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Chapter 6: Financing and Reimbursement Methods Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH

Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

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Page 1: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Chapter 6: Financing and Reimbursement Methods

Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH

Page 2: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Learning Objectives

Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard.

Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare.

Describe at least one reimbursement strategy used in insurance.

Describe at least three efforts to increase health insurance coverage for children by way of public insurance.

At the end of this lecture, student should be able to:

Page 3: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Effects of Health Care Financing and Insurance

Insurance: its nature and purpose

Page 4: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

What is the Moral Hazard in the U.S. Health Care System?

Financing Insurance

Health Care Expenditur

es

Payment to providers

Access to services

Moral hazard! Provider-induced demand!

From Figure 6.1 (page 131).

Who finances?

Taxpayer

s?

Page 5: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Health Care Financing and Its Effects

From Exhibit 6.1 (page 131).

Moral hazard!

Payments to

Providers

Provider-induced DemandFinancing of health

insurance (public/private) enables access

Technology/svcs with liberal

reimbursement policies

proliferate!

Total health care expenditures are

greater than if the same services

were to be paid by the patients!

Page 6: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Basic Insurance Concepts

Risk: Substantial financial loss from some event.

Insured/Enrollee/Beneficiary: A person protected against this risk.

Underwriting: The science behind risk. Premium: Amount charged each month

for insurance coverage (can be paid by employer, insured, government, etc.)

Cost-sharing: Ways the insured has to pay for the insurance (deductible, premium, copayment [$]/ coinsurance[%], but have stop-loss provisions)

Page 7: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

4 Principles Underlying Insurance

Risk is unpredictable for the individual insured.

Risk can be predicted with a reasonable degree of accuracy for a group or population.

Insurance provides a mechanism for transferring or shifting risk from the individual to the group through the pooling of resources.

Actual losses are shared on some equitable basis by all members of the insured group.

Isn’t an entire country one of the biggest groups you can have?

Page 8: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Will these changes work?

Affordable Care Act Individuals required to have insurance or pay

tax penalties Employers of >50 employees must offer

insurance or pay “free rider” tax Medicaid expanded to cover very poor, and

subsidize less poor States mandated to set up insurance

exchanges so individuals can afford insurance Sliding-scale tax credit allowed for businesses

<25 employees Illegal to deny benefits to those with pre-

existing conditionsFrom page 147.

Page 9: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Private Insurance

Page 10: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Private Health Insurance

“Voluntary health insurance” – not mandatory Mostly employer-based (through workplace) Many different health plan providers: commercial

insurance companies (Aetna, Met Life, Prudential), non-profit BC/BS, self-insured, MCOs

Self vs. family plans (different from public insurance, where each is own beneficiary)

79% of workers eligible, but only 65% take coverage Reasons not to 1) already under spouse’s coverage, 2)

low wage, 3) young age Cost of employer-based insurance varies widely

from workplace to workplace

Page 11: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Employer Characteristics Associated with Health

Insurance Rates

• Small employers• Greater number of low wage

earners• More part-time workers• Unionized employers• Higher proportion of older

workers

• Large employers• Greater number of high wage

earners• More full-time workers• Nonunionized employers• Higher proportion of younger

workers

From Exhibit 6.2 (page 136).

Page 12: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Five Types of Private Insurance

Self-insuran

ceIndividu

al Private Insuran

ce

HDHP

Managed Care Plans

Group Insuran

ce

Page 13: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Types of Private Insurance

• Obtained through emp., union, professional org.

• “Major medical plan” - catastrophic

Group Insurance

• Employer large enough to offer its own insurance

• Employer pays employee’s health claims

Self-insurance

• Farmers, early retirees, self-employed

• High risk people not eligible

Individual Private

Insurance

• High deductible, but can save in HSA or use HRA and save money

High-deductible

Health Plans

Page 14: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Managed Care Plans In 2011, 90% of employer-based health

plans were managed care plans. 17% of employer-based coverage was through

HDHP By contrast, 5% of Americans covered under

Individual Private Insurance (most likely not working)

We know about MCOs Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and

preferred provider organizations (PPOs) Contract with network of providers,

reimbursement, monitor utilization

Page 15: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Public InsuranceMedicare, Medicaid, CHIP

Page 16: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Major Public Health Insurance Programs

“Public insurance” is insurance funded by the government where services are purchased from the private sector (for the most part) – exception is VA

Public financing supports “categorical programs” (through which people are put on public insurance) Persons in the “category” get the insurance

(e.g., Age 65+ get Medicare) No program specifically for unemployed

Page 17: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP

Medicare

Medic-aid

CHIP

Seniors/ disabled

Indigent

Low-income Children

Page 18: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Public vs. Private Insurance

35%

29%

5%

26%

5%

2010 Census Insurance Distribution

Private Insurance through EmployerPrivate Insurance not through EmployerMedicaidOther Public In-suranceUnknown

From page 138.

