mml

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

lNferiCaffAdvisors Overseas . . . . . . . . . Edward c. Stewart 3

IoodNeighbors in Uniform . . . If Col Harry F. Walferhouse, USA, Ref 10

Petroleumand Communist Cl!ina . . . . . . . . . . Jan s. Pryby/a 19

RtdChiifas Military OoCtrirlL!. . Q. . . . . . . Ake Langley Hsleh 23

North Vietnam and the Sirro-Soviet Oispute . . . . . . . King Chen 31.

~Dtc~fftrO[DOCtrifZe. . . . . . . . Maj John K. Stoner, Jr., USA 40

Philosophyof the Attack . . . . . . Maj Clinton E. Granger, Jr., USA 45

IIOIifltMhfSUrgMICY . . . . . . . David c. Skaggs 52in Bleeding Kansas

OrganizedLooting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Leo Heimarr 61

A MilitaryReview Special Reprint: letter From Nankirrg . . . . . . Capt Ray Hrrang, Chinese Army 69

Nmihle Response . . ~ Gen af fhe Army Charles Ailleret, French Army 78

Attractionsand Pitfalls of Military History . . . . . . . 6ricm Band 87

MilitaryNotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Militar yBook s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

[ TheM!lltary of the UNITEDSTATES providesaforumfor theexpressi0n Reviewa publication ARMY,~Ofmihtarythoughtwithemphasison doctrineconcerningthe dwisionand higherlevelsof command.

The,VIEWSexpressedin this magazineARETHEAUTHORSand not necessarilythose of the ~SArmyor the Commandand GeneralStaff College.

Editor in Chief Cot Domdd J. Delaneu

Assistant Editor Lt Col Albert N. Garland

Features Editor Mffj Robert L. Burke

Layout Editor Ist Li Robert K. Lindgren

Acting SpanishAmerican Editor Luis A. Monwrrate

Brazilian Editor Lt Col J050 H. Faeci

Associate Editor Lt Col Algin J. Hugkes Armg War College

Production Officer JSaj Norman C. Mur:afr I

Staff Artist 1Chade8 A. Moore Ic

I In t

MILITARY REVIEWPubhshed monthly by U. S. Arnw Command and General staff Colle&mFort Le.g. t enworth, R...s,s, in Erwlbb, Spanish, .nd PortuaIew. Use of funds fm Drintmz of this p.bhc.tion h= beem .mmoved by Efe.dcwarters Dw.rtme.t of the Army, 8 JlY 1962. n

Sec.. d-c1.S. Dostwe Daid .t Fort Le., er.w.rtb, K..s-& S.bwipti.. ret,,: $350 i US mrsew) 8, i)Year in the United states. United States m!kt .!3$ post offices. and th.., mm,t ries whi.b are m@nb@~.0 the P.n.Amermm Postal Union ( mcl.dins Spain): 34.50 . ye.. i .1! .tber cmmtries. Address s.b,c,~ t:.n m.il to tbe B..k Department, u. s. A IIIIYC.mmmd .d G,..,,I saff COII,=., FO,t Lm.mwofih. K.nsas 66n27. . F

AMERICANADVISORSOVERSEAS t

Edward C. Stewart

The tieaw expressed in this article are the aathors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or t}w U. S. Army COmmand and General Staff Co[lege. Editor.

EVER since the end of World War 11, American military officers have gone overseas in large numbers to give advice and training tothe militarY personnel of developing countries. The demands of these missions, in many ways subtle or Intangible, are quite exceptional. The

khrdarfigtis

advisor, or trainer, is called upon to set aside his usual operational procedures as staff officer, or commander, and to work in a strange setting outside the miIitary organization to which he is accustomed.

Not only is the military situation strange, but the human milieuthe psychological and social context in which he worksis also foreign and makes unexpected demands on the knowledge, patience, and practical wisdom of the advisor. His counterpart and coworkers speak a different language and have different customs and preferences-external differences

3

ADVISDRS

which can be easily observed and described. Thair very obviousness, however, often obscuree more subtle differences in patterns of thought and modes of action, and in concepts about the world and experience, which affect the interaction of the advisor and his counterpart.

These cultural factors, which make up the distinctive nonmaterial heritage of a national or ethnic group-the cultural patternpresent obstacles to the procees of communication and cooperation overseas. The difficulty in cross-cultural communication and cooperation for US advisors overseas Iiee primarily in the disparity and conflict between the advieors own cultural pattern and that of hie foreign counterpart, and only secondarily in the strangeness of the foreign ways. It certainly appears that the cross-cultural performance of the US advisor would be enhanced if his area training included instruction on the US cultural pattern as well as on the foreign pattern. Cultural Awareness

The need for the US advisor to understand his own cultural pattern, as weI[ as that of the hoet country, does not mean that his insight must be explicit and articulate. His cultural understanding may often be implicit, as when an advisor gears his actions to existing cultural differences, even though he is not necessarily able to describe the relevant aspects of either

Edward C. Stewart, a Researc~ Scientist with the Human Resources Research Ofice, George Washington University, holds a Ph. D. degree from the University of Texas. He served with the 84th Infantry Division in Europe during World War II. From 1956 to 1959 he waa Assistant Professor at Lehigh University.

