The Mobility Technical Appendix provides further detailed information on the mobility and street design-related proposals in the Master Development and Implementation Plan, as well as information on their potential application in the Toronto context.

Most relevant sections: Vol 1 (Quayside Plan, River District Concept Plan) / Vol 2 (Mobility)

© 2019 Sidewalk Labs. The content, documents and materials contained herein are considered Sidewalk Proprietary Information.

Master Innovation & Development PlanTechnical Appendix

TITLE: Mobility Technical Appendix A: Enabling Rapid TransitAUTHOR: Sidewalk Labs

ABSTRACT

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Appendix A: Extending transit along the waterfront Summary ................................................................................................................................... 2

Key Components in Brief ........................................................................................................................... 2

Forces That Shaped the Plan ................................................................................................... 2

1. Observations: the necessity of, challenges to, and opportunities for extending rapid transit along the Eastern Waterfront ...................................................................................................... 3

2. Furthering the objectives of existing policies and plans ............................................................... 7

3. Public and expert input ........................................................................................................................ 10

Alternatives considered ............................................................................................................................ 12

Sidewalk Labs’ Proposed Role ............................................................................................... 14

Components Deep Dive ......................................................................................................... 14

LRT services ................................................................................................................................................ 14

Accelerating LRT expansion through financing innovation ............................................................ 20

Bus services ................................................................................................................................................ 22

Accessibility considerations ................................................................................................................... 23

Next Steps ................................................................................................................................................... 23

Projected Outcomes ............................................................................................................. 24

Transit ridership & mode share .............................................................................................................. 24

Accessibility of economic opportunities ............................................................................................. 25

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Summary A rapid transit backbone is crucial to creating a transit-oriented Eastern Waterfront, but there is neither dedicated funding for this major transit investment, nor the foreseeable prospect of any. Innovating on financing mechanisms, such as leveraging value capture, would help enable a phased expansion of light rail transit (LRT) along the Eastern Waterfront.

Key Components in Brief

Target improvement area(s)

Component Description

Connect the Eastern Waterfront via rapid transit

Light rail transit (LRT) expansion

A phased plan to embed LRT as the mobility backbone of Quayside and the Eastern Waterfront

Catalyze delivery of new transit infrastructure

Value capture financing mechanism

Given the lack of public-sector funding dedicated to the Eastern Waterfront LRT, provide a new financing mechanism that allows government to raise debt for transit investment, serviced by future increases in nearby land value

Connect the Eastern Waterfront via rapid transit

Bus services Anticipated bus service updates on the Eastern Waterfront to best complement the LRT

Forces That Shaped the Plan Sidewalk Lab’s active transportation plan is shaped by three forces:

1. Sidewalk Labs’ understanding of the necessity of a rapid transit backbone and its associated challenges and opportunities

2. Existing governmental plans and priorities 3. Input from experts and members of the public received in the public consultation and

engagement process

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1. Findings: the necessity of, challenges to, and opportunities for extending rapid transit along the Eastern Waterfront Quayside and the Eastern Waterfront cannot be developed without rapid transit. Numerous studies and approved plans have affirmed the importance of rapid transit for the Eastern Waterfront (Table 1). The area forms part of the eastern and western downtown "shoulder areas," where population and employment growth over the next few decades are poised to outpace most other parts of Toronto.1 Quayside is located approximately 700m (10-minute walk) from the nearest streetcar stop at King and Parliament and about 2 km (25-minute walk) from the nearest subway stop. Bus service in the area today, even before the significant population build-up and road congestion to come, is poor: the #72 (Pape), #75 (Parliament), #6 (Bay), and #65 (Sherbourne) routes are affected by congestion on their namesake streets, and this delay and unreliability cascades into the waterfront portion of the service. In 2018, on-time performance of these bus routes hovered around a mere 60% (Figure 1), far below TTC’s bus on-time performance target of 90%.2 The #72 Pape bus, today the only bus connection between Quayside and Union Station / the Financial District, exceeded the TTC’s peak-period crowding standard during the 2018 assessment.3

1 Waterfront Toronto. (n.d.). Attachment 1 – Waterfront Transit Network Plan Planning and Technical Background – toronto.ca. Retrieved from https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2018/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-110750.pdf, page 4. 2 Toronto Transit Commission. (2019, March). Toronto Transit Commission CEO’s Report – ttc.ca. (Rep.). Retrieved from https://www.ttc.ca/PDF/About_the_TTC/CEO_Report/CEO_Report_March_2019_Update.pdf. 3 Toronto Transit Commission - Chief Customer Officer. (2018, May 8). Capacity Improvements on Bus and Subway Services - ttc.ca. (Rep.). Retrieved from http://ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2018/May_8/Reports/7_Capacity_Improvements_on_Bus_and_Subway_Services.pdf.

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Figure 1. 2018 on-time performance of bus routes near Quayside

Data source: TTC, On-time Departure Report. Accessed March 9, 2019. Without rapid transit connections, Quayside and Villiers West residents, workers, and visitors will depend heavily on automobiles for trips to and from the neighbourhood. Congestion stemming from Quayside and Villiers West will add to the growing trip demand — and road congestion — from the already-completed and ongoing real estate developments along the Queens Quay East corridor. Stantec’s analysis of 2025 traffic conditions in the area shows significant degradation of traffic flow on Queens Quay during AM (Figure 2) and PM peaks (Figure 3), if there are no enhancements to mobility services and no changes to the proposed road network.