Page 19: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

MedicareTitle 18 of the Social Security

Act

Page 20: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Medicare 1966-1997

• Supple-mental Med. Ins. (SMI)

• Fee-for-service structure

• Hospital insurance

• Out-of-pocket costs to benefi-ciaries? Drug

Cover-age?

Part A

Part B

Cost-contai

n-ment?

Page 21: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Medicare Part A Hospital insurance – financed by “Medicare Tax” Pays for hospitalization, rehab in Skilled Nursing

Facility (SNF), home health care, and for terminally ill, hospice.

Rules are complicated “Benefit period” – period of time after initial

admission that the patient will get benefits for that admission

Hospital benefit period – after 60 days, patient pays copayment of $289 per day (2012).

Medicare must certify agencies providing the services (e.g. home health care)

Page 22: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Medicare Part A Expenditures – 2008 Estimates

56%

10%

3%5%

21%

5%

% of Expenditures (total expenditures = $235.6 billion)

HospitalSNFHome HealthHospiceManaged CareAdmin

From Figure 6.2, Page 141.

Page 23: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Medicare Part B Supplementary medical insurance (SMI) – also known

as Medigap insurance – covers the “gap” between hospitalization and necessary outpatient services

Medicare Part A recipients can opt into B, and usually do, because there is little competing in the price range

“Supplementary” to A: Covers following services: physician, ambulance, outpatient rehab, some preventive services, but mainly outpatient hospital services (outpatient surgery, diagnostics, etc.)

Why do you think Part A and Part B go together? Do you think the importance of Part B has grown over the years? Why?

Page 24: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Medicare <2003/2006

• Supple-mental Medical Insurance (SMI)

• Medicare Advantage

• Hospital insurance

• Out-of-pocket costs to benefi-ciaries? Drug

Cover-age?

Part A

Part BPart C

Page 25: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

1997 – Medicare Part C Not really a “program” that covers any particular

services Response to calls for “privatization” for

governmental services in the ‘90s Mandated by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 Basically, patient could choose old-fashioned

Medicare, or Medicare+Choice Old-fashioned: Medicare-approved facilities, fee-for-

service Medicare+Choice: Choose an HMO or PPO plan (MCO)

2003 – now Medicare+Choice called MMA, revamped to keep MCO’s from withdrawing, other issues

Page 26: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Medicare Today

• Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMI)

• Medicare Advantage

• Hospital insurance

• Prescription drug coverage

Part D

Part A

Part B

Part C

Page 27: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

2003-2006 – Medicare Part D

Even with Part C coming on board in 1997, drugs still an issue – one that could be handled with MCO

Part D added in 2003 and implemented in 2006 Created two types of private plans:

PDPs – offers only drug coverage, and only available to old-fashioned fee-for-service Medicare

MA-PDs – When signing up for Part C, this comes as part D, and the patient gets drugs through MMA

Take-home message All the pressures are toward new Medicare enrollees

signing up for Part C to get their Parts A, B, C, and D dealt with all through an MCO

Why?

Page 28: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Medicare Part C upgrade in 2003TRADITIONAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE (NOT MMA) Good if you dislike

choosing Enroll in A and B, but

avoid C Even B is a difficult

choice, because many Medigap plans

Also, can opt out of B and choose private Medigap plan

Have to enroll in Part D separately, have the PDP plan – less choice

PART C - MMA Like

traditional, have to choose Medigap

Then have to choose among MCO plans on list for patient’s area

Enroll in D, have to choose from MA-PDs

I want to know which of these

will save me the most money!

Page 29: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

How Medicare Part D Works

Deductible Initial Coverage

Gap or “doughnut

hole”

Catastrophic

Coverage

• For drug costs up to $320 in the year

• Beneficiary pays 100%

• For drug costs $321 - $2,930 in the year

• Medicare pays 75% (up to $1,957.50)

• Beneficiary pays up to $652.50 (25%)

• For drug costs 2,931-$6,657.50 in the year

• Beneficiary pays 100% up to $3,727.50 (up to 50% discount on drugs)

• For drug costs over $6,657.50 in the year

• Beneficiary pays about 5%

• Medicare pays 95%

From Table 6.1 on page 144

How does this work for the beneficiary?

How does this work for the

drug companies?

Page 30: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

MedicaidU.S. Public Health Insurance

Program for the Indigent

Page 31: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Medicaid Recipient Categories, 2008

48%

22%

15%

7%8%

Total beneficiaries = 58.2 million

Children <21Adults/Fam. With Dep. Child.Blind/DisabledElderOther

From Figure 6.3 on page 145.

Page 32: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

More on Medicaid Title 19 of the Social Security Act Each state has its own eligibility criteria (e.g. for

being indigent – finances, etc.) Federal law requires coverage for low-income elders,

blind, disabled (receiving SSI), some pregnant women. Lots of coverage to children in low-income families. Most states defined other “medically needy”

categories and support them (populations in institutions, those getting outpatient services so they don’t have to live in institutions, etc.)

