MAKING CLIMATE HOT

“… apart from when there is suffer-ing from unexpected heat or cold,flood or drought, it is always hardto give climate change the appro-priate urgency.”

—Sir Crispin Tickell2

Just as Sir Crispin Tickell, cli-mate change expert and chancellorof the University of Kent, Canter-bury, predicted, climate changerecently had a brief “revival” in themainstream press as Hurricane Ivanwas working its way toward astorm-ridden Florida in mid-September 2004 (see the illustra-tion on page 34). Yet, looking atU.S. public opinion more generally,it is safe to say that climate changedoes not register as an urgent con-cern. Despite plenty of weather-related suffering, Americans areotherwise preoccupied.

This is not to say that the U.S.public does not care or is blindlyand unknowingly tumbling towardthe future. Surveys suggest that thepublic now generally knows that cli-mate change is real, and vast num-bers are concerned enough to sup-port action.3 Numerous writers havedescribed climate change as one ofhumanity’s greatest challenges.4

Since 1990, the overall conclusionsby the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC) havegrown more confident about ourscientific understanding of theproblem. IPCC assessments areincreasingly urgent in conveyingthe immense magnitude of potentialimpacts and emissions reductionsneeded if these consequences are tobe avoided.5 Other scientists haveissued highly publicized warningsand increasingly speak out in public

MAKING CLIMATE

HOTCOMMUNICATING

THE URGENCY

AND CHALLENGE

OF GLOBAL

CLIMATE CHANGE b y S u s a n n e C . M o s e r a n d L i s a D i l l i n g

©JA

MI

JEN

NIN

GS

—IM

AG

ES

.CO

M

UR•GENT—from the

Latin word urgens, present

participle of urgere, to

press hard; compelling;

of pressing importance;

a request forcefully and

earnestly made; requiring

prompt attention or action;

a matter taking precedence

over others.1

BEYOND

KYOTO

This article was published in the December 2004 issue of Environment, volume 46,no. 10, pages 32–46. ©2004, Heldref Publications. www.heldref.org/env.php. Thisarticle was part of a special “Beyond Kyoto” issue. For copies of the entire specialissue, e-mail Customer Service at [email protected].

34 ENVIRONMENT DECEMBER 2004

forums about the need for action.6 Thereare even some encouraging, smallbeginnings in various sectors of civicsociety, among industry actors, in U.S.local and state governments, and—lately—in Congress.7

But have those communicating cli-mate change to the public and to deci-sionmakers set in motion a sufficientlystrong momentum that policy and socialchanges will now take their due course?Without denying the criticality ofnumerous other problems (such aspoverty reduction and the AIDS pan-demic), there is arguably an insufficientsense of urgency about climate change.Three major factors have kept the issueon the back burner: the enormous timelags in the climate and our social sys-tems, the fact that climate change hasremained largely hidden so far fromdeveloped countries and the powerelites within them, and the overshadow-ing of global warming by other prob-lems. Meanwhile, the gulf between theactions needed and the actions takenwidens below the radar of public orpolitical awareness.

The public to date has paid relative-ly little attention to climate change,

and those trying to create a greatersense of urgency have used someunsuccessful strategies. However,alternatives to improve the communi-cation of this global problem do exist.Rather than advocating a particular

course of action to mitigate or adapt toclimate change, the focus here is onhow to increase public understandingof, and civic engagement with, theissue. More effective communicationof climate change’s urgency—whichderives from the uncertainty in poten-tial climatic changes and the signifi-cant risks involved in some of them—can help bring about this highly de-sirable engagement.

The Roots of Inattention and Inaction

In attempting to engage the U.S. pub-lic in a national dialogue on climatechange, the scientific community hasencountered many hurdles that have yetto be surmounted. The most importantof these include the creeping nature ofclimate change, its complexity anduncertainty, system lags, human percep-

tion limits, and communication failureson the part of scientists.

The Creeping Nature of Climate Change

Global warming is a “creeping”environmental problem.8 Such haz-ards are long-term and slow-onset,cumulative processes that ultimatelycan result in crises or disasters. Theday-to-day changes one might noticeare small, if noticeable at all. Overtime, these small incremental changesadd up to major problems, as in thecase of the ecological disaster in theAral Sea basin.9 Creeping environ-mental problems are particularly diffi-cult to prevent or remedy, as the verynature of the problem combined withthe nature of human behavior andsocietal decisionmaking work againstearly detection and action. Oncecreeping environmental problems areidentified and determined to be seri-ous enough to act upon, it may be toolate to reverse the damage.

Complexity and Uncertainty

The nature of climate change as ahighly complex and global elusive haz-ard makes it difficult to pinpoint,understand, and manage—much lessexplain succinctly.10 Scientists are onlygradually unraveling these complexi-ties; thus, scientific certainty hasgrown only incrementally. The com-plexities and any unknowns therein, ofcourse, are of greatest interest to scien-tists. Whether driven purely by curios-ity, instrumental reasons, or a desire toprotect themselves against attack frompeers or adversaries, scientists fre-quently emphasize the complexitiesand uncertainties in academic and pub-lic communications.11

For lay people, however, these com-plexities are hard to comprehend andmostly uninteresting or esoteric. Toreduce the complexity of this problemto a digestible size, listeners followtypical human learning patterns: Theytry to understand global warming

Hurricane Ivan—the ninth-named tropical storm of the 2004 hurricane season—spawneda brief resurgence of interest in global warming.

through preexisting, simplifying men-tal models. Typically, these models donot adequately capture the complexrelationships between causes andimpacts of and solutions for climatechange. Important for communicatorsto understand, however, is that in theabsence of an adequate mental model,lay listeners will make up or seek theirown framework to help them makesense of the issue.

System Lags and Lack of Immediacy

The time lags between release of theemissions of heat-trapping gases andsubsequent impacts on the climatemean that the connection betweenactions today and their effects on theclimate is difficult to perceive (see Fig-ure 1 below). Carbon dioxide in theatmosphere today has accumulated overcenturies, with only a fraction beingreabsorbed by oceans and land duringthat time.12 The warming we already

experience and will witness in our life-times is therefore a result of fossil-fueluse over the past few centuries. Futuregenerations will experience evengreater impacts as a result of our andpast generations’ emissions. Moreover,there is inertia in our social systems(for example, population dynamics,technology development and marketpenetration, the “stickiness” of politi-cal and other institutions, and culturalbeliefs and values). While inertia lendsnecessary stability to a system, thesetime lags can become impediments tocreating change that would allow us toprevent a creeping environmental prob-lem from becoming a crisis.13 Thus,societies and ecosystems may be com-mitted to damaging levels of climatechange before the issue ever becomesan immediate, daily experience andstimulant of action.14

In addition to the temporal distancebetween cause and effect, there is also ageographic separation. At present, peo-

ple who live in the major source regionsfor emissions are geographically sepa-rated from people who live in regionsthat are already experiencing or areexpected to face the most severeimpacts from global warming.15 Thisgeographic mismatch is aggravated by apolitical-economic separation in spacebetween relatively unaffected decision-makers with substantial power andthose most negatively affected by cli-mate change and decisions made else-where.16 This is a classic problem ofinequities in the distribution of benefitsand costs well identified in the environ-mental justice literature and may helpexplain why the global warming prob-lem lacks immediacy to some of theworld’s most powerful policymakers.17

Finally, there is a disparity in themagnitude of the cause and that of thepotential effect. Any one of us is only asmall contributor to a problem that isnow taking on global proportions.Many have yet to believe that humans

VOLUME 46 NUMBER 10 ENVIRONMENT 35

12

10

8

6

4

2

02000 2100 2200 2300

900

800

700

600

500

400

3002000 2100 2200 2300

4

3

2

1

02000 2100 2200 2300

CO2 emissions (billion tons of carbon per year) CO2 concentration (parts per million) Temperature (˚C)

Constant CO2 emissions at year 2000 levelEmissions path to stabilize CO2 concentration at 550 parts per million

Figure 1. The challenge of stabilizing emissions versus concentrations of CO2

NOTE: The figure illustrates the implications of the long residence time of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere for potential emissions reduction scenarios. Instantly stabilizing annual emissions at 2000 levels (red line) would still result in steep increases inatmospheric carbon concentrations and global average temperatures rising for hundreds of years. On the other hand, radical reductions in annual emissions over the next 50 years would be required if we aimed to stabilize CO2 concentrations (blue line). Theresulting temperature increase would be steep over the twenty-first century but would then level off. In either case, CO2 concentrationswould reach levels far higher than at present or at any time over the last 740,000 years. (See L. Augustin et al., “Eight Glacial Cyclesfrom an Antarctic Ice Core,” Nature, 10 June 2004, 62328.)

SOURCE: Global Change Research Information Office, Figure 5.3, in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third AssessmentReport: Synthesis Report (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).


have the power to affect a system asbig as the globe. Even when lay peopleaccept human causation, they canmaintain a perception that their indi-vidual actions do not matter—a typicalcommons problem.18

Human Perception Limits and Priorities

For good evolutionary reason, mosthumans have a limited attention span todevote to nonimmediate problems.19

Combined with the difficult character ofclimate change, it is no surprise thatglobal warming does not rank highly onmost individuals’ lists of concerns.20

While more than 90 percent of Ameri-cans have now heard of global warmingand believe it is an important issue, amuch smaller percentage is actually per-sonally concerned about it.21 Globalwarming does not even fall within thetop 10 priority issues when comparedwith employment, the economy, crime,and other such concerns.22 For manypeople, global warming falls into thecategory of environmental issues, thusautomatically assuming a lower priorityrelative to more immediate socioeco-nomic problems.23

Classic time management literaturealso tells us that humans spend most oftheir time on issues or demands per-ceived as urgent, such as responding totelephone calls or e-mail, whether theyare important or not.24 The same litera-ture would advise more time be spent onimportant tasks, especially those that areurgently important. Inattention to globalwarming can thus be seen as yet anotherexample of this classic time manage-ment problem.

Communication Failures

It may be too simplistic to attributethe lack of urgency merely to the natureof the climate problem and that ofhuman beings. Those of us communicat-ing the issue to the public and to policy-makers have not done so as effectivelyas we might have wished. An importanthurdle, of course, is the media, which

tends to portray the climate change issueas one of large uncertainty, filled withcompeting claims and intense debatewithin the scientific community.25 Thecommon practice of giving equal time tounequal sides is highly misleading.26

“Balancing” the scientific consensuswith the voices of a comparatively tinynumber of contrarians overstates theactual degree of disagreement. This rein-forces the public’s perception of uncer-tainty and adds to confusion.

We have also failed to create a solidpublic understanding of the causes ofanthropogenic climate change andhence of the potential solutions.27

Without such an understanding, indi-viduals are left with overwhelming,frightening images of potentially disas-trous impacts, no clear sense of how toavert this potentially dark future, andtherefore no way to direct urgencytoward remedial action.

As mentioned above, people try toabsorb new information through preex-isting frames of reference. Frames arecognitive tools to order information.They intimately affect people’s under-standing, perceptions, and reactions toinformation.28 For example, if climatechange is reported on TV accompaniedby images of weather disasters, the“weather” frame may be triggered. Onthe coattails of the common conflation ofweather with climate, climate changebecomes synonymous with—and erro-neously restricted to—a change in theweather. Moreover, weather and disas-ters are generally understood as naturalphenomena not controlled by humansbut instead as “acts of God.” This framesuggests that climate change can neitherbe caused nor solved by humans.29 Thisexample illustrates the paramount impor-tance of choosing metaphors and othercues carefully (see the box on page 37).Failing to do so leaves the audience withinappropriate mental models to makesense of new information, understandcausal mechanisms, and identify relevantsolutions. Consequently, the issue caneasily be dismissed as non-urgent.

Finally, climate change has not andwill not be communicated to the public

Many have yet tobelieve that humans

have the power to affect a system

as big as the globe.

by a single or uniform voice. There arewell-organized groups with advocacyagendas for and against taking action onclimate change, which successfullypolarize the debate30 (see the box onpage 38). The result of such partisan andpolarized debate is that the mainstreamAmerican public gets turned off—notjust from the debate but from the issueand its urgency itself.31

In sum, the American public does notperceive global warming as urgent. Themajority does not yet accept globalwarming as an issue that must be takenon as a priority alongside terrorism andcrime, escalating health care costs, adecaying education system, and so on.The perception of global warming is thatit is uncertain, controversial, far off inthe future, and out of the public’s hands.Against this discouraging state ofaffairs, what possibilities exist for mov-ing this issue to the “front burner”?

Playing with Fire: Fear, Guilt,and Other Threats asMotivators

“If a red light blinks on in a cockpit,should the pilot ignore it until it speaksin an unexcited tone? . . . Is there anyway to say [it] sweetly? Patiently? Ifone did, would anyone pay attention?”

—Donella Meadows32

The conundrum so well expressedby the late Donella Meadows in one ofher biweekly Global Citizen columnsis one that concerned scientists andother communicators face daily. If sci-entific findings about serious environ-mental risks presented “sweetly andpatiently” (not to speak of their dense,obscure, and jargon-heavy technicalcousins) cannot capture public or polit-ical audiences, then what can? Whatwould move someone to act?

There seems to be an increasingimpulse among many to make globalwarming more scary and thereby moresalient.33 Senior scientists and editors offlagship science journals deplore theinattention given to climate change, stepoutside familiar roles to pen editorials inmainstream magazines and newspapers,and on and off the record suggest that “auseful catastrophe or two” and otherfear-provoking measures (such as terroralert systems for the state of the climate)are needed to motivate adequate policyresponse.34 Similarly, policy advisorsand politicians compare the seriousnessof climate change to that of currentlymore resonant fears, such as weapons ofmass destruction, terrorism, and war.35

But can such appeals to fear generate asustained and constructive engagementwith the issue of climate change?

The answer is usually not:36 From anevolutionary perspective, the three most


Since the U.S. Pentagon released its 2003commissioned report on low-probability,high-consequence climate events and themovie The Day After Tomorrow beganmaking headlines earlier this year, abruptclimate change has become a salient facetof public discussions about global warm-ing.1 This hard-to-perceive, abstract prob-lem seems to have finally acquired anewsworthy, attention-grabbing “per-sona”—fast, dramatic, potentially visible,and clearly more dangerous than “slow”climate change. To explain it, someexperts on abrupt climate change speakabout the climate having a “switch,”which—when pushed hard enough—getsflipped and causes the entire climate sys-tem to suddenly shift into a new state ofequilibrium.2 Compared to the moregradual climate changes over centuries,this abrupt shift occurs over the course ofonly years to decades.3

The switch metaphor immediatelycaught on in the press due to its simple,commonplace, and mechanistic connota-tions. Whether unconsciously or purpose-fully chosen, however, it might backfire:

If the climate has a switch that can beflipped one way, it could also be flippedback again. It is then not a far reach forthe public to conclude that climatechange may be reversible on relevanttimescales. People might assume, “Withbetter scientific understanding, expertsmight figure out how to manipulate thatswitch while the rest of us don’t have toworry about reducing emissions.” Reso-nant with the deeply held, Western cul-tural beliefs about controlling nature andalready-circulating geoengineeringschemes, abrupt change scientists havegiven the public a simplifying frame thatmakes a difficult phenomenon under-standable and controls its fears about thisunpredictable possibility. It fails, howev-er, to challenge most people’s simplisticcause-and-effect notions of complex sys-tem changes, to educate properly, and tomotivate people to take action.4 Quite tothe contrary, the “switch” may well allowlisteners to switch off their attention andany sense of urgency that the specter andspectacle of abrupt climate changebriefly evoked.

1. A. A. Leiserowitz, “Before and After The DayAfter Tomorrow: A U.S. Study of Climate ChangeRisk Perception, Environment, November 2004,22–39; P. Schwartz and D. Randall, An Abrupt Cli-mate Change Scenario and Its Implications for Unit-ed States National Security, report prepared for thePentagon, 2003, http://oco.jpl.nasa.gov/pubs/Abrupt_Climate_Change_Scenario.pdf (accessed 31August 2004), and http://www.grist.org/pdf/AbruptClimateChange2003.pdf (accessed 13 October 2004).

2. Two recent examples include an hour-longshow entitled “Climate of Uncertainty,” broadcast by American Radio Works on 17 August 2004,http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/climate/index.html (accessed 18 August 2004); and a special feature by The Weather Channel on the evening before The Day After Tomorrow wasreleased in U.S. cinemas.

3. National Research Council Ocean StudiesBoard, Polar Research Board, and Board on Atmos-pheric Sciences and Climate, Abrupt ClimateChange: Inevitable Surprises (Washington, DC:National Academy Press, 2002).

4. R. J. Bord, R. E. O’Connor, and A. Fisher,“In What Sense Does the Public Need to UnderstandGlobal Climate Change?” Public Understanding ofScience 9 (2000): 205–18; and J. D. Sterman and L.B. Sweeney, “Cloudy Skies: Assessing PublicUnderstanding of Global Warming,” System Dynam-ics Review 18 (2002), http://web.mit.edu/jsterman/www/cloudy_skies.html (accessed 24 September2003).

FLIPPING THE “SWITCH” ON ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE:THE DANGERS OF A TEMPTING METAPHOR


common responses to danger (associat-ed with a healthy internal experience offear and/or pain) are fight, flight, orfreeze. The psychological function ofthese responses is to control either the

external danger or the internal fear.These responses prove useful adapta-tions if they increase one’s ability tocope with the dangerous situation andultimately if they ensure personal and

species survival. To the extent that thesereactions only control the fear or painwithout reducing the danger, psycholo-gists consider these responses maladap-tive.37 The goal of effective risk commu-

UNDERMINING URGENCY:DEALING MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH ALARMISTS AND CONTRARIANS

Since climate change first entered publicand media consciousness in the late 1980s,the voices of the extreme have been part ofthe mix. Against a backdrop of significantscientific uncertainty, alarmists could stakeout a catastrophic future, while “climateskeptics” could deny or downplay theproblem. The resulting polarization under-mined attempts at getting across a messageof urgency founded on scientific under-standing and precaution. The tactics ofboth extreme camps have been widelydescribed and examined.1 Each side canfind plenty of “ammunition” in the so-called scientific facts. Meanwhile, the pub-lic is more confused than ever, and a grow-ing problem remains unaddressed.

While mainstream science today comesdown far closer on the side of those ring-ing the alarm bells, it also contributes toand suffers from this polarized situation:2

The problem is less the politicization ofscience as it is the “scientization of poli-tics.”3 Clear value conflicts, better overtlyaddressed as such, are instead carried outbehind the cover of scientific fact anduncertainty.4 Scientists—many with littleskill or training in speaking to publicaudiences, the media, or policymakers; anotorious lack of strategic sensibility; andan almost naive belief in the notion thatthe disagreements at hand could beresolved through rational exchange amongreasonable people—try to tame alarmistson the one hand and constructively engagewith contrarians on the other, only to giveboth undue attention and public standing.Science clearly provides an important ser-vice in setting the record straight and dis-proving false claims, yet it can do more,and better.

First, becoming intimately familiar withcontrarian/alarmist tactics will help to rec-ognize them more rapidly. Rather than justrefuting the substance of false claims,exposing those strategies to the publicmay also be effective. It would help dilutethe tactic’s power and educate audiences

about them. The audience and media stillget “entertainment value” out of theexchange, but the voice of reason will ringmore true.

Moreover, the value of science is fargreater for solving problems than armingvalue conflicts. Instead of engaging insuch covert conflicts, exposing them asvalue conflicts and forcing extremists tolay their values openly on the table willnot end the debate but take science out ofthe equation. Conflict resolution is betterequipped than modeling and analyticaltools to resolve value conflicts.

Third, scientific progress is propelled bycuriosity and healthy skepticism. Converse-ly, scientific progress is hindered by a cot-tage industry of engagement with “climateskeptics,” few of which have scientific cre-dentials or a true interest in the scientificprocess. Calling provocateurs by their truenames—naysayers, doomsayers, contrarians,ideologues—and marginalizing them bydoing so is one important element of deter-mining the terms of the debate. Disengagingfrom them more often and getting one’s ownmessage across is more powerful.

Finally, scientists and advocates for pre-cautionary action have been consistentlyon the defensive in public statements anddebates: Contrarians come in first to framethe debate and scientists, and policy advo-cates then feel compelled to contradictfalse claims or overstatements. Yet thepower is not in the response—howeverclever and effective. The power is in fram-ing the conversation. This requirescourage, strategic thinking, and effectivecommunications training. Being well pre-pared and one step ahead of the voices ofthe extreme is essential in a debate thatwill not be “won” any time soon and infact is likely to heat up further.

In sum, scientists may be better advisedto stop trying to “convince” the extremistson both sides with rational arguments andinstead to convince the larger audience ofa more reasonable approach.

1. Common contrarian tactics—tried and honed inprevious anti-environmental and anti-consumer safetycampaigns—go through a well-known sequence: deny-ing the problem, downplaying its severity, predictingeconomic ruin, and relying on human adaptive capacityand ingenuity. All along the way, the proponents ofthese views exploit scientific uncertainties, use selec-tive decontextualized scientific findings, call on flawedpseudo-scientific studies, and bank on the ignorance ofthe general public to support their views, while pepper-ing their public statements with derogatory name-calling and portrayals of scientists and politicians.Sadly, alarmists use a similar set of tactics. For moreon alarmists, see S. Boehmer-Christiansen, “GlobalClimate Protection Policy: The Limits of ScientificAdvice, Parts 1 and 2,” Global EnvironmentalChange 4 (1994): 140–59, 185–200; A. Ross, “Is Glob-al Culture Warming Up?” Social Text 28 (1991): 3–30;and P. J. Taylor and F. H. Buttel, “How Do We KnowWe Have Global Environmental Problems?” Geoforum23 (1992): 405–16. For more on contrarians, see G. E.Brown, Jr., “Environmental Science Under Siege in theU.S. Congress,” Environment, March 1997, 12–20,29–31; A. M. McCright and R. E. Dunlap, “Challeng-ing Global Warming as a Social Problem: An Analysisof the Conservative Movement’s Counter-Claims,”Social Problems 47 (2000): 499–522; C. E. Miller andP. N. Edwards, eds., Changing the Atmosphere: ExpertKnowledge and Environmental Governance (Cam-bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); D. L. Levy and D.Egan, “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Corporate Polit-ical Strategy: Conflict and Accommodation in the Cli-mate Change Negotiations,” Journal of ManagementStudies 40 (2003): 803–29; S. Beder, “CorporateHijacking of the Greenhouse Debate,” The Ecologist29 (1999): 119–22; R. Gelbspan, The Heat Is On: TheClimate Crisis, the Cover-Up, the Prescription (Boul-der, CO: Perseus Books, 1997); R. Gelbspan, The Boil-ing Point: How Politicians, Big Oil And Coal, Journal-ists, and Activists Have Fueled A Climate Crisis—AndWhat We Can Do To Avert Disaster (Boulder, CO:Perseus Books, 2004); and S. Opotow and L. Weiss,“Denial and the Process of Moral Exclusion in Envi-ronmental Conflict,” Journal of Social Issues 56(2000): 475–90.

2. J. T. Houghton et al., eds., Climate Change 2001:The Scientific Basis, Contribution of Working Group Ito the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmen-tal Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, UK: Cam-bridge University Press, 2001).

3. D. Sarewitz, “How Science Makes EnvironmentalControversies Worse,” Environmental Science & Policy7 (2004): 385–403.

4. This was also a clear finding in the early days ofrisk communication studies; see, for example, S. Krim-sky and A. Plough, Environmental Hazards: Communi-cating Risks as a Social Process (Dover, MA: AuburnHouse Publishing Co., 1988).

nication is precisely to support properadaptive behavior.

Perhaps the leading maladaptation tothe threats associated with overwhelm-ing, ill-understood problems—especial-ly ones in which we all are complicit—is psychic numbing or apathy.38

Communicators might be tempted tobreak through disinterest, indifference,and apathy by using fear as a motivatingforce. But even if they succeed in get-ting attention, the strategy might stillfail if it triggers denial or repression ofa problem perceived as overwhelming.39

Repression of emotions such as fear,pain, guilt, or despair requires and con-tributes to commonly observed “cultur-al ailments” including passivity onpotentially relevant issues.40 Suchrepressive mechanisms may even beconsciously sanctioned if dire predic-tions do not (immediately) materialize,thus giving a listener official permissionto turn attention away from recurringalarming news.41

Other maladaptive responses to fearand frustration can include anger andviolence toward the environment andothers, as well as counterproductivebehaviors that may in fact increase one’sobjective risk to external danger.42 Sur-vey studies have found, for example,that one common response to informa-tion about the threats of climate changeis a desire to buy a big sports utilityvehicle (SUV) as a means of protectingagainst an unpleasant or unpredictableenvironment.43 Unfortunately, of course,SUVs at current low levels of fuel-efficiency exacerbate the climate prob-lem. This reaction was captured comi-cally in a cartoon published after therelease of The Day After Tomorrow (seethe illustration on page 40).

Risk communication and psycholog-ical studies add weight to the cautioususe of fear appeals. Empirical studiesshow, for example, that fear maychange attitudes and verbal expres-sions of concern but not necessarilyactive engagement with the issue oractual behavior.44 Perceived self-efficacy in responding to a threat,expected response costs, and intention

have been found to be the strongestpredictors of concurrent or futurebehavior.45 Finally, if threat informa-tion is unspecific, uncertain, perceivedas manipulative, or if it comes fromsources that the recipients do not trust,it may not even evoke fear but resent-ment, dismissal, or nothing at all onthe radar screens of attention.46

Guilt—the emotional response tosome self-perceived shortfall withrespect to one’s own standards of con-duct—is another potentially powerfulmotivator of individual or socialresponse. People who feel guilty wantto make amends or feel a moral respon-sibility to behave differently.47 Re-search suggests that explicit guiltappeals can indeed evoke such feel-ings; however, because they also canbring about resentment or annoyancewith overt manipulation, these appealsdo not necessarily persuade or inducebehavior change.48 Milder appeals toguilt may be less persuasive and thusless motivational than overt tech-niques. To the extent that guilt chal-lenges one’s sense of personal integri-ty, it can initiate the search forself-affirmation. Responses to guiltthus aim primarily at maintaining one’ssense of a moral self, and they may ormay not also involve behavior thatends or rectifies the guilt-invokingaction.49 Put differently, guilt appealsare unreliable as motivators of sociallyor environmentally benign responses.

In summary, to the extent that climateinformation appeals to fear and pro-duces “Chicken Littles” or appeals toguilt and produces resentment, climatechange communicators are likely to failto engage and empower individuals tomake personal behavior changes ormotivate their support for public policychanges. Fear and guilt can serve amotivating function but require severalsupportive conditions to lead to desir-able responses.50 Thus, given the highlycomplex and uncertain outcomes ofsuch appeals and the limited ability tocontrol the audience’s emotionalresponse to information, using positivemotivations and forms of communica-


Seven proposed strategies together can greatly enhance

wider public appreciation

for the seriousness of the climate

change problem and build

momentum forsocial and policy

change.


tion may prove more successful in en-gaging social actors.