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Figure 2. Projected intersection level of service near Quayside for AM peak, 2025, absence of any mobility enhancements (including rapid transit expansion)

Figure 3. Projected intersection level of service near Quayside for PM peak, 2025, absence of any mobility enhancements (including rapid transit expansion)

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This increase in congestion will have several deleterious outcomes. First, it will decrease the quality of life for all travelers, wasting time for everyone involved. Second, it will create deadweight loss: the difficulty of accessing Quayside and Villiers West in a timely and convenient fashion will discourage some travelers from making the trip at all, meaning that some jobs, residences, and commercial and leisure activity will go unfilled. This latter outcome will have a further effect on the pace and type of development for Quayside and Villiers West. Given the ongoing demand for living space in Toronto, it’s likely that condos will be built along the eastern waterfront, without rapid transit it is likely that significant office and retail space — generators of jobs and economic development — will not come to the neighbourhood. Without rapid transit, Quayside and Villiers West is likely to suffer a similar fate. That would be a tragedy not only for the district, but for the city as a whole: office development is crucial to Toronto’s TOcore plan, which aims to accommodate approximately 300,000 new jobs downtown by 2041, particularly in the east and west.4 Design enabling true LRT quality of service The new rapid transit infrastructure for the eastern waterfront should be true LRT rather than a traditional streetcar service. Streetcars in Toronto mostly operate within dense downtown urban grids, which feature close stops and mixed traffic. Taken together, these conditions result in service that is limited in speed and often features vehicle bunching. The fastest streetcar line in Toronto, #501L, has a scheduled speed of only 15.7 km / hour during weekday morning peaks, shortchanging rapid transit’s speed superiority over private vehicles in congested downtown corridors.5 The rebuilding of Queens Quay East and re-development of the Port Lands offers an opportunity to provide true LRT service. Doing so would mean designing and building new transit infrastructure with dedicated right-of-way for transit vehicles, increasing the distance between stops to permit faster operating speed, and utilizing intersection signals that offer transit priority to minimize wait times. Financing innovations to tackle delivery challenges The principal challenge facing LRT expansion is the lack of public funding commitments to support and deliver this new transit infrastructure. The TTC’s capital budget for the period 2019-2028 contains no funding for the project, not even for initial design work.6 While the Province has made a recent major transit announcement, including a possible new “Ontario

4 The Globe and Mail. (2018, December 04). 'Hyper-concentration' of jobs occurring in Toronto's downtown, report says. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/toronto/article-hyper-concentration-of-jobs-occurring-in-torontos-downtown-report. 5 Toronto Transit Commission. (n.d.). Toronto Transit Commission Service Summary. (Rep.). Retrieved from https://www.ttc.ca/PDF/Transit_Planning/Service Summary_2019-03-31.pdf. 6 Toronto Transit Commission. (2019, January 24). Toronto Transit Commission 2019-2028 Capital Budget and Plan. Retrieved from https://ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2019/January_24/Reports/10b_2019_2028_Capital_Budget_Blue_Pages_Updated.pdf.

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line” running from the Ontario Science Centre to Ontario Place, neither the province nor the federal government have announced any funding for waterfront LRT. While Sidewalk Labs is fully supportive of traditional, public-sector approaches to funding and financing the LRT, jurisdictions around the world use other tools to fund and finance transit. Eastern Waterfront LRT could take advantage of these innovative (in Ontario) approaches to accelerate its delivery. One possible approach — value capture — is discussed later in this chapter.

2. Furthering the objectives of existing policies and plans Rapid transit for the Eastern Waterfront has been subject of extensive studies and approved plans for transit investment. All of these agree on what the fundamentals of eastern waterfront rapid transit should be, namely a network of light rail lines, in dedicated rights-of-way, providing broad-based coverage to the area, feeding into Union Station, the broader Toronto streetcar network via King Street, and the forthcoming East Harbour transit hub (which will feature commuter rail, Smart Track, subway Relief Line, and LRT service). Table 1. Relevant policies furthered by Sidewalk Labs’ rapid transit proposal (in reverse chronological order)

Plan Publisher Clause(s)

Waterfront Transit Network Plan (2018)7

City of Toronto “The results of the study and latest travel demand forecast confirmed the direction of previous initiatives to create an exclusive streetcar right-of-way (LRT) from Legion Road and Lake Shore Boulevard in the west to Leslie Street and Commissioners Street in the east. This direction is consistent with land use projections to 2041 where it was found that the waterfront will outpace most other areas of the City and Region in terms of growth.”

2041 Regional Transportation Plan (2018)8

Metrolinx (p.49) “These new corridors and extensions will complement the existing network, and continue the momentum of North America’s largest rapid transit expansion program: . . . Waterfront East LRT — New light rail transit corridor along the waterfront; links downtown Toronto, the Port Lands, and the Beach.”

7 City of Toronto - Deputy City Manager. (2018, January 10). Waterfront Transit Network Plan. Retrieved from https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2018/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-110749.pdf. 8 Metrolinx. (2018, March 8). 2041 Regional Transportation Plan For the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area. (Rep.). Retrieved from http://www.metrolinx.com/en/docs/pdf/board_agenda/20180308/20180308_BoardMtg_Draft_Final_2041_RTP_EN.pdf.

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Downtown Mobility Strategy (2018)9

City of Toronto (p.57) “In the absence of new rapid transit lines, surface transit routes serving the growing Downtown and surrounding areas have experienced a significant increase in transit demand. Recent development proposals have also generated requests for new north-south surface transit capacity in the eastern Downtown, as well as connections from the Downtown into the Port Lands.”

East Bayfront Transit Environmental Assessment (2010)10

Waterfront Toronto, Toronto Transit Commission, City of Toronto

Recommended providing LRT service in a dedicated right-of-way on Queens Quay.

Port Lands Planning Framework (2017)11

City of Toronto, Waterfront Toronto

(p.81) “Twelve objectives define what is to be achieved in the Port Lands and measure success. . . . #6. Enhanced physical, social, and visual connections will connect the Port Lands to the city. These connections include a network of fine-grained public streets with animated streetscapes, higher-order transit, new bridges, enhanced pedestrian and cycling connections, and the renaturalized Don River.”

East Bayfront Precinct Plan (2005)12

Waterfront Toronto (p.15) “The East Bayfront inherently helps achieve Sustainability Principles in the following ways: . . . Making public transit, cycling, and walking the primary modes of transportation.”