Dramatic variations state to state. Wealthier states have smaller share of cost reimbursed by federal government.

Page 33: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Select Federally Mandated Services for State Medicaid

Programs

Nursing facility svcs. for age 21+

Home health svcs. for those who qualify for above

Certified ped. and family NP svcs. (state-licensed)

Nurse mid-wife services

From Table 6.2 on page 146

Role for nursing?

Page 34: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Select Federally Mandated Services for State Medicaid

Programs

Inpatient hospital services

Outpatient hospital services

Rural health clinic services

Outpatient laboratory and x-ray services

From Table 6.2 on page 146

Page 35: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Children’s Health Insurance Program

CHIP

Page 36: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

CHIP Title 21 of the Social Security Act

Enacted under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 Originally for 10 years, now even Affordable Care

Act (ACA) extended through 2015 At the time, about 25% of low-income kids

uninsured Federal matching dollars to states who expanded

Medicaid to cover kids (<19), certain adults (pregnant women, parents/caretakers) Can set up non-Medicaid program, or a hybrid of the

two, as well, and get the match December 2010 – 5.2 million kids enrolled in CHIP

Page 37: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Reimbursement Methods

Page 38: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Fee-for-service and Package Pricing

Fee-for-service Just do the service, and charge by the unit. If

the child falls out of the tree, charge for x-ray, cast, etc.

Common before 1990s. Some cases, insurance limited reimbursement and beneficiary had to pay balance.

Main problem with fee-for service – providers induce demand = non-essential care.

Package pricing or “bundled charges” May figure out, on average, how much a

bundle of charges would be (e.g., vaginal delivery services).

Package deal at optometrist: eye exam + glasses

Page 39: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Procedure-based Reimbursement

1989 – Medicare invents the “resource-based relative value scale” (RBRVS) Complex reimbursement formula involving

time, skill, and intensity it takes to perform a service

Procedure code classification – CPT code Medicare publishes yearly fee schedule for

reimbursement by CPT code based on RBRVS of the CPT

Non-public insurances follow suit

Page 40: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Reimbursement Under Managed Care

MCOs

HMOs

HMO salaries its own

providers

Capitation

PPOsProviders

paid on FFS fee schedule

Page 41: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Retrospective and Prospective Reimbursement

RETROSPECTIVE <1983 for hospitals,

<1997 for hosp. outpt./SNFs, home health, rehab

“per diem” rates – overnight stays

Per diem rates set by calculating previous year’s actual cost at facility for services

Facilities could increase their rates by increasing their costs – “perverse”

PROSPECTIVE More recent – part of

budget-cutting/cost containment

Pre-established criteria used to determine amount of reimbursement in advance

Prospective reimbursement methods: DRGs, APCs, RUGs, HHRGs

Page 42: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Prospective Reimbursement Strategies

DRGs APCs

RUGs HHRGs

• Dx-related groups - inpt

• N=500• Fixed

price, but based on factors (rural)

• Like DRGs, but for ambulatory

• N=300• Also fixed

price based on factors

• Similar, but for SNFs

• N=66• Classifies

patient character-istics “case mix”

• Similar, but for home health

• N=153• Uses

OASIS calculation

Page 43: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

National Health Expenditures

Page 44: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

National Health Expenditures, Selected Years

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 20100.0

500.0

1,000.0

1,500.0

2,000.0

2,500.0

3,000.0

Amount ($Billions)

From Table 6.4 on page 153.

Page 45: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

National Health Expenditures, Selected Years

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 20100

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

Amount $ per Capita

From Table 6.4 on page 153.

Page 46: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

National Health Expenditures, Selected Years

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 201002468

101214161820

% of GDP

From Table 6.4 on page 153.

Page 47: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Breakdown of National Health Expenditures, 2010

31%

27%

13%

13%

7%3%

6%

National Health Expenditures = $2,593.6 billion

Hospital

Phys/Prof Svcs

Nurs Hm/Hm Hlth/Pers Care

Drugs/Med Prod

Admin

Pub Hlth

Rsch/Struct/Equip

From Figure 6.4 on page 154.

Page 48: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Conclusion Although there are different insurance

structures, most are now using MCOs Although there are different ways to get

insurance, those on private insurance usually get it through an employer

A lot of people are on public insurance, mostly seniors (Medicare) and children (Medicaid, CHIP)

Public insurance mostly uses MCOs to contain costs

Nevertheless, public or private, insurance and health care cost is going up in the U.S.

Page 49: Lecturer: Monika M. Wahi, MPH, CPH. Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard. Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare. Describe

Learning Objectives

Explain why provider-induced demand is a moral hazard.

Name and describe at least one of the parts of Medicare.

Describe at least one reimbursement strategy used in insurance.

Describe at least three efforts to increase health insurance coverage for children by way of public insurance.

At the end of this lecture, student should be able to: