Milrev_apr1967

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In This ISWP

~What Is the Threat?

~ CafiadianUnification

~ VietnamGroundWar

2“2.S&M UN!VERs~

ryx4,Jl 41ENTS April 7

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UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL

STAFF COLLE6E, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

COMMANDANTMajor General Michael S Davison

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

Brigadier General Robert C Taber

The MilitaryReview is published by the United States ArmyCommandand Gemi

Staff College in close association with the United States ArmyWarCollege. It provikrl

forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, rvItivJ

securityaffairs,and on doctrinewith emphasis at the divisionand higherIevalsof com~

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ilitary Review\Professional Journal of the US rmy

Canadi an Uni f i cat i on . . Wg Cdr J. Gel l rrer , Royal Canadi an Ai r Force, Ret

The Command?r and Civi lWi t ery Relat i ons . . LTC Irvin M . Kent , USA

The Cot f p D’ Et at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C. E. S. Dudley

6mt ran Reserves and Replacement s . . . . . . . . Er i c Wal dman

Inchon The 6enerat ’ s Dec i si on . . . . . CPT H. Pat Toml inson, USA, Ret

Ho’s M ist ake . . . . . . . . . . . . MAJ Dave R. Palmer, USA

M ossow and t he Chinese M issi l e . . . . . . . . . , Fri t z Ermart h

What Is t he Threat ? . . . . . . . . COL Irving Heymont , USA, Ret

India’ s Al t ernat i ves . . . . . . . . . . Bri g R. D. Law, Indian Army

Il rmrnd Warf are in Viet nam . . . . . . . . . . Ant hony Harr igan

~wf dsh Army’s Rol e in Nat ionbrr i l di r rg . . . . . COL Cl i f t on C. Fox, USA

Operat ion M ol dau . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . Anonymous

A New Look at t he M int i emen . . . . . . . MAI John R. Gal vin, USA

Waapons f or Int ernal Oef ens 1970. 80 . . . COL Alvin C. Isaacs, USA

Webi l i t y Wi t hout Wheel s, Wings, or Bl ades . . COL Char les M . Tyson, USA

~i y Not es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4+

F

ry Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

9

14

21

28

35

40

47

5B

80

88

75

80

87

92

87

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: The VIEWS expressed in this ma ezirre ARE THE AUTHORS’ and not neoeseerily those of the

fkrny or the Oommsnd and Genera Steff College. ,

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Edftorin Chief

COLDonaldJ. Delaney

Associate Editor

COLJohn B. McKinney

ArmyWarCollege

AaafstantEditor

LTCA, LeroyCovey

FaatsrrasEditor

LTCCharlesA. Gatzka

ProductionEditor

Helen M. Hsll

Spanislr-AmarisanEdftw

MAJJuan Horta-Merly

BrazilianEditors

LTCPaulo A, F. WanaLTCWalterJ, Fauathri

PublicationOflicer

MAJNormanC. Murray

Art and Design

CharfesA. Moore

OonaldL. Thomas

MILITARY monthlyby the U.S. Arm Command StsflSollege Fort&PW3V-Publlshed #ndGemorslrmwerth,Kansasin EnIlsh,Spanish,andPortuUWO.$SIof fund!ror h+Inllngof this publlcEtiOObermspprowdby Has% o0varters,D@artmerrt the Army,28 May1X!&

SSOOIId.SiaSSestagc rdat ort hawmwrth, Kansas,svbscrkwonwree,S4.00IUScur~e~ ehag the UnitedStates,f%tedStatesmillrSIYIOtiOfnM*,dthesamimfrle$fiich sreme~d

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7

(Estractedfrom a speech by PresidentLyndonB.VIETNAM lohnwn,Washington, 19S7).C.,10January

We are in Vietnam because the United States of America and

our allies are committed by the SEATOTreaty to ‘act to meet the

commondanger of aggression in Southeast Asia.’

We are in Vietnam because an int ernat i onal agreement signedby the UnitedStates, North Vietnam and ot hers in 1962 is bei ng system

at i cal ly violat ed by t he Communists.

>

That v iolat ion threatens the independenceof al l t he smal l nat i ons

in Southeast Asia and t hreatens the peace of the ent i re region and,

perhaps, the wor ld.

We are there because t he peopl e of Sout h Viet nam have as much

r ight to remain non-Communist , i f that is what they choose, as North

Vietnam has to rererainCommunist.

We ar e t here because t he Congress has pledged by solemn vote

to tak e al l necessary measurest o prevent fur ther aggression.No bet ter

words could describe our present course than those once spoken bythe great Thomas Jefferson.

‘ I t is the melancholy law of human societ ies to be compel l ed

somet imes to choose a great evi l in order to ward of f a greater avi l . ’

We have chosen to f i ght a l imi t ed war in Vietnam in an at tempt

to prevent a l arger war-s war that ’ s almost cer tain to f ol low, I

bel i eve, i f the Communists succeeded in overrunning and t aki ng over

Sout h Vie t nam by aggressi onand by f o rc e . I bel i eve , and I am suppor t ed

by some author i ty , that i f they are not chec ked now the wor ld can ex

pect to pay a greater pr ice to check them later .

..

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!SERVICE IN CANADANIFICATION

Wing CommanderJohn Gellner, ReMalCamre%mAir Force, Retired

ILL C-243, the Canadian Forces

Reorganization Act, is now ba

fore Parliament. It will still have come

rough going both in committae and

onthe floor of the Houee, but, barring

such drastic developments as the fall

of the present government, it eeems

assured of final paseage, perhaps by

nest summer. Its basic provision, in

stilon 2 of the act, then will become

law: “The Canadian Forcee are theanneal forces of Her Majesty raieed

by Canada and coneist of one Service

called the Canad]an Armed Forces.”

Thie ia a revolutionary departure.

Air forcee ara treated es weapons

branchee of a eingle service in some

countries—for example, Switzerland

-but nowhere is this the case withthe naviw. Furthermore, nowhere elee

bee the fundamental reason for oneservice--the indivisibility of modern

Wer-been established and then made

the basis for a complete reorganiza

tion of the defense establishment.

Canada’s ie, of course, an experi

ment. It could turn out badly in its

Practical application. If thie happens,

Ml 1337

the Canadian armed forces will have

been eeriouely harmed for ycare to

come. If it turns out well, and there

is no reaeon why it should not, then

Canada will have set a precedent of

the utmost importance, aapacially to

the world’s middle and smell pewers.

These countriw are being forced, just

as Canada is, by the growing axpen

sivenesa of military power into the

greatest possible rationalization oftheir defenee organizations. The uni

fication of the servicee ia surely the

ultimate in such rationalization.

It must not be thought that Canada

embarked on large-scale experimenta

tion with her armed forces juet for

the sake of testing a new model or

ganization, even if it was one whicheooner or later had to be tested soma-where. Caneda went into it bacause

ahe had to and because she could af

ford to try. This dual motivetion—

neceeeity and opportunity-is moat

important for understanding, the Ca

nadian unification scheme.

The political climate in Canada page

the defense ‘budget at 1.5 IAlli;ii dol

3

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wE.~ l sf l cmom

)are at the approximate dollar value

of 1662. TMs WS8 the year the pres

ent Liberal Government came to

power. There ie a modest yearly in

crement of about two pement to tiecare of inflation, so that successive

Defense Eetimatee have been for ap

proximately 1.626, 1.560, and 1.672

billion doUara. However, it is still only

1.5 biSUon in real 1962 dollars, and,

perhe~ not even quite that. Of tide

cum, 18ss than 1.4 billion actually go

to the three servicee. The balance ie

for eundry extraneous expenditure

such ae mutual aid or peneione.

Volusltw Fwses

Canada bee all-volunteer forces. No

other method of recruitment ie pelit

ieally Peseible in tbie country in time

of peaca. Gmeequently, the per cnpite

coet of the services is high. Taking

ee a meaeure only the more or less

tied expenditures shown in the Op

erations and Maintenance Stilon of

the Defense Estiitee-wldch covers

neY. . . allowances. maintenance of build

ings and materiel, and eoete of cur

rent operation-it amounte to more

than 10,000 dollare a year per man.

The result is that operation and

maintemuwe hea been taking an over

growing, pmpetilonately much too

high ehare of the total money avail

abla to the three services. Correapend-

Wing Commander John Ge41w,Rou04 Canadian Air Force, Retired,

was born in T&te and educnted inAuEh+a, France, and CcecheeZueakia.He practiced tiW in (?zecho8kw0.kiOuntil 1989 when b came to the UnitedStite8. He ealiet8d {n the RCAF upontb outbreak of World War II, andemved until hi8 retirement in 19S8.Commander GeUner is Editor Of Cemmentatir, a political nq7m”ne, cen

tributea to other publioatimw, and hueIeetwwd in tit-e United Statee.

4

ingly, the account for modarnicetioa

-construction and aequieition of w

jor equipment-bee been pm

sively decreasing in actual dollare esd

ee a proportion of the entire budgttIn the 1966-66 Defenee EetimeX &@

lest before the present reerganimtkm

showed any effects, the tlguree wen

1.119 billion and 268 milUon dolleq

rea@lvely, and the ratio betwm

tixed coete and funds for moderniw

tion wee more than four to one.

HEWEspsaditurssA projection made in 1961 indicated

that, if the dafenae budget remained

dxed, expenditure for operations end

maintenance would be equal to the

tot,al allotment for defense by Fiscal

Year 196S-69 with notMng laft for

new equipment. Even with the pm

vieion of the already mentioned two

percent increment for infletioq *

rainy day could not be peetpened for

more then one or two years, and this

only if some new fixed expenditera

would not epeed ite coming.

A pay increase which was effectht

1 October 1966 did so, and adde to

the budget an extra 62.6 miUion dol.

lara yearly. Ae the VbM Chief of tt+Defense Staff, Ak’ Marshal F. R.

Sharp, acid in a speech in Lendou

Ontario: ‘TIrdeae eometMng wee dom

we would price ourselves out of exisb

ence.”

The question wee what could la

done about it. Tha Canadian Geverw

ment dld not want to fail on ita coo +mitmente to North Ameriean defen%

to the North Atlantic Treaty Orgaei

sation, to the United Nations, and to

amrdler but atiil important domeetic

tasks. The only eolution wee to fuldll

all cmnmitmente with fewer inct.elb

tiorw and men. Hencq the radk.al *

tioneliaation came into being wbiCbeervice unification makes pmeible.

MilitwyRwiw

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... _..

UNIFICATION:

The other motivation for service

unification was opportunity, or free

dom to experiment. It must be re

membered that Canada hoe for the

last 96 years been in the extraordinary position of not bating to worry

about her passive security. She was

in no serioue danger of having her

territory, coastal waters, or air space

invaded. In the Treaty of Washing

ton in 1871, Caneda acquired a per

manently undefended border to the

south.From then until 1945, her ocean

tkmkewere secured mainly by British

mapower.And the belt of arctic waste

land to the north wae practically im

penetrable in the then stete of mili

tary technology. ‘

InviolataArea

From 1945 onward, with the center

of gravity of international relatione

atdftcd to the United States-Sovietcompetition for world leedershlp, Can

ada has, militarily, been the strategic

forefieId of the United States. She

thus is an aree wh]ch the world’s

mightiest power hae to keep inviolate

in its own interest even if it were

not treatybound to do so. The Cana

dian military establishment has al.WSYSeerved, and stiil serves, onlytbe country’s active security which ie

to help further Canadian political pol

icies.

This has been done traditionally by

SCtii se second to a principal-Great

Britain until the end of the Second

World War, and the United Ststee

since 1945. ca~dian defense planning

was, therefore, a relatively simple

matter. With one eye on available re-

SOUreesand the other on what the

principalwae doing, Canada produced

Zddhions to the latter’s military

drengtb, and organized, trained, and

equipped to fit. in with her military

W@izetion.

Before Hiroebhna, tMe did not pre- “

sent particular problems, It wee WY ;

to keep in stip with the Brit~h con- \

cept of conventional warfare, and then J

to produce a number of battalion, :4squadrons, and flotiltze on tbe British 3

PSttSrII. This was done in a smell way ~

5 laal

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UNIFICATION

Canada tried to do so until 1963,

In fact, unable to finance the frequent

changea the United States decided, or

was forced, tomekq she always hob

bled more or lese far behind. In thespring of 1963, Paul T. HelIyer came

in with the new Liberal Administra

tion as Minister of National Defense,

He was convinced that the simple, sec

ond-principal relationship no longer

C.z.udi.. arm .%nt<nelIwo.

Generrd Jean V. Allsrd, Chief ef theDefense Staff, Canadian armed forces

served, that it wee wasteful for Canada, and was of limited usefulness tv

the United States.

Consequently, he formed a Canadian

defense pelicy which was based on Ca

nadian military thinking and attuned

to Canadian capabilities and require

ments, including, of course, that of

cooperating militarily with the UnitedStaten and the we&em coalition Ied

by the United States. He thue became

the architect of the thorough reergani

aation Of the Canadian military es

tablishment based on a new definition

of missions, on service integration,

and, ultimately, service unitlcntion.

This complete overhaul has been

possible becmine Canada is pawively

secure as long as the United States

is strong. The work now hdng done

should result, if all goes well, in

greet)y enhanced Canadian active SS

curity which should benefit this coun.

try and ite friends and allies.

Nsw PrimaryMlsalona

In determining what Canada’s prin.

cipal military mission should be, both

the general politico-military situation

in the world and the role Canada isplaying in it had to be considered,

The feet that Canada needs to he

seriously concerned only with her SC.

tive security was the obvious etsrthgpoint of all considerations. The prob

lem wae to determine what kind of

militiry pelicy would do Canada the

greatest goed politically in terms of

helping her to achieve her natural

aims of peace, prosperity, and devel

opment in freedom; of maintainingher alliances; and of buying influence

where this is needed.

Clearly, this would not be achieved

by concentrating on the deterrence of,

and the creation of a capability to en

gage in, unlikely conflicts, General

nuclear war, limited nuclear war-

these two anywhere in the world-ormajor conventional war in Europe are

all possibilities but, fortunately; w

mote ones. Canada is committed to

contribute militarily to warding OR

these remote threats, and does so hy

participating in the North American

Air Defense Command and NATO.

ObvioirsIy, a much more usefo~pract.icel, and politically more reward

ing task can be performed by Canadr

keeping flexible and mobile forcfs

ready for the deterrence, and if nerd

be the fighting, of lower mule armrd

eonflicta. Such confllcta could include

ineurgent ware, civil wars extended

by foreign intervention, and llmitd

conventional wars jn the old etyla

MllltwyRariR

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..

With no specific interests, Canada

would, ss a rule, act as restorer or

keeperof peece in such confScta where

diplomacy has failed.

Logically, then, it ie thie missionwhich has bean made the principal one

for the Canadian armed foreee. It

must not be understood ae encom

pzseing only the type of UN police

MIOUSin which Canada has engaged

in the pest, and is engaged now in the

Sinai Peninsula (United Nations

Emergency Force) and in Cyproe(United Nations Forces in Cyprus).

It is not, ss Mr. Hellyer put it, merely

a matter of “blue berets and billy

sticke: but of having a fighting force

capable of intervening in a great va

riety of situations.

OneWar,Ona ServiceLimited conventional confllcts are

fought with all the means for fight

ing them applied together toward a

single aim: victory within the politico.

miIitary limitations resulting in a

favorable peace. The question iswhether the eingle purpose of the in

divisible war can be achieved better

by eeveral armed services acting in

esordination, or by one eervice withcotomon doctrine, personnel and ma

teriel planning, training, and epirit.

There can be litfle doubt that, thee

reticelly, one service is beet. It isalso the obvious eohrtioh because the

historical reasons that did exist for

a division have either dieappeared, as

in the ease of the separation of sea

end land warfare, or have never been

valid, as ie the czee of the reparation

of air from sea and land warfare.

‘Rwe traditional divieions in the pact

beve resulted in intereervice competi

tion and wrangling which were detri

mental to the over-all cause in time

of peace, and in inefficiency and mis

takes in war.

M 1ss7

“ ;” “ “ jUNiFICATION

All count?iee in the Second World

War probably suffered diflicultiee be

cauee the cldefe of the three services

bad different backgrounds, and thus

different outlooks. Fortunately, thesame difficulties were experienced in

countries on either eide of the figh~

ing lines. The moral would seam tobe that coordination is fine, but it is

even better if there is no need to

coordinate.

Tradition

Why, then, has unification of theservices never been attempted in prec

tice except now in Canada? The prin

cipal reason is, undoubtedly, the re

luctance to tamper with an existiig

organization wh]ch has eerved, albeit

not perfectly, for a long time. Tradi

tion also stands in the way. This is

partkxdarly true in the navies where

sea warfare wae of neceseity often

conducted in isolation from land op

erations.

In Canada, too, navy men are the

strongeet opponents of service unifi

cation. One rezzon for oppeeition is

typically Canadian. It steme from the

type of inferiority complex which Ca

nadians have in military affairs. Theydo not-doubt the fighting prowess of

their men, but they are dubious about

the qualifications of their leaders ae

military thinkers. This attitude ie, no

doubt, a throwback from the yeare

during which Canadian strategy was

made in I.andon and later in Waeh

ingten. It is shown in the questione

that are being asked: why do we have

to he the ftret to try? Are we really

capable of behg the first?

Service unification was set as the

ultimate goal in the “WMte Paper on

Defenee” of March 1964i mere are

no readings on the effeete of uni5ca

tion hacauee the servicee are not yet

unified-they cannot be until Parlia

7’

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.

.’ffNIFICAlfON

rnent approves. The preliminary work

of integration, of combhing paraSeI

functions while rnaintrdning the tri

aervice structure, is, however, far ad

vanced. Actually, it ie virtually com

pleted.

BN C-90, which became law on

1 Auguet 1964, mtablished a single

Chief of the Defense Staff to replace

the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff

Committee and the Chiefs of Staff of

the three servicca. This wae followed

by the formation of a single Canadian

Forceq Headquarters, and six func

tional commands-mobile, maritime,

training, materiel, air transport, and

air defens%ncompaesing the activ

ities of all three eervicee which had

totaled 11 commands.

In 1966 the service skzlls were in

tegrated. There were formerly 346 in

the three services. Now, there are 98,of which 28 are unique to one service,

and 70, from cook to aircraft engine

mechanic, common’ to two, or to all

three. In these common skills, mem

bere of the thrco services are inter

changeable and are, in fact, already

being interchanged as the need arises.

Bill C-243, when it becomce law, willintroduce the outer signs of unity:

a common rank structur+the ranke

will be the present ones of the army

with some slight meditbzationa-and

a common off-duty uniform.

Service integration is still too new

to have produced any great number

of resulti measurable in dollars andcents eavcd, and even less of the more

ditlicult to measure rcaulbr in greater

general ettlciency and combat readi

nem. This will take tjme.

There are, however, already some

encouraging indication. Each of W

cervices looked after ite own strategk

communications, Iandlines, teletype f~

cilitiee, and relay and filter centers

This required S,S07 personnel. TbI

three orgardnations were Integratd

into a eingle Canadian Forcee Commu.

nioations System nearly two years ago

It is run by 2,9S0 personnel with t

payroll saving of close to one and ~

half million dollars a year. A simiim

amount is being saved by the eIimiru

tion of formerly duplicated and trip

licntcd faciIitiea, both owned catleased, and of some plants that bav{

become redundant.

The ma] benefits from having {

single communications system arc

however, yet to come. Plans are un

derway te automatize it f(rllj. Tbi

would not have been economical witl

three smaller organizations, but wilbe with a single large one. This wil

lead to a reduction by 600 in man

power alone, or altogether by 22 psr

cent compared with the original ea

tablishmenti. The system is also m

pccted to be vastly more et?lcient.

In a recent speech in Montreal, Que

bee, General Joan V. Allard, Chief othe Defense Staff, said that all in d

“there has been a saving of over 14

million dollars since integration br

garr.” This is welcome because i

mearm that a substantial aum has kea

freed for the procurement of rim

equipment. Material efdciency is o d

onet t

Canadixf the revolutionaryplan.’ Operational efficiency is tb

other, and the more important, 1

Canada paem both, she will undoubledly have many followtwa in the worl

who will want to go the same way.

.8

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ml 1967

-

Lieutenant Colonel Irvin M. KenG Um’ted Stote8 Armu

The views eworeesed in thie artislo are the aw

thor’e and are no; nsceeearily those of the Depart-

ment of the Army, Department of Defense, or the

J7S Army Command atzd General Staff College.—Editor.

1914 a hard-pressed French Army moved severalthousand men from one flank to another, counterat

tacked, and restored a desperate situation. There was

nothing particularly unueual in the maneuver except thatthe movsment wae made by means of the civilian taxicabfleat of the city of Paris.

In 1940 another hard-preeeed French Army was unable to control the flow of civilian refugees along its main

eupply and reinforcement routes and found itself defeatedwithout even a chaneo to commit a large portion of its

reserves to action..

In the eummer of 1944, as US armies ewept acrossFrance, a eerioue ehortage of fiv+gallon gasoline cans

threatened to wreak havoc with the logistic ayatcm oftour forces. Thousande of these cans had been jeWleoncdby our troope in their haete to pueh on with the pursuitof the fleeing German armies. These cane were scattered

alqng the tielde and roade of France. A large-scale andihighly eucceeeful paychologicel campaign was directedtoward the echool children and other young people ofFrance to find, collect, end turn the cane in to the rtser

eet US unit or installation. WhSe many cans ware never

recovered, the responec of the children of France waeextremely helpful, and the worst aspccte of the ebortage

were thus overcome. ”

9

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CML-MS.ITARYEI.ATIONS

In 1945 commanders of US military

forces found themselves exercising full

executive, legislative, and judicial au

thority over millions of conquered peo

ples on both sideti of the globe.In the 1960’a the eronmanders of

several major US Army unita found

themselves and their unita committed,within the continental United States,

to enforce the orders of the civilian

courts.

For the past several years, the

commanders of Bolivian Army unitsand their US advisors have found

themselves fully committed to the

movement of people from the Alti

plano to more fertSe lowland areas.

Thie action caused them to use the

medical, engineering, and transporta

tion facilities of their unite to im

prove the lot of segments of the civilian populace.

Today, commanders of posts, camps,

and stations both at home and abroad

find -themselves engaged in attempt

ing to influence surrounding commu-

nities to provide housing, education,

and recreational facilities for their

personnel and their dependenta with-Lientenmt Colonel Irvin M. Kent

is un”th the Awge Advocate Section,l WbJmWt8r8, US Army Air D8fS7WSGomnwnd, Ent Air Fercs Bass, Cole-rao SF”ngs, Colorado. He /sol& aB.A. degree from S@wuse Universityin New York and an LL.B. from Har-vard Law School, Cambridge, Ma.

cha+retts. Hie assignments inclti dutgwith tks Oflice of the Staff Judge Ad-vocate, US Artwg CommdcationsZone, Europe, and with the US ArmyCombat Devehrpnwnte Command, CivilAraire Agetwg, Fort Gorckm, Geor-gia. A frequent contributor to tlwMnrrAIw REVIEW,his meet recent ar-tidv, “Hard SkU/a and Drepowte/ ap-

peared in the Dscember 1966 ieeuc.

a..

out discrimination because of race 01

color.

In the Republic of Vietnam, td

South Vietnamese ArmY units and Uunits are frequently engaged in at

tions designed to protect the bermand safe storage of the rice crop frw

the ravages of the Viet Cong and tbei

“taxation:’

MajorActivities .*Each of these vignettes of miii,

history illustrates one or more of.

seven major activities which tog

make up a military commander%’terest in his civil-military relatior civil affairs as they are eelle&

the US Army. These are: ~

Provision of civilian suppwtand prevention of civilian intc

ence with tactkal and logistic o1

tions. “s

Providing or supportingfunctions of government for a ci “

4population.

Community relations of theitary forces. ‘,

Military civic action se ‘pati”

internal deve~opment operations. ‘

BfSitsry patilcipation in a

ulace and resources control proas part of internal defense operati

Military support of civil defe ,

Consolidation psychological owations.

Each of these seven acti&.ies coal{

be illustrated by additional example

However, the examples given are mfbcient to identify civil affairs for whs

they are-the commander’s relatiouchips with Ida civilian environmsdThis scope is so broad that. no one sub

ordinate organization or eingle std

section could hope to encompass aUathe operations that deal with or affa

civil-military reiationehips.

Obviously, procurement offices mw

continue to purchsee or requisitb

Mmly u

. Ai10

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


civilians, assist in the preparation of

Plansand orders to implement that

@cy, and provide staff supervisionb oversee that implementation.

The field of logietics is almost

qually diverse in its manifestations,

butno commander would think of PUt

@3 himself in a position where hekid to @nvaaa all of Me general and

~wial stiff seetions and major sub

~:l%a,

geon, provoat marshal, and logistics

officer, as well as from ids major sub

ordinate unita. This is a difficult and

time-consuming procedure.

In some respeate, civil affairs isakin to intelligence. The acquisition

of information about the enemy ie the

business of many elemente of the

Army. The denial to the enemy of in

formation about our forces is the busi.

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


CNIL-MlltTARYELATIONS

ness of every member of the Army.

Intelligence and counterintelligenceoperations are planned and supervised

by specialists, but only a small per

centage of the total effort ia performed by specialist personnel. Never

theless, the intelligence element of thecoordinating staff can provide imme

diate and detailed information to thecommander on the whole intelligenceand counterintelligence situation. The

civil affaire problem should be handled in a similar manner.

Experience hae taught us that, whenwe deny to a commander the profes

sional toole he needs for an essential

tack, we have not relieved hlm of anyresponsibility-we have eimply made

all of hie tasks more difficult, To make

matters worse, most commanders havehad little training in civil affairs.

Too often, we eaddle commanders

with the necessity of doing their own

G5 work—not merely the making ofpolicy, which cannot be delegated in

any case, but aleo of doing the detail

work. Many commanders are forced

to parcel out the civil affairs job to

many etaff elements, with the risk ofgaps and duplication.

Central ContaotPointThe civilian-official or private cit

ir.en-who hae businese with a military command must hunt on his own

for the right man to see. Frequently,

he winds up at the wrong place or

finale himself talking to someone whohae only a peripheral interest in the

matter. The (25, on the other hand,provides a central point that can serve

as an initial contact for the civilian.Command policy can be explained and

proper arrangements made to do busi

ness with the appropriate staff sec

tion or euhordinate command. This at

least encourages good will, even when

the request cannot be fully satiefied.

To actileve civil affairs objectives,

the military commander engages ioone or more of the seven civil affairs

activities wideh affect the relation.

shlpe between hle forces and the civil

authorities and people in any area inwhich those forces are present.

PriorityActivityThe priority of command civil af.

fairs effort goee to that major $ivilaffairs activity moat directly related

to the mieeion of the military com

mand. Normally, consolidation psychw

logical. operations will be in supportof the other eix activities and will also

be geared to provide maximum support to the priority activity. Thus, in

1944 the priority civil affairs activitywas obviouely the provision of civilian

eupport for our tactical and logistic

operations, and the consolidation pw’

chological operation directed towardthe children of France was mounted

in eupport of that priority effort.The priorities of command effort in

this field of interest will be affected

both by the command miesion and by

the level of command concerned. Forexample, in the course of a etability

operation, such as that in Lebanon or

in the Dominican Republic, the com

mander of the US forcee was primar

ily concerned with the provision ofsupport to the civil government.

Nevertheless, the commanders of sub

ordinate units, while supporting the

over-all effort, might have differeotcivil affairs priorities.

The commander of the logisticalcommand committed in such an open

tion would he primarily concerned, ii

sofar as hie interest in civil affabr

activitke wae involved, in the provksion of civilian eupport for and Wprevention of civil interference Witi

hia Iogiatic activities. In eupport 0~

the over-~11 command mission, the IQ4

Mlllteryw2

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“ ;..

gietic commander might also partici

patein population and resources controland civic action activities, but thispwticipation would not change his

priority for civil affairs activities.

Priorities of command effort can

ideobe affected by a change in the-Isvelof conflict. Thus, a post, camp, or

station commander in the United

States normally accords priority of

his civil affairs effort to communityrelations.The outbreak of general war,

however, would mean an instantaneouschange in that priority to militarysupport of civil defense which couldwsii become the major activity of his

entire command.

8imilarly, the chief of a US MilitaryAssistance Advisory Group (MA

AG) in a country faced with a phase

i insurgency wouid be primariiy concsraedin the fieid of civil affairs with

smskmg host nation forcee in pianningand conducting miiitzry civic ac

tion. If the situation degenerated to@ase H, his emphasis shouid probabiy and properly shift to military

@Icipation in populace and resoureeacontrol.

If mattera became etill worse and

his host country were invoived in a

PhaseIII insurgency, his civil affairspriority would undoubtedly shift totheprevention of civilian interference

Withtactical counterguerrilia opera

tions. In each ease, the MAAG civil

Mr+irepriority of effort would match

thepriority of effort of the host countryforces.

Tbe allocation of resources to civiiaffairs activities muet also vary ac(wdfng to command mission and the

tharecteristics of the area, rather than~~lngohe size of the over-ali

Qiiftery force. Thus, Field Marshal

&raard L. Montgomery, wbiie com-

CIVIL-MILITARYE~TlONS

manding an entire army at the Battle

of Ei Alamein, needed only a emall

civil affaire staff to pian for civii af

fairs operations when he reached pop

ulation centers in Libya. On the otherhand, Lieutenant Generai Bruce

Palmer, Jr., with a force of 1SSSthan

two divisions in the Dominican Rc.

public, needed and, used the entirecivil affairs staff capability of the 18th

Airborne Corps and a fuil civil affairs

company to handle his. civii raffairs

probieme in part of one city.Civil affairs activities of any given

command may either be in support ofother command functions or may

themselves be the supported function.

Generally, the higher the ievel of conflict, the more likely civil affairs wilibe in the support role. In certain cases,

a command’s mission may require thatprimary attention be given to the civilaffaire function. There are four sets

of circumstances where this condition

will prevail:

Internal defeneedeveiopment as

sistance operations.

Stabiiity or other cold war opera

tion necessitating military support ofthe civil power outside of the continental United States.

Military support for the civil

power in the continental United

States as a result of domestic disturbances, disaster, or hostile attack.

Military government of occupied

territory after tbe conclusion of boa.tilities.

Taidng all of the published doe.

trine together, civil affairs adds UP to

being that branch of the military art

aimed at the intelligent handling of

our relations with civilians to best ea

sist the commander in the accomplish

ment of his mission.

13 MlSV

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From The Armu Quarterl Great Britain]

C. E. S. Dudley

RECENT years, the coup d’etatNhag come into its own as a meane

of seizing power from the legitimate

government of the state. It can no

longer be regarded as the prerogative

of Ruritanian revolutionaries. Since

World War 11, governments have

fallen in Czechotdovakia, Egypt, Syria,

Irsq, Turkey, Korea, and South Vietnam—to name but a few-as the result of successful coupe.

The Commonwealth bee not been

immune to this form of political ac

tivity either. Within the pact fewyears, the government of four newly

independent African territories havehad to face the threat ofs coup d’etat

launched from within. The failure of

all but one of these attempta (Zenzi

bar) wea due not only to prompt in

tervention by British troopc, but also

to the sheer ineptitude of the Ieadera

who, in each case, fMed to observe

the most elementary principles of nuch

an operation.

The COUPd’stat, like rebellion and

insurrection, is a method ofpower by illegal and violent meantUnlike the other two, however, it domnot require a large degree of pepuiu

eupport; on the contrary, it ie esemtially an operation for small, picked

elite. This does not mean that it wlU

not be used m part of the over.d

plan for bringing a mass uprieing &a succeeaful conclusion. In fact, *

Communis~ have utilized it in thb

manner eince the October Revolutkmof 1917 although they have attemptd

to dieguiae the fact.

The writinge of km Troteky me&the point clear that the coup and U@

mace uprising must be regarded aI

two separate undertaking althouti

they may be employed in conjunctiawjth one another. The dividing lb

between the two is semetimea a dM

one. Trotsky wae underetrmdably m

Iuctarrt to comment in preciue ~

on the retationabip between the *

apirecy and the Wmrrwtion. Aft8

all, he could hardly afford to MOW

14 Ullftxy*

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TSE COLIPD’ETAT

miciona that the October Revolu

a ro had ite root what heuse term “putschism or revolu

lnary a ven riem.”

Be that as it may, as a rule of~mb, it n e aseumed that, in an

am t“ n, t e massee are mobilisednef> e physical support of an at

npt to seize power, whereas their

Iein the COUPor “pure conspiracy”if they are allotted one at all—is

seive or for propaganda purposes

ly.A FactorsGeneral Franz Halder, in attempt-E to account for the failure of

e German ArmY conspiracy against

Iolf Hitler, declared that three mainndltions are “required for a succese-

I COUP:a clear and reeolute leeder

ip, the readiness of the masses toIlowthe idee of the revolution, ande right choice of time. Although one

ight quibble about General Halder’e

e of the word revolution (the COUPbut one of the weepone in the rev

kionary’s armory, it does not in it-If make a revolution), he appeare to

we pinpointed three vital factnre

hich muet he carefully consideredsing the planning stage of any coup.

The need for sound leadership is ob

OUS,There are, however, two dis

mt kinds of leadership required: thevr-sll politico-military leaderehi

Id the purely tactical leadership. 1

,nfueion is to be avoided, a clear d

Thie article waa digested fromthe original, pwbli.shed in THEARMY IABTEStLY ANO DEFENCEJOUBNALGreat Britain) October1968. Ccq@ghted @ 1966 bg THE$,,NSmmetLY AND DEPENCE

The a;ther ie presently serv-ing in the Saltan’8 armed fercee,

Mleeat.

vision of reepensibRity ie essential.

The first and most impertent of the

two will be concerned with over-efl

strategy and with providing the “tlex

ible orientation in changing conditions” stressed by Trotsky.

Dedicationto CausaOne particular characteristic ap

peare to be almost the hallmark of

successful conspirators: complete ded

ication to their cause, if neeeeeary tothe exclusion of all elee. Hit~eri who

wae something of an expert at thietype of infighting, never tired ofprezchlng the virtuee of “fanaticiemy

and history eeeme to indicate that it

ie, indeed, the fanatice who make themost competent conspirators. Men like

Colonel Claue von Stauffenberg andGeneral Ludwig Beck, courageous

though they were, never etoed a chanceonce they had failed to kill Hitler, if

only because their accomplices were

all too human.

One other point is to be noted: thel~dere of a successful coup will usu

ally be members of the military or pelitieel hlerareby. It would be mieleed

ing to overemphasize thle, hut the fact

remains that the COUSId’etat is primarily a weapon for the use of thoee

close to the santa of power. When or

.ganiead outeide theee circles, it is

likely, at beet, to degenerate into civilwar and, at worst, to take the form of

a purely hxal attack on the govern

ment.

Sometimes, however, the dynamicwill come from a foreign power

which, whether the coup succeeds or

not, may then intervene to establish

a puppet regime. Tids technique was

suicesefully employed by the Cemmu

niste in eastern Europe and more re

cently, but less effectively, by Preei

dent Gamel Abdel Nasser in Yemen.

In such eases, the over-all pelitice

15

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THECOUPO’ETAT

military Ieaderehip is likely to be pro

vided by the power concerned although local leadere and the rank and

file mnst be found from within.

General Halder’e eecond condition

—the willingness of the massee to follow the idea of the revolution—is

more complex. Under certain condi

tions, it ie poesible, if the conspirators are ruthless enough, to force anew government on a predominantly

hostile population. Nevertheless, thereis a minimum degree of support with

out which no government can survive.Once thie eupport has been achieved,the reactione of the remainder of the

population are of far Iese importance.

“ Generals ’ Revolt ”On the other hand, the sympathy,

or at least the neutrality, of the armed

forces is essential. But in a world of

almost universal conscription, it ie often difficult to draw a line betweey the

soldier and the civilian. The dangere

of a false appreciation of this factorwere clearly demonstrated by the 1961

“Generale’ Revolt” in Algeria. Its leaders, knowing that they could rely on

certain elite paratroop and Foreign

Mgion units, hoped te carry the restof the army in Algeria with them.

When they failed to do so, the revoltcollapsed.

General Halder’e last condition—

timing-muet be considered with re

gard to the international, domeetic,and @&lcal eituatione. It is unlikely

that, at any given time, all conditionat home and abroad will favor the con

spirators. They will have to balance

a number of constantly changing con

ditions, one against the other, before

deciding on tbe moment to strike. On

the international plane, they muetgauge the reaction of foreign powers.

In the domestic epbere, the conepir

atore must consider the economic and

8

Dolitical situation, the state of publii~pinion, and the likely reactions offriendly and rival political groups,

The tactical situation-the least im.

portant of the thre+need be consid.ered only ineofar as it will have a direct bearing on the immediate out

come of the coup.

Like any other operation demand

ing rapid and violent action, the coup

us Am!

General Franz Halder outlined three COBditions for a rmccemful COUP:smmleadership, eupport of the masses, m

timing

d’etut can logically be divided inti

three phaees: planning and preparstion, execution, and consolidation.

During the preparation phaee, ti

conspirators muet build up their oxganicstion so that they are ready t

strike when prevailing conditions arfavorable. In the modern etnte, it is

diftlctdt for all but the most ecrupu’

MllitelvRw@6

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]ous and proficient conspirators to

swid detaetion. Their work is made

more dangerous by the fact that pey

chologicatiythey must be on the offehsive, collecting information, recruit

ing new members, and makhg con

tacts. At the same time, funde mustbe raised, eezrecy preserved, and dis

cipline maintained. ‘

Ixistim Condit ionsThe-size and scope of the organiza

tionwill depend on exieting conditionsnedon the political outlook of its lead-we. It mw operate only within the

fmmework of the armed forces orjome existent political party; it maybe a maes movement with its ownhadow administration existing paral-

Isl to the state’s; it may employ the

Sfth-column technique used by Hitler,attempting to penetrate the ranks ofthe services, police, administration,

szd trade unions; or it may be a combination of the three.

Whatever form it takes, the conspirators will not necessarily be con

cerned solely with technical prepara

tions for seizing power should the

opportunity arise. If they adopt thispsssive approach: the movement will

probably become moribund. They

should, therefore, seek to create the

opportunity. To do eo, they must developa plan designed to tnm existing

@itical, ezonomic, and psychological

conditions to their own advantage.

Strizt]y speaking, however, their activities in thie field would not consti

tute part of the preparation for the

wup, but would fall within the scope

of other “departments of revolution.

W Politice.”Oneof the most important problems

Whichthe Conspiratire will have to

&e is that of recruiting the forcetith which to carry out the execution

Phase.If unite of the armed forcee

&l 1s7

.. ......-

THECOUPtl’ETAT

can be won over, they will have a

readymade and disciplined instrumentat hand, but it will require careful and

cautioue planning to subvert officersand men, weed out tmreliablee, and

yet maintak absolute eaerezy. Evenwhen thie has been done, it must beremembered that officers who dabble

in higls treason can never be absolutelycertain that their orders will be

obeyed by their subordinates u til7they put them to the test,

On the other hand, the security riskinvolved in recruiting, training, and

equipping an independent forze suchas the Red Guard or the SA (Stwm-abtsihm~) is considerable. Whichever

method is adopted, some form of pro

tracted eubvereive campaign is neceseary.

Execut i on PhaseThe execution pbaee of the coup will

have two main objective: to para

lyze the existing government and to

take over the apparatus of central administration. If the conepiratore have

overwhelming numerical superiority,and if their organization is geared to

it, they may be able to carry out bothstages simultaneously. More generally, the operation will he divided into

two distinct parts.

‘ In considering thie phaee, it mustbe apprwiated that, in a totalitarian

state, the government is only a small

part of a political party which has a

life and an ideology of ite own. Thue,even if Colonel von Stauffenberg’s

bomb had killed Hitler outright, he

would still have had the Nazi Party,

the SS (Schstmtaffel), and the @+

stapo with which to contend.

Under such conditions, a civil war

may be the inevitable outcome”of the

coup, a factor which must he takeninto account during the planning and

preparation phaee, but which should

17

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THECOUPO’ETAT

not be allowed to distract attention

during the execution phaze. It ia most

important to neutralize the govern

ment and seize the machinery of state;

the prosecution of the civil war will

form a separate undertaking thereafter.

If the aim of the coup d’etat is to?<$j~~~~]:>~~~-<<~,~~<,. ::.. .;,..,..,)-.. .

The trappinga of pnwer should not

be mistaken for power itself. Poww

is an abetraet thing. It may lie %Mr

one man-en absolute monarch or dictator-end hie subordinates; with a

political party; or with the lwders ofthe mass organizations. But at anygiven moment, it lice in the hands of

. . . ...”... -“,.*.~y$$:,

seize power, it follows that its leaders

must first decide exactly who holds it.In the past, many COUPShave come to

grief because the conspirator errone

ously believed that, by erecting bar

ricades and seizing ministry offices,

they had gained control of the gov

ernment. All they were really doing

was causing the general public a cer

tain amount of inconvenience.

a lirrdted number of individuals, forat root power is the ability of a man,or group of men, to bend others to

their will.

Having decided who theee men are,the conepiratore must either arrestor

kill them. With limited forces at their

disposal, the conspirator will be unable to deal with all the smaller frh

so, in compiling their lists, they will

MllifeIYRrvi@18

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


have to decide who are the most im

portant. The essence ,of the coup is

surprise, and the arrests must, therefore, be carried out quicldy, quietly,

end,as far as possible, simultaneously.VitslPoints

The central offices of administrat

ion-and, therefore, those individu

als who hold power—are usually lo

cated in the capital, so it is in thecapital that a COUPs most likely to belaunched. The conspirators must decide in advance if there are anykey buildings or installations (vitalpoints) which they need to occupy.

Economy of effort ie eesential. If

armed opposition is expected, it may

be necessary to disperse some of their

troops tactically, but no useful pur-Nse is served by occupying the min

istry of war, for example, with an

infantry battalion if a single sentryat the gate will achieve the same result.

The vital points are those places

from which warning may be given

(certain communications centers) and

those of immediate importance for

prestige or propaganda purposes, suchos television and radio statione and

certain public buildings. Generallyspeaking, other key installations needsimply be isolated, The imposition of

a strict curfew, enforced by mobile

patrols, will serve the same purpose

as numerous scattered detachments of. troops and will release men for the

more important task of carrying out

arrests. A strong reserve can be keptto deal with any unforeseen emergen

cies.

Once the government has been neutralized, the conspirators can proceed

to the second etage and take over the

Machkiery of central administration.Initially, they would be well advised

b trust nobody and to retakr all power

~ Jrdl1*7

THECOUPD’ETAT

in their own hands, enforcing theirauthority through the medium of the

forces they have deployed for the

coup.

The cldef actions required are theproclamation of martial law and; anannouncement of the change in gov

ernment which may be accompanied

by a tilef declaration of their aims

and policy. This declaration may simply be designed to win popular sup

port, and the new regime may haveno intention of subsequently honoring

its promises.If the population is enthusiastic

about the coup, the curfew can belifted, a public holiday declared, and

the day given up to celebrations. On

the other hand, if people are hostile

or indifferent, they are best kept outof mischief by staying at work al

though for propagrmda purposes “pop

ular” demonstrations of approval canbe stage managed.

Aggressive PolicyThe new government cannot afford

to rest on its laurels after the coup,

but should adopt a vigorous and aggressive policy during the consolida

tion phase. It is at this tim+im

mediately after tbe coup, hut beforeit is firmly established-that it will

be most vulnerable to attackThe new government must extend

its authority to all parts of tbe coun

try as quickly as possible. To do this,it will have to insure that orders are

carried out promptly and effectively

and that any lapses by civil servantsor heal authorities are dealt with immediately and rigorously. Perhaps,

the most effective method of doing

this is by attaching political officers or

“commissioners,” armed with sweep

ing powers, to as many administrative

centers-at all leveb+aa practicable.

While strengthening its grip on the

19

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THECOUPO’EtAT

administration, the new regime will

have two other major tasks: to elimi

nate any remaining opposition and to

gain international recognition. The

second task is a matter for a few specialists in the foreign affairs depart

ment, BOthe main effort can be di

rected toward crushing any likely re

sistance.

Once again, it is primarily a ques

tion’ of detecting and arrenting theright men—those with the ability and

inclination to rally the opposition. The

problem of mesa insubordination—strikes, civil disobedience, and demon

atrationtiannot be dealt with at any

length here. But in the light of past

experience, it would seem that, if theregime is ellicient and ruthless, it may

well be able to forse the public to co

operate against Ha will,

In the international field, the newgovernment will regularize ita poei

tion by gaining the recognition of

other governments es quickly se pos

sible. If there is a danger of foreignintervention, an appwd for help to

one of the major powers may result

in military or diplomatic support, orat least cauee the intervening stetc

to hesitate until the moment for so

tion has papsed.When the country ha6 returned to

normal, the consphwtme will be able

to turn their full attention to the bud.

nees of government. But in one eem

the consolidation phase will last fa

es long os there is the pomibility tbd

the new regime may itself be attackedfrom withh. For today, when cm

ventional warfare has become toocostly in term of humnn life to hworth while, the coup has many ad

vantages, It is economical in terms 01

men and material; it preeente thcountry and the world with a fait w

cowcpli; and, when suitably dreese$ up

by propagandists, it can even be cm.

ered with a cloak of respectability.It is to be expected that the coII;

d’etuf, ae a means of overthrowkq

the legitimate government of the statewill be used even more frequently il

the future than it hss been h the FWX

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Milky w

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


“’ - - ”

GERM NESERVES kNDREPL EMEN

.

v

Eric Waldman

NY meaningful evaluation of

the German military contribu

tion to the Weetern defenee alliancemust include an evaluation of the mil

itary reserve and replacement system.

In the Federal Republic of Germany,

most combat units are qnderetrength.

Therefore, ae aeonsituation ariaee, orintensified tensions,

ists are needed in

bsre to bring thetbe North Atlantic

se an emergency

even a period’ oftrained reserv

fairly large num

unita assigned toTreaty Organiza.

tion and those under the commandof the territorial defense to their au

thorized watilme strength. Reservists

are also needed to fill up mkf azti-

VStethe many mobilization unite and

to provide the personnel for the re

placement centers.

Ml 1987

IThe favorable reputation of the

German military system of the pest—both in terroe of efficiency and effec

tiveneee-was, in pa~ beeed on its

ability to buildup large fighting forceswithin a relatively short period of

time and to maintain Germany’s mil

itary strength, in spite of heevylosses, through an eilicient replace

ment system.

However, the political and social

climates of the past, marked by strongauthoritarian atiltudee among the

military and shared by large segmenteof the civilian population, are no

longer cbzraeteristic of contemporary

Germany. The democratic environment of the Federal Republic of Ger

many provides for an entirely dHer

ent background. In faz~ there wee

21

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


REsEmsml MPUCEMENTS

strong oppeaitton by a large percent

age of the German population toward

rearmament and toward the creation

of the Bsmdeswehr, the armed forcen

of the Federal Republic.

Mtltttdc Ch~o

Within the laet few yenm, a definitechange in the attitude of the Gertnrm

civllhme haa been observed, This

change wae probably caused primtwily

by the recognition that n Qwnmn contribution toward Wentern mcurity

wae not only necemary, but also ae

sisted in irnprcwing the internationalpositjon of the Federal Republic.

Nevertheless, the Brmdeewehr iaetill ehort of profeeeional soldiers

and eohfiern serving Ionrer poriodn of

time thrm the 18 months required of

the drafteen. The better financial op

portunities within n booming economy,

the Ions of pre~tige suffered by themilitary, and the long m-id articulate

oppcmition to rearmament ntill inttu.ence tho youngor generation. After

completion of the compuhiory mi}itiryewice, meet of tho draftees-much

like their American countarparta—

tack intereet in u continuation of their

mllitmry career in the remrve orgarri

sation and congider any required reserve obligation an err rmnoying inter.

fwcutcc with their privrite Iivee.

The planners of the new Gerrrmn.—— .. —..- ——. .

&ic Wahfman ie Profrmor PO-

tiMeaJcience at tkc Univereitu ofCa@ary, Cdgarg, Alberta (lmodc.Born iu Austria. he rreerl os aetivm

duty with the US Armv from 19Mfa z$b$, and bi& the nmk of majorin the Rwn-w. He atbdatths Uni?wr$iw of Vienna, ond enbqwnttlpreceived hix Ph, D. ie PofWaal Srieae~ jrom GROPLMWmh{wpfmr tfriiwreity, Wmhin@m, ~. ~, iiix 8rtiC/Q,*@rsIux$ Home Lbfmc Troape,” ap.

/r red in thaS 1S68 uetw of the

hftS.STAEYit&V5KW.

miiitary reserve nyetem thus had ti

take into eorudderatlon not only h

needs of the military for trained mserviate, but abia the changed over4

circumetancee, the attitude of the m

serviste, and the persistent atthatof many Germane who eee in tb

Ihmde8welw, at beat, a necofumry @

Systems ltlfhrIt also ehould be noted that the@

man military reeerve eyatem i6 *

niderebly ditXerent from the resect

system ae practiced in the Unitq

Statee; therefore, a mare compartqqof the two sys~me is of minimaI val~

First of all, the Germans utilkm ~individual reserviata. Reserve units uthe Armed Forces or National GuasI

unite, forming tbe basis for the URrmerw system, me unknown to tk

Gcrnwm.

The only exceptions to the Gernwpractice are the reserve units of tkterritorial defenne etnrted in Apd

196d and reorgnnizad into the horsdefense troups in April 1966. But eve

those units, when brought to the II

tended strength of 60,000 men h1968, will affect 5 relntivo]y madgroup of German rwerviste.

At the end of 1966, there were wproximately 900,000 Ihm&ewehr rifierviem. By 1970 their number Ml

hava lncrexsed to around 1.8 millia

and then wIII remain nbout the mm

provided that no drastic changes I

the=air,e of the Rctive Bunrkumhr N

cur, Tbe new rrscewhta becomla

available aftar 1970 will replnce oldermervlsfa daatgnstad for desctivatioc

A carefully worked out regi$tratiorind aaeignment eyatem kavpe track u

all available reeervhk In additioi

the Gerrncmc are certainly aware tbc’

In order to kesp up the mllltary pri

tlclency of tha mcerviste for their ma

krnpkct mflltxy uoe. proper trai~

ilunwy *

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


jag facilities must be provided. These

feciiitiee, however, are available only

tea very small numbeq of reservists.

EvsrY German male &izen between

the agea of 18 and 60 ie, under thepresent law, subject to military con

scritilon. Buamuefir reeervistet whOare the backbone of the German re

servesystem, qre only those men who

... . .... ‘“w

RESERVESNDREPtAiEMENIS

Reservist of the lower enlistedranks can be called back to active duty

until they have completed their 45th

year. In wartime, this period is ex

tended until the end of their 60thyear. The reserve obligations of noncommissioned officers and officers lasts”

until the completion of their 60th year.

RWIrcd professional eoldiere, irre

sctually saw eervice in tbe Btmdeswehr either aa draftees, ‘volunteers, or

se professional soldiers.

However, those German men whohsve eerved in the former German

miiitary forces, in the Federal BorderPelice, or in the unite of the Alert

Poiice organized by the individual

states are considered members of the

military reserve. Their eligibility andusability have to be verified by the

County hfilitary Replacement Olllce

with jurisdiction over their place of

residence.

w 19S7

‘spcctive of rank, can become reacti

vated until the end of their 65th year.kfembers of the German rsserve are

subdivided on the basis of their length

of military training and ages into

three groups:Reserve I is comprieed of for

mer draftees, volunteers, and profes

sional soldiers with at bmet nine

monthe of active eervice.

Reserve II is made up of former

draftees who had lees than nine

monthe of atilve service.

Reserve 111 contains reservists

23

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“‘RESERVESND REpMcEMEtiTs

who formerly belonged to Reserves Iand 11 after they have reached age 36.

A different way of dividing the

C&man reservists is based. on their

respective utilization after they are

ceiied back to active duty:Callup Group I includes all re

servieta who are assigned to 8ctiveBrwzdesreekr units or tm Mobilization

units.

. Callup Group II is for all reservists who, after calkrp, are to report

to Personnel Collecting Offices.Callup Group III includes all re

maining reservista who are not assigned to either of the two othergroups.

Since not all eligible young men are

utilized by the draft, the German military .reaerve aleo has a standby re

serve comprised of those draft-eligi

bles who were not called into the mil

itary eervice. The etandby reeerve isdivided into three groups. The firet

two are based on physical fitness cat

egories while the third is for all mem

bers of the first two groups after theyreach age 35.

Ueiservri*stemIn addition to 461,000 military per

sonnel, the Bwde.weiw aieo includes165,000 civil servantz. The objective

is to relieve military personnel during

peacetime from practically all admin

istrate, financial, and logietic func

tions. The adrnhietrative aspects of

the draf~lnckrding examinations andcallups, the supervision of the ever-

increasing number of reeervieta, and

the military replacement eystem-fallunder the jurisdiction of tbe civilian

Bundeswehr Administration.

Department V of the 06ice of Mil

itary Administration, krmivsr as theBurrdeswelw Replacement Ofdce, works

with the replacement oftica of the six

military d&ricte and 116 County

?24

Military Replacement Ofiicee coveringthe 5S0 political regione of the Fed.

eral Repubiic.

The Office of Military Administra.tion ie, in administrative matters, tbe

policymaking body whfle the CountyMilitary Replacement Offices admin.

ister the policy and remain in dkwtcontact with the reservist. They keep

the personnel records and aeeign raserviets on the baeis of mobilization

requirements. Reservists are required

to keep the county office informed ofchanges in residence.

Mobilization pkmning, allocation ofreserve manpower, and policies concerning training and welfare of w.

servists are the responsibility of the

military staff of the Ministry of De.

fense. The organization to carry out

the policies is headed by the Superintendent for Reserviete. His organi

zation extende throughout the FederalRepublic and is part of the structure

of the territorial defense with subor.dinate headquarters at military dis.

trict, region, and county levels.

OrganizationalCztagorissThe present 900,000 reservists are

grouped into six categories according

to the type of organization in whichthey wili be employed:

. Existing unite under NATO

Commands. Highest priority reeerv

iste will be ueed to fill existilng vacen

cies and bring the units to wartime

strength.Mobilization units. Theee may bs

part of NATO integrated forces or

of the territorial defense. Organiza

tional equipment for these units isetored end maintained in peacetime

by caretaker personnel.

Field replacement battalions.

These organizations provide for m.

placement of unit losses of all eerviced

and the territorial defense.

MI1611sRevier

IL ..-- .

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


Personnel Collectinx Offices.

kt&t 160 such offices pr~vide fillersiv the replacement battalion as va@ciss occur.

Logistic beae organizz~lon. Inweetime, the military logietica orpnicztion ia small, but it expands

apidly in mobSization with the addi

ionof over 100,000 reserviete.Home defense troops. These are

witewhlch will be called UP in emer-FIWYo perform a va~iety of tesks in

herear areas and in civil defense.[timing eservists

The effectiveness of the Germanditary reserve syetemie greatly af

kctcdby the quality of the individual

vservist. His miiitary Dreparedneee

sthe product of hie military trainny. The Bundeswehr, therefore, is

itally interested in providhg milimytraining, as well ae training failities for the ever-growing number

jfreservists.

However, the organization of the

hperintendent for Reservists is amall establishment, and it is beyond

is capability to meet the objective of

@ding training facilities. In fact,

wlythoee reservist who voluntarily

ptilcipate in furthering their mili

bry competence can be assisted inheir endeavors. Only five to six per

snt of the reservists avail themselves

f this opportunity of improving their

mihtsryproficiency.In addition to voluntary participa

tionof the reservist in the militaryksining program, there are official

dlups which require the reserviststotake part in mobSization exercisee,

WU811yasting 13 days and in ae

dlcd alert exercises, with a duration

Ofup to three daye. So far, only

@er units, such ae battalion and

tides, have been able to carry outb axemiees beeauee the Btuuies-

RESERVESNDREPf.ACEMENTS

welw does not have the facilities to

accommodate larger formation.

Mandatory exercises for reservists

unite are theoretically-held every thr~yeare and alert exercisee at ehorter

intervals. Actual practice chows greatdiecrepanciee. While some reservists

are called up every year, either upon

their own request or aeked for by

name by the units to which they are

aseigned, others are not called up at

all.Individual reservists may also be

called up for mandatory miSitary

training. As a rule, these periode ofduty last four weeks with the army,

four to eix weeks with the air force,

and eix to eight weeke with the navy.

Self-Development

Since the mandatory training of reservists affecta only a relatively emall

part of the total number of reservists,

the voluntary part of the reservista’

training program is of great eignificancel On an individual and voluntary

basis, the reeervist has a number of

opportunities to improve his militeryproficiency. He may:

o Attend a Bundeswehr school.. Apply for active duty training

with a Bunde8wehr unit.

. Avail himself of the military

training provided in the group of re

servists which are set up either by the

Superintendent for Reservists or hy

the Association of the Brmde8wehr Re

servists, (Verband).The groupa organized by the Super

intendent for Reservists participatein baaic individual training. In addi

tion, there are emaller work groups

which provide more advanced training

for reserve officers and noncommis

sioned oilicers.

The groupe organized by the Verband have precisely the same purpoee

25

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RESERVESNDREPLACEMENTS

and are, therefore, of tremendous. ae

sistanee to the military reserve train

ing program because of the limita

tions of the small organization of the

Superintendent for Reeerviste. TheVerba?zd was founded by a few individuals in January 1960 as a private

organisation with the intention ofcreating and maintaining contact be

tween the Bwzdeswekr and its grow

ing number of r~erviste.

When the Federal Defense Ministry

serve organization of the Territorti

Defense Command of practically su

its odministrative functions to petit

the active military personnel to dev~

their time to training functions,About two-thirds of the reeervbik

who volunteer for training do so wkb

the Verband. These training meetings

of the local groups of the Vee%tmd

have the same official status as the

meetings of the groups organized bythe Superintendent for Reservists.

recognized the weaknesses of its own

training program for reservists, it

decided to utilize the pdential services of the Ver$ewzd. OSicial funds

have been made available to this or

ganisation in order to enable it to

improve ita organisational structure

and to increase ita etTiciency in han

dling the training of ita reservists.

The objeetive is to build up the

Verba?ed to euch an extent that itwill W capable of relieving the re

2s

Therefore, the participants are con

sidered for the durntion of the msst

ing in a legal sense es “soIdlers.”The German military reserve aye.

tern may appear to he perplexing and

confueing because of ita curious mix

ture of military, civilian, and even

private aspecta. There are at least

three major factors which contributed

to the emergence of thie arrangement:

. The prevalent notion is to keep

civilian personnel’ in charge of ad-

MliituYWeW

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


ministrative matters of the military

Mablisbment because of the erroneousinterpretation. of the democratic con

mpt of civilian control. This concept

wee and still ie not generally under

stood to mean political and parlia�entary control, but is accepted toimply the control of the military by

civilims.There is a ehortage of qualified

�litary personnel for administrativetasks connected with the implementa

tion of an effective reserve program.Even an increaee in the draft quota,

unlikely for many reesone, would noteliminate this epeeitlc personnel short

ege of experienced officere and nontonneieeioned officere.

