it to inspire faith and pride among the young in times of crisis. 1

Shi‘ite Islam arrived in Lebanon in the mid-seventh century when Dhaher al-Ghafri, one of the Prophet Mohammad’s escorts, was sent into exile in Syria by Khalif ‘Othman ben ‘Afan. Mu‘awiya ben Abu-Safyan, the governor of Damascus and nephew of the Khalif, kept him away from Damascus , so he settled in the southwest of the city, in the area later called Jabel-‘Amil . The name originated from the settlement in this area of the al-‘Amila tribe, which had traveled from Yemen in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Ghafri lived in the village of Miss-Jbeil and preached Shi‘ite Islam among the sparse Christian population living in the area. At the beginning of the Abbasid period in the mid-eighth century, during the days of the Shi‘ite Imam Ja‘a far al-Sadiq , Shi‘a had become an existing religious  in Lebanon. It accepted Ja‘afari jurisprudence ( al-Madhab al-Ja‘afari ) in Islam, which includes a complementary system of beliefs, a legal theory and an entire way of life.

The decline of the Abbasid Sunni regime in Baghdad during the tenth century led to the weakening of Sunni leaders around the Muslim world and strengthened local Shi‘ite dynasties. In northern Syria, Twelver Shi‘ism fl ourished in several places: around the city of Aleppo through the Hamadi  (Hamadeh) dynasty (945–1055), in the city of Tripoli under the emirate of Abu Talib ben ‘Ammar , in the area of Sidon (Saida) under the emirate of Bani-Mirdas (1021–1028) and in the city of Tyre under ‘Ein al-Dawla bin Abi ‘Aqil . 2

During the fi rst centuries of Shi‘ite settlement in geographic Syria ( Bilad a-Sham ), the Twelvers settled in Kisrawan in the northern part of Mount Lebanon and in the Biqa‘ (the Lebanese valley). However, as Abbasid rule declined and the Mamluk sultans rose to power, the new rul-ers pushed the last of the Crusaders out of Syria and directed their military campaigns against Kisrawan. In the last campaign, which took place in July 1305, the Mamluks , who were characterized by religious intolerance, drove most of the Shi‘ies out of the area. Some Shi‘ies sought refuge in the towns of Ba‘albek in northern Biqa‘, Jezzine in the mountains to the

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south and in several points around the cities of Beirut and Sidon. Most of them, however, settled in the hills south of Mount Lebanon, in the region of Jabel-‘Amil. 3 During this period an ethnic shift occurred, resulting in the dominance of Christian Maronites in Mount Lebanon. As a result, many Shi‘ies exercised the religious duty called Taqiya , which requires concealment of the Shi‘ite faith in times of danger. By doing so, they also managed to preserve small communities of Shi‘ies in the mountains north of Jbeil .

The state of Lebanon, or “ Greater Lebanon ” ( Grand Liban , Lubnan al-Kabir ), was established by France in September 1920 as a separate entity from Ottoman Syria. From the 1516 Ottoman occupation of Lebanon to the First World War in 1914–17, the territory of what is today Lebanon evolved in a way that was unique in the Arab Middle East. Under the Ottomans, Syria was divided into administrative provinces ( Villayet ). The Shi‘ies in the Biqa‘ became part of the province of Damascus, while the Shi‘ies of Jabel-‘Amil lived in different provinces, such as Damascus, Beirut and Sidon, according to the Ottoman administrative divisions, which were modifi ed from time to time. The Shi‘ite population was not directly governed by Ottoman rule, but, rather, lived under the system of Iqta‘ , in which local people, Muqta‘ajiyun ( Muqta‘aji for an individ-ual), were given the authority to collect taxes. This system was established during the Mamluk period and was preserved until the radical Ottoman reforms introduced from 1839 ( al-Tanzimat ). The Muqta‘aji stood at the top of the social pyramid and had full control over social and economic life, as well as limited judicial status in the area under his control (known as Auhda ). The Muqta‘aji became the major intermediary between the Ottoman rulers and the residents, mostly due to his authority as tax col-lector for the Ottoman central treasury. This title was inherited and thus “dynasties” of Iqta‘ were established. Prominent among them in Jabel-‘Amil were the Shi‘ite families of ‘Ali al-Saghir , al-As‘ad , al-Sa᾿ab and al- Munqir , and in Ba‘albek- Hirmal in the western Biqa‘, the tribes Hamadeh and Harfush . Below the Muqta‘ajiyun in the social pyramid, with a lesser degree of independence, were families of ‘Ulama (religious scholars) who came from all classes of society. At the bottom of the social pyramid were commoners, known as the A‘awam , or ‘Aamt al-Nas . Although the gov-ernment, and thus the tax collection system, were replaced, this social structure continued to characterize the Shi‘ite community until the last quarter of the twentieth century, albeit with minor changes such as replac-ing the Muqta‘ajiyun with Zu‘ama and creating sub-classes within the three layers of the society.

INTRODUCTION 3

THE SHI‘IES OF JABEL-‘AMIL The political history of the Shi‘ies in Jabel-‘Amil can be divided into six periods. The fi rst period was from the arrival of the al- ‘Amila bin Saba tribe from Yemen in the seventh century until the Ottoman conquest in 1516. The second was from the beginning of Ottoman rule until the death of the great Shi‘ite feudal leader ‘Ali Bek al-As‘ad in 1865, which symbolized, in many respects, the decline of the Muqta‘ajiyun in Jabel-‘Amil. Following the death of ‘Ali Bek al-As‘ad, the uniformity of Jabel-‘Amil, which was unique in its consisting of one feudal unit, and the dominance of the al- As‘ad family declined. The third period was from 1865, when the area was under direct Ottoman rule, until 1918 (although offi cially 1915), when the Ottoman Empire collapsed during the First World War. The fourth was from 1918 to 1943 or 1946, the period during which Jabel-‘Amil was under European rule, mostly French but also British. During the fi fth period it was part of the independent Lebanese state, and during the sixth it was under Israel i occupation, in the years 1982–2000.

The traumatic collective memory of the Shi‘ies in Jabel-‘Amil goes back to the mid-eighteenth century. This memory is the basis for some behavioral patterns. At that time, the Shi‘ies supported the Ottoman Wali (governor) of Sidon, Dhahir al-‘Omar , who rebelled against the Ottoman Sultan over high taxes. The good relations between the Shi‘ies and the local ruler came to an end in 1770 at the initiative of the Shi‘ies, a move that demonstrated the strength of the Shi‘ite society in Jabel-‘Amil. However, with the assassination of Dhahir al-‘Omar in 1776, the residents of Jabel-‘Amil faced a diffi cult period, the trauma of which left marks on the Shi‘ite community for generations. ‘Omar’s successor, Ahmed al- Jazzar , moved decisively and ruthlessly against anyone who had acted in the past against the Ottoman regime. He killed thousands of Shi‘ies in Jabel-‘Amil, including the Shi‘ite armed forces under the leadership of Sheikh Nasif al-Nasser . 4 According to Shanahan, the effects of al-Jazzar’s punitive rule were still being felt by the Shi‘ies in the middle of the nineteenth century. 5 However, Shi‘ies subsequently established a pattern of collective resistance against any occupying power and local opposition movements became an integral part of the local scene in Jabel-‘Amil. In later years, resistance was directed against Ottoman rule, against the French Mandate and against the Israeli occupation. After the death of al-Jazzar in 1804, Jabel-‘Amil returned to the Iqta‘ system following an agreement between the new Wali of Sidon and the local strongman of Jabel-‘Amil, Fares al-Nassef . 6

4 O. NIR

The Iqta‘ system lasted until the beginning of the reforms introduced by the Ottomans in 1839, known as the Tanzimat . As part of a new admin-istrative division in 1864, Jabel-‘Amil became part of the new province of Beirut, under direct Ottoman rule. Tamara Chalabi claimed that with the modernization of the land regime some of the prominent Zu‘ama families suffered a dramatic loss of power, including the al-As‘ad (formerly al-Saghir), but they succeeded in maintaining a position within the new hierarchy while adjusting to the new status quo. 7

Another pattern that was repeated consistently over the last two centuries of the second millennium is related to economic hardship in Jabel-‘Amil. This hardship worsened in the last quarter of the eighteenth century following the decline of the port of Sidon and the rise of Beirut’s port. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, agricultural status and economic distress were directly linked, affected by market require-ments, government investment in irrigation projects, and the security situ-ation in Jabel-‘Amil and the ports of Tyre and Sidon. A severe crisis in agriculture in the 1930s caused the Shi‘ies of Jabel-‘Amil to emigrate to western Africa and South America . The Shi‘ite demographic distribution in Lebanon changed signifi cantly in the 1950s and 1960s, when many of them migrated from rural areas to Beirut.

The beginning of direct Ottoman rule over Shi‘ite areas in the mid- nineteenth century had a profound effect on their lives, as a more modern administration system and military service were implemented. One impor-tant change concerned the new Ottoman policy of preferring alternative power centers to the families who ran the Iqta‘ system. This policy deeply affected the status of these families in the local social structure. In order to maintain their infl uence and previous status, many of them became gov-ernment offi cials and representatives to the local population. As a result, relations between these families and the local residents in the area of their operations were harmed. Within this framework, a group of grain dealers rose in the last third of the nineteenth century. These traders, known as Wujaha᾿ , became tax collectors ( Multazimun ) and government offi cials. Some of them, who were able to break into the lucrative and respectable class of leaders, gaining extensive infl uence, were later to be called Zu‘ama ( Za‘im for single). The most prominent among the nouveaux riches in Jabel-‘Amil was Sunni Rida al-Sulh from Sidon, who, together with the heads of the Shi‘ite families ‘Osseyran , al-Khalil and al-Zein , represented a genuine challenge to the old hegemonic tribal status, represented at the time by the Shi‘ite al-As‘ad family. Most of the Zu‘ama trace their origins to the Arab tribes of Yemen. 8

INTRODUCTION 5

The new local leadership was, to some extent, a platform that helped introduce some of the reforms to Jabel-‘Amil. The main motivation of the Zu‘ama seems to have been a desire not to fall behind their class cohort from Beirut, who started gaining power rapidly during this period. Among the prominent Shi‘ite Zu‘ama who contributed to the introduc-tion of new ideas to Jabel-‘Amil were ‘Abd al-Karim Qas em al-Khalil, who established a cultural club to revive Arab culture, and ‘Aref al-Zein , who began publishing a Shi‘ite journal, al-‘Irfan , in 1909 in Sidon. This journal was the fi rst Shi‘ite stage for intellectuals and publicists and was considered infl uential in Lebanese Shi‘ite society. 9 Literary and political associations, which were merged in Jabel-‘Amil, addressed issues related to the Ottoman state in an effort to implement Arab national rights and aspirations. The Zu‘ama provided the basics for movements that led the Shi‘ite political ideas, while searching practical integration within the Arab-Syrian surrounding. These movements often provided ground for argu-ments and rivalries between “classic” Zu‘ama and “new” Zu‘ama , who, to a certain extent, were riding on the back of reforms and Arabism . In Tyre, for example, an anti-Turkish, but not necessarily anti-Ottoman, move-ment called the “ Movement of Tyre ” acted under the leadership of Sunni Rida al-Sulh and Shi‘ite ‘Abdul Karim al-Khalil. The two were sentenced to death by the Ottomans in 1915, after a trial involving intrigue and denunciations from all the Zu‘ama in Jabel-‘Amil. This confl ict involved the old-fashioned Shi‘ite Za‘im Kamel Bey al-As‘ad, against the “new” Shi‘ite Zu‘ama ‘Osseyran, al-Khalil and al-Zein. The struggles among the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama during the First World War partly paralleled the struggle between pro-Ottomans and pro-Arabs. 10

The end of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire ended the internal struggle between pro-Ottoman and pro-Arab Zu‘ama in Jabel-‘Amil, a struggle that was conducted under the leadership of Shi‘ite Kamel Bey al-As‘ad on the one hand, and Sunni Rida al-Sulh on the other hand. The pro-Arab group left the struggle with an upper hand. Soon all the local leaders became pro-Arab, removed the mask of political- ideological struggle and became focused on personal issues. During this period, the idea of establishing an Arab monarchy on Syrian territory became the goal of Arab nationalism. Shi‘ite intellectuals such as Ahmed Rida , Mu hammad Jaber al-Safa and others became authentic partners of the Arab intellectual awakening. 11 Their contribution to strengthening Arab nationalism was equal to that of Sunni intellectuals. The connections between these intellectuals and the Zu‘ama led to a national awakening among the latter.

6 O. NIR

THE SHI‘IES IN THE BIQA‘ While Jabel-‘Amil was associated with the coast, the Shi‘ies in the Ba‘albek-Hirmal in the Biqa‘ (valley) had ties with the Syrian interior areas and retained their tribal structure and lifestyle. The Biqa‘ had been generally considered more independent, less subject to the infl uence of external authority. The power bases of the Zu‘ama in this area were more evenly distributed. 12 Since the days of the Muslim occupation of Greater Syria , also known as Bilad al-Sham (Northland), which included Arab areas north of the Sinai desert, the Biqa‘ was controlled by the Emirs of the Harfush tribe. The town of Ba‘albek, with a population estimated at 7000–8000  in the eighteenth century, functioned as the capital of the Biqa‘ region. 13 In the economic sphere Ba‘albek was a major cotton pro-ducer, grain cultivation center and exporter of raisins, which were sent to Europe through the port of Tripoli and to Anatolia through the Syrian city of Hama. Its location, across the Damascus–Sidon corridor (to the port) and along the route taken by the Hajj caravans from the north, meant that it made a signifi cant contribution to Syria’s prosperity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Towards the late eighteenth century the city’s importance declined due to a long struggle between the Emirs of Harfush on the one side and the Ottomans and Shihabi Emirs of Mount Lebanon on the other. In 1748 the Biqa‘ was brought under the con-trol of the Shihabi Emirs following their victory over Wali of Damascus. Following the brutal war between the Shi‘ies of Jabel-‘Amil and al- Jazzar in 1781 and the arrival of survivors from Jabel-‘Amil to the Biqa‘, some communal affi nity developed between the two Shi‘ite communities. 14 In 1799, when the Ottomans conducted military operations in the region, they were supplied with wheat from the Biqa‘ by the Emir Bashir Shihab II . As a result, the Ottoman Grand Wazir recognized Bashir as gover-nor of Ba‘albek and the Biqa‘. 15 The struggle mentioned above, between Harfush and the Ottomans and Shihabi Emirs, had taken a heavy toll on the Shi‘ies of the Biqa‘, fi nancial as well as demographic, since many decided to leave the area. Harfush’s protracted rebellion against Ottoman rule ended in 1864 with the complete elimination of the tribal leadership, ending its dominance in the Biqa‘. 16

Another factor that affected Ba‘albek was its proximity to the Syrian city of Hama . The latter was, for years, a stop on the caravan route to Mecca, which contributed economically to its surrounding. After Hama’s impor-tance declined in the mid-nineteenth century in favor of the new city of

INTRODUCTION 7

Zahle , with its Christian population, Ba‘albek was fi nancially affected. 17 The Hirmal region in the northwest of the Biqa‘, on the other hand, did not change hands between tribes and remained the stronghold of the Hamadeh tribe. In the mid-sixteenth century, this tribe controlled large areas in north Lebanon. As a result of local revolts, however, it was driven back to the eastern slopes of Mount Lebanon, to Hirmal, where it contin-ued to be dominant throughout the twentieth century.

The direct Ottoman rule in the Biqa‘ following the Tanzimat (reforms) had a similar effect to that in Jabel-‘Amil. In socio-economic terms, the Haydar tribe rose from a status of franchise owner of agricultural land ( Multazem ) to the status of Zu‘ama . This tribe replaced the Harfush tribe as the great rival of the Hamadeh tribe. In addition to these two tribes, a system of sponsorships was formed among other infl uential tribes, the most prominent of which were Dandash and al-Husseini . Although the Zu‘ama families in the Biqa‘ had hoped to see Arab nationalism take root after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, they did not take action with local intellectuals towards that end. Pro-Arab nationalist activities, in gen-eral, were nonexistent in the Biqa‘. The only prominent Shi‘ite involve-ment in national affairs from the Biqa‘ was that of Rustom Haydar , who was involved in the “ Association of Young Arabs ” ( Jam‘iyat al-‘Arabiya al-Fatat ), founded secretly in Paris in 1911 by Syrian Jamil Mardam to promote total Arab independence. 18

CENTRAL POINTS FOR UNDERSTANDING LEBANESE SHI‘IES

The Politics of the Elites

The assumption that Lebanon is dominated politically by sectarian elites is the underlying basis of this study. This dominance is more evident in Lebanon than in other countries due to the fact that the Lebanese politi-cal system is based on sectarian key representation, in which the top ruling positions and the parliamentary seats are reserved for the main religious sects. This structure has increased the gap between the elite and the masses, since the quotas of positions reserved for each religious sect are fi lled by a small group of elites and their representatives. In all parliaments elected in Lebanon between 1943 and 1992, except that of 1960, between 40 and 60 percent of those elected were related in some way. 19 The main reason for this is the socio-economic structure that characterized Lebanon for cen-turies, headed by the Muqta‘ajiyun who became Zu‘ama . Naturally, the

8 O. NIR

Zu‘ama took over the key public and economic positions in the Lebanese state after its formation in 1920. They formed alliances that overcame reli-gious sectarianism and enabled them to continue their control over power centers in Lebanon. The control of the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama over their commu-nity was nearly complete and was derived from the deep backwardness of the Shi‘ite masses in every fi eld, and from the absence of any other politi-cal tradition that could have provided a real alternative to the Zu‘ama .

The Lebanese sectarian system also contributed to intersectarian con-fl icts between leaders and their supporters. In Hirmal in the 1920s, for example, Sabri and Sa‘adallah Hamadeh collaborated with the French Mandatory authorities in order to retain the existence of a Lebanese entity separate from Syria. As a result, they lost the support of those who fought for the unifi cation of Syria. These struggles were also economically moti-vated: the active participation of the Zu‘ama families in politics expanded the socio-economic gaps between them and the masses of the commu-nity. While the leaders wrestled for governmental posts, the Shi‘ite villages deteriorated into poverty and ended up with huge debts. The sectarian system also created an affi nity between government positions reserved for the Shi‘ies, especially the offi ce of Speaker (head) of the Lebanese Parliament, and fi gures such as Ahmed al-A s‘ad and Sabri Hamadeh . In contrast, less familiar Shi‘ite fi gures, such as Kazem al-Khalil and Yusuf al- Zein, cooperated with the Sunni s under a Muslim umbrella, and therefore found it diffi cult to be elected to the offi ce of Parliamentary Speaker. All these struggles had the cumulative effect of alienating the traditional lead-ership from a generation that was gradually developing a political aware-ness with a strong Arab nationalist political identity.

Geographical Aspect

Lebanon’s physical space plays an important role in some of the coun-try’s diffi culties. Lebanon is a country in which areas populated by dif-ferent religious sects were integrated into one entity. Its border crosses areas that have been under the political control of different administrative frameworks for centuries. The space has impacted the Lebanese Shi‘ies on three levels: regional, state and local. On the regional level, the Shi‘ies in Lebanon have no territorial continuity with other Shi‘ite communities in the Middle East. In this they are different from the Shi‘ies of Iraq, for example, who live in physical proximity to Iran, the Shi‘ite state. This physical distance has made it diffi cult to maintain religious and political

INTRODUCTION 9

connections with Iran, and to a certain extent has prevented the Lebanese Shi‘ies from receiving political or military backing for many years. The Shi‘ies in Lebanon are surrounded by Sunni and Christian populations, while across the Israeli border there is a Jewish population. This is a sig-nifi cant barrier to the spread of Shi‘ite Islam into the Levant.

At the state level, the border of the Lebanese state has created problems for the two historical Shi‘ite strongholds, Jabel-‘Amil in the south and al-Biqa‘ in the east. First, the borders of “Greater Lebanon” separated the Shi‘ite population in the Biqa‘ from Syria after centuries of being an integral part of the Villayet s of Syria or Damascus, or Aleppo. This cre-ated, from the start, opposition to the Lebanese state among the residents of the Biqa‘. Second, within the borders of the modern Lebanese state, spatial inequality became evident when Beirut and some parts of Mount Lebanon received a larger share of the state’s budget and were modern-ized long before other areas of the country. As a result, the Shi‘ies lived in the most backward areas in Lebanon. Third, the geopolitical situation led to outside intervention in Shi‘ite areas—the Biqa‘ region was infl uenced by its proximity to Syria and the Jabel-‘Amil region was affected by its proximity to the Israeli border . Fourth, the geographical and topographi-cal characteristics of Lebanon created variance within the Shi‘ite commu-nity: the Biqa‘ region, detached from the country’s political and economic center in Beirut by Mount Lebanon, differed from Jabel-‘Amil in its life-style and political approach. 20

At the local level, the Zu‘ama families became synonymous with the geographic areas they controlled. The Lebanese electoral system made it possible for the Zu‘ama to establish their electoral strength in these regions and thus made them, to some extent, local rulers. The identi-fi cation of Zu‘ama with their constituencies was particularly evident in the periphery while in Beirut, which became the third Shi‘ite population center after the late 1950s, the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama had no power. The most prominent example is the leaders of the al-As‘ad family from the village of Taybe in Jabel-‘Amil, who were known as the “Masters of the South“. The al-Khalil family controlled the city of Tyre, the ‘Osseyrans controlled parts of the city of Sidon, the al-Zein family was infl uential in the rural area around Tyre, the Hamadehs dominated the town of Ba‘albek, and the Haydars controlled Hirmal in western Biqa‘. This phenomenon was not unique to the Shi‘ies, as it was common also among other religious sects. The dominant families among the Sunnis were the al-Sulh and Karami families in the cities of Tyre and Tripoli respectively, and the al- Yafi and

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Salam famil ies in Beirut; the Druze families Junblatt and Arslan dominated the Matan and Shuf constituencies in Mount Lebanon; and the Maronite families of Gumayil , Ed de and Sham‘un controlled the eastern and north-ern neighborhoods of Beirut.

Modernity Versus Backwardness

The process of modernization in Lebanon occurred at the same time that spatial variability expanded economic and social gaps. The rapid prog-ress of Beirut, and the relative backwardness of the peripheral areas, dur-ing the 1950s led to massive migration to the capital city that produced a third Shi‘ite stronghold in Lebanon, in the southwestern suburbs of Beirut, known today as the “ Southern Suburb ” ( al-Dhahiya al-Janubiya ). The migrants’ encounter with the modern city evoked anger towards the national and Shi‘ite establishment and claims of neglect and discrimina-tion. These feelings provided an incentive to search for alternatives to the sectarian leadership, fi rst in social leftist movements outside the Shi‘ite ranks, and then as part of the Shi‘ite movements, “the Deprived ” ( al- Mahrumin ) and the Amal movement. The exposure to modern ideas , combined with the accumulation of feelings of discrimination, threat-ened the ability of the Zu‘ama to retain control over their constituencies and therefore intensifi ed their efforts to slow these processes and control them. The struggle of the Lebanese Zu‘ama to maintain their power was particularly evident in the Shi‘ite strongholds in the backward periphery in light of the emergence of a new Shi‘ite leadership during the 1980s.

Demographic Aspect

When seeking to understand the history of the Lebanese Shi‘ies one must take into account the religious-sectarian mosaic that makes up the popu-lation of Lebanon. The formation of modern Lebanon in 1920 created a political framework that integrated seventeen different religious sects, none of which had a demographic majority of over 50 percent. The politi-cal system and the allocation of public offi ces was based on permanent sectarian lines that relied on a census conducted by the French in 1932. According to the census results, the Shi‘ies were considered the third- largest group (18 %), after the Maronite Christian community (29 %) and the Sunni Muslims (about 24 %). The census results have been the subject of constant debate between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon. The Muslims

INTRODUCTION 11

already claimed in the 1930s that the results were distorted by the French in favor of the Christians to further their own interests. Indeed, it can be assumed that the actual size of the Shi‘ite population was not refl ected in the results of the census for two reasons: (1) a particularly high illiteracy rate hindered technical and mental cooperation with French enumerators among the Shi‘ies; and (2) lack of access roads and communication in Shi‘ite areas, as a result of extreme backwardness, prevented enumerators from reaching some villages. Since the census was taken, the demographic balance has shifted in favor of the Muslim population as a result of higher birth rates and a higher rate of emigration of Christians out of Lebanon. No offi cial census has been conducted since the 1930s due to the explo-sive political potential and intersectarian sensitivity. However, according to demographic estimates conducted in the fi rst decade of the third mil-lennium, the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon consists of about 1.6 million people, or approximately 35 percent of Lebanon’s population, making it the largest religious sect in the country. 21

The Lebanese Question

Like other topics of study concerning modern Lebanon, the Lebanese Shi‘a is closely linked to the term “ Lebanese question ”, which embod-ies the country’s main political debate. The term was used already in the nineteenth century with regard to the debate on the autonomous province of Mount Lebanon and the involvement of the superpowers in the crisis on the mount in 1840–60. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the “Lebanese question” was the name of a book published by Maronite Bulus Nujaym , which called for the return of geographical regions that had been cut off from the emirate of Mount Lebanon during the formation of the autonomous province in 1861 ( al-Mutasarifi ya ), on the basis of the existence of a Lebanese nation since the dawn of history. 22 Subsequently the “Lebanese question” had different meanings depending on political developments related to the formation of the Lebanese state in 1920. From the end of the First World War until Lebanon’s independence in 1943, the “Lebanese question” referred to Syrian and Lebanese attitudes to the idea of the Lebanese entity formed by France. After independence, the meaning changed, referring more to the character of Lebanon, situated between two poles—an Arab state on the one hand, with a special relation-ship with the West on the other. The balance between these two elements was the essence of the “Lebanese question” also in the 1950s and 1960s.

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The bloody civil war that was waged in Lebanon in 1975–90 gave new meaning to the term, referring to possible solutions to end the war, while at certain stages bringing into question the very existence of Lebanon. At the time, suggestions were made to divide Lebanon into cantons associ-ated with sectarian geographic distribution. At the beginning of the third millennium, it seems that the “Lebanese question” focuses on the cultural nature of Lebanon in a broad sense—that is, intersectarian relations, politi-cal culture, economic development and the future of the society.

NOTES 1. ‘Ali al-Zein, lil-Bahth ‘an Ta᾿arihuna fi Lubnan (Discussion on Our

History in Lebanon), (Beirut: no publisher, 1973), p. 481; and Ahmed Rida, “al-Shi‘a aw al-Mutawila fi Jabel-‘Amil”, al-‘Irfan , no. 2, issue 5 (July 1910), pp. 237–238.

2. Majed Hallawi, A Lebanon Defi ed: Musa Al-Sadr and the Shi ‘ a Community (New York: Westview Press, 1992), p. 30.

3. Ibid., pp. 30–31. 4. On the relations between al-Jazzar and the Shi‘ies see: Muhammad Taqi

al-Faqih, Jabel-‘Amil fi al-Taarikh (Baghdad, 1945), pp. 397–415. 5. Rodger Shanahan, The Shi ‘ a of Lebanon  – Clans, Parties and Clerics

(London and New York: I. B.Tauris, 2005), p. 24. 6. al-Safa, pp. 140–142. 7. Tamara Chalabi, The Shi ‘ ies of Jabal ‘ Amil and New Lebanon – Community

and Nation State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 23. 8. Ibid., p. 22. 9. On al-‘Irfan magazine see: Tarif Kalidi, “Shaykh Ahmad ‘Arif al- Zayn and

al-‘Irfan”, in: Marwan Buheiry (ed.), Intelectual Life in the Arab East (Beirut: American University Press, 1981), pp. 110–124.

10. Omri Nir, “Continuity and Change in the Shi‘ite Community of Lebanon”, a Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the University of Tel- Aviv, 2002, p. 6, based on French archive document.

11. The activities of these people as part of the intellectual awakening in Jabel-‘Amil is briefl y reviewed in Muhammad Zazem Maqi, al- Haraka al-Fak-ariyya wal-Adabiyya fi Jabel-‘Amil (Beirut: Dar al- Andalus, 1963). pp. 219–230.

12. Shanahan, p. 34. 13. Hallawi, p. 36. 14. Shanahan, p. 25. 15. Ibid., p. 22. 16. Hallawi, p. 36.

INTRODUCTION 13

17. On Hama, see the introduction in Tiqva Bracha, “The City of Hamat and the French Mandate (1920–1936)–Socio-Political History”, a Ph.D. dis-sertation submitted to Tel-Aviv University, 1997.

18. Stefen Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under the French Mandate (London: Octagon Books, 1972), p. 28.

19. Farid al-Khazen wa Bol Salem, al-Intikhabat al-Ula fi Lubnan ma ba‘ad al-Harb – al-Arkam wal-Waqa‘wal-Dalalat (Beirut: Dar al- Nahar, 1993), appendix, table 11; on familial relations and the socio-economic hege-mony of the Lebanese elites, see: Samir Khalaf, “Adeptive Modernization: The Case of Lebanon”, in: Charles A. Cooper and Sidney S. Alexander (ed.), Economic Development and Population Growth in the Middle-East (New York: American Elsevier, 1972), pp. 567–598.

20. On the differences between Jabel-‘Amil and the Biqa‘, see Raymond Adams, “Paradoxes of Religious Leadership Among the Shi‘ites of Lebanon”, MERA , Forum 6, Winter 1983, pp. 9–12.

21. On demographic statistics showing that the Shi‘ite community has been the largest community in Lebanon since the last quarter of the twentieth century, see: Muhammad Faour, “The Demography of Lebanon: A Reappraisal”, Middle Eastern S tudies, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1991, pp. 631–641; and William Harris, Faces of Lebanon (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1997), pp.  82–85; and Samir Khalaf, Lebanon’s Predicament (New York: Columbia, 1987), p. 186; for a more updated discussion on demographic developments, see Mark Farha, “Demografi c Dilemmad”, in Bary Rubin (ed.), Lebanon: Liberation, Confl ict, and Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 83–98.

22. The territories Nujaym referred to in his book were those of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon and the Biqa‘ region. The book was published in Paris under the pseudonym M.  Jouplain: M.  Jouplain, La Question du Liban: Etude d’Histoire Diplomatique et de Droit International (Paris: 1908).

14 O. NIR

15© The Author(s) 2017O. Nir, Lebanese Shi‘ite Leadership, 1920–1970s, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43014-0_2

CHAPTER 2

Main Classes in the Traditional Lebanese Shi‘ite Community

Abstract The chapter defi nes the factors that made up the Shi‘ite leader-ship from 1920 to the 1970s. It describes the role of Zu‘ama and their dominance in Lebanese politics and daily life. It also incorporates general defi nitions of Za‘im from previous publications. The chapter explains the importance of religious clerics ( ‘Ulama ) in the Shi‘ite world, the hierarchy within the Shi‘ite religious establishment in general, the Shi‘ite religious establishment in Lebanon and the involvement of ‘Ulama in politics. The chapter also explains the differences in the role played by Arab intellectuals in the modern Arab world, including the Shi‘ite community of Lebanon, compared with their role in Western culture.

Keywords Za‘im (Zu‘ama) • ‘Alim (‘Ulama) • Intellectuals

Until the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, political infl uence in Lebanon was dominated by small elite groups. This was an outcome of the confes-sional structure of the Lebanese political system , also known as conso-ciationalism. This system pledges permanent posts for members of each religious sect, as well as seats in the parliament, in accordance with their proportion of the population. These positions, however, were manned by members of the elite and their associates, a fact that actually widened the socio-economic gap between the elites and the masses. In all the Lebanese parliaments elected between 1943 and 1992, with the exception of the one elected in 1960, 40–60 percent of the deputies were relatives. 1 In order to

retain power, members of the elite had to preserve the political structure, especially in light of social and demographic changes that occurred as a result of urbanization in the 1950s and threatened to bring about political change. Within their confessional communities, the elites faced pressure from groups that were politically limited by the social structure. In hind-sight, we can say that the signifi cant turning point in this socio-political struggle took place during the civil war of 1975–90 , when the infl uence of the traditional elites decreased signifi cantly, although it did not disappear entirely. This transformation was most visible in the Shi‘ite community, where the old elites lost their infl uence almost completely.

During the fi rst six decades of the twentieth century, the Shi‘ite politi-cal leaders in Lebanon enjoyed practically unlimited control over inter-nal matters within their confessional community. These leaders, called Zu‘ama (singular Za‘im ), dominated wide-ranging realms, from eco-nomic and business matters, to social and materialistic issues, including the military, ideological and political domains. They also wielded power in clerical circles by virtue of their control of appointments and because in many cases they paid part of the clerics’ salaries. On the national level, however, the political infl uence of Shi‘ite Zu‘ama was limited, especially in comparison with their counterparts, the Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim Zu‘ama , who enjoyed political hegemony in Lebanon.

The control by the Zu‘ama of the political power centers of the Shi‘ite community was based on coalitions and agreements centered around both personal and political interests. Each prominent Za‘im had allies among different Shi‘ite circles through which he was able to confront his oppo-nents. Usually, his major ally and associate would be another Za‘im with whom he shared material or political interests, or with whom he had blood relations or marital ties. Geography was also a determining factor in the relationships between Zu‘ama . Rival factions in a particular Shi‘ite popula-tion center tended to ally themselves with rival factions from other regions. For example, Hamadeh and Haydar, the rival tribes of the Biqa‘ region, were associated with rival families from Jabel-‘Amil : the Hamadehs with al-As‘ad and the Haydars with ‘Osseyran. Zu‘ama of such high status were supported by families who owned property or by large clans under their authority. These families possessed infl uence and status in their own ter-ritory. Usually, such a coalition included senior clerics, such as the town Mufti (religious authority), the Qadi (religious judge) or Imam (direc-tor of a mosque), and in some cases also intellectuals, mainly writers or journalists who were well respected but lacked political infl uence. Such

16 O. NIR

coalitions struggled for political infl uence both within the Shi‘ite commu-nity and within the greater Lebanese political system.

THE ZU‘AMA The term Za‘im refers to a type of feudal leader that exists in the Middle East. Abu Khalil defi ned this term as a communal leader whose fortune and social status are inherited. 2 Dekmejian described the Za‘im as a leader whose political power is concentrated in a particular geographical area; he is a landowner and he is rich or from a rich family. He is of a high social status, associated with the political elite and has the ability to attract clients and to promote their interests. 3

Two prominent scholars, Hottinger and Hourani, have attempted to classify the Zu‘ama and to defi ne their responsibilities. Hottinger defi ned the Za‘im as a recognized leader of the community, who speaks on behalf of his clients as a whole or in part, and who represents both their interests and his. Since money, power and infl uence were all prerequisites for join-ing the Zu‘ama class, the Za‘im often inherited his status. Although this was the case, according to Hottinger, this position was not passed down according to age, but rather according to character qualifi cations. 4 This is exemplifi ed by the al-As‘ad family after the death of Kamel Bey al- As‘ad in 1924. Although his brother ‘Abdul  Latif was the oldest member of the family, the position was passed down to his nephew Ahmed, who was con-sidered better suited to the job.

Hottinger defi nes the organizational basis of the political mechanism of the Zu‘ama as personal relations between the Za‘im and the client , based on social, economic or political interests. He distinguishes between the various duties of the Za‘im as follows. In times of peace, he acted as a middleman between the client and any opposing force, particularly the government. The Za‘im could conduct business relationships with the client as landlord, employer or middleman. In times of war, his sup-porters functioned as the Za‘im ’s private army (militia), which was some-times reinforced by bodyguards and bully henchmen (called qabadiyat ). During such periods, the Za‘im helped the client, and the client, in return, accepted his authority. An example of this can be found in the village of Taybe , where the Za‘im Kamel al-As‘ad had a private army of 130 men, with the potential to enlist 1000 men in a state of emergency. In peaceful times, payment took the form of political, commercial and moral sup-port. In times of both war and peace, the Za‘im bore responsibility for

MAIN CLASSES IN THE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE SHI‘ITE COMMUNITY 17

his supporters. During periods when help and defense were not needed, the loyalty of the client was expressed by occasional visits to the Za‘im . 5 Hottinger also emphasizes the importance of success in parliamentary elections for the Zu‘ama . He explains that electing a Za‘im to parliament was seen as a “political duty” by his clients, because it granted him both the aura of modernity and the pleasure of satisfaction. It also conferred material benefi ts, including an advantage in any negotiation and state recognition. 6

Rodger Shanahan noted that a large part of the Za‘im ’s power was exercised through the tradition of the “ open house ” ( Beyt Maftuh ). This was the main setting in which the “give and take” relations between the Za‘im and his client ( Zilm ) were expressed. The client had the right to have his grievances heard at the Za‘im ’s house, and the Za‘im tried to solve the client’s problems. 7

Akram Hourani employs a different approach to explain this term. He classifi es the Zu‘ama according to three categories: feudal, populist and the urban-boss. The feudal Za‘im owns vast properties in the country-side that he inherited from his family or the previous patron. If we try to fi t Shi‘ite Zu‘ama into Hourani’s paradigm, then Ahmed al-A s‘ad and Yusuf al-Zein are in this category in that they both inherited large estates near Nabatiyeh in Southern Lebanon. The Za‘im who fi ts into Hourani’s urban-boss model bases his power on his ability to organize the masses with the help of bully henchmen ( qabadiyat ). He also counts on attracting the masses through his ideological commitment, appealing to such ideas as Syrian unity, pan-Arabism or Nasserism. ‘Adil ‘Osseyran can be seen to fi t within this category in the Shi‘ite community, but the ultimate example of this type of Za‘im is the Sunni Arab nationalist from Sidon, Riad al- Sulh. The third type, according Hourani, is the “populist” Za‘im who bases his power on strong houses that provide him with protection and patronage, as well as on ideology or some sort of program. This category is less common among the Shi‘ies, and the Za‘im who seems to match this description best is the late Druze leader Kamal Junblatt . 8

Most of the Zu‘ama families that dominated the Lebanese rural areas in the fi rst fi fty years after the formation of the state emerged in the last third of the nineteenth century. Their rise to power and infl uence originated in the geographical division defi ned in 1864 as part of the reforms of the Ottoman administration system, known as the Tanzimat , from 1839 to 1876. These families, which numbered several dozen, served as the link between the Ottoman government and the local public. Another group

18 O. NIR

of Zu‘ama emerged in the cities, among heads of families who amassed wealth by taking advantage of the economic breakthroughs of Lebanese coastal cities in the nineteenth century. Among the Maronites this was a time when families such as Sham‘un , Faranjiyeh , Edde and Gumayil arose; among the Sunnis the Sulh , Salam and Karami families emerged, while among the Druze, the Arslan and Junblatt families were already domi-nant. Similarly, some Shi‘ite families were able to take over the leadership of their community more easily than families in other religious sects. This was the result of the backwardness of large segments of the Shi‘ite popula-tion and the fact that most of this population lived in peripheral areas of Lebanon, which were generally neglected by the central government for generations. The families that attained political status in Lebanon after the First World War included the al-As‘ad , ‘Osseyran , al- Khalil and al- Zein in Jabel-‘Amil, and the Hamadeh and Haydar tribes in the Biqa‘ region.

The Zu‘ama dominated daily life. The following report, written in the early 1930s by a French Special Service offi cer about the Shi‘ite Za‘im Yusuf al-Zein , gives a general idea of their involvement and of the meth-ods the Zu‘ama used to amass wealth:

Several days ago, a young attorney came to my offi ce in Saida , and told the fol-lowing story: Fifteen days ago, a car from Tibnin (in the area of Tyre ) passed through Saida and ran over a child. The parents appealed to Yusuf al-Zayn and asked him to intercede in order to obtain compensation for this tragedy. Al-Zayn promised to settle this matter. After a while, he sent a telegram to the owner of the car, asking him to come to Saida with 100 ounces of gold, which it appeared, was being demanded by the second affected party. Because the amount looked infl ated, he (the driver) appealed to me. I went to the child’s parents to tell them that the people from Tibnin are poor and would not be able to pay what al-Zayn asked them to. But these people had not been updated regarding the amount and had not asked for it. The attorney could have resolved this issue by demanding 60 ounces of gold. 9

The sectarian nature of the Lebanese political system caused the Sunni and Shi‘ite leaders to become alienated from one another. For example, during the fi rst half of the twentieth century, in Jabel-‘Amil , the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama Kamel and Ahmed al-As‘ad struggled against the Sunni Rida and Riad al-Sulh for infl uence. In some cases, the confessional system cultivated intercommunal struggles between the Zu‘ama and their followers. This was the case in the 1920s, when Sabri and Sa‘adallah Hamadeh lost their core group of supporters in Hirmal (in the western Biqa‘) because they

MAIN CLASSES IN THE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE SHI‘ITE COMMUNITY 19

cooperated with the French against those who fought for Syrian unity. This political system also led to a pattern in which the government posts reserved for Shi‘ies were connected primarily to people such as Ahmed al-As‘ad and Sabri Hamadeh, while lesser known Shi‘ite politicians had to join forces with the Sunnis under the Muslim title to gain appointments.

THE ‘ULAMA The most important allies of the Zu‘ama were the religious scholars, known as ‘Ulama , who granted the religious legitimacy needed by the Za‘im to remain dominant. From an Islamic standpoint, the term ‘Ulama (singular, ‘ Alim ) is a religious title referring to religious jurisdictions and scholars or students of Islamic law. Politically, the position of the Shi‘ite ‘Ulama in Lebanon underwent a signifi cant change during the twenti-eth century, from a marginal status at the time of the formation of the Lebanese state in 1920, to a position of great political infl uence by the end of the century, under the leadership of political ‘Ulama . The politi-cal success of the clerics is especially evident in light of the infl uence of Musa al-Sadr in the 1970s and the Hizbullah movement since the 1990s. Sadr was a cleric who encouraged activism among the Shi‘ies and used his popularity to establish the Movement of the Deprived ( Harakat al- Mahrumin ) and the Amal movement . Hizbullah achieved political suc-cess as a result of its success on both the social and military fronts, the latter referring to their struggle against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Sadr and Hizbullah were not the fi rst Lebanese Shi‘ies to offer a political-religious leadership, but they continued the political tradition of direct and indirect involvement in politics by Shi‘ite scholars that began in the early twentieth century. 10

The Shi‘ite Religious Establishment in Lebanon

Shi‘ism was recognized as an independent religious sect in Lebanon on January 25, 1926. This recognition was granted by the French High Commissioner de Jouvenel as part of a benevolent policy toward the Shi‘ies, in order to please them and prevent them from joining forces with other Muslim elements that were against the formation of a Lebanese constitution:

20 O. NIR

The Shi‘ies in Greater Lebanon are an independent community. They shall be judged in matters of personal status by the Ja‘afari school [paragraph 1], by their own judge [paragraph 2], and by appealing to a special bureau of the appeals court, to be comprised of a president and two assistants, who will be elected by the Shi‘ite clerics. 11

Despite their religious independence with regard to personal matters, the Shi‘ite ‘Ulama were not allowed to establish a Shi‘ite Islamic council of their own to address the community’s religious issues. Instead, they par-ticipated in a council of ‘Ulama that covered all Muslims in Lebanon, whose leadership was expressly Sunni and that was headed by a Sunni Mufti . This partnership, which granted the Shi‘ies status as secondary participants, came to an end in May 1969, when after years of effort an independent Shi‘ite council was established—the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council ( al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shi‘i al-A‘ala ).

These efforts began in the late 1920s, when the Shi‘ies sought to establish a council to manage the Ja‘afari Awqaf (Shi‘ite Muslim reli-gious endowments). At that juncture, they aspired for the council to be located in Beirut, near the Ja‘afari Qadi (the chief Shi‘ite religious judge), and for its members to include Qadis (religious judges), members of local boards and also a district attorney or doctor. 12 The objective was to broaden the range of issues under the jurisdiction of the Qadi , which at the time included only personal matters. In the late 1920s, at the time the Syrian–Lebanese border was demarcated, the need to manage the Awqaf property became urgent. Problems arose in some of the villages in Jabel-‘Amil and the Biqa‘ , where the committee responsible for demarcation was assisted in the process of property registration by local families. These families took advantage of the situation to register property under their own names. 13 This endangered the properties owned by the Awqaf , and as a result, the French inspector general of Awqaf endowments approved the application submitted by Sheikh Munir ‘Osseyran , who served as the president of the Ja‘afari (Shi‘ite) appeals court, and permitted the Shi‘ite ‘Ulama to administer judgment also in matters of inheritance and Awqaf property. Consequently, a directive was issued in 1928 granting the Shi‘ies total independence as a religious group, under the religious jurisdiction of Qadis and religious courts. 14 A similar appeal by the Shi‘ite community in Syria was denied by the French , who feared it would lead to a demand for separate Shi‘ite representation in the Syrian parliament, a demand

MAIN CLASSES IN THE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE SHI‘ITE COMMUNITY 21

that could have undermined the balance among Syrian minorities. 15 The independence of the Ja‘afari courts was threatened with nullifi cation in December 1939, when French authorities sought to merge them with the Sunni courts , then under the authority of the Sunni Mufti of Beirut. Sunni and Shi‘ite clerics, along with members of both communities, pro-tested this plan, and the French were compelled to abort it. 16 In 1942, an attempt to establish a Supreme Islamic Council for all Muslim com-munities failed. When such a council was fi nally established in 1954, the Lebanese government worried that the Shi‘ies and Druze would respond acrimoniously by unilaterally establishing a similar institution of their own. Ahmed al-As‘ad , the Shi‘ite Za‘im who dominated Jabel-‘Amil at the time, was greatly annoyed by the establishment of the council and its delineation as a “common Islamic council”. 17 In spite of this protest, the Supreme Islamic Council was led by a senior Sunni Mufti with the participation of Shi‘ite and Druze clerics until May 1969, when the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council was founded. The formation of this council separated the Shi‘ite religious establishment from that of the Sunnis entirely.

The main duties of the ‘Ulama involved religious law, religious educa-tion, support of community life, protection of Ja‘afari Awqaf property and organization of important holidays. A signifi cant amount of time was dedicated to organizing ‘Ashura celebrations to commemorate the death of Imam Hussein Bin ‘Ali, the founder of the Shi‘ite sect, who was killed in the Karbala Massacre of AD 680. ‘ Ashura , which falls on the tenth day of the Muslim month of al-Muharam, is the most important day in the Shi‘ite calendar. The ‘ Ashura ceremonies, celebrated in Lebanon since 1918, took on a violent character over the course of the 1920s due to the infl uence of similar ceremonies in Iran . 18 The celebrations have taken on a distinctive character in Jabel-‘Amil and the Biqa‘ . In the south, people act out the passion with self-fl agellation, whereas in the Biqa‘ they com-memorate the mourning with restraint by reading the Marathi lamenta-tion chapters from the Qur’an. 19

The violent style of the celebrations in Jabel-‘Amil was demonstrated by the custom of Ta‘aziya , in which the celebrants march and beat themselves on their shoulders and chests until they bleed. This provoked a debate between two of the leading ‘Ulama of Jabel-‘Amil in the late 1920s. Sayed Muhsin al-Amin , from the village of Shakra, opposed the importa-tion of the Iranian style of violent celebrations into Lebanon, while ‘Abd al- Hussein Sadiq , from Nabatiyeh , interpreted al-Amin’s attitude as an attack on the Shi‘ite religious establishment. 20 This debate ended only half

22 O. NIR

a century later, with the increase in fundamentalist infl uence on the eve of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran . In the 1980s, the ceremony became a central element in Lebanese Shi‘ite martyrology and in the formation of a Shi‘ite political identity. As a member of the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council remarked, “ ‘Ashura furnishes the symbolic aspect of Shi‘ite iden-tity ”. It is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council dedicates a signifi cant amount of time to organizing these ceremonies and bringing speakers from Iran and Iraq to take part in these ceremonies in Lebanon. 21 The great efforts made to portray the ‘ Ashura celebrations as a symbol of Shi‘ite exclusivity are refl ected in the increasing numbers of people who participate in the ceremonies. In 1973, approximately 60,000 people participated in the celebrations in Nabatiyeh , and in 1974 the num-ber increased to 80,000. By 1994, there were 120,000 celebrants. 22 By the twenty-fi rst century, the numbers had grown to 200,000–300,000.

The offi cial Shi‘ite religious establishment includes positions at differ-ent levels. Before the formation of the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council , the chief Shi‘ite ‘ Alim , usually the Ja‘a fari Mufti, was the senior per-son in the system. In this role he was the head of the Shi‘ite ‘Ulama in the original Higher Islamic Council, serving under the Sunni Mufti . The fact that the senior Shi‘ite religious authority occupied the lowest posi-tion compared to the religious leaders of other communities offended the Shi‘ies and added to a general feeling of contempt. In 1958, Muhammad Jawad Mughniya , the head of the Ja‘afari Shar‘i court (the Shi‘ite court), complained that he was relegated to sitting at the edge of the table in joint meetings with the Maronite Patriarch and the Sunni Mufti , in spite of his position as the highest authority in the Shi‘ite religious system. 23

The Shi‘ite religious establishment is headed by a Ja‘afari Mufti , who also heads the network of Shar‘i courts and mosques. In the past, most functionaries in that position focused on religious issues, although some did concern themselves with political issues. For example, ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan , the Ja‘afari Mufti since the 1960s (and still in offi ce in 2016), has been known to involve himself in domestic Shi‘ite politics, affi liating himself with the Amal movement since the mid-1970s. There is a religious cleric, in addition to the Ja‘afari Mufti , who serves as the chairman of the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council . He is regarded as having the highest post in the Shi‘ite community hierarchy, thus making him the offi cial leader and representative of the Lebanese Shi‘ite community, although in terms of infl uence there are far more infl uential leaders among the Shi‘ite sect. His scholarly background, and the fact that senior ‘Ulama are members of

MAIN CLASSES IN THE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE SHI‘ITE COMMUNITY 23

the council, grant the chairman of the council important religious status. Over the years there have been other high offi cials in the Shi‘ite religious establishment who were also involved in politics. Munir ‘Osseyran , who headed the Ja‘afari appeals court in the 1920s and 1930s, was very active as a middleman between the Mandatory authorities and the Shi‘ite com-munity, a position that earned him respect among both the secular Shi‘ite leadership and the French Mandatory authorities. 24 In the 1940s the role of Mufti in the city of Tyre became more central within the religious hier-archy, due to the special status of the charismatic clerics‘Abd al- Hussein Sharf al-Din and, after 1959, Musa al-Sadr .

One of the problems the Lebanese Shi‘ite religious establishment faced starting in the mid-nineteenth century was the shortage of skilled can-didates for positions. This shortage notwithstanding, it was diffi cult to obtain a position within the religious system, such as that of judge of Shar‘i courts, Imam or Mufti . The nomination of a Mufti , for instance, required a long training period, as we learn from a letter sent by several ‘Ulama to the French governor in 1932:

… According to the Shi‘ite religious directives, only a Qadi [judge] can serve as a Mufti. One can obtain neither the position of Qadi, nor of Mufti, unless one is a Mujtahid, a skilled expert in religious sciences. Furthermore, this title can be obtained only after ten years of religious studies and by passing a diffi cult exam before a strict review board. 25

As a result of the shortage of qualifi ed candidates, religious scholars were imported from Iran and Iraq to fi ll religious positions in Lebanon. 26

Hierarchy Within the Religious Establishment

The religious hierarchy in Shi‘ite Islam as we know it today was estab-lished in the late eighteenth century following a debate over two opposite approaches to the daily behavior of believers. According to the Akhbari approach, the answer to every question should be sought in the Qur’an and Sunna , under the guidance of the ‘Ulama . According to the Usuli approach, however, a living judge, known as a Mujtahid , should pro-vide the answers. In accordance with the latter, believers began to turn to the Shi‘ite Mujtahidun (judges) to resolve their daily problems. The Mujtahidun sought to self-legislate through the process of Ijtihad , which is the authority to pass judgment according to Islamic law on the basis of

24 O. NIR

written texts. In order to become a Mujtahid in Shi‘ite Islam, an ‘ Alim must pass through three stages of learning and training: Muqadamat , Sutuh and al-Dars al-kharij . These stages can be said to correspond to the B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Western academic study programs. Upon obtaining the degree of Mujtahid , the ‘ Alim is then able to advance through three further stages. The fi rst, called Hujjat al-Islam wal- Muslimin ( or sometimes Thiqat Allah, meaning an authority for Islam and Muslims) , is a junior degree, the second is known as Ayat-Allah (a sign from God) and the highest degree is Ayat-Allah ‘Uzma (a great sign from God). The fi ve or six Mujtahidun who have obtained this highest degree serve as Maraja‘al-Taqalid , the sources of authority for judges of the lower degrees and for the followers. Sometimes the Mujtahidun who serve as Maraja‘al-Taqalid select from among themselves a Maraji‘A‘ala (supreme) as head of the Shi‘ite religious hierarchy. 27

Over the course of the 1970s, a transformation occurred in the socio- economic backgrounds of the Shi‘ite clerics in Lebanon. Previously, most of them came from families with long traditions of religious scholastics. They left Lebanon at a young age to obtain their education under the prominent Shi‘ite jurists at the religious universities of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq or in the Iranian city of Qom . These universities were known as Huzat Diniya or Huzat ‘Ilmiya (Hawza, singular). Among the traditional families of such religious scholars of Jabel-‘Amil were the Sharf al-Din and Shams al-Din of Tyre , al-Sadiq of Nabatiyeh and al-Amin of the village of Shaqra . Some of the families even claim to have the status of Asyad , liter-ally, from the genealogical line of ‘Ali, the father of the Shi‘ite sect of Islam (similar to the Sunni status of Ashraf , which indicates a lineal descen-dant of the Prophet Muhammad). The most prominent families of this group were the Mussawi from Ba‘albek , al- Husseini from Tripoli , Hors from  Jbeil  and Shams al-Din from Tyre . 28 The social status of the ‘Ulama families was lower than that of the Zu‘ama , but in most cases it was higher than the ‘ Aawam , the class of commoners, consisting mostly of peasants.

The path the ‘Ulama followed in order to reach a high religious status was passed down from generation to generation, especially among fami-lies with religious reputations. In their late adolescence or early twenties, young members of such families would travel to one of the cities men-tioned above. In most cases, Najaf , being the spiritual center for most senior scholars of Shi‘ite Islam, was the preferred destination. When they returned to Lebanon fi ve, ten, or even twelve years later, some of them were integrated into the governmental religious establishment, serving as

MAIN CLASSES IN THE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE SHI‘ITE COMMUNITY 25

judges in Shar‘i courts, as Mufti s, or as Imam s in mosques. Others taught in religious colleges in areas with a high concentration of Shi‘ies.

In the late 1960s, young Shi‘ies from different backgrounds began to seek higher religious education. There were several reasons for this change. First, feelings of deprivation among Lebanese Shi‘ies reached their peak at this time. Sons of Shi‘ite peasants and merchants of the middle and lower classes, who had witnessed their fathers’ economic struggles, sought a way to avoid suffering similar hardships. Some saw religion as a way out of the cycle of poverty. Political and ideological leftist parties that acted under the banner of social justice at the time served as a favored alternative and attracted most of the young Shi‘ies. However, after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war against Israel , some of them turned to the religious option out of frustration with the secular social ideology. Second, in the late 1960s, a star emerged in the Shi‘ite religious-political sky in the form of Sayed Musa al-Sadr . He was a religious cleric who emphasized exclusive Shi‘ite elements in his doctrine , which attracted Shi‘ite youth who were looking for a leader to follow. As a result, the religious path became an attractive option, particularly after the establishment of the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council under Sadr’s leadership. The council enabled Shi‘ite ‘Ulama to infl uence Shi‘ite matters on the political level and elevated their sense of self-respect. This trend, in which religious scholars came from secular families, increased in the 1970s, infl uenced by external events related to the two centers of the Twelver Shi‘a outside Lebanon. At the beginning of that decade, about a hundred Lebanese religious scholars who were studying in Najaf and Karbala returned to Lebanon after being perse-cuted by the Iraqi Ba‘ath regime, which suspected them of participating in the activities of the Islamic Da‘awa Party (the Islamic Call) against the Ba‘athist government. In addition, in the same period, Lebanon became a center for Iranian oppositional activity against the Shah . Religious col-leges were established in the country with donations from senior Shi‘ite ‘Ulama outside Lebanon, and the presence of Iranian ‘Ulama in Lebanon increased. After the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in early 1979, the religious option began to appeal to more Shi‘ies. Youngsters from poor families, who strove to emulate the revolution, went to study in the Shi‘ite holy cities, and upon returning to Lebanon established revolu-tionary groups in the mosques and religious colleges.

From a religious perspective, the Lebanese Shi‘ite ‘Ulama benefi ted from strong relationships with their Iranian and Iraqi colleagues. Their personal status usually corresponded to their offi cial religious degree.

26 O. NIR

A distinction must be made between their status in the religious establish-ment, which was based on achievements within the religious realm, such as doctrinal publications, and their status in the wider political system, which was based primarily on their political activity. In order to obtain a high religious position, senior Lebanese Shi‘ite ‘Ulama such as Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah , Muhammad Jawad Mughniya , Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din and Musa al-Sadr published dozens of books and articles on religious and political philosophy, religious interpretations and poetry. However, only some of them gained prestige outside Shi‘ite religious circles. Prominent ‘Ulama such as Mughniya and Hassan al-Sadiq were not popular in secular circles because they were active only in the fi elds of religious jurisprudence and scholastics. In contrast, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah , who was highly acclaimed within religious circles, also won respect outside these circles after he became a spiritual leader of Hizbullah .

Involvement of  ‘Ulama in Politics

The theological disagreement within Shi‘ite Islam regarding the involve-ment of ‘Ulama in secular politics has its roots in two different approaches among the Mujtahidun . The “quietist” approach is based on the idea that the purity of political authority derives from the Imam ’s immunity from mistakes. This implies that as long as the Imam is temporarily “hidden”, there is no way to prevent mistakes. Hence it is necessary to abstain from direct involvement in politics, since proper leadership will be possible only after the reappearance of the Hidden Imam , known as Mahdi . The sec-ond, “activist” approach is based on a forceful denunciation of the despo-tism and dictatorship of totalitarian regimes. This view leads to political activism, which does not necessarily involve violence. 29

The gap between these two approaches led to a distinction between those who sought political infl uence without political authority, and those who sought unequivocal and direct political authority. The twentieth century afforded opportunities for both approaches: in the fi rst group we can include the Shi‘ite Mujtahidun who issued legal jurisdictions ( Fatwas ) supporting the armed struggle against the British in Iraq . They did not seek political power for themselves, but supported the existence of an Arab monarchy under the leadership of the Emir of Trans-Jordan, ‘Abdullah Ibn Hussein of the Hashamite family. 30 The struggle led by Musa al-Sadr in Lebanon during the 1970s similarly did not aim at the assumption of political

MAIN CLASSES IN THE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE SHI‘ITE COMMUNITY 27

authority. Khomeini’s 1979 revolution in Iran exemplifi es the second approach, in which the ruling authority converted Iran into an Islamic state governed by a senior Mujtahid . Muhammad Jawad Mughniya , one of the prominent Lebanese Shi‘ite ‘Ulama in the past, offered his own commentary regarding this dispute. He discusses the role of Imam s as community leaders and the role of the religious jurists in the absence of Imam s. He concludes that until the return of the Mahdi (the Hidden Imam ), no man can claim supremacy over a political body, not even the ‘Ulama . 31 In order to prove his case, Mughniya refers to various religious sects that implement a judicial hierarchy at the highest level but do not support a single spiritual leader, particularly not a politically superior one. 32

Another important Lebanese Shi‘ite religious fi gure, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah , treated the question of the involvement of the ‘Ulama in daily national politics. In his book, Islam and the Logic of Power (al- Islam wa-Mintaq al-Quwa), Fadlallah claimed it was wrong to assume that the ‘Ulama’ s sphere of activity should be limited to setting guidelines but not to taking part in life itself, and that the ‘Ulama deviate from their religious mission when they involve themselves in politics or assume authority in order to affect political and social conditions. According to Fadlallah, this is a false assumption because Islam comprises both “mission and state” ( da‘awa wa-dawla ) and is not only a religious ritual. In order to prove his case, Fadlallah mentions that the Prophet was both a political ruler and a spiritual guide, as was the Imam ‘Ali. 33

In principle, the Shi‘ite ‘Ulama agree that Muslims must live under Islamic rule, but only the judges known as Mujtahidun should decide how a specifi c setting corresponds to a particular principle. 34 Shi‘ite his-tory provides the basis for both the “quietist” and “activist” approaches. One can fi nd the roots of the activist approach in the importance given to Imam Hussein Ibn ‘Ali in Shi‘ite Islam and to his death after revolting against Yazid’s despotism. After the death of Hussein Ibn ‘Ali, his follow-ers were persecuted, causing the ‘Ulama to employ the Taqiya , which allows Shi‘ies to hide their identity during times of danger in order pre-serve their faith. Taqiya is the ultimate practice of the “quietist” approach. Despite the differences between the approaches, each has contributed to Shi‘ite survival. The ‘Ulama have endorsed one approach over the other according to the social and political circumstances of the period.

In the realm of the dispute in the Shi‘ite world over the involvement of spiritual leaders in politics , a personal struggle emerged in the early 1960s

28 O. NIR

following the death of the Iranian Maraji‘ Hussein Marjadri , the leading authority in Shi‘ite Islam. Because no heir was chosen before his death, sev-eral senior ‘Ulama considered themselves worthy of succeeding him. The most prominent were two Iranians , Ruhallah Khomeini and Muhammad Kazem Shari ‘atmadari, and two Iraqi s, Muhsin al-Hakim and Abu Qasem al Khuii . The struggle between these Mujtahidun , which paralleled intrigues against Shi‘ite scholars by the Iranian and Iraqi regimes, contributed to the emergence of a militant stream among the ‘Ulama , specifi cally around Khomeini in Qom and al-Hakim in Najaf . From June 1963 to 1964, the tension between the secular Iranian regime and the ‘Ulama led to a dis-pute between Khomeini’s followers and the Iranian army, and subsequently to the exile of Khomeini to Turkey and then to Iraq . While in the Iraqi city of Najaf , Khomeini remained under the protection of al-Hakim and joined the ‘Ulama who established the Shi‘ite militant movement in Iraq. The prominent fi gures of that movement, in addition to al-Hakim and Khomeini, were Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr , the two sons of al-Hakim, the Lebanese Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah and Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din . The last two were destined to play a prominent role in the transfor-mations that the Shi‘ies underwent in Lebanon in the 1980s.

THE INTELLECTUALS The idea of intellectuals in the modern sense was conceived in the late nine-teenth century. The defi nition of this concept is not straightforward, and it is therefore sometimes referred to instead as the “educated elite”, “people involved in academic pursuits”, “scholars”, “erudite elite” or “intelligent elite”. Shlomo Zand indicated two standard usages of the concept of “intel-lectual”. The fi rst refers to educated people of high standing, particularly from the fi eld of humanities or literature, who surpass their specifi c profes-sional pursuits, and who appeal to the public or the government with a clear moral-political stance. Historians tend to accept that defi nition, while sociologists generally accept the other defi nition of “intellectual”. This defi nition sees intellectuals as entire groups that produce or distribute cul-ture, including prophets or priests, philosophers, authors, journalists and teachers. 35 Our discussion of Lebanese Shi‘ite intellectuals adheres to the second, broader usage. This defi nition is preferable for practical reasons, including the scarcity of Shi‘ite intellectuals in Lebanon, and also because of the unique public status of some Shi‘ite fi gures in occupations such as teaching, linguistics, journalism and religious scholastics.

MAIN CLASSES IN THE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE SHI‘ITE COMMUNITY 29

Since this study analyzes the dynamics between the political power centers in the Shi‘ite community, we must broaden the discussion of the association of intellectuals to politics on the one hand, and to tradition on the other hand. Goldmann defi nes the difference between intellectu-als and politicians as a difference between infl uential people and those who hold authority. 36 According to him, intellectuals do not control other people, do not set rules and do not make decrees concerning other people. Their status depends on their degree of infl uence on the public conscious-ness. Their degree of prestige and infl uence dictates their autonomy over other elements within society, such as the ruling power or the aristocracy. In “popular” democratic societies and other authoritarian democracies of the third world, intellectuals are usually satisfi ed with social and economic privileges. The absence of political confrontation, as well as the complete dependence of the intellectuals on the state system, hampers almost any possibility of collective intellectual struggles for the sake of autonomy and greater infl uence. 37 In the case of the Lebanese Shi‘ies, the unique public status of the intellectuals dictated their freedom of expression in the face of the Zu‘ama and enabled them, in several cases, to remain outside the Zu‘ama ’s struggle for power. Zand, who wrote about the relationship between intellectuals and power in Europe, claimed that the image of intellectuals as those who dissociate themselves from governmental power is simplistic and inadequate, especially, as he argues, because many did aspire to power. They aspired to free themselves from dependence on gov-ernmental elites, particularly in light of their frustration with the political clout of those elites. 38

The issue of the relationship between intellectuals and tradition was dis-cussed at length by Eizenstadt in his lecture “Intellectuals and Tradition”. The impetus for this discussion was a change that took place among social-ists, who began to view intellectuals as the main promoters of tradition and its byproducts, such as religious and spiritual symbols. This approach deviated from the assumption that tradition limits creation and creativity. In spite of Eizenstadt’s criticism of this contrasting approach, it seems the discourse on the relationship between tradition and intellectuals with regard to the Lebanese Shi‘ies is based largely on the old view, according to which pre-modern or traditional societies are more or less “closed” societies. Sociological thought tended to view the political aspects of tra-ditional society as based on the traditional elite, whose authority stems from “Divine mandate”. Modern society was viewed as based on larger social classes, whose leadership does not rely on traditional legitimacy but

30 O. NIR

rather whose validity is determined by non-religious criteria. In addition, traditional society was regarded as one in which culture was defi ned by tra-ditional mores, whereas modern society was seen as culturally dynamic. 39

NOTES 1. Farid al-Khazen wa Bul Salim, al-Intihabat al-Ula fi Lubnan ma Ba‘ad al-

Harb – al-Arqam wal-Waqa'i‘wal-Dalalat (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1993), Appendix pages, table 11; On family ties and socio-economic control of the elites, see: Samir Khalaf, “Adeptive Modernization: The Case of Lebanon”, in: Charles A. Cooper and Sidney S. Alexander (ed.), Economic Development and Population Growth in the Middle-East (New-York: American Elsevier, 1972), pp. 567–598.

2. As‘ad Abu Khalil, Historical Dictionary of Lebanon (London: Scarecrow, 1998), pp. 228–229.

3. Hrair Dekmejian, Patterns of Political Leadership – Egypt, Israel, Lebanon (New York: State University of New-York, 1975), p. 12. The defi nition originally referred to the Zu‘ama in Mount Lebanon , but there is no essen-tial difference in other peripheral areas.

4. Arnold Hottinger, “ Zu‘ama and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958 ” , The Middle East Journal , Spring 1961, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 128–129.

5. Ibid., pp. 128–129. 6. Ibid., p. 131. 7. Shanahan, p. 81. 8. Akram Hourani, “Ideology of the Mounten and the City”, in Aharon Amir

(ed.), Lebanon – Land, People, War (Tel-Aviv: Hadar, 1979), pp. 88–94 (In Hebrew); See also: Wade R.  Goria, Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943–1976 (London: Ithaca, 1985), pp. 11–12.

9. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 455 (D50), “Secret Note du Commandant Pashkof: Les Députés Chiites”, Beyrouth, 30 Dec. 1933, pp. 3–5.

10. See in Omri Nir, “Continuity and Change in the Shi‘ite Community of Lebanon”, pp. 138, 272–273.

11. Pierre Rondot, Le Institutions Politiques du Liban (Paris: 1947), pp. 65–66; See also in: Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 190.

12. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2958, “Traduction – Monsieur L’Inspecteur General du Controle des Wakfs et de L’Immatriculation Foncière”, Mounir ‘Osseyran á L’Inspecteur, Beyrouth, 28 Nov. 1933.

13. A French report relates the argument between the Wakf and the Haj Hasan family in the village of Nebishit. See: AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2958, “Requête adressée à Son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire”, Beyrouth, 25 Sept. 1929.

MAIN CLASSES IN THE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE SHI‘ITE COMMUNITY 31

14. The application in: AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2958, “Requête des Musulmans Djafarites”, Beyrouth, 31 Jullet 1928.; The French response in: AD (Nantes), MAE, Syrie-Liban 2958, Beyrouth, 28 Août 1928.

15. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2958, “Requête du Président de la Cour de Cassation Chérieh Jaffarite de Beyrouth”, Damas, 4 Oct. 1932.

16. AD (Nantes), MAE, Beyrouth Consulat B/12, “Bulletin Hebdomadair D’Information No. 2, 11-17/12/1939”, Beyrouth, 18 Dec. 1939.

17. PRO (London), FO 371/110958, Vl. 1017/4, Chancery to Levant Department-FO, Beirut, 10 May, 1954.

18. AD (Paris), AE, Levant 1918–40, Syrie-Liban-Cilicie, E 313.1, Vol 30, Beyrouth, 3 Juillet 1920.; on the beginning of ceremonies in Lebanon, see also: Werner Ende, “The Flagellations of Muharram and the Shi‘ite ‘Ulama”, Der Islam (Hamburg), No. 55 (1978), pp. 19–36.

19. Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam – Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 128. For further details see: Yves Gonzales-Quijano, “Les interprétations d’un rite: Célébrations de la ‘Achoura au Liban”, Maghreb-Machrek (Paris), No. 115 (Jan.–Mar. 1987), pp. 5–28.

20. Ende, p. 21. 21. The quotation and the expression on bringing speakers, from an interview

made in 1982 with al-Rumri, a member of the SSIC in: Fuad Khuri, “Secularization and Ulama’ Networks Among Sunni and Shi‘i Religious Offi cials”, in Halim Barakat (ed.), Toward a Viable Lebanon (London, Sydney: Groom Helm, 1988), pp. 93–95. In the interview al-Rumri indi-cates that he dedicates about four months a year to the ‘Ashura celebrations.

22. Al-Safi r , 2 June 1994. 23. Chibli Mallat, “Aspects of Shi‘i Thought from the South of Lebanon: al-

‘Irfan , Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya, Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddin, Muhammad Husain Fadlallah”, Papers on Lebanon , No. 7, p.  5. Mallet bases on Mughniya ’s memories that were collected and published as a book in 1980 by his son, ‘Abd al-Hussein.

24. Chalabi, p. 143. 25. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 607, “Traduction Résumée de

l’arabe – Requête du Notables Chiites Adressée à Son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire de la R.Fr”, Tyr, 25 Sept. 1932; The letter was sent as part of the Zu‘ama ’s struggles over power by Isma ‘il al-Khalil, Najib ‘Osseyran and Hanjar ‘Abdallah , signed and backed by six ‘ Ulama , in order to cause ‘Abd al-Hussein Sharf al-Din ’s nomination as the cheif Mufti of the Shi‘ite community to fail. Sharf al-Din was one of the closest allies of their rival, Ahmed al-A s‘ad .