4

his own or the foreign culture. In this circumstance, the advisOr perceives the cultural disparities at some intuitive level and acts accordingly, Direct Participation

In other instances, although lacking cultural understanding, the advisor is successful through serendipity. A fortunate and accidental combination of cultural factors on one hand, and personality and behavior of the advisor on the other, may produce a result that would usually be expected only on the basis of cultural insight The average Americans facility in establishing social relationships frequently creates favorabIe circumstances for giving advice, especially when it is followed by the Americans willingness to work .yith those at the loweik levels of an organization or group. Thus, in non-Western countries, US officers are often more effective in working with the enlisted men than with the officers. Part of the reaaun for the success of the Americans rests with their greater willing nessin comparison to nOn-Western officers-to work with all ranks, even the loweet.

Success through serendipity may take strange forms; the experienced advisor learns not to count on it, for unwitting failure is probably far more frequent than uuplanned sucee.w An exampie of this type of success was given by an Ecuadoran admini$ trator who supervised several Peace Corps volunteers in social welfare work. Because the volunteer did noi speak Spanish fluentIy on arrival, thej were forced to demonstrate rathel than to give lectures, working directl} with the Indians instead of super vising them.

The actions of the volunteers influ enced their Ecuadoran counterparts t(

MilitaryRWiOr

ADVISORS

workalong the same line. Although the Ecuadoran administrator recognized that demonstrate ion and direct participation are typical American methodsof instructing and influencing others, he pointed out that many Americans overeeas become like their Iesalcounterparts, giving lectures and remaining aloof. In this instance, he felt that the Peace Corps volunteers Lackof fluency in Spanish contributed, inpart, to their success. Cross.CulturalIncongruity

Many problems of US advisors overseaecan be traced to the incongruities between American and foreign culmrsl patterns. When the US advisor ie confronted with unusual cultural patterns, his lack of familiarity with them may lead to misunderstanding andfriction. Americans, like members of any other culture, have their own cultural patterns which provide them with a comprehensive system of perceivingand understanding the world, andwith preferred modes of action.

Whenever the individual finds the strangeness of life in a foreign country leading to uncertainty, be adopts hypotheses derived from his owncultural pattern to fit the new

I situation. Since these interpretations based on his own cultural pattern dominate, he is not likely to suspend judgment and action until he can

I fully understand the strange ways. Because his nwn ways seem to him normal and natural, he is likely to regard those of another culture as

t undesirable,,unnatural, or immoral. ! Consequently, the individuals own r Pattern comes into conflict with that I of the foreign cu]tre. Any contin

gency he may meet, no matter how strange, is ]ikely to lead to an interpretationaccording to his own pattern.

0 since the cultural pattern itself ia

not precisely articulated, the tentative hypotheses are likely to be imprecise. The individual will, accordingly, epawn a crude interpretation and thereby reduce the ambiguity pf cross-cultural differences. Examples of Incongruity

The waye in which people act toward each other reveal many instances of cross-cultural incongruity, since each culture has pre. ferred standards which govern social interactions. ., American men, for instance, have well-marked norms of displacement in space in regard to other people. When sitting in an audience, an American man does not ordinarily lean against or touch persons sitting next to him, because the act carrie.+ emotional or sexual meaning. In conversation, he stands at least an arms length from the other person. If he comes closer, the distance is charged with significance. Thus, the intensity of a cocktail party, the intimacy of a small, crowded restaurant, and the camaraderie of people jamming a parade route, are all partly a result of the necessary proximity of the persons involved.

The inexperienced American overseas may become very uncomfortable when he talke to an Arab or a Latin American whoee face is only a short distance from his own. Their proximity merely expresees a more persOnidized manner of interacting with other people; it is a custom, bowever, that is incompatible with American habits.

Another practice that may chock the American when he first observes it is tbe custom in many parts of the worldin Vietnam, for instance-for men to hold hands as an expression of friendship. While the American knows that the practice bas no

5

ADVISORS

sexual significance for the Vietnamese, he cannot regard it with equanimity because his own cultural pattern gives him an interpretation of holding hands contrary to the Vietnamese meaning of the act. Both the Americans and the Vietnamese may well understand these different ways, yet each is likely to feel that his own way is the normal one.

An aspect of interpersonal relations found in US culture, which contrasts with non-Western ways, is the depersonalized manner of dealing with

Advisory duty makes unexpected demands wisdom of the advisor

and predictable ways of interactkg with other people, he is unprepared for the personal mode of social inter. action in other parts of the world. ID the Middle East, in southeast Asia, and in other areas of the world, the business dealings that take place over a purchase are seen as a person. alized way of doing business. The price of an article is not standardized, hut is subject to bargaining between the seller and the buyer.

In non-Western countries, bargain. ing is a transaction between persons

m Am!-.

on the knowledge, patience, and practicaj

other people. The American places a high value on equality, informality, and depersonalized business relations. He takes an objective approach to bis job, trying to remove his feelings from his work. Preferring standard

who, because they have about the same control over the situation, may be considered equals. Gift giving, especially a gift of money, is a pelsonalized way of conducting affairs in which reciprocity is incomplete Or

MilitaryRe?ieti 6

ADVISORS

nonexistent. The person who received moneymay reciprOeate with his usual wvices, or he may not be expected 10make any return at all.