There has been an absence oflong-range plannin& for reserve mat

ters caused, in part, by aesigning the

buildup of the NATO-integrated

forces consistently the higheet priority. This encouraged improvisation

endthe willingness to look for outaiie

solutions. The arrangement with theVefband is a case in point.

ftESERVES

.

ANDREPLACEMEN

The key question is: Can this or

ganisational structure achieve the ohjetlivee of a military reserve system

and accomplish ita miesion during

peacWlme, during periods of increasedtensions, and under wartjme conditions ?

The answer might take the charac

ter of qualified optimism. This rela

tive omlmistic evaluation is based onobservations made during m~ny per

sonal visits; by numerous interviews

with key personnel of the Bwndeswehr,both military and civilian, and with

officiale of the Vet-band; and, finally,

upon the realization of the duty eoneciouanees nf the average German

citizen who, as soon as be receives an

official order, reports for duty.

But the efficiency of the organiza

tional structure, the intensiveness of

the training program, and the over-alleffectivanees will depend upon the pri

ority the reserve and replacement pro

gram receives from h]ghest authori

ties, And this ie primarily a political

and not a military decision.

COMMENTSI NVI TED

The Military Review welcomes your comments on any mate

rial published. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought

will aesist ue and may

are an authority on a

for our consideration?

haps we can aseist you

lead to publication of your ideas. If you

certain subject, why not write an article

If you have only an idea, query us; per-

in developing an acceptable article.

m 1267 21

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.

IHCHOH: DECISHE6ElIlERA1’SCaptain H. Pat Tomlinson, United States Armff,Refird

N 15 September 1950, as the gray shoreline adjn.

cent to the South Korean port city of Inchon be.came visible in the morning haze, the stillness was shahtered by eamplitting sounds and sheets of flame tbstbelched forth from the cruisers and dwjtroyers. A major

amphibious assault against the invadhg North KoreaoPeople’s Arnry (NKPA) was beginning. So deep bebindthe lines was the attack that only a few had confidence

in the feasiiAlity of the daring scheme. This opsratio~

was the brainchild solely of one of the most controversialmilitary leaders of modern times, General of the ArroyDouglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far Esst

(CINCFE).

General ItfacArthur’s plan WSBbased ]arge]y on ter.rain. An evaluation of terrain would be necesssry be

cause Korcais eseentiaI1y apcnineula of mounmins. Tbe

east coaet coneiste of ranges running ita length withspur rangec deviating waatward acroes the peninsuh

These ranges are characterised by their ruggedness and

hllllbryR@

.&

26

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I IHCHO

SW ridiy; however, they are notnotably high. They definitely curtail

mobiIity for mecherria4d forces.

Therefore, motor movement was re

stricted to a few primitive roads,arsirdyin the lowlands along the weet

side of the peninsula. The same restrictions applied to railroads. Thus,

Korea’sprimary communications were

centered in the weet with the mainroods and rails converging on Seoul

fromthe south and following the western lowlands te the north.

AmphibiousendingThe general planned an amphlbioue

Ieadiug at Ind’on, a sescoaet town 25miles west of Seoul, to be followed bys lightning advance on the capital city

to cut the NKPA’s main communica

tion routes. Simultaneously, the flthUS Army in the south would mount

a counterattack northward, presenting%he NKPA with a two-front war.Inchon, the second largest port in

Korea, would he in United Nationshands.

Finally, the recapture of Seoulwould ba a psychological and political

blow of great significance. Gensral

MecArthur envisioned winning the

war with thie one bold stroke. Any

doubts that might have crept inte hh

mind were quick2y subdued by hls

overwhelming self-confidence.

Considering the tides that limitedan Inchon landing to one of four dates

—15 September, 11 October, or 2 or3 November—he chose 15 September

Captain H. Pat TomUnson, USAPMy, Retired, h with the Department of Hi8toW, Louieiaras Pol@echnic Ingtitute, at Rwtork. He aeq.vsdwith the US Navy during World War11,and w“th the US ArmsI in Korea.Heholds degvees from Louieiaua StiteUniversity, Baton Rouge, aml the ~rsivw’m”tyof Arkaneas, FayetteviUe.

ipil Ieel

ti>..>

becauee it would more quictdy re2ieve

the preeeure on his outnumbered

troops on the Puean perimeter andepare them a bitter winter campaign.

A longer wait would permit the enemy additional time to improve hie

defensee, An early liberation would

give the South Koreans an opportu.nity te harvest their Octobsr rice. Afrontal aseault from the perimeter

was dismiseed because, even if suc

cessful, the heavy casualties wouldoutweigh any advantages iq simplic

ity.In July the CINCFE transmitted

hie plan to the Pentagon, es12ing for

a twedvision amphibious landing at

Inchon.

Optimismversus PessimismThere was evidence of skepticism

among his own staff in Tokyo. They

thought that two dlvisione were insufficient and were worried over whatmight happen in Japan with the occupation forces removed. They agreed

with the Navy that the poor landingconditions at Inchon made the plan

too rieky. Further, reinforcements

could not be provided from Puean.

So enthusiastic was General Msc-Arthur, however, that, early in July,planning for Operation B2uehew-t8 to

put the let Cavalry Divieion aehore

at Inchon ae eorly as 20 July was ini

tiated. Thie endeavor wa% scuttledwhen the cavalry had to be committed

to Korea at an earlier date.At a meeting in Tokyo on 10 July,

Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commander, Fleet Marine

Force, Pacific, told General MscAr

thur that the 1st Marine Division withneceseary air eupport could he ready

for a landing by 15 September. Thiswas a b]g order. The only poseihle

method of bringing the division to

full etrength was to call in tbe Re

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


SI MON

serves. Sean many eiviIi6ne, who just

five years before had aaid “never

again,” were receiving clothing issue

at Camp Pendleton, California.

Opposition to General MecArtimr’s

plan wee not confined to ids own staff.The Navy Department praeantad a

sound case. l+ydrographicaily, Irwhon

was one of the bet desirable ports,

Flgnre 1.

Tide varied from 26 to 99 feet. The

approach to the objective wes restricted by a narrow channel with s

fivc+lmot current studded with natural

obstacles snd easily mined,The wet only offered limited facil

ities for handling esrge. Further, the

Marines would land in the middle of

a itywith an added obstacle of 12

foot eeawalie to ecde. The ameil ie

larrda of Wolmi and Sewolmi were lc

cated in commanding positione and

were Kqired to Inchon by causBwaYs.

Jo

h.. ..

As the bad co~ditione in tie 4trmrwl

precluded night aeeembly of tlur ft~the main ]amting force would have to

hit the beacime in the aftemoen day.light, alIowing ozdy about two houta

in which to eacure the city.ilpmtlorriXtrmrrSe’

By earIy Augusk Generai MeeAr.

thur had his unite-the lat MarimDivision cormnmxkd by Major Gee

eral Oliver P. SmMk apd the 7th Ie.fantry Division under !Major Generel

David G. Barr. The 6th Marine WK.

iment wouid be withdrawn from tbePusan perimeter, bringing the Mc

rinea to division strength. The twodivisions and support wouId form ~

IOth Corps, to be commarrded by M&jor General Edward M, Almond. Sear

Admiral James H. Doyle was Navyampidbzous commander, and Vice Ad.miral Arthur D. Struble was over-ail

commander of the invru?ion arnrsd&

Admiral StrubIe answered to Vim

Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commmdcr

Navrd Forcee, Far Eeet. The opera.tion was assigned the code name Chro.

mite.

The itnal debate on Operation L’h*

mite was heId ’28 August. The rne&

ing was attended by General J. ,Lcrr.ton Coltins, Chief of SW?, US AmAdmiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chid

of Naval Operations; General ShSP

herd; and Lieutenant Generai ]dwd

H. Edwards, US Air Forve; as well

se other Pentagon representatives andGeneral MacArthur’s own staff. GorP

eral Cdiins later said: ‘We went oatto discuae it with Genernl MacArthur.

We eugfreeted certain alternate pemibiijtiea and phcca. . . f’

The Navy had a group of eight em

phibioue experts repreaentlng everl

swialty. lkh wee allowed elSht mfrrutac to praaent hir cane. They spb

of navfgatfonat, hydrvgraphic, w

tmitq M’rleJ

. .. ,. ..”!. .. .. .... ..-..d~

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


...

paphic, and other obstacles that made

the doubtful plan sbsm impossible.

Then General Collins voiced MS

doubts.He did not like removing theMarine regiment from Pusan, andwonderedif the loth Corps might bepiiued down ashore. He suggested

lbmsan as tbe place to land, and Admiral Sherman agreed.

General MacArthur conceded that

,., ... . . . ..... ......... ..

ae to tti itnpraeticabilities involved

wU4 tom-1~to ineure for me the ele

ment of eurpriee. For the enemy rwm

mander wi~ rsaetm that no tme wouldbe eo braeh as to muke such an at

tempt.

He recalled Wolfe’e impossible victory at Quebec and assured the Joint

Chiefs that Inchon would ha another.

He argued that the combined effort.,’ . . . . ... ..r.

US WW

Extreme tides at Inchrm limited the dates appropriate for a landing

Kmsan would ha safer, but, at beat,it was a Sanking attack at worst, a

bloody affair that could fail. Ratherthanthat, he would commit his troopsto Lieutenant General Walton H.

Walker for a frontal assault but hewould not assume responsibility for

nucbati]on. He was confident the Navycouldovercome the ditliculties of tide

md terrain. Noting the objections

hem the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),hctold them the:

,.. v- arguments you have made

r$nIml.:

would put 90 percent of the NKPAbetween a hammer and an anvil. He

ended his defense with an argumentthat reliccted his view of the globalstruggle in which the United States

was engaged.

If the war in Korea were lost, Europe would be jeopardised. The anti-

Communist front did not lie in Europe or Washington, but along the

Naktortg River in Korea. In Europe,

it was a war of worde+n =Ia, it was

a war with bullets. He warned that

M

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/doubts.He

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/doubts.He

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


INCNON

millions of Asians were watching the

outcome of battle. “I can’ almost hear

the tickiing of the second hand of destiny . . . we must act or we will die.”

As his voice sank to a whisper, he

ended with, “We shall land at Inchonand I shall crush them.”

The historic conference concluded.

Pigure 2.

He did not ask nor did he receive the

approval of the Joint Chiefs present.The Navy still doubted the sound

ness of General MacArthur’s plans.

On 24 August, Admirals Sherman, Ar

thur IL Radford, JoY, and Doyle met

with Gen&al Shepherd and decided topropese the more favorable P’osung-

Myon area, south of Inchon, for thelanding point. General Shepherd ap

proached General MacArthur in a Iaetminute plea for reconsideration, but

the general would not alter hie plan.

A reluctant JCS approval was trane

mitted from Washington, but their ro.

luctance was confirmed when thsyagain queried the general on 7 Sep

tember. Their concern was based on

the fact that nearly all reserves would

be committed. On S September they mapprOved, hut only after obteiuing anendorsement over the President’s sig.nature. This geeture might well be in.

terpreted as written insurance in cosethe mission were dieaatrous. General

MacArthur labeled it “pessimism atits worst.” However, he was wellaware of the tremendous gamble,

nit ial Phase

With clocklike precision, the hammer fell, and the initial phase of @

eration Chmmite wae executed on 16September 1950. The Marines lande&and the 7th Divieion followed in their

wake. On 29 September, General MadArthur, in a dramatic ceremony,

turned Seoul back to South KoreanPresident Syngman Rhee.

General Walker launched the StbArmy’s offensive on 16 September,

Soon the hemmer and anvil met. 0026 September the UN forces made

contact. The North Koreans werebeaten, disorganized, and sufferadheavy Iosees. The formidable I’WP&

which had all but overrun the entirepeninsula, ceased to exist as an or

ganized force below the 38th Parallelby the end of September. The old sol

dier had scored another spectacularsuccess.

Viewing the Inchon operation in retrospect, military studenta and schol*

ars generally agree that LWromiteweea brilliant maneuver—tbat it was aspectacular success cannot be doubted

Even those who tried the hardei?t toconvince the general that other land.

ing points would be the wieer choicedreadily praiaed its outcome. General

Shepherd praised the operation wh~

MllltIIYRevkI2

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...

he said, “The Inehon landing was a

major amphibious operation, plannedin record time and exeeuted with sk]llandprecision.”

Only a man possessed of self-confi

denceto a degree beyond that of moatmen could have refused to alter oreempromise under such pressure. The

Navy’eskepticism was baeed on soundresearch by specialists in amphibious

“ ‘“-’%

INCHON

from the conception, he did not waverfrom his prediction of complete suc

cess. Luckily for General MaeArthur,

the two men who had confidence in

him were the two men who couldhave overruled hia deeision-PreeidentHarry S Truman and Secretary of

Defense Louis Johnson,

Considering that the argumentsagainst the general’s plan were sound,

US Arm ”

A landing force reaches the shere ef Wolmi Island in IrrchonHsrber

operations. The hydrographic obstacleswere real. The Marines were right

-the geographical features lent advantage to the defenders. The enemy

hadexcellent topographical commandof the landing area, and the seawallwasa difficult obstacle. Even hie own

staff had sound reasons for their

hesitancy.The Joint Chiefs were unable to

shake General Me&Arthur with their

doubte. He listened as come of theWet reputable and high-ranking professional soldiers literally tore his

@enapart for more than six weeke.He listened with interest. He consid

ered-even doubted at times-but,

m J*7

&

one might easily conclude that the en

tire affair was just plain luck Battleshave been decided by unforeseen circumstances that have been referred to

as “luck.” However, a brief look at thenine principles of war and an analysis

of their application to the Inchon operation leads to a different conclusion.

Objective. The ultimate military objective of the war was General MecArthur’e-to destroy the enemy and

his will to fight. His plan would ac

complish the ultimate objective bycutting the main north-couth, line ofcommunication, immediately securing

Inehon, presenting the enemy with a

two-front war, and psychologically

39

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INCHON

damaging the Communists by retak

ing the South Korean capital.

Off~”ue. Originally, the defense

was forced by the overwhelming ad

vance of the NKPA forces. UN-held

territory had shrunk to a 140-mile perimeter around Pusan. General Mac

Arthur’a conception of a two-front

war and double-offensive thrueta

would give bia forces the initiative.

Sintpticitfh The over-all planningand execution were accomplished with

out violating tbia principle. This was

most d]fficult due to the limited availability of resources for the operation.

UnitW of Command. TMla principlewee achieved and maintained. The

command structure from the ganeral

down ta the smallest efamente weesound enough to minimice confusion.

Muu.c.To ati]n the maximum avail

able combat power, he esked for thelat Marine Division. To attain a full

division, the 6th” Marines were taken

fmm Pusan. Careful planning, fmepower, tactics, and morale contributed

to the effectiveness of the principle of

mass.Economy of Force. There is no evi

dence that exceesive numbers of men”

or materiel were devoted to unnecee

eery secondary efforts during tpe op

eration.

Manezawr. Operation Chrom te was

a classic example of maneuver being

used to alter the relative combat powerof the enemy. Envelopment, severance

of communication lines, and confront

ing the enemy with a two-front warwere planned and executed in such a

manner se to place the NKPA forces

at 8 costly dieadvantage.

Surprise. General MacArthur based

much of MISplanning on the element

of surprise. Thla wee evident at the

conference on 2S August when he in

formed ,t.lw skepthxd repreeentativee

of the varioua services that their er.

gumente es to the impracticability 01his plan tended to insure its succw

since the enemy would reason in thtsame way.

Secws+tV, the last principle, is a+aential to the application of the otim

principles. So much depended on theelement of surprise that a major sf.fort at securing positive intelligema

for planning was initiated. Ageebworked in the lending area, aerial pho.

tograpbs were taken by the hundr~

and tidse and hydrogreph]c condMoreof the narrow approach through thechannel were studied. Lieutenant Eu.

gene F. Clark US Navy, eetabiishafrapport with the natives, rowed .s

dinghy to Inchon Harbor to confirm

tbe height of the asawall and bottomconditions of the herbor, and repeircd

tbe harbor Iighthouae, turning thebeacon on to guide the invasion fledthrough the narrow channel. Decep

tion measuree, such as bombardmentand decoy invasions, were planned to

enhance security of the invasion tiest

Strategically, the most dangeroessituation involved in the operation

was the commitment of nearly alf of

the available reserves, even those inthe continental United Statea. Thegeneral was confident that notbint?

would go wrong. NotM]ng did go

wrong,

The succees of the Ope+ tion wasbased on ids self-confid~n$ e, ability,

and qualitilee of leederahlp, And on the

abiiitiee and leedersh]p of the huwdrede of individueie wbo were iu

volved in the over-all planning and ex

eention of the mansuver.

Inchon has to be recorded as oosof the great battles of military his

tory, and General MecArthur’a breve

decision earned him a place amoru

tbe great captains of the past.

34 MIIHNYssk

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/Muu.c.To

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/Muu.c.To

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


Major Dave S. Palmer, Um”tedStates Arm#

OMETIItfE during the summer of 1964, President Ho Chi-minh—probablywith the advice of Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and other top ad

visers in Hanoi-decided to commit North Vietnamese troops to the war in thesouth.

The fateful results of that decision bacame evident in the fall and earlywinter when surprised United Statee and South Vietnamese intelligence officersdk!xoveredthe presence of North Vietnamese regular army units in South Vie&ncm. At first, only individuals and small uhits were detected, but soon regi

ments were confirmed and entire divisions were suspected.The saquel has been well reported. US combat troops were dispatched to ,.

~unteract the Communist threat on the ground while an air Offeneive was si-,

mnltaneously mountad against military ta~geta in the north. A knockout blow bythe Communists wss stalled by the weight of US arms. General Giap’s hope tomeke196s the “year of victory” was frustrated.

Less well racorded-in fact unknown to us-are the reasons for the Communist decision. Why dld the North Vletnamcee choose, in the late smmner of1964, to add units of their town army to the struggle in South Vietnam? The

answer ie available to but a select few in Hanoi. Pending the unlikely event oftheNorth Vietnamcee Government’s laying bare ita inner eccrets, we are obligedtoconjecture. Such cemjceture reveals thrae. pleuaible raeeons.

The one moat commonly accepted is that the position of the Viet Cong (VC)wasso strong, while the situation of the Americana and South Vietnamese hadco deteriorated, that the northern leaders wsre impelled to bslievc that the im

P@IISf fresh troops would essurs a rapid tictory. Backers of this line are augmented by the ysers of gloomy reporting coming out of Viatnam-rapnrtingwhich appfied euch metaphors as morass, nightmare, and ~uagmire. Moreover,

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


Ha

this argument tlte neatly into the pat

tarrr of the claesic three-phase insurgency war; the introduction of North

Vietnamese regulars can eeeily be in

terpreted as the technique by whichGeneral Giap planned to enter phaseIII.

Some thoughtful observere have offered a eeeond motivation. They eug

gest that the power of the Viet Conghad become eo strong that Hanoi

feared an eclipse of ite own influence.

According to this contention, the VCleaders, enjoying heretofore unequaledstrength, were ehowing reluctance toplay a wholly fmb8ervient role to thenorth. To counteract that trend and

to reassert ita complete dominance,

Hanoi intervened. However, Mriguing ae it ie, thie idea Iackn any factual

foundation. It rcste on supposition,

not imbetarrce.Key Assumption

Theee two reatrorw bhare a key us-

i+umption: They preeume the Viet

Gong were riding a victorious tide.The third Wi38ibie raaeon for HO’Sdecision eprings from the hypothesla

that the Communists wore being the

war in 1964. If the man in the northbelieved they were no longer winningthe fight in the nouth, the only inter

pretation one can give to their decision to intervene directly Is that they

were willing to gamble on a quick

Major Dave R. Palmer is with theDapartrnent of Afilifmv Art and I%.

Oineem”ng, US Militarp Aradcmv. Hehdfe a Maeier’s degree in MilitaryHietory /rem Duke Usivur&itV, Durham, North Carolina, and attendedthe US Armv Command and GeneralS af CofIqm in lLW. Ne ha irmwerfw tkhe Berlin Command$n (Wmanv,* for three wor with the Id Ae-.mored Riviuifm, and k 3884 woe in

Wehtawr whtm ha man advkor toa Vie#nam*&e armor unit.

n

victory rather than follow their owo

text by slipphrg back into a lower

level of inteneity. BY thi8 logic, tta

invaeion of South Vietnam bynortk

ern regulars is seen ae a de8peratemove to rectify a losing cauee, notwthe coup de Qroce following avictorl.

oue guerrilla war. Thie third reason b

as plaueible-indeed, perhaps morr

plausibl%than the other two.

FourriroupktgsThe eihmtion in 1964 muet be con.

eidered from the perspective of Hanoi.Apart from their own po~kion, Pm+

ident Ho and General Giap had to

evaluate four groupings of people:the Viet Cong, outside countriee, the

go~ernment and army of South Vi8bnam, and, not least, the people of

South Vietnam. The rolee of nll fournro Interrelated, but, for clarity’ssake, each cm be examined se$wrntel y.

Although they had experienced tbounding resurgence in the wokodthe coup which toppled Preeident NW

dinh-Diem in the outumn of 1963, the

Viet Cong were in trouble in mid.1964. Tho most telling evidence lie!

in the increaeinrr numbers of ethnicNorth Vietnames~ found in leadership

pmitimm. After the French wor iuIndochina, thoumndeof nntivenou~

ernem traveled to the north for interi

sive trtdning and indoctrinrition. Wtercd back into the south over W!

yearn, theee men became dedicati

tough foes. They pmmamed an int!mnto knowlcdjro of the country eidti

Relatives-even kin not nympnthttk

with ttre Cemmunints-were shm~at hand to harbor and nupply th=

lf death crone, burhd would be In*

land of thdr fmccdom. Fkrnlly. *warn ttghting In an nma which, rJW

vlctary, tbsy hopad to rula.Tham wmw man to be r=k~

Mlltta’fnmtn

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N

‘ith, although attrition cut themdown. Death, disease, and desetilon

badmore than decimated their ranks

by 1964. It had heen 10 yeare since

they had initiated the long etruggle.Toreplace them, the Communist lead-ere in Hanoi were reluctantly forced

to resort to native northernei~menwhose speech is often poorly under

stoodby the southern peaeant.

lhe Oldand the NewCompare these new leaders to the

old. They are operating in a strangecountry. Their relatives are distant

by weeks or rnonthe. Graves for thoeewho fall are unmarked plote in a remote jungle hundreds of miles from

their home village or town. And,

should victory crown their efforte,they will probably return to the north

rather than reap the spoils in thesouth. However motivated and dedi

cated they might be, they could not

be as effective as their predeeeseors.By the summer of 1964, something ofthe magnitude of 40 to 60 percent of

all cadre in the south were men bornand raieed in the north.

Nor was that the only indicatorwhich caused concern in Hanoi. Terrorism, the final arbiter of the insur

gent, wae beginning tn have adverse

feedback. After 10 yeare and tens of

thousands of terrorist executions,hardly a family in atl of the south

had been left untouched by this Com

munist tactic,

The great reservoir of resentmentstarted to well over in 1964 when the

Viet Cong launched a policy of more

or less indiscriminate killings bybombing buees, market places, hotels,andbars. It was in 1964, too, that the

Viet Cong were compelled to raise the

already onerous texe~ and to imprese

unwilling reeruite into their ranks.All in ,all, Hanoi could not view with

April967

optimism the future of its arm in th

south.With respect tu “third countries:

the outlook was most dismal b th

rnlera in the north. True enough,, thAmericans had made mistakes and ba

appeared to waver in their resoluteness, but by mid-1964 they were mor

experienced and appeared to be eve

more in earnest. A new and dynamigeneral wae in command, a famou

war leader had been appointed as am

bassador, and the major civilian agenties—US Operations Mission anUS Information Servic~bad fresh

beeees.Furthermore, the advisory progra

was being enlarged to place US offcers at the district level, the grass-

roots, and to inject even more advisors into the combat units. Althoughit dld not seem probable to Hanoi tha

the United States would commit com

bat troops, it wee, nonetheless, appar

ent that the Americans were willingto spend more money and to provid

more expertise.

Tangible AssistanceTo make matters worse, the United

States was not alone. Many of thnon-Communist countries of Asia werlining up on the side of South V]e

, nam. Korea, Australia, New ZealandThailand, and the Philippines weramong those giving tangible assist

ance. Besides, the movement waspreading and other nations ahowe

signs of support while the quantityof aid tendered waa increasing. Clear

ly, the commitment of third countrieswas not an encouraging fact.

On the surface, it would seem tha

Ho should have been pleased with th

shaky government in Saigon. Thshock of President Diem’s ouster an

death had no more than been absorbeby tbe nation before General Nguyen

3

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


no

Khanh took the reins of power. He,

in turn, wee beset by potential coup

makere, In the eummer of 1964, the

outlook for stability wee not good,However, that was at the top level,

At the all-important lower reacheaof the governmental hierarehy—provincee, districts, viliagee, police, and

civil servants-a greeter and growing

meeeure of stability existed.Following the purges connected

with the coup against Diem, in whichall echelons of the administration had

been severely ehakek the governmentwee restructured to insure that themen serving in subordinate positionswere loyal to the Saigon Government,

not to an individual. Hence, a change

of personalities at the top would haveminimum impact on the actual operation of government. Further, the men

in Hanoi had no choice but to assumethat the passage of time would

strengthen rather than weaken theSouth Vietnamese Government.

AmIyof South VietnamDetlnitely discouraging, when

gauged in Hanoi, was the constantly

improving army of South Vietnam.

Even though thousands of soldiers deserted yearly, the peasant youth werealeo defecting from conscripted serv

ice with the Vjet Cong. Sjgrriflcantly,

South Vietnamese oSicers did not desert, but VC cadre frequently did so.More and better equipment, effective

training, the experience of years of

combat against the Communist insurgents, and a deepening hatred of theViet Cong were some of the factors

making the South Vietnamese Army

a more potential force. Thst it would

continue to improve was tbe sole pre

diction General Giap could mske.

The leet group ti whom the Com

munieta could hopefully look wee the

populac~the bulwark of previous

“m

succeesea, the “sea” which had alwa~

provided sustenance ta tbe guerril~Unhappily, even the previously d~

pendable peeeant revealed disturbingindications of turning against tlw

Viet Cong. Years of tmrorism, Uconstant burden of taxation to sup

port the guerrillrm, and an increaeintfrequency of kidnappings of youngmen for service in insurgent unite

were not likely to raise the Commu.

niete’ popularity among the messes,Then, too, the army of South Vietnam

was gradually coming to realize tbetits task wae a hopeless one without

the help, or at leaet the neutrality, ofthe people. VC harshness, contrastedwith the improving understanding of

Saigon, was paying dividends for thegovernment.

View frem North

Large numbere of refugees fromCommunist-dominated regione begau

to etream into safe area8 in 1964.Voting with their feet, these pcneante were emphatically rejecting the

Viet Cong. rn that year also, a pm

viouel y rare phenomenon wae occurring more and more often; the people

began voluntarily supplying intelligence of VC actions and locations.

This movement of the people away

from the Communist cause could wellhave heen the bittereet pill Ho had

to swallow.

Ae the pendulum swinge, the Re

public of South Vietnam was no longerat the bottom, Neither wae it at the

top, but the movement up had begun

—the low point had been pemed, To

those in Hanoi, the omens were clear:

The Wet Cong were losing effectivenew, outside natiorm were rallying to

the Saigon regime, the South Visb

rwmeae were developing daily, and the

popubkion in the beleegored south

was tending to rehift from the guer.

Mllltq MvlR

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


Ho

dilee.This is not to say that the war

w over-far from it. But the trends

wereunmistakably against the Comrneninta.Somehow, Hanoi felt, the

pendulummuet be reversed.The Communist eolution was the

Msion h retrieve its fading chancesbywending regular troops southward.

A major victory-such es capturing

i province capital, destroying a large

S&b Vietnamese force, or slicingthdr southern neighbor in half—might create panic in Saigon, con

ntwnationin. Weeldnaton, and victoryinthe south.

Memorise of Dien Bien Phu still

loomed large. A smashing success

could precipitate eollapee in Saigon

and bring a total victory. At the veryleast, it would reveree the unpromis

ing tide of eventa.Meet ware are started because some

one miscalculate. Hanoi did not ex

pwt the commitment of US combatforces as the response to its own open

aggraeeion. when US Marines wadedashore at Da Nang and US bombers

took the fight north of the 17th Parallel, a new war began-e war which

rages yet. The old war, the one inwhich Americans were only advieore,

was won in 1964.

.

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7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


MOSCOWNDTHECHINESEISSI

Fritz Ermarth

Subsequent to the wbticrztion of

this article in East Europe, Cotrz

munist China exploded her fzfth nuclear device.—Editor.

HE announcement that Com

munist China had successfully

tested a miesile carrying a nuclearwarhead laet October must have been

received in Moscow with feelings similar to those expressed in Washington

—apprehension as to the future ofChinese military power, plus resigna

tion to a development which neither

Washington nor Moscow is in a position to avert.

Unlese China falls prey to cripplingcivil strife or to miiitary intervention

by her enemies,. nothing can prevent

her from becoming, in time, a full-fledged nuclear power. Further, noth

ing can prevent China from using

this might to influence, for good orill, the international environment of

which she is a part.

W)ll this new step in Chin~’s nuclear program push Moscow closer to

the West ? Not very abruptly. China’smissile teat dose not represent the

kind of quantum jump which would

upeet the Soviets’ short-term assessment of the international aituatiou

even though Moscow may have beencaught unawares on the timing of tbe

test. Yet one can hardly doubt that

it will lend impetue to long-range S@

viet thlnk]ng on how to sdjust to

China’s growing nuclear stature.

The Soviet leaders have been cml

tious in their public treatment Of

Chinese nuclear weapons developmenta. In fact, except for terse an.

MllifsryRreie

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


mnccnmnt% they have been silent

sincethe C~Inese exploded their first

nuclear device in October 1964.

Formerly, in the’ period of Sino-Sovietideological polemics before andcf@ the test ban, treaty, Moscowaccused China of jntilng light of

the awesome implications of modernweaponsand even ~f advocating nu

clesr war as a means for promotingrevolution. Peking replied that the

Sovietcbad fetishized the atom to the

Nint where their will to engage incombatwith imperialism had becomeporalyzed.

Nikita S. Khrushchev’s successors

probablycontinue to feel that the Chiucse are naive and irresponsible innuclear matters although they have

wrelYnoticed that, as Chinese nuclear

developmentproceeds, one hears lessand 1sss from Peking about the nu.cleerbomb being a paper tiger.

ACompronrise.In June 1965 the Soviets implied

thst, by working out a compromiseinvolvingpragmatic political and eco

nomiccooperation, specifically against

tbe United States in Vietnam, theUSSRand China could take the firststeptoward an ultimate, more broadly

bssed reconciliation. But as the Chioeee nuclear program proceeded and

Cbiia’s hoetility did not abate, theSovietamust certainly h&ve concluded

-if they had not hefor~tbat a hostile nuclear China was the probable

contingencyagainst whkh plans mustbe formulated.

This articls waa digeeted fromthe ov giccd, published in EMTEmCOPE,December 1966. CoWc ghted @) 1966 bg Free Europe,Inc., New York.

Mr. Ermarth ie an andget of

fhviet aflaire for l?adw Free EWrope ;?sZfvwich, West Gevvmwqr.

THECHINESEMISSIL

In workihg out their plans, Soviet

intelligence experts’ must begin with

some assessment of where the Chhesenuclear weapons program stands andwhere it is going. The question ie

whether they are in a better position

to judge thie than the United States.

Soviet Intel l igenceOne would assume that they are in

a better position to judge. Soviet radar

coverage of the Chkwse missil,e rangenear Lop Nor should have revealed

many specific detills of the Cldnesetest-its range; whether a ballistic oraerodynamic projectile was used; andwhether, perhaps, an air-breathkg

miesile for poseible deployment on

submarines may have been tested. Soviet intelligence is presumably in aposition to judge the extent to which

China’s missile program is dependentupen rocket technology left over from

the days of Sine-Soviet cooperation in

this field.

Intelligence on Chinese weapons

development ie more critical for the

Soviets than for the United States.The point is that the USSR must make

a reasonably precise and accurate assessment of that program considerably

sooner than must the United Statee.This is because China will be in a

technological position to threaten Soviet territory sooner than that of the

United Statee. While a nuclear threatto the USSR is certainly not the onlyconsideration of Soviet kmdere (andprobably not even the most likely), it

is surely the most apocalyptic and,

therefore, psychologically tbe meetpreesing.

By 1980, fifteen years after her

*first nuclear teat, it is hardly con

ceivable that China will @ve pro

gressed as far ae the Soviets didbetween 1950 and 1965. Secretary of

Defense Robert S. McNamara’s pro

41

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


TSE MIINW MfWLE

jection hmpliee rather vaguely that

the Chinese wiIl try to foIIow, at their

own pace, the weapons developmentvector previomdy followed by Moecow.

If se, in lti years, they would be producing both medium-range and inter

continental delivery capacities, but inlittle more than token numbers in

heth catcgoriee.Assuming, as is likely, that China

threat of attack from a Soviet-TJnite

states alliance or an attack hy ei%superpower independently. If so, tfiejehouId concentrate on deveiopbtg

mix of midrang~ intermediate magtand intercontinental haHietic mhwli

(or, in the short run, subnmrim]delivery systems. Although these da

Iivery eystems wotdd be sndl in nurt

bcrs, they would be aesured of de

Holding books contcinlng quotatlene of ChatrmattMae Tee-tung, Chtneee in Pekbcelebrate the news of the guided-missile, n~clear weapon test

bae not yet progre.wed so far thatalternatives are foreclosed, this may

not be the direction sbe takes. Other

possibilities are open, and it is jmportant for the Soviete to be clear as

to which course China adopts.

China’e choice depends on how sheviews her foreign policy intereetn over

the next decade, One might sketcbethree alternative echemes:

In the comhtg decade, the Chi

nese could regard their nuclear powerprincip dly cc a deterrent against the

etroying a small number of one o

both of the superpowers’ vital urbwcenter8.

Thi$ stance would not support uamrrwsive foreign policy involginfmjlitary confrontation with either tb

UnMsd States or the Soviet Union C&

eide Chhmae territory. It would, bowever, be consistent with China’s @

tiow. approach, tbua far, and @

consistent with her declared f~r oft

US rkt.sck. Parndoxicnlly, ouch s wture of minimum deterrence ml~

Mlltny*

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


irddbit China because she could notrisk any couree of action that might

provokeone of the other powers to a

preemptivestrike against her.If the Cbhese regard their ma

jor foreign pcdicy tack in the next

dscade as not merely territorial de

fense but, rather, as the expuleion ofthe United States from the westernPeciSc region or key pofi]ons of it,

shemust choose a different and more

costlynuclear poeture. To her deterrmt force directed at the United

Stetea ebe would have to add suffideot medium-range nuclear power to

e@ieve local superiority in at leastanueareas on her esetern and southern periphery.

In such a situation, China could

crcdtblythreaten to introduce tacticalnoclear weapons into a clash over,

my, Taiwan while, at the came time,

k@mg to deter a US nuclear attack

oe her territory. The United States

@ght then be persuaded to withdraw.

Obviously,the risks involved in euch

~~vmture would be enormous. Thk

d@?er array might not be up to theskein of a direct Sine-American con

fimtation, but ita psychopolitieal in

fluence on China’e Asian neighbors

wouldbe considerable.

. Finally, if the present rulers of

Chinasee their future foreign policy

ss aimed primarily at gaining ter

ritoryin Soviet Asia, they must eeek8 Meximalist posture. This would

rsquireboth conventional and nuclearau riority in the border regions and

8 sufficiently powerful weond-strike

Sbetegic force tn deter a Soviet nu-Clserattick under dire provocation.

Surveying these theoretical alter-

IIStiw, one can readily see tbt the~ is a distinct and attractive pas-,eitdlity for China, that the second

THECtSSE2EMt221LE.

would be extremely ditlicult to achieve

in the 10 to 20-year period being

considered, and that the thhd is out

of the question. Only the first alter.native, the posture of minimum deter

rence, is consistent with the highlydefensive attitude with’ which China

now views tbe two superpowers.Therefore, the Chinese leadere will

probably strive to ach%ve a reliable

minimum deterrent against both the

United States and the Soviet Union,plus a marginal component of a me

dium-range strike capability designedmainly for psychological impact on’

China’s neighbors to the south and

eaet.

Inter im UsterrentChina may, indeed, succeed in de

veloping a primitive nuclear deterrentin the next two or three years, and

this would go far toward alleviatingher present intense ~nse of inseeu.

rity. The “several” midrange ballisticmissile launchers which Secretary

McNamara predicts for this periodwould be sufficient to hold one or twomajor Soviet cities in Aeia hostage

against a nuclear attack. They mighteven make limited” conventional aggression by the USSR appear risky

—in the event, for example, that

Moscow might like to take advantage

of domestic etrife in China.In the ehort run, China will likely

attempt to develop an interim deter

rent against the United States beeedupon aerodynamic missiles, surfacelaunched from the G class submarine

she is rumored to be building. WhSe

this system can be efficiently countered

by existing US defenses, the prospectof even one nuclear strike on a west

coast city, is probably regarded by

China as a significant beginning forher deterrent posture.

In the next decade or so, the Soviets

v

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


THECHINESEMISSILE

need expect no direct threat from

China. In the more distant future,

however, the Chinese may he able to

develop sufficient nuclear power to sup

port an expansionist foreign policyagainet the United States in the west

ern Pacific. Thie would raise theprospect of dangerous crieea in Asia

into which the Soviete might fearbeing drawn. It is questionable

whether the expulsion of US power

from the rim of southern Asia is regarded by the Soviets es being in

their long-run interest. In any caee,

this ie not a development towardwhich current planning must be

geared.

Corrsequarrcmor MoscowAll thie leade to tbe conclusion that

Chinese nuclear development over the

next decade or two will aim at building minimum deterrence and that

such a posture will not drasticallythreaten Soviet interests. Thie doesnot mean, however, that Moscow

ehould make no countermove.

Certain adjuetmenta of force depositions will certainly be made in

the next few years. First, Moscow

muet guard againet the outeide pese”i

bility that China might attempt to

exploit her naecent nuclear power in

come irrational feehion. The likelihood

of this is probably not much greeter

in the case of China than with othernatione; her leadere, while unre

strained in language, have been fairly

cautious in practice. But the rick isalways there, At the came time, Moecow must conelder that the Chinese

might seek to step up their troubki

making on the SinO-Soviet border

while sheltering behind their deterrent power.

Thus, the USSR must tirst impress

upon China that any irrational uee ofnuclear weapons would be ivuicidal and

then deploy her own strategic weapm

to back up this warning. And ths

USSR must also deploy eutlicient gen.

eral purpoee forces, conventional and

nuclear, along the border to controlincidents in their initial stagee. Thhdeployment ie already rumored to laproceeding.

InternationalEffectsThe growth of Chinese nuclear

power, even if deployed only for deter.

rent purpoeee, will have important

international political effects to whisbthe Sovieta must adjuet, The wtremely enthusiastic responee whistChinese nuclear teata have elicitedfrom North Vietnam dose not augot

well for Soviet influence in Hanoi.

Among China’s other Aeian neigh

hors, the eflecte will probably be ve$

oue. Some will eee their security inetronger ties with the United Sta :1

others will etrive to improverelations with China; and come+

ckding India, may louk for Soguaranteea against China. One ,%

predict juet how the Ieadere ofnations will view China in co

years. The USSR’e net influence inregion may well decline, but ~thisnot inevitable.

In the immediate future, Chinew

nuclear developments are likely to

complicate the search for worksbkand enduring aseurancee against no.clear proliferation. Until now, tbe %

vieta have acted, in part, out of $

serioue desire for a nonproliferati~treaty, but, at the came time, d4have sought to use tbe negotiation tO

block changes in the nuclear polkv d

the North Atiantic Treaty Orgerb

tion. Negotiation have centered ~most exckaeively on the desire of

United Statee to preserve a roes@

of freedom for joint nuclear soar@ment schemes within NATO and fw

44

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


. .....

tbeultimate oDtion of a Euronean nu.clear force when political preconditioueare achieved.

The Soviet objective has been tocompressttila freedom se much se pos

eiblewithout committing Moscow tomy preciss definition of what is ac.eeptableand what is not acceptable.

The psychological impact of Chinese

‘ ““’”‘“‘“’’’-””’--

TNECHINESEMISSILE

fit) while failing to alleviate the insecurities of the nonnuclear powers.

The nuclear powere will, in eho.rt, be

getting something for nothing. So far,thie dissatisfaction has been expressed

in the insistence that a nonprolifera

tion treaty involve some formal dieermsment commitments on the pert ofthe nuclear powers. If the negotiations

based on aerodynamic mieeileej surface launched from G class enbmarines

nuclear developments ,seeme to beleadingthe nonnuclear nations to in

cwsee their demands.These nations are increasingly re

sentful of the fact that the treaty

-which will deprive them of the righttedevelopor possess their own nuclearwespone-ie being forged along lines

which ignore their own security in

breate. They obviously fear that theekt of the treaty will be to formalise

he monopoly of the exieting nuclear

mere (who will remain free to dewIoptheir own weapons as they see

M 1*7

drag out much longer, other demands

may be raised.It is conceivable that important

candidates for the nuclear club may

refuse to sign the agreement unless

offered binding guarantees of theirsecurity by the nuclear powers. The

proepect that these complication willmultiply with the passage of time may

impel the Soviet Union to an earlier

and more liberal compromise on herdifferences with tbe United States.

But even if the two major powersrush to sign a nonproliferation agree

45

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


THECHINESEMISSILE

ment “before it’s too late,” the prgblem remains how b remove the pree

sures on nonnuclear powere to eccurenuclear weapons. A nonproliferation

treaty can only be a first step. Nothingunderscores th~s fact es impressivelyas Chirm’e nuclear achievements.

In other respects, Soviet policy toward the W@ is not likely to be muchaffected, China ie simply not strongenough. While striving to reduee the

military and peliticel 8olid8rity of the

Atlantic community, the Soviets have

aimed at formalizing the division ofGermany and preserving the solidarityof the Warsaw Pact countries.

The Soviets have also struggled inrecent months, with rather lees euccees, to coordinate the policies of the

Warsaw Peet countries toward western Europe. WM]e Soviet tnctiee wi]]

surely react to changing eituatione in

the West and ebrewhere, Chinese nuclear developments are not likely toalter the breed contours of Soviet

policy for a geed many years.

Conceivably, these developments

may induce the Soviets to shift someof their forces from eastern Europe.There are good economic reaeene for

thinning out these forces, and, from a

militav view, the forward disposi

tions of the peat are no longer sopressing. The principal obataele to

this, at present, is tbe Vietnam war.MOSCOWas etiked a greet deal on

maintaining solidarity with Vietmm

especially for political r-em witththe international Communist mon

ment.

The Soviets must be careful not tigive substance to Chinese eecusatiou

that they are facilitating the dissn

gagement of the, Unitad States froaEurope. Despite considerable dictweion of troep withdrawals in Europ

and the United States, Soviet prop

aganda has been aignitlcantly noocommittal on this issue in rwed

montbe.whet effect will Chinese nucleu

developments have on SinO-Soviet rektions in the near future? Mowm

doee not ecem optimistic. The Sovid

press noted that ‘the Chinese miss~

teat had bean “’used for the furthawhipping up of anti-Soviet hysterb’

in China, suggesting that the W

would play into the hands of tkradicals. As a symbol of China’8 PO

tential power, the nuclear missile w]offset the failures of Peking’s rem

diplomacy,

In the more distant future, a wture of nuclear deterrence may gk

Chiua’s leaders a sense of securltIwhich, in turn, could promo~ @itia

moderation and pragmatism. If tb

aPP@rane@of a nuclear China on tkworld scene has many perilous im

placations, tbie one optimistic noteicertainly worth 8ounding,

48

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


Celonelrving Eermon& United Stotse Armg Itetired

MAJOR problem in long-range military studiae and cost effaetiveness

analyses is a proper delinaetion of, the thraat. The problem etcms fromU@encefilntiee of the future the diversity in areas where US forms must

k prepared to operate,’ and the divereity in @cntial enemies. Disregerd oftheseproblems could lead to fomee prepared to fight the wrong kind of war atthewrong time and place, and with eerioue vulnerabllitiee. General Edwardbddeck’e defeat by the Indiane in Pennsylvania in 1765 was, in part, a reaukofthe fai]um of Britieh force plannera to anticipate PrOPCrlythe r~uiremen~

ofcolonial frontier warfare.Planning the composition of military forces ie based on the exiatin~ or

Mential military threat to the axecution of national policy. In the psriod followingthe CNil War, US Army forces were dwignad primarily to secure the

W@sternrontier end to maintiln seacoast defenses. Following the Spanish-AuwricanWa;. the stramrth and comnoeition of the US military forcee’changedmkeeping wit’h the new-national w~cy beeed on a assured Western frontier ‘andmaintenance of overeeae possessions.

M 1 81 41

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


THREAT

The major source of information on

the threat is usually a threat study.

This is a formulation and analysis of

the expected or real situation fromwhich to derive the combhation of

enemy capabltities that can be usedto counter a propesed US military capability. Other source materials in

clude target arrays, foreign technol

ogy. and long-range forecasts. A target array is a representation of any

enemy force in a specific situation that

usually includes a scenario, a portrayal

of dispositions, and a target analysis.

A foreign technology forecast describee anticipated foreign scientificadvances of military interest.

Any intelligence estimat~threat

studies are typee of such estimates

+f future enemy activities is a set

of conclusions projected into the fu

ture. The projection is based on the

enemy’s previous behavior in comparable situations, his expected behavior

baeed on indkations, and estimates of

what he is physically capable of do

ing. These conclusions are founded oninformation that is either incomplete

or uncertain or both.

Even if the intelligence informa

tion available at a given time was complete and accurate, there is still no cer-

Colonel Irving Hegmmzt . US ArmzIRetired ie a veteran of World War IIand Korea. While en active dutv healeo served with the North AtlanticTreatg Organicatiom Advanced Weap-erw Branch US Army Europe andwae amigned to the faerdtg of the US

Army Command and General StaffCoUege for fear yeare. The author of“Inraeli Defenee Forcee” which ap-peared in the FebruaW 1967 izene ofthe MILITARYRSWSSW,Cobnrel Hey-

ment is preeently with the ReeearohAnalgeis Corporation McLsnp Vir.giniu.

4s

.

Wlnty that the enemy will not chse~

his mind. We have pursued the d~velopment of major weapons and or.

ganizstion systems with much fanfm

only to cancel them for valid reaso~

The transition from the triangular di.vieion to the Reorganization of Cm.bat Infantry Divieion (ROCID) to ths

Reorganization Objective Army Dirn.sion teok place in lees than a decmh

Considering the publicity on the mu.ite of the ROCID division, it would

have been difficult for enemy intelh.gence agencies to conclude that ii

would be dkwarded in a few years.

Tentstive Conclusions

In preparing an intelligence esti.

mate, the estimator creates oue 01

more hypotheses to explain the avsil.able information. The hypotheses e~

tentative conclusions on the eigsitl.

cance of the information. By weigh

ing the known information for pertinency and validity, and by testinj

with new information, the estimatmfinally selecte one hypethesie, perhz~

modified, as the beet explanation oall the available information. Thie ~

pothesis rests on assumption tldcover many aspects including accu~

of information and validity of prevf

ous judgments on enemy behaviorSuch assumptions are neceesary, bn’they are not always the only logicsones that can be made. A change irthe basic aseumptione would probabl~

lead to different hypotheses and dit

ferent conclueione.

Threat source materiale are ofts

misused because of failure to rccos

nize that they do not coneider the impact on the enemy of the epcc~

friendly capability that ie under etudY.Thie misuse often rezulte in dieregadof enemy countermeasures or counter

moves. For example, standard tar’t@

arraye for a potential mechanked sc-

Mllltellnmw

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


my for the 1966-70 timeframe cannot

smsider all possible friendly developnsats or enemy responaea during thatpcried.This does not imply that stand-

ml target arraya are uselees, but,nther, that their limitations must bemderstood.

One method sometimes mistakenly

wed in formulating a threat studyh known as ‘inhror image.” This

mctlmdis based on the implied as

sumption that “if we dan do it-so

CSnour opponent.” With this techniqoe,a technology forecast of friend

ly developments is modified slightly,@upledwith come assumptions on the

Ioliticel context, and presented as the

CO@nyhreat. Such a procedure incor

wSy assumes that the United Statesmd the enemy have the same objeetirw, resources, and economic and po

~tk?alreet,~inti. For example, cur-

Mot US objectives call for greaterIOobilityor ground forces, and exten-

M 1s7

THREAT

sive use is being made of helicopters.

It does not necessarily follow that apotential enemy can or will do the

same. His obj~lves might be satis

fied by his current capabilities orgreater use of existing or improved

armored personnel carriers.

Tbe major variablea in the threatare time, the enemy forces, the locale

of potential conflicts, the type of war

fare, the politieel context, and devel

opmenta in technology. Each variable

influences tbe nature of the total enemy threat and the other variables

witbin the total threat. A variation inthe political context may change the

composition and strength of the po

tential enemy or only change theweapon systems available to the en

emy. There is further variakdlity with

in the enemy factor because of the

::g:~:;:ly countermeaiuree or

T]me influences the validity of all

49

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


threat source materials. Estimatee for

the near timeframe ard usually more

valid then those for later periode because, witbin certain Iimita, the en

emy’s capability tn depart from present patteme is restricted by time. It

takes time to develop systems to the

peint of operational readineee, to develop new doctrine and tactice, and to

retrain and reorganize forces. For thelater periods, time is lees restricting

and additional options become avail

able beeauee of new technological de

velopments. It is dficult enough topredict what our antitank weapons

will be 15 years hence, much less pre

dict with cetilnty what a eeeretiveenemy will then have. It is usually im

passible to prepar~with confidence

—threat studiee, target arrays, or en

emy tachncdogical forecasts beyond

about 10 years except to indicate broadtrends.

The threat study

the same timeframe

useful lifespan of

study. Judging the

used must cover

as the expected

the system under

effectiveness of a

new kind of division by use of a

threat model based on a Korean eit

uation enemy and tactics of 1950-63may lead to false conchrsione.

CharrgeaIIIThreat

Another pitfall is to assume that

the enemy threat will remain constant

during the time period under study.The thrent may change because of the

introduction of new enemy capabili

ties or cbengee in the over-all strategic concept. The useful lifespan of

the 120-millimeter antiaircraft gunwee cut ehort by the introduction of

jet aircraft. It is ditllcnlt to foresee all

changes in the enemy threat and their

timing, but the Poaelbj l i t y Of suchcbengee ee they affect the 8yatem un

der study, muot be considered.Enemy forcee may vary signithwmtly

depending on the political context ot

the time period under etudy. In igiven time period, one potential eo.

emy may be equipped with highly&

veloped air defenee mieeilee and w.teneive ground and air mobility mean

In the came time period, there rru}

also be other potential enamies whoare equipped only with simple weepim

syeteme. All significant enemy form

must be considered in judging theffectiveness of alternatives unlw

there are obvioue reasons to the cm.

trary. Nothing ie gained by meeeur.ing the .etRctiveneee of a Proposal

eystem for defense againet low-flYIoIsupersonic aircraft in an environmmt

where the enemy forcee do not ban

modern weapons available.

CommonErrorConsideration should not be ~

stricted to only one enemy unless heystem is intended to be emplo@ ;againet only that type of enerny.~common error when employing ~ ‘ ione kind of enemy in an effeetiv :model, ie to generalise to other

mice. One study on new artillery :munition, for inetance, consid ;

only an enemy mechanized force. .proposed ammunition may be

effective than current atilllery a~

nition against such a force, but ~

against other kinds of forces. Th$

effectiveness of a proposed capebilib

against all possible aignitleently M.

ferent enemy forces should be a .

amined. With such information avakable, better decieione can be made 00

allocating reeourwes to counter e@potentiet enemy or, perhaps, to invw

tigate new altemativee.Examination of effectiveness is alto

degraded by uee of a target arN

that doee not depict all logical

of the enemy. In the ammurdtbetudy, the effectiveneen eeenarlo ws

MultaryM @ 1

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


1“THREAT

‘

IIA on a target array expected to

exi~ if the enemy motorized forcewcs frOmn in place four houra afteran attack started. Such a test is in

omckrsive. MSitary forces dispoee

tlmneclves differently in the defense,offense,retrograde, and other opera

tions. Judgment must determine the

differentenemy wetures that aignifi

tiee, but not all, ueurdly leads to false

measurement of effectiveness.The enemy must be credited with

some degree of abSity to react to new

friendly capabilities. Guerrilla forcesfeeed with a new airmobile capability

should not he expected to continue to

employ the same taetice used against

a roadbeund enemy. The introduction

TheMauler air defense eystem, even before bsbtg canceled, wae behind in its e;imeteddevelopment schedule

rmtly influence the over-all effecthw

nesaof the eyatem being examined.

AU the perthent elements of theentire enemy force muet be included

h considering enemy operations. An

ersmination of enemy attack eapabU

itks,should not be limited to one class

of weapone such as surface-to-eurface

b. Close air support, if available

tothe enemy, must also be considered.Treating only some enemy eapabili

Wl 1*7 ‘

of a tank main wecpon with greatly

increased accuracy or lethality can be

expected to result in some change in

the enemy’s tactics.The significant feasible enemy coun

termeasures and countermoves must

be developed for each epeeific etudy

beeauee each new capability opens new

possibilities for countermee$urea and

countenrtovee. Tbcxe must be developed to supplement target arraye and

51

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


THREAT

threat studies that are prepared with.out consideration of the system under

study. The countermeasures and coun-

termoves should be formulated by spe

cialists in intelligence of the potential

enemy and in friendly and foreigntechnology, economics, and the type

of military operations involved. The

formulation of countermeasures andcountermoves ia a form of cost effec

tiveness analysis from the enemy

point of view.

WarGames

War games and simulation areoften useful for gaining insight into

the nature and limits of pessible en

emy countermoves and countermeae.

ures. Such games should be repeatedwith varying scenarioa by personnel

knowledgeable of the potential enemy’s

past and current developments. The

scenarios should consider appropriatevariations in political conte~t, Iecale,

and in enemy strength and composi

tion. The emphasis should be on the

play of the friendly alternative in or

der to uncover vulnerabilities to feas

ible countermeasures or countermovesrather than on compliance with rules

of the war game. The enemy should

not be assumed to be beund to his

current strategy and tactics, yet be

ehould not be permitted unlimitedfreedom to react. Cogniaence must be

taken of his possible technical, budg

etary, leadtime, bureaucratic, and

other constraints.

In a long-range development pre

grem, it ia possible to keep eecret thedetdls of efficiency, operational capa

bilities, performance characteristics,and level of procurement. However, it

IrJ not ueiually possible to hide the

existence and purpose of the systam.

This is particularly true if tbe pro

posed eyatem ia o large magnitude.

For exsmple, the broad outlines o

. ..... ...

the Nike X program have been well

publicized. The test of the air assault

concept that led to the formation of

an airmobjle division waa also well

publicized. In peacetime, it is almret

impoaaible to duplicate the security ofa Project Manhattan.

(lualitativaUncertaintyAlthough the enemy must be cred.

ited with some knowledge of the pro.

posed capability, he cannot foremhis opposition’s every move. Nations

do not have perfect information of

their petential enemy, and they do notalways either react or react appro.

priately to the information they do

possess. History is full of exampleeof nations that faiied to take advnn

tage of available information becauwof inetiltutional processes, incredulity,

and human failurea. Although this

qualitative uncertainty cannobbe reduced to a probability figure, it should

not be disregarded.

It is equally as dangerous to over.

estimate the enemy’s capabilities av

it ia to underestimate them becaueo

overestimates do not necessarily lead

to insurance and eafety. The enemycan hardly meet all of tbe competing

demands for resources. It is unreel

ietic to asaume that he will use a dis

proportionate ehare to counter one

threat at the expense of neglecting

other threats and ericritlcing other

significant capabilities. In studyingthe air defense of one smcitlc lecnkt

it is wrong to aeeume t~at all of the

enemy air defensee will be used thereThe enemy cannot be certnhr of our

decieione or which capability we will

exerciee and to whst degree. Overw.

timatlng enemy capabilities Ieada to

pricing of important policy objecttvce

out of the market Rnd to strategf

o desperation.

A cost e$fediveneas analyals ehmdd,

Mltfuy8*

.

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


.

where appropriate, examine the impsstof different significant leealee on

he alternative under study. The in

6uenceof the am= on military opera

tions and effectiveness of militaryforcesis well known. Such an examinationhelps in judging whether the

recourcee required are applicable toroostlocalee or only to one. or more

of the greateet importance or likeli.

hoodof use.

Ins of WarfareVariablaThe advent of etrategic and tactical

umlcar weapons has profoundly affectedthe utility of eystams and doc

trines. For example, the Honest John

is significantly more effective in nu

clearthan in nonnuclear warfare. Cer

tsin logistics policies on stoekage levelandstorage policiee also vary in effectiveness depending on whether the

coniiict is expected to he nonnuclearornuclear. Although the broad effecte

of nuclear weapons are known, the

preeise effects are yet undetermined.

The consideration of this variable iecomplicated by the possibility that a

nonnuclear war may develop at come

undetermined point into an undeter

minedlevel of use of nuclear weapone.

The distinction between nuclear andnonnuclear warfare ie eo profound in

its miiitery implication that it must

betreated as a variable when the en

emyhas nuclear weapone or allies whocouldmake them available.

The political context variable influ

encesand interacte with almoet all the

other variables in the total threat.Straight Sine projection of exieting

piitical aliiances and power blocs arehelpful, but should not be the exclu

sive basis for determining the polit

icalcontext. The influence of the most

and least favorable political contexts

meet aiao be examined. The Iifeapan

of political alliances is highly uncer

lpil 1ss7

THREdT

~. Between 1957 and 1962 serioue

rlfto uecurred both within the North

Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the

Soviet bloc. Chha no longer receives

military aid from the Soviet Union.The unanimity of NATO has dieeipated to the point where France now

deniee baee righte to the other mem

bers of NATO.

The political context directly influ+

ences logistic services and overflight

rights provided or denied by ot~er na

tione. The availability of base righte

influences force composition and eventhe composition of Iogietic unite. T-heavailability of overtlight authority

may aleo influence the deeign of army

aircraft, particularly in terms of

ferrying capabilities. If the availability of these rights or services is as

eumed, then the study muet examine

the degree of dependence on euch asenmptiona in terms of required re.eources.

Indirect Influanoas

Changes in the political context canalso have important indirect intlu

ence. An internal defense opera~lon

can be transformed into a different

conflict by a change in tbe politicalcontext. Such a change could alter the

enemy capab]litiee, the locale of the

operation, and even tbe kind of war‘fare. Tbe insurgents are usually ini

tially weak in air defense weapone.

In etudying equipment for use in coun

terinsurgency operations that exploit

this weakness in air defense, examin

ing only the current air defenee capabiiitiee of the ineurgente is inade.

quate. The political context muet also

be examined to determine if any rea

sonable changes could result in the

ineurgente reeeiving inereesed air de

fense ca~abilities. The purpose ie not

to predict whether the ineurgenta will

or will not receive air defense weap

es

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


THREAT

ens, but, rather, to determine the pos

sible results if they did receive them.

Similarly, the study of any new capa

bility must consider what significant

changes in the peliticel context, ifany, will alter the effectiveness of the

we~llity under study.

TechnologicalDevelopmentsVariability in both friendly and en

emy technological developments poses

great uncertainties in planning for

the future.

The forecasting of trends in science and technology and their influ.ence on military affairs cannot be reduced to a scientific method. Progress

in science ie not like the growth ofpopulation or the development of backward economies where trende are well

recognized and reliable predictions are

possible. Progress in scientific knowl

edge cannot be foretold since a breakthrough may or may not occur at any

moment. When a breakthrough doesoccur, it usually opens new fiekie both

in further scientific ideas and in technological application. Nevertheless, it

is possible to analyze scientific devel

opments and to evaluate their possible

military implications if one is awareof the limitations imposed on such

considerations.

The uncertainties regarding enemy

technological deveiopmente can be

readily appreciated by comparing them

with the uncertainties of our own future technological development where

full information is available. For example, the Skvboit missile had been

under development for many years be

fore it was abandoned because of tech

nical difficulties and changed opera

tional needs. Furthermore, estimates

on the operational availability of new

systems have been more in the nature

of gueaEee. The lfaulw air defensesystem, even before bahg canceled,

was well teehind the estimated devel.

opment schedule.Enemy technological developments,

despite the uncertainties involved, are

an integral part of the threat. The UO.certainties about which development

he ia pursuing, operational availsbil.

ity, dnd the probability of his msk.ing unanticipated technological bresk.

throughs cannot be dismissed because

there is a lack of firm information,Treating these uncertainties is dti.

cult, but failure to do so can lead b

poor decisions. During World War I,

the Allied failure to anticipate theGerman development of peison gas andthe German failure to anticipate the

development of the tank led to near

disasters.

SorrrseMater ia lsThe first step in handling the threat

factor in a study is to secure thrcst

source materials that cover tbe same

time period as the subject under studyand tbe anticipated service life of the

development proposed. However, it

usuelly is not possible to obtain threat

source materials that cover the timeperiod of concern and specifically con-

eider the implications of the proposedcapabilities under study.

The next step is to modify and am.plify the threat source materials b

meet the neede of the particular sub

ject being examined. This is best accomplished by personnel qualified in

intelligence, friendly and foreign tech

nology, economics, international relations, and the type of military opers.

tions involved.

Uncertainties in regard to any onevariable that eignitleently influences

the alternatives are best reduced toquantitative considerations. This can

be accomplished by studying the ef.

fectivenees and cost of the alterrwtives under a range of different but

MllltsryleItw4

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


THRWT

reasonablerangee in the v~riable. Dif

ferences in cost and effectiveness re

sulting from such examinations muetbs,presented. In etfect, th]e requiree

doingthe study more than once. The

extent to which this can be done depends on the available time and resmrcee. Where time and resources are

limited, the variability ehould be

treated qualitatively by pointing outtkedependence of the conclusions, recomraendatilone,and other areas of the

studyon changes in the variable.

It ie often feasible to reduce thevolume of these combined uncertain

ties tn a manageable number and

range by carrying three threat esti

matesthrough the etudy: “optimistic”and “pessimistic” estimatee that

bracketthe range of uncertainty, and

a “best estimate” that has the hlgheetconfidence of likelihood of occurring.

Tkeaeterme are not rigoroue, and sub

jective judgment is required. Using

these three estimates aeeists in de

termining the sensitivity of the effeetiveneas of any indNidual alternative

to the assumptions about the threat

variables.

In dealing with the “pessimistic”

eetimate, it should not be assumed that

the enemy will always react to cauee

ue the most harm. What is worst forus is not necessarily the best for theenemy. For example, the enemy’s

maesing of his air defenaee ip one

area may be the worst action from

our viewpoint. However, it ia not neeeeearily the best for the enemy be

cause of the vulnerability that ensueein other vital areas. The enemy use

of low airburst nuclear weapons incertah terrain may bring both hie

and our forces to a standstill.Failure to consider properly the

threat factor leads to faulty prepara

tions. Victories of tomorrow can only

come from today’s proper vieion.

Sendi nyourCHANGEOFADDRESSTo assure uninterrupted delivery of your Military Review, be sure to

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lege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


~e’~lkv~ From The Owl (India)

‘ E~NATi ~... . .

“3Brigadier R. D. Law,

Indian Armu

UCLEAR detonations by Com

munist China and the proepeci

~ of mainland China becoming a nu

cIear power have posed a number of

~ problems for India. Theee problems

have a direct bearing on her domeeticand foreign policy. Most important is

the queetion of whether India should

attempt to develop and produce nu

clear weapene.

When eutllciently developed, China’s

nuclear “capability will Wee a serious

threat to India’s eecurity, and, unlem

tbe Indian armed forcoe are provided1nuclear eupport, their morsle will1

suffer a serioue eetback. To expect the

armed forces to resiet Chinese attacke

which are supperted by nuclear weay

one would be a useleee sacrifice.

If India is to defend hereelf againet

Chineee aggraeeirm, or if ehe ia toD

have any hope of recovering Ioat tar.ritoriea, her forcee muet have nuclfwr

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


1 support, be it with her own weapons

or those obtaine~ elsewhere.

In modern war, the morale of the

armed forces is essentially a part of

national morale. If cities and indus

trial complexee are subject to Chinese

nuclear attacks, maintenance of na

tional morale will be an impossible

task unless India has the meane to

retaliate, thus providing a deterrent

to the use of these weapons by an

aggreesor.

me eterrentIndia ie at a considerable disad

vantage compared to China. From

Tibetan bases, China can etrike at

msny of India’a major cities and

muchof her industrial potential with

out employing highly eopbisticated

delivery. means, On the other hand,

Indiacannot retaliate against Chinese

cities or industry without highly so

phisticated delivery syeteme. The only

military targets within easy reach are

those in Tibet and Sinkiang, and

Chinawould not be unduly concerned

eheutattacks on these targeta. There

fore, if India develops nuclear weap

ons, the cost will be high.

The annual cost for an effective nuclear deterrent is of a magnitude

clearly beyond India’s means unless

she stops development and increasee

tasation. This would certainly lead to

a collapse of her economy and cause

widespread discontent-e eituation

vddchwould be to China)a liking.

India has pledged herself to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has

This article wae digeeted fromthe mfgirml published in THE

Owh (Indin) Volume XXI 1965

66 under the title “Emergenceef China as a Nuclear Power.”Co-p@ghted @ 1965-66 by THE

OWL.

l s

INDIA ;

been one of the most enthusiastic sup

porter of disarmament. This stand ie

widely appreciated by the civilized

world and, along with her policy of

nonalignment, has helped to ease

world teneione. As a result, India has

attained a position in international

affairs out of all proportion to her

material strength.

A reversal of these policies is bound

to tarnish India’s image in the civi

lized world. She would cease to be a

stabilizing influence in internationa~diaputee. Thh would be a disservice

to the cause of peace. However, theee

considerations are secondary when

the conntry’s sovereignty is at stake.

Proiiferstionof WeaperrsIf India attempts ti develop nuclear

weapone, other nations may consider

themselves threatenad by India and

follow euit. Thie may well start a

chain reaction and reeult in some ir

responsible nations possessing nuclear

weapons which would considerably

increase the chancee of the outbreak

of nuclear wars either accidentally or

intentionally. The development of nu

clear weapons by India will, therefore,

have far-reaching effects.India’s efforts to promote world

peace and her sacrifices for thie cause

have been appraeiated in most quar

tere. Consequently, she reseives sub

stantial aid from practically all the

developed countries of the world, ir

respective of their ideologies. India

will continue to require euch aid for

many years. If India were to take the

step which would lead to nuclear pro

liferation, she would loee the sympa

thy she enjoys. In fact, in order to

discourage India from producing nu

cksar weapons, external aid may well

be refueed or etopped altogether by

many nations.

The attainment of a nuclear capa

57

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


bbility will certakrly bolster India’s

preetige among Afro-Asian countries

and produce a corresponding setback

to China’a stature. It will retard the

sprekd of Chinese influence and would

be a major contribution toward the

cotrtainmant of Communist China.

Since ignoring the Chinese nuclear

T

Requesting a nuclear shield un.

der the auspices of the United Ns.

tions.

Entering into collaboration with

a country or countries, similarly

threatened, to share the cost of devel.opment and production.

Intensification of nuclear re

search in India so the V!me gap lx-

s.. -“ ,:’ ‘J, f

D P@t w nt 01 S*

A UN nuclear shield is not a mtlicfent guarmtee for India berarreeII Security Coundlmember rmuldexerciee his veto at s critfcsl time

since d&elopment and production ofnuclear weapons and their aaeociated

delivery meant would severely tax

India’s economy, four alternatives

sre oporr:

An underetarrding with one or

more friendly nuclear powers to pre-

vide nuckrar protection to India in the

event of a Chhtwe nuclear attack.

tween a decision to produce nucleuweapone and actual production cm k

reduced b the minimum.

The United Stste6 hee made a geo

eral etatement that her aasietance @

be available to any country threnteod

by a nuclenr attack, India could od

possibly rely on 8 general dtclaratiti

of this nature, for thie is not a 6@

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


‘~

INDIAeient gaarantee that nucleer protec

tion will be provided at the critical

time. A more concrete arrangement

is neeezsary. possibly in the form of

n treaty. Countries which could provide this protection are the United

Stetea or the Soviet Union.

India could enter into an agreement

witheither one, both of them individ

ealIy, or with the two collectively.

Suchan agreement would not be contrary to India’s policy of nonalign

ment but it will not be entirely freefrom drawbacks.

First, the ability of a country to be

ableto provide the required support

will depend upon the international

@nation prevailing at the time. For

uu.tance, if India had an agreement

with the United States, ehe may not

te able”te offer assistance if, as a

consequence, she is threatened withretaliation by the Soviet Union. It is

ertramely unlikely that India would

~w any control of nuckmr weapons

Iied by another nation.

, ‘riderthe UN Charter, any member

taned by aggression can ask the

Nations for aseietonce. If

.: tened with a Chinese nuclear at-India could follow tbia course;

I ever, there are serious disadvan

. All decisions of the United Na

are eubjeet to a majority vote.

P@has been India’s experience that

thevoting in the United Nations is

tot always on the basis of a case’s

omits. Not to be ruled out is the pos

!ibtity that a member might exercisehisveto in the Security Council at a

witksl time.

The only country likely to be threat

@by China and which ie sufficiently

Ukvmcedto collaborate with India in

tke development and production of

00c1earweapons is Japan. The strong

feelingin that country against nuc]ear

weapone ie well known. Therefore, it

is unlikely if any Japanese Gover

nment would be in a poeition to col

laborate on su h a proje t in the face

of such strong public opinion. Further, the .Japaneee Government has

declared that it would accept the

positioning of US nuclear weapons if

Japan is threatened. Under thsse cir

cumstances, it is doubtful if Japan’

would be prepared to divert re

sources for the development of nn

clesr weapens.

In addition to any other arrange

ment that India may make, it would

be a logical course to @.ep up nuclear

reeearch so that, if the need arises,

India coul&start production of nuclear

weapons with minimum delay. This

would be a useful standby arrange

ment in the event other arrangemeute

fail to materialize.In a few years, the Chineee nuclear

capability will pose a very live threat

to India, and she has to devise ways

and means of countering it. Develop

ment of nuclear weapons is clearly

beyond India’s reeourcee, and euch a

step would have serious repercueeions

on her economy.Nuclear protection under the aus

pices of the United Natione will not

be sufficiently reliable, for one cannot

afford to stake a country’s security on

the whims and fancies of voters or

those who have the power of veto. An

agreement with the United Stetee, or

the Soviet Union, or both for nuclear

protection would have dieadvantages,but it is the beet under the circum

stances. In addition, efforts should be

made to step up nuclear reeearch to

an extent that the timelag between

the decision to produce nuclear ,weep

ons and actual production ie reduced

to the minimum, This would be a use

ful standby.

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


LTHOUGH the United States is

in South V]etnam to aseist that

country in maintaining its independence, the southeast Asian conflict also

is serving ae a laboratory in wldch a

new type of war is being tested. Tbedetails of the test have profound significance to free societies confrontedwith the menace of an illusive, guer

rittaenemy backed up by regular unite

iadltrating across a border.

NowTools of War

Wllitary commentators have mademuch of the new tools of war whichengineers have produced to aid United

States and Republic of Vietnam forcesin dealing with the Viet Gong and

~NorthVietnamese regular units. The

$rnostimportant of these toole is the‘ elicopter. In the course of the Viet

struggle, the helicopter has un

‘rgone a remarkable evolution fromunarmed aerial transport for a

i,uad of soldiers to a true combat air

+.de mounting an elaborate array

, . weapons, including rockets, guided

I siles, grenades, and automatic can

‘n.

‘[Somewhat overlooked in the public

d professional attention devoted to~e new weaponry is the revolution in

ttlefield tactics. Important as aree new machines and weapons, the

~ YS in which foot soldiers are em-

LL. Ttle L MO mm mtesyAnmu New .y Fat. . ..

Anthony Harc%gan is A880C&7teEditor of The News and Courier,

Charleston, South Carolina, and amember of th8 Institwte for Strategic&udie8 {London). He is US cornc-

mt fov the Canadian MNitaryJOUrneland the auther of the recentlypubltihed book, A Guide to the War

in Vietnam. Hia article, “Armies andkmcr Leadec’8hip~ was the MILITAXY7@licw Awavd Article for the Jan-

c%l 1967 iseue.

IJcil1s7

6ROUN0WARFARE

ployed have even greater eigniticance.

In the final analyeie, troops on theground decide whether a country ie

won or lost.

The US soldier on the ground inVletnsm can count on extraordinary

support. Maesive firepower is available to back up deep penetrations ofenemy territory. Excellent communi

cations make possible complicated, pre

cieely timed operations. In criticalsituations, troops on the ground can

summon aerial and artillery eupport.Availability of fixed-wing and rotarycraft have made instant logistics al

most a reality. Most important of all,

there ie the unprecedented mobility of

ground unite and their “weapons.It is routine for a divieion com

mander to have a battalion picked up

by helicopter and carried to a clear

ing deep in a jungle. It aleo is routine to fly artillery over rice paddies

and ,_jungle into positions miles from

any road or atop high ridges.

ImportantAdvancesThe heli-lifting of atilllery, even at

night, represents one of the most im

portant advances in ground warfare

in centuries, Major General MosheDayan, former Israeli Chief of Staff

who observed the ground confllct in

Vietnam, has deecribed this heli-lift

ing as “the American anewer to theproblem of movement in the jnngle:

mobility that is not dependent on

roads, ground vehicles or airtielde.”

Neither mobility nor massive fire

power, however, offer a complete answer to the problem of the elusive

guerrilla unit. The Vlet Gong andthe North Vietnamese are superbly

adapted to the environment in which

they are fighting. AS through the

emnmer of 1966, for example, the

North Vietnamese regulars infiltrated

into wilderness areas of South Viet

61

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6ROUHDWARFARE

nam. Using tunnels and jungle tracks,they built up supply and ammunitiondepots ineide the “demilitarized zone.

The battles US ground troops fought

in the mud and among the rocks in

the summer and early fall teetilled tothe legpower of the enemy.

These qualitiee on the pert of the

Communist units have led to frustration for US ground forcee on many

occaeions. Nothing is more depressing

than a sweep that nets nothing. TheVlet Cong and the North Vietnamese

are ekllled at utilizing the hours ofdarkneee, the early morning monsoon

raine, and the fog to withdraw fromthe US attackers. Thle, after all, is

their basic etrategy. For them, victory

often simply meansstroyed,

tlid&and.Srmk

Ground warfare,stances, frequentlyand-eeek. Reaction

avoiding being de-

in these circumis a game of hide-time is no longer

a major problem for US forces now

that helicopters are available in great

numbers. But locating the enemy—

pinpointing his formationz-ie a different etory. Helicopters loudly an

nounce themselves as they approach

a landing zone. Often, they are theeignal for the enemy to brak up into

small units and move into tbe jungle

by different routes se they strike out

for a new rendezvous. It is thie eitua

tion that has rreceeeitated sopbieticated tactica for etealtby entry onto

the battlefield,

In time, leee noisy helicopter maybe produced which will allow a greater

meeeure of surprise in heliberne ae

smdts. For the present, US combat

forcee have to rely on unconventional “

taetice. This ia not to say that eide-

Iooking radar and infrared devicee in

reconnaineznce aircraft are not useful.

They are able to detect river croeeinge

at night and lrxate the cites of recent

enemy campllree.The meet valuable date, however,

cornea from the soldier who epets tk

enemy with his own eyes. Thus, in.creasing uee ie M]ng made of long.range reconnaiaeance patrols. Thwelemente have been introduced at th

battalion ae well as the brigade level,

Cuetomary procedure is for thm

patrols to be heli-lifted into enemyareas for reconnaissance miesione ot

eeveral daya’ duration. Their mieaion

ie not to engage the enemy, but tolocate him. As in all patroI activitiwresults are mixed, Sometimes no u@

ful information is turned up. On othw

oeeasione, the patrols are epotted byetrong enemy forces, and it is neeea.

sary for the reconnaissance group to

disengage. Finally, there are the aW

ceseful operations when the enemy $pinpointed and a powerful US re+

tion force arrives on time to aeeatl

plieh its miesion.

FollowupProcedureA followup procedure is an o&

growth of the long-range patrol S+W

tern. Under thkr procedure, a

tion force of company size ie locati

fairly close to the reconnaissance wtrol. Once the reconnaissance petrol

hae acquired a target, the accompezy

ing reaction force begine the engage

ment. Meanwhile, the main battaliozstrength reaction force is lifted into

the area se fast ae poeeible.

US troops aleo have been msldea

increased use of night operation. Mt.taIion airmobile aesaulte have b@

made under cover of darkness, fd

lowing reronnaiesance by the ba@

ion reconnaizesnce unit. These bmbeen accomplished without prelid.

nary aerial or artillery fire,

Continually being refined in VW

nam ie the mode of entry onto W

MlltaryM

.a

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


6ROUNDWARFARE

battlefield.The basic style of the heli-

Imne aaaault involves preliminaryaerial reconnaissance; closer inspec

tion of a landing zone by air and

ground commander; preparation ofthelending zone by bombing, ati]llery&e, ehd helicopter gunehlps; and, fi-OZIIY, of the aseault force.he landing

This basic etyle ia not always sat-

the main zone without preparatory

fire.

This is not to say one approach or

another is better under all circum

steneez. The ‘ti]x” of the Vietmzrnwar changes all the time. Fightingguerrilla and fighthig North Vletnameee regulara are very different

propositions. Fighting in the Mekong

., AWWNw* Feat.rea

Increasing use ie being mede of Ions-range patrOk

iafectory, however, as the preparatoryphases of the operation frequently

$erauadethe enemy to depart. A modiikation of the claeeic heliborne as-

N.ldt involvee moving elements of a

battalion into landing zones near thelozin landing aone that baa been se

bcted. Moving by night, a small re-Omaaissanze force takes up poaitfonz

h the main landing aone. The other

dementa.of the battalion then land in

@ 1967

...

Delta and along the demilitarized zone

involves different problems. In the for

mer, the uze of air and afi]llery has

to be restrained because of the dan

ger of harming friendly people. In thedense tropieel foreata along the Lao

tian border, where there are few peo

ple, it is possible to drench the. ridgesand valleys with afi]llery and rocket

fire.

Heavy preparatory fire also is nec

6s

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/dementa.of

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/dementa.of

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


V

GROUNDWARFARE

essary in contested landing zones or

in areae which it is necessary to seize,

over fierce opposition, because of major campaign objectives. In euch an

operation, 105-millimeter howitzers

might be heli-lifted into an uncontested landing zone a mile or two

from the main landing zone. These

howitzers would be put to work tosoften up the perimeter of the mainlanding zone during a firing schedule

of, perhaps, 30 minutes. Fighter bombers might then drop 500-pound bombs

on the jungle bordering the main landing cone. Then, the troope would make

their aesauit.

Ringside SeatIn euch an operation, the aseardt

commander would be in a helicopter

command post where he has a sweep.

ing vision of the battle area. Indeed,

even a tank battalion commander is

likely to be airborne during action.This way he ia able to keep in con.

stint touch and know where all bis

tanks are deployed,Insofar ae an assault commander is

concerned, he can detect from a heli

copter a gap in the bomb and artillery

barrage eoftening up a landing zone.

If the enemy ie scattering, he can direct the gunships to follow as the en

emy withdraws. The commander can

take note of all the elemente on thebattleground+verything from unexploded bombe that endanger his own

men to unwise bunching of troops.

what the helicopter means to tbe aseault commander is unprecedented op

portunity to direct a battle from a

ringzide eeat.

In World War 11 a division commander might not know what wae go

ing on until reporta came in from the

battlefield. In Vietnam, however, com

mander can be in visual contact with

tbe developing combat situation. In-

u

k..

deed, it is possible for a divieion coro- ;mander or aasistint d]vision corn.

mander to oversee several battalion. ;sise operation in a eingle day, ‘fhisolation of beadquartera frbm front- :

line troops—always a danger in for.mer wars—no longer exists in theVietnam conflict.

Another interesting aspect of thenew warfare in South Vietnam is the

tempo of divisional action. Brigadier

General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 10lst Air

borne Division, gave this account ofdivision operations in Arrnu Digest:

During a dx-dau period at TUY

Hoa, we conducted four battalion w

eaulti and 11 artillery batteW did.

plaeemente bv helicopter. At Tou Mo.

rorzg, we moved nearly 1.5,000 troW

and accomplished 9S 8eparate unit air

mobile operation, plus 8eveu artilk?y

battery dieplacemente jn an 18dayperiod.

ModernArtilleryRaid

One of the techniques used by theartillery in Vietnam is an updatedvereion of the artillery raid. A typical

raid consists of picking a location cen

tral to several enemy targets, landing

a battery (four gmre and a minimumof personnel) with 70 rounds for ench

gun and preeomputed firing data. Ac

cording to one 1st Cavalry Division

source, “The idea is to get in, get the

rounds off, and get out of the aree.”

This type of raid is typical of the nggreseive uee of artillery in Vietnam.

Current infantry tactice indicate

there is little danger of the war as

suming a static quality. Indicative of

this is the following statement by M8jor General WiIljam E. DePuy:

We don’t IJend troops elogoi!w

through the jungiea arqirrtovojustJok-

irtg for uornethffir. We fat the Afi

8quade move out oa reconnafaaam&

MlllfmyAelK

.. . :=. A

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


GROUNDWARFARE~

s%en thev find eomething, we quickly

tend in a battalion, nuwbe two. Awl

we prouide the firepower eapport.

For the foot soldiers, the moment

of grC8teSt danger—and also the pa

riod of maximum eaeualties-is the

initial contact with the enemy. After

the troops have been offloaded from

helicopters, they move out from the

landing zone. Because of the natureof the terrain in South Vietnam, it

often ie necassary for a platoon to

advance in single file down a narrow

sath.

This type of formation means thattbe unit has only a minimum of fire

power forward. In euch a situation,SCOUtewill proceed with great cau

tiod, etopping to listen for the enemy

Ml 1s67

and to search the path for evidence

of mines. Ne#ertheleee, ambush often

cannot be avoided within a few hun

dred yards of a landing zone.The Viet Cong are skillful at cam

ouflage and at preparing firing positions. In all likelihood, the Vkt Gong

unit commander will allow the first

US squads or platoona to pass along

the path, and then direct all availablefire at the other platoons strung out

along the path. In such an incident,

casualties are likely to be heavy on

the US side.

The US counterattack% when it

comes, most probably ie conducted

with aerial and artMery atrikea, not

manpower. Repeated storming by

ground forces is not standard prece

6s.

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


dure in the Vietnam war. In8tead,

firepower {a directed to accomplish

the job. l?omba, rockets, and shells,

ttfter sII, are not vulnerable to am

buehee, nor are they impeded by jun.gle growth, To draw out the enemy

ta where he can be rwbjceted to man.

e.ive firewwer in the US aim in thenow warfare,

Cam cad Tuned 6@amsOf course, “shaking out” the Viot

Gong and the North Vietnamese canbe extremely ditltcult. In the regionof razorback ridges in the highlanda,

the North Vietnamese dug an @lab.

orate awe and tunnel ayatmo that randeep into the mount.@na. DeniB War

ner, the Austrrdlrirr military writer,

k reported that %ome of thcne man

mrtde caven were 00 feet long and 40

f~t wide, with I?-foot ceilings.”

On the nurfrmc in the demilitarizedzone, the North Vktnamme in thermmmer of 1966 dug milen of crrmmu.

nlcationn trmrchrw and ~n emplKe

merrta. Deallng with the Cgmmuni@tcave nnd tunnel “ynbmn 1S B prob)cm

throughout Vlctnam, although the URCof xmoke and tcnr gm in helpful.

T’he extent of the tunnellng pdntn

up the fallucy of rotmrdhrg COrrrmu.rrint imurgent wnrfare in V&Rnam an

strictly prlmitlve. The notion of guer

riltan nwimmlng In s protective ma ~f

r nti in trroaelynndequsts. Rewlutlorrary warfnre in the Vktrmmew

country@ido hac bermno quiie mphi~ticatod, with the enemy mquirhrg con

@cd baecn In forecte and swemp.tnnde. Some of the cnvee and tunrw)n

conatttute targe ernmunitiori rind nup

piy dumpm. Indeed, ~ W&bed boxpital

w foond hr cum csve network in tlwfd of Itkld. M was doci@wt b nervs

?%3rthVhtnameaeroopsWdc to undoratmrdhru t.h conflict

in $%trrxm i- the meiirattmt that

S9

sevfmd different typec of war me h

procecs at tbe same time In dlffermt

parts of the country and in dlffemetterrnin, While Vietnam h not an cr.

mor war, for inetance, tank units bavcplayed an incraeaingly important rcAin the Central Highlands.

Wherever the North Vietrramrcrhave iwtabliahad vDlag~ fortitled with

concrete burrkere and trench systenqa tank is e ueef d weapon. Tanks elm

hava been uerrful in fighting off North

Vi&name80 bnttalion.sim mttacke. In

one arch at@ck on a Korcnn unit IDAugust 19S6, tanka employed in sup

port of the 2i5th Divieion killed 44

pement of the attackhrg force.

The French had a dlseatrou@ emriencc with armor in Vietnam, butthey lecked advarrtagen poaaeased ~

US forcec. Helicopter mobility rnek

porwible the ewift diepatchof

repaircrown to disabled tanks. Thwe crew

can repn}r in a matter of hou~ ~

tank thnt hae bean put out of nctioaby mince or rocoillwn rifles.

Reut@6ecwttyTanks deo hro proving vdu~blo for

route security. They cen keep rod

oorm and prowt trut.t convoye, In m

Kmbuth, W-& immcdi tttdy got out of

the “’kill rare” nnd chrmga thrn cm.

bumhcrrt. one of the mwrt etT@im

tank vwipone in the cmrlater roued

This corrt.hin~2,700 mrall &toolpollsbwhkb have a shotgun amect on a hlI1.

nlde. Operating on nmd petrol, thr

tank am-a cu an e4rty wrirning #ye.

tcm for an mea, The Pecmt of 8 mm.c~ful tank patrol, tmwmor, in novu

to do the srmw thing twica, Mm+

mmrte hnvo M be vwied co thtit Ckcm

munia tmope do noi discern n pWem

The Prt@@ E#p r@mmim W@[email protected] and 15M II-$ s.@J#? @

of the e problem, Now rtericm #t@

hqse nt marked sdv&rrtw@MOng i~

-n

mailto:mount.@na

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:mount.@na

mailto:[email protected]

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


.

lines, however. ‘l’he chemical person

nel detector, carried by the lead man

On8 patrol, promises to be effective

in revesting an 8mbusher”s locationbefore an” engagement begins.

Perhaps the most significant appli

cation of US technical know-how is

the use of computers to pkccess intel-Iiice data. An enormous mass ofintelligence date ie available throughhuman and technical channels. Here

tofore, the problem has been organiz

ing it in timely fashion for the useof field commanders. WMc the installationof the fcrst computere in Saigon,

however,the commander of US forcesin Vietnam can pull the necessary in

telligence data together in a matterof a few hours,

Fed into the automatic data proc

eedingequipment are the locations ofroads, waterways, and landing sites;information on peat ambush sites,

knowntunnel systemz, caves and anti

aircraft gun sites; material gathered

byelectronic and infrared means; and

knowledgegained from informers and

““ ”’ ”GROUNDWARFARE

deserters. It is possible, on tbe beeie

of a computerized reading of th~e

datd, to obtain a complete intelligencereport on an area in which a divieion

plans an ofiration. In the pact, theinfo~ation was available to a con

siderable degree, but collating it wee

an almost impossible task in a shorttime.

No accurate report on the war in

Vietnam can properly conclude. however, with the impression that thk is

an entirely new kind of war. The warin Vietnam contains the claesic ele

ments of battlefield combat, only indifferent combinations. Furthermore,

the real heart of victory is not exotic

weaponry or tactical gimmicks on the

battlefield. The -sentfals are the age-old qualitiee of well-trained and

worthy ground forces, familiaritywith personal weepone, pbyeical conditioning for combat, lecderebip at all

levele, and the will-to-win that ie born

of the proud tradition of a greet army

mindful of the concepte of duty,honor, and country.

The Army’s over-all training mission is to provide units which can cleze

with and defeet the enemy in snztnfned land cembet... . Esch man must know

bis job thoroughly end have complete con5dence in his ab]~ty end the deter

mination to accomplish that job under eny corrditiona.The men in eombet units

mmt be trained from %cretcb’heceuee there is no counterpart in civlfian life

for a rifleman,a howitzer crewman,or e tank gunner.

Gcnerol Harold K. Johmsom

M 1s7 67

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Turhish rmy’s Role nNationbuilding

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Anoy’officers OCCUPY special niche

~ Turkish scc.iety, not only because

they are generally well educated, but

also because they, more than any

other group, understand tbe divisive

factors width separate rural from ur

ban societies. On one hand, they are

undisputed members of tbe nation’s

intellectual elite, and, on the otherhand, they largely come from peasant

stock. Because of ita talents and its

unique position in society, the Turk

ish ArmY has been able to assume aleading role as a nationbuilding in

stitution.

Poliiiosand GovernmentTurkey has never bad an overabun

dance of administrative competence

and could iii afford to ignore the tal

ents of. her well-educated miiitary of

ficers. Since the establishment of theRepublic, the government has never

hesitated to tap this source of admin

istrative talent, but only after the

persons concerned had divested them

selves of their miiitary identity.

Retired officers and officere who

have resigned from the army have

been active in the government of Turkey throughout the hietory of the Re

public. During the period from 1920

Coionel Clifton C. Fox is servingwith the . ldInfantrg Division i%Germany. Hie other eervioe includee dutgin Japan with Genera?, He@uartar8,

‘,ParEewt flmmund; with the let Cav-

OIWDivieion in Icorcd; in Washing.ti m“th the Career Management Dihi-eien and the O~e of ths Chief of&eca~ch and Development; and two@ one-half yeatw in Twrke~ aa an$+visor to Turkish militeny echoole.?~e received an M.S. it? International?Affaivefrom George Washington UniA @t~, U@hingtw, D. C., and iS a

“j@dtmte of the US Army Commaad‘l%edGeneral Staff College a?td the US

htv War ( oilege.

WI 1907

TURKISHARM

to 1967, former miiitery pereonnel

had the highest Grand National As

sembly election rate of any vocational

group except professional civil serv

ants. Three of Turkey’s Presidents

also have had military backgrounds.

In general, the active army has

maintained a position of pcditical neu

trality and has exhibited a reluctance

to associate itself with any particular

political party. The younger officer

especially tend to be suspicious of

politician and bureaucratic funtilone.Conversely, the army has evidenced

an awarenesa of political ieaues and

has demonstrated that it values pe

iitical democracy. It did not baeitate

in 1960 to wrest control of tbe govern.

ment from an administration which

it thought had become wo authoritar

ian and which threatened to de@ropolitical freedom in Turkey.

EducationalEndeavora

The Turk]sb Army hea heen re

ferred to as tbe “school of the nation.”

Indeed, the army’e most valuable con

tribution to Tnrkkih mwiety has heen

in the field of education. Aside from

ite basic literacy training programand its various programs for trairihg

technical speciaiiets, the army also

hae taken a more direct step to aseist

public education.

Prior to 1960, all high school level

graduatee were required to enter the

army and spend two yeara on active

miiitary duty as rwerve oSicers. Anew law allows them to undergo oSi

cers’ training for aix months and

epend the remaining 1S monthe as

teachers in village elementary echcole.

The program bee resulted in several

tboueand young men being dispatched

to viilages all over Turkey and has

been an important factor in ailcwia

ing the existing teacher shortage.

The army is aleo a major eource o

a

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TURKISHSMY

pereonnel with linguistic ability. To

meet its requirement for interpreters

and translators and to qualify officers

and noncommissioned officers for at

tendance at technical schools in the

United States and Germany, the armyconducts courses in the English lan

guage using language lahoratary fa

cilities provided under the MSitsry

Aseietance Program.

Additionally, many officers and non

commissioned o5cars acquire a lan

guage proficiency on their own initia

tive by off-duty study. These person

nel, in turn, frequently conduct classes

in local schools or evening classes for

other civilian groups, including de

pendents of military personae] who

are inteewated in learning the Eng

lish language.

Admhtedly, the army’s activity io 1

the field of basic edueetion is moti. ‘

vated largely by self-interest and m. \cessity; The advent of US miSitaty J

assistance pointed up the need for cr.

panding the country’s reservoir O

personnel with sufficient education to

enable them succeesfuUy to compl~

the technical training that would Is

associated with the supply, operatioq j

and maintenance of modern miSitary ~

weapons and. equipment. Since the ci. +

vilian edueation syetem was not geared :

to cope with the problem, the army ihad to do what was possible within

its own capabilities.

Basic LiteraayCoursesThe basic literacy training program

was an ambitious undertaking. Con. 3

sidering the ages and circumstanw

of the personnel involved, it was a 1

program which only the army could :carry out with any degree of C5 ;

ciency. Since the program wee esscs- ;

tially one of adult education, some ;

form of regimentation was neees~ :

to bring together the iSSitsrate person. :

nel who were to receive special trait- 1

ing. Even if adequate facilities and {teachers had been available in the vii.lages, other practical problems .wouIi

have precluded wide subscription tn

concentrated coursee in basic literacy, :

Regardless of the motivating fso ‘

tora, however, both the army and d.

vilian society benefit from the armyi

educational endeavors. In a countrF

where less than half of the Villa&a

had elementary schools in 1960, tbe

return to society of approximate

100,000 literate discharged soldiers *

nually repreaenta a eigniftcant impact

Both directly and indirectly, W

Turkish Army serves as a major irtstrument to promote general economk

development and social change. In em

ploring this area of nationbuilding e@

MilitaryR*I

..

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‘ ”’’’”””’ ”TURKISHARMY ;

tivity, atintion must be turned againto the individual soldier.

During the two years that he spends

in the army, the young coneeript de

velops a new personality and a new

oeaeeof valuee. He leame to read and

to write-if he were unable to do so ‘

before entering the army-and he sc

quires some degree of tacbnieal skillin areas which previously had been

foreign to him. His horizons are broad

ened to include an appreciation of a

world‘that is much larger and morecomplex than the eimple village so

ciety, and he begins to identify him

self with the larger body. Gradually

and unconeeioualy, he acquirca a new

levelof expectations which tbe old so

ciety is unable to eatisfy.

IndependentAttitude

Upon returning to the village following the completion of his compul

sory tour of military service, the ex

soklfer is likely to resist falling back

into the traditional social pattern and

the primitive way of doing things.

With hia newly acquired confidence in

his own ability, he may exhibit a more

independent attitude that may etrain

femily tics.

The ex-soldier may even be inspired

to abandon village life and move to

the city where greater opportunities

exiet for his advancement and for ap

plicationof the skills which he learned

in the army. If he remains in the vil-

Isgc, however, he is likely to become

thedriving force behind the introductionof technological and social change.

He may be the first to purchase a

truck or a farm tractor or to estab

lish a repair facility for radios or

Vcldclee.

The ex.soldier’s appreciation of the

value of organization and teamwork

mayprompt him to take tbe lead indkge youth tilvitiae or in the pro-

f#il 1*7 .

motion of agrarian cooperatives. His

habita of dress and etandards of per

sonal hygiene will have a profound

effect on the msmbere of his immedi

ate family and conceivably on a large

segment of the community. Certabdy,

he ie a potential exponent of commu

nity cleanup eampaigne or other proj

ects designed to improve the sanita

tion aepccta of community living.

There has been a long-existing tend

ency in Turkey for the wealthiest,

most talented, and most ambitious citizens to concentrate in the cities of

Istanbul, Ankzra, and Inmir, thus

leaving the villagee and towne devoid

of such quality personnel. To counter

thie trend, the government began in

tbe 1960’s to distribute industrial fa

cilities more widely and thereby to

force more professional people into

the remote regions. The army aleo ini

tiated companion measures designed

to encourage social mobility and to

support the over-all government ob

jective.

Assignment Policies

Assignment policiee were devieed to

require draftees from urban areas to

perform their compulsory military

service in remote regione while those

draftees from rural areas were to

serve in or near the cities. Rotation

of officere iz aleo accomtdiehed in a

similar faehion. Even though the SYS- .

tern results in a greater expenditure

of travel funde, tbe country profite

from the increased fueion of population groupe, and the army avoide a

potential morale problem that could

result from maldhtribution of ite per

sonnel.

The army also serves se an instru

ment for general cultural development

in the areas that eurround the major

military installations. A good exampleie the remote eaetern tmvn of Ersurum

71

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TIMKISHARMY

where a large army headquarters is

Ioeated. A new university was estab

lished in Erzurum primarily because

of the presence of a great number of

college-age children from military

families. Tbe stimulating influence ofa major educational institution in

new]y developing eastern Turkey is

expected to be significant.

bsdtrstrlalDewloprnerrtThe contributions of the Turkish

Army toward industrial development

have been largely of an indirect na

ture and not particularly dramatic,

The Turkish Army’s value to indus

try principally derivee from the edu

cation and release of vast numbers of

mechanice and tcchniciane who are

capable of accepting employment in in

dustry with little additional training.

In asrreesing the individual eoldier’s

potential value to the industrird man

pewer pool, the change in outlook experienced by the eoldier during his

tour in the army ie, perhaps, more

eigniticant than acquired skille. Be

cause of his introduction to urbanized

society and his reorientation toward

an appreciation of mechanicetion, the

ex-soldier is more likely to seek em.

ployment in industry than if he hadnever eerved in the army. The role of

the ex-soldier in the economic and hr

dustrial development of Turkey is an

importnnt one indeed. Thi6 was rec

ognized by Ambaeead& Fletcher Wm

rmr wberr he stated in 1956:

AU over Turkev technico.1 &-ills

learned in the arrqi are being put to

work in oconornic activiiim. The importance of the amw w a school can

rsot be oucremphastied.

program which has served to

intcgr@s national e.earity int4meats

with economic rrooh hr Turkey is that

of rend nnd highway drrveloprnent.For

many Yesre, Turkey wes rnluctnnt to

Y2

develop good roads, especially in her

eastern sector, because of the fear that

the Soviet Union might use them for

invaeion routes. With the introdu&lori

of US military assistance came the

realization that the lack of an adequate road net, which had been a ibn.

iting factor in industrial developmee~

wouid aiso hamper the operations of

a mechanized army.

Roadlridldlng

Corurequentiy, a roadbuilding pro.

gram wae initiated as a part of the

Miiitary Assistance Program. An

agreement was reached between the

Turkish Generai Staff and the Mirrkr.

try of Public Works whereby a nuar.

ber of army personnei would be

trained to operate road construction

machinery. They eubeequently wem

ueed in construction work untii the

program wae taken over evmrtualiy by

civiiian concerne.Aside from the network of eecond.

ary roade constructed throughout tbe

Turkish countryside, the roadbuildbrg

effort aleo remited in an increase o

primary roade from 16,000 miles io

1950 to neariy 27,000 milee in 196t

Although priority was given initiailj

to building roads of Mrategic impor.tarrce, the road network wae deliber.

ately planned to facilitate the mow

ment of agricultural, mineral, aar

other products to domedic markeb

and te Turkieh ports.

The made in Turkey are fnr fren

adeemate. but a hmre oercentnue 01

rur~l fsrniliea hsve “be& uneh~ckkd

from the villages. Not only can th~move their pr-ducte to market with

greater epeed and etTtciency, but thSJ

nlso can broaden their nocinl horhoro

by occnnlorralvieks to tbe hqer towmand cen trnneport thuir ehildrm @

schoeln outslds the V\hI&&

Another useful dmrolopmrmtprokxt

MlotulySvdw

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TURKISHRMY

undertaken by tbe Turkish Army, come to aesociate intenee nationalism

which holds considerable promise of with instrdility. Turkey, on the other

long-range benefit to Turkey. is that hand, is a case in which nationalism

of reforestation. has been reasonably well controlledThe roots of presenfiday Turkish and guided into a channel of produc

nationalism extend from the founding tive patriotism. This hae been poseible

of the First Turkish Republic when because of the moderating influence

KemalAtattirk was able to inspire his of the army whefe, in epite of its in-

USATITurkish Army accomplishments in Kerea have made a great centrihutien to nationel

pride and morale

of a nation-state within defined bound- ture and responsible type. Althougharise. However, the intensification of the army haa been a consistent cham-nationalist feelinge and development pion of modernization, it has managed

of responsible national citizenship hae even during periods of domestic atrife

been a gradual process and one in to maintain a sensible balance between

which the army has had an important realism and pressures for innovation.

function. Consciousness ,of being a pert of the

Beeeuse of widespread upheavals whole nation is greatly strengthened

within the newly emerging areas of by compulsory military service. Thethe world in recent years, we have conscript soldier develops a sense of

April1967 13

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WtKISllARMY

citizenship and a fierce pride in being

a Turk. Upon visiting a Turkish rnikitary unit, a perzon becomes acutely

aware of th>s spirit.

The twmy enjoys enormous prestigethroughout the general public. Pr&

ably no single factir haa contributed

more to Turkish national pride and

morale than the accomplishments of

the Turkish ArmY in Korea.

The army’s d~rect usefulness in con

trolling domestic disturbmma was

dwdy demonstrated during the Kurdish uprisings in 1925 and 1990, the

anti-Greek riots in 1955, and the stu

dent riots jn 1960. Ita greatest value

cc a stabilizing force, however, prob

ably lies in its ability to deter polit

ical violence.

Although occasions have arisen

when it hae had to act M an umpire

between competing politicsl factions,

the army’s refuetd to serve ac n tool

of any particular party forces poIitical

Ieadera to promote a more moderate

atmosphere h seeking 8olutions to

their problems. Turkey is fortunate in

that her top military leaders have re

peatedly demonstrated their willing

ness to place the national well-beingabove persomd ambkione.

The success of the Turkish Army

as s nationbui}ding inatjtution Eug.

geata that military predominance with.

in developing countries is not new.

sarily 8 condition to be feared andavoided. In aseeeeing the prrmpscta of

other nations, Americans should net

be blinded by their own trnditio ‘

prejudices against military invol

ment in governmental affaira. T

should realize that in some countrf

the military forcim represent the

source of patriotic, honest, andcient national leaders and public

ministrators.

Furthermore, the Tur%b exam’

suggeate that, in providing eesieta

to developing nations, Ameri ishould encourage the complemental?

WWtS of military and nonmilitq

programg while bejng careful to avoid

actions which will lead tn a stifling of

development in either sector. Ameri

cans must be constantly aware of the

necessity to maintain a proper bol

ance between military assistance and

programs dezigned to promote pelit

iwd, social, and economic progrem. Ig

noring any one of them areas could

jeopardize the over-sll aesi8tnnce objective.

_—

SUBSCRI BERS

Avoid the inconvenience of renewing your subscription each year, Write to

The Book Department, U. S. ArmY Comm*nd and General s~m Cdew,

Fort Lmvanworth, Knnsm 66027, requesting converdm to tho Automstlc

Renewsl Plan.

.

Miilm’fCm&4

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


~~From Wehrkmde (We,t G,,Rwy) “’.

OPERATION MOLDAU’

HE largest military maneuver

in the n-year hktory of the

Warsaw Pact was conducted in Sep

tember 1966 in Czechoslovakia. East

European sources, claimed that the

maneuver, under the code name Vttmw

(Mokfmt), surpassed any conducted

by the North Atlantic Treaty Organi

zation in terms of the number of per

sonnel involved and the eize of themanenver area.

Participating in tbe maneuver were

forces froin the Soviet Union, Czecho

slovakia, Hungary, and Eaet Germany.

Although no figure was released on

the combined etrengtb of the forces,

Western sources estimated 150,000

men were involved. This included threeSoviet, three Eaet German, two Hun

garian, and at least five Czeehoslova-

This amwwrnem article wastranslated and digested from the

ari9i@ published in WEIIE.K JNDE (Federal Republic of Germany) November 1966, under the

title, “‘Moldau’-Die Gr688tenMani?ver dss f)stblocke.”~

“

ipril19b7 75

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OPERATION ~OLOAU..

A multinational Frog-i surface-to-surface rocket battafion was formed during tbemaneuverwith one battery each. from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and j

-

the Soviet Union

lpril1967

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


OPESATIONMOI.OAU

kisn divisions. The maneuver was

commanded by General Bohumir Imm

sky, the Czechoslovakian Defense Min

ister.

The exercise marked the first ap

pearance of Hungarinn forces in a

Warsaw Pact fall maneuver. The ab

senca of Polieh forces was presumed

to have been due to financial consider

ations. However, Polish forces had

pati]cipated in smaller exercises dur

ing 1966 and in the 1965 fall ma

neuver.

ManeuverConcept‘ The concept of the maneuver was

based on a defense against NATO’s

forward strategy with NATO forces

stationed in Weat Germany as the as

sumed adversary. Presumably, the

Warehw Pact command element rea

soned that the location of neutral

Switzerland and Austria and the blockformed by Yugoslavia, Albania, Bul

garia, and Romania would adequately

cover NATO’s southern and south

eastern flanks. This permitted the use

of Hungarian troops in Cneehoslova

kia to reinforce the striking force.

The Warsaw Pact forces were desig

nated the “Green” force and the ag

greasor the “Pink” force.

Almost one-third of the paratroop

ers who participated in the maneuver

were reservists. CsechuelovaMa, in

particular, had called up a large num

ber of reservista for the maneuver’s

duration.

The maneuver started when Phk

forces made a penetration in the southof the Province of Slovakia and air

landed troops in Bohemia. It was as

sumed that nuclear weapone, when

ueed, would be restricted to tactical

operations.

During the firet day, the Pink force

advanced, and the Pink and Green air

forces sought to gain air superiority.

During the night, the Green force re

ceived a substantial number of rephwe.

menta, most of whom were Soviet

troops stationed in central Germany

and Belorussia.

At dawn on the second day, the

Pink force conducted an air-landing

operation using Caechoslovaklan and

Soviet 3 3 Hook and 3fi-4 Hewui

helicopters to carry the combat troeps.

Mi-1 Hare helicopters were used for

liaison while Fitter tighter bombers

and MiGZ9 l@wwr-E all-weather

fightere covered the landings. Compared with earlier Warsaw Pact exer

cises, there was a significant increase

in the use of air-land]ng operations.

The. Czechoslovakian Deputy De.

fense Minister pointed out that the

term “air landing” includes more than

just lsnding personnel by helicopter

and parachute. During the exercise,

medium and heavy equipment was fre

quently air lifted with ATZ-12Cub and

12-14 transports.

CounterattackLaunchad

On the eecond day, the Green

forces gained air superiority and SUC.

ceeded in launchlng a counterattack

According to plan, on the third and

Iaet day of the maneuver, the Green

forces mounted an offensive using nu

clear weepone. Croesing of the Moldau

River, which had been started during

the hours of darkness, continued un

der the cover of strong air support.

An Eeet German journalist de.

scribed the activity at one of the

crossing sites. While fighter aircraftcovered the cite and artMery pounded

Phrk forces on the opposite bank, S*

viet fighter bombers approached the

area, went into a steep climb, and re

leased nuclear weapons, he said. ‘1’bis

was followed by a-helicopter landing

operation on the opposita bank while

T55 tanks provided direct fire support

MllibiyReview

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


OPERATIONOLllAU

fraas the near bank. Other troops

siosead the Moldau at points where

the river’s width is about 800 yards.

The maneuver wee baaed on a grad

usl eewdation of the use of taetiesl

nuclearweapons. The th ink ing in the

Eset bloc ia tW a nuclear strike et a

wer’soutset which would affaet all of

ceetml Europa ia improbable.

Supplying tbe maneuver elcmentz

wee reportedly conducted without

problem. There was evidence that the

taebniesl equipment of the Conmm

nist forces bzz bean improved. The

maneuver control center bad a larga

scale television net at itz disposal.

Cooperation between the stztTs of

the Warsaw Pact forces appeared to

be good. Even though there were lan

guage barriers, all tbe staffs have a

similar structure which facilitates

combined’ operations.

LESSONS LE RNED

The MILITARYREVIEWis particularly interested in receiv

ing manuscripts covering lessons learned by US unite in

Vietnam. problems of organization, command and control,

equipment, tactics, and fsre support merit informed discus

sion. After complying with appropriate bxal regulations,authors may submit manuecripta direct to the MILITARYR

VIEW. We will obtain the necessary security review on those

accepted.

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


Ne w Look

a t t h e

M i n u t e m e n

Major John R. Calvin,United Statea Armu

HE mere meation of 1775 recalls at once Paul Revere riding

hard for the Mystic Road to avoid agalloping patrol of Britjah regulars;

angry farroere witk mueketa in their

field-hardened fieto hurrying _dark furrows; a ragged Jine of proudmim facing the tide oi”onmrdng md

and-wl$te ranb at hinwon green;

breve Captain Iaaae Dqvii;’ markedfor deaw striding .dilwil e’ CM@

%ay to the North Br$&@IAY onw~

and btubborn, cm@mrbW old ~

Whittimom &tagwor@K. un er th

weight of Mu nwdtetj. piatole, -d 8A

ber to plant lIiKL9W Wotty in W

path of Iard ~Jluxh; P.WU k~

MillblyRr?l a

b->.. ,

1

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growth of the minuteman concept-is

worth knowing in full, not only for

thefurther understanding of the greateffort these men made, but also be

causethe problems they faced are, inmanyways, analogous to our own.

The 19th of April certainly was the

greatest day in the history of tbe

“minutemen,but it was not their debuthy any means. They had been called

outearlier on a number of minor alertscaused by British General Thomas

Gage’spractice marches and hia raidsonCharleston and Salem. They werewell organized and, in some waye, aswell prepared ,as the regulars in Bos

ton. Still more important, not only theminutemen themselves, but the entireeonntryside understood tbe “minute

man concept” which was not new to

them.

ConceptDevelopsSince the earlieet colonial military

companies under Daniel Patrick, John

Underhill, and Mylee Standish, the

organizational and tactical concept—alarm riders, alerts, intertown coop.

eration, and rapid aseembly of special

units detached from the militia—had

begun to develop. On 12 August 1645the Massachusetts Council ordered the

commander of every militia company

b appoint 30 percent of the soldiers“whoehall be ready at half an hour’s

warning upon any service they shall

h put by their chief military officers.”

The preparations and campaigns of

the half dozen wars before 1763 illus-

Major John R. Galvin is with Headquarters, Ist Air Cavalry Division, inVietwam.Hs reeeivsd his Maater’8 degree from Columbia University, NewYork, and was gradeazted from the USArmy Command and General Staffcollege in 1966. His book, The Com-Pset History of the Minutemen, is

achedmledfor .pmblication in April.

’ q

MINUT M N

trate a steady refinement of this con

cept wldch continued to the end of theRevolution.

Any attempt to tell the story ,of the

Battle of Concord is handicapped bythe inordinate number of legends andanecdotes that over the years have be

come associated with the events of the

day’a fighting. Tbid historical em

broidery grew because the battle hasnever received the analytical atfention

given to most of the other actionsfought by this country’s soldiers. Ithas been dismissed as an accident that

only occurred once and, happily, withgood results, or explained away ae the

spontaneous combustion of a smolder

ing rabble, or, worst of all, given asproof that not much training ie neces

sary to build an army.

KnowParticipants

The difficulties in analyzing the battle of 19 April arise not in following

the actions that occurred, but in un

derstanding the participants. Whowere the minutemen ? How were they

organized, trained, equipped, and led ?

How did they manage to march from

distant towns in time to strike the

fast-moving British column before itcould get back to Boston? what rela

tionship existed between the minute

men and the militia ? How did the

minuteman and militia soldier com

pare to their opponent, the Britieh

regular in General Gage’s army atBoston ?

It is a distotilon of the facts to

say that the battle of 19 April wasa spontaneous uprising of loosely or

ganised “embattled farmers’’-it was

more than that. The “battle can better

be seen ae the final clash of arms of

the old Massachusetts militia in which47 regiments, containing over 14,000

men, marched against the British reg

ulars. Over 4,000 men from 14 of the

*U 13s7 81.

~::

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/Vietwam.Hs



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MINUTEMEN

regiments actually struck the column,

employing conuepts of organisation

and methods of command and control

that had been forged during a century

and a half of nearly conetant warfare.In the progressive transition of thie

fighting force from a crude miniature

replica of Elizabethan militias to a

state of near completion as a powerful

army, some factors can be isolated as

control aJso departed from English

tradition and continually evidenced erealistic evaluation of the possib]litiw

and limits in areas such aa weaponry,

tactics, eupply systems, and training,Third, the individual towne of the

province, from the earliest daye, prktided a degree of discipline and m

environment of cooperation which

would have been impossible except in

not only contributory to an important

degree, but also as quite unique.

First, the militia organisation—al

though etrongly based on the English

Mueter Law of 1572 and later regula

tions-was continually revamped byrequirements euch as the levy eys

tem for the provisional expeditionaryforcee and the concept of alert and

rapid response by designated potiions

of the regimente. These and other re

quirement produced several precur

sors of the minuteman-militia struc

ture of 1774, including the enowsboe

men of 1702-4S and the picket guards

of 1765.Second, the system of command and

DA ROTCM 14s. 0

the political, social, and spiritual at.

mosphere under which these communities chose to live. The close mutual

association of these towns and the in.

fluence of the town meetings, theclergy, and later the newspapers cm

ated a matrix in which the coopers

iive spirit of the province was nurtured. Thus, when the committees of

correspondence were created in 1772

they had a profound effect, galvaniz

ing the province into the collective

action that created tbe minutemen.

As the conflict that was to open the

Revolution drew near, the provinoieb

knew that widespread militia regkmenta would be difiicult to control cod

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...

wouldbe too slow in forming to meet

anattack by the reirulare. At the came

time,the cradion of a Standing Armyin the province would precipitate a

Britieh move againet thie force. Untii some of the other colonies wereready to throw. their strength behind

Meeaechueetts, a small, untrained pro

vincial force would present the khdof target General Gage was reedy to

attack.

PiesIs Proposed

A few of the other colonies wereconsidering plans to oppoee GreatBritain, hut no one was ready at thie

time. In Massachuaetta, some type of

miiitery force had to be created tomeetthe neede of the moment-to opposethe British until a stronger army

couldbe built. This force would have

to be composed of well-trained, lightlyarmed infantry capable of rapid assembly and movement to any point in

the province.

The interim unit wae, of course, theminutemen. In the 1st Provincial Con

gress, in the fall of 1774, a plan for

the organization of the minutemenand militia wae proposed. The plan

touched off a hammer-and-tongs de

bate that lasted from 21 to 26 Octo

ber. During this time, it was read and

eraended eix times and, finalIy, ac

cepted.

The firet resolve created the com

mittee of eafety, consisting of threedelegates from Bostun and six from

the rest of the province, empoweredtO “abmrn, muster, and cause to beSesemb]ed” as much of the provincial

militia as needed at any time. All offi

cers and soldiers of the miiitia were

“eerneatly recommended” to carry outthe orders of this committee. The sec

ond rewolve established a committee

of supplies to provide logistic suppartfor any mueter of the militia. Other

J@ 1#7

‘MiNiJ~ME

resolves covered the appointment and

pay of the officere and men of the newarmy.

The final point approved by the con

greee was the organisation of the armyitself. The new army was createdfrom the old militia. All militia comp

anies were to elect new officers. These

officers were to aseemble and elect bat

talion and regimental commanders and

General Thomas Gage

staffs. Once the regimente wereformed, the commanders were to enlist one quarter of the men into new

companiea of 50 privates:

. . . who .dtall equip and hold them

selves in readine8s, ore the sharteet

notice from the eaid committee of

eaf et~, to march to the place of rendez

vous; and that each and eveW com

pany so formed chooee a captain andtwo lientanante to command them oa

any such emergent and neceeearyear-vicem they rnw be edted to.

The men were to form into battalions of nine companiea eecb. Al] menwere directed to eupply themselves

with weapuns and to become prottcient

in military ekille. Selectmen of all the

towne were told to insure an adeqnate

supply of ammunition for their ownmilitia.

03

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MINUTEMEN

Extracts of the resolves were sent

to every town in the province, and the

reaction, in most cases, wae immediate and hearty. New elections took

place, and there seems to have been

very little trouble in filling the ranksof the expanding provincial army.

Poeitions of command responsibil

ity—previously filled by men whoee

The Minutemsn

prime distinction was a firm loyalty

to the Crown-now were open to sol

diers who were popular enough with

their townsmen to be elected to thejob. Knowing they would probably be

serving in combat under the new lead.ere, the soldiers chose, in almost all

eases, wise and hardened veterans of

earlier Indian fighting. The splitting

off of minuteman regiments doubled

the number of leadership positions

available and allowed many of the

G .-.

younger men to move UP, adding new

vigor to both the militia and the min

utemen.

The response to the call for minute.

men wae remarkable. This was a

touchy point since it meant that theregimental commanders would actu

ally be giving away not only one quar

ter of their etrength, but also manyof their best young fightere. In view

of this, the active support which reg.

imentzl commanders gave to the re.

organization is one of the best indi.

cations of the strength of the minuteman concept.

CongressionalRecommendationsThe Provincial Congress, after pub

licizing the resolvea which formed the

minutemen, cent a steady succeeaionof notee to tbe towns encouraging the

rapid organization and training of the

units. In December 1774 the congressannounced:

We now think that partieukzv care

should ix? taken by the towns and

dktricts in this colong, that each

of the minutemen, not already pm

vialed therewith, hotdd be immedi.

ately equipped with an effective fire

arm, bagonet, pouch, lcmzpeaek, thirtv

rounds of cartm.dge8 aced balk, andthat theu be disciplined three times

a week, and oftener, as opportunity

mag offer. To encourage these, ow

worthy countrymen, to obtatn the skill

of complete 801dieV8, we recommendtt the towns and dietrtcts forthwith

to @ZZIheir owu minuteman a reasow

able consideration for their service8:and in caae of a general muster, their

fuvther services mcwt be recompensed

by the provbwe. An attention to die.

cipline the militia in general is, how

ever, by no means to be neglected.

A few of the more independent

towns were not easily convinced that

the minuteman concept was the best

MllteryRwlse

.-d

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..=.

MINUTEMEN

solution, and they were not anxious to

tmnsfer control of their men to the

committee of safety. These towns didnotfollow to ‘the letter the recommen

dations of the Provincial Congress,

but adapted them to suit themselves.

Some did not allow election of newofficers,but, rather, appointed officere

and let the officers select the men, a

reverse procedure from that intended.

Other towns allowed elections of theofficersby the rank and file, but took

othermeeaures of control. In general,however,the revival of the minutemanconceptcaught the imagination of the

entire province. In a short time, theminutemen were the pride of their

towns, and the cost-conscious townsmen did not overlook the fact that

here was an ideal army to fit the

situation in the provinc%an army

that had to be supported only when itwas actually fighting.

ReinforcementsAt Boston, General Gage was order

ing additional reinforcement to joinhim. During the month of October,

the 10th and 52d Regiments arrivedfrom Quebec, together with the 18th

cud 47th Regiments from New York,andthe two detached companies of the

66th from Newfoundland, bringing

that regiment up to etrength. General

,Gagehad said that four s’egimenta in

phusetts would be quite suffiment to intimidate the province, Now,

with nearly triple that number, he wae

aware that his control did not extendkyond the port of Boston—the Gen

eral Court had melted away, the mili

tia, stripped of reliable loyeliet offi

kwe, was now turned against him, and

the Provincial Congress governed the

tolony.

~ The inevitable succession of eventsliedGeneral Gage to order a force of

Iabmrt800 men out to Concord on 18

April 1775, and the result is well

known. General Gage’s troops were

completely surprised by the “incred

ible number of the people of the conn

try in arms.” He wrote that “the

whole country was aesembled in arms

with surprising expedition.” One ofthe junior officers of the expeditionlater wrote in hie diary:

I believe the fact ie,, that Gcnsral

Gage waa net cmlg much &ceiveft withrespect to the gemntitrr of military

stores said to be collected in Concord,f@[email protected] conception the vebets wouldhave opposed tlw King’e troope in the

manner theg did.

A Plot

The officer who commanded the colnmn, Lieutenant Colonel Francis

Smith of the 10th Regiment of Foot,

felt that the whole affair was somekind of plot:

They bega~ to fiTe on uc from be

hind the walls, ditches, treee, etc.,

which, a-s we marched, incveased to

a verg great degree, and continuedwithout the intermieeicn of jive min

utes altogether, for, I believe, upwarde

of eighteen miles; eo tkut I can’t think

but it mvwt have been a preconcertedscheme in them, to attack the King’s

troops the first faverable opportunity

that o~ered, otherwise, I think thev

could not, in ehcrt a time uc from

our marching out, hnve raised such a

nurmerene body, and for eo great a

space of ground.

As the British marched for Concord, they were astounded to find that

they were not the only soldiers head

ing for that town. They had only the

vaguest idea of the organization of

the provincial forces, even after the

several contecte they had experienced

in the past year. Abnoet to a man,

they simply refnsed to believe that

an army had been created under their

85

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MINUTEMEN

noses, and now, unwittingly, they were

marching directly into the center of

six regiments of that army.A five-mile circle drawn around

their marching column would have en

compassed 76 companiee of minute.men and militia, most of them muster

ing more men than a regular Britiehcompany. At thie time, nearly every

one of those companies was either inthe procees of aee.embling or on the

march to meet the British column at

Concord.

Concord woe the ehire town and theleader of all activities in Middleeex

County. The town was the geographical center around whkh the country

regiments were Iecated, all of them

containing at leaet one company raiaedin Concord or in a town bordering on

Concord. These regiments alone to

taled 6,000 men. Not a man in General

Gage’s army understood how wellthese regiments were organized—not

even General Gage.There were 28 complete regiments

of 10 or more companies, and 19 etjllin the formation stage, alerted, hav.ing received messages from Dr. JosephWarren informing them that the Brit.

ieh planned come type of move imms.diately with Concord ae the likely

goal.It is in terms of this regimental

organisation and with a recognitionof the’”minuteman concept that thebattle, of 19 April has to be etudied.

Additionally, the evente of the seven

or eight monthe of marches and coun.termarches that preceded the battle

muet be given a proper place in theanalysie of that tight.

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i

- , - . .. ..

.

,

..

WEAPONS DEFENSORNTERNAL

1970=80Colonel Alvin C. Iasacs, UmYed Stotes Army

The views ezpreeeed in this article are the authtie and are not necee

aarilg those of the Depatiment of the Army, Department of Defense, or the

US Army Command and General Sta CoUege.—EdC?or.

ATERIAL developed to meet broad military requirements often fails

during speeific employment beceuee it ie not optimized to meet tbe more

probsble conditions of use. Certahdy, today’e conventional military-hardware

is not optimized .@ msst the conditions peculiar to lower levele of insurgency.

W4 W7 87

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I

: INTERNAL DEFENSE

Today’s equipment ie designed to

inflict maximum destruction on an

enemy who is expected to fight, but

rarely does eo, in the manner for

which the United Statee is prepared.

Conventional forces are required, of

course, to seize and bold territory and

defeat the larger organized subversive

formation.To supplement but not replace these

conventional forces, we need a epecial

purpose force capable of detecting in

surgents and temporarily neutralizing

them until they can be subdued, caP-

tured, and turned over to a special or

ganization for indoctrination. Thie

should be the primary mode of opera

tion of the force, although it would

still require a capability to inflict cas

ualties as a protection against hard-

core subversives.

Proposed ArsenalThe force would require weapons

and devices tailored for anti8uerri11a

operations in tropical areae. Whether

they are feasible to develop is un

known, but these or similar devices

using the came concepts are urgently

needed. The ideas may seem to be

taken from science fiction, but theirdevelopment may await nothing more

than a decision to explore a bit deeper

the state-of-the-art.

Colonel Alvin C. 18eacs ie Chief,

Plum and Opmatiorre Divi8ion, G4Section, Headquarter, US A~u,

Vietnam. ffie aanignmente include

dutu in North A friar and It.alu during-World War Ii: with ath US-ATWHeadquarter& Korea; and with thoReamrch and Development Division,O@u of the Chief of Ordnance, De

partment of the Arrntt. He receivedhia Afwter of Bunbrtxw Admhdetmtion degree from the Vnivereitu ofChicago, and torMgraduated from the

US Army Command and G.rneral StnflCollcpe mrd the US Armv War ColhWc.

Generally, equipment should be de

eigned apecitically for tbe purpose in.

tended. Superfluous requirements-

operation at temperature extremeq

extended and probably uselese ranges,

and potential application to the Euro.

pean battlefield-complicate develop

ment, increase complexity and maink

nance, and should be eliminated.

Datactor Oevicas

Included in the group most urgently

needed are:

A man-detector (surface). Thie

is a device that will sense the presence

of a man in the jungle or other under.

growth up to a dietance of 55 yards

and in cleared land up to 110 yard.t

The device would gather the eound

energy of heartbeat or breathing,

translate this inpnt into electrical eti

ergy, amplify it, and provide an au.

dible signal in a set of enrphonee, Itwould have an integral discriminator

to eliminate the sounds of animal lif

and wave lengths other than those w

culiar to humans.

The trrmsducing equipment should

be microminiaturized, employ solid.

state components, and be easily port

able by one man. It would be connectedto a small horn-type sensing deviw

with highly directional characteristh

to eliminate pickup from the rear and

sidee. It” initially would be designed

for dismounted use, although it would

move to its general area of use by

vehicle or man-portage. Helicopter nnd

vehicular mounts could be delayed un

til the man-carried equipment is pep

feeted, and then be developed as s

product improvement.

A mandetedor (underground).

Thin device would be almilnr in prio.

ciple to the rmrface device. It ehould

be a separate development however,

because the serrnitivity and diucrim~

natlon problem~ dii?er from thone of

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the wfaee device and ~re probably

awier to solve. A requirement to eom

bffe the two would delay availability

of both capeb]lities. On the other

hand, it is entirely posqible that progress in one of the devices would en

hmce the progress of the other, and

‘ Themzn.sniffer tiff detect the presenceof en enemy from hts body odor1

tbe final equipment would have a num

ber of interchangeable parte.

Operationally, the device would be

used to detect the presence of human

life in a tunnel or other excavation.

: The range of the device should be upto 110 yarda of open tunnel apace, with

a 220-yard maximum desired, if pos

sible. This range capability probably

can be more easily attainable than

that desired for the surface device

since there is less sound absorptive

~terial in a tunnel even though de

ftmdation would be caused by turnsoin the tunnel.

@ii 1987

--’-3

INTERNAL “ DEFENS

A tunnel-detector. A device to

detect holes and tunnels large enough

to hide two or more men would use

a sonar principle or electromagnetic

radiation to detect grose dMcontinui

ties in the earth, and would be direc

tional so that the discontinuity could

be pinpointed. A sensor would trans

mit the detecting radlatfon, receive

the returning signal, and send the re

turned signal through an amplifier to

earphones. A distinctive signal would

indicate the presence of an excavation,

and the sound intensity, comtilned

with an interrupted lock-on eignal of

different pitch, would indicate that

the directional censor had been pointed

full into the target.

The device would permit the opera

tor to follow the path of the tunnel

from a fixed point on the earth’s sur

face so that its course could be de

termined without following it on the

surface. The change in intensity in

the earphones would indicate when

the sensor had been pointed toward

the entrance, The search range of the

eet ehould be 55 yards, and the range

capability, once a tunnel had been detected, would allow its course to be

followed for 220 yards. The sensor

would be carried by one man, with‘another required to use the earphonee,

plot the tunnels, and carry the ampli

fying equipment. Microminiaturiza

tion of components would insure easy

manportability.A tunnel-clearing device. This

would be a rocket propelled snake-

like device to be ineerted into an oc

cupied tunnel that had been detected

by the previous devices. The, device

would be man portable for short dkz

tancea and be carried to the area o

use by vehicle. It would be insertedheadfirst into the tunnel and ignited

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INTERNALEFENSE

mechanically or by built-in electrical

ignition. Propulsion would be fur

nished by a elow burning rocket that

would move the device at a rate of

10 to 20 feet per second. A sensor

in the noee would guide the missilethrough the open space of the tunnel

by keeping the head centered with

respect to the eides.

It could contain a small inertial

and follow one, other than that of en

try. The device would be amed with

a. selectable number of small, eelf

ignitable grenadee filled either with

high explosive or a pacification gse

at the user’s choice. Theee grenadrcwould be dropped off and ignited suo

cessively at preset intervale.

A pacifier. This would be a gun

—magazine or drum fed—that would

The pacifierplaces an enemy in a highly pacifiedstate for manyhoure,greatly facilitkiughis capture

guidance unit that would preclude itsreturn to the point of original entry

into the tunnel in caee the miesile

raeched an underground room from

which the entering tunnel wae tbe

only egrese. The guidance eystem

would recognize its preeence in a room

wider than a tie-foot-wide tunnel,

eeek out tunnel exite from the room,

fire bursts of emall needles, each aerodynamically designed to fly at ex

treme velocity without tumbling afterentering a human body. The tips of

the needlee would be impregnated with

a chemical that would induce an er

treme desire to move into the open

in a pacified etate, Thie condition

would laet for eeveral hours. The viz.

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INTERNALiEFENSE

tim could then be captured without

resistance, evacuated to an ares where

he could be interrogated, and later

evacuated for indoctrination.

As an alternative to the needles, oras a product improvement, tbe gun

could be designed to fire droplets at

extremely high velocity so they would

penetrate t e skin of the victim much

Iiie the esent pneumatic inoculat

ion gun. The needles, or droplets,

wouldfly a veloeitiee sufficient to pen

etrate foliage to a distance of 10 feet,

roughly equivalent to the distance re

quired for cover and observation hy

a guerrilla. The material used ae a

pacification agent would have to be

such that friendly forces could be in

neculated to guard against its effect

on our own troops.

An interrogation device. Thla

piece of equipment would be eimilarin operation to the currently available

polygraph. The latter device, however,

with its electrodes and general formid

able appearance, can be expected to

alarm a suspect who ie to be interro

gated. The proposed device also would

nse seneors that detect changes in

heartbeat, blood preeeure, perspiration level, or some combination of

these. It would do so by exterior sen

sors that could be installed easily and

inconspicuously in sofa cueldons, the

top of a wooden bench, chair seat, or

a similar place so that any bodily con-

tact,even through a thickness of clothing, would actjvate the sensor. The

sensor then would send a signal when

it detected body changes that indicate

faIsehood or evasiveneee. The signal

wouldtravel by radio wave to a small

Snrplitierand earpiece concealed in tbe

earcanal of the interrogator.

It is not contemplated that uncon

ventional warfare iteme euch ae those”

describedwould be the exclueive arma.

ment of a counterinsuruenc~ force.

A requirement etill woul~ r ain for

conventional weapons to, deal with ait

uationa obviously beyond the capqbU

ity of these unconventional weepene.One group of weapons would complement the other in a counterinsurgency

force. The proposed weapons would be

appropriate for use by combat andcombat support elements of a division,

group, or airnilar force.

The two man-detector-urface

and underground—the tunnel-detec

tor, and the pacifier would he appro

priate for use by infantry-type com

paniea. In general, men and equipment

should be provided so that any ele

ment which might be expected to en.

counter revolutionaries in a mission

would have the support of these teame.

In any encounter, first priority after

detection of an enemy should be givento hia paciibmtion, If thie e~ould fail,

and the livee of combat personnel are

unduly threatened, it might then be

come necessary to reeort to lethal

weapons. Consequently, the lethal

weapons should be available, and no

force should be armed exclusively

with pacification-type weapons.The tunnel-clearing device would be

appropriate equipment for an engineer support unit. A clearing team

‘would move to the required site by

surface vehicle or helicopter at the

radio request of the f rontline com

mander who had located an occupied

tunnel with his equipment.

The interrogation device would be

suited beet for use by trained intelli

gence personnel. It basically would be

an adjunct to skilled interrogation

techniques. It is contemplated that it

would be utilized by intelligence teams

attached at battetion level, or by a

team accompanying a company-eiae

unit on an independent mieeion.

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Colonel Charles M. Tyson, Um”tedStates Armu

AN has spent thraequarters of a century and untold

billions of dollars devising ways ti propel himself higher

and faster. He is now getting close tQ tbe moon and exceeding

the speed of a bullet. Thus far, the main effort has been dirsctcdtoward seating man inside a machme dceigaed to provide him

with supermobility. But removed from such a machine, he is

virtually immobilised. As a soldier, he drags across the esrth

at two and one-half to five miles par hour, much like his Nean

derthal forebaars, except that he is now laden with many poundsof equipment that may hinder more then it helps Kim. It would

seem that technology has forgotten the soldier—still the most

dscisive military asset, now and in tbe future.In an era of the lightest and strongeet fabrics, tbe US sol

dier is weighted with heavy stiff webbing, iron buckles, and

bulky containers. In an era of incredible strides in firepewsr

lethality, he still carries a yoke of ammunition not much im

proved since invention of the cartridge in the previous century.

After four major wars, be is still carrying a pistol made 66

years ago.

On the field of battle, he is more vulnerable than the Knightsof tbe Round Table-susceptible to bullets, f ragtnente, ftrq

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MOB

knives, traps, holes, bamboo spikes,

and the mosquito. And in the field of

mobility, the miracles of science have

made hi no more fleet of foot thanthe primitive invisible guerrilla he is

expected to defeat.

IndmidualMobilityUnquestionably we have given him

the greatest degreeof mobility in mov

ing from one co~tinent to another and

in jumping from one battle area to

another—th]e by an impressive arrayof ground and air vehiclee. But once

we have disembarked hlm within the

tactical confines of the battlefield and

within small arms range of the en.

emY, we Ieave him no more mob]lethan his foe. In fact, when considering

the individual and organisational gear

we have heaped upon him, he ie al

most at a mobility disadvantage.

We have done well in long-range

planning for strategic mobility, and

we have come a long way in saturat

ing the battle area with tactical ma

bility, but we have done almost noth

ing to develop individual mobility. Ia

a breakthrough in individual mobSity

feasible in the 1970-80 period? Ie itdesirable?

There are few long-range projec-

Cobnsel Charles M. Tgaon ie withthe US Armg Element, O@ee of theJot-nt Chiefs of Staff; Washington,D. C. He aevved in the Paci@ duringWorld War II; waa Senior US Advieor

with the Sd Ro@ Thai Army; wasO.wigmedto the Ofie of the DcpntyChief of Stuff for Militaw Operatiorw,Department of the Army; and .wwved

de Chief, Special Weapoaa Division,Allied Land Forces Southern Europe.

ffe hoide an M.S. degvee in Im?arnatkmal Affaire from George Washing-tea Univeraitv, Washington, D. C. arsd

is a g.radr@e of the US Armg WarCollege, Carliele Barm&a, Pemw@ventiz.

tions of the world environment

the nature of future warfare t

suggest the dfminiehing importa

of the combat soldler. The contraaPPeare to be so.

It is obvious that there is an

creasing probability of carefully

cumscribed conflicts ah~d of us b

in remote primitive areas and in

litically volatile and heavily popula

urban areae. Such conflicts prom

to produce future combat akuatiowhere small-unit tactical ingenui

and individual mobility will be imp

ative.

There appear to be two technol

ikd steps which, if vigorously und

taken now, could increase individ

mobility and eoldier effeetivenees d

ing the next decade.

The firet of these steps involves

need for a completely freeh appro

toward outfitting the combat soldi

of the future with clothhg, equ

ment, and weaponry of the futu

Every item now worn and carried

the 1967 soldier repreeente only

marginal product improvement o

that borne by his father in 1944.

Siscard GaarStarting from the skin out, t

preeent eoldier’s combat garb an~ ge

. should be discarded. Whatever

placed back on him should be h

the weight and should afford twi

the comfort and twice the protecti

from the elements and the enemy.There appear to be no technologic

obstacles to devising a basic com

uniform that would be made from

featherweight fabric that ie plaat

thin and impam”oue to we&h~,

which will breathe and prdvide p

spiration absorption. While come

tensive ret%arch may be required,also seems feasible withh the n

decade tQ design a lightweight ou

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MOBILllY

Ministurlmd 6PSCC-SWversion of aoetond.jrenerstlon Jet Ilelt

proteetivo gnrmont capable of renist

hrg small arm f% and fr irmmb

without impairing ~he weurer’n free-

t+om of movement.

Anothar aoume of Irritntlon shouldbe scr atc hed. Zlppera mwm or abrn-

sive faetmmrs should replace antiqu~

laces, buttons, buckles, and other bu~

metal items, Strapa, where neeaewq,

should be wide-band thin nylon nod

should emphaeice expendability ratherthan durability.

The canteen, sleeping bag, pouchq

and other containers should be madd

of Iixhtweixht and collam!ible fabric

offering no- additional c&mr whee

empty. Boot and helmet deeign should

be started anew with modem mate.rials. The future vereion of both ha

should provide protection without

weight, comfort without bulk, and

ventilation without vulnerability,

Since thin, resilient, fairly impcrm

trable plastics and other materiab

are now within reasonable teehnolog.

ical grasp, them is no valid obstacle

to putting drastically improved fcot

wear and headgaar on tom6rrow’8 eoldier.

Food Packages

Similarly, it ie within existing aci

entitlc capabilities to provide the fu

ture combat 8oldier with ~ compare.

tively small package of nourishing

concentrated field mtions capable of

mmtahing him for several daye incombat. While it is visualized that

aerinl resupply will be the future rub

rather than the exception, such an

emergency food pockage should br

available to him without burden, No

great scientific challenge nhould be

involved in developing a vnriety of

pnlatable three-day emergency rationtwith a packaged henting I!ourcr+-atl

within a packege no Irwger than s

porket-eized book.

Dramatic improvement in indivbl.

ual weaponry for the naxt decade MC

be more difficult, However, a major

rammrcb and dmdopmtmt (R&13) cf.

fort, coupled with the willingn- tOthmncs the hrdlvidurd noldlm’n ft~

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‘ ” ”MOBIUTY!

;,;

.

arm as a si c ntweapon system,

ceuld, within the n=t 10 years, re

lieve him Of the poundage of steal,

bmas, wood, and lead under which he

now labors. Virtually at hand is the

Mchette principle. This promises con

siderable weight reduction in ammu

nition and the tirearm itself. Also pos

sible is the use of a liquid propellant

source encased in a light rifle stock.

In essence, the breakthrough needed

to modernize the soldier’s accouter

ments is not so much teehnical ae itis fiscal, but it is hard to conceive

of any effort more importcnt than fur

zieldng the beet to the man who daily

comesto grips with the enemy.

6i ie Him a l i f tOnce we have lightened the load

carried,by the soldier, we can, then,

turn to the second major step toward

achieving indi~dual mobility—that of

lightening the soldier.

For at least 10 years, the Army

has stated a requirement for a sim

ple lift device to enable a combat sol

dier to fly short distancee without

benefit of an aircraft. The device

would encompass a small thrust sye

tem attached to a belt, with a light,back-mounted power package that

couldbe rapidly refueled or recharged,

plus a one-hand control mechanism.

Idsrdly,it would be a 15-pound system

O@ would permit nap-of-th~arth

6ight for dietances up to one mile.

Where do we stand on such a mo

bility project ? Although such a device has never been regarded as a

priority operational requirement, one

commercial company has conducted

several promising feaeibllity teeta dur

iag the past few yeara. As far back

se 1963, this company demonstrated

a 22.second, 65.mile-per-hour fllght

over a distance of 1,000 feet at alti

tudes under 100 feet. The prototype

.

thrust apparatus was a rather bulky

affair weighing 115 pounds.

The Advanced Research Projects

Agency has funded for the develop-

ment of a eecond-generation Jet Belt.ThM new “flying belt” promises vastly

improved flight performamw with no

increase in weight and bulk. It thus

appears that individual mobility isnot .a-futuristic dream, but, rather, an

excltmg new capability that is prac

tically at our technological doorstep.

With concentrated funding supportand R&D effort, there seems to be no

reason why a miniaturized space-age

version cannot be developed within

, the next five to 10 years or earlier.

But tbe question remains: Would

euch a device be merely an interest

ing, nice-to-have accessory, or is it

an eseential combat requirement?

Tactical Advantages

Perhaps the best way to approach

an answer to this query would be to

liet some of the tactical advantages

its use would suggest:

The Belt, Aerial Thrust (BAT)

would provide a margin of protection

for the soldier by enabling hlm to

avoid guerrilla-placed mantraps, minefield, and other latent casnalty-pro

ducing ruses. It would minimize his

vulnerability by affording only fleet

ing dispersed targets for enemy small

arms fire. It would give the soldler a

capability to escape from ambuehes

and enable hlm to vacate vulnerable

helicopter landing sites with speed.The EAT obviously would be a

means by which to vault barriers. It

would provide an instantaneous capa

bility to cross rivers, ecale cliffs, tra

verse impassable terrain, an)d overtly

all types of man-made obstacles and

structures.

. Its potential for reconnaissance

work would be significant. The BAT

Jplil19a7

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would yield an improved capability

for swift patrol and observation mis

sions by stealth, botb day and night,

with less vulnerability.

. The BAT could be used for local

resupply choree. Small-load packages

could be retrieved readily from drop

zones and be man flown to otherwise

inaccessible combat locations.

The BAT most certainly would

revolutionize the techniques of maneu

ver. It would afford unlimited oppor

tunities to achieve cross-country me

bility and perfect demoralizing tzctize. Defensive situations could be

turned rapidly inte offensive oppor

tunities by permitting swift dispersal

and regrouping. It would make pormi

ble the launching of sodden and con

fusing 360-degree attacks against

suspected enemy locations, thus re

quiring the enemy to diffuse hia fire

both horizontally and vertically. Un

anticipated avenues of escape could

be observed and cut off promptly. Tre

mendous advantages also would be

pemrible in city ftghting, riot control,

and other disordere that might typify

future warfare.

It also ie apparent that such a sYs

tem would not be without problems.Exteneive training would be required

to acclimate the soldier to individual

flight. Mwbanical operation of the

one-band control lever, perhapz, would

not be too difficult, but the develop

ment of flight proficiency to cope with

feet-moving tactical siturstions and

emergencies would take time.The syetem would force tactical

leaders to develop the ability te con

duct the type of split-second mcmeu

ver concepts needed to exploit tbe full

potential of euch a mobility system.

No new and worthwhile military cape.

bility, however, hse ever been achieved

without some degree of experiment

tion and training.

Another problem cordd stem from

the BAT’s short endurance. Certainly,

the relatively short-range characteri~

tice of the belt as it is thus far vis.

ualized would entail frequent refuel.

ing or recharging. However, the de

vice is not yet envisaged as a meeos

by which to soar perpetually around

the battlefield. However, until greater

sustxdrred flight capabilities can hsachieved, a single refueling station

mounted on a ground vehicle in the

combat ares would eerve the interim

purp9se adequately.

Safety is another consideration.

Without doubt, a zudden inflight real.

function of the BAT would find the

soldier with poor intrinsic flight chnracteristice.

On the other hand, nap-of-the-earth

maneuvering would not neceeearily in.

volve the same degree of hazard es

a free fall from great altitudes. And

the protection from enemy tire af

forded by the BAT’8 mobility would

more than offset the risk of injury

through pessible malfunction,There can be no doubt that an un

stinting effort to lighten the load of

the eoldier, coupled with priority de

velopment o a propulsion syetem to

permit individual flight, will produce

a truly medern, mobile, and vital

weapon syetem. While such an event

may not yet mean the end of the walking infantryman, it will at Irxwt cOnvey the idee that technology has not

moved into epace leaving him with the

baeic load and the bueic problem still

on hi8 back.

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---

.

UNITEDMi nef ieldIhmol i t ion “ Ski ds”

Remote-control blasting of enemy’

minefiebfe by rockets trailing strhga

of exploeivee and which are launched

from arnpldbious demolition “skide”

A m w EeaenvchandDmelmmw nt Nenmm am@w

is a new technique developed at 3ica

tiony Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey.

The fully loaded, rowboat-liie ekkle,dmignated the M179’8, can be towedover land or water and fired by any

vshiole containing a 24-volt directcurrent power eupply.

Constructed of waterproof fiberglass, the skids are 12 feet long andilve feet wide. When loaded with

Isuncher, rocket, and exploaivee

string, a skid weighs 8,000 pounds.

Plastic exploeivee are coiled in the

center section of the skid and attachedto an lf%5 “jato” rocketi When pro

jected across a minefield, the rocket

@rll1SS7

.- .-==—

STATES

traile an armed explosive charge series that, in turn, exploded minceplanted in ite path. The reckat’s tra

jectory ie halted by an arresting wire

attached to the sl@d.—News item.

STRATCOM Hoadquartsrs Moving

Headquarter of the US Army

Strategic Communications Command

(STRATCOM) will be moved from

the Washington, D. C., area to FortHuachuca, Arizona.

The move of STRATCOM is being

made to provide a permanent station

for the headquarters and to consoli

date, in one location, all elements of

the headquarter now ecattcred at sev

eral sites in the Washingten area.

The location of STRATCOM Head

quarters to existing facilities at FortHuachuca, a communications-electron

ice post since 1958, provides an en

.viromnent that will enhance the capa

bility of STRATCOM Heedquartere to

carry out ite mieeion of directing theArmy’e portion of the worldwide De

fense Communications Syetem.

The announced move will be phased

over a period of several months, and

should be completed by mid-1967.—Army Newe Features.

sl

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‘M aver ick ’ Ab-to. surface Missi le

Two aircraft manufacturers havebeen seleeted by the Air Force to pro

ceed with the contract definition phase

of the Maverick (AGM-66A ) air-to

eurface missile program. The purposeis to verify the preliminary design

and engineering, and to provide infor

mation necessary to award a contract

for development produ&lon.

The Maverick ie plsnned as a non

nuclear air-to-surface miseile for uee

with the F-111A, A-7D, and F-4 se

ries. h mteeion is to increase the

ntrike capability against point targets,

such as armored vehicles, tanks, and

ground &ucturee.-News release.

w

Hdic opter Il adar System .

The Joint Army-Navy Instrumenbtion Research (JANAIR) Programhae announced the development of snew helicopter radar syetem for u~

at night and in foggy weather.

Flight teeta using the radar system

have ehown that contrast between ob

jects and differing terrain is aucb tit

almost pictorial ground mapping reeuita. Large or extended objeets, surles airport runways or Nlghwaye, am

unmistakab~q and pilote aided by pk

tos or cbarta or with previous knewk

edge of the area mm &ndily identifl

clusters of trees, buildings, or ofl

tanke.-Arrny News Features.

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MI Regions Research.The ArmY’s Cold Regions Research

sad Engineering Laboratory (USA

CREEL) is engaged in a number ofprojectsto learn how to cope with and

ntilize frozen materials for the sur

eivilirmoperations in cold weether refions.

The laboratory has designed vehi

cleeto travel over ice or dig into it,

studied diepersal of fogs and how to

combatsprintilme soil erosion caueedby thawing, determined the effect oftemperatures on vegetation growth,kerned how to etop subsurface per

zrzfrost and muskeg from ruiningrozds and buildlngs, studied avabm

cbes and explosions on froccn mate

riel, and has broken up river ice

jsare.

Sdentists are currently analyzinga mile of vertical ice cores drilled out

ofthe Greenland ice sheet. These and

otherarctic cores, some whkh fell as

snow10,000 years ago, have been his

torically dated by means of radio carbendating, in which a Geiger counterrzeaeures the carbon found in the

rare’eair bubbles.—Army News Features.

Project‘WEST’A potential problem of gunsmoke

md missile propellant fumes which

mdd affect crew eiliciency in the

Army’e newer, more heavily armedMicopters after they reach combat

wer Vietnam is being etudied byArmyand Ah Force scientific teamsmProject wEST, a Weapons Exhaust

Study.

Crews evaluating the new helicop

krs have complained of nausea and

tissincss after inhaling thick concenkstione of gunpowder and miseile

wepellant fumes during firing tests.

Wi laa7

MILITARYOIES

Widle not a critically serious problem,

the Army reports that these fumes,

partbmlarly heavy in recently devel

oped and modified aircraft with a,larger number and variety of wcep

ons, when drawn into the helicopter

could distract or otherwise reduce tbe

combat effectiveness of the crew.

The two services are examining theexbzuet gaees produced by va~lous ‘

types of munitione to detcrmin,e theirexact chemical composition and degree

of toxicity.Utilizing tbe came equipment and

techniques used to evaluate recketfuels, Project WEST engineers aretesting gases produced by both gun

powder and missile propellants burnedunder laboratory conditions. To de

termine their composition, the resultant gaece are analyzed by nltramodemscientific equipment.

A new series of tests will be con

ducted under field condltione, moreclosely simulating actual service op

erations.-US Air Force release.

Carrier landing Device

An automatic engine throttle con

trol is being installed by the Navy onall firsthe carrier-based jet aircraft

to aeeist pilots in making eafer land

inge, particularly during difficult nightand all-weather operations.

,The device, called the Approach

Power Corapsrwator (APC), accu

rately controls airspeed during land

ing. It hae been installed in F-8 Crw

.szder and RA-5C V@wtte aircraftand will be installed in all new Navy

aircraft, such as the F-11 iB and theA-7A.

The Federal Aviation Agency and

commercial airlines are considering

use of the APC as part of proposed

all-weather landing systems.—DOD

release.

SS

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MILITARY NOTES

Cadet Esct!angeProgrsm

The @sny has inaugurated a Cadet

Exchange Program between tbe US

Military Academy (USMA) and se

lected military academies in Latin

America. The exehange follows an,exircrimental exchange program conducted in July-August 1966 in which

28 USMA eadete vieited 14 Latin-

American miiitary academica. In Sep

tember, 28 cadets from Central and

South America returned the visit.Pafilcipating Latin-American coun

tries were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,

Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala,Salvador, Hondurae, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

—Army Newe Features.

‘HARP’ h t

In recent teats, the 120-footAong

High-Altitude Research Project (HA12P) gun iired rounds to an altitud~

of 103 miles, a world record for gun.

fired projectiles.Two other records were eet during

the firinge when a maximum velctity

mark of 6,800 feet per eecond w~

recorded and when 1,225 pounds of

powder were loaded into the HARP

gun.

The gun—which ie used ae an mperimentel launcher for miesileo and

thin, stabilized shelie-fired projeotiles leaving a chemicai traii of Iighf

visible 300 mike away (MR, NOI1966, p 97) .—Army News Featurea,

The vehicle cnn travel on improved roade at Convoy smcds of 80 miles w 1hour and incorporate a conetant horsepower hydrauiic rear-wheel power eecirtfor covering rough terrain and fording streams. It bae a cruising range of 266miiea and a bed-carrying capacity of 31 600 pounds, the weight of three fubloaded CONEX.—Newe releaee.

100 MllltrryMvi@

.

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M oonVeldcl e Conoept s

ho lunar vehic le concepts are being teeted at Aberdeen Proving

Ground, Ma@rmd, by the US Army

Test and Evaluation Command [USATECOM) for the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA).

USATECOM is conducting gravity,

endurance,and movement experiments

on the four-wheel and six-wheel itfobilitg Test A*”ctes, which are vehi

cles based on NASA’s design studyfor a Lunar Mobile Laboratory.

The four-wheel version, for exam-

Nc. is Zt feet lonfs and nearly 15 feet

Arm Uesemchnd

Dwebpnwnt Neumnamzin.

k own drive motor and can be steered

iedhidually. Two levers constitute thedriver controls, one for speed and the

other for dhction. ,

After USATECOM teats the vebi

cka for hard-surfeee mobility, it willsend them ta Yuma Proving Ground,

Arisone, for eoft-surface testing.Date obtahed from these tests willbe used by NASA to design a Lunar

Wiemtific Surv.qi Mod&e (LSSM)

which will look iike a scaled-down ver

eion of a Mobility Teet Article. The

6MalierLSSM would fit into the ee

hunaute’ Apollo rocket to the moon.

-Army, News Features.

lpil 1W7

MILITARV’NOTES

New Reenii stnr ent Progrem

The Department of the Army hasannounced a likmonth enlistment pre-

gram in the US Army Reserves, with

concurrent call to eetive duty forservice in Vietnam.

Those eiigible for the enlistment

option must be former Army servicemen without current reserve status,and former active Army personnel

who are curren$ly in the National

Guard or US Army Reeervee..

Personnel who are accepted willserve 12 monthe in Vietnam, with the

remaining time used for any neededrefresher training couree, 30 days’

leave, travel to and from Vietnam,and processing.

Accepted individuals will hold the

grade they held when last separatedfrom active duty or the current grade

they hold in their National Guard orReserve unit.

Applicants must have served atleast 21 months of continuous active

duty during their Army career. Pe

riods of active duty fcfr training will

not be credited.Applicants not. in ‘e current re

serve statue must reenlist for the 15

month program withh three yearsfrom the date they were last eeparated

from atilve duty.

‘ Reserve personnel are not eligible

if they have been assigned to a con

trol group for more than three yearsand have not participated in any mil-

ita;y occupational specialty (MOS)

training during this period.All applicants must be fully quali

fied in an MOS for which a require

ment exiet.v in Vietnam.

Those completing the 15-monthduty who desire an extension must receive specific authority from the Office

of Pereonnel Operations.-Army Newe

Features.

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men f or nearly 20 years, and, duringthte time, it hfta increased in Eim and

*p.

I@ dual mheion is to provide in

struction to Lntin-American military

men in fieldc rcnging f rmn civic fic

tion planning to hesvy equipment oP

erntiocw, cc well aa to tmdn soldjemto defend their countrka from internal

subvcmion and extaraal enendee.

Forty- lve coumoa are taught at the

eehoo), 17 of which deal with military

CIVICsct ion, At the hlgheet level is

the three-week CIVICaction trainingwhich ie declgned to prepcre Lntln-

Im

binee both the military and civic artion rob of Letin America’e mititarr

forma.

US Army engineem teach waterpur i t lc st ion, wel l dr i l l i ng, and heawequipment and comit ruct lon eupportequipment operation, Thcee sktlln pw

para the men to work in community

devcdopment progranm

The bmic medical techrdclan coumaincludes a four-dsy medlcd sealstanm

program in tbs Republic of Pcnccoc.

During thO 20-w@k 8@do~ 6hIdOCCb

act so numes nnd mlmintgtmtive pwnonnal for United StAt811snd PUW-

Mllltq Rwk9

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..

osmian doctors, end wist environ-mental heeiti specialist with me-ierie surveys

Merging the military civic actionrole with the continuing miesion of

protesting against incipient insurgenciee, the Irregular Warfare Cem

adttce mh= both the military meae~ mqnired to defeat an insurgent

00 tbe battieiield, as well as the civicaction functions and reeponeitrilitiee

of military forces in an insurgent environment. Instruction ia presented infield probkrne and maneuvers in thelo-week wuree for sompany grade

Lctin-Amerisen officers.Spanish became the official teaching

Im@age in 1955, and, since then, theas@el baa graduated nearly 19,000

US ArfIwPkoiw

Stedents from Honduras enrolled in theeeven-week well-driliing course

I&in Americans. Twenty-two Letin-

Aorerieerr officers and nine noneom-

OdWonad odicere from 16 conntriee

s?e presently teesbing at the school as

MII.ITASYnoms

guest instructors. These inetrrretor

personnel are assigned to the eeheelfor one-year periods.

A “bridge that finks the Arnerieae~the school serves as a platform for

the interchange of ideas among mili

tary men of aii the American countries. As su~ the School of the Amer

icas playe a significant role. in Latin

Americe’a battle against Comrnunistinepired subversion and vioi’ante inthe Weetern Hemisphere.-US Army

release.

M utual Understanding ProgramEnti;ee are currently being acseptcd

for the Edward L. Berneye Founda

tion ~ward. The purpose of the awardis to provide euggeetions and ideas

that can be used by governmen~ pri

vate organiaatiom, voluntary groups,

and individuals to further understanding between the peoples of the

Unitsd States and tba United Eing

dom.

The closing date for entrke is 30

June 1967. Information on the program can be obtained from the Sec

retcry, Edward L. Berrtaye Fonndatfon,” 7 Loweil Street, Cambridge,Massachusetts 02138.—Nsws item.

Bird Col l i sions With Aircraf t. The Air Force baa several meaeurea

under consideration to reduce or elim

inate “bird collisions” with aircraft.

These coliiiione-329 were reported

in 196S-coet the Air Force almost 10

miliion dollars a year, according to

the OfSce of Aeroepeec Reeeersb.Means under consideration to com

bat the intrudeti include loud “crackershells” fired from guns, draining of

ponds near runways, and the cutting

of weeds.

The major offender is the stariirtgaithough other birds have proved

troubleeome.-DOD release.

103

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MILITAf t Y NOTES

!

Awwj , t - f i .nwal hodm

TRAP equipment aligned along the side of a KC-135 jet aircmftI

Ballistic missiles are being tracked and their performance recorded duringthe time between reentry into the atmosphere and impact by u new systemwhich attained operational statua in November.

Named TRAP (for Terminal Radiation Program), the eystem provides in.formation vital to the development of antimissile and advanced intercontinentalballistic missile systems. It was produced for the Air Force Ballistic SystemDivision.

A crew of seven physicists operatee TRAP’s army of camerus, photometers,radiometer, and cinwpectrographa from e. specially modified KC-I.?5 jet tankeraircraft.

On a mission, inunch information is trmwmitted from the launch site directly to the TRAP syetem in the KC-1,%5 which is on statiotl at 40 000-feet

altitude about 6,000 milee down range.

Tracking begins from the aircraft when the reentering miwile is riboutfiOmike above the surface and continues until the target plunges into the swproviding data for analyeis by computers.-New8 item.

Alrbome Trairrlrrgor Cadats

A program permitting US Military Trajnlng is open to vokin~m of

Academy cadets to receive airborne the tlret and eecond cleaeee. Those dm

tratnlng during the eummer lenve pe- to ~aduate in June may partJcJpM8

rlod Iua bean approved by the Army durhrg their graduation laave.-DOD

Chief of Staff. r?haee.

tM MuttuyAoFt@

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BRAZILIT-37’Trainers

FortY T 7 aircraft have been ordered by the Brasiiian Government

from a US manufacturer. The 10 ruiliion-doiiar contract for the trainers

eiee includes maintenance equipment8Udspare parts.

The aircraft are scheduled for delivery te the Breziian Alr Force dur

ing the period JuiY 1967-October 196S..-News item.

‘Smcst’Mi ssil es f or VesselThe Breziiiara destroyer Mariz e

BafY08,the Sr8t South .Arnerican vee

sei to be titted with guided missiles,

was recently commissioned after being

armedwith British surface-to-air Sea-

cot missiles (MR, JuI 1966, p 102).

The Brazilian-built destroyer, after

keing overhauled at the &asiiianNavy Arsenal in Rio de Janeiro, alsoreceived new guns. After a aeriee of

tests, the Maria e Batv’08 will become

the flagship of the deetroyer flotiila.

Three other warships-the cruisersBarroso and Tarnanokwd and the air

craft carrier MirPW Gcraia-are also

scheduled to be equipped with the

S8acat.-News item.

CENTO‘I i id l inkIX’

J@lirzk IX, a 10-day Central Treaty

Organization (CENTO) maritime exercise conducted in November, in

cludedvessels from the navies of Iran$

Great Britain, and the United States.

‘During the exercise, “enemy” sub

marines were tracked and attackedwith dummy depth charges, and live

antiaircraft and surface tiring were

conducted. The force performed con

vey duties, practiced refueiing opera

tieaz at sea, and conducted a mine-sweeping exercise.-Newa release.

ml laa7

MiLITARY”NOTES ‘~

CHILE‘Twin Otter’ Aircraft

The first three of eight Twin Otter

aircraft for the Chilean Air Force

have been flown to Cidle. Marm@ctured in Canada, the three aircraftwilI be used for aerial survey andfor supplying isolated communitiee.—

News item.

EAST GERMANYAir Units

Air force unita of the Eeet German

People’s Army, initiaiiy organized fortactical supPly missions, were formedin 1950 se a branch of the police.

The air force has two fighter divi

sions of three regiments each. In addition, there are two transport and

r i .?rk6n” i ”9

IUiG-15

equipped with M-l and ii4i-4 helicop

ters; three regiraenta of ground airilefenae forces, each having three bat

talions; and two radar battalions.

There are about 400 tactical air

craft in the air forc+100 iWG-15,260 MiG-17, SO MiG-19 and MiG21,

and an unknown number of 12-28 air

craft, For transport, 11-14P and An-%

aircraft are used. For training andliaison, the Yak-n, Yak-1 , Yak-18,

Zlin, and MiG-16 UTI, are used.

The training “divieion operates two

schools to train pilots. In tiddition,

crew training ia also conduc~d in the ‘

Soviet Union.—Newa item.

165

,$

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MILITARY NOIES

INDIASoviet NavalAid

India wtlt receive six submarines

and 40 smaller veeseki from the Soviet

Union. Soviet specirdiste will IIISOhelp

construct a shipyard in India (MR,~Ul 1966, p 104).

Heretofore, the Indian Fleet had

used vessels of British origin.—Newsitim.

AUSTRALIAi iMAS ‘ I l tway’

Australia’s second 1,600-ton Oberonclam submarine, the HMAS OtzoW,

wee recently launched in Scotland.

The new craft is one of four Oberonclam aubmarinee scheduled to be de

livered to the Royal Australian Navy

by 1969.

The HMAS OzkW, launched in 1966,

will be delivered this year. The othertwo will be named the Ovens and the

OnuZow (MR, Oct 1966, p 104).

The cost of each submarine, excluding aaeociated epare equipment

and torpedoes, is 9.2 million dcdlara.

—Newa release.

New MotorcyclesIn the future, the Australian Army

will be equipped with lightweight

British motorcycles. The 450 new mo

torcycles will replace World War II

models now in use.—Newe release,

Naval EnslglrAll Australian naval shipe and ee

tablisbmenta are flying a distinctiveAustralian ensjgn.

The new ensign reteine the Union

Jack at tbe upper esnton at the hoiet,

hut the red crone of Saint George han

been replaced by the eix Austral ianntara In blue on a white baclwrround.

The flag h called the AuutrallnnwhM,e ennlgn,-Naws rehmm

‘M lraga S1-0’ Jat TrairrarThe Royal Amrtralian Air Fora

recently took delivery of the ilrat o

10 Mirqre HI-D twe-eeat jet trainem

The Mirage program compfirwe 160fighters and ground attack aircraft 10addition to the 10 trainere.

The Mirage III-D, developed is

France ae an Australian variant d

tbe Miruge III-B two-seat aircrafiwill eeeist in the conversion of jel

pilots to the single-e.eat Mimge IILO

13ghter.-News releeae.

GREAT BRITAIN‘Blowpipe’

Blowpipe, a one-man air defenue

weapon currently under development

which ie deehmad for use againet low

I.td”l.l

Blowpipe mockup

flying aircraft, was recently displayed

by itn manufacturer at n British air8how.

The nystem consi5te of the mldh

a tube which is used for trauspert endM the launcher, an optical sight whirb

mountn on the tube, and u small radiotmnrtmitter which the gunner uses toguide the mkiaile in flight. The weigh

of tho complde nystam Is 26 pounda.-

Nmm Item.

laa Mllltwyswim

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


ITALY‘691Y’M aiden Fl i ght

MILITARYNOTE

Fiat

The first prototype of the twin-engine, lightweight reconnaissance fighterG91Y has made its’ maiden Sight.

Equipped “with two engines of a total static thruet of 8,160 pounds withafterburner, the aircraft has a maximum speed of more than Mach .96.—News.

release,

NORWAYNaval Construc t ion Program

The first of five new frigates being millimeter antiaircraft guns in double

constructed in Norwegian ehipyards gun turrets, six tubes for antisubma

hss entered eerviae with the Norwe- rine torpedoes, and a six-tube Terme

gian Navy. The new veeeela are similar rocket launcher. Each frigate willin design to the US Deole~ class and carry one helicopter. The veesele carry

have a standard “displacement of ap- a crew of 150.proximately 1,500 tons. The naval construction program also

Powered by Swedish-built turbines includes 15 submarines of 370 tonssnd machinery (20,000 horsepower), and 20 patrol boats of 100 tona capathe vessels have a top speed of 25 ble of a speed of 30 knots.-Newskoote. Armament consiste of four 76. item.

d

kpr l 1967 10

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


DEADLY LOGIC: 7fre 7froory of NuclearDatarrenca. Sy Philip 6raan. 361 Pages.:b&S& Mbri wrrslt y Prass, Columbus,Ohio,

. .

BY MAJ CHM@s L. MCNEILL, USA

The author, an Assistant Professorof Government at Smith College, has

launched a frontal and powerful rk

taek on the authoritative credencegiven to what he deacribea in tMe

book aa the unproved “theory of nu

clear deterrence.”

Mr. Green claime that the @tudy

of nuclear deterrence policy is in noway an academic discipline, and then

proceeds to diseect the various policy

propoeale and the strategies which

have been advanced by nuclear the

orieta.

What Professor Green is really at

tempting to refute is the mantle of

ecientitlc expertise which haa been assumed by the deterrence theoriste.

Champions of certain new techniques

which are used in decieion making

-such ea syatema anelyeia, game the

ory, and simulation—will find their

methodology challenged and tbe validity of their canclusionn sharply

questioned.

For the military reader, this bookwill be thought provoking and may

cauae him to reexamine the validity

of the strategy of maaaive retaliation

that wee in vogue in the 1950’s. Whatthe author baa accomrAlahod la toattack the detmrence &sorirda with

thlr own ultimate wenpen+rudlto

logic.

1

MILSTARY

BOOKSIU60SLAVIA’S REVOLUTIONOF 1941. ~

Wag N. Rktf~ 175 Pagea. 7ha Panasflvarria State Urrlverslty Press, UrtivarsltfPark, Pa., W& $7.50.

BY MAJ ANTHONYP. DE LUCA,USA

Adolf Hitler’s aeheme in kite 1940for winning World War H included

maintenance of the statua quo in theBalkans and the elimination of any

cause for a Britieh-Soviet entry into

the area. Yugoslavia was a vital ele

ment in that echeme since British

forces in Greece would pose a threat

to the Romanian oil flelde, and a pro.Axie Yugoslavia might have diecour.aged Greece from inviting British aid,

‘The political courting of YugorJavi*succeeded temperaril y with Yugosh.

via’s acceesion to the Tripartite Pact

in hfareh 1941. However, two day8Iat.ar, pubIic indignation led to a miii

tary coup and revolution which precipitated the German attack.

The author, aide-de-camp to Gen

eral Du&m Simovi/ who enginecrfdthe coup, preaen% eyewitneee accounts

of one of the most important evenbin modem Yugoslav history. Since@

full eigaiflcance of tbe event ie still

a eubjwt of speculation, the reader bpreaerrted with detaite on which to

determine whether the coup wau m

eponaible for saddling Yugodavia witha CaOmmnist regima whether it waa

doaignad to atop %esiat ag~aardo%

whether it wca the cnuee or ttm ax

cuae for the his war arrdnat Yul’O

nlavk, and hi what waiy it contributed

to Elttur’a uitimab defeat.

MlittmyA@?

7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


-“”-a

AJJISTOM AND WEAPOf% 449 toFWAR1sS0. Enali sh Warf are From t he AI@W

SSSOINo-Crmnwell.BY A. V. B. Norman & d00s Poff lngrw. S24 Pages. Thomas Y.

CrswellCo. , Now York, 1906. $RB5.BY LTC FommeT R. BLACKBURN,

USAR

Four paral le l themes involving Eng

lieh warfare and weapons from 449

to 1660 are developed in thle beok:

military organisation, arms and ar

mor, tactics and strategy, and castles

sad cannons.Cbengee in the methods and equip

ment of warfare are traced from the

tiie of the invasion of the British

ISICSby the Anglo-Saxons to the estabJisbrnentof the first modern army.The author discusses the development

sad use of weepone from the crossbow

to the pistil and musket, the pike tothe bayonet, the catapult to the esnnon, and describ- the design andconstruction of castles and other for

tidcstione.

HigWlghting tha book are 200 de

taiied drawings of weapone, armor,castles, and fortifmotions. These, along

with a readable text, make the book

of considerable interest to the miJitery reader.

1 WORLOOF NUCLSAR POWSRS? ErSWd by

AbstsJr Bucban. 176 Pages. prmrt ic a.t la l~lea. Engfaw ood Cl i ff s, N. J., lBBB. $1. 95psparbourrd.

BY LTC GEORGEM. RonG8RB,USA

Man~ problems of nuclear proliferation are discussed in detail by out

standing scholars to give the reader

a bettar understanding of the varyingworldwide viewe.

IUgldy recommended for the mili

tary rsader, this book should be of

SPCCiSJ to student of ponterest the

“liticel affairs.

w lea7

,,,

MILJTARYBOOKS .

FOLLO IM 6 TNE 6UIOON. By El i ssbet i B. :Crrstar. WJt h ao Intr odrrot ioa,by Jaoa R. . ,Stew 341 Pages. Univarai t y of Okl ahoma ~Press, emran, Okla . , 1$$S. $2.00.

~This 8 new edition of Mrs. Cue- ~a

ter’e book first puhJished in 1890. It ;relates many anecdotes of Jife with ~

the US Cavalry during the Indian ,?fighting after the Civil War. Never an ~

unbiased Kletorian where her husband ~is concerned, Mrs. Custer ia at her ~

best in describing post life on the ~

frontier.

AN ADMINISTRATIVE NISTORY OF w ~1B31HBB3.By Robarl L. Roshofk 381 Pages. ;NstJenal Aeroasutiss and Space Adminlst rs. :

t i on , Wasbingtmr, 0 . C. , 1W6. $4.00. :

BY JOXN R. CAMESON

The purpose of this volume is to \

provide a detailed study of the admin- :

istrativa framework of the National v :

Aeronautics and Space Administra- ‘? i

tion (NASA). Thus, the book traces

the Jife of the NationsI Advieory Corn-

mitt= for Aeronautics, born in 1916,to it-s redesimmtion in 1958 as NASA. .

The bulk o; the study is devot@d to

the NASA years.

Drawing upon legislative and in

ternal hietory, Dr. Rosholt covers the

con4Wte in the development of the

US apace agency. The impost of external events and pressures is chartedto place NASA decisions in proper

parsptilve. Major deeuments, legisl~

tion, and positions are emnmericed to

provide the flavor of the moment. Tberelationships of NASA to other gov

ernment agencies and te its own ele

ments are scratinieed. The character

that cash adminietraitor embodied in

NASA is carefully brought to Jight.

The book is WCJ1documented and

authoritative and sucewds admirably

in its purpose.

10s

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7/27/2019 Milrev_apr1967


MlLk7ARYBOOKS

FJ6N7JN6 UNOER THE SEA. Oy CaptainDonald M aoin(yra. 174 PaE6a. W. W. Nort onG Co. , Inc . , Maw Yorl r j 19S5 . $4.95.

BY LTC MA800 J. CAEACCIA,USA

Captain Donald hfaeintyre retiredfrom the Royal Navy in 1954 afterhaving served aa a pilot of the FleetAir Arm. Hie experience with sub

marines began in World War II when

he wea an Eaoort Force Commanderduring the Battle of the Atlantic.

In Fighting Under The Sea, the

author introduces hie aubjad with achapter which aketchee the pioneer

efforte of early aubmarinere-to in

clude the activity of an American,

David Buehnell, who in 1776 con

structed the tlret practical submarine

to be employed ee a ship of war. The

following chaptera are short storiee

depicting the exploits of renownedsubmariners during the two World

Wara. The accounts are vividly andobjectively presented.

A CORRUA7E0 HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST.CidrIa, Kores, Japan. By MarJaPwrkabt .76 Pages. Charlas E. Mrt t l a Co,, Rut l and, Vt. ,

1900.$7.50 paporbound.

, BY LTC JOHN M. JENNINGS, USA

A Correlated HietoW of the Far

Eaet ie a chronological listing of eig

nitlcant evente concerning China, Ke

ma, and Japan from before 8000 B.C.to A.D. 1964. The eventa are well documented by W mape.

This book is a valuable referencetool to the student of Far East hie-tory, particularly one intimated in

tracing the political, religious, and

cultural evolution of these three coun

t r ien . However, Ita meager t reatmentof recent h latory r r rakw i t of marghalvalue. t o n mi l l tary hister imr who is

Intmeeted in ewmta of more recent

thnee.

no

SCIENCE ANO SURVIVAL BY Barry CaMmonar . 150 Pagaa. 7FraVlk i i rg Prass, IWNew yo~ lW. $4,50.

BY EWaENE H, MILLER

Science and Survival aurveyO therevolution in science and technology

that hae brought physical changee enan unprecedented scale, changea ths.t

make pesaible a better life for mzo.kind, The author, an outstanding con.

aervationist, believes that we are io

real trouble, however, becauay of the

gap between tbe rapid developmentsin the phyeicrd eciencee and the rektively slow pace of the biological eel.ences.

Thue, phyaiciate split the atom aod

gave ue nuclear energy before the life

scientist understood the ett’eet.nof

fallout, and engineere developed the

internal combustion engine withoutregard to air pollution.

In eucceseive chaptere the author

diecuseee poseible solutions, and th

role of the scientist, the citizen, andthe adminiettator in making valuejudgments that will preserve the bir.

sphere for mankind’a future.

FOR CONSPICUOUS 6ALJ.AN7RY.Winnersdt he M adal of Honor. By Donald E. . CoakA85 Pager. C. S. Hammond & Co., M aplew ~N. J. , 1084. $S. 50.

BY COL GEQROES. PAPPAe, USA

Mr. Cooke hue sek cted 46 winnem

of the Medal of Honor aa repreeenb

tive of the more than 8,000 men WLhave earned the award. The actiorwhich resulted in eeeh award ie d~

ecribed briefly, but effectively.

By adding a very nhort narmtim

of the origin of the MedaI of Honeand the et lor t e to mainta in th{s awar ifor gaILantry above nnd beyond tbl

ca l l of duty, tbe author hns I Iucseeddin providing s uneful rr i f erenre book

UII* M

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------- --, . ., . ..-..—

“ .-

,’ ---=

MiLiTARY BOOii3

i i oWTO STAY AWE IN VIETNAM . Combat3wsisci i r r tJre Warofk lc ny Fmnta. i f ytniorralRobart B. Rim. 05 Pazaa. Tha St ac k.

~ie Co. ,Narr iafmr& ~sr. , lSf% . $1. 95.

By LTC JOSEPHM. COBVINO,USA

Colonel Rigg’s formula for survival

in Vietnam is a combhmtion of knowing the traite and tactics of your ensmy and of being constantly alert. In

his words, the book is “a profile of

what to watch and watch out for inVietnam.” The words of advice are

amplysupported and illustrated by ac

emmtsof actual actions and incidents

in this strangest of wars in wh]ch afarmer with a hoe may turn out tohe your enemy.

liiE M iLiTARY iNTELLECTUAL.3 iN BRiTAiN191&1939.By Robin Nigi ram. 267 Pagas.

Rutgers”University Prass, Naw Brunswick,N.J.,1SSS.$7.50 .

BY MAJ NXVENJ. BAISO, USA

Atilral Sir Herbert Richmond,

1. F. C. Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart,

andLord Hugh Trenchard, Marshal of

the Royai Air Force. are all familiar

namesto those interested in the evolu

t i on of strategy. Their ideas, and theformswhich influenced their thoughta,

AN ARMY FOR TNE St XTiES. A s t udy i nNat icr t a iPol ic y, Cont ract and OJliigation.By Ant i ronyVarr iar . 280 Pagaa.Mart ialSack er&Warbur& Ltd., London, Eng., 1SS0. $ W1.

BY COL JULIAN P. FANE, BrWsh

ArmI/

Tbe author draws attention te thelack of emphasis given by successivegovernments in the United Khgdom

to the army as an element of national

power. He demands a change in themcial structure within the British

Army and considers that sufficient sm

phesis ia not being given to profes

aionaiism.

Mr. Verrier arguea that the present

British prdicy continues to be based

on the fallacious notione of a global

role. He recommends that the govern

ment face the realitiee of Britidn’s

changed situation in the world today

by tailoring the army to meet its pri

mary defensive commitment in Eu

rope, and its contribution to the United

Nations in the maintenance of world

peace.

SPURS TO GLORY. Tha Story of tira Unitad

Sta tas Cavairy. By Jamas M . M err i i i . 302Pages. Read Mc Nai iy & Co. , Chic ago, i i i . ,

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