32 O. NIR

26. A prominent Shi‘ite ‘Alim, Muhammad Jawad Mughniya , claimed that one of the consequences of this lack was the nomination of unqualifi ed scholars. See: Mallat , note 17, p. 23.

27. David Menashri, “the Islamic Revolution in Iran: the Shi’ite dimention”, in: Martin Kramer (ed.), Protest and Revolution in Shi’ite Islam (Tel-Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuhad, 1986), pp.  33–34 (in Hebrew); See also in Ann Lambton, “A Reconsideration of the Position of the Marja Taqalid and the Religious Institutions”, Studia Islamica (1964), pp. 115–135.

28. Khuri, p. 90. 29. Bernard Lewis, “ The Quietist and Activist Tradition in the Islamic

Writing ”, Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies , 1986, pp. 141–147.

30. Abbas Kelidar, “The Shi’i Imami Community and Politics in the Arab East”, Middle Eastern Studies , Vol.19, January 1983, pp. 7, 9.

31. Mughniya’s books on that issue are: al-Islam wa-al-‘Aql (Beirut: 1984), al-Tabi‘a al-Thaniya, and Amamat ‘Ala Baina al-‘Aql wa-al- Quraan (Beirut: 1970); For discussion on this issue see also: Mallat, p. 8.

32. Mughniya, al-Islam wa-al-‘Aql , p. 230. 33. On that matter see Ajami , p. 250. 34. ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Fadli, al-Dawla al-Islamiya (Beirut: 1979), p. 34. 35. The prognosis in: Shlomo Zand, The Intellectual, the Truth and the Power

(Tel-Aviv: Ofakim-‘Am ‘Oved, 2000), p. 16 (in Hebrew). 36. The discussion on Goldmann’s prognosis in: L.  S. Feuer, “ What is an

Intellectual? ” in: Alexander Gella (ed.), The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals. Theory, Method and Case Study (Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1976), pp. 47–58.

37. Zand, pp. 19–20. 38. Ibid., pp. 26–27. 39. Shmuel Eizenshtadt, Intellectuals and Tradition (New York & Tel- Aviv:

Humanist and ‘Am-‘Oved, 1973), pp. 4–5.

MAIN CLASSES IN THE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE SHI‘ITE COMMUNITY 33

35© The Author(s) 2017O. Nir, Lebanese Shi‘ite Leadership, 1920–1970s, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43014-0_3

CHAPTER 3

The Centers of Power

Abstract The chapter explores the main power centers of the Shi‘ite com-munity from 1920 to the 1970s. It maps out these power centers and divides the Shi‘ite leadership into three main groups: the al-As‘ad family and its allies, including the Hamadeh and Dandash families, as well as reli-gious scholars and intellectuals; the al-As‘ad family’s opponents, including the alliance of the ‘Osse y ran, al-Khalil and Haydar families and their sup-porters; and the al-Zein family.

Keywords al-As‘ad • Hamadeh • Dandash • ‘Osse y ran • al-Khalil • Haydar • al-Zein • ‘Abd al-Hassan Sadiq • ‘Abd al-Hussein Sharf al-Din

The formation of the Lebanese state in 1920 involved the creation of a new political and organizational framework for its territories. Like the other communities in Lebanon, the Shi‘ite population was subject to the authority of several feudal leaders who were divided into various groups, according to familial and material interests. Within the Lebanese state, the infl uence of Zu‘ama from across the confessional spectrum increased sig-nifi cantly, as their overall power was greater than it had been in the political entities of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab (Syrian) monarchy headed by Emir Faysal , established in Damascus between 1918 and 1920. This was even more true for the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama , who were the leaders of the

third-largest sect in the Lebanese state, representing almost one-fi fth of the total Lebanese population. In the fi rst fi fty years or so of the Lebanese state, constituting the height of political feudalism, the structure of the centers of power in the Shi‘ite community remained stable. This was due to the demographic distribution of the Shi‘ite community. In Jabel-‘Amil , the power centers were based on familial and personal rivalries, which also took into account political and economic elements. In the Biqa‘ , the rivalries were of a more tribal nature, according to tribal alliances in that region. In both regions, the mid-1920s and 1930s saw the arrival of a new generation of Zu‘ama , who were to lead the Lebanese Shi‘ies for many years to come. The main power groups in that period were: (1) Ahmed al-As‘ad and his allies, including the prominent religious scholar ‘Abd al- Hussein Sharf al-Din and the Za‘im of the Biqa‘, Sabri Hamadeh , who, in turn, was allied with the Shi‘ite tribes Dandash of Hirmal and Yaghi of Ba‘albek ; (2) the southern Zu‘ama ‘Adil ‘Osseyran and Kazem al-Khalil , who were allied with the religious scholar Muhammad Taqi  al-Sadiq and with Ibrahim Haydar , a Za‘im from the Biqa‘; (3) the al- Zein family from the Tyre region and their allies; and (4) other people who had local infl u-ence and were not identifi ed with a specifi c group.

MASTERS OF THE SOUTH: THE  AL-AS‘AD FAMILY AND THEIR ALLIES

The term Zu‘ama in the Lebanese Shi‘ite context is most closely identifi ed with the al-As‘ad family of Taybe , a village in Jabel-‘Amil . Their promi-nence was not based on land ownership, since they owned less land than other Shi‘ite families in Jabel-‘Amil, such as the al- Zein , al- Khalil and al- Amin . Rather, their rise to power stemmed from their reputation since the sixteenth century as defenders of Shi‘ite interests before the rulers of the principality of Mount Lebanon and Jabel-‘Amil, who included the Ma‘an and Shihab families, as well as the Ottoman authorities. The infl uence of the al-As‘ad family grew in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a consequence of their alliance with the ruler of Galilee, Dhahir al-‘Omar , and also of their assistance to the Ottomans in defeating the Egyptian occupation of Muhammad ‘Ali and Ibrahim Pasha in 1840.

Political reforms in the Ottoman Empire during the last quarter of the nineteenth century opened up a new political arena for the heads of the family in which they could establish their leadership. Following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, representatives from the provinces were

36 O. NIR

allowed to join the Ottoman parliament. Kamel Bey al-As‘ad , born in 1868, was the fi rst family head to vie for a seat in the Ottoman parliament of 1908 as a representative of the Sanjaq (Ottoman district) of Beirut , which included Jabel-‘Amil . His opponents were the Shi‘ite Za‘im Kazem al-Khalil , the Sunni Rid a al-Sulh and the Maronite Suleiman al-Bustani . In contrast with the Arab nationalist sentiment promoted in particular by al-Sulh and his followers in those years, al-As‘ad represented a pro-Turk stance. During the First World War he was accused by his rivals of informing the Ottomans of the activity of an Arab movement operating in Jabel-‘Amil known as the “ Movement of Tyre ”. This led to the hanging of Kazem al- Khalil in 1915. 1 Towards the end of the war, Ottoman defeat was in sight and Arab nationalist hopes for establishing an Arab monarchy on the territory of Ottoman Syria were on the rise . Then  Kamel Bey was to become an Arab nationalist like the other Zu‘ama in Jabel-‘Amil .

From that point until his death in 1924, Kamel  Bey al-As‘ad remained a radical Arab nationalist as well as a prominent opponent of the French colonial presence in Syria and Lebanon, which began in 1918. He was among the fi rst to support the establishment of an Arab government in Damascus in July that year, headed by Emir Faysal , that encompassed the territories of what had formerly constituted Ottoman Syria. Al-As‘ad accompanied Faysal in his historic entrance into Damascus , along with a few hundred horsemen, and was later appointed his representative in Jabel-‘Amil . 2 In December 1919, along with the Bedouin of the Hula region, he supported the anti-French uprising in the area of Marj‘ayun - Tyre . 3 In late January 1920, he escaped to Syria after the French authori-ties combed the village of Taybe searching for him and imposing fi nes on his property. 4

After the formation of the Lebanese state in early September 1920, al- As‘ad’s relationship with the French Mandate authorities improved, partly due to the new French policy of pursuing better relations with the Shi‘ies. Upon al-As‘ad’s return to Jabel-‘Amil , he supported French policy for a time, apparently in acknowledgment of a monthly salary of 6000 francs, but reconsidered when this salary was terminated. 5 French offi cers in the sub-district of Marj‘ayun , particularly Captain Fariex, understood the importance of good personal relations with al-As‘ad, and acted to soften his resistance. 6 The French policy of offering members of the al-As‘ad fam-ily positions in the upper echelons of the government in order to neutral-ize Shi‘ite resistance continued until they left Lebanon in the summer of 1946. Kamel Bey al-As‘ad nevertheless retained his pro-Arab stance, and abstained from collaborating with the authorities.

THE CENTERS OF POWER 37

The vacuum left by the death of Kamel Bey al-As‘ad in 1924 was not fi lled by either of his two brothers, Mahmud or ‘Abd ul  Latif , who were in disagreement regarding the “ Lebanese question ”. While Mahmud was a Francophile, ‘Abdul Latif continued to believe in the Arab nationalist course initiated by Kamel, but he possessed neither the leadership qual-ities nor the determination of his late brother. Toward the late 1920s, the leadership of the family passed into the hands of ‘Abd al-Latif ’s son, Ahmed al-A s‘ad . Ahmed became the most important Za‘im of the Shi‘ite community for the next forty years and became known as “the Master of Taybe”, “Leader of Jabel-‘Amil”, and “Leader of the Shi‘ies”. During his years in power, he was supported by other Zu‘ama , as well as by impor-tant ‘Ulama and hundreds of armed men. Over the course of that era, he became a symbol of corrupt feudalism and utilitarian politics devoid of ideology in Lebanon.

Ahmed al-As‘ad was born in Taybe in 1908 and his formal education was limited to elementary school. 7 In his early twenties, he married the daughter of his uncle Kamel , whom he succeeded as feudal leader. Until the late 1930s, he chose not to run for the Lebanese parliament or to serve as a cabinet minister, preferring to impulsively follow a line of action between the French Mandatory rule and the Arab nationalist camp, which fl uctuated according to his personal economic interests in Jabel-‘Amil . His participation in offi cial Lebanese institutions such as the parliament and the government became possible only after the turnaround in the attitude of Sunni leaders towards the Lebanese state in the late 1930s, which included acknowledging the state’s existence. He served as a rep-resentative in parliament for the fi rst time between October 1937 and July 1939, and later almost continually, from July 1943 until his death in March 1961. Al-As‘ad served as Parliamentary Speaker between June 1951 and May 1953, and for short terms in the late 1950s. Over the years, he served as a minister many times and in different areas, including health, mail and telegraph (1938); agriculture, mail and telegraph (1939–42); public works and health (1945); agriculture and defense (1945–46); and public works (1948–49, 1950–51). Al-As‘ad’s political career fl uctuated according to his personal relationships with politicians. In the 1950s, he became a political adversary of President Kamil Sham‘un . Sham‘un both supported al-As‘ad’s rival, ‘Adil ‘Osseyran , who was elected Speaker, and nominated his opponent Kazem al-Khalil for a post as minister twice. Thus, al-As‘ad operated against Sham‘un while the latter served as President out of personal motivation, presumably with fi nancial aid from Saudi Arabia . 8

38 O. NIR

His supporters believed their leader was not treated fairly by Sham‘un, particularly after al-As‘ad’s efforts when Sham‘un ran in the presiden-tial elections of 1952. 9 After an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile with Sham‘un in February 1956, al-As‘ad joined the opposition just before the parliamentary elections of 1957 . As a political adversary, al-As‘ad led the people of Jabel-‘Amil against President Sham‘un during the civil war in the summer of 1958 , which divided Lebanon’s politics between pro- and anti-Sham‘unist camps. 10

During Ahmed al-As‘ad’s tenure as leader, Shi‘ite representatives began to integrate into the Lebanese parliament and government . His politi-cal colleagues and Western observers outside the Lebanese political system abhorred his abilities and ascribed his attainment of high positions to the government’s desire not to oppose the Shi‘ite population he represented. He was appointed minister many times in order to prevent him becoming an embittered opponent who might incite all of Jabel-‘Amil against the govern-ment. In 1939, al-As‘ad was appointed minister of agriculture only because French High Commissioner Catroux hoped to quell the desire of the Shi‘ies of Jabel-‘Amil to secede from the Lebanese state. 11 A similar consideration led President Alfred Naqash to appoint al-As‘ad as a government minister in 1942. Naqash explained the nomination by saying that al-As‘ad was an infl u-ential member of the Shi‘ite community and it would be a mistake to pro-voke estrangement. 12 A British report by political offi cer Furlonge to Foreign Minister Eden, in which he described Minister Edward  Spears ’ discussion with Lebanese President Naqash, refl ected the mixed feelings regarding al-As‘ad’s nomination as a member of parliament (MP). The British under-stood that the list of Shi‘ite candidates was very limited. Spears’ response to President Naqash was that in regard to Ahmed al-As‘ad, he felt obliged to express an offi cial objection because his name would not contribute to the authority of any government and because, according to unequivocal reports from the Offi ce of Grains, he had lately had been using his unquestioned infl uence in Jabel-‘Amil to sabotage the wheat project. 13

For the same reason, in order to neutralize al-As‘ad’s potential parlia-mentary power as an opponent, Sunni Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh let him participate in his governments in 1944 and 1948, despite the fact that al-As‘ad was his sworn enemy in Jabel-‘Amil . 14 Al-As‘ad was often accused of using all means to gain power in the personal arena, while neglecting his public duties. In 1942, during his term as minister of agriculture, he led the actions against the department of taxation of the agricultural sector, and incited peasants against government taxation. 15 He was often described in

THE CENTERS OF POWER 39

French and British reports as dishonest, unreliable, conscienceless, corrupt, disregarding of law and order, involved with smuggling, and lacking the appropriate qualities for the position of Parliamentary Speaker . 16 Al-As‘ad nevertheless maintained complete control over parts of Jabel-‘Amil. The deference to his authority was particularly evident in parliamentary elec-tions, since the Lebanese electoral system allocates seats to each religious sect in advance and in practice the struggle for the seat is within the sect. As a result, dozens of Shi‘ite politicians aspired to be included on his lists, knowing that the lists were the only way to be elected. In his book, Fouad ‘Ajami quotes a common allegation that if Ahmed al-As‘ad had desired, he could have caused his walking stick to be elected to parliament. 17

Al-As‘ad’s overarching political modus operandi was shaped by personal intrigues and rivalry with other Shi‘ite Zu‘ama and politicians. His reaction to the defeat he faced in the 1953 parliamentary elections illustrates this. In previous elections, al-As‘ad took advantage of the fact that the Jabel-‘Amil was one united constituency, electing fourteen out of the seventy- seven representatives in parliament. Due to electoral reforms instituted prior to the 1953 elections, Jabel-‘Amil was divided into two such con-stituencies (consisting of Jabel-‘Amil and Nabatiyeh ), thereby minimizing al-As‘ad’s infl uence and shrinking his parliamentary block to only two rep-resentatives, him and his son Kamel . As a result of this defeat, al-As‘ad lost the position of Parliamentary Speaker to his sworn enemy, ‘Adil ‘Osseyran , the Shi‘ite Za‘im from the city of Sidon . Humiliated, he argued with the Sunni Prime Minister, ‘Abd a llah al-Yafi , on the parliamentary fl oor after the latter accused the al-As‘ads of “destroying Lebanon”. Insulted and hurt, al-As‘ad absented himself from the parliamentary plenary sessions for six months, during which time he moved to Damascus . On his return in March 1954, his supporters led a procession through the streets of Beirut , passing near a neighborhood controlled by Prime Minister al-Yafi . Riots broke out, in which one man was killed and eight were injured. 18 Over the decades, a small band of armed men remained loyal to al-As‘ad, and they were enlisted for such demonstrations of force. Usually this com-pany included between thirty and fi fty armed men, and when the necessity arose, he was able to recruit around 1000 armed followers. 19

Ahmed al-A s‘ad did not have an unwavering political or ideological orientation during his political career. His political positions regarding the “ Lebanese question ” fl uctuated according to how he viewed his chances for personal gain. At the beginning of his career, he helped the rebels dur-ing the Druze Rebellion, which became the 1925–27 Arab revolt against

40 O. NIR

the French . In the early 1930s, he held the most moderate views toward the French Mandatory authorities of all the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama in Jabel-‘Amil, to the point of being forced to cooperate with the authorities as a result of the crisis in the tobacco industry, which led to the depletion of his fortune. During that period, he began to participate in the Lebanese state institutions after he realized that doing so would help him retain his sta-tus. During the Arab revolt in Palestine in 1936–39, al-As‘ad supported the rebels, although he simultaneously maintained a relationship with the Jewish settlement on the “ British ” side of the border, even selling land to Jews within Palestine. The 1948 war in Palestine put an end to his open relations with the Jews, and he became one of the most radical of the Arab leaders in his opposition to the establishment of the State of Israel . During the Suez crisis of 1956 , in which the British and French fought alongside Israel against Nasser ’s Egypt, al-As‘ad openly stood against the British and, together with his son Kamel, was among those who demanded the termination of Lebanon’s diplomatic relations with Britain and France. Al-As‘ad supported the pan-Arab Egyptian leader Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, and from the mid-1950s he maintained connections with his agents in Beirut in return for money. When the United Arab Republic was formed (UAR, the unifi cation of Egypt and Syria between February 1958 and September 1961), al-As‘ad was suspected of being one of the secret channels for the smuggling of weapons to Lebanon from Syria by pro-Nasserites, and as such, the Lebanese authorities treated him as an insurrectionary security risk. On the eve of the civil war in 1958 , he main-tained contact with American agents for a short time, and was regarded as being under their protection. 20 The historian Fouad ‘Ajami argues that the civil war remained outside the sphere of action of Ahmed al-As‘ad and his followers. A British report similarly indicated that al-As‘ad’s role in the war disappointed his supporters. 21 However, according to Lebanese press accounts from the summer of 1958, as well as American diplomatic docu-ments, al-As‘ad was one of the leaders of the popular rebellion in Jabel-‘Amil and cooperated closely with the Druze leader Kamal Junblatt . 22

Despite being criticized over the years, al-As‘ad became identifi ed with Lebanese politics to such a degree that he is regarded as one of the founding fathers of independent Lebanon. After his death in March 1961, Lebanese politicians and journalists lauded his contributions to the estab-lishment of the Lebanese state. In the parliamentary memorial session, the speakers went to such extremes of praise as to border on the ridiculous, portraying him as responsible for the unity of his homeland, as tolerant and

THE CENTERS OF POWER 41

as one who rose above quarrels. Then-Prime Minister Sa’ib Salam said that al-As‘ad was a foundational pillar of a free, independent and Arab Lebanon, and that he struggled on all fronts for Lebanon’s glory and for the sake of the Lebanese people. Parliamentary Member Rinya Mu‘awadh , who served as President of Lebanon for a short time in the late 1980s, said al-As‘ad had left a rich legacy for his successor, and that over the course of his career he devoted himself to three goals, namely, God, the homeland and the people. He added that al-As‘ad was furthermore a symbol of justice, loyalty and poise. 23 The magazine al-Sayad called him “a statesman who embod-ied generosity”. 24 Historian Arnold Hottinger called him “a great landlord and politician”. 25 Ahmed al-As‘ad was succeeded by his son, Kamel , whose struggle to replicate his father’s status is discussed further in this work.

The Hamadeh Tribe

Ahmed al-As‘ad’s major political ally was Sabri Hamadeh , a Za‘im from Hirmal in the northern Biqa‘, who was married to al-As‘ad’s daughter. Even though the two men vied many times for the position of Parliamentary Speaker , they cooperated in their political and personal struggles within the Lebanese political system, and within the Shi‘ite community.

The Hamadeh clan arrived in Hirmal from Yemen, traveling through Bukhara. From there, in the early fi fteenth century, they extended their infl uence through violent raids northward and westward to the primarily Maronite -dominated regions of B shari and Diniyeh . In the mid-sixteenth century, at the peak of their domination, the Hamadehs controlled Hirmal and large parts of northern Lebanon and ‘Akar . However, the uprising of Maronite peasants in 1762 and the clan’s subsequent 1766 defeat by Emir Yusuf al-Shihabi in the Battle of Amiyun, led to the loss of all territories outside of Hirmal. 26 The expulsion of the Hamadeh sheikhs from the ter-ritories beyond Hirmal caused some of their supporters from the villages of northern Lebanon to emigrate to the Biqa‘ , thus separating into two groups. The fi rst group consisted of Shi‘ite peasants who remained on Mount Lebanon , in the districts of Jbeil and Kisrawan , and retained their fathers’ names, including the clans ( Hamulat ) of Z‘aytar , Ja‘afar , Nasser al-Din and Nun . The second group consisted of emigrants known as “al- Jarid”, who settled on the eastern slopes of Mount Lebanon and in the arid valleys of Hirmal . This group divided the territory tribally between the Shams group in Birk-‘Alma and the Z‘aytar in Birk-Afqa. Both groups were divided according to clan relationships ( ‘Asha’ir ). 27

42 O. NIR

During the years following the First World War , as the struggle ensued over the establishment of a Lebanese state, Sa‘adallah Hamadeh took up the leadership reins of the family. His pro-French position on the Lebanese question had its roots in his rivalry with the pro-Arab Haydar tribe on the one hand, and his good relations with the Christians on the other hand. His relationship with the Christians was the product of the tribe’s historic linkage to the Sanjak (district) of Mount Lebanon during Ottoman rule. Sa‘adallah Hamadeh proved his pro-French position in 1920 when he pre-vented the residents of Ba‘albek from attacking French soldiers on their way to Damascus , by threatening military intervention. 28 From the French point of view he was an ideal leader, to such an extent that before the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 1933 , they predicted that “the voters in Hirmal will vote according to an order from Sa‘adallah Hamadeh , who would follow the French orders”. 29 In the mid-1930s, the family leader-ship suffered a split over personal disagreements between Sa‘adallah and his nephew, Sabri, who became the chief of the tribe.

Sabri Hamadeh led the family for almost forty years, thereby becoming one of the dominant Shi‘ite politicians in Lebanon. He was born in the Biqa‘ in 1902 or 1903, and was one of the few members of his tribe to continue his education beyond primary school. After fi nishing high school, he studied hydrology in the French college of Beirut . In the mid-1930s, he was elected to parliament for the fi rst time. The 1937 elections brought to light the controversy within the Hamadeh tribe between Sa‘adallah , who was loyal to the government, and Sabri, who was in the opposition. 30 The disagreements did not concern the “ Lebanese question ”, as both remained supporters of the Mandate and the Lebanese state. Their differences of opinion instead revolved around issues of honor and infl uence between vari-ous branches of the extended family, which numbered about 60,000 people in the early 1940s. 31 In the wake of those struggles, some sheikhs and other Shi‘ites from Hirmal sent petitions to the French High Commissioner in which they expressed support for Sabri and viewed with disfavor the nomi-nation of any other family member. Other tribal members expressed their support of the nomination of another family member, Faddi Hamadeh . 32 Sabri Hamadeh’s pro-French approach, as well as the fact that he served in key positions in the Lebanese regime in later years, brought criticism from within the tribe and led to a split between the various branches. ‘Ajami quotes Hamadeh’s explanation to his wife regarding the difference between the incontrovertible authority of her father, Ahmed al-A s‘ad , and his own frustration with the diffi culty of controlling his own followers: “ I am a horse among horses, while your father is a horse among mules ”. 33

THE CENTERS OF POWER 43

Sabri Hamadeh was elected to the position of Parliamentary Speaker many times from the 1940s to the 1960s, which earned him the nick-name “The Perpetual Speaker”. Hamadeh became a political symbol of feudal corruption, at least to his opponents, and he was famous for being an arrogant and vulgar politician, a Hashish smuggler, and for accepting bribes. 34 His electoral lists were desired by many Shi‘ies, but his corrupt behavior in parliament caused his status to erode during the 1950s and the 1960s. In the elections of 1953 , he almost failed to be elected to the parliament because of his bad relations with President Kamil Sham‘un . 35 Before the elections of 1960 , Hamadeh accepted 350,000 Lebanese lira from one of the candidates in return for being added to his list. 36 Even though he was the Parliamentary Speaker at the time of the elections, he was barely elected and four candidates on his list, including the one who had bribed him, lost to other competitors. 37 In another case, a claim was fi led against Hamadeh when he served as Speaker for attempting to assas-sinate his political adversary and the editor of al-Kifah newspaper, Riyad Ta’ , using his parliamentary guard. 38

Politically, Hamadeh was steadfast in his support of the Mandate authorities and the existence of the Lebanese state. Even though he was regarded as a French yes-man, and even maintained connections with the French intelligence service in the 1930s, the French themselves looked down upon his arrogance and corrupt ways. 39 After Lebanon gained its independence in 1943, he does not seem to have had a clear political inclination, because he was torn between his desire to maintain the politi-cal status quo due to material and personal interests, and his desire to retain the support of his followers, who tended to be swept away by the pro-Arab nationalist sentiment that swept through Lebanon in the 1950s and 1960s. In that period, many Shi‘ies were attracted by slogans of Arab unity, which in effect compelled Lebanon to be united within a broader political frame. Although such unity would have rendered ineffectual the privileges of leaders like Hamadeh in Lebanon, taking a clear stance against Arab nationalist sentiment risked driving his supporters away. Hamadeh was among the opponents of President Kamil Sham‘un in the parliament. As such, he played an active role in the crisis that caused the supporters of Sham‘un’s pro-Western line to confront his opponents. In April 1958, Syrian offi cers armed Hamadeh’s people in order to attack positions of the Lebanese gendarmerie and communication centers “in the name of God and the Arabs”, but the attack was never carried out. 40 During the civil war of 1958 , Hamadeh led the insurgents in the northern Biqa‘ , and even lost his nephew in one of the confl icts with the security forces. 41

44 O. NIR

In the mid-1960s, Hamadeh was involved with the Institutional Unity Party ( Hizb al-Itihad al-Dusturi ) , a rightist, mainly Christian party, void of any ideology, whose power center was in ‘Aley and Jbeil . Hamadeh was one of the strongest fi gures in the party even though its offi cial leader was Khalil al-Khouri , the eldest son of former President Bishara al-Khouri . The party adopted the direction of the Institutional Bloc Party ( al-Kutla al-Dusturiya ) of Bishara al-Khouri, which operated in the 1930s and 1940s. 42 In the 1960s, following the death of Ahmed al-A s‘ad , Sabri Hamadeh understood that he could no longer retain feudal power, and therefore tried to adapt to the political changes that were taking place in the Shi‘ite community. One episode that symbolized Hamadeh’s position was his gesture to Musa al-Sadr , the religious scholar who pushed for the establishment of the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council . When al-Sadr was elected chairman of the council, Hamadeh insisted upon kissing his hand publicly, as an expression of recognition of the new balance between the status of Zu‘ama and ‘Ulama , after years in which religious fi gures had been under his authority. 43

Sabri Hamadeh’s political activity revolved for years around the strug-gle of the Hamadeh tribe and the Haydar tribe regarding the issue of tribal hegemony in the northern and western Biqa‘ . Within the context of this struggle, the Hamadehs were allies of two other large tribes. One was the Yaghi tribe, whose members did not serve in government positions but who possessed numerical superiority in Ba‘albek , the residential town of the Haydars . The other tribe was Dandash , which was the third most important tribe in the Biqa‘, after Hamadeh and Haydar . 44

The Dandash Tribe

The Dandash tribe, which resided in the Hirmal region, played a sig-nifi cant role in the intertribal relations in the Biqa‘. In contrast to the two largest tribes, whose behavioral code corresponded with their politi-cal status, the Dandash remained loyal to traditional tribal codes and to a militant worldview that earned them the title of “band of robbers and cut- throats”. 45 Their violent ways created internal Lebanese secu-rity problems. They would raid Christian villages as well as government and military sites of the French Mandate , taking advantage of their geographic superiority stemming from living on the hills of the Hirmal plane. Many of the raids concerned quarrels about sovereignty over land. In 1939, for instance, following several raids in Hirmal, some villages in

THE CENTERS OF POWER 45

the region demanded that youth of the Dandash tribe who had partici-pated in the raids be sent to Syria , but the French objected, claiming it was a domestic controversy over leadership jurisdiction. 46

The Dandash attitude towards the “ Lebanese question ” was not deter-mined by ideological considerations, but rather by intertribal alliances. In the early 1920s, they were under the leadership of the Hamadeh family , and therefore did not rebel against either French military or Lebanese interests. While creating public unrest, the Dandash tribe was pro-French, even fi ghting those of the Haydar tribe considered enemies of France dur-ing the Arab rebellion of 1925–27. 47 In the mid-1920s, the Dandashes were involved in intrigues and sedition against their Hamadeh allies, which led them to briefl y support the Haydars and to turn against their former leaders, and against Christian villages. This transformation changed their perception of the French military and the Lebanese security forces, making the tribe a security threat. In April 1926, fi fty armed men of the Dandash tribe, led by Hassan Ta‘an Dandash , sabotaged the Homs–Riyek railway and raided government targets. The French Mandatory authorities, who were helpless in the face of these raids, agreed that the Dandashes them-selves would protect the railway, for 24,500 FF per month. 48 In addition, the authorities reached an understanding with more than fi fty tribesman that they would stay away from settlements located on the hills of the Biqa‘ , in order to nurture mutual trust with their neighbors. While the recon-ciliation was still ongoing, Hassan Ta‘an Dandash was assassinated in April 1929 by a Christian from Ba‘albek , in the context of a vendetta related to a local rivalry. 49 After Lebanon gained its independence in 1943, the Dandash tribe continued to cause security problems in the Biqa‘ , at the same time as it integrated into the system of parliamentary elections . They reached their peak of parliamentary power in the early 1960s when they obtained three seats, but lost their parliamentary power later that decade. 50

The tribe twice disrupted security in the Biqa‘ , compelling the authori-ties to allocate large forces to restore peace to the region. The fi rst inci-dent, in April 1929, was the result of dissatisfaction with the progress of the investigation of the murder of the tribal leader, and then disap-pointment in the assassin’s light punishment of fi fteen years of penal servitude. In view of these feelings, both the brother of the murdered tribal leader and the new leader of the tribe, Mustafa Ta‘an Dandash , vis-ited the French offi cer in charge of the Biqa‘ region, escorted by several dozen armed men who, taking violent measures, acted in contempt of the law. After the visit, the French issued an order for the tribe to disarm,

46 O. NIR

an order approved by the Lebanese Mandatory government . In May that year, twenty-seven tribesmen, including Mustafa Ta‘an , gave themselves up and disarmed. A Lebanese military tribunal sentenced them to prison for the raids and crimes committed in the preceding months. The rest of the tribal warriors, about thirty armed men organized into three groups, succeeded in escaping to the mountains. There, they spent the following weeks robbing and plundering in an effort to undermine the security of the Syrian–Lebanese border. In December, French troops under the com-mand of Colonel Aliegrini subdued one of the groups, killing fi ve of the tribesmen. The women and children of the tribe were concentrated in a camp built in Nabi ‘Othman , and later were exiled to Mayadin in eastern Syria , along with the warriors who had been held since May and were just then released from custody. In early September 1932, four tribesmen, including Mustafa Ta‘an Dandash , infi ltrated the hills near Hirmal and gave themselves up to the French Special Service, which sent them back to exile in Mayadin. In early July 1933, fi fteen tribesmen infi ltrated the original tribal territory in Hirmal, and were granted permission to stay there under the guaranty of the Hamadeh tribe, and under restrictions set by the authorities. In September 1933, the entire tribe was allowed to return to Hirmal from exile. 51

The second occasion on which the Dandash tribe disrupted the security of Lebanon, this time as an independent state, was in 1948, when it threat-ened Christian villages in the wake of a blood feud. In early June that year, Dandash tribesmen attacked six Greek Catholic peasants who were work-ing in the fi elds, killing fi ve of them and burying one captive alive. Ten gendarmes who were supposed to protect the Christians ran away after the fi rst shot was fi red. Due to the limited availability of security forces, the government had allocated only several hundred gendarmes to defend against the Dandashes, provoking Christians in the region to threaten to take the law into their own hands. Sabri Hamadeh , the Parliamentary Speaker , asked for police protection for his home during this crisis, in order to take advantage of any governmental appeal to assert his infl u-ence on the Dandashes in order to bring stability. After the crisis was over, there was a great fear of retaliation by the Christian villages, which would have heightened the Christian–Muslim tension across the entire country. About sixty armed Dandash tribesmen went into the hills overlooking the Hirmal in order to provoke the Lebanese government, and stayed there until the end of that year. 52

THE CENTERS OF POWER 47

‘Abd al-Hussein Sharf al-Din

Prominent ‘ Ulama joined the political axis, which was headed by the Zu‘ama al-As‘ad and Hamadeh. The pre-eminent Shi‘ite ‘ Alim in Lebanon during the fi rst half of the twentieth century was ‘Abd al- Hussein Sharf al-din, who headed the Shi‘ite ‘ Ulama in Lebanon for many years. He was born in 1873 in the Iraqi town of Kadhimiyeh , where his father had moved from Lebanon to pursue religious studies. This was not an unex-pected course in the Sharf al-Din family, which was known for its tradition of scholastics and high religious standing. He studied under the greatest ‘ Ulama in Najaf and Samara before returning to Lebanon, to the village of Shuhur in Jabel-‘Amil , where his family had lived for generations. 53 In his fi rst years as an ‘ Alim , Sharf al-Din wrote many articles on reli-gious matters, and he received six authorizations ( Ijazat ) from senior Iraqi ‘Ulama . 54 His breadth of knowledge stretched beyond matters particular only to the Shi‘a, including issues of concern to Sunnis and to Zeidies . This enabled him to carry out a dialogue with Sheikh al-Azhar Salim al- Bashri , who was the prominent ‘Alim of the Sunni Muslin world. Their dialogue, on the differences in perception of the Prophet between Shi‘ies and Sunnis, began during Sharf al-Din’s visit to Egypt in 1910, and con-tinued after his return to Lebanon. 55

Sharf al-Din’s political activity began as a result of the reforms in the Ottoman Empire following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The reforms, for the fi rst time, allowed for the election of representatives from the provinces to the Ottoman parliament. The electoral race for a seat in the Ottoman parliamentary elections of 1908 ignited a rivalry of many years between the two prominent Zu‘ama in Jabel-‘Amil, the Shi‘ite Kamel  Bey al-As‘ad and the Sunni Rid a al-Sulh . Sharf al-Din openly supported al-As‘ad on the principle that he was the only Shi‘ite candidate in Jabel-‘Amil who could defeat al-Sulh. His position, which was explicitly that Jabel-‘Amil should not fall into Sunni hands, refl ected an awareness of Shi‘ite identity. In taking this step, Sharf al-Din was among the fi rst to insinuate an element of Shi‘ite identity into the political and personal confl icts in Lebanon. 56 The alliance between Sharf al-Din and al-As‘ad continued dur-ing the First World War , when a confl ict arose between the Ottoman Turks and Arabs following the Hashamite Sherifi an revolt in 1916 . In that confl ict the Shi‘ite Za‘im adopted a pro-Ottoman stance, while the Sunni was pro-Arab. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the war led most of the lead-ers in the region, including al-As‘ad and Sharf al- Din, to become pro-Arab.

48 O. NIR

During the Arab struggle in Syria in 1918–20, Sharf al-Din continued to support al-As‘ad and was one of the most prominent activists against the French , mainly protesting their commitment to Maronite and sectarian interests in Lebanon. In 1918, his home in Sidon was ravaged by French troops. Many of his books and scriptures were confi scated and another of his houses was set on fi re. Because he was wanted by the French, Sharf al-Din escaped to Damascus , and later to Palestine and Egypt . In 1919, he returned to Jabel-‘Amil . 57 In June of that year, Sharf al-Din was among the Shi‘ite delegates who met the American King–Crane Commission , which was contemplating the future of Syria , and demanded the establishment of an Arab state led by Emir Faysal Ibn Hussein Ibn ‘Ali al-Hash a mite. 58 The Arab failure in Syria and the formation of Greater Lebanon in September 1920 inspired Sharf al-Din’s interest in social issues in the ensuing years.

During the French Mandate Sharf al-Din, in his indirect political career, continued to support Ahmed al-A s‘ad . He dedicated much time to religious and social matters in his capacity as Mufti of the city of Tyre and chief of the Shi‘ite ‘ Ulama in Lebanon. Even though he was regarded as a frantic anti- Christian and opponent of foreign occupation, his political positions often fl uctuated under the infl uence of his patron, Ahmed al- As‘ad. On the one hand, Sharf al-Din disapproved of the foreign military presence in the Middle East, and even took steps to oppose this presence, including preaching Jihad (holy war) against the British during the revolt of 1936–39  in Palestine; refusing to support the Vichy regime against Britain after the occupation of Lebanon by Britain and Free France ; and, in 1945, signing a radical petition submitted to the American consulate in Beirut in which he protested the French invitation of Senegalese troops into Lebanon. 59 On the other hand, Sharf al-Din praised the French, stat-ing that the Shi‘ies were grateful to the Mandatory force for allowing free-dom of religion and equality to the Shi‘ites, and claimed that “Lebanon could exist only under French control”. He even prayed for the well-being of France and for a French victory in the Second World War . 60 The change in Sharf al-Din’s attitude towards the French in the early 1930s was a result of the shift in his patron Ahmed al-As‘ad’s approach, and also refl ected the shift in attitude on this issue in the Muslim camp in general, and among Shi‘ies in particular. His positive attitude to the French authorities was also in part a result of his efforts to bring about the appointment of his son, Say e d Muhammad Rid a Sharf al-Din, as a teacher in the new mosque built in Tyre in 1933. 61

THE CENTERS OF POWER 49

One of Sharf al-Din’s greatest enterprises was the establishment of the Ja‘afari School ( al-Madrasa al-Ja‘afariya ) in Tyre in 1938. During the 1958 civil war , this school served as a center for Arab nationalist advance-ment. Sharf al-Din wrote dozens of books about religion and theology. The most important are al-Muraja‘at (Browses), which was translated into Persian, and Ajubat Musa’il Jar Allah (Answers for Questions of the Sheltered under the Lord). Starting in 1940, he served as the chief Shi‘ite ‘ Alim in Lebanon and the Ja‘afari Mufti . He died in 1957 and was buried in Najaf , Iraq . 62

AL-AS‘AD’S RIVALS Ahmed al-As‘ad and his allies were opposed by two primary centers of power in the Shi‘ite community. One was comprised of the Zu‘ama from the ‘Osseyran and al-Khalil families from Jabel-‘Amil and the Haydar tribe from the Biqa‘ . They adopted an Arab-nationalist position at the time of the mandate , and cooperated with the Sunni Za‘im Riad al-Sulh , who was al-As‘ad’s chief adversary in Jabel-‘Amil. The al-Sulh family led the Muslim opposition against the Lebanese state, together with the Karami family of Tripoli , also a Sunni. ‘Osseyran was affi liated with ‘Abd al-Hassan Sadiq , a leading cleric from Nabatiyeh , in Jabel-‘Amil. The second center of power was the al-Zein family , particularly the Za‘im Yusuf al-Zein , whose power stemmed from French patronage and from mediation between the man-datory authorities and the Shi‘ite public in Jabel-‘Amil. A third center, although less infl uential than the fi rst two, included people with unique social or religious status but who were not identifi ed with a particular group. They were united by their opposition to al-As‘ad and usually by their support of Arab unity. Prominent fi gures among them included intel-lectuals such as Ahmed Rid a, Suleiman Dhaher and Muhammad Jaber . The political fragmentation in Jabel-‘Amil was in many cases the result of personal feuds, a fact which often caused rivarlries, even between Zu‘ama who held similar political views. After Lebanon gained its independence in November 1943, these personal fueds remained the driving force in the Zu‘ama relations. while ideological differences were blurred between the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama , the rivalry between the two prominent Shi‘ite and Sunni leaders of Jabel-‘Amil, Ahmed al-A s‘ad and Riad al-Sulh , ended following the assassination of the latter in July 1951.

50 O. NIR

‘Osseyran—al-Khalil— Haydar

The most prominent Za‘im outside al-As‘ad’s circle of infl uence was ‘Adil ‘Osseyran , who was greatly appreciated within the Lebanese political sys-tem. The ‘Osseyran family, from the city of Sidon , owned property there and in Qasmiy eh . In these areas, the ‘Osseyrans were stronger than the al- Zein family , their main rivals, and more acclaimed among the local people. Until the mid-1930s, the leaders of the family were loyal to the French Mandate , but some of the youth, including some who were lawyers and doctors working in Jabel-‘Amil , began to heed the Arab nationalist pro-paganda that was spreading in Muslim schools, calling for the unity of the territories of Ottoman Syria. 63

At the time of the formation of the Lebanese state, three brothers, Muhsin , Najib and Rashed , headed the ‘Osseyran family. Muhsin, born in 1887, decided to support France and to tie his fate to that of the Mandatory government. In 1909, after he fi nished his studies in a teach-ers’ college in Istanbul, he was appointed as a school headmaster in Sidon , and in 1911 as headmaster of another school. In October 1922, he applied to the French for an executive post: “ I believe, Mister Governor, that my studies and professional experience give me the ability to serve my country and the French mandate with the loyalty and devotion of an honest person and a patriot ”. 64 Munir ‘Osseyran , a relative who served in high positions in the Shi‘ite religious establishment and as a middleman between the Shi‘ite community and the Mandatory government , acted along with him.

His younger brother, Najib , who during the 1920s became the pre- eminent representative of the ‘Osseyran family, persevered the family’s support of the Mandate and of the Lebanese state. French Mandatory offi cers wrote that he behaved according to the advice given to him by French agents, and that he was willing to assert his infl uence for French gain, although he did not initiate actions for their benefi t. Najib was a member of the governmental council that preceded the Lebanese parlia-ment in 1922–26, and he later served as a member of parliament almost continuously from 1927 to 1939, and as deputy Speaker from 1937 to 1939. 65 Najib ‘Osseyran was also esteemed by Arab nationalists for his reliability and his easygoing nature, which gave him a reputation for being one of the calmest and self-possessed politicians of the Shi‘ite community. He avoided the intrigues and power struggles that typically occupied the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama , such as his brother Rashed, whom the French described as one who “made intrigues his profession”. 66

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Rashed took an active role in some of the pro-Arab organizations that were organized after the liberation of Syrian territories from the Ottoman rule. He participated in the Syrian congress , which was convened twice, in the summer of 1919 and the winter of 1920. This congress demanded com-plete independence of the territories of Syria , Lebanon and Palestine . At fi rst, he unequivocally objected to French occupation of Lebanon, but after the occupation of Damascus and the removal of Emir Faysal by France , he became less antagonistic to French occupation, without harming his good relations with the Arab groups. His attitude towards Lebanese institutions was favorable, and his attitude towards the Mandatory forces appropriate. Rashed was regarded , like his brother Najib, as one who did not accept bribes. At times, because of Rashed’s ambition to replace his brother in the parliament, the relationship between the two brothers turned cold. 67

‘Adil ‘Osseyran was born in Sidon in 1905. Beginning in the 1940s, he became the prominent Za‘im in the family, and one of the most esteemed Shi‘ies in Lebanese politics. After fi nishing his studies in Sidon , he moved to Beirut . There, in 1928, he received a bachelor’s degree in political sci-ence from the American University of Beirut and a master’s degree in the same fi eld ten years later. During his studies in 1936, and under the infl u-ence of the pro-Arab propaganda on Beirut campuses, ‘Adil ‘Osseyran was imprisoned for activity against the French Mandate . Because of this activ-ity, the Mandate authorities foiled his fi rst attempt to be elected to parlia-ment in 1937 . In the early 1940s, the French suspected that ‘Osseyran was operating under British protection and he was listed as a British informer. Their suspicions grew even though ‘Osseyran headed an anti-British pro-test movement in Jabel-‘Amil following the anti-British revolt in Iraq in 1941 and directed the Arab National Defense Committees of the Iraqi Red Cross, which organized petitions and meetings in Tyre and Nabatiyeh . 68 The French believed that his pro-British and anti-French positions origi-nated at fi rst from fear, and later from conviction. 69 The British described ‘Osseyran as strong, open and intransigent, unlike other Shi‘ite leaders, and also as a “sharp and uncompromising lawyer, who enjoys dealing with political arguments”. 70 Even though his relations with the British did not deviate from the limitations set by his Arab nationalist conviction, ‘Osseyran developed a friendly and close relationship with the commander of the British forces in Lebanon, Edward Spears , and maintained this con-nection even after the latter left Lebanon. In a letter ‘Osseyran sent to Spears in May 1945, when the retired British offi cer ran for a seat in the British parliament, he wrote:

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This country shall never and can never forget you. Its people are having great deal of sympathy, attachment and appreciation for your personality. Your name became very much popular than you think it was when you were in the country as an offi cial minister. You are now a minister in the hearts of the greatest majority of Lebanese and other people of this Arab world … We are ready to conquer the hearts of the Britishers for your sake because we lay great deal of importance on your success. Lady and General Spears should be looked upon as eminent fi gures in England as much as they are here. 71

Supported by the British, ‘Adil ‘Osseyran was elected to the parliament for the fi rst time in 1943 as a representative of the constituency of south Lebanon and served as the minister of commerce and provisions. Prior to that, he was active outside the political arena but was nevertheless regarded by the British as one of the two most important Shi‘ies in Jabel-‘Amil . 72 In 1943, he became one of the heroes of Lebanese independence, together with President Bishara al-Khouri , Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh and other senior politicians, who were arrested by the French for sub-version against the French occupation of Lebanon. Later they convinced France to grant Lebanon its independence through mass demonstrations and a popular uprising supported by Britain . As a result of his personal role in those events, ‘Osseyran was among the most prominent fi gures in Lebanese politics.

Between 1953 and 1992, ‘Osseyran was elected continually to the parliament as a representative of the Zaharani constituency, the only two exceptions occurring in 1964 and 1968. In the 1950s, he represented a serious threat to Ahmed al-As‘ad ’s leadership in Jabel-‘Amil and in Lebanese politics in general, partly because he was preferred by President Kamil Sham‘un for the position of Parliamentary Speaker. The climax of his political career occurred when he served as the Speaker of Parliament between 1953 and 1958, during the time when Nasserism was wide-spread across the Arab world, including in Lebanon. ‘Osseyran made his Arab nationalist and pro-Nasserite opinions known already in the early 1950s. At the time of the formation of the United Arab Republic  (UAR) , ‘Osseyran’s view that Lebanon should join the UAR and his frequent vis-its to Cairo provoked a political and public storm. In spite of his well- known pro- Nasserite views, he played a passive role during the civil war of 1958 , which made him a target for criticism, mostly from Shi‘ite religious circles. 73 Soon after that crisis, he resigned as Speaker and was replaced by Ahmed al-A s‘ad .

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‘Osseyran served in many positions during his political career, includ-ing minister of defense, interior, justice, public works, fi nance and edu-cation. During the years 1984–1990, under President Amin al - G umayil, he served as the minister of defense in the national unity government, a period during which Lebanon was engaged in civil war (1975–89). He participated in the parliamentary sessions that debated the adoption of the 1989 Ta’if Accord , which ultimately ended the civil war. In 1992, his parliamentary position was assumed by his son ‘Ali . When another of his children, ‘Abdullah , was murdered in 1975, ‘Adil ‘Osseyran temporarily retired from political life. In June 1998, he died after suffering from Parkinson’s disease for fi fteen years.

‘Abd al-Hassan Sadiq

‘Osseyran’s religious ally was ‘Abd al-Hassan Sadiq. Sadiq was born in 1862 in the Iraqi city of Najaf , after his family moved there to continue the family tradition of studying in the leading colleges of the Shi‘ite world. His father returned to Jabel-‘Amil the year he was born and was asked by the brothers ‘Ali and Muhammad al-As‘ad to settle either in the village of Taybe , where the al-As‘ads lived, or in al- Khiyam . He complied, and the entire family decided to leave Iraq with him. Many members of his family died on their way to Lebanon, including his parents, and he was raised by his older brothers. Sadiq began his studies in the school of Majd al Sl e m and later in Bint-Jbeil . In 1884, he moved to the religious college in Najaf to study under the greatest Shi‘ite scholars of the time. He passed the second stage of studying, known as Sutuh , and focused on the works of such scholars as ‘Abd al-Karim al-Baghdadi , Sheikh Ja‘afar al-Sharuki , ‘Ali al-Bahrani and Yasin Tah . 74 His permit ( Ijaza ) to act as a religious arbiter ( Mujtahed ) was not limited to certain fi elds, as was common, but was valid in all fi elds ( Ijtihad al-Mutlaq ).

After returning to Jabel-‘Amil, ‘Abd al-Hassan Sadiq became the Mufti of Nabatiyeh and established connections with the Zu‘ama Najib ‘Osseyran and Kazem al-Khalil . He founded a school in al- Khiyam whose graduates usually went to Iraq to continue their religious train-ing. Among its graduates were his three sons, Muhammad Taqi , ‘Abd al-Karim and Hassan . After the parliamentary elections of 1933 , he feared that his rivals would gain an advantage due to the success of their Zu‘ama patrons, and for this reason he ceased to abstain from contact with the Mandatory authorities , as did his patron ‘Osseyran. In early

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1934, he visited the Mandatory offi ces in Sidon , along with the MPs Najib ‘Osseyran and Fadhel al- Fadhel , to express his support and pres-ent his requests. Sadiq expressed the satisfaction of the Shi‘ies with the improvement in the economic situation following the appointment of a new French High Commissioner. He then requested the improvement of irrigation projects, roads and schools. One of his major entreaties was for the creation of a position of a Ja‘afari Mufti for the city of Sidon , which, although surrounded by many Shi‘ite villages, had only a few Shi‘ite resi-dents, while the vast majority of the population were Sunnis . The main purpose of the visit was to ensure the nomination of one of his sons to the new position. 75 In March 1934, the Ababil newspaper reported that one of Sadiq’s sons had been arrested on charges of smuggling goods from Palestine . The report was part of a struggle that broke out among the Zu‘ama over the nomination of the Ja‘afari Mufti in Sidon. Later it was made clear that the man who was arrested was someone else with the same name, and that Yusuf al-Zein , a rival of Najib ‘Osseyran and Kazem al-Khalil , was responsible for the announcement. 76

As the Mufti of Nabatiyeh , Sadiq made efforts to build the mosque in al- Khiyam and other mosques in the surrounding villages. He enlarged the mosque in Nabatiyeh and established the fi rst charity association ( Husniya ) in Jabel-‘Amil, where many of the religious gatherings and public events subsequently took place. Sadiq also wrote commentaries on Islamic religious law ( Shari‘a ). His most well-known book was Masa’il Faqiya (Issues/questions in Religious Law), in which he discusses the fi ve judicial schools of Islam. Sadiq also published many manuscripts and arti-cles. In one of them, “The Aspiration of the People who Desire” ( Baghyat al-Raghbin ), he presented the history of the Sharf al-Din family , espe-cially in light of its connections to the families of al-Sadr, Nur al-Din, Abu al-Hassan and ‘Abas. In addition to his contributions in the fi eld of religious thought, Sadiq published books of poems on many topics, from the Prophet Muhammad to nationalist and patriotic poetry. His poetry refl ects pain regarding the plight of the Arabs, as well as the desire for the Arab nation to return to its bygone era of glory and power. In his poetry, he also expressed his pain in the face of the apathy of the people of Jabel-‘Amil after its annexation to Greater Lebanon in 1920. In addition, he promoted in his writing local issues regarding poverty in Jabel-‘Amil. He died in 1940 and was buried in the Husniya of Nabatiyeh . 77 After his death, two of his sons became among the most prominent ‘ Ulama in Jabel-‘Amil, particularly Muhammad Taqi al-Sadiq . He was an ally of

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Kamel Bey al-As‘ad during the 1950s and 1960s and provided him with religious support during the civil war of 1958 . Muhammad Taqi al-Sadiq was an Arab nationalist who preached a conservative policy and rejected any kind of political activism. Only after his death did the idea of establish-ing a Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council take root. 78

Al-Khalil

‘Osseyran’s main political ally was Kazem al-Khalil . The al-Khalil family were landowners with property and high status around Tyre . During the French Mandate in Lebanon, the family adopted a pro-Arab stance. Members of the family were involved in the anti-French uprising of 1919, assisted in the Arab revolt of 1925 and promoted propaganda for the unity of Syria in 1935. 79 After Lebanon gained its independence, the al-Khalil family tended to support the political status quo, unlike the main Muslim camp in Lebanon, which aspired to intensify the inter-Arab relations of Lebanon.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasem al- Khalil was the head of the family. He was one of the fi rst to promote the concept of Arab nationalism in Jabel-‘Amil . In 1905, he arrived in Istanbul to study in the school of administration and law. As a student, he was one of the fi rst members of the Arab Revival Association ( Jam‘iyat al-Nahda al-‘Arabiyya ) , which promoted Arab solidarity within the Ottoman Empire. In 1908, he ran against Kamel  Bey al-As‘ad for a seat in the Ottoman parliament, and after his defeat in 1909 was among the founders of a secret association called “al- Qahtaniya ” in Istanbul. The dual purpose of the association was to raise the cultural, social and eco-nomic level of the Arabs , as well as to encourage them to demand their rights within the Ottoman Empire. Al-Khalil felt that the activities of this secret association were not suffi cient, and that an open institution needed to be created, in which the Arab students in Istanbul could discuss their culture and heritage. That enterprise led to the establishment in Lebanon in 1910 of the Literary Club ( al-Muntadab al-Adabi ) , under the leader-ship of al-Khalil and another Shi‘ite, Yusuf Muhaybar Suleiman Haydar from Ba‘albek. 80 When the First World War broke out, al-Khalil and the Sunni Za‘im from Sidon , Rid a al-Sulh , were among the founders of an anti-Turkish movement named the “ Movement of Tyre ” ( Harakat Sur ). Because of his activity in that movement, the Ottomans executed him in August 1915, apparently after being informed of his involvement by his rival, Kamel  Bey al-As‘ad . 81

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In the years following his death, his brother, ‘Abdallah Yahya al-Khalil , became leader of the family. He represented the Lebanese littoral in the Syrian Congress of 1920, together with Rid a al-Sulh. 82 Afterwards, Hajj Isma‘il Yahya al-Khalil took over the leadership of the family. He was known as intelligent, energetic and devious and as one who did not look to fi ll public offi ce. In the early days of the French occupation, he main-tained an unwavering connection with the Arab nationalists and sided with the British. Al-Khalil supported Riad al-Sulh, who was the leader of the Muslim opposition to the Lebanese state in Jabel-‘Amil and the son of Rid a al-Sulh , who was a partner on his own father’s political path. 83 Hajj Isma‘il Yahya’s political ally was the Shi‘ite Za‘im from Sidon, Najib ‘Osseyran , who was also a relative. 84 Al-Khalil’s main political adversary was Yusuf al-Zein , whom he regarded as being devious and energetic like him. Hajj Isma‘il had a special relationship with Sheikh Hasan Mughniya , a well-known and respectable ‘Alim who served as the chairman of the Shi‘ite association of ‘ Ulama in Jabel-‘Amil . He shied away from public positions for himself, but tried to obtain positions for his sons. 85 Other prominent people in the family, in addition to Isma‘il Yahya al-Khalil, opposed the Mandatory authorities , but they maintained correct relations with the Lebanese government . That group included his brother Musa al-Khalil , who was regarded as having a weak personality and lacking any infl uence, and his nephew Muhammad al-Khalil , who owned most of the property in the village of Biyutsid in the district of Tyre. Unlike them, his brother Yusuf al-Khalil s upported the French and served as a district administrative adviser for the Mandatory authorities.

Hajj Isma‘il’s son, Kazem al-Khalil , was born in Tyre in 1902. After fi nishing elementary school in Sidon and secondary school in Beirut, he studied at the American University of Beirut for three years before going on to law school in Damascus . In 1934, he modifi ed his cold attitude towards the French Mandat ory government and started to fi nd his way within the Lebanese justice system. At that time, he not only maintained connections with French offi cials, but also regularly reported to French Commissioner Pashkof regarding the situation in Bint-Jbeil , a town in Jabel-‘Amil. 86 Al-Khalil was elected to the parliament as a representative of the southern constituency in 1937 and 1943, and was very active in the plenary sessions. His political activity was linked to his family ties , as he was married to the daughter of Ibrahim Haydar , the Shi‘ite Za‘im from the Biqa‘ and father-in-law of ‘Adil ‘Osseyran . 87 When Al-Khalil ran in the elections of 1937 , he conditioned his pro-French stance on the agreement

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of the Mandatory government to add Ibrahim Haydar to his list. That year he angrily left a parliamentary session in protest of the government’s attitude to the Haydar family . 88 In the 1940s and 1950s, he and his allies publicly criticized the leadership of Ahmed al-As‘ad in the south. A report written by the Department of Arab Affairs in the Israeli foreign ministry describes the tension between al-Khalil and al-As‘ad during a visit of the Lebanese President Bishara al-Kouri to Jabel-‘Amil in October 1945:

There was much tension between Kazem and his supporters against Ahmed Bey surrounding the propaganda which concerned the selling of land … The crowd was about to divide into two parts, and there was great concern from that morning on that clashes would erupt .

And in another report:

The tour of the President led to rivalry between the two leaders of the south: Ahmed al-As‘ad, a minister in the current government, and the member of parliament ‘Adil ‘Osseyran who is supported by the parliamentary members Kazem al-Khalil and Rashid Baydun , while al-As‘ad is supported by parlia-mentary members Muhammad al-Fadhel , ‘Ali al-‘Abdallah , Marun Kna‘an and Nasib Jibril … 89

In the 1950s, al-Khalil’s political position was reinforced when he became the secretary-general of the National Liberal Party headed by President Kamil Sham‘un . In both 1953 and 1957, he was elected MP of the con-stituency of Tyre , and served as a minister for social affairs in the gov-ernment of Rashid Karami (October 1955–March 1956), and later as a minister of agriculture, fi nance and planning in the government of Sami al-Sulh (August 1957–September 1958). The political alliance with Sham‘un allowed him to overcome the political consequences of the scandal caused by the importation of diseased cattle from Sudan, which occurred during his tenure as minister of agriculture. 90 During the civil war of 1958, al-Khalil was the only Shi‘ite politician who supported the President. After Sham‘un left offi ce, al-Khalil’s position was weakened. In the 1960 elections , he lost to Ahmed al-As‘ad, and found himself outside the parliament. His political activity became anti-establishment until he was suspected of being involved in a coup attempt in late December 1961, for which the Syrian Nationalist Party was responsible. 91 That party stood for Syrian nationalism and aspired to the territorial and political unity of Ottoman Syria.

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Kazem al-Khalil accumulated many enemies during his political career because his political positions always deviated from those of the Muslim mainstream in Lebanon. In the early 1940s, his pro-British views bothered the forces of Free France in Lebanon. In 1942, the French authorities put forward administrative regulations in Jabel-‘Amil that were directed against the al-Khalil family, because of a personal feud between the al- Khalils and the administrative counselor of Sidon. In the same year, the commander of the Free French forces in Lebanon, General Catroux, was required to discharge the Guardian of Tyre, who was regarded as too friendly to the Khalils. The Guardian was explicitly instructed to change his decision regarding a dispute between the al-Khalils and the Sharf al- Din family concerning ownership of a school in Tyre, and to settle it in favor of Sharf al-Din. 92 After Lebanon gained its independence in 1943, al-Khalil supported the National Covenant and the political status quo. In the 1950s, faced with the challenge of pan-Arabism and Nass erism , his positions deviated once again from those of the Muslim majority. Due to his support of President Kamil Sham‘un and his anti-Nasserite stance, al-Khalil had to leave the city of Tyre along with his family when the opposition took control of the city in 1957, returning only after the civil war was over in the summer of 1958. 93 Al-Khalil, who continued to hold positions that clashed with the Arab nationalist stance of the Muslim wing in Lebanon, paid for this conviction by being “ exiled ” from his home on two more occasions. In 1970, he was forced to leave after he openly stood up against the Palestinian predominance of Tyre, and in 1985 he again left when the forces of the Lebanese Resistance ( al-Muqawama al- Lubnaniyya ), which resisted Israeli occupation and took control of the city after the Israeli withdrawal, accused him of cooperation with Israel. 94 Al-Khalil died in Paris on April 22, 1990, and was buried in the Shi‘ite shrine of Sayda Zeinab in Damascus .

Haydar

The political alliance between ‘Adil ‘Osseyran and Kazem al-Khalil included a third party, the Za‘im from the Biqa‘ , Ibrahim Haydar . These three, who were connected through marriage , refl ected the personal feuds of the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama and the adversarial relationships between the main groups: Ibrahim Haydar was the chief adversary of Sabri Hamadeh , just as al-Khalil, ‘Osseyran and their protégé from the religious establishment, al-Sadiq , clashed with Ahmed al-As‘ad and his religious ally, Sharf al-Din .

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The rivalry between the Haydar and the Hamadeh tribes overshadowed all the Shi‘ite issues in the Biqa‘ region, and dictated the attitude of the French Mandate and Lebanese authorities towards the Shi‘ite population in the region. Under the shadow of this rivalry, there also existed an intra- tribal rivalry within the Haydar family that divided it into two factions: one opposed the existence of a Lebanese state separate from Syria , and the other cooperated with state institutions. Toward the late 1930s, the pro- Arab unity faction weakened, while the pro-Lebanese one, led by Ibrahim Haydar and Subhi Haydar , gained prominence and took part in Lebanese institutions and political struggles.

The Haydars became Zu‘ama after the reforms introduced in the Ottoman Empire in 1864. Two factors contributed to that change. First, a vacuum was created in the leadership of the tribes in the area of Ba‘albek prior to those reforms after the Harfush leadership, which had been the dominant tribe, lost power. 95 Second, as part of the Tanzimat (Ottoman reforms), the Ottomans began to impose direct rule in the Biqa‘. As a result, the new Multazimat (tax collectors) from amongst the Shi‘ite tribes gained power. In the early days of the Lebanese state, the Haydar tribe’s political views, which called for resisting the Mandatory authori-ties and supporting the idea of annexing the Biqa‘ to Syria, were contrary to those of the Hamadeh tribe. This position, however, was not clear-cut, since the Haydar s sent representatives to Lebanese Mandatory institu-tions while simultaneously participating in anti-French and anti-Lebanese activities, becoming, especially after 1920, extremely anti-French. This policy of swinging between Syria and Lebanon paid off for the Haydar leadership, which gained honor and high positions in both administra-tions. The Haydar s also maintained close ties with the Shi‘ite community of Iraq . 96

The larger faction of the family was anti-French . Its leaders led the insurgencies in the Biqa‘ in 1919–20, which were known as al-‘ Asabat (guerrilla attacks). One of the reasons for this faction’s resistance to the Lebanese state was the historical and geographical ties between the city of Ba‘albek and the administrative Vilayet (Ottoman district) of Damascus . This faction was led by Rustum Haydar and his nephew Tawfi q Hilu Haydar . Rustum, along with the Syrian Jamil Mardam and others, was among the founders of the Arab underground movement al- Fatat in Paris in 1911. 97 After the formation of Arab government under Emir Faysal in Damascus in October 1918, he served as minister of fi nance, until Faysal’s deportation by the French in July 1920. He followed Faysal to Iraq and

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served there also as a fi nance minister, until his assassination in his offi ce in Baghdad in January 1940. Rustum was shot in the left hip by Fawzi Hussein Tawfi q, a police commissioner who had been laid off because of Haydar ’s policy; he was transferred to hospital but died of his wounds. 98

In the 1920s, Tawfi q Hilu Haydar led a violent gang that raided Lebanese and French targets, as well as Christian villages. Together with other gangs, he led a raid on Ba‘albek in May 1926 in which Christian houses and the old palace of the city were ravaged and burned. In July 1926, after they burned the village of Labwu’ , the French arrested some of the old leaders of the tribe, including As‘ad Bey Haydar , the father of Ibrahim Haydar , and exiled them to Zahl e , a town in the central Biqa‘. These measures caused Tawfi q Hilu’s gang to disperse and hampered the anti-French uprising he led. Most of his people surrendered in the autumn of 1926, but he and other family members managed to escape to Egypt and Trans-Jordan. 99 The charges against him included attempted assassi-nation of a French offi cial. In the 1930s, he continued to resist the Muslim integration into the Lebanese state. He maintained ties, along with other family members, with the Syrian President Hashem al-Atasi . Before the Lebanese election campaigns of 1933 and 1937, they offered their services to the Syrian President with the goal of sabotaging the elections. 100 In the late 1930s, Tawfi q Hilu Haydar was in contact with Eliyahu Sassoon of the Jewish Agency, with whom he had grown up in Damascus, and told him about a proposal he had received from the Mufti of Palestine to lead the Arab revolt in Palestine during 1936–39. 101

A smaller faction of the Haydar tribe, which declared its support for Lebanon, demanded an inordinate remuneration from the French Mandatory authorities for its cooperation with the Lebanese state. This faction was headed by Subhi Haydar and his cousin Ibrahim Haydar . Subhi Haydar was born in 1893 in Labwu’ , studied in France and in the University of Texas, and after returning to Lebanon worked as a teacher in a school in the Biqa‘. 102 In the early 1920s, he served in the Lebanese gov-ernment, mainly in the ministries of education and agriculture. In 1925, he became a member of the Council of Representatives, which preceded the formation of the Lebanese parliament, and after the Lebanese consti-tution was approved in 1926, he served as a member of parliament until 1929. In the late 1930s, he served as minister of education. 103 Unlike the majority of the Haydar s, Subhi Haydar tended to see himself as pro- British , although the British did not consider him as honest or intelligent as his cousin Ibrahim. 104

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Ibrahim Haydar was born in the village of Labwu’ in 1888. 105 In his youth, he studied agriculture in Lebanon and in the French University of de-Grignon. He graduated before the First World War but returned to France as a member of the Syrian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, in order to petition for a French Mandate for Syria. From the early 1920s, he supported the French policy in Lebanon, in return for posi-tions in the Lebanese ministry of agriculture. In 1925, Ibrahim Haydar was appointed by the French Commissioner de Jouvenel as Senator of the Biqa‘ region in the Lebanese Senate , a body appointed previous to the formation of the parliament according to the 1926 constitution. In 1926 , however, Haydar was dismissed and his property confi scated because he was sus-pected of assisting the Haydar s, who had rebelled that year. 106 From the 1930s to the 1950s, he served as a member of every Lebanese parliament. In the late 1930s, he was among the fi rst Shi‘ies to serve as a minister in the government, holding positions in the ministries of agriculture, fi nance and public works. 107 He was dismissed from his position as minister of agriculture in the government of al-Ahdab (1937) after it became known that he was involved in hashish smuggling . 108 In the 1950s , Haydar served on the committee for foreign affairs as one of his parliamentary duties. In this function he outraged his tribe when he supported the Lebanese appeal to the UN Security Council against the United Arab Republic during the 1958 crisis . Various groups of the Haydar family publicly condemned him for this step. Ibrahim Haydar was known to be corrupt and quarrelsome, although he was also known for his intelligence. Western reports described him many times as a sly provocateur, albeit also as intelligent. 109 The British wrote that his arrogance and extensive experience as an MP caused his comments to be taken more seriously than they were worth, and for this reason he became known as “the Giant of the Biqa‘“. 110 Haydar ’s political ally, the Za‘im ‘Adil ‘Osseyran , wrote of him in the 1930s that he was the most erudite fi gure in the Shi‘ite community. 111 Like ‘Osseyran, Haydar was pro-British and maintained good relations with the Hashamite fam-ily. 112 Among his political associates was the ‘ Alim Hussein Mughniya .

Other members of the Haydar tribe also participated in Lebanese politi-cal life over the years. The most prominent among them was Salim Haydar , born in Ba‘albek in 1912. He held a Ph.D. in law from the University of Paris. Early in his career, he served as a judge and later as the ambassador of Lebanon to Iran (1948–52). In 1953, he was elected to parliament, but failed to be re-elected in 1957. Salim Haydar served as the minister of agriculture, post and telegraph in the government headed by Sami al-Sulh

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in 1954, and was later appointed as ambassador to Morocco (1958). He was known as friendly and well mannered, but also as dull, with a tendency towards political instability and intellectualism. 113

The Haydar s were also involved in the local political scene in Ba‘albek , where they struggled against the Yaghi family , allies of the Hamadehs. In the 1920s, the Haydar s controlled the municipal council and brought about the formation of a local constitution, which included a demand for the annexation of Ba‘albek to Syria, and a resolution that prevented mem-bers of the council from participating in the committee for the formation of the Lebanese constitution promoted by the French. In the 1930s, their infl uence in the municipal council declined and the Yaghi family took over. In the early 1940s, as their infl uence declined further, many Haydar s of the anti-Lebanese faction, including Yusuf Mehayber Haydar , Tawfi q Hilu Haydar , Dr. Muhammad Haydar , Farid Bey Haydar and forty other nota-bles, decided to send a telegram to the President of Lebanon demanding the re-establishment of the municipal forum of Ba‘albek that had been suspended in 1930. 114 At that time the Haydar s were supported by the clans of Baridi and Abu-Hatar from Zahl e and by the Maronite politician from Beirut Emile Edde . 115

The power struggles between Haydar and Hamadeh underlined the traditional tribal nature of the Shi‘ies of the Biqa‘ . The struggles repre-sented a major security concern for the Mandatory authorities, and later for the independent government of Lebanon. The location of the Biqa‘ between Mount Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, in an isolated region that was very diffi cult to pass through, made law enforcement dif-fi cult. It also cut the region off from the political centers of infl uence of Beirut and Damascus and strengthened the dominance of strong tribes at the expense of the police and the army. The Shi‘ite tribes in the Biqa‘ resorted to violent raids to settle disputes over issues of jurisdiction, con-trol and revenge. The rivalry between the various tribes was especially heightened during parliamentary electoral campaigns. At the time of the Mandate, the French tried to manipulate their relationship with the two tribes by exercising their right to nominate representatives in addition to those who were elected. In order to maintain the balance between the tribes, the French would support the candidate who had the best chance of being elected, while reserving a seat for the defeated candidate. 116 As for the candidates themselves, they employed every possible means to suc-ceed. In the 1943 elections , for instance, Sabri Hamadeh paid the equiva-lent of 70,000 sterling lira to buy votes in Hirmal and Ba‘albek, and his

THE CENTERS OF POWER 63

rival Ibrahim Haydar was similarly aided by his uncle Mustafa and other relatives in buying votes in Ba‘albek. The split within the tribes was so deeply embedded that intelligence regarding the corruption was provided to the police by the candidates’ own relatives: Jawdat Haydar informed on Ibrahim Haydar and Fadlallah Hamadeh informed on Sabri Hamadeh . 117

The electoral campaigns usually entailed violent incidents that refl ected the system of protection among the tribes. The results of the 1960 elec-tions , for example, created tension in the electoral constituency of Hirmal , between Hamadeh on the one side and the clans of Zaytar and Dandash on the other. The latter two clans were not satisfi ed with the results and considered uniting their forces in order to strengthen their powers of infl uence. Over the course of this struggle, the nephew of Parliamentary Speaker Sabri Hamadeh was killed in a clash between tribal armed men from Hirmal that took place in a coffee shop in Beirut. Among those detained under suspicion of involvement in the incident was the leader of the Zaytar tribe. A week later, several Zaytar tribesmen were shot dead in a suburb of Beirut , presumably by Hamadeh’s people. 118 Subsequent to those events, a gang from the Dandash tribe went to the hills around Hirmal, likely with the intention of organizing a plan for revenge. These developments were a cause for concern for the government, and therefore the Prime Minister and the Parliamentary Speaker interfered directly in order to establish peace between the two tribes. Mustafa Ta‘an Dandash , who led the gang in the hills, handed himself over, and the tumult caused by those incidents was forgotten. 119

THE AL-ZEIN FAMILY The al- Zein family of Kafarman near Tyre was infl uential, owning land in the area of Nabatiyeh . The people of Jabel-‘Amil regarded the family with respect because of the uprising initiated by Sheikh ‘Ali al-Zein against the Ottoman ruler al-Jazar and his successor Suleiman Pasha, who had oppressed the Shi‘ite population in the early nineteenth century. 120 The al- Zeins reached a peak in their infl uence at the time of the French Mandate, when al-As‘ad’s power decreased due to his resistance to the Mandate and his confl icts with notables in Jabel-‘Amil. The al-Zein family, particularly Yusuf al-Zein , increased their infl uence in Jabel-‘Amil as a result of their cooperation with French authorities. The family contributed greatly to the cultural life of Jabel-‘Amil thanks to the efforts of ‘Ar e f al-Zein, who established the Shi‘ite magazine al-‘ Irfan . 121

64 O. NIR

The al-Zein family cooperated with the French from the beginning of the French occupation of the region. Hussein al-Zein served as the chairman of the executive committee, established by the French in Lebanon in September 1920 to organize the administrative and political systems of the young state. He was one of the two Shi‘ite members of a committee of seventeen members, and later, in 1926–27, was a member of the Lebanese Senate (the Council of Sheikhs, Majlis al-Shuyukh ). 122 At that time Yusuf al-Zein , who was born in 1873, became the prominent Za‘im of the family. He served in the Senate and later in the parliament continually from 1927 until his death in 1962. For many years he relentlessly supported the French Mandate and Greater Lebanon. Al-Zein’s willingness to serve the French at all times stemmed from their contribution to his wealth, and to his public reputation when serving as deputy Speaker of Parliament in the 1930s. At the same time, in return for material remuneration, al- Zein acted as a mediator with the authorities for Shi‘ite clerics and others among his supporters. 123 His work as a media-tor, along with his divisive personality, deterred other Zu‘ama in Jabel-‘Amil from allying with him. Already in 1920, Shi‘ies from Sidon had contacted the French in an effort to prevent the nomination of his brother, Hussein al-Zein , to the position of administrative advisor in Sidon. In a letter to the French governor of the city, they indicated that they preferred not to be repre-sented at all to being represented by him, claiming he was unlanded, immoral and ignorant. Other parts of their appeal clarifi ed that other reasons for their objection were related to their fear of Yusuf al-Zein:

2. Yusuf al-Zein achieved his wealth by spying for the Turks, since he did not have enough money to immigrate to America . He testifi ed against enlightened people whom he knew personally, although this did not stop him from testifying against them, as we see from the book of Jamal Pasha.

3. ( Hussein al-Zein ) was an agent operated by Ottoman junior clerks, who bribed them in order to smuggle grain, and his brother (Yusuf) testifi ed on this matter against someone else, who was executed in consequence . 124

In the late 1920s Yusuf al-Zein had diffi culties in fi nding his place among the feudal centers of power in Jabel-‘Amil. The main reason was the mutual animosity with the al-As‘ad family , on the one hand, and with al- Khalil and ‘Osseyran , on the other hand. The rivalry between the al-Zeins and the al-As‘ads had a major impact on the security and stability of Jabel-‘Amil, and on the relations within the Shi‘ite class of Zu‘ama . That rivalry

THE CENTERS OF POWER 65

began in 1915 subsequent to the Ottoman discovery of the Arab cultural movement, the “ Movement of Tyre ” ( Harakat Sur ) which ended with the execution of ‘Abd al-Karim Qasem al-Khalil . In the early 1920s, al- Zein tried to bridge the gap between al-As‘ad and the Mandatory authori-ties, and even held a reception for al-As‘ad’s associate, ‘Abd al-Hussein Sharf al-Din . 125 Having good relations with al-As‘ad was paradoxical, as al-Zein’s status was based on al-As‘ad’s weakness. For this reason, we must be careful in referring to the descriptions of the good relations between the two, which were written by the al-Zeins. According to them, Yusuf al- Zein visited Kamel Bey al-As‘ad just before the latter died, and heard him say in the presence of witnesses that, “Only this man will lead Jabel-‘Amil after my death”, pointing to al-Zein. 126

Kamel Bey al-As‘ad’s brother, ‘Abdul Latif , who succeeded him after he died, lacked leadership qualities. He was partially under the political patronage of Yusuf al-Zein due to a political debt he owed him after his brother passed away. The death of MP Fadhel al-Fadhel in 1936 vacated a seat for a new MP from Jabel-‘Amil, which the French sought to fi ll with al-Fadhel’s son Bahiya, who gave his word to be loyal to the government. Yusuf al-Zein, contrary to his normally pro-French position, enabled French opponents and al-Fadhel’s rivals to elect ‘Abdul Latif al-As‘ad. According to al-Zein’s version, ‘Abdul Latif distinctly obeyed him in the parliament, and they were close political allies to such an extent that when ‘Abdul Latif died later that year, it was al-Zein who announced the news to the Lebanese and Arab leaders. 127

While Ahmed al-A s‘ad was the head of his family, there was an open rivalry between him and Yusuf al-Zein, that included personal defamation. In April 1936, al-As‘ad said of Yusuf al-Zein that, “ Zein offered my father bad advice … I realize that his infl uence can be nothing but harmful and destructive”. 128 Echoes of that rivalry are refl ected in Fuad ‘Ajami’s writings, in which he mentions a phone call from al-Zein to the director general of the Lebanese ministry of interior in 1951, in which he complained about the wild celebrations held by al-As‘ad’s supporters on the occasion of his return from his studies in Paris. Following the celebrations, which included shots fi red into the air, both near the airport and in the streets of Beirut , al-Zein threatened that he and his supporters would behave similarly. 129

It seems that the one issue the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama agreed on was their animosity towards Yusuf al-Zein. His rivalry with the ‘Osseyran family stemmed from power struggles in the Shi‘ite villages near Sidon, and from the fact that al-Zein was pro-French, in contrast to the Arab nationalist

66 O. NIR

stance of the ‘Osseyrans. Before the parliamentary elections of 1933 , the brothers Rash e d and Najib ‘Osseyran wrote to French Commissioner Pashkof that “ The people in southern Lebanon are not against the mandatory authorities, but against the French offi cials who supported the criminal Zein, who took advantage of his friendship with the French and in so doing caused great harm to all who opposed his will ”. Later in the same letter they called al-Zein “ an infamous gang leader ”, adding that, “ It is a shame to see that al-Zein is supported by the authorities. This is what sometimes distances the people from the mandatory authorities because they despise seeing a weak and malicious gang leader received at the High Commissioner’s residence ”. 130 It was then that the rivalry between al-Zein and ‘Osseyran reached its peak. 131

In spite of the rivalry between the families, Yusuf al-Zein cooper-ated with Rashid ‘Osseyran and Dr. Sharif ‘Osseyran in the Democratic Party of Sidon in 1934, and established a joint list for the 1937 elec-tions, along with ‘Adil ‘Osseyran. 132 The latter became related  to Yusuf al- Zein through marriage, having the same grandchildren, after ‘Osseyran’s daughter married al-Zein’s son. A year later, their paths diverged once again, and each camp gathered its supporters in Jabel-‘Amil to protest the discrimination against the Shi‘ite community and the neglect of Jabel-‘Amil. 133 ‘Osseyran’s ally, Isma‘il al-Khalil , who had a dispute with al-Zein, expressed his feelings about him thus: “ … All of southern Lebanon wants to vomit out this man … Even those who declare themselves to be his friends hate him and regard him as fi lthier than the dirt on the street ”. 134 This contempt towards al-Zein damaged his status in the eyes of the French , who gradu-ally declined his services although he was almost always willing to work in their favor. In one report they wrote:

… He has become a nuisance to the mandate because he is suspected of support-ing the French simultaneously with his involvement in gangs, and because of his lack of conscience and moral standards. Nobody understands why the French need him. He has often bribed administrative offi cials and judges, in addition to being a spendthrift and a dandy. He despises the weak, and behaves like a lord. He also gave many gifts to clientele of offi cials. People describe him as hav-ing generous character and as helping the poor, but on every occasion of offering aid, he benefi ted . 135

In spite of the French dislike of al-Zein, they supported him once again as a candidate in the parliamentary elections of 1943 , mostly in order to prevent the election of the list of a competitor, which was supported by the British and headed by Ahmed al-As‘ad and ‘Adil ‘Osseyran. 136

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Yusuf al-Zein’s relations with the ‘ Ulama of Jabel-‘Amil were less hos-tile than his relations with the Zu‘ama because of his fi nancial support for educational institutions in Nabatiyeh and the surrounding villages. In 1923, al-Zein played a central role, along with his brother Hussein , in the re-opening of the al-Hamidiya religious school. The school was estab-lished in 1891 by the ‘ Alim Sayid Hussein Makki and was named after the then-ruler, the Ottoman Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II. When Makki died in 1906, this was the last religious school of the old style to be closed in Jabel-‘Amil. The building remained empty until the al-Zein brothers decided to renovate and modernize the building and to take upon themselves the management of the charity association ( Jam‘iyat al-Muqasid al-Khiriya ) that fi nanced it. Many prominent twentieth-century ‘ Ulama , poets and writers from Jabel-‘Amil studied or taught in the school, including Sheikh Ahmed Rid a, Sheikh Suleiman Dhaher , Muhammad Jaber al-Safa , Sheikh Ahmed ‘Aref al-Zein , Sheikh Hussein M u ruwa, Sheikh Asadallah Safa —who served as a Ja‘afari Qadi in Tyre, Sheikh Rid a al-Zein —who served as a Qadi in Nabatiyeh , and Sheikh Tawfi q al-Sarut —who served as the Mufti of Ba‘albek. 137

Two of Yusuf al-Zein’s sons continued along the family’s political path after his death. ‘Abdul Karim , born in 1927, studied fi rst in a college, and later in the Syrian military school of Hamziya in the city of Homs . His brother, ‘Abdul Latif , was born in Kfarrumin in 1930. He studied law in St. Joseph University of Beirut and then worked as a lawyer. From 1960, he was continuously elected to parliament. In the 1960s he belonged to the “Shihabist” camp and was nominated minister in 1969. During the civil war of 1975 – 90 , he maintained an independent way of looking at things. 138 Lawyer Suleiman al-Zein (born in 1924) from Nabatiyeh was another family member who opted for a political career. In the mid-1960s he served as minister of education in the external parliamentary govern-ment headed by Rashid Karami . He was supported by Kuwaiti sheikhs with fi nancial interests in Lebanon. 139

NOTES 1. In the early 1920s, as part of al-As‘ad’s efforts to appease the French who

controlled Lebanon, he tried to adduce to his blamelness regarding the informing. See: AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie- Liban 2432, “Compte – Rendu”, Saida, 26 Nov. 1920.

2. On al-As‘ad’s entrance to Damascus : R. Lescot, “Les Chiites du Liban Sud”, CHEAM (Paris: No Date (1937?) 5; on his nomination as the

68 O. NIR

Qaymakam of Jabel-‘Amal: Wujuh Kuthrany, al- Itijahat al-Ijtima‘iya wal-Siyasiya fi Jabel-‘Amal wal-Mashriq al-‘Arabi (Beirut: bihsum, 1986), p. 271 (in Arabic).

3. AD (Paris), MAE, Levant 1918–40, Syrie-Liban-Cilicie, E313.1, Vol. 20, “Note No. 25: La Situation en Syrie, en Cilicie, à Chypree et la Egypte”, Service de la Information de la Marinedans la Levant, Service General, Beyrouth, 26 Dec. 1919.

4. AD (Paris), MAE, Levant 1918–40, Syrie-Liban-Cilicie, E313.1, Vol. 21, “Note No. 26: La Situation en Syrie, en Cilicie, à Chypree et la Egypte”, Service de la Information de la Marinedans la Levant, Service General, Beyrouth, 2 Jen. 1920.

5. Lescot, p. 100. 6. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 930, Le Capitaine Farine,

Commandant Militaire Délégué, à Monsieur Le Commandant Coustilliere à Beit-Eddine, Djédéidé, 8 Nov. 1923.

7. According to most British and French documents, al-As‘ad was born in 1905. When he died, the Lebanese press reported his year of birth as 1908.

8. PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58, “Leading Personalities in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958.

9. PRO (London), FO 1018/93-1014/15/2/53, “The Muslim Wing in Lebanon”, By Wadih Malouf, Beirut, 15 Feb. 1953.

10. Omri Nir, “The Shi‘ites during the 1958 Lebanese Crisis”, Middle Eastern Studies , Vol.40, No.6, November 2004, pp. 116–118.

11. PRO (London), FO 226/233-31/133-134/42, “Note for His Majesty’s Minister”, Political Offi cer Furlonge to Foreign Minister Edden, Beirut, 23 Jul. 1942.

12. Nakash said this to Eduard Spears, see: PRO (London), FO 226/233-31/151/42. “Immediate”, British Legation to FO, Beirut, 25 Jul. 1942.

13. PRO (London), FO 226/233-31/145/42. “Note for H.M.Minister”, Forlonge to Edden, 24 Jul. 1942.

14. PRO (London), FO 484/2-E 10407/425/88, “Canges in the Lebanese Cabinet”, Houstoun-Boswall to Bevin in FO, Beirut, 30 Jul. 1948.

15. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 771, Le Capitaine Vidler Inspecteur Régional de l’O.C.P. au Liban-Sud à Le Directeur General de l’O.C.P. au Liban, Saida, 11 July 1942.

16. PRO (London), FO 371/35206/507-E 5063/507/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon”, Spears to Mr. Edden, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943; or PRO (London), FO 226/233-31/133-134/42, “Note for His Majesty’s Minister”, Political Offi cer Furlonge to Foreign Minister Edden, Beirut, 23 Jul. 1942; or PRO (London), FO 226/233-31/152/42. “Urgent”, His Majesty’s Legation, Beirut, 25 Jul. 1942; Ajami, p. 66, quotes similar descriptions from an American communication of 1942.

17. Ajami, p. 64.

THE CENTERS OF POWER 69

18. On the incident see: PRO (London), FO 371/110956-VL 1013/5, 1019/2/2/54. “Monthly Political Summery for March 1954”. 5 April 1954; on the wrangling see: PRO (London), FO 226/239-E 129 159/4/42, “Arab Youth and the War”, Beirut, 30 Dec. 1942; or Ajami, p. 67, based on American diplomat.

19. Ajami, p. 68, based on an American report. 20. PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58. “Leading Personalities

in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958. 21. Ajami, p. 75; or PRO (London), FO 371/142209-VL 1012/1, “Leading

Personalities in the Lebanon”, P.M. Crosthwaite to FO, Beirut, 18 Jul. 1959.

22. Nir, “The Shi‘ites during the 1958 Lebanese Crisis”, p. 110. 23. al-Yawm (newspaper), 23 March, 1961 24. al-Sayad , 23 March 1961, no. 822: pp. 12–13 25. Hottinger, “Zu‘ama and Parties”, p. 130. 26. Suydan Nasr al-Din, “al-Ardh wal-Nass wal-Ta‘arikh fi Ba‘albek-al-

Hirmal”, al-Safi r , 6 June, 1988, pp.  6–7; or Raymond Adams, “ The Social Organization of the Shi’ite Community in Northern Lebanon ”, (Ph.D diss., the University of Manchester, 1978), pp. 97–106.

27. On the division among the Shi‘ite tribes after they moved from northern Lebanon see: Yusuf Muhammad ‘Amuru, “Qatra ‘ala Madi wa-Hadir fi Bilad Kisrawan wa-Jbeil”, al-‘Irfan , 72, no. 2, Kanun al-Thany 1984, pp. 62–73.

28. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Information No. 4338”, Le Directeur de la Surete Generale, Inspecteur General Des Polices, Beyrouth, 19 Aug. 1937; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Rapport de la Haut Commissariet”, pp 5–9.

29. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 455, “Note-Situation électorale dans la Bekaa au 14.12.1933”, Haut-Commissariat, Beyrouth, No Date.

30. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Information No. 4338”, Le Directeur de la Surete Generale, Inspecteur General Des Polices, Beyrouth, 19 Aug. 1937.

31. The fi gure is from a British report of 1943: PRO (London), FO 371/35206/507-E 5063/507/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon”, Spears to Mr. Edden, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943.

32. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Télégramme to Haut Commissire”, Hermal, 27 Sep. 1937; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Télégramme”, Hamadé to Haut Commissire, Hermal, 7 Oct. 1937.

33. Ajami, p. 128. 34. PRO (London), FO 371/35206/507-E 5063/507/89, “Personalities

in the Lebanon”, Spears to Mr. Edden, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943; or PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58. “Leading Personalities in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958.

70 O. NIR

35. PRO (London), FO 1018/93-1014/15/2/53, “The Muslim Wing in Lebanon”, By Wadih Malouf, Beirut, 15 Feb. 1953.

36. PRO (London), FO 371/164150-EL 1015/83, H.G. Balfour- Paul to A.E. Saunders of FO, Beirut, 26 Nov. 1962.

37. PRO (London), FO 371/151141-VL 1015/24, Crosthwaite to FO, Beirut, 5 Jul. 1960.

38. PRO (London), FO 371/164150-EL 1015/83, H.G. Balfour- Paul to A.E. Saunders of FO, Beirut, 26 Nov. 1962.

39. PRO (London), FO 371/35206/507-E 5063/507/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon”, Spears to Mr. Edden, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Rapport de la Haut Commissariet”, pp.  5–9; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, Candidates de la Élection 1937, 1937, pp. 4–5.

40. PRO (London), FO 371/13416-VL 1015/14, Chancery Beirut to Levant Dep. of FO, Beirut, 11 Apr. 1958.

41. On Hamadeh’s gaining control over Ba‘albek as an opposition leader, heading 700 warriors: Teleghraf , 24 May 1958: 1,8; on the death of his nephew: Teleghraf , 28 May 1958, p. 1.

42. PRO (London), FCO 17/317-EL 1/9, “Political Parties and Grouping in the Lebanon”, MacRae to A.E. Saunders of Est. Dep. FO, Beirut, 7 Dec. 1967.

43. Ajami, p. 135. 44. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Information No. 4210”,

Le Directeur de la Surete Generale, Inspecteur General Des Polices, Beyrouth, 18 Aug. 1937; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Information No. 4238”, Le Directeur de la Surete Generale, Inspecteur General Des Polices, Beyrouth, 19 Aug. 1937.

45. This title was used by a British division commander in Lebanon in 1941, following the harassment of Christian villages in Hermel by the tribal gangs. See: PRO (London), WO 202/36-File 55/1, No. 58, Major General Commander 6 Division to Hamilton of the Spears Mission, 21 Aug. 1941.

46. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2423. “Information de la Sareté Générale Concernant la Tribu Dandache”, De Salins, Le Conseiller Administratif de la Bekaa à Le Haut Commissaire, Zahle, 29 Nov. 1939; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie- Liban 2423. “Information No. 7734”, Beyrouth, 18 Nov. 1939.

47. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2423. “Information No. 7734”, Beyrouth, 18 Nov. 1939.

48. AD (Nantes), Mandat Syrie-Liban 2423. “Dossier Politique de la Bekkaa, Tribu Dendache”. No Date. p.4.

49. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2423. “Dossier Politique de la Bekkaa, Mai-Aout-Septembre 1929”. No Date.

50. PRO (London), FCO 17/317-EL 1/9, “The Lebanese Elections, 24 March – 7 April 1968”, Mr. King to Mr. Stewart, Beirut, 26 Apr. 1968.

THE CENTERS OF POWER 71

51. Ibid.; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2423, “Dossier Politique de la Bekkaa, Tribu Dendache”. No Date, p. 4.

52. PRO (London), FO 484/2-E 8915/1011/88. “Relations Between Chritians and Muslems in the Lebanon”, Houstoun- Boswell to M. Bevin, Beirut, 26 June 1948; PRO (London), FO 484/2-E 8915/1011/88. “Relations between Chritians and Muslems in the Lebanon”, Houstoun-Boswell to M. Bevin, Beirut, 26 June 1948. This event was mentioned in the context of the idea of allocating British military from Egypt to help the Lebanese. See also PRO (London), FO 484/3-E 2158/425/88. “Lebanon: Annual Review For 1948”, Houstoun-Boswell to M. Bevin, Beirut, 6 February 1949. p. 7.

53. Mohammad Kazem Maki, al-Haraka al-Fakariya wal-Adabiya fi Jabel- ‘ Amil (Beirut: Dar al-Andalus, 1963), p. 220.

54. A. Qubaysi, Hayat al-Imam Sharf al-Din (Beirut: Dar al-Tawjiya al-Isl-ami, 1984), pp. 41–43.

55. Parts of the dialogue were published after the death of Sharaf al- Din in a book: ‘ Abd al-Husain Sharf al-Din, Bawghiat al-raghibin (Beirut: Dar al-Islamiya, 1991). The Zaydi y ah is a faction in Shi‘ite Islam who left the main stream of Islam after the death of the fourth Imam. They are closer in their faith to Sunnis than the Twelver Shi‘a and are therefore considered moderate. Unlike the Twelvers, they do not ascribe superhuman qualities to Imams , they deny the existence of a “divine spark” in Imams , they do not need a Taqiya , and they do not believe in the return of the Hidden Imam ( al-Mahdi ), because they have established a country led by a visible Imam —Yemen. Zaydies are not concerned about the taint of disbelievers, so they could rule the Sunni popula-tion without impediment. About Zaydiyah , see Nehemiah Levtzion, “sects in Islam”,,in: Hava Lazarus-Yaffe (Editor), Chapters in the History of the Arabs and Islam (TA: Reshafi m, 1967), pp 187–189.

56. Hussein M. Gharbieh, “ Political Awareness of the Shi’ites in Lebanon: The Role of Sayyid ‘Abd al-Husain Sharf al-Din and Sayyid Musa al-Sadr ”, Ph.D. Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies in the University of Durham, 1996, p. 64.

57. Maki, p. 220; Ajami, p. 46, describes a similar path but relates it to the 1920s. 58. Sharf al-Din, p. 78. 59. On his declarations against the British and his opposition to Vichy see:

PRO (London), FO 371/35206, E 5063/507/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon”, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943; The text of the petition that was deliv-ered to the Americans is quoted in a monthly political report by the American consulate in Beirut, May 25, 1945, as quoted in Ajami, 47. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 940, “Information No. 214: Fêtes de monled à Saida et à Tyr Repondant à L’invitation du Grund Mufti”, Saida, 30 Jun. 1934.

72 O. NIR

60. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 940, “Information No. 214: Fêtes de monled à Saida et à Tyr Repondant à L’invitation du Grund Mufti”, Saida, 30 Jun. 1934.

61. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 607, “Confi dentiel”, Tyr, No Date; This is a letter from Sharf al-Din to High Commissionaire Peshkof.

62. The details on Sharf al-Din’s books are from: Nawal fayadh, Safahat min taarikh Jabel-‘Amil fi al-‘ahdayn al-‘uthmani wal- Faransi (Beirut: dar al-Jdid, 1998), pp. 135–136.

63. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 455, “Les Députés Chiites”, 30 Dec. 1933.

64. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2432, “A Monsieur Le Gouverneur Du Grand Liban”, Mouhsen Assairan à Gouverneur Du Grand Liban, Beyrouth, 25 Oct. 1922.

65. Ahmed Musstafa Haydar , al-Dawla al-Lubnaniya (Beirut: Huquq al-Tabi’ wal-Tarjama Mahfuzza ll-Muwalif, 1954), pp. 14–30.

66. AD (Nantes), Mandat Syrie-Liban 455, “Les Députés Chiites”, 30 Dec. 1933; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Candidates de la élection 1937”, 1937, pp 4–5.

67. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 940, “Notice de Renseignements”, Merdjayoun, 12 Dec. 1933.

68. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 771, “a/s d’Adel ‘Osseyran et de l’Administrateur”, Le Conseiller Administratif de la France Combattante au Liban-Sud à Monsieur L’Ambassadeur de France, Delegue General et Plenipotentiaire P.  I., Beyrouth, 29 May 1943; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 771, “Information Speciale”, Beyrouth, 14 Jan 1944.

69. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 771, “Information Speciale”, Beyrouth, 14 Jan 1944.

70. PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58. “Leading Personalities in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958; or PRO (London), FO 371/35206/507-E 5063/507/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon”, Spears to Mr. Edden, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943.

71. Spears Private Papers (Oxford), Spears V/4, Useyran to Spears, 6 May 1945; the French mentioned in one of their reports in 1944 that ‘Osseyran and Spears used to go hunting together, see: AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 771, “Information Speciale”, Beyrouth, 14 Jan 1944

72. PRO (London), FO 371/35206/507-E 5063/507/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon”, Spears to Mr. Edden, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943.

73. On ‘Osseyran during the 1958 crisis , see: Nir, “The Shi‘ites during the 1958 Lebanese Crisis”, pp. 113–116.

74. Hussein Sadeq, al-‘Irfan 31, part 9, p. 488 75. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 607, “Information No. 4:

Demande de nomination d’un Moufti Chiite à Saida”, Saida, 17 Mar. 1934.

THE CENTERS OF POWER 73

76. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 940, “Information No. 5”, Saida, 24 Mar. 1934.

77. The information on Sadeq is from Fayaz, pp. 139–142. 78. Ajami, p. 74. 79. On the role played by the al-Khalil family in the events mentioned here,

see the letter written by al-Khalil’s opponents to the High Commissionership before the 1937 elections: AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397”. Information” Beyrouth, No Date.

80. The details on ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khalil were taken from Eliezer Tauber, The Arab Associations 1908–1914 (a Ph.D. dissertation, delivered to the depart-ment of History, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 1986), pp. 120–133.

81. Mohammad Jabir al-Safa, Ta ‘ arih Jabel-‘Amil , al-Tabi‘a al- Hamitha, (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1981), pp. 213–214; or Fayaz Tarhini, al-Sheikh Ahmed ridha wal-Fikar al- ‘ Amili (Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadid, 1983), p. 31.

82. AD (Paris), MAE, Levant 1918–29, Vol. 33, “Note”, No Date. 83. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 455 (D50). “Secret Note du

Commandant Pechkof”. Beyrouth, 30 Decembre 1933, p. 6. 84. Nashura, the eldest daughter of Isma’il al-Khalil, was married to Kamil

‘Osseyran, a cousin of Najib ‘ Osseyran. A general chart of intermarriage amongst prominent Lebanese families is in Dekmajian, “Patterns of Political Leadership”, p. 20, and in Shanahan, p. 43.

85. The information on Isma’il al-Khalil is from AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 455, “Les Députés Chiites”, 30 Dec. 1933.

86. Beyrouth, 24 Septembre 1937. “AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397”. Visite de Kazem Khalil.

87. Ibid; and PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58. “Leading Personalities in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958.

88. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Note – Visite de Youssef Zein, Situation Électorale au Liban Sud”, Beyrouth, 1937.; and also: AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 944, “Compte Rendu Succinct la Seance de la Chambre des Deputes en Date du 14 Decembre 1937”, Beyrouth, 14 Dec. 1937.

89. The fi rst quote is from ISA (Jerusalem), Hts 2567/2, “Bitsfon Haaretz”, Beirut, 29 Oct. 1945; the second quote is from ISA (Jerusalem), Hts 2567/2, “Mikhtav mi-Beirut (kr”h) 29.10.1945”, The Arab depart-ment, Jerusalem, 7 Nov. 1945.

90. PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58. “Leading Personalities in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958.

91. Al-Khalil was kept under arrest for a few days with his brother ‘Abdul Rahman in January 1962, for involvement in the failed coup d’état . See PRO (London), FO 371/164147-EL 1015/30. Note from M. Crosthwaite. Beirut, 12 January 1962.

92. PRO (London), FO 226/233-31/265/42, fi le 31, Part VI, Political Offi cer G.W. Furlonge to Spears, Beirut, 6 Nov. 1942.

74 O. NIR

93. Despite al-Khalil’s opinions on Lebanese issues differing from those of the Muslim camp, he helped “ fadawiyun ” gangs that acted against Israel from Lebanese territory in 1954–55. See Erlich , 401, which is based on Israeli intelligence documents; or Ehud Ya’ari, Egypt and the Fadaein (Giv’at Haviva: The Center for Arab Studies, 1975), p. 11.

94. Gharbieh , 132, note 2; on the cooperation see also in Ze’ev Shif and Ehud Ya’ari, Milhemet Sholal (Jerusalem and TA: Shoqen, 1984), p. 200; or in a lecture by Izhak Beily, who served as a special advisor to the Israel defense ministry during the Israeli war in Lebanon in 1982: The Shiloah Institute Seminar on “Sunnites and Shiites in Contemporary Middle East”, vol. 1, 1982–1983, Tel-Aviv, 9 Mar. 1983, pp. 15, 25.

95. Majed Halawi, A Lebanon Defi ed – Musa al-Sadr and the Shia Community (Boulder: Westview, 1992), p. 36.

96. PRO (London), WO 202/36-File 55/1, No. 58, Major General Commander 6 Division to Hamilton of the Spears Mission, 21 Aug. 1941.

97. “Al-Fatat” was the most important Arab secret movement during the First World War. It was established in Paris in 1911 by seven people, including Jamil Marda, who later became the leader of the Syrian “National Block”. See George Antonious, The Arab Awakening , p. 111.

98. The details on Rustum Hayd a r were taken from a series of articles based on his memories, published in al-Akhbar, 3 November, 2013, http://www.almadasupplements.com/news.php?action=view&id=8909 ; It was published also in 1988  in Beirut al-Masa’. British report ℸuspected German agents carried out the assassination. See: PRO (London), WO 202/36-File 55/1, No. 58, Major General Commander 6 Division to Hamilton of the Spears Mission, 21 Aug. 1941.

99. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Rapport de la Haut Commissariet”, pp. 5–9.

100. On the 1933 elections see AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie- Liban 455, “Note-Situation Électorale dans la Bekaa au 14.12.1933”, Haut-Commissariat, Beyrouth, 14 Dec. 1933; on 1937 see AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2423, “Dossier Politique de la Bekaa”, No Date.

101. Erlich , p. 59. 102. According to another document, Subhi Haydar was born in 1855; see

PRO (London), FO 371/20849-E 2142/630/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon and Syria”, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943.

103. The data is from Haydar , pp. 11, 14, 18. PRO (London), FO 371/35206/507-E 5063/507/89 (p.181), “Personalities in the Lebanon”, Spears to Mr. Edden, Beirut, 6 May 1937.

104. PRO (London), WO 202/36-File 55/1, No. 58, Major General Commander 6 Division to Hamilton of the Spears Mission, 21 Aug. 1941.

105. According to the following paper he was born in 1892: PRO (London), FO 371/20849-E 2142/630/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon and Syria”, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943.

THE CENTERS OF POWER 75

106. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Candidates de la élection 1937”, pp 4–5, 1937; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Information No. 4210”, Le Directeur de la Surete Generale, Inspecteur General Des Polices, Beyrouth, 18 Aug. 1937.

107. PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58. “Leading Personalities in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958; and also: PRO (London), FO 371/20849-E 2142/630/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon and Syria”, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943; and also: AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 455, “Note-Situation électorale dans la Bekaa au 14.12.1933”, Haut-Commissariat, Beyrouth, No Date.

108. PRO (London), FO 371/35206/507-E 5063/507/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon”, Spears to Mr. Edden, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943; or PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58. “Leading Personalities in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958.

109. PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58. “Leading Personalities in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958; or PRO (London), FO 371/35206/507-E 5063/507/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon”, Spears to Mr. Edden, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943; or PRO (London), FO 371/17946-E 1178/526/89, Acting Consul-General Havard to Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Beirut, 3 Feb. 1934; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Rapport de la Haut Commissariet”, pp 5–9.

110. PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58. “Leading Personalities in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958; or. PRO (London), FO 371/20849-E 2142/630/89, “Personalities in the Lebanon and Syria”, Beirut, 12 Aug. 1943.

111. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 940, “Information No. 1”, Beyrouth, 3 Jan 1933.

112. PRO (London), FO 371/134115-1012/22/58. “Leading Personalities in the Lebanon”, G.H. Middleton to FO, Beirut, 2 May 1958.

113. Ibid. 114. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2455, “Information du 3 Sep.

1942 – Baalbeck”, 3 Sep. 1942. 115. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2423, “Dossier Politique de la

Bekaa”, No Date. 116. We can fi nd such considerations in the following report of the French

High Commissioner before the 1937 elections: AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, No Date, pp. 5–9

117. PRO (London), FO 226/240-9/649/43, “Scandals in Beka’a Elections – Buying Representation with Money”, Local Personalities to President of the Republic and Members of Parliament, Beirut, 22 Sep. 1943.

118. PRO (London), FO 371/151142-VL 1015/32, Sir Moore Crosthwaite to FO, Beirut, 6 Sep. 1960.

76 O. NIR

119. PRO (London), FO 371/151142-VL 1015/34, A.  J. Edden to FO, Beirut, 13 Sep. 1960.

120. ‘Abd al-Karim Haballah, “Yusuf al-Zeyn 1879–1962, Hayatuhu al-siyas-iya wal-Ijtima’iya”, Risala Ai‘idat lil Dablum fi al-Dirasat al-‘Aliya (Beirut: al-Jami‘a al-Lubnaniya, 1989), p. 89.

121. On al-‘Irfan see: Tarif Kalidi, “ Shaykh Ahmed ‘Arif al-Zayn and al-‘Irfan ”, in: Marwan Buheiry (ed.), Intelectual Life in the Arab East , (Beirut: American University Press, 1981), pp.  110–124; or Mallat , pp. 4–5.

122. The other member was Ibrahim Haydar . See Haydar, pp. 8–9. 123. These reasons were suggested by the French, see AD (Nantes), MAE,

Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Candidates de la élection 1937”, pp. 4–5, No date, 1937.

124. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2432, Saida, 1 Oct. 1920. 125. “Muthakarat Sharf al-Din”, chapter 3. 126. Haballah, p. 50; The information is based on a private source published

by the al-Zeyn family, titled “Yusuf al-Zeyn wasam al- Washah al-Akab”. 127. Haballah, p. 51; Yusuf al-Zeyn was not involved in the efforts to elect

‘ Abdul Latif al-As‘ad, but allowed the election by not actively objecting to it. The election was led by Hussein Mahmud al-Amin.

128. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 944, “Note No. 8139  – Intrugues de Youssef Zein”, Saida, 23 Apr. 1936.

129. Ajami, p. 67, based on American communication. 130. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 455, “Rachid bey ‘Osseyran”. 131. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 944, “Information No. 2328”,

Direction de la Police, Beyrouth, 1 Jul. 1936; at that time ‘Osseyran was seeking Arab unity.

132. On the Democratic Party of Sayda, see: AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 2433, “Liban Sud”; On joint list with ‘Osseyran, see: AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Information No. 5259 – A/S Adel ‘Osseyran”, Le Directeur de la Surete Generale, Colombani, Beyrouth, 2 Oct. 1937.

133. AD (Nantes), MAE, Syrie-Liban 397, “Compte Rendu des Réunions tenues à Saida et Kfar Roummane le 23 et 24 Février”, No Date.

134. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 455, “Les Deputes Chiites”. 135. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 397, “Candidates de la élection

1937”, pp 4–5, 1937. 136. PRO (London), FO 226/240-9/610/43, Beirut, 1 Sep. 1943. 137. al-Safa, pp. 266–268 138. As‘ad Abu Khalil, Historical Dictionary of Lebanon (London: Scarecrow,

1998), 228–229. 139. PRO (London), FO 371/180767-EL1015/15, H.A Hukey to

W. Morris, Beirut, 31 Jul. 1965.

THE CENTERS OF POWER 77

79© The Author(s) 2017O. Nir, Lebanese Shi‘ite Leadership, 1920–1970s, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43014-0_4

CHAPTER 4

The Speakership of the Parliament

Abstract The chapter describes the struggles for the parliament’s speak-ership, which is the highest position allocated for a Shi‘i in the Lebanese political system. It highlights some important aspects of the role and the ways it was used by the Zu‘ama for personal and political purposes.

Keywords Speaker of Parliament • Sabri Hamadeh • Ahmed al-As‘ad • Kamel al-As‘ad • ‘Adil ‘Osseyran • Ahmed al-Husseini • Hussein al- Husseini • Kazem al-Khalil • Nabih Berri • Fuad Shihab

Starting in the early 1940s, there developed a custom within the Lebanese political system of electing a prominent Shi‘i to the position of Speaker (chairman) of the Parliament. This offi ce is regarded as the third most important in the political system, after the President, a position that is reserved for a Maronite Christian, and the Prime Minister, which is reserved for a Sunni Muslim. 1 This custom was reinforced in the National Covenant of November 1943, when it became part of the intersectar-ian agreement of allocating high political positions according to sectarian affi liation. In time, it became a central stage for power struggles among Shi‘ite Zu‘ama , since it was the highest position allocated to them in the Lebanese political system.

Although the position of Speaker was reserved for Shi‘ies, a Greek Orthodox candidate, Habib Abu-Shahla from the Biqa‘, was elected in the parliamentary winter session of 1946. As a result, a confl ict erupted between Abu-Shahla’s supporters and those of his Shi‘ite rival, Sabri Hamadeh . 2 Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi has claimed that only from 1947 was the position of Speaker given to the Shi‘ies exclusively. In any case, from that year on, only Shi‘ies served in that offi ce. 3 The British , who controlled Lebanon militarily in the years 1941–46, refused to appoint a Shi‘ite fi gure to the offi ce, mostly because of the problematic issues surrounding the personalities of the candidates for the offi ce. A report by the political offi cer of the British delegation to Lebanon refl ects the British position:

For the offi ce of President of the Chamber (Speaker), Adel Usseyran is under-stood to be putting forward, a claim that this should be reserved for Shias, as being the third largest community. The claim is unsupported by precedent, but is reasonable in itself; but its adoption would in all probability be a disaster on account of the extreme unsuitability for the post of the leading Shias. These are: (a) Adil Usseyran, who could be guaranteed to quarrel with all the depu-ties in the fortnight; (b) Said Ahmed Husseini , who is weak, uneducated, and exceedingly stupid; and (c) Sabri Hamadi and Ibrahim Haidar , who are both relatively speaking gangsters . 4

Despite the prestige of the offi ce and the benefi ts it held, it did not see serious competition between the Shi‘ite candidates. Only a few Shi‘ite Zu‘ama served in the offi ce between the 1940s and the 1980s, the most well known of whom are Sabri Hamadeh , Ahmed al-As ‘ad and Kamel al-As‘ad . The ongoing struggles for the Speakership between Hamadeh and al-As‘ad were detested by some Members of Parliament (MPs) and led others to attempt to run for the offi ce. In 1951, for example, the MPs from Beirut began to garner support for a Shi‘ite candidate of their own, Rashid Baydun . However, it soon became clear that the likelihood of him receiving votes from MPs outside Beirut was small, because Sabri Hamadeh controlled the votes of the representatives from the Biqa‘, while al-As‘ad controlled those of the south. 5 Occasionally, other Zu‘ama were elected to this offi ce, including ‘Adil ‘Osseyran , Ahmed al-Husseini and Kazem al-Khalil , although in most cases they were elected as a compro-mise between the “traditional” Speakers, al-As‘ad and Hamadeh.

80 O. NIR

The Lebanese practice of re-electing a Speaker every seasonal ses-sion, rather than every four years as is the case for parliamentary elections, increased the frequency of the political struggles for this position to several times each year. The candidates did not hesitate to use illegal, and sometimes even violent, means in order to win the elections. A French report describes the atmosphere of the parliamentary plenary session when Sabri Hamadeh was elected Speaker, after defeating ‘Adil ‘Osseyran in October 1954:

Sayyid Ahmed Husseini, the senior Member of Parliament, was the chairman of the session. Many spectators fi lled the benches, including Shi ‘ ies from Hirmal and Jabel-‘Amil . In private ballots, the following results were received: Sabri Hamadeh 33; ‘Adil ‘Osseyran 14. Hamadeh’s election was accepted with strong applause and with the expressed support of the parliament. The newly-elected Speaker, who was in fact just re-elected, occupied his seat with his new secretaries surrounding him. After he listened to the greetings of his opponent ‘Osseyran, he thanked his colleagues for believing in him. He later indicated in his speech that the way would yet be full of obstacles, and there was much to do under the leader-ship of the President of the republic. He ended by encouraging ‘Adil ‘Osseyran, saying that his qualities would carry him the highest positions of the state, and even though he was unsuccessful today, we wish him success in the future. This wish raised a smile on the faces of those in the plenum. Afterwards, a victory parade escorted Hamadeh to the house of his father-in-law, Ahmed al-A s‘ad . 6

In some cases, the campaigns for the offi ce of Speaker refl ected a broader struggle between political powers in the Lebanese parliament. The most salient case was in the autumn of 1964, when Kamel al-As‘ad and Sabri Hamadeh both ran for the offi ce. They represented different political blocks: al-As‘ad stood for the opposition, and Hamadeh for the “loyal-ist” camp that supported President Fuad Shihab . The excitem ent about the candidates was unusual because the “loyalists” were determined to punish al-As‘ad for thwarting the re-election of Shihab for a second term. The loyalists attempted to retain their block and to prevent the opposition from persuading deputies to vote for their candidate, with whom they had little in common after Shihab’s retirement. Hamadeh’s victory in these elections, winning fi fty-two to forty-eight, caused chaos to break out in the plenary session, in which al-As‘ad’s supporters threw chairs at Hamadeh’s supporters. 7 Before the next round of elections for Speaker, in the winter of 1965, President Charles Hilu worked to minimize the turmoil by elect-ing a neutral candidate, and asked Hamadeh to withdraw his candidacy. Hamadeh, however, was nevertheless elected by a large majority. 8

THE SPEAKERSHIP OF THE PARLIAMENT 81

Unlike the premiership and the presidency, which were essentially exec-utive offi ces, the executive authority of the Speaker until 1992 was limited to the functions of directing the plenary sessions, assembling special ses-sions, infl uencing the composition of parliamentary committees and the like. Nevertheless, men possessing status and signifi cant political infl uence did sometimes serve as Speaker. The position of the Speaker was often an instrument in the hands of the top Shi‘ite politicians in their struggle for infl uence over Shi‘ite public opinion. In the 1990s, for instance, the leader of the Amal movement, Nabih Berri , faced the challenge of Hizbullah’s takeover of southern Lebanon by using money from the governmental and parliamentary committees he controlled in his capacity as Speaker. Berri, who became Speaker in 1992 and remained in that position as of 2016, had a decisive infl uence over the steps taken to extend the term of President Elias al-Harawi in 1995, since according to the law he held the constitutional means to carry it out. His practical support of that step, although he opposed the idea of extension by changing the constitution, which became possible only due to Syrian involvement in Lebanese poli-tics, paved the way for an overwhelming parliamentary consensus in favor of the extension. 9 In the past, before Syrian infl uence in Lebanese politics became so powerful, some Shi‘ite Speakers used their position to infl uence the agenda of Lebanese politics. Four prominent examples for their infl u-ence are: (1) preventing the election of President Fuad Shihab to a second term; (2) electing Bashir al-Gumayil as President in 1982; (3) passing the Lebanese– Israeli pact of May 1983; and (4) passing the Ta’if Accord of 1989, which brought the Lebanese civil war to an end.

Speaker Kamel al-As‘ad prevented the re-election of President Shihab to a second term. Shihab, who was unanimously elected by the parliament as the only person who could restore peace to Lebanon after the violent crisis of 1958 , ended his six-year term in the summer of 1964. Shihab’s tenure in offi ce was characterized by the centralization of power and by a lessening of social and economic gaps within Lebanese society. In that context, a Project Authority was established to promote the focus on areas considered backward, particularly ‘Akar in the north and Jabel-‘Amil in the south. The increase in governmental involvement in the region of Jabel-‘Amil reduced the status of the Zu‘ama there. This led to a serious personal clash between President Shihab and the leading Za‘im Ahmed al-As‘ad, who served as Parliamentary Speaker during the fi rst half of Shihab’s term. After al-As‘ad’s death in March 1961, his son Kamel suc-ceeded him as the leader of the south and the senior deputy of that region.

82 O. NIR

When Shihab’s six-year term in offi ce ended, no other prominent can-didate was to be found and the parliamentary majority made a motion for his re-election. His supporters in the parliament, who were known as the “loyalists”, aspired to take advantage of their majority and began negotiat-ing in that direction. The formal procedure required the Lebanese constitu-tion to be amended, since the presidential tenure was limited to one term in offi ce. Therefore, a petition signed by the majority of deputies needed to be fi led to the Speaker, and he, in turn, possessed the authority to petition the President to call for a special parliamentary session to invoke the amendment. A majority of three-fourths of the deputies was then required to bring about the amendment of the constitution. Al-As‘ad claimed he did not intend to promote the process as long as the President did not declare his explicit con-sent to it. Shihab, who at fi rst did not want a second tenure, fi nally agreed to be re-elected and to promote the amendment of the constitution, but only if his candidacy would be accepted unanimously. Under these circumstances, Shihab expected the parliamentary activity for the constitutional amendment to precede the actual amendment, while al-As‘ad took advantage of Shihab’s precondition to disrupt the procedure by inserting his own condition, which was Shihab’s acceptance of the candidacy in advance.

In early August 1964, fi fty-one “loyalists” out of ninety-nine deputies in the parliament signed the necessary petition, with seventeen deputies abstaining. Those who abstained were the deputies of the parliamentary block led by al-As‘ad, who argued there was no reason to call for a special session as long as there was no chance of reaching the three-fourths major-ity required, which would constitutionally mandate the dissolution of the plenary session. The “loyalists” harshly criticized al-As‘ad for his attempt to hinder voting on the amendment of the constitution. In these circum-stances Shihab gave up his intention to serve a second term. His sup-porters nominated another candidate, Charles Hilu . When the time drew near for the dissolution of the plenary session, and following al-As‘ad’s announcement that he would assemble the plenary session for the elec-tion of a new President on August 18, the tone changed in light of con-cerns regarding the election of the opposition candidate. Under pressure from Shihab, his supporters gathered to prevent the dissipation of their narrow majority and thus the election of the opposition candidate. The opposition, which together with al-As‘ad’s block included forty deputies, needed eleven more votes for the necessary majority to elect a President. According to rumors circulating at the time, money was set aside to buy those votes, and the necessary arrangements for the payment were carried out. 10 In the end, the “loyalist” candidate, Charles Hilu, was elected.

THE SPEAKERSHIP OF THE PARLIAMENT 83

As Speaker , al-As‘ad stood at the center of two other political storms. The fi rst occurred during the election campaign of Bashir al -Gumayil for President in August 1982, and the second during the political nego-tiations to approve the Lebanese– Israel i accord of May 17, 1983. In the fi rst case, he allowed the election of Bashir al-Jumayil as President while Israel was occupying parts of Lebanon, by deciding to support the presidential election. This occurred after the issue had already been at the center of a major dispute between the Christian and Muslim camps, since Jumayil was Israel’s main ally in Lebanon and its preferred candi-date for Presidency. In the second case, al-As‘ad worked to shape a par-liamentary block that would support the Lebanese–Israeli agreement of May 17, 1983, going against the pro-Syrian political stance adopted by most Shi‘ies at the time, which opposed any Lebanese–Israeli agreement. Al-As‘ad paid a price for his actions in the 1984 elections for Speaker, when he was defeated by Hussein al-Husseini , who was supported by the Syrians. 11 The election of al-Husseini refl ected the political and social changes in the Shi‘ite community that had taken place in the 1970s and 1980s. The Speakers who served in that offi ce subsequently no longer represented the Zu‘ama of the traditional order, but instead represented the Shi‘ite population much more accurately. The representatives of the Amal movement in the parliament, who served as Speakers over the next three decades, were well suited to the offi ce, as Amal’s ideology is com-mitted to integration within the Lebanese establishment. Hussein al-Husseini (1984–92) and Nabih Berri (since 1992, and still in offi ce in 2016), who headed the parliament during those years, represented the new Lebanese Shi‘a, and their status was not derived from the traditional political-social order of the Zu‘ama .

Before being elected as Parliamentary Speaker, Hussein al-Husseini temporarily headed the Amal movement for two years, following the dis-appearance of Musa al-Sadr , the movement’s founder, in 1978. The high-light of his eight years in offi ce was the adoption of the Ta’if Agreement that ended the civil war. The agreement was signed on October 22, 1989, in the Saudi town of Ta’if, and was passed in the Lebanese parliament by the deputies then in offi ce, who had been elected in 1972. 12 As Speaker, al-Husseini was the driving force behind the gathering of the deputies in Ta’if and the adoption of the agreement. Nabih Berri’s extended tenure in offi ce since 1992 has led to claims that he has, in many respects, become a new type of Za‘im with no historical precedent.

84 O. NIR

NOTES 1. Offi cially the Speaker of the Parliament is second to the President and

higher than the Prime Minister, and sometimes the position is even called “the second presidency” (al-Riasa al-Saniya), but practically the two other offi ces are more important.

2. Alexander Bley, “Ha-‘Eda ha-Mutualit Bi-Levanon ve-Yihuda”, Hamizrah he-Hadash , k"g, 1973, p. 197; or Yalqut Hamizrah Hatichon , Oct.–Nov. 1946: 146, based on the Lebanese daily al- Hadaf , 28 Oct. 1946.

3. Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions (Berkely, Los-Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1988), p. 146.

4. PRO (London), FO 226/240-9/621/43, Furlonge to Spears, Beirut, 10 Sep. 1943.

5. PRO (London), FO 1018/80-10123/-/51, “Political Summary for May 1951”, Beirut, 8 June, 1951.

6. AD (Nantes), MAE, Beyrouth Consulat B13, “Compte-Rendu de la Séance de la Chambre des Deputes du 16 October 1945”, Beyrouth, 17 Oct. 1945.

7. PRO (London), FO 371/175696-EL1015/51, H.  G. Balfour- Paul in Beirut to A. C. Goodison in FO, Beirut, 23 Oct. 1964.

8. PRO (London), FO 371/180767-EL1015/24, M. H. Riches, Beirut to W. Morris, Est. Dep. in FO, Beirut, 16 Oct. 1965.

9. Nir, Nabih Berri and Lebanese Politics , p. 108–110, and 174–175. 10. PRO (London), FO 371/175696-EL1015/29, H.  G. Balfour- Paul,

Beirut to A. C. Goodison, East. Dep. in FO, Beirut, 14 Aug. 1964; or PRO (London), FO 371/175696-EL1015/20, H. A Hankey, Beirut to A. C. Goodison, East. Dep. in FO, Beirut, 11 Jul. 1964.

11. Clinton Baily, “ Lebanon Shi ‘ ies After the 1982 War ”, in: Martin Kramer (ed.), Shi ‘ ism, Resistance, and Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1987), p. 228.

12. As a result of the war in Lebanon that began in 1975, no parliamentary elections were held between 1972 and 1992. During most of this period the representatives who served were those elected in 1972.

THE SPEAKERSHIP OF THE PARLIAMENT 85

87© The Author(s) 2017O. Nir, Lebanese Shi‘ite Leadership, 1920–1970s, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43014-0_5

CHAPTER 5

The Intellectuals and the Power Centers

Abstract The chapter deals with the role of the Shi‘ite intellectuals within the Shi‘ite leadership in Lebanon during the era of the Zu‘ama . The chap-ter focuses on prominent intellectuals during the relevant era: Muhammad Jawad Mughniya, Ahmed Rida, Muhammad Jaber, Suleiman Dhaher and Kamal Muruwa.

Keywords Shi‘ite intellectuals • Muhammad Jawad Mughniya • Ahmed Rida • Muhammad Jaber • Suleiman Dhaher • Kamal Muruwa

Within the Lebanese Shi‘ite community, in the late nineteenth and along the twentieth centuries,  intellectuals were regarded as a separate group since in most cases they remained outside domestic infl uence struggles and tried not to be identifi ed with any of the Shi‘ite factions. The few Shi‘ite intellectuals in Lebanon during the era of political feudalism lived, for the most part, in Jabel-‘Amil , and later also in Beirut . In the Biqa‘ region almost all intellectuals were religious scholars. During the years of the French Mandate , the vast majority of intellectuals fi rmly supported the idea of Arab unity , or the integration of Lebanon into a wider pan-Arab framework, largely because most of them were engaged in some sort of artistic activity connected to Arab culture, particularly the Arabic language, such as writing prose and poetry, analyzing modes of poetry, writing and undertaking journalistic endeavors. Through such work, they maintained

relations with politicians and those intellectuals who were identifi ed with the Arab plight, in forums such as the Arab Academy of Damascus (Ahmed Rida and Suleiman Dhaher), editorial boards of newspapers (Kamal Muruwa and Talal Salman) and political activity (Ahmed Rida and Muhammad Jaber). In retrospect, their activity might be regarded more as a contribution to the promotion of Arab culture than as a contribution to the Shi‘ite community.

In spite of their reputation, Shi‘ite intellectuals did not have any sig-nifi cant political infl uence. There were two main reasons for this. The fi rst was the poor economic conditions in which they lived, which prevented them from asserting their infl uence. The second was the high rate of illit-eracy among members of the community, which prevented most Shi‘ites from being able to read and enjoy the literary output of the intellectu-als. The people who were exposed to their works were the elites and the Sunni urban population in Lebanon and Syria , and in special cases also in Iraq . Whether because of lack of interest on the part of the Zu‘ama or because of the intellectuals’ loathing of the Zu‘ama , most Shi‘ite intel-lectuals remained outside the clashes between the Zu‘ama . Some of them retained an independent status (Mughniya), some cooperated with the Sunni Za‘im Riad al-Sulh (Rida, Jaber and Dhaher), and in later years, there were others who opposed the hegemony of the Zu‘ama as a result of their previous political background, usually in the Lebanese leftist move-ments (Muruwa and Salman).

MUHAMMAD JAWAD MUGHNIYA Muhammad Jawad Mughniya was a religious scholar who, between the 1950s and the 1970s, enjoyed a unique status as an intellectual among the Shi‘ies of Jabel-‘Amil . Although he had no political power, he enjoyed public recognition for his erudition and knowledge in the religious realm, and for his many publications. Throughout most of his career, his views were compatible with those of the Arab nationalist camp, particularly with regard to the pan-Arab challenge of the 1950s. Mughniya had no political patron among the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama and was eventually removed from the Shi‘ite religious establishment in Lebanon, because he denounced politi-cal feudalism and the Zu‘ama . For that reason, he cannot be regarded as belonging to any of the political groups in Jabel-‘Amil, although his father, Hasan Mughniya , had been an avid supporter of the al-As‘ad family and maintained excellent relations with Isma‘il al-Khalil .

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Mughniya was born in Jabel-‘Amil in 1904. He grew up in diffi cult conditions, his parents having died before he reached the age of ten. Like many other orphans, he had to move to Beirut to make his living by selling candies in the streets. At the age of twenty-fi ve, Mughniya chose the only path available for him to acquire an education, and moved to the Iraqi city of Najaf , the center of Shi‘ite scholastics. Najaf at the time was a poor, crowded and dirty city, with diseases raging throughout. It could offer the poor religious students only a small room, a little bit of food and a teacher. After eleven years of study, he returned to Jabel-‘Amil and worked as a religious teacher in the village of Ma‘arqa , replacing his brother who had died. The poverty and deprivation of the village inspired Mughniya to write his fi rst book in 1947, entitled al-Wadh al-Hadher li-Jabel-‘Amil (The Current Situation in Jabel-‘Amil). Thanks to his juridical expertise, he proceeded through the Ja‘afari court system, which treats issues of personal status and was under the control and direction of the Zu‘ama . His expertise was based on his unique work comparing the Shi‘ite Ja‘afari religious school and the four Sunni schools (Madaheb). 1 In 1948, he was appointed Qadi (judge) of the Shar‘i court in Beirut, and in 1949 he was appointed president of the court. Notwithstanding his high position, Mughniya had no infl uence with the Lebanese political institutions that had begun to develop at that time. In 1956, Mughniya’s career as a Qadi came to an end because of the ceaseless intrigues and hostility of Kazem al-Khalil and the Parliamentary Speaker ‘Adil ‘Osse yran. When Sheikh ‘Abd al-Hussein Sharf al-Din , the senior Shi‘ite ‘ Alim in Lebanon, died in 1958, Mughniya considered himself a potential successor for the offi ce of the Mufti of Tyre, which was in fact the leading position in the Lebanese Shi‘ite religious establishment. Mughniya’s previous confrontations with the Zu‘ama , as well as concerns that his nomination might bring about serious confl icts between the religious establishment and the political leadership, caused the Shi‘ite institution to prefer the Iranian ‘Alim Musa al-Sadr over him. From then on, Mughniya distanced himself from the Shi‘ite religious powers in Lebanon, and refrained from developing close relations with al-Sadr. Nevertheless, he remained active in the Shi‘ite world of scholarship and was invited to give lectures in Iran , Iraq and Bahrain . 2

Mughniya’s work was mainly concerned with the poor conditions in Jabel-‘Amil,  such as a lack of educational institutions, paved roads, and hospitals. He averred that the Shi‘ies there behaved as servants before their masters, and called for a revolution against the state and the deputies who represented them in the parliament:

THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE POWER CENTERS 89

We expect the deputies not to pit one community against the other or one person against another or one region against another. We do not ask them to turn Jabel-‘Amil into a second America. We want Jabel-‘Amil to be an integral part of Lebanon, with its privileges and duties; we want the schools in Jabel-‘Amil to be equal to the other schools in Lebanon, the roads to the other roads in Lebanon, and the hospitals to the other hospitals in Lebanon … 3

Mughniya ’s most active years overlapped with the period of nationalist zeal in the Arab world. He supported the Arab nationalists and expressed in his writings the hopes and the basic tenets of Arabism . During the Lebanese civil war of 1958 , he publicly called upon Speaker ‘Adil ‘Osse yran to stop his “apathetic behavior” and to take steps in favor of the Shi‘ite community, but his call was not heeded. In the late 1970s, when an Islamist spirit began to take root in Iran , Mughniya started to emphasize a more Islamic stance: “ The only way to attain victory and redemption is through struggle, solidarity and immolation under the ban-ner of Islam … The redemption of the Arabs and the Muslims is possible only by returning to Islam, which is true at all times and in all places ”. 4 In the late 1970s, at a time when clashes between Shi‘ite and Palestinian militias began to occur in southern Lebanon, Mughniya supported the resump-tion of the Palestinian resistance to Israel , giving priority to Arab national interest over international demands. In theological discussions within the Shi‘ite world, Mughniya found his place in more liberal circles, and disagreed with the leader of the Islamic revolution, Ruhallah Khomeini , claiming that no man, not even a Muslim ‘ Alim , has the right to lead the public. 5 Mughniya died in Beirut in 1979.

AHM ED RIDA, MUHAMMAD JABER AND  SULEIMAN DHAHER Ahmed Rida, Muhammad Jaber and Suleiman Dhaher were the three most prominent Shi‘ite intellectuals during the time of the French Mandate and the ensuing struggle for independence. They all came from similar backgrounds.

Rida was born in 1872 and lived and worked in the town of Nabatiyeh in the southeastern part of Jabel-‘Amil. His father was one of the district’s notables, famous for his honesty and reliability. At the age of six, Ahmed learned reading, writing and arithmetic, as well as Qur’an recitation. He later moved from Nabatiyeh to a school in Ansar , where he learned syntax and grammar under Sayyid Hasan Ibrahim , one of the prominent

90 O. NIR

‘ Ulama of Jabel-‘Amil. At his parents’ request, he returned to Nabatiyeh to study mathematics and geography, in the school of Sayyid Mustafa al-‘Akari al- Trablisi . He later studied philosophy and modern studies with the best teachers in Jabel-‘Amil, including Sayyid Muhammad Nur al-Din . When the ‘ Alim Hasan Makki al-Husseini arrived in Nabatiyeh in 1891 and established the al- Hamidiya school , Ahmed Rida studied and later taught there. 6

Suleiman Dhaher was born in 1872 on ‘Ashura’ , the holiest day of the Shi‘ite calendar, which falls on the tenth day of Muharram , the fi rst month of the Muslim year. Like his colleague Rida, he was a close associ-ate of the Sunni Za‘im Riad al-Sulh , who also supported the idea of Arab unity . Dhaher gained a reputation as a writer, poet and excellent researcher and was a member of the Arab Academy of Damascus. He divided his pro-fessional career between research, journalistic writing and literary work. In his career as a researcher, Dhaher analyzed the literary styles of older- generation writers as well as writers of his time. As a journalist, he edited the newspapers al-Qabas , Alif-Baa and al- Nidaa . Dhaher wrote articles for several newspapers in Beirut and Damascus , including al- Muqtabas and al-‘Irfan and also contributed editorials to al-Marj. Al- Marj was established at the time of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 in the vil-lage of Jdayde by his doctor friend, As‘ad Thiab Rhal . He wrote about his-tory and politics for the magazine Jabel-‘Amil , as well as about society and ethics. Dhaher devoted much of his time to writing modern poems, which were distinct from the style that was popular in Jabel-‘Amil in that period. Most of his poems remained unpublished, and after his death around a thousand manuscripts were found in his offi ce.

Dhaher’s profession enabled him to maintain relations with Arab intel-lectuals and politicians, such as the Druze Shakib Arslan , with whom he corresponded prior to the formation of the Lebanese state. 7 He was con-nected to the Arab Trust House in Beirut, an institute where intellectuals who were known for promoting Arab culture gathered and occasionally made political declarations. Dhaher was regarded as radically anti-French, and he criticized the Mandate in many of his writings. 8

Muhammad Jaber was born to a family of non-Arab origin who emi-grated to Jabel-‘Amil from the Iranian city of Isfahan in the early fi fteenth century. He was born in Nabatiyeh in 1870 and studied in the Al-Amiriya school under the teacher Muhammad Ibrahim al-Husseini , and later in the Al-Hamidiya school in Nabatiyeh. Jaber participated, along with his colleagues Ahmed Rida and Suleiman Dhaher, in political and cultural

THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE POWER CENTERS 91

activities. He established an Islamic Charitable Association in 1899 ( al- Jam‘iyya al-Khairiyya al-Islamiyya ) and was among the founders of the Scientifi c Revival Association in Nabatiyeh (1927), established with the goal of breathing new life into the intellectual and cultural movement in Jabel-‘Amil . Jaber later abandoned the fi eld of education to engage in commerce, but he continued to conduct research and to write. 9

Jaber’s most important book, Ta’arikh Jabel-‘Amil (The History of Jabel-‘Amil), covered the events in the Shi‘ite region of Lebanon from the Ottoman conquest through the end of the nineteenth century. It is considered one of the most reliable and important sources on Lebanon during the Ottoman period and is a sort of textbook about Jabel-‘Amil. Jaber also published articles in the Shi‘ite magazine al- ‘Irfan and politi-cal articles in the newspaper Jabel-‘Amil . His views were unremittingly pro-Arab, and he was regarded as a loyal supporter of Riad al-Sulh. At the time of the French Mandate , he was a strong supporter of Arab unity , but he was nonetheless careful not to declare too openly his resistance to the Mandatory government. 10 The topics of Jaber’s many manuscripts include philosophy, natural sciences and poetry. Muhammad Jaber died in 1945. 11

KAMAL MURUWA The most prominent Shi‘ite intellectual during the 1950s and 1960s in Lebanon was the journalist and publicist Kamal Muruwa. He was born in 1915 in the village of Zerariya near Sidon . After he fi nished his stud-ies in the al- Muqasid elementary school and al- Funun al-Jamila secondary school in Sidon, Muruwa moved to Beirut , where he attained a bachelor’s degree in political science from the American University of Beirut . Already as a student, he began to write for the newspapers al-Nidaa (1933) and al-Nahar (1935). Towards the end of the French Mandate he and Sheikh Fuad Habish founded the weekly al-Harb al-Jadida al-Musawara (The Photographed New War), which ran for eighteen months. After the French issued an arrest warrant against him, Muruwa was forced to fl ee to Europe. After wandering from Istanbul to Bulgaria and Romania, he joined the Arab volunteers who fought for the Axis Powers in Germany. When he returned to Beirut in 1944, Muruwa was imprisoned for several months. 12

In January 1946, he founded the newspaper al-Hayat , which was to become the Arab world’s leading newspaper. In 1952, Muruwa estab-lished the fi rst serious Lebanese daily to be published in English, the Daily Star , which was temporarily shut down during the civil war of 1975–90 .

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In 1959, Muruwa established the Beirut Matin , a daily that was pub-lished in French. 13 His career as a journalist was established during the 1950s when he demonstrated his resistance to the infl uence of Nasserism , which Muslims in Lebanon and the Arab world were increasingly adopt-ing. Al-Hayat was read closely as it provided access to information about Nasser’s rivals in Lebanon and abroad, material that other newspapers did not publish. Muruwa looked down upon the leftist movements and openly supported the regimes in the Gulf states. To this end, he turned his newspaper into a powerful conduit for anti-communist propaganda. His opponents accused him of receiving money from Western intelligence agencies, but there is no evidence to support that claim. In May 1966, Muruwa was assassinated in his offi ce by a pro-Nasserist supporter.

Muruwa was not the only Shi‘ite journalist whose infl uence reached beyond Shi‘ite circles. Talal Salman , born in the village of Shmistar in the Biqa‘, was a prominent journalist in the 1970s. His career began in the mid-1950s, when he worked fi rst for the newspaper al-Sharq , then for the weekly al-Hawadith (1957–59). In the mid-1960s, Salman wrote for the weekly al-Siyyad and became well known for his clear pro- Palestinian views. After spending a few years working for other newspapers, he returned to al-Siyyad in 1970. In 1974, Salman established the daily al- Safi r , which was known for being pro- Libyan in its initial years, and as having good connections with the Lebanese left. In 1976, it was closed down by the Syrians who took control of parts of Lebanon, and when it was reopened this daily adopted a pro-Syrian political stance. During the civil war of 1975 –90, al-Safi r became the second most important newspa-per in Lebanon, after al-Nahar , and counterbalanced the latter. Whereas al-Nahar supported the government, al-Safi r supported the Palestinians and the Lebanese National Movement .

NOTES 1. Shanahan, p. 151. 2. On Mughniya see Karl Heinrich Góbel, Moderne Schiitische Politik und

Staatsidee (Leske: Opladen, 1984), 65–140; or Mallet, pp. 10–17. 3. The quotation is from Mughniya’s memories that was edited and pub-

lished after his death: ‘Abd al-Huseyn Mughniya, Tajarib (Beirut: Dar al-Jawad, 1980), p. 98.

4. From Mughniya’s article under the title “Our Weapon is the Quraan”, Ibid., pp. 429–430, quoted in Mallet , p. 7.

THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE POWER CENTERS 93

5. In his book “The Shi‘ies and the Scholars” in Arabic: Muhammad Jawad Mughniya, al-Shi ‘ a wal-Hukimun , al-Tabi‘a al-Hamitha (Beirut: Dar al-Jawad, 1981).

6. The biographical details are from Fayaz , 111–112. 7. The letters with Arslan were published during the 1940s in al- ‘ Uruba

(Arabism) newspaper. See: Saliman Tahir, “Muzakarat al- Jaza‘ al-Thalith”, al-‘Uruba , Mar. 1947, pp. 37–40.

8. The information on Suliman Tahir is from Fayaz , pp. 122–124; or AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 940, “Notice de Reseignements”, Merdjayoun, 12 Dec. 1933.

9. al- ‘ Irfan , 31, part 7, p. 43. 10. AD (Nantes), MAE, Mandat Syrie-Liban 940, “Notice de Renseignements”,

Merdjayoun, 12 Dec. 1933. 11. Fayaz, p. 143. 12. Adib Muruwa, al-Sahafa al-‘Arabiya, Nashaatiha wa-Tatwiriha (Beirut:

Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, 1961), p. 277. 13. Most details on Muruwa were taken from the back cover of the fi fth vol-

ume of the editorials collection that he wrote between 1946 and 1966. See Kamal Muruwa, Qul Kalimtak wa-Amshi (Beirut: Dar al-Hayat lil-Tiba‘a wal-Nashr, 1988), al-Jazaa‘ al-Hamis.

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95© The Author(s) 2017O. Nir, Lebanese Shi‘ite Leadership, 1920–1970s, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43014-0_6

CHAPTER 6

The Decline of the  Zu‘ama

Abstract The chapter explains the reasons for the decline of the feudal leadership in the Shi‘ite community during the 1970s. It analyzes the emergence of leadership alternatives—religious leadership on the one hand and secular leftist leadership on the other. The chapter focuses on the efforts made by the prominent Za‘im , Kamel al-As‘ad , to maintain his status and infl uence against the meteoric rise of the religious scholar Musa al-Sadr . It also explains the reasons for Sadr’s success and decline.

Keywords Kamel al-As‘ad • Musa al-Sadr • Movement of Deprived • Amal • Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council (SSIC) • Urbanization • Impact of “Shihabism”

In the early 1970s, the status quo that had characterized the political power centers of the Shi‘ite community since the formation of Lebanon in 1920 was violated. The Zu‘ama , who had led the community from the time of Ottoman rule, were replaced by a new leadership. This new leadership consisted of two groups whose ideological positions were in opposition to one another: one consisted of pious men of religion , and the other of young former activists in leftist movements . In those years, the new leadership established the moral and organizational infrastructure that would set the stage for the great breakthrough of the Shi‘ies into

the center of the Lebanese public consciousness one decade later. Against these changes, the Zu‘ama struggled to retain their status and property in the upper ranks of leadership, but they failed to do so. The prominent Zu‘ama of the Biqa‘, the Hamadeh clan, were unable to regain domi-nance after the death of Sabri Hamadeh in 1976. ‘Ali ‘Osseyran , the son of Za‘im ‘Adil ‘Osseyran , suggested the Hamadehs’ electoral failure was the result of a combination of their inability to agree to a political accom-modation with Syria , which had became dominant in Lebanon in those years, and the fact that too many members of the family stood for elections and thereby diffused the family’s support base. 1 The two fi gures who best symbolized the struggle between the old and the new leadership were the Za‘im Kamel al-As‘ad , Ahmed al-As‘ad’s son, who represented the weakening of the Zu‘ama ; and the charismatic ‘Alim Musa al-Sadr , who symbolized the emergence of the new Shi‘ite leadership.

KAMEL AL-AS‘AD Kamel al-As‘ad was born in Beirut in 1929. He studied at the faculty of law at St. Joseph’s University in Beirut and at the Sorbonne in Paris. The sons of the elites from all confessional communities were sent to such institutions, since French was an essential language for those who wished to join the top ranks of government under Maronite hegemony. In 1953, when he was only twenty-four years old, al-As‘ad was elected to parlia-ment for the fi rst time on a platform headed by his father Ahmed. After his father died in March 1961, Kamel inherited his property and position. Between October 1961 and February 1964, he served as the minister of education and arts in Rashid Karam i’s government. During this period, his personal relations with the President of Lebanon, Fuad Sh ihab, dete-riorated as a result of Shihab’s support for the candidacy of ‘Ali Bazzi , a Shi‘ite who ran against al-As‘ad in the 1960 elections . In 1964, Kamel was re-elected to parliament in the Marj‘ayun constituency, at the head of a large parliamentary bloc consisting of seventeen of the ninety-nine members of parliament. As a result, he obtained the necessary majority to be elected Parliamentary Speaker , a position he held between May and October 1964. While in offi ce he found himself at the center of political strife when, on the basis of his legal authority, he vengefully prevented Fuad Shihab from running for a second term as President. Between April and December 1966, al-As‘ad served as the minister of water resources and public health in ‘Abdallah al-Yafi ’s government. In the 1968 elections,

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he was elected in the Marj‘ayun-Hasbaya constituency, and again served as Parliamentary Speaker between May and October 1968. In 1972, he was re-elected and served as Speaker continuously until 1984, when he lost the offi ce to the “man of the Biqa‘“, Hussein al-Husseini . After this loss, al-As‘ad spent time in France . He returned in time for the parliamentary elections of 1992 , in which he lost once again.

Kamel al-As‘ad was known as a playboy whose behavior resembled that of his late father, a feudal lord known for his arrogant and scorn-ful attitude towards the Shi‘ite public. His lavish and lawless lifestyle was often remarked on, along with his tendency to humiliate destitute peas-ants, who had no choice other than to succumb to his authority due to the power he held over their lives. His contempt and arrogance towards wealthy people and liberal professionals who immigrated from Jabel-‘Amil to Beirut was also well known. Historian Fuad ‘Ajami writes that al-As‘ad detested the south and its way of life, and held his fellow Shi‘ies in con-tempt. This notwithstanding, many Shi‘ies’ fondest desire was to be on the list of candidates he headed for parliamentary elections. Politics provided an opportunity for those who aspired to leave the largely neglected south and move to Beirut, as well as for the many Shi‘ite immigrants returning from West Africa and America after extended absences. One’s chance of being elected to parliament from the list was very high due to the author-ity he wielded, and because so many tended to vote for al-As‘ad’s list. 2 The primary obligation of the candidates on this list was to support the inter-ests of the al-As‘ad family, which included struggling for political infl u-ence against the lists of other Zu‘ama families from the south, including al-Khalil, ‘Osseyran and al-Zein.

THE REASONS FOR THE LOSS OF STATUS Kamel al-As‘ad was the last Za‘im of his family, and after his political decline the hegemony of the al-As‘ads in Jabel-‘Amil came to an end. His deter-mined opposition to any change to the socio-political order, as well as his personality traits, paved the way for his defeat. However, the main reasons for his defeat were the social and political changes that had occurred within the Shi‘ite community and in Lebanon as a whole, which had made it dif-fi cult for the Zu‘ama to retain authority. The most prominent social change was the result of the massive urbanization process that occurred among the Shi‘ies in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, part of this process was a direct result of the economic crisis that affected Lebanon during those

THE DECLINE OF THE ZU‘AMA 97

decades, especially in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 3 In addition, part of this process can be seen as a direct result of “ Shihabism ”. In Lebanese his-toriography, this is the name used to refer to the period between 1958 and 1970, under Presidents Fuad Shihab and Charles Hilu , during which the government made earnest efforts to decrease the economic and social gaps in Lebanese society. For the fi rst time, the Lebanese central government attempted to enforce its authority in all aspects of life and in all districts of the country. The government was intent on organizing programs to raise incomes among underprivileged groups. The Shi‘ies in Jabel-‘Amil were the main targets of such programs, although the government also targeted other groups. The Ministry for Social Development was established for this pur-pose with the help of the French Institute for Project Development, known as IRFED (Institut de Recherche et de Formation en Développement). This institute, devoted to research and development, brought about substantial improvement in the Shi‘ies’ standard of living. Many villages benefi ted for the fi rst time from running water, electricity, roads and a national educa-tion system. However, these changes threatened the authority of traditional leaders, such as al-As‘ad, who saw it as in their interest to retain the enor-mous gaps among the rural population, particularly in the fi elds of educa-tion and property. 4 As a result of Shihab’s policies, the social and economic gap between Beirut and distant districts was reduced.

Another outcome of these policies was a signifi cant increase in urban-ization among the Shi‘ies. Part of the impetus for this urbanization trend is related to the economic changes of the 1950s, particularly the oil industry boom, which transformed the city of Beirut. As market demands changed as a result of the oil boom, the agricultural industry changed with it. The result was a massive exodus from rural areas in search of alternative sources of income. Between the early 1950s and the mid-1970s, almost 40 per-cent of the Shi‘ite population left for the cities, so that 63 percent of the Shi‘ies became urbanized, 45 percent of whom lived in greater Beirut. 5

A similar process of urbanization occurred among other Lebanese reli-gious sects as early as the 1940s, when the governing elites were able to adapt more easily to the demographic transformations. Family ties were shifted in part to Beirut as patron–client sub-networks, enabling the fami-lies to retain their status. In the fi rst years of the formation of the Lebanese economic and political systems, the family unit became the political sup-port base for the urban working class. Family ties and social relations with government functionaries were essential for promoting personal concerns and for obtaining employment. Labor confl icts and communal problems

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were often solved by arbiters representing the elite families. Such rela-tions with the urban working class enabled the ruling class to mobilize social and political support in the city. Due to diffi culties in controlling their urban “clients”, the Zu‘ama turned to working-class families to act as subcontractors of all sorts. Urbanization and its implications might be the reason behind al-As‘ad’s attempt to seek out traditional forms of allegiance. In 1969 he formed a parliamentary alliance with Maronite Suleiman Faranjiyeh and Sunni Sa’ib Salam , both leading Zu‘ama . When Faranjiyeh was elected President in 1970, al-As‘ad was elected Speaker of the Parliament and Salam became Prime Minister. 6

However, the situation was different for the Shi‘ies. The fact that urban-ization among the Shi‘ies occurred during a later period made it diffi cult to integrate the Shi‘ite elite into the realities of Beirut , far from its stronghold, and to create a sub-infrastructure of the patron–client type there. There were a number of reasons for these diffi culties. First, the Shi‘ite migrants who arrived in the cities were poor and in diffi cult economic straits, having been unable to earn a living from agriculture or commerce in Jabel-‘Amil and the Biqa‘. Those who migrated from Jabel-‘Amil in the early 1970s were compelled to leave their homes due to clashes between the Israelis and Palestinians . The latter carried out terror attacks against Israeli civilians across the Lebanese–Israeli border, compelling the Israeli Army to retaliate against the Palestinian bases, near the Shi‘ite villages in Jabel-‘Amil. Arriving thus, the Shi‘ies could afford to settle only in the poorest slums of Beirut, along the so-called “Misery Belt” ( Sharit al- Ba’as ) that bounded the south-western neighborhoods of the city, known today as the “ Southern Suburb” ( al-Dhahiyya al-Janubiyya ) . This is how the mixed-population neighbor-hoods of Beirut were formed, of which the largest included ‘Ain al-Rumaina, al-Nab‘a, al-Muslih and al-Qaratina. 7 These economic diffi culties generated feelings of inferiority among the Shi‘ies in relation to people from other reli-gious sects, and anger at the traditional Shi‘ite elite for not having provided proper conditions for the Shi‘ite public to live honorably.

The second reason for the diffi culties of Shi‘ite leaders in Beirut was that clients of the Sunni and Maronite Zu‘ama had already claimed most of the control over power and infl uence in the city. This lack of infl uence made it diffi cult for the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama to provide the patron services necessary to mobilize social and political support. Indeed at fi rst, some of them maintained relations with Shi‘ite supporters who had migrated to Beirut. ‘Ajami describes the great excitement in the Shi‘ite neighborhoods on election days, when the Zu‘ama would drive their supporters by bus

THE DECLINE OF THE ZU‘AMA 99

from Beirut to vote in Jabel-‘Amil. 8 Over time, increasing urbanization caused the connection between the migrants and the Zu‘ama to wane. The third reason for the diffi culties faced by the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama in Beirut was that the Shi‘ies were under-represented in the Lebanese political sys-tem and therefore had limited power. This made it diffi cult for the elite to provide for the Shi‘ite population effi ciently, as the Maronite and Sunni elite were able to do. The welfare services that the government established in the 1960s benefi ted primarily the two other large religious sects, who were adequately represented, while the Shi‘ies remained largely neglected .

The process of urbanization occurred simultaneously with another social transformation, namely, the creation of a new middle class, situated between the elite and the working class . While among the Maronites and Sunnis the urbanization process led to the creation of a class of “sub-contractors” within the patron–client system, among the Shi‘ies it cre-ated an anti-elite class opposed to the hegemony of the Zu‘ama . This class included young Shi‘ies who had attained a higher education thanks to the process of urbanization. As long as those young Shi‘ies lived in areas under the infl uence of the Zu‘ama , their chance for mobilization was very limited. In light of the fact that access to state institutions depended on the mediation of the Zu‘ama , they served as agents of moderniza-tion on behalf of the state. When the process of modernization protected the interests of the elite, the Zu‘ama served as loyal agents of the state. However, when modernization threatened their position within their sect, the Zu‘ama prevented their clients from progressing. By creating a new middle class, the process of urbanization enabled the improvement of the social and economic status of young Shi‘ies. Members of this group gradu-ated high school and pursued higher education in Beirut, studying to be doctors and lawyers. However, the repressive living conditions in the city caused many of them to remain unemployed, adding to their frustration. The new social class also included Shi‘ite merchants who had emigrated from Lebanon to West Africa in the 1930s because of economic diffi cul-ties, and had returned to Lebanon. These groups constituted a sort of petit bourgeois class that had not previously existed in the Shi‘ite community.

The position of the Zu‘ama was also damaged by the fact that many Shi‘ies felt the Zu‘ama had let them down. The government projects aimed at developing backward areas during the era of “ Shihabism ” raised high expectations from the Zu‘ama . The young people who hoped to improve their lot, especially as compared to the Maronites and Sunnis, were disappointed by their inability to fulfi ll those expectations. Religious

100 O. NIR

institutions also could not offer a solution to the problems of the urban migrants, since these institutions played an insignifi cant role until the late 1980s. Amidst the chaos that prevailed in Beirut after the outbreak of civil war in 1975 , there was no way to establish religious institutions in the city, particularly as most of the Shi‘ies put their hopes in the secular educated lead-ership of the Amal movement (established in 1975) as the only Shi‘ite militia during the fi rst years of the war. Therefore, new religious institutions devel-oped only in the Biqa‘ region, where they were assisted after 1979 by the emissaries of the Islamic regime of Iran , far from Beirut, where international attention was focused during that period. In light of the disappointment and lack of effective leadership, the new social class became fertile ground for radical social and political mobilization. Shi‘ite migrants in Beirut joined the Ba‘athist, Communist and Nasserite organizations by the thousands. This phenomenon refl ected the emergence of the political left in Lebanon and turned these organizations into standard-bearers of the struggle against social deprivation. Moreover, for these people the Zu‘ama represented the root of social illness, which the leftist ideologies claimed to be able to heal.

One of the unremitting opponents to the strong control of the Zu‘ama over the Lebanese state was the Shi‘ite publicist Kamal M uruwa, who often attacked their use of political-communal jurisdiction to obtain jobs and to promote private concerns. Already in the days of Ahmed al-A s‘ad , Moruwa published editorials in which he accused the Zu‘ama of commer-cializing communal segregation, lowering ethical standards and promot-ing egoism, leading to the weakening of Lebanese society. 9 He accused the Shi‘ite Zu‘ama of perpetuating the backwardness of the Shi‘ite com-munity and of neglecting Shi‘ite regions. 10 Moruwa supported President Shihab ’s policy of centralized reforms, particularly as this was his way of opposing the Zu‘ama . He called for investment in social projects such as hospitals, laboratories, orphanages, playgrounds, public housing and pub-lic transportation to the villages. 11 In addition to his criticism of the gov-ernment and the parliament, Muruwa supported the activities of IRFED and assistance from foreign experts. Moruwa’s articles, which were read in Lebanon and across the entire Arab world, strengthened the popular sen-timent that there was a need for change. Such feelings threatened al- As‘ad and the other Zu‘ama . 12

An additional transformation that threatened al-As‘ad’s statu s was the disturbance of the balance between the power centers in the Shi‘ite commu-nity, which occurred following the structural and social changes initiated by the Iranian-born cleric Musa al-Sadr . Al-Sadr arrived in Lebanon in 1958

THE DECLINE OF THE ZU‘AMA 101

to serve as the Ja‘afari Mufti of the city of Tyre, as there was no suitable candidate for this offi ce among the Shi‘ite Lebanese ranks. 13 This offi ce became available following the death of ‘Abd al-Hussein Sharf al- Din , who had held the position for many years. ‘Ajami argues that Sharf al-Din invited al-Sadr to Lebanon on the eve of his death, since he did not think either of his sons was suitable for the offi ce. 14 Different theories have been proposed regarding the real purpose behind al-Sadr’s arrival in Lebanon. Former offi cials of the SAVAK (the former Iranian intelligence agency) claim that al-Sadr’s mission as a Mufti was to promote the Shah’s inter-ests and to bring the Lebanese Shi‘ite community closer to Iran. 15 Others claim he was sent by exiled Iranian opposition leader Khomeini in order to establish an organizational basis for the Iranian opposition in Lebanon. In any case, al-Sadr’s activity in Lebanon over two decades caused two main problems for Kamel al-As‘ad as a Za‘im . The fi rst was the expropriation of the community’s leadership from the Zu‘ama . This occurred through the establishment of a new body, the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council , which was recognized by the Lebanese state as the offi cial representative of the Shi‘ite community. Al-Sadr headed the council, whose representatives included clerics as well as secular notables and people who had been unable to infl uence Shi‘ite matters under the feudal system. The second problem was that al-As‘ad was the prime target of al- Sadr’s attacks in the context of his social struggle to improve the status of the Shi‘ies.

MUSA AL-SADR Al-Sadr was born in the Iranian city of Kom in 1928. His father, Ayatollah Sadr al-Din al-Sadr, was one of the most prominent scholars in the Shi‘ite world. After completing his elementary and secondary studies in Kom, Musa moved to Teheran to study political economy and law in a secular college. At his father’s insistence, he gave up his plans to live a secular life and instead started to study at a religious school ( Hawza ‘ Ilmiya ) in Kom. During his studies, al-Sadr edited a Persian magazine, called the Islamic Schools . After his father died in 1954, he moved to Najaf to study Islamic religious law ( Shari‘a ) by the Marja‘a al-Takalid (a source of emulation) Muhsin al-Hakim . In 1957, he visited Lebanon for the fi rst time, leav-ing a strong impression on the local ‘Ulama , who invited him to replace Sharf al-Din, the late Mufti of Tyre , one year later. After settling down in Tyre, al-Sadr established several educational institutions , including a voca-tional school for orphans in the village of Burj al-Shimali , a girls’ school called “House of the Young Woman”, and a college called the “Institute

102 O. NIR

for Islamic Studies”. 16 In 1963, he was granted Lebanese citizenship by President Shihab, who encouraged his social-communal activity and pro-moted him as an alternative to the Zu‘ama . Despite the fact that he started his career in Lebanon in 1959, Sadr succeeded in establishing his position as a leading religious authority among the Shi‘ite community ( Mujtahed ) only in the second half of the 1960s.

On the basis of his religious status, and in his capacity as the Shi‘ite Mufti ( Ja‘afari Mufti ) of Tyre, al-Sadr was the obvious candidate to lead the establishment of the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council (SSIC) on behalf of the Shi‘ite community. With the establishment of the council, the Shi‘ies were no longer part of the overall Islamic Council, which had been conducted under Sunni hegemony for years. When al-Sadr was elected as the head of the new council, he became the offi cial head of the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon, although in terms of power, he was still second-ary to the Zu‘ama and political leaders. Thanks to his charismatic appeal, he was able to gather thousands of Shi‘ies to listen to his speeches on mass occasions, creating a momentum that promised innovation and revival. The formation of the SSIC in May 1969 was al-Sadr’s most important act, making him a leader on the national level and well known also outside Shi‘ite religious circles. In his capacity as Chairman of the council , al-Sadr initiated political and social changes within the Shi‘ite community and infl uenced the transformation of the community’s status. His contribution to these transformations within the Shi‘ite community in the 1970s lay in the following areas:

1. The creation of a political alternative to the traditional leadership

As described earlier, until the early 1970s a small number of Zu‘ama held a socio-economic and political status that enabled them to have complete control over community matters. That changed when the SSIC began to function. Under al-Sadr’s leadership, the council became the leading body in determining the community’s social, economic and political orientation. Al-Sadr took advantage of a political vacuum caused by the decline in status of the traditional leadership on the one hand, and on the other hand the lack of a Shi‘ite base within the platform of the ideological leftist parties . He had the advantage of possessing offi cial governmental status while also being accepted by a variety of groups within the Shi‘ite community, includ-ing the ‘Ulama , the educated class, free professionals and even politicians of the traditional system. That popularity made it possible for Shi‘ies of the lower and middle classes to identify with the alternatives he introduced.

THE DECLINE OF THE ZU‘AMA 103

Al-Sadr confi gured himself as a political alternative to the existing communal leadership. Throughout his political career, he struggled against the traditional leadership and against the attraction of young Shi‘ies to the ideological leftist parties , particularly to the Lebanese Communist Party . The measures he took on behalf of the community were very often related to his attempt to attract Shi‘ite activists from opposing bodies. He initiated many projects whose dual purpose was to attract Shi‘ies, in addition to reaching the immediate goals of reliev-ing economic distress and protecting Shi‘ite neighborhoods. Such proj-ects included organizing strikes to protest and improve socio-economic conditions; establishing the Movement of the Deprived ; and founding a sectarian militia — Amal . To improve his chances of success, al-Sadr escalated his personal rivalry with the leading Za‘im , Kamel al-As‘ad , who represented, in al-Sadr’s view, all the negative aspects of Shi‘ite poli-tics. 17 Although al-As‘ad could have helped him, al-Sadr preferred to treat al-As‘ad as a rival in order to highlight the social struggle and to consolidate his supporters.

Al-Sadr was not a revolutionary , but rather a reformist who aspired to improve the conditions of the Lebanese Shi‘ies within the existing political system. He saw Lebanon as an eternal homeland for the Shi‘ies who resided there. For this reason, he was careful not to undermine the existence of the Lebanese state or its confessional (multisectarian) struc-ture, but instead attacked problematic aspects of it, including capitalism, governmental neglect and political feudalism. 18 His stance in favor of the existence of the Lebanese state made it easier for the masses to identify with his goals, since it went hand in hand with the policies that had been pursued by the Shi‘ies in Lebanon since the 1930s.

2. The transformation of the Shi‘ite sect into the primary mode of identifi cation for many Shi‘ites

Al-Sadr infused new life into the Shi‘ite Lebanese identity by relating the struggle for social and political justice of the 1970s to the Shi‘ite tradi-tion of early Islam. In so doing, he created a feeling of exclusivity among the Shi‘ies for the fi rst time, as well as a common foundation for political activity in order to reach communal goals. That common foundation was shared by religious scholars, secularists, peasants and city dwellers.

Al-Sadr’s success in the fi rst half of the 1970s can be partly attributed to his impressive style and commanding performance . He was very tall

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(over 190 cm) and dressed in traditional garb of an ‘ Abaya and a turban. His Persian-accented Arabic bespoke his foreign origins, and added a par-ticular charm to his performances. Moreover, the title “ Imam ”, which he adopted from the Shi‘ite tradition, injected power and authority to his speeches. Al-Sadr knew how to manipulate the media as well as use his unique status as head of the SSIC . He often organized activities, such as strikes and demonstrations, that were also photo opportunities in order to reach a broad audience. His unusual performances and unique style were a fresh innovation in the Lebanese and Shi‘ite political arena.

3. Change in the Shi‘ite political pattern in Lebanon

Under the leadership and direction of al-Sadr, political activism replaced the passive approach of the Lebanese Shi‘ies to their social and political status. For the fi rst time, the Shi‘ies demanded their rights fi rmly, bringing about a struggle in which both the leadership and the public participated. The new leadership cooperated with political fi gures outside the Shi‘ite community, particularly those from the Lebanese left . It did not hesitate to take political action, including popular protest. This included mass meetings and demonstrations as well as marches, strikes and petitions. This activism reached a peak in the mid-1970s with the establishment of Amal , an armed militia of Shi‘ies, which refl ected al-Sadr’s awareness of the need for military power to achieve political goals within Lebanon. 19

4. The establishment of a new political and military infrastructure for the Shi‘ite community

Al-Sadr initiated the establishment of new political frameworks, includ-ing the SSIC, the Movement of the Deprived ( Harakat al-Mahrumin ) and the Amal movement , which aimed at dissolving the traditional feu-dal system. The SSIC became the main decision-making body concerning Shi‘ite matters in Lebanon, while the Amal movement became the central political and military framework during the civil war of 1975 –90. In the 1970s, al-Sadr also established the infrastructure for the alliance between the Lebanese Shi‘ite community and Syria , which was the most prominent force in Lebanese politics between 1976 and 2005. That alliance provided the Amal movement with military and political backing during the civil war.

The strong link between the Lebanese Shi‘ies and the ‘Alawites in power in Syria has its roots in the approval al-Sadr gave to that community

THE DECLINE OF THE ZU‘AMA 105

in 1973. He did this by recognizing the ‘Alawites as part of the Shi‘ite Ja‘afari religious school ( Madhab ). The ‘Alawite regime in Damascus, which came to power in 1970, needed Islamic recognition in the early 1970s because the majority of Syrians were Sunni Muslims, and later because of its struggle against the (Sunni) Muslim Brothers. Al-Sadr, in his capacity as head of the SSIC, initiated the ‘Alawites into the Twelver Shi‘ism stream by appointing the ‘Alawite Sheikh ‘Ali Mansur as the Shi‘ite ( Ja‘afari ) Mufti of northern Lebanon and the city of Tripoli . 20

Al-Sadr’s Opponents among the Religious Establishment

The noticeable increase in Musa al-Sadr’s infl uence in the public and political systems of the Shi‘ite community, and the increase in the indirect infl uence of the religious establishment within the Shi‘ite power centers, intensifi ed Iranian involvement in community matters. The exchange of religious scholars between Lebanon and Iran has been previously treated by Fuad ‘Ajami, Bernard Lewis and Shimon Shapira. These scholars claim that the Lebanese Shi‘ite ‘Ulama moved to Iran out of a motivation to study under the greatest religious authorities of Shi‘ite Islam. In addi-tion, they claim Iranian ‘Ulama moved to Lebanon for three key reasons: fi rst, to reinforce the Lebanese Shi‘ies’ ties to religion; second, to further Iranian infl uence over Lebanese Shi‘ies by fostering a connection between the two communities; and third, to provide the Lebanese Shi‘ite establish-ment with ‘Ulama , of which there was a permanent shortage.

During the 1960s, Musa al-Sadr was supported by the Iranian Shah. Some have even claimed, as mentioned above, that al-Sadr was sent to Lebanon on behalf of the Shah in order to increase Iranian infl uence in the region by advancing the idea of Shi‘ite solidarity between Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. Al-Sadr’s opponents claimed he was acting on behalf of the SAVAK , the Shah’s intelligence organization. Shapira, whose research focused on Iranian–Lebanese relations, claims that al-Sadr sought recogni-tion by the SAVAK in order to obtain fi nancial backing from the Shah, and that he provided the organization with information about his meetings with high-ranking offi cials of the Lebanese government. 21 During his visits to Teheran in the early 1970s, al-Sadr was warmly welcomed. However, a rift between al-Sadr and the Shah appeared after the Arab–Israeli War of 1973 , when al-Sadr accused the Shah of supporting Israel and of maintain-ing close relationships with Israel and the USA. Around the mid-1970s, the Iranian attitude to al-Sadr underwent a transformation, provoked by

106 O. NIR

fear that his support for the Islamic opposition to the Shah was more sig-nifi cant than his contribution to Iranian interests. That conclusion drew Teheran to seek out Lebanese ‘Ulama who might be able to damage al-Sadr’s public position and thereby force him out of the political spotlight. To that end, they attempted to back a candidate they thought could defeat al-Sadr in the elections for head of the SSIC to be held in March 1975. The candidate they chose was Suleiman al-Yahfufi (born 1931) from Nahla, a town near Ba‘albek.

Sadr and al-Yahfufi had different approaches to many matters, not just in their perceptions of the Shah during the mid-1970s. Al-Yahfufi lived and worked in Ba‘albek , the Biqa‘ capital, which lagged behind Jabel-‘Amil and Beirut in terms of political awareness among the Lebanese Shi‘ite community, and was also distant from the political center. This distance was emphasized by the sense of isolation that took shape over the years as a result of the geomorphologic structure of the Biqa‘ region, situated between Mount Lebanon in the west and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains in the east. This led to a long tradition of non-intervention by the authorities in tribal matters, which in turn contributed to behavior that was radical compared with that found in Jabel-‘Amil and Beirut. The militant char-acter of the Shi‘ies in the Biqa‘ was rooted in their tribal structure, as it depended on militancy for survival. Al-Sadr took advantage of that factor at the outset of his political career by mobilizing followers from among the Shi‘ies of the Biqa‘. He did so by acting as mediator between families divided among several strong rival clans. 22 Al-Sadr’s surprising popularity in the Biqa‘ naturally harmed al-Yahfufi ’s ability to compete with him, and compelled the local Mufti to accentuate the differences between the two, presenting al-Yahfufi as a better alternative because of al-Sadr’s preference for non-militant conciliation. Like other religious scholars from the Biqa‘, al-Yahfufi refl ects well the radical militant tendencies of the large clans.

When the elections for the leadership of the SSIC took place, in March 1975, al-Yahfufi was serving as al-Sadr’s deputy. At that time, al-Yahfufi also led an organization known as the Groups of the Imam ( Jama ‘ at al-Imam ) , which included ‘Ulama who were also members of the SSIC. Despite Iranian efforts, al-Yahfufi was defeated and dismissed by al-Sadr, but he continued to oppose him, backed by Iranian support . In the summer of 1976, al-Yahfufi took advantage of the diminution in al-Sadr’s public status, caused by his failure to prevent the expulsion of Shi‘ite residents from Beirut by the Christian Phalanges . Al-Yahfufi was able to offer the exiled Shi‘ies the possibility of settling in his city of

THE DECLINE OF THE ZU‘AMA 107

Ba‘albek . He made this offer after receiving fi nancial aid for this purpose from the senior Shi‘ite ‘Alim in Iran, Ayatollah al-‘Uthma Muhammad Kazem Shari‘atmadari . 23 Other Iranian ‘ Ulama , particularly Ayatollah al-‘Uthma Muhammad Reza Gulfaygani , also offered fi nancial support. 24

The subsidies al-Yahfufi received from the leading ‘Alim of Iran, Muhammad Kathem Shari‘atmadari, were offered under the rubric of assis-tance whose aim was to hinder the infl uence of al-Sadr in Lebanon. This plan was suggested by the Shah’s advisors. In June 1977, Shari‘atmadari sent two Lebanese envoys, Sheikh Zidat Farhat and Sheikh Muhammad Mughniya, to convey the fi nancial assistance to Sheikh al-Yahfufi and Kamel al-As‘ad , al-Sadr’s main adversaries. The envoys’ arrival in Lebanon caused al-Sadr to cut short a visit to Paris and return to Lebanon as quickly as possible in order to issue a statement of condemnation by the SSIC , in which he criticized Iranian involvement in community matters. The statement indicated that the council was exclusively accountable for all the Muqalidun (the “imitates”, or believers) in the Lebanese Shi‘ite com-munity. In response, the envoys proclaimed a declaration in which they referred al-Sadr directly to Shari‘atmadari , whom they called “the head of the Shi‘ite community in the world”, to verify the authenticity of their mission. 25 The warm relations between Iran and al-Yahfufi continued dur-ing his visit to Teheran at the head of a delegation of Lebanese ‘Ulama in the autumn of 1977. The members of the delegation, including al- Yahfufi , Sheikh Muhammad al-Amin , Muhammad ‘Ali al-Husseini and Ja‘afar Sharf al-Din , were presented in Iran as the leaders of the Lebanese Shi‘ite community. 26

After al-Sadr’s disappearance from the political stage in late August 1978, under circumstances described below, a dispute arose between al- Yahfufi and Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din , al-Sadr’s replace-ment as acting head of the SSIC . This occurred as a consequence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran , which compelled al-Yahfufi to cease his politi-cal activity for a few months. However, by late 1980, he returned to work after redirecting his loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeini and making peace with Shams al-Din.

Another adversary of Musa al-Sadr from among the religious establish-ment was Hassan Mahdi Shirazi , an Iranian who was very active among the Shi‘ite communities in both Lebanon and Syria in the 1970s. Shirazi was similarly supported by Iran in efforts to undermine al-Sadr’s status and present himself as an alternative religious leader of the Shi‘ies of Lebanon. In contrast to most of the prominent ‘ Ulama in Lebanon, Shirazi did not

108 O. NIR

have local familial roots. He was a son of a well-known family of religious scholars of Iranian–Iraqi origin that had lived in the holy Shi‘ite cities in Iraq for many years. Shirazi was born in Najaf in 1937, and from child-hood on had trained under the best ‘Ulama of Karbala , where he moved with his father Ayatollah al-‘Uthma Mirza Mahdi Shirazi . In 1969, his involvement in opposition activity brought his expulsion from Iraq , after which he immigrated to Lebanon.

Shirazi’s activity in Lebanon was focused, at fi rst, mainly on social and religious matters. He established in Lebanon the “ Hidden Imam” ( al- Imam al-Mahdi ) school for religious studies, while in Syria he established the “ Zaynab Religious College ” ( al-Khauza al-‘Ilmiya al-Zaynabiya ) . In the early 1970s, he spent a signifi cant amount of time in the ‘Alawi Mountains and the city of Latakia in northern Syria. There, he established a social asso-ciation called the “ Islamic Ja‘afari Association for Charity” ( al- Jam‘iya al-Islamiya al-Khiriya al-Ja‘afariya ) . The purpose of the association was to promote the position of the ‘Alawites in the Syrian coastal region. 27 Shirazi’s close relations with the ‘Alawite community of Syria were formed after Musa al-Sadr recognized it as a sect within the Ja‘afari Shi‘a. Through his effort to promote the ‘Alawite cause in the early days of the ‘Alawite regime in Syria, Shirazi developed close relations with the Shi‘ite communities of Damascus , as well as with those of Sierra Leone and Kuwait .

In Lebanon, Shirazi established a Shi‘ite organization known as the “ Organization of Religious Scholars” ( Jam‘iyat al-‘Ulama ) , which united several Shi‘ite sheikhs who acted as opposition inside and outside the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council . This group was headed by Sheikh Suleiman al-Yahfufi and Shuki al-Amin . 28 In April 1977, Shirazi joined a new organization, known as the “ Lebanese Strength Union” ( Itihad al-Quwa al-Lubnani ) . The organization sought to promote itself as non- religious, and saw itself as an alternative to the Shi‘ite leadership headed by al-Sadr, whose standing fell when civil war broke out and social issues became less prominent on the public agenda. The new organization called for intercommunal agreement and for the end of the war. It was headed by Muhsin Slim , a Shi‘ite attorney and former MP, who gathered edu-cated Shi‘ies and liberal professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, around him. 29 After Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance in August 1978 and his trans-formation into a mythological fi gure in the minds of the Shi‘ite public in Lebanon, the organizations that opposed him, such as the Lebanese Strength Union, lost status. Ayatollah Shirazi was assassinated in Beirut in May 1980. 30

THE DECLINE OF THE ZU‘AMA 109

THE DECLINE OF AL-SADR AND AL-AS‘AD The Lebanese civil war that broke out in April 1975 led to the removal of the social struggle led by al-Sadr from the public agenda. It also led to the erosion of his political position. At the same time, the war led to a tempo-rary rise in the status of Kamel al-As‘ad .

Musa al-Sadr vanished —literally vanished—abruptly from the Lebanese political arena. In late August 1978, he was involved in diplomatic meet-ings concerning southern Lebanon following the Israeli invasion of March 1978, known as the Litani Operation ( ‘Amaliyat al-Litani ), and the con-tinuation of the Lebanese civil war. It was in this context that he arrived in late August at the Libyan capital of Tripoli. On August 31, al-Sadr was reportedly seen for the last time by Lebanese tourists while walking out of his hotel on his way to meet Libyan President Mu‘amar Qadhafi . He was escorted by his assistant, Sheikh Muhammad Ya‘aqub , and journalist ‘Abbas Bader al-Din . From that moment, he disappeared without a trace. The Libyans claimed that the three men boarded an airplane bound for Rome, while the Italians claimed that they never boarded. For a long time, rumors circulated among Shi‘ies that people had seen al-Sadr on several occasions, and that he would return to Lebanon in the near future. 31 The mystery of his disappearance transformed al-Sadr, in the eyes of many Shi‘ies, into a fi gure like the Mahdi of Shi‘ite mythology. The idea of the Mahdi is based on the belief that Muhammad bin al-Hasan, the twelfth Shi‘ite Imam who vanished at a young age, will reappear one day (the appearance is called Raj‘a ). Al-Sadr’s disappearance caused the Shi‘ite community to return to the center of the Lebanese public agenda, albeit only for a short time. This event added to the urgency that some felt was needed to remedy the injus-tices that had befallen the Shi‘ies and had characterized their history since the killing of Hussein Ibn ‘Ali near Karbala in the fi rst century of Islam.

Unlike al-Sadr, whose status had declined prior to his vanishing, Za‘im Kamel al-As‘ad succeeded in restoring some of his lost status. Al-As‘ad and his followers utilized two political positions to tamp down popular senti-ment towards the new leadership headed by al-Sadr. One was the position of Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, in which al-As‘ad served from 1972 until 1984. In this capacity, he controlled the fi nancial system that allo-cated money for under-developed regions and benefi ted from good rela-tions with Lebanese politicians and with the Syrian regime. His image as an ally of the Syrians at the outbreak of the civil war was important for both the Lebanese and the Syrians, since the Syrian army had been occupying

110 O. NIR

Lebanese soil since June 1976. Al-As‘ad counted on good relations with Damascus to strengthen his personal infl uence, and Syria, for its part, wanted good relations with the Lebanese authorities in order to justify its military involvement in Lebanon. The more al-As‘ad’s popularity declined in the eyes of the Shi‘ite public, the more he was compelled to change his style before it was too late. He had to struggle to improve conditions in the Shi‘ite regions. Al-As‘ad tried to portray himself as a leader in the struggle against deprivation in Jabel-‘Amil, especially following the Israeli invasion of March 1978, which sowed destruction in many Shi‘ite villages. The Israeli invasion was in response to a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorist attack earlier that month that killed dozens of Israeli civil-ians, and resulted in the destruction of about 1000 Shi‘ite homes in Jabel-‘Amil . With this in mind, al-As‘ad established a parliamentary bloc called the “ National Parliamentary Unity” ( al-Tajama‘al-Watani al-Niyabi ) . In the late 1970s, this block occupied the political center under the banner of resisting Israeli invasion and supporting the Shi‘ite population of the south. This parliamentary bloc also promoted al-As‘ad’s personal position against the reforms advocated by Musa al-Sadr. 32

The second political position of which al-As‘ad took advantage was the Council of the South ( Majlis al-Janub ) , which was established by the Lebanese government in June 1970, inspired by Musa al-Sadr. Al-As‘ad succeeded in keeping his opponents out of this new body, manipulating his control of the council to prevent opposition from arise against him in Jabel-‘Amil. Al-As‘ad transformed the council into a hub of corruption and embezzlement by abusing a large portion the funds allocated to the council. For this reason, the Majlis al-Janub was nicknamed cynically by many Lebanese as the “ Majlis al-Juyub ” (Council of Pockets). 33 Al-As‘ad’s unequivocal domination of the council in the mid-1970s is illustrated by a story that circulated in Jabel-‘Amil, according to which al-As‘ad demanded from someone desiring fi nancial assistance that he hang a picture of him on his living room wall. 34 With the intensifi cation of the Lebanese civil war , the Council of the South ceased to function for several years, and al- As‘ad’s control of the council became meaningless.

Al-As‘ad’s political career deteriorated to its lowest point in 1984, after he failed to be re-elected as Speaker. The direct cause for this loss was the cessation of Syrian support, which occurred as a result of his support of the Lebanese–Israeli agreement of May 17, 1983. The position of Speaker was fi lled by Hussein al-Husseini of the Amal leadership. This symbol-ized the political shift in the Shi‘ite community that had occurred over the

THE DECLINE OF THE ZU‘AMA 111

previous dozen years. The timeline of al-As‘ad’s decline undermines the claim that his main problem was moving to Mount Lebanon in 1976, thus losing direct control over his stronghold in Jabel-‘Amil. 35 After 1984 al- As‘ad went to France and returned only after the end of the Lebanese civil war , just before the parliamentary elections of 1992 , in an attempt to run for re-election. Along with independent candidates who had cooperated with the al-As‘ad family for years, he set up an electoral list known as the “Will of the People” ( Iradat al-Sha‘ab ), which represented the traditional Shi‘ite leadership of the south. 36 The electoral law of July 1992 reduced his prospects, since it united two electoral constituencies, Nabatiy eh and al-Janub, into one constituency, thereby eliminating his infl uence in his traditional stronghold of Nabatiya. 37 Additional factors that damaged al- As‘ad’s chances included the low voter turnout of the Maronites in the united constituency, and the closure of the Israeli security belt by Israel and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) on election day. 38 Some 20 percent of the people who had voting rights in the southern constituency were Maronites, but only 5 percent of them came out to vote. 39 This was an important factor due to the high rate of turnout among the Shi‘ies in that district, which reached more than 60 percent. 40 The low turnout rate among the Maronites resulted from a boycott of the elections, along with the fact that most of the Maronite residents of the south lived within the Israeli security belt, which was closed. This combination of factors, along with the fact that people identifi ed Kamel al-As‘ad with Israel, cost him many votes.

The elections in the south refl ected a struggle between the young gen-eration of Shi‘ite politicians who ran for the “Liberation List” headed by Nabih Berri , who had led the Amal movement for a dozen years, and the Zu‘ama generation who ran for al-As‘ad’s list, known as the “People’s Will”. Both sides slandered and cast aspersions on the other before the elections. In a speech he delivered in the presence of tens of thousands of his supporters, Berri accused al-As‘ad of being backed by Israel. 41 Al-As‘ad, for his part, accused Berri’s followers of intimidation, after the former Shi‘ite MP Anwar al-Sabah from al-As‘ad’s list was compelled to cut short an electoral tour because his vehicle was being targeted by shoot-ings. Mustafa Sa‘ad , an independent candidate from Tyre, complained of “ mercenaries who attempt to disturb the peace and the democratic atmo-sphere in Lebanon and the south ”. 42

The elections resulted in a crushing defeat for al-As‘ad’s list. Twenty- two out of the twenty-three elected seats from the south went to Berri’s list. The additional winner was Mustafa Sa‘ad of the Popular Nasserite Organization

112 O. NIR

( al-Tanzim al-Sha‘abi al-Nasseri ), who was elected as an independent candi-date. 43 Kamel al-As‘ad received only 33,638 votes, about one-third of the votes needed to be elected as a Shi‘ite MP in the south, compared with 118,827 votes for Nabih Berri. The results dissolved Kamel al-As‘ad’s infl uence, as well as that of the classic Shi‘ite Zu‘ama , in the political centers of Lebanon. 44

The title of this chapter, “The Decline of the Zu‘ama ”, was not chosen at random. It is meant to refl ect and draw attention to the decline of the old leadership, without mentioning the emergence of the new leadership represented by Musa al-Sadr: although al-Sadr was a charismatic leader, his years of leadership cannot be regarded as successful or complete. His activity was justifi ably renowned for its signifi cant contribution to the changes in the Shi‘ite community. However, in retrospective, it seems the praises were exaggerated and his success limited. Three main reasons for this can be identifi ed. First, when he vanished , the status of the Shi‘ies in Lebanon had not yet been substantially transformed, and they continued to be treated as an insignifi cant junior partner. The substantive change in that attitude occurred only in the mid-1980s, as a result of the military position of the Shi‘ies and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon . Second, the Shi‘ies, for the most part, did not identify with the Amal movement in al-Sadr’s days. Approximately one-third of the Shi‘ies supported Amal at the time of al-Sadr’s disappearance. Third, due to developments among the Lebanese Shi‘a from the mid-1980s on, one can view al-Sadr’s political contribution as an intermediate stage that linked the Arab nationalist ori-entation of many Shi‘ies with their Islamic religious tendency. Connecting these two tendencies became possible not only because of what al-Sadr introduced to the Shi‘ite political identity in Lebanon, but also because of the blueprint for activism he patterned within the community. One decade after his disappearance from the political scene, these same patterns of behavior became a central tool in the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran , which turned against al-Sadr’s legacy by promoting a vision of the Islamic republic in Lebanon as an alternative to the multisectarian state.

NOTES 1. ‘Osseyran, in an interview with Rodger Shanahan. See: Shanahan, p. 83. 2. Ajami, p. 70. 3. Omri Nir, “The Lebanese Shi’a as a Political Community”, in Barry Rubin

(ed.), Lebanon: Liberation, Confl ict and Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 181–182.

THE DECLINE OF THE ZU‘AMA 113

4. Bley, p. 198. 5. Salim Nasr, “ Roots of the Shii Movement ”, MERIP Reports , Vol. 15, No. 5,

June 1985, p. 11. 6. Shanahan, p. 75. 7. Kamal Salibi, Cross Roads to Civil War 1958–76 (New York, Delmar:

Caravan Books, 1976), p. 9. 8. Ajami, p. 75. 9. On accusations as “communal traders”: Kamal Moruwa, “al-Taa’ifa al-

Siyasiya”, al-Hayat , 20 Feb. 1960, in Kamal Moruwa, Qul Kalamtak wa Amshi , al-mujalad al-thalith (Beirut: Dar al-Hayat lil-Tiba‘a wal-Nashr, 1986), p. 541; The quotation is from Kamal Moruwa, “al-Ra’is Shihab wal-Hakem al-Niyabi”, al-Hayat , 27 May 1960, Ibid, p. 575.

10. Kamal Moruwa, “Mujamil Lubnan”, al-Hayat , 5 Jul. 1960, Ibid, p. 591. 11. Kamal Moruwa, “al-Wizara wal-Wajabat al-Ijtima‘iya”, al-Hayat , 16 Aug. 1960. 12. The criticism of the parliament is in Kamal Moruwa, “fathabal Tujriba”,

al-Hayat , 14 Dec. 1961; on Moruwa’s support in IRFID see his articles: “al-Mashru‘al-‘Amal”, al-Hayat , 28 Nov. 1959; or “Khabar al-Tafah”, al-Hayat , 1 Mar. 1962.

13. The nomination of Mu hammad Jawad M ughniya, the only appropriate per-son for the position, was wrecked by the Speaker of the parliament, ‘Ad il ‘Osseyran, and  Minister Kazem al-Khalil, a close associate of the President. This banished Moghniya from the Lebanese Shi‘ite religious establishment.

14. Ajami, p. 45, quotes an Iraqi friend of the Sharf al-Din family. 15. Abbas William Samii, “The Shah’s Lebanon Policy: The Role of SAVAK”,

Middle Eastern Studies , Vol. 33, No. 1, Jan. 1997, pp. 72–73. 16. Shimon Shapira, “The Imam Mussa al-Sadr: the Motivator of the Shi‘ite

Movement in Lebanon” (Tel-Aviv: The Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1986), p. 8 (In Hebrew).

17. On the struggle between al-Sadr and al-As‘ad, see Thom Sicking and Shereen Khairallah”. The Shi’a Awakening in Lebanon”, CEMAM Reports , No.2. Center of the Study of the Modern Arab World – Saint Joseph’s University. Beirut: Dar el-Mashreq, 1974, pp. 120–127.

18. Al-Sadr ’s position that Lebanon is an “eternal homeland” was quoted by Karim Pakraduni, then an assistant to President Elias Sarkis and later the head of the Phalange party. See Karim Pakraduni, The Lost Peace (Tel-Aviv: Ma‘arachot, 1986), p. 105 (the Hebrew edition).

19. Tabitha Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon (New-York: Monthly Review, 1987), p. 263.

20. On the nomination: Shapira, “the Imam Mussa al-Sadr”, p. 27; or Martin Kramer, “Syrias Alawis and Shi‘ism”, in Shi‘ism, Resistance and Revolution , ed. Martin Kramer, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1987), p. 247. Many researchers ascribed to al-Sadr a Fatwa that gives the ‘Alawites approval as Shi‘ite Muslims, but none of them have been proved.

114 O. NIR

21. Shimon Shapira, Hizballah Between Iran and Lebanon (Tel-Aviv: Ha-Kibutz ha-Meuhad, 2000), p. 53.

22. Shapira, “the Imam Mussa al-Sadr”, pp. 18–19. 23. Al-Yahfufi organized a mass gathering in Ba‘albek a few days after the fall of al-

Nab‘a, during which al-Sadr was strongly criticized. See al-Safi r , 24 Aug. 1976. 24. al-Safi r , 22 Aug. 1976. 25. The enouncement of the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council is in al- Safi r , 18

Jun. 1977; the response of the Iranian delegates is in al- Safi r , 19 Jun. 1977. 26. Shapira, “ Hizballah Between Iran and Lebanon ”, pp. 49–50. 27. Details on Shirazi, from the announcement published by “Jam‘iyat al-

‘ulamaa” (the religious scholar’s organization) in al-Safi r , 5 May. 1980, p. 4. 28. Shimon Shapira, “The Iranian Policy in Lebanon 1955–1989” (Ph.d

Dissertation, Tel-Aviv University, 1994), p. 48. 29. On the activities of this organization: al-Nahar , 27 Apr. 1977, p. 2. 30. al-Safi r , 5 May. 1980, p. 4; Shapira, “The Iranian Policy”, p. 104. 31. Such rumors were spread in mid-November 1978. The Ja‘afar Mufti , ‘Abd

al-Amir Qabalan , said that he was told by Syrian President al-Assad and PLO chaiman ‘Arafat that al- Sadr is alive and is expected to arrive in Damascus. See: Paris AFP in English, 19 Nov. 1978 in FBIS-DR, 20 Nov. 1978: G3; the Saudi magazine al- Jezira published in London), published an item claiming that al- Sadr had been released by the Libyan government in response to pressure from Presidents Bumedian and al-Assad, and that he was in Paris on his way to Damascus. See: Doha QNA , 18 Nov. 1978, in FBIS-DR, 21 Nov. 1978: G3; A Kuwaiti newspaper reported that al-Sadr had arrived in Teheran via Addis-Ababa, see: al-Watan , 13 Sep. 1978, p. 1; Such a rumors were spread during the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in 1982, see: Shapira, “The Imam Musa al- Sadr”, p. 32; and also in 1988, see: al-Watan al-‘Arabi , 576, 26 Feb. 1988, p. 19.

32. al-Nahar al-‘Arabi wal-Dawli , 49, 8 Apr. 1978, p. 4. 33. Richard Augustus Norton, Amal and the Shi ‘ a: Struggle for the Soul of

Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), p. 196, note 23. 34. Sicking and Khirallah, p. 110. 35. Such a claim was mentioned by Shanahan, p. 81. 36. “The People’s will” entire list is in: Farid al-Khazen wa Bul Salim, p. 400;

or the Voice of Lebanon , 3 Sep. 1992, in FBIS-DR, 3 Sep. 1992, p. 34. 37. On the absolute infl uence of the al-As‘ad family in the district of Nabatiya,

see: Malcolm H.  Kerr, “The 1960 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections”, Middle Eastern Affairs , Vol. 11, No. 9, October 1960, p. 269.

38. The “Security Belt” was an area under Israeli military control in parts of Jabel-‘Amil, with assistance from local pro-Israeli militia (SLA), between the years 1985 and 2000.

39. Monday Morning , no. 1029, 14 Sep. 1992, p. 6; al-Masira , no. 359, 14 Sep. 1992, p. 17, pointed out that the voting rate among 107,886 Christians with

THE DECLINE OF THE ZU‘AMA 115

the right to vote in the south was less than 10 percent. According to the offi -cial voting list that was published in al-Safi r , 19 Jun. 1992, p. 3, in the south there were 57,973 Maronites out of 504,982 people with the right to vote.

40. al-Masira , no. 359, 14 Sep. 1992, p. 17, pointed out that the voting rate among the Shiites in the south was higher than 60 percent. Ha’aretz, 7 Sep. 1992, p. 9, noted a voting rate of more than 70 percent; according to the offi cial voting list that was published in al-Safi r , 19 Jun. 1992, p. 3, in the south there were 328,162 Shi‘ites out of 504,982 people with the right to vote; Harik, 37, claimed that the voting rate in the south was always the highest in the country—about 60 percent.

41. On this matter see “Ruba’ Milyun Muwatan Libuaa li-Da’awa”, al-‘Awasif , 130, 14 Aug 1992, pp. 18–20; or Jerusalem Post , 11 Aug. 1992, p. 12.

42. On the shooting on Anwar al-Sabah see the Voice of Lebanon , 26 aug. 1992, quoted FBIS-DR , 26 Aug. 1992, p. 42; Mustafa Sa‘ad was quoted from the Voice of Free Lebanon , 7 Sep. 1992, quoted in FBIS-DR , 8 Sep. 1992, p. 52.

43. The offi cial electoral results in the south were published by the Lebanese ministry of interior and were quoted by al-Khazen , 437; or al-Masira , no. 359, 14 Sep. 1992, pp. 16–17.

44. The numbers of voters for Berri and al-As‘ad from al-Masira , Ibid., p. 437; or “zakirat Lubnan 1993”, Kasandar  – Nashira Shahriya Tawthiqiya Ahsaiya, al-Kitab al-Sanawi 1992 (Beirut: Mu‘ahad al-Tawthiq wal-Bahath al-Lubnaniya, 1993), p. 364 (on Berri), p. 368 (on al-As‘ad).

116 O. NIR

117© The Author(s) 2017O. Nir, Lebanese Shi‘ite Leadership, 1920–1970s, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43014-0

The structure of Shi‘ite political and social power centers, based on coali-tions in which Zu‘ama , ‘ Ulama and intellectuals participated, was weak-ened over the course of the 1960s with the deaths of most of the Zu‘ama of Lebanon’s independence era. During the last third of the twentieth century, the political power centers were gradually transferred from the Zu‘ama to two opposing groups. The fi rst included Western-infl uenced people of explicitly secular background, who were educated and held lib-eral professions. The second included religious scholars with political aspi-rations who derived their inspiration from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Under the infl uence of these two streams, the power of leading Shi‘ite per-sonalities within their community signifi cantly decreased compared with the authority of the Zu‘ama at their time.

In the secular group, this phenomenon is understandable, particularly if we take into account the fact that their main aim was to treat social injustices whose sources were found in the community’s social structure under the Zu‘ama . However, with regard to the religious group, the issue is more complicated due to the tendency of religious leaders during the fi rst decade following the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) to control many aspects of the lives of their followers under the aegis of religious law. This situation was to change later, beginning in the early 1990s, when clerics blurred the Islamic dogmas regarding the daily lives of the Shi‘ies in Lebanon. While Shi‘ite political leaders after the 1970s no longer enjoyed the total control that was in the hands of Zu‘ama regarding domestic

CONCLUSIONS

118 CONCLUSIONS

communal matters, their infl uence grew within the general Lebanese polit-ical system. That shift was possible because the Shi‘ies no longer remained in a secondary position to the Maronites and Sunnis. They began to play a major role as a result of the civil war of 1975–90, from which they emerged as the strongest religious sect militarily, and probably as the largest one.

The need for domestic coalitions within the Shi‘ite community in order to gain political infl uence did not end with the era of the Zu‘ama . Musa al-Sadr, the man who brought about the dissolution of the authority of Shi‘ite Zu‘ama and who created the infrastructure for the emergence of alternative political and social power centers, constituted the foundation of a wide coalition that included both secular politicians and religious cler-ics. The Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council and the Amal movement, both of which he established as communal bodies, enabled the replacement of the Zu‘ama by new political centers. Al-Sadr’s successors in Amal also needed to form a coalition in order to take control of the communal power center during the 1980s. That coalition included secular politicians as well as militants and religious fi gures, such as the Ja‘afari Mufti and the acting head of the Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council at the time, ‘Abd al-Amir Qabalan and Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din. The religious scholars, whose political infl uence grew during the 1990s through the Hizbullah movement, were satisfi ed with a smaller coalition within the movement’s own limited ranks. That coalition was adequate because of its reliance on a stable alliance with an outsider power, that of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thus, the picture of the Lebanese Shi‘ite elite between 1920 and 1970, which includes both Zu‘ama and a small number of ‘ Ulama and intellec-tuals, perhaps better than any other religious sect in Lebanon represents the dual phenomenon of Lebanese political feudalism and sectarianism. The fact that the names of some descendants of Zu‘ama , such as ‘Ali ‘Osseyran and ‘Abdulatif al-Zein, are mentioned by scholars as leaders who have been able to hold onto some of the pre-war infl uence of their fathers, is exaggerated. It ignores the fundamental change in their power compared with that of the Zu‘ama in the relevant period. 1 The reason the Zu‘ama were able to control the Shi‘ite community absolutely was the profound backwardness of the Shi‘ite population, which produced an enormous gap between its leaders and the population. That gap allowed the Zu‘ama to manipulate the Lebanese socio-political system in order to protect their own status and fortunes. We should nevertheless remember that despite the feuds between Zu‘ama, discussed at great length in this book, they represented the Shi‘ite sect in Lebanese politics, and therefore

CONCLUSIONS 119

had the ability to control the Shi‘ite share of the national multisectarian system. The decline of the Shi‘ite traditional power centers during the 1970s was rapid and all-encompassing, compared with that of other reli-gious communities, for the same reasons that led to their prominence in earlier years.

NOTE 1. For instance: Shanahan, p.  82; Harel Horav, “Power, Tradition and

Challenge: The Resilience of the Elite Shi‘ite Families of Lebanon”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies , Volume 40, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 305–323.

121© The Author(s) 2017O. Nir, Lebanese Shi‘ite Leadership, 1920–1970s, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-43014-0

ARCHIVES French: a. Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (Nantes): Mandat Syrie-Liban, 1918–1948. Beyrouth Consulat b. Archives Diplomatiques, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (Paris) : Syrie-Liban-Cilicie, 1918–1940. c. Centre de Hautes Etudes sur l’Afrique et l’Asie Modernes (CHEAM), Paris. British: a. Public Record Offi ce (London): Foreign Offi ce: FO 226 – Files of Beirut Legation and Spears Mission. Foreign Offi ce: FO 371  – General Political Correspondence and Eastern

Department. Foreign Offi ce: FO 484 – Confi dential Print – Lebanon. Foreign Offi ce: FO 1018 – Embassy & Consular Archives – Lebanon. British

Council: BW 86 – Registered Files, Lebanon. Foreign & Commonwealth Offi ce: FCO 17  – Near Eastern Department:

Registered Files. War Offi ce: WO 202 – British Military Missions and Military Headquarters

Papers.

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122 BIBLIOGRAPHY

b. St. Anthony’s College (Oxford), Meadle East Center. Private Papers: Spears Papers.

Israelis: a. Israeli State Archive (ISA): Foreign Offi ce fi les. b. Israeli Defence Forces Archive (IDFA) (Giv‘atayim): Northern Command and

Intelligence fi les.

NEWSPAPERS Dailies: al-Hayat (Beirut and London) Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem) al-Nahar (Beirut) al-Safi r (Beirut) Teleghraf (Beirut) Magazines: al-‘Irfan (monthly – Tyre and Beirut) al-Masira (weekly – Beirut) Monday Morning (weekly – Beirut) al-Nahar al-‘Arabi wal-Dawli (weekly – Paris and Zurich) al-Sayad (weekly – Beirut) al-Watan (weekly – Beirut) al-Watan al-‘Arabi (weekly – Paris)

SUMMARY OF RADIO BROADCAST FBIS-DR – Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report Radio Stations: Voice of Lebanon (the Phalanges station) Voice of Free Lebanon (military station of the Phalanges)

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Index1

1 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refers to notes.

A‘Abas family, 55and Arab Revival Association (Jam‘iyat

al-Nahda al-‘Arabiyya), 56execution, 66and Literary Club (al-Muntadab

al-Adabi) 56and the Movement of Tyre, 66

Abu al-Hassan family, 55Abu-Shahla, Habib, 80relations with Hamadeh, 81

as Speaker of Parliament, 80‘Akar region, 42, 82Al-Amiriya school, 91‘Alawites, 105, 106, 109, 114n20al-Fatat movement, 60, 75n97al-Hamidiya religious school, 68, 91al-Khiyam, 54, 55Amal, 11, 20, 23, 82, 84, 101, 104,

105, 111–13, 118American University of Beirut, 52, 57,

92Amin, Muhammad al-, 77n127, 108

Amin, Shuki al-, 109Ansar, 90Arab Rebellion of 1925-27, 46Arab Revival Association (Jam‘iyat

al-Nahda al-‘Arabiyya) 56Arab revolt in Palestine 1936-39, 41, 61Arslan, family, 19Arslan, Shakib, 91As‘ad, ‘Abdul al-Latif al, 17, 38, 66,

68, 77n127As‘ad, ‘Ali Bek al-, 4As‘ad, Ahmed al-, 9, 18–20, 22,

32n25, 36, 38–43, 45, 49, 50, 53, 58, 59, 66, 67, 80–2, 96, 101

As‘ad, Kamel al-, 17, 37, 48, 56, 66, 80–2, 96–7, 102, 104, 108, 110, 112, 113

and Fuad Shihab, 81–2, 96lifestyle, 97loss of status, 97, 101, 111–12rivalry with Musa al-Sadr, 102, 111as Speaker of Parliament, 80, 82, 84,

96, 99, 110–11

128 INDEX

As‘ad, Kamel Bey al-, 37, 38, 66relations with the French mandate, 37

As‘ad Family, 4, 5, 10, 17, 36–50, 65, 88, 97, 112, 115n37

‘Asabat (guerrilla attacks) 1919-20, 60

‘Ashura, 22, 23, 32n21, 91Association of Young Arabs (Jam‘iyat

al-‘Arabiya al-Fatat) 8Atasi, Hashem al-, 61

BBa‘albek, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 25, 36, 43,

45, 46, 56, 60–4, 68, 71n41, 107, 108, 115n23

Ba‘ath, 26Bader al-Din, ‘Abbas, 110Baghdadi, ‘Abd al-Karim al-, 54Bahrani, ‘Ali al-, 54Bashri, Salim al-, 48Baydun, Rashid, 58, 80Bazzi, ‘Ali, 96Beirut, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 21, 22, 37, 40,

41, 43, 49, 52, 57, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69n2, 72n55, 72n59, 75n98, 80, 87, 89–93, 96–101, 107, 109

Berri, Nabih, 82, 84, 112, 113, 116n44Bishara, 45, 53, 58British / Britain, 4, 27, 39–41, 49, 52,

53, 57, 61, 62, 67, 69n7, 70n31, 71n45, 72n52, 72n59, 75n98, 80

Bustani, Suleiman al-, 37

CCatroux, French High Commissioner,

39, 59Council of the South (Majlis

al-Janub) 111

DDa‘awa Party (the Islamic Call), 26Damascus, 2, 3, 7, 10, 35, 37, 40, 43,

49, 52, 57, 59–61, 63, 68n2, 88, 91, 106, 109, 111, 115n31

Dandash, family, 36, 45–7, 64Dandash, Hassan Ta‘an, 46Dandash, Mustafa Ta‘an, 46, 47, 64Democratic Party, 67, 77n132Dhaher, Suleiman, 50, 68, 88, 90–2Diniyeh, 42Druze, 11, 18, 19, 22, 40, 41, 91

EEgypt, 41, 48, 49, 61, 72n52, 75n93

FFadhel, Fadhel al-, 55, 66Fadlallah, Muhammad Hussein, 27–9,

32n23Faranjiyeh, Suleiman, 99Farhat, Zidat, 108

GGreek Catholic, 47Groups of the Imam (Jama‘at

al-Imam) 107

HHabish, Fuad, 92Hakim, Muhsin al-, 29, 102Hama, 7, 14n17Hamadeh, Sa‘adallah, 9, 19, 43Hamadeh, Sabri, 9, 19, 20, 36, 42–5,

47, 59, 63, 64, 80, 81, 96Harawi, Elias al-, 82Hasan, Ibrahim, 90Haydar, Dr. Muhammad, 63

INDEX 129

Haydar family, 58, 60, 62Haydar, Farid Bey, 63Haydar, Ibrahim, 36, 57–64

attitude to French Mandate, 62during the 1958 crisis, 62familial connections, 57, 59hashish smuggling, 62relations with Hashemites, 62

Haydar, Rustum, 8, 60assassination, 61

Haydar, Salim, 62Haydar, Subhi, 60, 61, 75n102Haydar, Tawfiq Hilu, 60, 61, 63Haydar, Yusuf Mehayber, 63Hidden Imam (al-Imam al-Mahdi)

school, 109Hilu, Charles, 81, 83, 98Hirmal, 8–10, 19, 36, 42, 43, 45, 47,

63, 64, 81Hizbullah, 20, 27, 82, 118Husseini, Ahmed al-, 80Husseini family, 8, 25, 80, 81, 84, 91,

97, 108, 111Husseini, Hussein al-, 84, 97, 111Husseini, Muhammad ‘Ali al-, 108Husseini, Muhammad Ibrahim al-, 91

IImam Ibn ‘Ali Hussein, 28Institut de Recherche et de Formation

en Développement (IRFED), 98, 101

Institutional Bloc Party (al-Kutla al-Dusturiya) 45

Iqta‘ 3–5Iran, 9, 10, 22–4, 26, 28, 33n27, 62,

89, 90, 101, 102, 106, 108, 113, 117, 118

‘Irfan, al-, 6, 13n1, 13n9, 32n23, 64, 70n27, 73n74, 77n121, 91, 92

Islamic Charitable Association (al-Jam‘iyya al-Khairiyya al-Islamiyya) 92

Islamic Ja‘afari Association for Charity (al-Jam‘iya al-Islamiya al-Khiriya al-Ja‘afariya) 109

Islamic revolution, 23, 26, 33n27, 90, 108, 117

JJa‘afari Mufti 23, 50, 55, 102, 103,

106, 118Ja‘afari School (al-Madrasa

al-Ja‘afariya) 50Jaber, Muhammad, 6, 50, 68, 88,

90–2Jazzar, Ahmed al-, 4, 7Jews, 41Jouvenel de, 20, 62Jumayil, Bashir al-, 84Junblatt family, 11, 18, 19Junblatt, Kamal, 18, 41

KKarami family, 10, 19, 50Karami, Rashid, 58, 68, 96Karbala, 22, 25, 26, 109, 110Kazem, Muhammad, 29, 108Khalil, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasem al-, 6,

56, 66Khalil, Hajj Isma‘il Yahya al-, 57Khalil, Kazem al-, 9, 36–8, 54–9, 80,

89, 112and Arab nationalism, 56attitude to French Mandate, 57and cattle scandal, 58and civil war of 1958, 58and coup attempt, 58exile from home, 59

130 INDEX

Khalil, Kazem al- (cont.)familial ties, 57and Nasserism, 59and National Liberal Party, 58as Speaker of Parliament, 80tension with Ahmed al-As‘ad, 58

Khalil, Yusuf al-, 57Khomeini, Ruhallah, 29, 90Khouri, Bishara al-, 45, 53, 58Khouri, Khalil al-, 45Khuii, Abu Qasem al, 29

LLabwu’, 61, 62Lebanese Communist Party, 104Lebanese question, 12–13, 38, 40, 43,

46Lebanese Resistance (al-Muqawama

al-Lubnaniyya) 59Lebanese Senate (Majlis al-Shuyukh)

62, 65Lebanese Strength Union (Itihad

al-Quwa al-Lubnani) 109Litani Operation (‘Amaliyat al-Litani)

110Literary Club (al-Muntadab al-Adabi)

56

MMa‘an family, 36Makki, Sayid Hussein, 68Mamluk period, 3Mansur, ‘Ali, 106Mardam, Jamil, 8, 60Marjadri, Hussein, 29Marj‘ayun, 37, 96, 97Maronite Christian, 11, 16, 79Modernization, 5, 11, 100Moruwa, Kamal, 114n9, 114n10,

114n11, 114n12Moruwa, Sheikh Hussein, 68

Mount Lebanon, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10–12, 31n3, 36, 42, 43, 63, 107, 112

Movement of Deprived, 11, 20, 104, 105

Movement of Deprived (Harakat al-Mahrumin) 20, 105

Movement of Tyre (Harakat Sur) 6, 37, 56, 66

Mughniya, Muhammad Jawad, 23, 27, 28, 32n23, 33n26, 88–90, 114n13

Mughniya, Sheikh Hasan, 57Muhammad ‘Ali, 36Munqir family, 3Mussawi family, 25

NNabatiyeh, 18, 22, 23, 25, 40, 50, 52,

54, 55, 64, 68, 90–2, 112Najaf, 25, 26, 29, 48, 50, 54, 89, 102,

109Naqash, Alfred, 39Nassef, Fares al-, 4Nasser, Gamal ‘Abd al-, 41Nasser, Sheikh Nasif al-, 4National Covenant, 59, 79National Parliamentary Unity

(al-Tajama‘ al-Watani al-Niyabi) 111

1958 crisis / civil war, 62, 73n731967 war against Israel, 26Nujaym, Bulus, 12Nur al-Din family, 55Nur al-Din, Sayyid Muhammad, 91

O‘Omar, Dhahir al-, 4, 36‘Osseyran, ‘Abdullah, 54‘Osseyran, ‘Adil, 18, 36, 38, 40, 51–4,

57–9, 62, 67, 80, 81, 89, 90, 96, 114n13

‘Osseyran, ‘Ali, 96, 118

INDEX 131

‘Osseyran, Dr. Sharif, 67‘Osseyran, Munir, 21, 24, 51‘Osseyran, Najib, 32n25, 51, 54, 55,

57, 67, 74n84‘Osseyran, Rashid, 67Ottoman rule, 3–5, 7, 8, 43, 52,

64, 95

PPalestine, 41, 49, 52, 55, 61Palestinian Liberation Organization

(PLO), 111, 115n31Palestinians, 59, 90, 93, 99Pasha, Ibrahim, 36Phalanges, 107, 114n18Popular Nasserite Organization

(al-Tanzim al-Sha‘abi al-Nasseri) 112–13

QQabalan, ‘Abd al-Amir, 23, 115n31,

118Qahtaniya (movement), 56Qom, 25, 29

RRhal, As‘ad Thiab, 91Rida, Ahmed, 6, 13n1, 50, 68, 88, 90,

91

SSa’ab Family, 3Sa‘ad, Mustafa, 112, 116n42Sadiq, ‘Abd al-Hassan, 50, 54–6Sadiq, ‘Abd al-Hussein, 22Sadiq Family, 25, 59, Sadiq, Muhammad Taqi al-, 36, 55, 56Sadr, Muhammad Baqir al-, 29

Sadr, Musa al-, 20, 24, 26, 27, 45, 84, 102–11, 113, 118

Safa, Asadallah, 68Safa, Mohammad Jaber al-, 74n81Saghir, ‘Ali al-, 3Salam family, 11, 19Salam, Sa’ib, 42, 99Salman, Talal, 88, 93Sarut, Sheikh Tawfiq al-, 68Sassoon, Eliyahu, 61SAVAK, (the Shah's intelligence

organization), 106Scientific Revival Association, 92Shah Muhammad Reza Pahalawi, 26,

102, 106–8Shakra, 22Shams al-Din, Muhammad Mahdi, 27,

29, 32n23, 108, 118Sham‘un, Kamil, 38, 44, 53, 58, 59Sharf al-Din, ‘Abd al-Hussein, 24, 36,

48–50, 66, 89, 102Sharf al-Din Family, 25, 32n25, 55,

59, 73n61, 73n62, 102Sharf al-Din, Ja‘afar, 108Sharf al-Din, Muhammad Rida, 49Shari‘atmadari, Muhammad Kathem,

108Sharuki, Ja‘afar al-, 54Shihab, Bashir, 7Shihab, Fuad, 81, 82, 96, 98Shihabi, Emir Yusuf al-, 42Shihabism, 98, 100Shirazi, Hassan Mahdi, 108Shmistar, 93Sidon, 2–7, 10, 14n22, 18, 40, 49,

51, 52, 55–7, 59, 65–7, 92Slim, Muhsin, 109Southern Suburb (al-Dhahiya

al-Janubiya) 11South Lebanon Army (SLA), 112Spears, Eduard, 69n12Suez crisis, 41

132 INDEX

Sulh family, 50Sulh, Rida al-, 5, 6, 37, 48, 56, 57Sulh, Sami al-, 58, 62Supreme Shi‘ite Islamic Council

(al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shi‘i al-A‘ala)

Syria, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 21, 37, 41, 46, 47, 49, 51, 52, 56, 58, 60, 62, 63, 88, 96, 105, 108, 109, 111

Syrian Nationalist Party, 58

TTah, Yasin, 54Ta’if Accord, 54, 82Tanzimat (Ottoman reforms), 60Taybe, 10, 17, 36–8, 54Trablisi, Sayyid Mustafa al-‘Akari,

91Tripoli, 2, 7, 10, 25, 50, 106, 110Tyre, 2, 5, 6, 10, 19, 24, 25, 36,

37, 49, 50, 52, 56–9, 64, 66, 68, 89, 102, 103, 112

UUnited Arab Republic (UAR), 41, 53,

62UN Security Council, 62urbanization, 16, 97–100

WWest Africa, 97, 100Will of the People (Iradat al-Sha‘ab)

112

YYa‘aqub, Muhammad, 110Yafi, ‘Abdallah Al-, 40, 96Yahfufi, Suleiman al-, 107, 109Young Turk, 36, 48, 91

ZZahle, 8, 61, 63Zaytar tribe, 64Zein, ‘Abdulatif al-, 118Zein, ‘Ali al-, 13n1, 64Zein, ‘Aref al-, 6, 64, 68

and al-‘Irfan 64Zein, Hussein al-, 65Zein, Sheikh Ahmad ‘Aref al-, 68Zein, Sheikh Rida al-, 68Zein, Suleiman al-, 68Zein, Yusuf al-, 9, 18, 19, 55, 57,

64–8animosity towards, 66attitude to French Mandate, 65French attitude to, 67and ‘Osseyran, 67relations with al-As‘ad, 77n127relations with ‘Ulama, 68