Personalization in unequal situationsbetween superiors and subordmstes-may be regarded as graft, corruption, influence peddling, or nepotismby the American. He tends :0react with moral indignation forgetting similar instances in his own romtry. His sense of outrage preventa hls recognizing that personalized superior-subordinate relationships are expected in many nor?-Western cul:wav.His anticipation that US money andmaterial overseas will yield goods, wvices, or at least will not ge into wmeonespockets is not necessarily sharedby his counterpart. US mqney mgoods, or even the adyisors themselves,may mean to the counterparts a personalized gesture of good will fromthe US Government which does notr$quire an accounting. !reaof Application

Various aspects of interpersonal rela.t]ons in US culture provide precedents for understanding graft in otherparts of the world. The tip, in someinstances, has functions similar tograft. The main difference between ihetwo is in the area of application. \$hereas for Americans the tip is wally confined to personal services green by nonprofessional persons, peoplein other parts of the world extend tbe same kind of personal masideration to most activities.

This parallel between graft and the tip is not suggested to induce the Amer]can to regard graft as inevitable,but only to avoid reactions that wll subvert his own purposes. For Instance, he will anger many nOn-Westerners if he reacts to graft with moralindignation, because they accept

what Americans call graft as part of social existence. They feel it is something not to abolish but only to curb. When an American,reacts indignantly, as if graft can and should be eradicated, the non-Westerners may become angry, for they consider the American unrealistic and hypocritical. Finding the Right Concept

The task of the US advisor is much easier if he can find a concept that is meaningful to him and that can be effectively translated into the language of his counterpart without causing confusion. Transferring concepts from one culture to another is more than the translation of words. Culture differences exist even when members of both cultures speak tbe same language, as in the case of Americans and the British, and require the same tact and understanding that is needed between the Americans and, say, the Chinese or Iranians.

The conflict between different cul~,,ral patterns can be so subtle that

may lead to misunderstandings:/ cult to ~rave, Because the

ritish and American cultures are very similar in most respects, no great difficulty arises in reducing the amount of discnrd between the two when translating the cultural items of one culture into the patterns of the other. When two cultures are very different, however, additional complications are introduced. The patterns of the twro differing cultures may not be parallel and hence may lack analogous focal points.

Fortunately for the US military advisor, he is working in areas of activity for which his own culture offers clear parallels. In most military matters, the advisors activities can be considered as efforts to impose certain Weetern patterns of Organi

>

1

ADVISORS

zation and action upon a different culture environment. Quite often it may be possible for the advisor to translate US concepts into familiar terms dealing with generalized ideas or acts and thereby produce the desired results.

Some time ago in Laos, a US military advisor attempted to motivate Lao soldiers by describing the squad, platoon, and company in terms of the family. This officer apparently recognized that the Lao might not have a national identification, that he could not readily identify himself with the army, and that he might not be motivated by a spirit of competition. The officer took advantage of the Lao soldiers attachments to their own large and extended families to supply the motivation which, with the American, is usually derived from competition, personal rewards, and satisfactions. Basic Differences

In each cu Itu rsl pattern, experiences are organized by means of certain concepts. Western European and US cultures, for instance, employ a subject-predicate relationship, clearly separating the agent both from his actions and the context in which they occur. These cultural focal points allow for the development of separate abstractions such as the individual, his feelings, and various kinds of activities in which he may engage.

Practically speaking, in ~he case of the military profession, the American can readily separate tactical and logistical problems and consider each problem by itself. An even more fundamental distinction can be made between military and political or social problems in a war like that being fought in Vietnam.

The Chinese, however, do not have

clear parallels for such abstractions. They do not recognize the subject. predicate relationship, and do not clearly distinguish between the indi. vidual and his thoughte and feelings, the individual and h]s actions, and the context in which these occur. The Chinese mind is concrete and he is situation-centered to a degree unb~. lievable to the Westerner. He does not derive laws and principles that presumably govern events in the way that the Westerner does. In the writings of Mao Tse-tung we read that the laws of war are different according to the character of the war, its time, ita place, and the nation. Misunderstandings

Perhaps it is the Chinese trait of concrete thinking that induced one American writer to state that Maos:

. . . theory has universal applic~ bility only in its repeated warnings that everg situat{on must be consid. ered in the frame of its historic development and geographic setting.

Even though a word may be found to translate a concept from one cultural pattern to another, there is no assurance that an accurate and viable concept has been chosen in the second pattern that is equivalent to the original one. When two cultures are not parallel in their focal points, misunderstandings can occur and inaccuracies can be perpetrated by the application of familiar concepts in a foreign environment. Americans and other Westerners have taken political and social concepts such as nationalism, militarism, and the demo. cratic svstem of elections, which are native t; Western countries, and have attempted to apply them to the underdeveloped countries where they have different meanings.

The procees of translating these

wiitsry rwiw 8

ADVISORS

deas from one language to another s likely to fail of the desired intent. h an example, the Lao do not constitute a pOlitical entity in the sense hat the Americans or Frenchmen do. rheLao villager, who Identifies solely sith his family and village, does not mvethe sense of being a national of is country in the same way as the Americanor the Englishman.