Improving the Communicationof Climate Change

Seven proposed strategies followdirectly from the pitfalls describedabove and build on research on com-munication, information processing,and emotional and cognitive responsesto risk information. None alone will“do the trick,” but together they cangreatly enhance wider public apprecia-tion for the seriousness of the problemand build momentum for social andpolicy change.

Abide by Basic Communication Rules

The first rule of good communicationis to ask who the audience is. Impor-tantly, we should ask ourselves, “Whoneeds to understand climate change at this time? Who is in the best positionto set in motion the most critical so-cial/policy/regulatory/technologicalchanges to bring about significantemission reductions? Who are the like-

ly early adopters, and who sits on thefence?”51 Mindfulness of the audiencefurther implies an attempt to under-stand what interests and concerns lis-teners have and what mental modelsprevail among them. It is still critical tochoose mental models that clearly linkcause, effect, and solutions.52 In addi-tion, applying the lessons learned fromrisk communications and economicresearch will help in choosing theappropriate action frame: Highly certain-to-succeed, preventive actionsare best induced by a frame that sug-gests benefits (gain frame), while riski-er choices (where success is less cer-tain) can be used in the context ofavoidance of losses (loss frame).53

Picking the right messenger to maxi-mize credibility and legitimacy withthe audience (see below) is critical.Equally important is to carefullychoose the communication channel(such as newspapers, TV, or person-to-person exchange among family, neigh-bors, and friends). If the purpose is tospread information widely, mass com-munication channels are viable options.If the purpose is to persuade and solic-it commitments to take a specific

action, more direct and personalizedchannels are needed.

Address the Emotional and TemporalComponents of “Urgency”

Fear as a motivation to create greaterurgency should be used with significantcaution—and only if one also plans togive his or her audiences a sense of“response-ability” to deal with theproblem. In other words, to increase thelikelihood that threatening informationleads not to denial and apathy but toaction, a focus—in tone and content—on empowerment should be the highestpriority. Highlighting the effectivenessof recommended actions, addressingconcerns over costs, and bolstering peo-ple’s sense of self-efficacy all contributeto a “can-do” attitude. It is helpful inthis context to share examples of suc-cess and to reward early action throughvisibility and public acknowledgment.54

It is also important to give specificinstructions on what to do and to givecues that will prompt people to remem-ber and take the intended action. To bet-ter address the time dimension ofurgency, communicators need to betterexplain the implications of delayingaction or not taking action at all in asconcrete and tangible ways as possible.(A comparison to paying into pensionplans, for example, may serve as aptmetaphor.) This will help lower thereward for inaction.

Increase the Persuasiveness of the Message

To garner greater attention, there areways to increase the persuasiveness ofthe climate change message withoutappealing to fear. Maybe the mostimportant option, and one often quiteuncomfortable for scientists, is to leadwith the strongest argument—that is,with the greatest scientific certaintyand confidence.55 If the first order ofbusiness is to reach the audience, it isin the first few minutes (sometimesmoments) of that communication thatlisteners must be convinced it is worth

After the release of The Day After Tomorrow, many cartoonists used the film’s mostcompelling images and American symbols to comment on other American “love affairs.”

their time to pay attention. Vivid,understandable, believable, interesting,and personally meaningful openingsare critical. Reordering content so thatthe most important information is toldupfront ensures that the take-homemessages are given during the time ofgreatest attention. Repeating thosemessages ensures greater retention.56

Appealing to reason and to most peo-ple’s desire to be seen as reasonable byothers are the cognitive siblings thatwill meet a well-argued point. By thesame token, it is important to avoidpitching climate change as a purelyenvironmental or—worse—as a parti-san issue.57

Use Trusted Messengers:Broadening the Circle

Convincing arguments are bestreceived if they come from highly cred-ible and legitimate sources. Credibilityand legitimacy are not innate qualitiesbut ones attributed to information andto speakers by the audience in specificcontexts.58 Communicators can consid-er bringing together experts on variousaspects of climate change for publicpresentations or referring to colleagueswith the pertinent expertise whenspeaking to the media: An economistwill carry more weight than a climatescientist in speaking to the options,costs, and feasibility of certain solu-tions, and a social scientist will bemore believable than a technologyexpert on human impacts. Bringing allof these voices to bear makes for themost convincing case.

The deeper question, however, iswhether scientists are always the bestmessengers, even on a complex issuelike climate change. Pioneering indus-try leaders will be more legitimate toindustry audiences; a religious leadermore legitimate as carrier of the moralargument. Even more creatively, canwe employ the skills of artists, story-tellers, and musicians to popularize a“dry” scientific matter as—ultimate-ly—a deeply human affair? Consideralso that, for example, an African

American speaker will tend to havegreater legitimacy with an AfricanAmerican audience than a non-AfricanAmerican speaker would.59

Use Opportunities Well

Some opportunities to bring attentionto climate change open up without any-one’s specific intention; others can beactively created. The most commonproblem in the past was that communi-cators failed to see them coming, didnot make good use of them, or missedthem altogether. While none of us canalways foresee opportunities, we canincrease our expectation that they willarise.60 Some will feel inclined to domore than expect them. Examplesinclude establishing oneself as anexpert resource to reporters throughcareful relationship-building; standingready to publicly comment on climaticdisasters without overstepping scientif-ic credibility (the idea of a “rapidresponse team”); foreseeing and pre-paring for newsworthy events, such asatmospheric carbon dioxide concentra-tions soon reaching 400 parts per mil-lion. Such opportunities become “teach-able moments” only if the events arelinked in meaningful ways to people’slives and concerns.

Tap into Individual and CulturalStrengths and Values

An eclectic set of research points toanother resource that climate changecommunicators can tap into. People’smotivation and willingness to engagewith an issue and act on its behalf is notpurely instrumental (“by using energy-efficient appliances, I can save mon-ey”). If a problem and the actions peo-ple can take to help solve it are framedin ways that resonate with cultural val-ues and beliefs, people are more likelyto take the action than if they are not.For example, Americans deeply res-onate with notions of competitiveness,leadership, ingenuity, and innovation.There are equally deeply held beliefs


If a problem and the actions people can take to help solve it

are framed in ways that

resonate with cultural values

and beliefs, people are more

likely to take the action

than if they are not.


and moral values about fairness, teamplay, stewardship, and responsibility forthe welfare of others (children, kin,neighbors, and other species).61 Mes-sages should begin by appealing tothese higher values to prime the audi-ence’s receptivity. Such messages alsocounter common defensive responses(exceptionalism—“it won’t happenhere”; traditionalism—“we’ve alwaysdone it this way”; transference—“experts will fix it”; and the uncertaintyescape—“we don’t know enough toact”).62 Furthermore—and maybe evenmore importantly—when messagesspeak to an individual’s identity (and tothe desire to express that identity to rel-evant cohorts), that individual appearsto be more willing to take on seeminglyinconvenient or costly efforts to con-tribute to a problem’s solution.63 Thefirst Toyota Prius buyers—while sup-ported by tax deductions—may haveagreed to the additional expense of anew hybrid vehicle not just to reducepersonal emissions or save on gas but atleast in part also because they like feel-ing and being seen as environmentalistsand early adopters. British Petroleumnot only invested in emissions reduc-tions and alternative energy technolo-gies to save money and diversify itsportfolio but broke with the anti-KyotoGlobal Climate Coalition and went outof its way to remake its public image(“Beyond Petroleum”).

Unite and Conquer

The final strategy pertains to climatechange communication and otherefforts to build growing support for theimmense task of reorganizing a societycurrently built on unsustainable prac-tices and principles. The “unite andconquer” strategy is the antidote todivisive tactics and isolationism ofindividuals and issues. For example,the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-mate Change rests its conclusions noton a single temperature record or pieceof evidence, but on “a collective pic-ture of a warming world.”64 If a singletype or instance of climate change

impacts does not convey the magnitudeof the problem, then the public andpolicymakers must be aided in seeingthe patterns of change. For example,one species migrating to higher lati-tudes or elevations in response towarming may be a locally caused phe-nomenon; hundreds of species doing soall in response to the same environ-mental driver is more convincing evi-dence. Or, while any one extremestorm event cannot be causally linkedto global warming, a global pattern ofincreasing severity of extreme events isconsistent with theory and global cli-mate model predictions.

Another way to counter issue com-partmentalization is to unite around thehuman activities that both emit heat-trapping gases and cause other problems(the “collateral damage” of human activ-ities). For example, urban sprawl resultsin increases in vehicle miles traveled(higher emissions), traffic congestion,and landscape fragmentation; powergeneration emits greenhouse gases andair pollutants; reliance on fossil fuelsimported from politically unstableregions decreases energy security; andthe loss of forest “carbon sinks” alsoreduces recreational spaces. Conse-quently, solutions for the climate prob-lem are also solutions for other problems(the “collateral benefits” of the samesolutions for multiple problems). In fact,most local, state, and private-sector mit-igation efforts in the United States todate mention climate change only inpassing or as a secondary justification,instead arguing for solutions to moreimmediate problems (such as air pollu-tion) or highlighting immediately feltand highly resonant benefits (such assaving energy and money).65

Climate change is also likely to aggra-vate existing problems, includingspecies loss, the urban heat island effect,degradation of air quality, and higherincidence of respiratory illnesses. Thusmany actions taken to mitigate climatechange will also help abate others, anargument increasingly made in favor ofviewing mitigation and adaptationactions as complementary and synergis-

Changing one light bulb will notmake a difference, but the cumulative

impact of every American household

changing one light bulb is

surprisingly large.

tic activities, rather than as trade-offs.66

While few examples exist where theleading or sole justification for emis-sion-reducing actions was climatechange, typically this combination ofjustifications has worked better formany early adopters.67

Another way to “unite and conquer”and counter isolationism applies toengaging people: If as individualswe—rightly—cannot be convinced thatour personal actions will make a differ-ence in the global context, we must bemade to feel part of a larger collectivethat can successfully tackle the prob-lem. Changing one light bulb will notmake a difference, but the cumulativeimpact of every American householdchanging one light bulb is surprisinglylarge. Building on a long history ofcommunal achievements and tappinginto a yearning for community andmeaning, the way we speak about cli-mate change must become the ultimateexpression of our love for land andneighbor, for life itself.

Recreating and SustainingMomentum: Closing Thoughts

Communicating the enormous chal-lenge and urgency of climate changedoes not commence from a nascent,level playing field. Any improvementmust build on the uneven understand-ing and judgment of the problem, aswell as the outright failures and limitedsuccesses of the past. This requiresfinding ways to engage previouslyunconcerned audiences and—maybeeven more problematically—reengag-ing audiences turned off by the contro-versial and confusing discourse onglobal warming to date. Dealing withthe legacies of climate change commu-nication in the past and reframing adebate where positions are deeply dugin are crucial challenges. To this end,perhaps the propositions offered abovewill provide some concrete help andstimulate further creative thinking,including the necessary social scienceresearch to develop and test alternative

frames, strategies, and approaches. Inparticular, it would be desirable for cli-mate and other physical scientists—andeven social scientists previously notconcerned with the discursive side ofclimate change—to collaborate withcommunication experts to help createan elevated public conversation.

Even less trivial than (re)creating thepublic discourse, however, is the chal-lenge of how to maintain it. Nothingholds anyone’s attention at consistentlyhigh levels over long periods of time.Such an expectation for climate changewould be entirely unrealistic. At thesame time, bringing about the changesrequired to achieve greater than 80 per-cent reductions in heat-trapping gasemissions requires sustained engage-ment. Of course, many emission reduc-tions can be achieved through techno-logical, policy, and infrastructurechanges—such as higher efficiencystandards for cars and appliances, betterbuilding codes, and high-density devel-opment that reduces the need for indi-vidual vehicle use—that will allow indi-viduals to “act green” without activelyhaving to think about doing so.68

But even until and while we bringabout these changes, public and politicalattention to climate change will wax andwane through numerous “issue cycles”;we all will be distracted by competingdemands on our attention.69 Maybe evenmore discouraging is the empiricalobservation that the American publictends to drop its concern for the environ-ment when it perceives that there is“someone in charge” at the federal level.During the Reagan and Bush Sr. and Jr.administrations, public concern over cli-mate change was and has been higherthan during the Clinton administration.70

This suggests a see-saw sense of urgencyand personal responsibility depending onthe prevailing perception of how muchothers—Congress, an administration,businesses, or civic groups—do for theenvironment. Thus, maintaining themomentum for engaging with climatechange requires connecting the issuemore strongly with those concerns forwhich people feel a persistent and per-

sonal responsibility (echoing the notionsof stewardship, personal relevance, andteam-playing mentioned above).

Further, it requires efforts to betterunderstand and facilitate internalizationof motivations to behave (or producegoods and services) sustainably. Suchefforts must stand on three pillars:empathetic understanding of the diffi-culty or inconvenience that change andnew behaviors involve for a person; theprovision of maximum choice and flexi-bility over the course of alternativeaction; and a meaningful, persuasiverationale for the required change.71 Thisthree-legged approach is easily transfer-able from individuals to organizations,industries, and political entities.72 Overtime this process will help elevate andinternalize social norms, which aremotivating factors themselves.

Finally, if in fact uncontrolled anthro-pogenic climate change leads to region-al or even global crises—and maybeirreversible losses and changes—then“success” in our efforts to mitigate cli-mate change could be defined by avoid-ing just that. The absence of somethingdreadful, however, is a notoriously badmotivator to keep going. The occurrenceof “nothing different” from what we arefamiliar and able to deal with now willbe hard to chalk up as success, or—more poignantly—as “reward” for whatmay be perceived as inconvenientbehavioral and policy choices. Someform of “patting on our collectivebacks,” however, is needed to keep moti-vation high for continuing to participatein the necessary social changes.

Clearly, then, there is a need to definepositive visions, ones that are far broad-er than just the hope that we might ducka potential climate crisis. Believable,positive, open-ended, problem-solving,and meaning-giving visions are neededto offer a lasting motivation to partici-pate in conversation and partake in com-munal action.73 Developing such cultur-ally resonant and engaging visions“involves our highest aspirations for thefuture and our deepest assumptionsabout what is possible.”74 Criticallyimportant thus for communicating the



magnitude of the challenge before us arenot measures of doom but yet-to-be-developed imaginative, compelling indi-cators that allow us to assess ourprogress toward that “better world.” For,as futurist Robert Olsen says (paraphras-ing historian Frederik Polak), “thefuture may well be decided by theimages of the future with the greatestpower to capture our imaginations anddraw us to them, becoming self-fulfilling prophecies.”75

Susanne C. Moser is a research scientist at the Nation-al Center for Atmospheric Change’s Institute for theStudy of Society and Environment (ISSE) in Boulder,CO. She is a geographer by training, and her researchfoci for the last 10 years have been the human dimen-sions of global change. Her current research interestsinclude effective climate change communication andsocial change, interactions between scientists andstakeholders (in particular, decisionmakers), coastalimpacts of climate change and effective adaptationstrategies, and health impacts of climate change. Dur-ing a post-doctorate at Harvard University’s KennedySchool of Government in the Global EnvironmentAssessment project, Moser became particularly inter-ested in the science-policy interaction. She alsoworked for the H. John Heinz III Center for Science,Economics and the Environment in Washington, DC,on a congressionally mandated project on coastal ero-sion and management. From 1999–2003, Moser wasstaff scientist for climate change for the Union of Con-cerned Scientists, managing projects on climatechange impacts and working in the trenches of effec-tive climate change communication and social mobi-lization for change. She may be reached at [email protected]. Lisa Dilling is a visiting fellow with theCenter for Science and Technology Policy Research,Cooperative Institute for Research in EnvironmentalSciences, University of Colorado at Boulder. Her cur-rent research focuses on the use of science-generatedcarbon-cycle information in policy and decisionmak-ing. More generally, she is interested in the intersec-tion between science and policy, especially topicssuch as the scales of information needed and used, theinstitutional barriers to better use of information, andthe decisionmaking process used to set priorities forresearch to serve societal needs. Dilling previouslyworked as a program manager for a national carbon-cycle science program at the National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration, where she studied theoceanic carbon cycle. She recently contributed an arti-cle related to her research to the Annual Review ofEnvironmental Resources. She may be contacted viaphone at (303) 735-3678 or via e-mail at [email protected]. The authors thank Robert Katesfor inviting them to write this article. He and the othereditors of Environment provided very helpful feed-back on an earlier draft. In addition, the authorsreceived valuable feedback from Robert Harriss,Nancy Cole, Aaron McCright, Susan Watrous, andAnthony Leiserowitz. More fundamentally, this articledraws on the thoughtful discussions that took place inJune 2004 at a workshop in Boulder, CO (see http://www.isse.ucar.edu/changeworkshop/index.html). Theauthors are deeply indebted to all participants for theirexpertise, wisdom, and inspiration. They will adddepth to the ideas presented here in a forthcominganthology on climate change communication andsocial change (edited by the authors). The authorsgratefully acknowledge funding for the project fromThe MacArthur Foundation, the National ScienceFoundation, and the National Center for AtmosphericResearch’s Walter Orr Roberts Institute and Institute

for the Study of Society and Environment (formerlyknown as the Environmental and Societal ImpactsGroup). The opinions expressed herein, and any per-sistent faults, remain the authors’ own.

NOTES

1. The American Heritage Dictionary of the EnglishLanguage, Fourth Edition (New York: Bartleby.com:2000), http://www.bartleby.com/61/.

2. C. Tickell, “Communicating Climate Change,”Science, 2 August 2002, 737.

3. See for example, W. Kempton, “How the PublicViews Climate Change,” Environment, November1997, 12–21; S. Ungar, “Knowledge, Ignorance andthe Popular Culture: Climate Change Versus the OzoneHole,” Public Understanding of Science 9 (2000):297–312; and S. R. Brechin, “Comparative PublicOpinion and Knowledge on Global Climatic Changeand the Kyoto Protocol: The U.S. versus the World?”International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy23 (2003): 106–134.

4. To name but a few: C. S. Silver (with R. S.Defries), One Earth, One Future: Our Changing Glob-al Environment (Washington, DC: National AcademyPress, 1990); National Research Council (NRC) Boardon Sustainable Development, Our Common Journey: ATransition Toward Sustainability (Washington, DC:National Academy Press, 1999); and J. G. Speth, RedSky at Morning: America and the Crisis of the GlobalEnvironment. A Citizen’s Agenda for Action (NewHaven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).

5. A summary of research progress over the pastdecade is available in J. T. Houghton et al., eds., Cli-mate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, Contributionof Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report ofthe Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cam-bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Seealso K. E. Trenberth, “Stronger Evidence of HumanInfluences on Climate: The 2001 IPCC Assessment,”Environment, May 2001, 8–19.

6. Maybe the premier example is the Union of Con-cerned Scientists (UCS), eds., World Scientists Warn-ing to Humanity (Cambridge, MA: UCS, 1993),renewed in the World Scientists Call for Action at theKyoto Climate Summit in 1997, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_environment/archive/page.cfm?pageID=530 (accessed 30 September 2004). More recentexamples include the Amsterdam Declaration on Glob-al Change, http://www.sciconf.igbp.kva.se/AMS_DECLARATION.pdf (accessed 30 August 2004); orthe joint statement, “The State of Climate Change Sci-ence” by 17 national academies of science, publishedin Science, 18 May 2001, 1261.

7. J. Carey (with S. R. Shapiro), “Global Warming,”BusinessWeek Online, 16 August 2004, http://www.businessweek.com; T. L. Brewer, “Seeds of Change inthe US: Public Opinion Ahead of Politicians on Cli-mate Change,” New Economy 10 (2003): 150–54; PewCenter on Global Climate Change, Climate ChangeActivities in the United States, 2004 Update, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/74241%5FUS%20Activities%20Report%5F040604%5F075445%2Epdf (accessed 10 August 2004); and InternationalCouncil for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI),U.S. Cities for Climate Protection Campaign, http://www.iclei.org/us/ccp/ (accessed 10 August 2004). ThePew Center on Global Climate Change offers a usefulsummary on the McCain-Lieberman Climate Steward-ship Act at http://www.pewclimate.org/policy_center/analyses/s_139_summary.cfm; the companion Housebill sponsored by Representatives Wayne Gilchrest (R-MD) and John Olver (D-MA) is described at http://www.pewclimate.org/policy_center/analyses/gil_olver_summary.cfm.

8. M. Glantz, ed., Creeping Environmental Prob-

lems and Sustainable Development in the Aral SeaBasin (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press,1999).

9. Over the course of several decades, decisionsmade to irrigate the dry sands of the central Asiandeserts to grow cotton have resulted in drastic reduc-tions in the size of the Aral Sea. This in turn has nega-tively affected water levels, fish populations, riverflow, and public health. What makes this such a com-pelling example of a “creeping” environmental prob-lem is that small incremental decisions to continue irri-gation policies were continued in the face of increasingknowledge of their negative consequences. Ibid.; andN. F. Glazovsky, “The Aral Sea Basin,” in J. X. Kasper-son, R. E. Kasperson, and B. L. Turner II, eds., Regionsat Risk: Comparisons of Threatened Environments(Tokyo and New York: United Nations UniversityPress, 1995), 92–139.

10. R. E. Kasperson and J. X. Kasperson, “HiddenHazards,” in D. G. Mayo and R. D. Hollander, eds.,Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Man-agement (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991),9–28.

11. S. Shackley and B. Wynne, “Representing Uncer-tainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy:Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority,” Science,Technology and Human Values 21 (1996): 275–302.

12. C. B. Field, M. R. Raupach, and R. Victoria, “TheGlobal Carbon Cycle: Integrating Humans, Climateand the Natural World,” in C. B. Field and M. R. Rau-pach, eds., The Global Carbon Cycle: IntegratingHumans, Climate and the Natural World, SCOPEReport #62 (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2004),1–13.

13. Ibid.

14. To date, few regions of the world experiencerapid and/or noticeable climate change. Exceptions arethe circumpolar regions, which have the fastest rates ofwarming; low-lying island states, which are affectedby sea-level rise; and high-elevation regions, such asthe South-American Andes, where impacts on ecology,snowfall, and glaciers are already pervasive. See J. J.McCarthy et al., eds., Climate Change 2001: Impacts,Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Contribution of Work-ing Group II to the Third Assessment Report of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cam-bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

15. Ibid.

16. See Glantz, note 8 above; S. Rayner and E. L.Malone, eds., Human Choice & Climate Change. WhatHave We Learned? Vol. 4 (Columbus, OH: BatellePress, 1998); and K. L. O’Brien and R. M. Leichenko,“Double Exposure: Assessing the Impacts of ClimateChange within the Context of Economic Globaliza-tion,” Global Environmental Change 10 (2000):221–32.

17. R. E. Kasperson, J. X. Kasperson, and K. M.Dow, “Vulnerability, Equity, and Global Environmen-tal Change,” in J. X. Kasperson and R. E. Kasperson,eds., Global Environmental Risk (Tokyo and NewYork: United Nations University Press, 2001), 247–72;J. Ikeme, “Equity, Environmental Justice and Sustain-ability: Incomplete Approaches in Climate ChangePolitics,” Global Environmental Change 13 (2003):195–206; and P. Ehrlich and A. Ehrlich, One with Nin-eveh: Politics, Consumption, and the Human Future(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2004).

18. R. J. Bord, R. E. O’Connor, and A. Fisher, “InWhat Sense Does the Public Need to Understand Glob-al Climate Change?” Public Understanding of Science9 (2000): 205–18; and J. D. Sterman and L. B.Sweeney, “Cloudy Skies: Assessing Public Under-standing of Global Warming,” System DynamicsReview 18 (2002), http://web.mit.edu/jsterman/www/cloudy_skies.html (accessed 24 September 2003).

19. In a world where human action can alter globallife-support systems, this limit becomes problematic,however. See R. Ornstein and P. Ehrlich, NewWorld/New Mind: Moving Toward Conscious Evolu-

tion (New York: Doubleday, 1989).

20. C. Bosso and D. L. Guber, “The Boundaries andContours of American Environmental Activism,” in N.J. Vig and M. E. Kraft, eds., Environmental Policy:New Directions for the Twenty-First Century (Wash-ington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), 79–101.

21. K. R. Stamm, F. Clark, and P. R. Eblacas, “MassCommunication and Public Understanding of Environ-mental Problems: The Case of Global Warming,” Pub-lic Understanding of Science 9 (2000): 219–37; and A.Leiserowitz, American Opinions on Global Warming:Project Results (Eugene, OR: University of Oregon,2003).

22. See Bosso and Guber, note 20 above; and D. L.Guber, The Grassroots of a Green Revolution: PollingAmerica on the Environment (Cambridge, MA: MITPress, 2003).

23. Note that this is only a seeming contradiction tothe consistent survey result that a significant majorityof Americans support protecting the environment.While Americans widely espouse environmental val-ues, only a small percentage likes to self-identify withthe “environmentalist” label. Rather, being pro-environment is now part of good character. Overtlyanti-environmentalist attitudes or actions seem to havea greater impact on voting choices than now common-ly held pro-environmental attitudes and values (see W.Kempton, “Will Public Environmental Concern Leadto Action on Global Warming?” Annual Review ofEnergy and Environment 18 (1993): 217–45).

24. S. Covey, The Seven Habits of Highly EffectivePeople (New York: Franklin Covey Co., 1989).

25. A. Bell, “Media (Mis)Communication on the Sci-ence of Climate Change,” Public Understanding ofScience 3 (1994): 259–75; S. Dunwoody, “What’s aJournalist to Do? Challenges and Approaches toReporting Scientific Assessment,” in S. Hassol and J.Katzenberger, eds., Elements of Change ‘96: AGCISession II: Characterizing and Communicating Scien-tific Uncertainty (Aspen, CO: Aspen Global ChangeInstitute, 1996), 147–52; and M. T. Boykoff and J. M.Boykoff, “Balance as Bias: Global Warming and theUS Prestige Press,” Global Environmental Change 14(2004): 125–36.

26. Boykoff and Boykoff, ibid.

27. J. Immerwahr, Waiting for a Signal: Public Atti-tudes toward Global Warming, the Environment andGeophysical Research (Washington, DC: AmericanGeophysical Union, 1999), http://www.agu.org/sci_soc/attitude_study.pdf (accessed May 1999); and S.Seacrest, R. Kuzelka, and R. Leonard, “Global ClimateChange and Public Perception: The Challenge ofTranslation,” Journal of the American Water ResourcesAssociation 36 (2000): 253–63.

28. Such frames get activated through a variety ofclues, including metaphors, images, the messenger,and other contextual clues. See A. Bostrom, M. G.Morgan, B. Fischhoff, and D. Read, “What Do PeopleKnow About Global Climate Change? 1. Mental Mod-els,” Risk Analysis 14 (1994): 959–70; D. Read et al.,“What Do People Know About Global ClimateChange? 2. Survey Studies of Educated Laypeople,”Risk Analysis 14 (1994): 971–82; and M. G. Morgan,B. Fischhoff, A. Bostrom, and C. Atman, Risk Com-munication: The Mental Models Approach (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2001).

29. As another example, global warming came topublic attention only after stratospheric ozone deple-tion (“the ozone hole”) was discovered. Thus, surveysrepeatedly show that people try to understand globalwarming as caused by the ozone hole, with the con-current suggestion that ceasing the use of spray canswill also solve the global warming problem (see notes27 and 28 above). See also C. Trumbo, “ConstructingClimate Change: Claims and Frames in US News Cov-erage of an Environmental Issue,” Public Understand-ing of Science 5 (1995): 269–83.

30. G. E. Brown, Jr., “Environmental Science UnderSiege in the U.S. Congress,” Environment, March

1997, 12–20, 29–31; A. M. McCright and R. E. Dun-lap, “Challenging Global Warming as a Social Prob-lem: An Analysis of the Conservative Movement’sCounter-Claims,” Social Problems 47 (2000):499–522; C. E. Miller and P. N. Edwards, eds., Chang-ing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environ-mental Governance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,2001); and D. L. Levy and D. Egan, “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Corporate Political Strategy:Conflict and Accommodation in the Climate ChangeNegotiations,” Journal of Management Studies 40(2003): 803–29.

31. FrameWorks Institute, Talking Global Warming(Summary of Research Findings) (Washington, DC:FrameWorks Institute, 2001).

32. In her Global Citizen column, Donella Meadowsdescribes her reaction to the sweeping accusation—notjust made by non- or anti-environmentalists, but alsowithin the pro-environmental community—that every-one speaking on behalf of the environment is a cata-strophist and alarmist. See D. Meadows, “How Envi-ronmentalists Ought to Talk,” Global Citizen, DonellaMeadows Archive, 1996, http://www.sustainer.org/dhm_archive/search.php?display_article=vn635environmentalistsed (accessed 26 May 2004).

33. Attempts to rename the problem as a “climate cri-sis” or “climate disruption” belong here as well.

34. The call for a few “useful catastrophes” comesfrom Tickell, note 2 above, and is reiterated in S.Ungar, “Social Scares and Global Warming: Beyondthe Rio Convention,” Society and Natural Resources8 (1995): 443–56. Editor-in-Chief of Science, Don-ald Kennedy, stated in an editorial that he deploredthe lack of attention that climate change is receiving(Science, 11 June 2004, 1565). And H. Jesse Smith,in an introduction to “state of the world” papers onvarious environmental problems, offers these scien-tific summaries “in the spirit of ‘forewarned is fore-armed,’ not ‘the sky is falling.’” (see Science, 14November 2003, 1171).

35. Examples include H. Blix, “Global Warming asBig a Threat as WMD,” New Perspectives Quarterly 21(2004): 3233; G. H. Brundtland, “The Test of Our Civ-ilization,” New Perspectives Quarterly 16 (1999): 4–7;M. Gorbachev, “Pre-empt Global Warming,” New Per-spectives Quarterly 21 (2004): 17–19; and D. A. King,“Climate Change Science: Adapt, Mitigate, orIgnore?” Science, 9 January 2004, 176–77.

36. Clearly the answer is highly complex. Fearappeals have shown to be effective at various timesthroughout U.S. history. The recent American responseto fear appeals regarding terrorism (associated with arally for preemptive war) seemed to have brought thedesired intent (see a discussion of this issue with lin-guist and framing expert George Lakoff, UC-Berkeleyat http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/08/25_lakoff.shtml (accessed 10 August 2004). Furtherback in history, Franklin Delanor Roosevelt during thegreat depression famously said to the American peo-ple, “Let me assert my firm belief that the only thingwe have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning,unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts toconvert retreat into advance.” Acknowledging people’slegitimate fears, he went on to say, “only a foolish opti-mist can deny the dark realities of the moment” andcalled for a renewed vision and concrete action plan(cited in K. Wilson, “Global Warming—Facing ourFears,” truthout, 6 May 2004, http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/9/4388 (accessedMay 10, 2004)). The key to whether or not fear, guilt,or other threat appeals cause the desired impact in theaudience is the presence or absence of concurrentenabling conditions—originating in the issue contextand/or the audience.

37. R. A. C. Ruiter, B. Verplanken, D. De Cremer,and G. Kok, “Danger and Fear Control in Response toFear Appeals: The Role of Need for Cognition,” Basicand Applied Social Psychology 26 (2004): 13–24.

38. Etymologically, the term “apathy” means the

absence of feeling or, more specifically, suffering(whether due to an inability or a refusal to feel pain).The term “psychic numbing” was first introduced byR. J. Lifton in his book Death in Life: Survivors ofHiroshima (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967).This is not to suggest—for we are not aware of anystudy providing empirical evidence—that climatechange by itself can or has created pervasive apathy.However, climate change does not exist in isolation.The cumulative or synergistic effect of numerous over-whelming environmental, military, economic, andsociocultural problems on people’s perception andexperience of the world certainly seems to have thisnumbing effect. See also the 1999 American Geophys-ical Union’s study that found focus group participantsrelating the low prospects for solving the climate prob-lem to a general moral decay of society (Immerwahr,note 27 above).

39. J. Macy and M. Y. Brown, Coming Back to Life:Practices to Reconnect Our Lives, Our World (Gabrio-la Island, British Columbia: New Society Publishers,1998), especially pages 26–32.

40. Ibid., pages 34–37. For a longer treatment ofthese issues, see S. W. Nicholsen, The Love of Natureand the End of the World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,2002) especially Chapter 5; J. Greenberg, S. Solomon,and T. Pyszczynski, “Terror Management Theory ofSelf-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews: EmpiricalAssessments and Conceptual Refinements,” in M. P.Zanna, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychol-ogy, Volume 29 (New York: Academic Press, 1997),61–139; and the review by R. A. C. Ruiter, C. Abra-ham, and G. Kok, “Scary Warnings and Rational Pre-cautions: A Review of the Psychology of FearAppeals,” Psychology and Health 16 (2001): 613–30.

41. K. Dow and S. L. Cutter, “Crying Wolf: RepeatResponses to Hurricane Evacuation Orders,” CoastalManagement 26 (1998): 237–52; and K. McComasand J. Shanahan, “Telling Stories about Global ClimateChange: Measuring the Impact of Narratives on IssueCycles,” Communication Research 26 (1999): 30–57,especially pages 51–53.

42. For example, after September 11, 2001, manyAmericans chose to drive rather than fly, thereby—sta-tistically—increasing their risk of accident and death.For additional examples, see G. M. Gray and D. P.Ropeik, “Dealing with the Dangers of Fear: The Roleof Risk Communication,” Health Affairs 21 (2002):106–16. Anger and violence toward the environment asa maladaptive response to fear, pain, or despair canoften be spiteful or even have the flavor of revenge—all in the name of reasserting one’s power. Littering,for example, can be an intentional act, and destroyingprotected vegetation and even harming animals havebeen observed reactions in people who feel powerlessin certain spheres of their lives.

43. FrameWorks Institute, note 31 above. See also S.Plotkin, “Is Bigger Better? Moving Toward a Dispas-sionate View of SUVs,” Environment, November 2004,8–21.

44. More specifically, threat information has a high-er likelihood of being persuasive, causing persistentattitude change and eliciting positive responses (suchas danger control and precautionary action) only whenpeople feel personally vulnerable to the risk; have use-ful and very specific information about possible pre-cautionary actions, positively appraise their own abili-ty to carry out the action, and feel the suggested actionwill effectively solve the problem; believe the costassociated with taking an action is low; view thereward for not taking the precautionary action low orunappealing; and tend to consciously and carefullyprocess threat information (that is, have a need for cog-nition (central/systematic processing) as opposed toperipheral, heuristic information processing). See J. R.Lynn, “Effects of Persuasive Appeals in Public ServiceAdvertising,” Journalism Quarterly 51 (1974):622–30; H. Leventhal, M. A. Safer, and D. M. Panagis,“The Impact of Communications on the Self-Regula-tion of Health Beliefs, Decisions, and Behavior,”



Health Education Quarterly 10 (1983): 3–29; I. Ajzen,“The Theory of Planned Behavior,” OrganizationalBehavior and Human Decision 50 (1991): 179–211; D.W. Hine and R. Gifford, “Fear Appeals, Individual Dif-ferences, and Environmental Concern,” Journal ofEnvironmental Education 23 (1991): 36–41; A. Ban-dura, Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control (NewYork: Freeman, 1997); R. J. Bator and R. B. Cialdini,“The Application of Persuasion Theory to the Devel-opment of Effective Proenvironmental Public ServiceAnnouncements,” Journal of Social Issues 56 (2000):527–41, especially pages 530–31; R. Osbaldiston andK. M. Sheldon, “Social Dilemmas and Sustainability:Promoting Peoples’ Motivation to ‘Cooperate with theFuture,’” in P. Schmuck and W. P. Schultz, eds., Psy-chology of Sustainable Development (Amsterdam:Kluwer, 2002), 37–57; and R. A. C. Ruiter, B. Ver-planken, G. Kok, and M. Q. Wrrij, “The Role of Cop-ing Appraisal in Reactions to Fear Appeals: Do WeNeed Threat Information?” Journal of Health Psychol-ogy 8 (2003): 465–74. See also Ruiter et al. in notes 37(fear and danger control) and 40 (scary warnings)above; and E. Das, J. de Wit and W. Stroebe, “FearAppeals Motivate Acceptance of Action Recommenda-tions: Evidence for a Positive Bias in the Processing ofPersuasive Messages,” Personality & Social Psycholo-gy Bulletin 29 (2003): 650–64.

45. S. Milne, P. Sheeran, and S. Orbell, “Predictionand Intervention in Health-Related Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of Protection Motivation Theory,”Journal of Applied Social Psychology 3 (2000):106–43. As many of these insights come from researchon health-related behavior and crime, transfer tobehavior relative to the environment must still be inter-preted with caution. While numerous studies have beenconducted on the relationship between environmentalconcern and behavior, a careful assessment of the psycho-dynamics underlying this relationship is wanting.

46. P. Slovic, “Perceived Risk, Trust and Democracy:A Systems Perspective,” Risk Analysis 13 (1993):675–82; Gray and Ropeik, note 42 above; and Osbald-iston and Sheldon, note 44 above.

47. D. J. O’Keefe, “Guilt as a Mechanism of Persua-sion,” in J. P. Dillard and M. Pfau, eds., The PersuasionHandbook: Developments in Theory and Practice(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002),329–44.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.; R. L. Nabi, “Discrete Emotions and Per-suasion,” in Dillard and Pfau, note 47 above, pages289–308; and D. J. O’Keefe, “Guilt and Social Influ-ence,” in M. E. Roloff, ed., Communication Yearbook23 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002),67–101. An example may be someone’s reaction to thecriticism that they drive an SUV—in certain contextsperceived as a guilt-invoking statement. The almostinvariable resentful reaction to this criticism is fre-quently followed with various justifications for owningsuch a vehicle. For example, people may argue that thevehicle is required to reach off-road or mountainouslocations, to transport big items, or to protect the chil-dren—thus reaffirming the sense of being a reasonableperson and responsible parent.

50. See A. H. Eagly and P. Kulesa, “Attitudes, Atti-tude Structure and Resistance to Change,” in M. H.Bazerman, D. M. Messick, A. E. Tenbrunsel, and K. A.Wade-Benzoni, eds., Environment, Ethics, and Behav-ior: The Psychology of Environmental Valuation andDegradation (San Francisco, CA: The New LexingtonPress, 1997), 122–53.

51. A few examples to make the point: Women areconsistently found to have a greater concern for theenvironment and all things related to their children’sfuture than men. Some U.S. states are currently con-templating taking emissions-reducing actions. Innova-tion—whether in business or policy—always has achampion.

52. An alternative mental model—based on extensive

testing and focus group research—was recently sug-gested: As we drive our cars and use electricity (humanactivity), we burn fossil fuels and emit gases (causallink) that form a thickening “blanket” of CO2 (mentalmodel). This CO2 blanket traps heat around the Earth,not allowing heat to escape into space (elaboration ofmental model). See FrameWorks Institute, note 31above.

53. A. J. Rothman and P. Salovey, “Shaping Percep-tions to Motivate Health Behavior: The Role of Mes-sage Framing,” Psychological Bulletin 121 (1997):1355–69; and D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Choices,Values, and Frames,” American Psychologist 39(1984): 341–50.

54. D. McKenzie-Mohr, “Fostering SustainableBehavior through Community-Based Social Market-ing,” American Psychologist 55 (2000): 531–37.

55. Commonly, scientists prefer to cautiously pre-cede their statements with acknowledgments of all thatis still uncertain or unknown. Experience and observa-tions of people’s reactions to statements about scientif-ic uncertainty show, however, that a first messageabout uncertainty gives listeners the permission to dis-miss or turn attention away from what follows. We donot suggest that what remains unknown should not betold. In fact, it is our repeated experience that anearnest, balanced presentation of the state of ourknowledge is received most openly and given mostserious consideration. We merely suggest a reorderingof the presentation to get and retain attention. It shouldgo without saying that overstating one’s expertise,much less the truth of the problem or the feasibility ofsolutions, undermines not only the speaker’s credibili-ty but that of the entire community of seriously con-cerned individuals.

56. See Bator and Cialdini, note 44 above; and Dil-lard and Pfau, note 47 above.

57. Partisanship is not only a public turn-off, espe-cially when it comes to issues that truly concern peo-ple; it also is an historically incorrect claim in terms ofenvironmental leadership and, ultimately, a misleadingobstacle to addressing this global problem.

58. R. Mitchell, W. Clark, D. Cash, and F. Alcock,eds., Global Environmental Assessments: Information,Institutions and Influence (Cambridge, MA: MITPress, forthcoming).

59. E. Vaughan, “The Significance of Socioeconom-ic and Ethnic Diversity for the Risk CommunicationProcess,” Risk Analysis 15 (1995): 169–80. We thankJulian Agyeman, Tufts University, for teaching us themeaning and importance of “PLUs”—people like us.

60. Clearly, the well-stoked PR machines of climatecontrarians and conservative think tanks vigilantly identi-fy and define such opportunities for their own purposes.

61. FrameWorks Institute, note 31 above.

62. Osbaldiston and Sheldon, note 44 above.

63. This has been shown in various fields: environ-mental and social psychologists trying to make senseof people’s environmentally significant behavior (seeS. Clayton and S. Opotow, eds., Identity and the Nat-ural Environment: The Psychological Significance ofNature (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), especiallythe chapter by W. Kempton and D. C. Holland, “Iden-tity and Sustained Environmental Practice,” 317–41);political scientists trying to extend rational choice the-ory to understand the paradox of public participation incollective action—for example, turn-out for electionswhere the cost of participation vastly exceeds its per-sonal, instrumental benefit (see A. A. Schuessler, TheLogic of Expressive Choice (New Haven, CT: Prince-ton University Press, 2000)); or sociologists studyingsocial movements and mobilization (see A. Melucci,“Getting Involved: Identity and Mobilization in SocialMovements,” International Social Movement Research1 (1988): 329–48)).

64. Houghton et al., note 5 above.

65. A review of many of the climate change actionplans developed by U.S. cities participating in the

International Council for Local Environmental Initia-tive’s (ICLEI) Cities for Climate Protection (CCP)campaign shows the tendency to couch climate changemitigation efforts in terms of reducing other “collater-al damage” from human activities, or—alternatively—in terms of “collateral benefits” of addressing some ofthe more immediate problems (access action plans viaICLEI at http://www.iclei.org/ccp/). State climate mit-igation efforts tend to be framed in similar ways. (Fora comprehensive, frequently updated overview see thePew Center for Global Climate Change at http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/,accessed 23 September 2004). For example, few of the15 or so U.S. states with renewable energy standardsjustify them as climate change mitigation measures butmore frequently as means to increase energy indepen-dence/security or air quality (for an overview of whichstates have renewable energy requirements, see Unionof Concerned Scientists, Renewable Energy Standardsat Work in the States, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/renewable_energy/page.cfm?pageID=47,accessed 23 September 2004).

66. See, for example, T. J. Wilbanks et al., “Integrat-ing Mitigation and Adaptation: Possible Responses toGlobal Climate Change,” Environment, June 2003,28–38.

67. One of these examples was reported to theauthors by David Gershon, executive director of theEmpowerment Institute (http://empowermentinstitute.net/Default.htm), who conducted a pilot study in aneighborhood in Portland, Oregon, in which he testedwhether small communities of people could beengaged in reducing their emissions by argumentsabout climate change alone. The campaign, entitled“Low-Carbon Diet—How to Lose 5000 Pounds in 30Days,” appears to have been highly successful. A sec-ond example is the San Francisco Climate Action Plan,released in September 2004, which leads with a directargument about the reality of climate change, the vul-nerability of the city to climate change impacts, and amoral argument about “doing our part” without relyingon the “collateral damages or benefits” track. See SanFrancisco Department of the Environment and SanFrancisco Public Utilities Commission, Climate ActionPlan for San Francisco: Local Actions to ReduceGreenhouse Gas Emissions, 2004, http://temp.sfgov.org/sfenvironment/aboutus/energy/cap.pdf (accessed27 September 2004).

68. B. Metz et al., eds., Climate Change 2001: Miti-gation, Contribution of Working Group III to the ThirdAssessment Report of the IPCC (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 2001); S. Pacala and R.Socolow, “Stabilization Wedges: Solving the ClimateProblem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technolo-gies,” Science, 13 August 2004, 968–72; and R.Socolow, R. Hotinski, J. B. Greenblatt, and S. Pacala,“Solving the Climate Problem: Technologies Availableto Curb CO2 Emissions,” Environment, December2004, 8–19. This is not to suggest that this transitionwill be easy, as the social and political barriers to scaling-up even available technologies are formidable.

69. A. Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology—The‘Issue-Attention Cycle,’” The Public Interest 28(1972): 38–51.

70. A. Mazur and J. Lee, “Sounding the GlobalAlarm: Environmental Issues in the U.S. NationalNews,” Social Studies of Science 23 (1993): 681–720;and D. W. Moore, “Public Sense of Urgency aboutEnvironment Wanes,” The Gallup Poll Monthly 355(1995): 17–20.

71. Osbaldiston and Sheldon, note 44 above.

72. Note 7 above, all authors.

73. R. L. Olson, “Sustainability as a Social Vision,”Journal of Social Issues 51 (1995): 15–35.

74. Ibid., page 33.

75. Ibid., page 34; Olson is summarizing the classicwork of historian F. Polak, The Image of the Future(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1973).

Documents

MAKING CLIMATE HOT