Numerous local stakeholder groups have also called for rapid transit investment as a necessity for the Eastern Waterfront’s development (Table 2). Table 2. Other local stakeholders who have called for the Eastern Waterfront rapid transit

Study / statement Publisher Excerpt(s)

Economic Impact Study: Acceleration of the Implementation of

Waterfront Business Improvement Area

(p.4-5) “With the accelerated build of the Waterfront East LRT, there will be increased productivity of workers and residents that will live along the Waterfront. Mode shares are assumed to shift, with an increase of 15% public transit mode share for new residents/workers. In downtown Toronto, it is assumed that there will be a decrease of 44% of automobile use by incoming residents and workers in the corridor which

9 City of Toronto. (2018, April). Downtown Mobility Strategy. (Rep.). Retrieved from https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/9700-downtown-mobility-strategy-city-panning.pdf. 10 Waterfront Toronto. Toronto Transit Commission. City of Toronto. MRC. (2010, March). East Bayfront Transit Class Environmental Assessment. Retrieved from https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/waterfront/611b92f5-1201-48ff-ac74-2f3de96dc609/ebf_environmsntal_study_report_1.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 11Portland Planning Framework Section 3. (n.d.). (Rep.). Retrieved from https://portlandsto.ca/wp-content/uploads/Port Lands Planning Framework_Section3.pdf. 12 Waterfront Toronto. (2005, November). East Bayfront Precinct Plan. (Rep.). Retrieved from https://waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/waterfront/71663e82-9ef0-4ff1-af30-ab9ef9ef2342/4491a914d1783.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.

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Toronto Waterfront East LRT (2019)13

contributes to reduced congestion and productivity gains. Delaying the build of the LRT from 2025 to 2045 could cost about 100 million person-hours (cumulative from 2025-2045), which monetizes to time savings of about $1.8 billion. Tax Revenue Uplift:

- The costs of delaying the LRT project is approximately $3.8 billion in tax revenue to the Province of Ontario between 2025 and 2045.”

Waterfront Commuter Survey (2019)14

Waterfront Business Improvement Area

Workers who reside in Toronto, and GTA residents commuting to the downtown, would significantly increase their transit use with the Waterfront East LRT

Official statement15 Code Blue T.O. “CodeBlueTO agrees: adequate, early funding to build transit needs to be a priority as we move forward on the Port Lands.”

“Waterfront East LRT: Will This Ship Ever Sail?”16

Steve Munro, Toronto transit advocate

“I can’t help thinking of the Waterfront East transit scheme and its LRT network as a cousin of that derelict ship, Captain John’s Restaurant, a dubious diner recently closed for nonpayment of rent and utility charges. Like Captain John’s, the transit plans never leave the dock, and the outside promise, the drawings, the bold “transit first” planning, is never quite matched by the dwindling bill of fare. Toronto seems destined to view transit with a few buses and, maybe, reserved lanes as good enough for the waterfront, and to stop planning seriously for anything more.”

Letter to Toronto City Council, 2012-02-0717

3C Lakeshore, Inc., on behalf of: • Corus

Entertainment • George Brown

College • Hines Corporation • Tridel • Great Gulf Homes • Other East

Bayfront landowners and investors

“All of the aforementioned stakeholders made significant initial investment totaling well into the hundreds of millions of dollars on the promise and expectation of LRVs connecting this burgeoning community [i.e., on Queens Quay east of Yonge] to the wider transit system and Union Station. . . Not only will it [i.e., LRT expansion] ensure success for the City’s waterfront objectives along East Bayfront, without this critical piece of infrastructure, any development initiative in the Portlands further east will not be taken seriously. . . the future of our waterfront is at stake.”

13 The Waterfront BIA. (2019, January). Economic Impact Study: Acceleration of the Implementation of Toronto Waterfront East LRT. (Rep.). Retrieved from http://www.waterfrontbia.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Waterfront-BIA-Waterfront-East-LRT-Economic-Impact-Study.pdf. 14 The Waterfront BIA. (2019, March). Waterfront Commuter Survey. (Rep.). Retrieved from http://www.waterfrontbia.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/WaterfrontCommuterSurveySummary_March2019_TheWaterfrontBIA.pdf. 15 Codeblueto. (2012, May 31). Supporting the people's plan for Toronto's Port Lands. Retrieved from https://codeblueto.com/post/24127312470/matt-elliott-build-waterfront-transit-now-or. 16 Steve. (2012, September 04). Waterfront East LRT: Will This Ship Ever Sail? (Updated). Retrieved from https://stevemunro.ca/2012/09/04/waterfront-east-lrt-will-this-ship-ever-sail. 17 Landowners and Investors on the East Bayfront Corridor Between Yonge and Cherry Streets. (2012, February 7). LRV's - East Bayfront. Retrieved from https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2012/cc/comm/communicationfile-28492.pdf.

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3. Public and expert input Public input The public engagement process made clear the need to make Quayside and the broader waterfront into transit-accessible places. Public input — the Reference Panel, dozens of comment cards left by visitors to 307 Lake Shore, and every public roundtable — emphasized the importance of connecting Quayside to the rest of the city. There is a shared, strong desire that Quayside’s transit planning and decision-making are coordinated with the rest of the city.18 Relatedly, the public has expressed the hope that the project will bring opportunities to improve Toronto’s transit service at large, testing and demonstrating innovations that, in collaboration with the public agencies, will be eventually be introduced throughout the rest of the city.19 Figure 4. Select public feedback comments collected regarding public transit

18 Sidewalk Toronto. (2019, May). Sidewalk Toronto Residents Reference Panel. (Rep.). Retrieved from https://sidewalktoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ST-Residents-Reference-Panel.pdf; Sidewalk Labs. (2018). Summary Report Roundtable 1-4. (Rep.). Retrieved from https://sidewalktoronto.ca/documents; Sidewalk Labs Toronto Office Comment Cards. (March.2019). Title (Comment Cards Left by Visitors of the Sidewalk Lab’s Office). Sidewalk Toronto. 19 Sidewalk Toronto. (2019, May). Sidewalk Toronto Residents Reference Panel. (Rep.). Retrieved from https://sidewalktoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ST-Residents-Reference-Panel.pdf; Sidewalk Labs Toronto Office Comment Cards. (March.2019). Title (Comment Cards Left by Visitors of the Sidewalk Lab’s Office). Sidewalk Toronto.

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Expert input Sidewalk Labs consulted extensively with local experts on Toronto transit in the design of the LRT proposal, including the former and current affiliates of the Toronto Transit Commission, University of Toronto, and local transit advocacy. Several themes emerged from that consultation which Sidewalk Labs has taken seriously in its LRT work. Those themes included the importance of the following:

• Serving the waterfront with an extension of existing streetcar/LRT service, rather than introducing a new or competing technology

• Introducing rapid-transit service simultaneous with, or in advance of, new residential or commercial development, and the damage to transit mode share that would result if this principle was not respected

• The importance of value capture, not only to accelerating implementation of LRT infrastructure along the waterfront, but also to adding this tool to Toronto’s toolkit for funding new public works

• Connecting new service to multiple points in the existing streetcar network, rather than at Union Station alone

• Linking new service to Union Station by means of a new portal at Bay near Yonge, and a rebuilt access tunnel, such that eastern waterfront LRT is connected directly

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to Union Station rather than via people mover, or moving sidewalk, or any other approach

Alternatives considered Bus rapid transit (BRT) BRT systems provide transit service by bus, and typically feature the following characteristics: frequent service, operation of buses in their own rights-of-way, typically located in the median of roadways, prioritization of transit vehicles at intersections, and off-board or all-door fare collection. The combination of these features allows buses to deliver truly rapid transit. In Ontario, both York Region and Ottawa operate this service, as do cities around the world. Advantages of BRT for the eastern waterfront include the low cost of implementing BRT (typically half the cost of LRT); the speed with which BRT can be implemented — BRT ROWs do not require the complex electric infrastructure that LRT ROWs do, and buses may be procured ‘off the shelf’ rather than through extended commissioning processes; and the fact that existing plans already call for dedicated rights-of-way for transit throughout the neighbourhood. Against these advantages, the disadvantage of BRT in the eastern Waterfront is the lack of station infrastructure in or around Union Station to accommodate boardings and alightings. Union Station itself has no TTC bus terminal, nor has it scope to add one. The nearby GO bus terminals — i.e., the existing terminal and the terminal under construction — also do not have the capacity to serve waterfront BRT. Lack of appropriate station infrastructure to anchor BRT service at the western terminus makes BRT a poor choice for waterfront rapid transit. Tram buses with vehicle-guidance systems A tram bus is a bus that is powered by electricity, delivered either by overhead wires or ground-level power supply. Such tram buses may be augmented with vehicle guidance systems. Such systems orient themselves in space by means of on-board sensors which detect exterior markers, and in so doing permit precise navigation of their routes and parking at their stops. The markers in question may be visual (typically paint), detected by cameras; magnets embedded in the right-of-way, detected by on-board magnets; or the curb itself, detected by guide wheels. They are predominantly deployed in Europe, including in Barcelona, Geneva, Brussels, and Hamburg. Tram buses with vehicle guidance systems offer all the advantages of BRT. Beyond these, they also use electricity for motive power rather than gasoline, with the concomitant savings on fuel costs and lack of polluting emissions. The vehicle guidance systems allow for precision stopping at stations; buses always align themselves exactly with the station length, and stop only centimetres from the platform. As a result, dwell times are minimized and accessible boarding is always possible even in the absence of a ramp. In the event of an obstacle in its

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path, the driver of the tram bus may simply disengage the guidance system and pilot the bus around the obstacle. This technology is not recommended for waterfront rapid transit for the same reason that BRT is not — there is no prospect of a western terminal station that could support such buses. Additionally, introducing a wholly-new type of vehicle to the TTC’s fleet — neither a conventional bus nor a streetcar — would require significant increases to the TTC’s maintenance budget. Parts for these systems would need to be procured, stored, and maintained, and new staff would need to be trained and retained to keep them in service. Such a diseconomy of scale would not serve Toronto well, unless the TTC was prepared to see use of this technology on the waterfront as a pilot for introducing it throughout the city.

Trackless trams So-called ‘trackless trams’ are vehicles with LRT-like capacity, but operate on rubber tires as opposed to on rails. This is made possible by the use of vehicle guidance technologies — GPS, LIDAR, optical sensors, and paint markings on their routes, etc. — to achieve quasi-autonomous operation. For motive power, they use onboard batteries, which may be rapidly charged at stations. They are constructed on chassis that are lower and wider than buses, reducing the effects of inertia on passengers. Trackless trams exist in some Chinese cities, notably Harbin and Zhuzhou, and have gained traction in Australia.20 Judging from pilots and deployment to-date, the key advantage of trackless trams is the ability to offer LRT-esque ride experience and capacity, without needing as much time and money to install tracks. Furthermore, they are a potential bridge for transit agencies to leverage the benefits of automation, as their navigation capabilities are built towards partial, and eventually full, autonomous operations.21 By the same token as BRTs, though, they suffer all of the demerits of BRT and guided trams: lack of an appropriate western terminal, and the diseconomies of scale associated with new technology. In addition to these, it remains unclear how well the trackless tram’s battery power and LIDAR guidance systems might function in Toronto, given that previous instances of trackless tram have been built in snow-free environments.

20 "智轨"电车在哈尔滨市试跑受市民追捧. (2019, April 03). Retrieved from http://www.hn.xinhuanet.com/2019-03/04/c_1124189059_3.htm; 马路“地铁”株洲试运行 列车在虚拟轨道上奔驰. (2018, May 16). Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-05/16/c_1122841030.htm; Parris, M. (2018, October 03). Should Newcastle be looking at an autonomous rail transit and trackless trams? Retrieved from https://www.theherald.com.au/story/5683518/should-newcastle-be-looking-at-an-autonomous-rail-transit-and-trackless-trams. 21 Newman, P. (2018, September 26). Why trackless trams are ready to replace light rail. Retrieved from https://phys.org/news/2018-09-trackless-trams-ready-rail.html.

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Sidewalk Labs’ Proposed Role As noted above, the importance of timely delivery of LRT, at or before the opening of Quayside and the other areas of the eastern waterfront to be developed, cannot be overstated. For this reason, Sidewalk Labs believes the plan for eastern waterfront LRT, which underwent environmental assessment in 2010, should proceed to implementation without further delay. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that will be the case. For all of its importance — and the City of Toronto did recognize the LRT extension as a priority project earlier this year (i.e., in Spring 2019) — it is competing for scarce resources with other important projects, many of which will improve service to existing constituencies, and as such are better positioned to garner political support. Recognizing this reality, in its most recent capital budget, the TTC allocated no funding for design of eastern waterfront LRT anywhere within the planning horizon, which extends as far as 2028. Even if such funds were made available in 2029, the likely five-year duration of the project to design and construct LRT infrastructure suggests that service to the eastern waterfront will not arrive before 2034, long after development has already arrived.

Because LRT service is imperative to achieving the aspirations of the Master Innovation and Development Plan (MIDP), Sidewalk Labs is willing to help accelerate delivery of the project through provision of financing support. The form of that support is open and subject to negotiation with the relevant orders of government. It is also wholly supererogatory to the MIDP as a whole — if government prefers to finance LRT without Sidewalk’s assistance, Sidewalk will withdraw its offer without issue. The point of the offer is, and only is, to ensure that LRT arrives in a timely manner.

In concrete terms, Sidewalk Labs is prepared to offer up to $100 million of credit support, in two tranches of up to $50 million, each tranche to serve a different phase of the LRT extension (details below), to be repaid at a fixed rate of return. The financing would be offered at market rates to be negotiated, with a commitment from Sidewalk Labs to work with governments, pension funds, and other institutional investors to develop transaction structures to reduce the rate as much as possible while still attracting the necessary financing.

Components Deep Dive

LRT services Sidewalk Labs’ proposed Eastern Waterfront LRT configuration (Figure 6Figure 6) is mainly based on the plan as specified by the Port Lands and South of Eastern Transportation Master Plan, approved by Toronto City Council in January 2018 (Figure 5). Sidewalk Labs’ plan also includes several modifications, for reasons detailed below.

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Figure 5. Proposed LRT alignment, as specified by the Port Lands and South of Eastern Transportation Master Plan

Figure 6. Maps of Sidewalk Labs’ proposed LRT network, by phase

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Sidewalk Labs has grouped Waterfront LRT implementation into three phases. The configuration, scope, and phasing considerations are based on projected latent demand for LRT and cost estimates of each segment (Table 3). Table 3. Cost estimates by LRT segment

Segment Segment Name Segment length (km)

Subtotal (millions CAD)

Phase 1

1 Union Station to Queen's Quay, via rebuilt tunnel 0.3 $341.0

2A Bay to Bonnycastle, via Queens Quay 1.35 $271.0

3A Distillery Loop to Queens Quay, via Cherry St 0.25 $47.2

Phase 1 subtotal $659.2

Phase 2, IDEA District

2B Bonnycastle to Cherry, via Queens Quay 0.35 $71.9

3B Distillery Loop to Queens Quay, via Cherry St 0.25 $47.2

4 Queens Quay to Commissioners St, via Cherry St 0.45 $48.6

Phase 2, IDEA District subtotal $167.7

Phase 2, beyond IDEA District

5 Cherry St to Broadview Extension, via Commissioners St 1 $131.4

6 Commissioners to Unilever lands, via Broadview 0.3 $9.4

7 Commissioners to Ship Channel/Polson Pier, via Cherry 1 $97.5

Phase 2, beyond IDEA District subtotal $238.3

Phase 2 total $406.0

Phase 3

8 Broadview Extension to Leslie St, via Commissioners St 1.5 $102.8

9 Commissioners to Queen, via Leslie (stop infrastructure only) n/a $24.8

10 Cherry to Commissioners, via Queens Quay East and eastern Villiers Island (note: not part of approved City plan; Sidewalk Labs suggestion)

0.4 $75.1

X Parliament underpass improvements N/A $77.7

Phase 3 subtotal $280.4

TOTAL $1,345.6

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Phase 1 estimates were developed by the City of Toronto as part of its Q1 2019 costing exercise for a rebuild of the Union-to-Queens-Quay streetcar tunnel. Other estimates were developed by the consulting firm WSP, using high-level estimates for the cost-per-element embedded in each segment, which include trackage, electrical infrastructure, bridges and underpass rebuilds, and vehicles for anticipated service levels. These estimates are appropriate for this stage of planning; they would need to be refined as part of the design process if the proposal proceeds. As discussed above, Sidewalk Labs is prepared to offer credit support for delivery of LRT infrastructure within the IDEA District.

Phases 1 and 2 (IDEA District) These phases include the segments along Queens Quay and Cherry Streets, as well as a new portal to the (to be rebuilt) tunnel connecting Queens Quay to Union Station. These components form part of the City’s approved plan, and correspond to Segments 1-4 of the Sidewalk Labs plan. These segments connect Quayside into the city’s rapid transit network at Union Station and at King Street via Cherry. These segments have already undergone environmental assessment. These two phases would proceed simultaneously; the distinction between them has to do with financing their delivery. The segments that make up Phase 1 serve areas of the waterfront that have already been well developed, and as such, are ill-suited to be financed through tax-increment financing (about which more in the next section). Accordingly, Sidewalk Labs believes these segments should be funded and financed in the traditional manner, through a partnership between the relevant orders of government. Conversely, the segments here which fall within the IDEA District do seem apt for delivery via tax-increment financing, and for that reason, Sidewalk Labs is prepared to offer up to $50 million in credit support to assist with implementation. Achieving the expected headways for LRT and bus service in Quayside and beyond will require close attention to the timing of signals at intersections. During peak periods, LRT headways in Quayside will be as short as 3.5 minutes. Traffic lights will need to be closely coordinated in order to permit light rail vehicles to arrive when they are expected.

Phase 2, beyond IDEA District This phase includes segments on Commissioners Street and Broadview Avenue and an extension of Cherry Street south from the temporary turnaround loop on Villiers Island over a new bridge to a new turnaround loop on Polson Quay, immediately north of the Ship Channel. These components also form part of the City’s approved plan, and correspond to segments 5, 6, and 7 of the Sidewalk Labs plan. These segments serve development on the eastern part of Villiers Island, the McCleary district, and Polson Quay, and connect these neighbourhoods, as well as Quayside and Villiers West, to the forthcoming East Harbour transit hub via Broadview. Sidewalk Labs, as discussed previously, is prepared to offer an additional $50 million in credit support for the segments of Phase 2 that fall outside of the IDEA District.

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Phase 3 Phase 3 includes service to the eastern Port Lands and north of the Keating Channel. This phase includes segments that should be built just prior to the development of these areas, in order that these new residential and commercial neighbourhoods may open with excellent transit service in place. This construction comes last because, as per Sidewalk Labs’ analysis, this area will be the last to develop. In the case of the former, though the portions of the LRT network east of Broadview (Segments 8 and 9) are part of the approved plan, the latent passenger demand, per Sidewalk Labs’ analysis, is too low to justify the expense of this investment in the near term. The principal value of these segments is to connect the new network with the Leslie Car Barns at Leslie and Lake Shore. While this segment would be useful for efficient transfer of vehicles to and from that maintenance facility, that value must be weighed against the cost of infrastructure that will serve negligible demand. Once the area is poised for development, though, the equation will change. Similar considerations apply to Keating Channel. Once the Gardiner redesign has been implemented, it is reasonable to suppose new development will emerge on the north side of Keating Channel, and that that development will require LRT service. Once that development is poised to emerge (but not before), it will be appropriate to consider adding service along Queens Quay east of Cherry, bending south to Commissioners Street via Villiers Island. Finally, the rebuild of the Parliament underpass will be a valuable contribution to the overall improvement of pedestrian mobility networks at Quayside. Sidewalk Labs believes there will be economies of scale associated with undertaking that project in tandem with the necessary rebuild of the Cherry underpass within Phase 1, but further analysis of how and when that work is undertaken will be necessary. In general, LRT infrastructure should be installed, where possible, in the initial build of the new streets to be laid out in Quayside, Villiers Island, and the Port Lands in the coming years. This LRT infrastructure includes track foundations, power supply conduits, and reservation of space for pole bases (that will ultimately support the catenary) and switching equipment. Provision of these matters during street layout will save money against an alternative where streets are retrofitted to accommodate them later. This is certainly true for Phase 1, and may be true for Phases 2 and 3, depending on available public fiscal capacity.

The Union Station connection The question of how eastern waterfront LRT should relate to Union Station was open for some time, as interested parties mulled over the relative merits of a funicular-style people mover between the Union TTC station and Queens Quay, versus a rebuild of the existing streetcar tunnel between those points. In March of 2019, City of Toronto staff reached a conclusion, which was endorsed by City Council in April, namely that the latter option for a tunnel rebuild was most appropriate.

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In the opinion of Sidewalk Labs, this is the right choice. A rebuilt tunnel offers a lot of value to people traveling to and from the eastern waterfront. As per Sidewalk Labs’ own modelling, most trips to and from the neighbourhood include a leg of the trip at Union Station, where travelers connect with the GO rail or bus network or the Yonge-Union subway. On the one hand, this connection helps achieve Sidewalk Labs’ goals of a high transit share of trips in Quayside and beyond, but on the other, the fact that riders have to change from a GO vehicle or a subway car penalizes those riders by adding non-travel time to their trips (the so-called ‘transfer penalty’). To keep the transit mode share high, it is important to minimize the extent of that penalty, and adding an additional trip — whether of people-mover, moving sidewalk, or any mode other than direct transfer to LRT — is inconsistent with that goal. Indeed, if the penalty was too high, there would be a permanent depression of ridership to the eastern waterfront, limiting the extent of development, and consequently of new housing and jobs there. Thankfully, the City chose otherwise and endorsed a rebuilt tunnel connection. The downside of that choice is the associated cost. By the City’s estimates, it will cost between $650 million and $700 million for this project. Separating out the associated LRT link from Yonge to Parliament, which Sidewalk estimates to cost approximately $150 million, results in an estimated cost for the tunnel rebuild at $500 million or more, making the Union-Queens Quay segment easily the single most expensive link in the eastern waterfront LRT network. That cost reflects, to a certain extent, the work’s complexity. Uniquely among project segments, this job will require tunneling, subterranean construction, coordination with a variety of affected landowners in a crowded space, and competition between undertaking the work and maintaining existing service (in this case, streetcar service to the western waterfront and Spadina via the tunnel). This project segment seems most apt for traditional funding. The connection with Union Station — which serves Toronto travelers via the subway, interregional travelers via the GO network (and the farther reaches of the Yonge-University line), and even interprovincial travelers via the Via train network — means that the work is of significance to all three orders of government, and hence should have a claim on their funding outlooks. Further, as per the City’s own modeling work, almost half of the travelers who will take advantage of the new tunnel are beginning or ending their trips in the immediate vicinity of Queens Quay and Bay, a highly-developed area that is not only far from the eastern waterfront, but also is significantly built up, meaning the innovative financing tools that Sidewalk proposes to support the development of the LRT (see next section) cannot deliver meaningful funds here. For all of these reasons, funding by government to deliver this vital public asset seems most appropriate.

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Accelerating LRT expansion through financing innovation A policy tool called “value capture” could be appropriate for accelerating financing if traditional approaches do not materialize. Using this mechanism, a government uses the increase in property-tax revenue near a proposed new transit investment to service the debt that the government has incurred to make that transit investment. This reduces the amount of upfront funding that a government has to have, without privatizing the transit ownership or operations. Value capture’s effectiveness requires a significant delta between the value of relevant lands before and after the proposed transit investment. Quayside, Villiers Island, and the Port Lands offer ideal circumstances for implementation of value capture. Though they lie in close proximity to Toronto’s downtown and its principal transit hub at Union Station, these lands are significantly underdeveloped, thanks to their history as flood-prone industrial sites that are practically unserved by any transit. Given the flood-proofing work currently underway, the principal barrier to their development is the lack of good transit service; if such service was provided, the value of these lands would rise significantly, which could in turn be captured to offset the cost of providing the service. Legislation to permit one form of value capture, tax-increment financing (TIF), was passed by the Ontario Legislature in 2006. However, since the government of the day did not proclaim enabling regulations, value capture is still out of bounds today. To promulgate the enabling regulations, the Minister of Finance could, after carrying out public consultation, draft appropriate regulations and submit them to the Lieutenant-Governor, who would sign an Order-in-Council to put them in force. No input from the Legislature is required, meaning the process does not depend on the political calendar. One reason that TIF is not more widely used in North America, and perhaps why the regulations to permit TIF in Ontario have not been promulgated, is that the revenue from development begins to arrive well after implementation costs for new service are incurred. This gap between financing costs and offsetting revenue has typically meant that investors seek a third party to fill the void by paying those costs until new development has advanced far enough that the property tax associated with that development may do so. As outlined above, Sidewalk Labs has proposed an approach that seeks to address this problem by offering certain credit support (pursuant to detailed terms to be agreed upon by the parties). This credit support could reduce the size of the gap that would be borne entirely by the public sector.

Precedents Using value capture to help offset the cost of Eastern Waterfront LRT would be a first for Toronto, as it has not been used in the city before. However, value capture has been used in Calgary, Winnipeg, and throughout the USA, Europe, and Asia to fund new public

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Sustainable Urban Goods Logistics Achieved by Local and Regional Policies (Rep.). (2011, November). Retrieved http://www.sugarlogistics.eu/pliki/handbook.pdf

infrastructure. Below is a case study on Denver’s Union Station redevelopment, which has a similar structure as the proposed financing plan for the Eastern Waterfront LRT.

Case Study: Denver Union Station Redevelopment Denver Union Station (DUS) is a large-scale, mixed-use development — consisting of residential, office, retail, hotel, and transit uses — in downtown Denver, Colorado. The following description of the project is taken verbatim from TCRP Research Report 190: Guide to Value Capture Financing for Public Transportation Projects.22 The Denver RTD (RTD), the regional transit agency, acquired the 19.5-acre station site in 2001 and cooperated with the Colorado DOT, the Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG), and the CCD to implement a master plan to redevelop the station into a multimodal transportation facility bringing together light rail, commuter rail, intercity rail, bus, parking, taxi, pedestrians, and bicycles. The vision for the station was that of a mixed-use TOD that would become a hub of urban activity including office, retail, and residential uses. The plan’s public elements was expected to cost about $480 million, including accommodation of various transportation modes and multiple capital investments in buildings, rail and bus facilities, and public spaces. Legal Steps The partners undertook a number of structural legal initiatives to make DUS a reality. These included measures to provide access to funding sources— tax-increment financing (TIF) and special assessment districts— as well as innovative finance programs. Regulatory and institutional initiatives undertaken by DUS partners included:

• Intergovernmental agreement: The intergovernmental agreement (IGA) was originally intended to memorialize the contributions of each of the four public partners to the purchase of the historic building and site and to acknowledge RTD as the property’s fee owner, managed through an executive oversight committee. This was not a legal entity, and it did not have the power to contract. Eventually the group established a legal authority, the Denver Union Station Project Authority (DUSPA).

• DUSPA: DUSPA was created as the legal entity for the purpose of managing, financing, and implementing the project, including issuing tax-exempt debt, something that was lacking under the IGA. All four government partner agencies and the private partner participated in the governance of DUSPA.

• Denver Downtown Development Authority (DDA): DDA was created by statute. DDA had statutory authority to use TIF, which lasted for 30 years (5 years longer than a TIF through urban renewal authorities) unless obligations were retired earlier. The DDA plan area included the DUS project area (19.5 acres) plus an additional 25 acres. DDA entered into an agreement with CCD to remit TIF to DDA, which DDA pledged to pay debt incurred as part of DUS. Certain taxing entities were excluded from the DDA area and TIF payments, including the Central Platte Valley Metropolitan District and Cherry Creek Subarea Business Improvement District DDA.

• DUS Metropolitan District Nos. 1 through 5 (Met Districts): The CCD established “Met Districts,” statutory metropolitan districts that levied property taxes (like special assessment districts). Boundaries of Nos. 1 through 3 included the 19.5-acre site, and those of Nos. 4 and 5 include Market Street station. The districts had the following characteristics: o These Met Districts were not-for-profit corporations organized by CCD for managing, financing, and

implementing the DUS. o They were defined as “enterprises” under Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights, each with authority to

issue revenue bonds and operate “on behalf of issuer” for federal tax purposes (allowing issuance of tax-exempt debt).

o During the TIF period, revenues generated from the 20 mills of incremental property tax would be payable through DDA, and thereafter for an additional 11 years, payable through the Districts.

22 Transit Cooperative Research Program (2016). Guide to Value Capture Financing for Public Transportation Projects. (Rep.). Retrieved from https://www.ssti.us/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/TCRP-report-on-value-capture-editted.pdf.

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Following master plan approval, the DUS partners led a request for qualifications (RFQ) process that led to the master developer selection of a master developer. DUS partners selected Continuum/East-West Development Partners (now called Union Station Neighborhood Company or USNC) from 11 competing entities in 2006. USNC was able to propose a lower budget of $480 million, which was much lower than the budget originally envisioned by planners. This was achieved, in part, by putting all light rail, commuter rail, and intercity rail facilities at grade. The bus station, however, was located below grade, with some changes in configuration. RTD entered into a letter of intent in 2008 to develop the station site, and DUSPA later entered into a contract with the master developer, USNC. Kiewit Construction would complete the transportation elements of the work under a guaranteed maximum price contract. USNC would receive a development management fee of $10.4 million to plan and design elements of the site, and USNC committed to purchase various development parcels from RTD that would eventually total $27 million and agreed on a takedown from 2010 to 2015 to retain the rights to develop. Financing DUSPA originally assumed a financial plan based on tax-exempt securities to be sold in financial markets and serviced from RTD’s FasTracks allocation ($208.8 million) and CCD TIF revenue. Unfortunately, during the global financial crisis, the tax-exempt markets were not viable when needed. In response, DUSPA turned to federal agencies and funding sources. DDA pledged all tax increment revenue (at a millage rate of 67) for 30 years to DUSPA in order to secure and repay the federal Railroad Rehabilitation & Improvement Financing (RRIF) loan. Property taxes (20 mills) generated within the DUS project area for 11 years after the TIF expired were also pledged, which was an approximate 30% increase over the underlying base tax rate. In addition, RTD pledged $165 million of sale tax funds from FasTracks, RTD’s major transit expansion program at that time. The RRIF loan was secured by the full faith and credit (city-contingent commitment) of CCD. In the event of a shortfall in revenue available for debt service on the subordinate loan (RRIF), CCD would request that the city council appropriate up to $8 million annually during the term of the loan to make up any such shortfall.

Bus services East-west bus service through Quayside, Villiers Island, and the Port Lands will largely be redundant after completion of Waterfront LRT. Accordingly, Sidewalk Labs anticipates that the TTC will retire the 72 Pape bus service as currently offered once Waterfront LRT is implemented, and will terminate the service at or near the intersection of Carlaw Road and Commissioners Street. Similarly, any seasonal bus service offered along Unwin Avenue east of Cherry — proposed in the Port Lands and South of Eastern transit plan — will be redundant to Waterfront LRT service there and may be retired once Phase 2 of the LRT is built. North-South service along Parliament, currently offered by the 65 Parliament bus route, is expected to continue into Quayside, rather than terminating at Front Street as it does now. Service will presumably continue south on Parliament to Lake Shore, and then proceed east via Lake Shore to Silo, south to Queens Quay and then westbound, co-located with the Parliament Plaza LRT stop. Stopping to allow passengers to board and alight at the bus stop on Queens Quay, bus service will turn northbound on Small Street, and turn east at Lake Shore before returning northbound along Parliament. In a similar fashion, while few buses will pass through Quayside, the 65 Parliament bus is expected to travel northbound on Small Street, turn right onto Lake Shore Boulevard and then

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turn left again onto Parliament Street Given the distance between the Small and Parliament intersections with Lake Shore is approximately 100m in length, buses will only be able to make this movement if the signals at these intersections are synchronized.

Accessibility considerations The most critical accessibility considerations and commitments reside within TTC’s mandate — accessible transit vehicles and stop designs. Sidewalk Labs fully supports TTC’s latest accessible vehicle and stop designs.

Next Steps Given that the proposed light-rail extension to the eastern waterfront has already been approved by the City of Toronto and completed environmental assessment, the next step is to secure financing for the project. As noted above, Sidewalk Labs is prepared to offer financing assistance to help expedite delivery, but this offer is supererogatory to the Master Innovation and Development Plan, and Sidewalk would happily withdraw it if government prefers to rely solely on public funding and financing for the project. Stipulating that the LRT extension receives the financial guarantees necessary to proceed, next steps for Sidewalk Labs includes working with the City and the TTC to help develop a phasing plan for extension of service to the eastern waterfront. The element of the project that will be the lengthiest and most costly to deliver, and is most likely to suffer delay, is the connection between Union Station and Queens Quay, including the tunnel rebuild and construction of the portal to surface level (including finalizing the location of that portal). It will be important to ensure that construction on other segments proceeds simultaneously with that work and that temporary measures to ensure continuity of service are put in place while the work is underway.

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Projected Outcomes Transit ridership & mode share Table 4. Sidewalk Toronto LRT Ridership Projections

Year LRT Line All Day Am Peak

2025 Union — Queens Quay 17,878 6,373

2041

Union — Queens Quay — Port Lands — Broadview corridor

53,029 15,490

Cherry — Keating — Unwin — Broadview loops

19,902 6,808

See Appendix G: Modelling and Transportation Analysis, “Developing a model for mobility innovation: the G4ST” for model inputs and assumptions.

Sidewalk Labs’ travel demand model forecasts that, with the transit investments, about 43% of trips to and from Quayside will be made via transit. Working together with the other proposed mobility strategies, the light rail service as modelled will lead to transit mode share of 57% (Figure 7). At the scale of the IDEA District, 61% of trips to and from the area will be made by transit, in conjunction with all mobility strategies (Figure 8).

Figure 7. Forecasted modal splits for travels to/from Quayside, 2025

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Figure 8. Forecasted modal splits for travels to/from the IDEA District, 2041

Accessibility of economic opportunities With the LRT, Quayside residents could reach about 32% of projected jobs across Toronto by transit within 30 minutes and 47% of jobs within 45 minutes. As the Eastern Waterfront grows as a major employment area — enabled by rapid transit service — transit access to employment will be even higher. Residents living in the IDEA District could reach about 36% of jobs across Toronto by transit within 30 minutes and 51% of the jobs within 45 minutes. Table 5. Job accessibility within 30 and 45 minutes of transit travels

Jobs accessible within transit travel time

Transit travel time

Quayside (2025)

% of Toronto jobs (2025)

The IDEA District (2041) % of Toronto jobs (2041)

30 min 531,991 32% 737,303 36%

45 min 791,091 47% 1,015,348 51%

Assumed total number of jobs in Toronto: 1,673,588 in 2025, 1,999,103 in 2041. See Appendix G: Modelling and Transportation Analysis, “From GTAModel v4.0 to G4ST — Sidewalk Labs’ adjustments to the model — Baseline setting adjustments” for data source. For additional model assumption details, see Appendix G: Modelling and Transportation Analysis, “Developing a model for mobility innovation: the G4ST.”