In regard to militarism, an ot%cer 10a Middle Eastern country is likely :0 represent the conservative feudal demeritof the society with an outlook md manner of life typical of his class. Elsewhere, as in Brazil, the nditary officer often represents the liberalintellectual whose a&itude and position in his own society resemble that of militarists in other countries onlyin the uniform that others wear. Finally, an election in manY non\\~esterncultures is more like a festival and celebration than a political campaign. hriou~Obstacles

Cross-cultural incongruities present serious obstacles to the US advisor, becausehe may not have the principles and concepts readily available that ui]lhelp him understand his situation. tIe may become puzzled and confused ]f he does not recognize the cultural disparities; more likely, since his own cakural pattern provides him with possibleinterpretation?, he will derive erroneousconclusions about the mean. mg of the situation.

Advisors in Laos, when faced with tbetactics of their Lao eommanders whichthey call a game of tagsus-Pectedthe Lao officers of cowardice and, in some cases, of co]lusion with tbePa[//et .&so. They apparently were notaware that one pattern of warfare in that part of the world is, in the American view, a matter of bluster,

evasion, and tleception, and hence such tactics do not necessarily represent cowardice or collusion.

Although the misunderstandings that can occur are many and varied, the instructor in area training who prepares advisory personnel for overseas work does not face an impossible task in giving advice and training. Interviews with advisors who have been overseas serving in various countries show certain similarities in the problems and difficulties that they regularly meet. The US cultural pattern, shared by all US advisors, provides one constant factor among all the competition and friction that develop between the American and the foreign ways. And although the widely separated countries to which Americans are sent each possess unique characteristics, they often differ from the American or Western culture in the same directions.

The primary objectives of the area trainer should not be limited to coping with information about the many dilferent countries to which military personnel may be assigned. Rather, he should concentrate upon the development of concepts and principles that will help the student first to understand his own cultural pattern and then be able to translate it satisfactorily into the patterns of any country to which he may be assigned.

Sometimes the necessary interpretations can be carried out at a superficial level, but when the differences between the cultures are profound, the tactics of finding a common ground may be beyond the scope of commonsense concepts. It may require psychological or social analysis to discover the means for transforming the understanding of one cultural pattern into effective performance in another.

Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Waterhouse, United States Army, Refired

M UCH of the euphoria which ite successes have been only relative. surrounded the inaugural of Neither the United States, architect the Alliance for Progress in the sum- of the program, nor her beneficiaries mer of 1961 has dissipated. Although are satisfied with the accomplishments the first three years of the 10-yerw to date. All concerned are beginning economic blueprint for Latin America to appreciate that revolut ionsocial, has achieved a measure of progress, economic, or militaryrepresents no

MilitaryReVi! 10

GOOD NEIGHBORS

lore than an accelerated facet of evo]otion. In fact, revoluti~n of itself Oftenis regressive.

In terms of a homely analogy, the Alliancefor Progress may be likened IOa cart in danger of becoming stuck mthe mud. Tbe carts horses representan unworkable tandem of status quoand revolutionary zeal. The sticky amd is a Mend of compounds, some oldand some new. There is, for instance, the stultifying heritage of Spanishcolonialism; there is the more contemporary clamor of impoverished mdlions who seek a more equitable share in the patrimony of the 20th century. fioodNeighborliness

A number of willing volunteers are pushing the cart ahead elowly. They represent both forces of internal reformand external assistance, not the least of which among the latter are thepersonnel of the US Armed Forces assisting in civic action operations.

In essence, the Alliance for Progressrepresents a cont~mporary manifestation of what often has been characterized as the Good Neighbor Policy.Generally, this concept of hemispheric good neighborliness is identified with former President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Certainly, he ras nne of its most ardent exponents, and during his administration, as a

Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Waterhouse, United States Army, Retired, obtained an M. A. degree from the bniuersity of South Carolina subsequent to his retirement and is now tcith the cocoa Beach, FlO~ida, High School. He served in Japan as a mili. [!Z?Ygovernment oficer du~ing Worfd Ivar II, has held intelligence assigrarnents in the Far East Command and in Korea, and was Director of the Civil Affairs Combat Development &rencg at Fort Gordon.

Mmary1965

notable US uolicy. the Good Neighbor Policy took shape and marked ~ new departure in our foreign relations.

But neither the thought nor the terminology was original with President Franklin Roosevelt. Buena Vecindad (good neighborliness) was a common political cliche in the 19th century diplomatic correspondence of the Republics. Elihu Root possibly was the first North American to use the phras+he chose the words in 1907 to describe the attitude of the United States toward Santo Domingo. The late President Herbert Hoover during his goodwill tour in 1928 advocated the sentiment and employed the good neighbor expression in a number of his addresses. US Interest

The United States has maintained a friendly interest in the Latin-American Republics from the inception of their independence. True enough, there have been times when relationships have been strained over such matters as manifest destiny and dollar diplomacy. Neighborliness in spirit never is easy among disparate peoples.

Originally, mutual benefit gave rise to good neighborliness. The same mutual benefit motivated the Alliance for Progress:. Reciprocal interest continues to inspire cooperation and coordination among countries whose cultural and political heritages tend to separate. From its colonial beginnings the stamp of a predominantly Anglo-Saxon origin has shaped the North American way of life in spite of an amalgam of differing races and cultures. It was not strange that the political and economic intercourse of the United States found stronger gravitational pulls toward Europe than to the South where other new

11

MOD NEIGHBORS

nations with different roots were achievjrrg independence.

In a per[od when the politically stable United States was creating a cohesive and viable economic community, Latin America fragmented into a score of republics whose leaders engaged in chronic conflict for position.

Governments fell with alarming frequency and usually without benefit of franchise. Democratic constitutions were ignored or were rewritten. Political or trade agreements made with Latin-American administrations frequent~y were abrogated in the chaotic transition of authority. Rich natural resources were developed slowly, usuaIly with foreign capital and foreign enterprise. Since foreign investors

portunists alike took strong exception to the dichotomy between raw abun. dance, exploited by foreign cspita] and the domestic elite, and the desti. tution of the majority. They argued that natural wealth belonged to the nation and the betterment of all its people. Their arguments and their expropriations ran counter to equally logical rebuttai from risktakers. The capital and technical skills of the latter were invited to develop projects which countries either were unable or unwilling to undertake themselves, Entrepreneurs pa!d taxes and reh. tively good wages. They expected legal protection. Expropriation and pdit. ical instability y provoked intervention.

In 1903 the United States secured canal rights in Panama after inter

-.

,...-.. -- ~~==~~

Military civic action air ambulance operated by the Guatemala Air Force

emphasized the procurement of produce and raw materials which were complementary to their domestic economies and which promised a return upon investments, industrialization throughout Latin America lagged.

Dedicated patriots and political op

vening to prevent Colombia from put. ting down a Panamanian revolution. In 1906 US troops made the first of a series of Platt Amendment incursions into Cuba. In 1909 Mmines landed in Nicaragua to restore order: they returned in 1912, remained for

MilitaryReview 12

GOOONEIGHBORS

Hyears, and departed only to come I]ck again in 13 months. Between I$10and 1930 Marines occupied Honiwas On a number of occasions. In 1914 the United States seized

hracruz, and two years later, in 1916, GeneralJohn J. Pershing took a mili[aryforce hundreds of kilometers into !lexiw in search of Pancho Villa. In

concentric waves of anger and fear throughout South America. Thirty years after the last occupation troops had departed from Latin America the waves have subsided. The evidence of their erosion, however, is still plainly apparent.

In the early 1900s, US troops represented the element of force in inter-

US A{, l?.,,.

The beginning of the Santa Rosa Canal civic action project in Ecuador 1915the Marines went into Haiti, and In1916 they moved into the Domini!anRepublic. The Iast of the US occupational units left Latin-American ,nilwhen the Marines quit 1934.

Proximity probably was [actor behind the record cessionin the Caribbean

Haiti in

the major of inter-countries.

Yeverthe]e~s,US activities in the Carlhbean,arguments and counterargunentsover justification aside, set off

khuary1965

ventionism. Today, though, in one of those intriguing quirks of history, members of tbe US Armed Forces on Latin-American territory epitomize good neighborliness and constitute one of the strongest links in hemispheric solidarity. The neighborly in. vasion has come about gradnally.

Around the turn of the century the Latin-American armed forces began to professionalize, at first drawing almost exclusively upon Europe for ad

13

600D NEIGHBORS

visors to assist in revamping their organizations. World War I opened Latin Americas doors to a sizable number of US military representatives. Some of those repreeentatives, particularly navaI persmmel, stayed on after the war. Since the end of World War H, US military personnel have enjoyed a virtual monopoly in advisory functions. Today, US military advisory groups or missions, including 15 from the Army, operate in 17 of the 20 republics. In two of the three exceptions, Cuba and Haiti, their absence patently is poIiticaI.

The US military advieory organization in Latin America is numerically modest. From the first, advisors were utilized in conventional training capacities concerned with tactics, techniques, and uee of equipment, much of which is of US manufacture. Those functions still characterize advisory operations. Now, however, the emphasis is shifting etrongly toward considerations of economic uplift and social reform. Concurrently with tbe inauguration of the Alliance for Progress, the US Department of Defense began a comprehensive military civic action program in Latin America. Initially, the two assistance schemes were, perhaps, coincidental, but the fact that they had common objective quickly became obvioue. Civic Action

In point of fact, the first civic action projectso designatedactually predated the Alliance for Progress by a few months. The initial US Army civic action team went to Guatemala in November 1960, at a time when the concept of civic action generally was meeting somewhat grudging acceptance within the US Armed Forcee. Although earlier civic action operations in southeast Asia had met

with some success, a joint Department of Defense-State-InternationaI CoOp. eration Administration query in 1960 elicited only, two requests for civic action teams from Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs ) or missions. One of these had come from Guatemala. Experienced Leaders

Credit far the atlirmative response from Guatemala can be linked clearly with the personalities and past expe. riences of two menthe Guatemala President and the American Ambmsador. The then President, Miguel Ydigorae Fuentes, had been an army general. He also at one time bad been the Director General of Roads. over. all, his administration was marked by controversy beyond the scope of this article. It can be said, though, that he was depoeed in a bloodless coup in March 1963 and ~hat he was reform minded.

The US Ambassador at the time was John J. Muccio. He earlier had been the firet American representative to the Korean Government, a position he held at the time of the North Korean invasion. In Korea Mr. Muccio had been able to observe the good work of the Armed Forces Assistance in Korea program in assisting that war-ravaged country. Too, he had had an excellent opportunity to observe that troops could rebuild what they earlier had destroyed. The able Ambassador was not likely to overlook any preventive meaeures aimed at a POSSible Communist takeover in Guatemala, where in 1954 a Communist-controlled dictatorship had been overthrown.

Civic action caught on magically in Guatemala. A staff planning organi. zation wae set up on the national defense level. Troops built roads

MilitaryRavim 14

6(IODNEIGHBORS

bridges, and public buildings; they developed water syetems, undertook public health projecte, and operated adult education centers. Plane for the second year of operation envisaged an ambitioue development program for a virgin jungle area, a scheme vhich included exploiting timber and chicle resourcee and planting nut and citrus groves and cereal grain Bcreage for commercial production. Furthermore, Guatemala officere be

. . . the task of our armies is ex, tremely dij$icult. They have a greater political responsibility which YOU no longer can ig-nore, because there are conditions in some communities of our countries which, if they are not im. proved, will bring em to disaster. . . . If we wish to attack these miserable condition in the same wag we would attack a combat objective, we can make uee of the practical weapon of civic action to atta{n bread, literacg,

Pm Anwr,can L7n

6000 NEIGHBORS

t fair and cow~ansfntw weapon of military civic action.

.,.

Burst of Inter?st Guatemalas program stimulated a

burst of interest among other Latin-American Republics, especially in Central America. In 1962 the Central American countries formed their own civic action association. A year later, at a meeting of tbe association in El Salvador, representatives adopted a civic action seal which bore, besides Civic Action, the words Security and Progress and facsimile flags of member states.

At about the same time, military civic action became an important adjunct of US foreign policy in Latin America. The late President John F, Kennedy told Latin-American diplomatic representatives at a March 1961 meeting in the White House: The new generation of military leaders have shown an increasing awareness that armies cannot only defend their countriesthey can help build them.

Four months later his Army Chief of Staff, General George H. Decker, linked civic action directly with the Alliance for Progress in an address before the Inter-American Army Conference in Panama. General Decker noted the proud record of nationbnilding activities in which each army represented at the meeting had en. gaged. The same type of operations, he pointed otit, would contribute to national progress and serve to confound Communiet propaganda.

Tbe role the US Army was expected to take in motivating and underwriting national civic action programs was spelled out clearly at the annual meeting of the Aseociatirm of the US Army in October 1962. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Secre

16

tary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance, Chief of Staff General Earle G. Whee~ er, and most of the major Command. ers who attended the meeting indi. cated strongly that civic action could make a substantial contribution to. ward progrese in underdeveloped countries. Lieutenant General AndreIy P. OMeara, Cemmander in Chief, Ca~ibbean, tild strike a cautious note at the meeting with respect to ~on. gressional skepticism over the man. ner in which Latin-American ~rmie~ often become embroiled in politics. Nevertheless, he maintained that these same armies had the capab6ities to make the A1liance for Progress an effective program.

Joint Programing It was in a Latin-American courl

try, incidentally, where Department of Defense Military Assistance Pro. gram (MAP ) money and Agency fir International Development (AID) funds were used for the first time in support of common programs. ID January 1962 a US Army civic action team went to Ecuador. The five officers making up the team developed a comprehensive plan which the Ecus. doran Defense Minister liked but which he held his country could not afford. Secretary McNamara took personal action to see the plan implemented and authorized the expenditure of 1.5 million dollars in MAP funds. He also secured an additional half-million-dollar allocation from AID. The authority for joint programing of this nature had been incorporated in a National Security Memorandum promulgated by President Kennedy at the end of 1961.

US civic action operations in Latin America at first were mounted by teams recruited from the Army Civil Affairs School, the 95th Civil Affairs

.

MilitaryItwim

Group, and technical ~er~ce specialists generalIY. When six Reservg civil affairs units came on active duty in the summer Of 1961 as part of the Berlin crisis buildup, a rich new source Of personnel temporarily becameavailabIe. On a more sustaining basis, the 3d Civil Affairs Detachment, Army Forces Southern Command,was organized in April 1963 as partof the Armys counterinsurgency force. Projects

In the first year of its operations, the 3d engaged in civic action projectsin 11 of tbe Repnblica. Engineers, medical, and veterinary officers, agrooomiata,educators, economists, and expertsin various other socioeconomic spheresmade up the organization, fmd assignments generally consisted of team operations with team-member trength and skills and length of employment varying with the scope of the miksion.

Following the preeedent set in Ec,!ador,plans drawn up by the teams recenredfinancial support botb from AID and Department of Defense IMP funds. Furthermore, civic action specialists today augment a number of IIAAGs and missions to coordinate nith national army CounterParts in carrying out programed projects and to r$commend new ones.

Latin America is in a state of social and economic. ferment. Even though most of the military forces beganto avoid political meddling early ,n the century, they have not been able to stand entirely clear of the ttrf)ulece ae~ociated ~,ith the indu~rialand social revolution taking place m their countries. Urbanization, inkatrialization, soaring populations, mdthe emergence of a politically VOI-Me labor and middleclass group have

GOODNEIGNBORS

contrived to disturb the security of the traditional elite. Powerful new forces seek progress and change, but neither the old nor the new orders appear always to recognize the essen. tiality of political stability for programs of national advancement.

To a degree, Latin Americas military forces have always engaged in nationbuilding activities. In many respeets, their efforte have heen somewhat similar to activities undertaken by the US Army in pioneering the West. Now, new and challenging operational opportunities lie ahead for these military forces. There are virgin jungles to colonize and rich natnral resources to develop. There are communication and transportation networks to build. Most important of all, there are people to educatein baeic literacy, in tbe skills of modern technology, and in the attitudes of change. Special Assets

These tasks by no means represent the primary military responsibility. 13ut military forces can complement civilian efforts with some undeniable special aesets. They possess leadership, techniques of management, disciplined manpower, and technical skills. They can operate in primitive environments, and they can impose order where unrest threatens.

Unquestionably, military operations in constructive fields can be broadened and facilitated. US advisory personnel have assisted considerably in recent years; these advisors could make an even greater contribution. More than good neighborliness, important as that may be, suggests they should. The United States and the rest of the Free World retain a vested interest in a politically stable Latin America. Frustration, hardships, and uncertainties spawned by

17

6000 tiElGH60Rs

provide a milieu the Communists. a Communist re.

Latin-American poiitical and se-

poverty and disorder which benefits only

The imposition of gime in any of the States poses distinct curity hazards for the United States as well as the other Republics. Intervention at best would create an unpopular image of Yangrd imperialism; at worst it could Iead to escalating Communist pressures elsewhere. On the other hand, Communist basee in Latin America, such as in Cuba, ex. port hate and subversion. Their con

.

tinued existence threatens neighbors, the security of the Panama Canal, a~ sources of strategic materials vita] tO the United States. Prevention offers the surest means of solving this prob. lem, and one of the better preventives is military civic action as a contribu. tion to nationbuilding.

Good neighbors in uniform can go a long way toward contributing to some of the as yet unfilled objectives of the Alliance for Progress. They may well shove the cart out of the slough which restrains its progress,

There is no quick, easy, cheap way to success. The road is long and our task will require courage, steady nerves, and sacrifice by all the peoples of the hemisphere.

Assistant Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann (Inter-A mericarr Affairs)\

18

; PetroleumY 1-. .} nist {no:f,/ ,

PETROLEUM and its products are today not only the foundation ~ modern industry and, hence, of a regressive economy, but also of the nilitm-ymight of nations. The Comnmist countries interest ip economic rowth is matched only by their preoccupationwith military strength. In ecent years, they have put mnch tress on the rapid expansion of indignous petroleum production, domestic .Mning,and the rapid transportation ,fcrude oil hy underground pipelines Yomthe producing to the deficiency Ireas and to strategic ports within he Communist world. Communist China, who arrived Iate

m the scene of Communist economic construction, was quick to recognize [he tremendous importance of the Petroleum industry and of the ~Pparently limitless possibilities of

Muary1965

Prybyla

( .-

,

.,

fered by her vast, untapped petroleum potential.* As early as 1953 probable crude oil reserves within. the boundaries of Mainland China were put at approximately 20 billion barrels, while ultimate reserves were considered to have been virtually unlimited. Although in the absence of thorough geological surveye these estimates were no more than rough guesses, they did indicate the order nf magnitude of the vast Chinese petroleum potential.

Chinas seven main sedimentary basins favorable for oil have an area of over 2.3 million square kilometers. The largest of thew+--the Tarim and Dzungarian Basins in the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Regionare located far from the populous coastal

The kvm Chh. 3, used th mwhout the remainder of this article to refer to Communist chum-the Peoples Republic of Chins.

19

PETROLEUM .

areas, near the Soviet and Outer Mongolian borders. Lands in these basins lack water, suffer from periodic sandstorms, and are even today accessible only with great difficulty, considering the backward state of Chinas roads and rail communications. The unfavorable natural and capital factors, rather than any lack of drive or ambition, have so far been responsible for tbe relatively slow pace of development in these and other remote petroleum-bearing rsgions and for Chinas continued heavy reliance on coal as the source of primary energy. Production and Exploration

Even so, the Chinese record in petroleum production and exploration since 1950 has been far from negligible. In 1950 there were only 17 exploratory parties in the field; seven years later 246 parties were reported. In the course of the First Five-Year PIan (1953-57), the Chinese claimed to have explored about 290,000 square kilometers of territory and to have located 11 crude oil deposits. After 1957 statistics on exploration and footage drilled became ecarce and increasingly unreliable, and it would appear that the pace and scope of exploration were stepped up during the Second Five-Year Plan and the Great Leap Forward (1958-62).

It was during this latter period that the moqt important discovery in Chinas petroleum history was made

Jan S. Prybyla is Associate Pvafessor of Economics at the Pennsylvania State University. He has carried out extensive research on Communist bloc oil resources and has published numerous studies on the economics of communism. For I?ve years, Dr. Pr#byla was associated with the Free Europe University in Exile in France.

20

in Szechwan in a 480-Kilometer radius around the city of Nanchung. Wkh Soviet help, modern electric and radio. active well-logging methods were introduced on a fairly large scale in the midfifties. BY the early sixties, the Chinese claimed a total of 32 crude oil depositsmost of which had been located after 1957.

This exploratory activity has resulted in an increase in total crude oil production and a rise in the propor. tion of natural crude oil in the totai, From 200,000 metric tons in 1950, output climbed to about 5.3 million tons in 1961, and was expected to reach nearly 12 million tons in 1965, The proportion of synthetic oil in the total, which was about 55 percent in 1952, declined to less than 35 percent in 1958, and this trend has almost certainly continued since.

Thermal refining of oil shale and, to a much lesser extent, coal are the two sources of Chinas synthetic crude oil. This activity centers on Manchuria, especially at the Fushun plant and at a newer installation in the Kwantung Province of southern China. Increase in Oemand

One of the immediately trouble. some effects of Chinas Great Leap Forward was the sharp increase in the demand for petroleum. On the eve of the leap, in 1957, annual petro. Ieum consumption was just over tbre? million metric tons; it rose to about eight million tons in 1960. Sine! domestic output in 1960 was only fiv~ million tonsin spite, and, in part because of the installation of score: of small, inefficient, backyard syn thetic petroleum plantsthe thre( million tons annual deficit had to b( met from imports at tbe tires thal relations with the main supplier, th~

Militsry,Reci!~

i-PETROLEUM

Soviet Union, were at an unprecedented IOW. Moreover, Chinas refining capacitymost of it installed with Soviet material and technical ai# was capable of handling only the domestic output, leaving a net import requirement for producte+specially gasolin~f approximately three million tons annually.

Given Chinas steel production levels and, as yet, still modest technological know-how, this import dependence was likely to increase in the foreseeable future on the assumption that the amhftioue Chinese industrial and military buildup plane were realistic. If, in their dispute with the Chinese, the Soviets could have prevented their adversary from securing new sources of refined petroleum through diplomatic overtures and trade offers they would have had in their hands a political card more convmemg and infinitely more reliable thamthe shaky Khrushchevian version of tbe doctrine according to Marx. The Chinese leadership was not slow in perceiving this danger, aid much of the history of Chinese diplomacy since 1960 is witness to Pekings determination to outmaneuver the strnngest of Soviet movesthe ever-present threat of petroleum blackmail. Although the facts of the case are not quite clear, tbe Soviets did reportedly suspend deliveries of gasoline and jet fuel to China during the Sine-Indian border conflict. UnrelatedEvents

Fortunately for the Chinese, the impact of the rapid decline in Soviet sales of gasoline and other products to China after 1960 and the effects of the brusque withdrawal of Soviet technical advisors from China in mid1960were cushioned by two unrelated events: the loosening of discipline

kbmary1965

within the Soviet bloc and the discord in the Western alliance. Rebel Albania, while willing to come to the aid of her Chinese protector, was not of much help because of the relatively low grade of her petroleum and a limited refining capacity which was desperately short of Soviet-made spare parts. Tbe Albanians did, however, send quantities of dense, asphalt-based crude and some residual fuel oil, but the transactions were mainly political and symbolic in nature and exerted a strain on Chinas modest oceangoing tanker fleet.

Romanias Role The role of Romania was and con

tinues to he much more curious. For some years the Romanians have been chafing under the constraints imposed upon them by the Soviet-sponsored .. Council of Mutual Economic Aid ( COMECON ) and have eyed with suspicion and resentment Soviet incursions, via the friendship pipeline, into Rbmanias petroleum markets in Eastern Europe. At the ti:ne that Sine-Soviet trade pIummeted to virtually rockbottom, the Romanians were signing trade and payments protocols with China that envisaged (for 1963) increases in trade of up to 10 percent over tbe previous year. In November 196S the Romanians sent a trade delegation to Peking as a followup on the agreement eigned earlier in the year. The delegation included a number of oil. experts whoee task apparently wae to supervise those sections of tbe agreement relating to Romanian sales of petroleum products and refinery equipment.

The Hungarians, too, have not been idle. In March 1964 they concluded a trade agreement with Peking which, among other things, envisaged Hungarian exporte to China of steel tubes,

21

PETROLEUM

diesel locomotives, and machinery accessoriesall. important items for Chinas badly pressed refining and petroleum transportation industries. In the meantime, Sine-Soviet trade talks for 1964 were, according to all indications, hopeIesely bogged down.

Chinae main hope of eecaping the Soviet petroleum grip lice, however, in another direction. Shortly after Premier Chou En-laia African safari, a delegation of Chinese oil experte visited the AIgerian capital. Their purpose was allegedly to secure four million tons of Saharan oil annually a plan made realiatic by Algerias cordial relations with Peking, the establishment of diplomatic representation in France (which could facilitate triangular payments arrangements ), and, over the long run, the withdrawal of French companies from their Saharan concessions. A Chinese petroleum and natural gas production and treatment delegation spent four weeks in France early in 1964 negotia

ting bids for the construction of ~ three-million-tons-per-year refinery in China by a consortium of French companies led by the Compagnie Frar@se dEtudes et de Constrwc. tiorz. The delegation subsequently visited England.

It is clear that, over tbe long stretch, production and refining equip. ment and know-how, rather than oil imports, are the answer to Chinas petroleum problem. Imports of oil refinery process pumps of various types from England, piping for oil and natural gas pipelines and anto. mation equipment from France, and contracts for the constriction of a five. million-dollar refinery in Manchuria by an Italian enterprise all point to the fact that the Chinese leadership has fully understood this trend. They also indicate that the leaders look beyond the present products shortage problem to the time when China may interest Japan and other oil deJficit countries with offers of surplus products.

MilitaryIlevien 22

RED CHINAS MILITARY

DOCTRINE

fthmary1965

Alice Langley Hsieh

T HE image of a reckless, bellicose Communist China which emerged during the Sine-Soviet dispute contrasts neatly in Soviet propaganda with the portrait of a Soviet Union dedicated to peace. Chinas military policies, however, have been very cautious and reflect a realistic assessment of the military situation and a careful calculation of risks.

Since 1953 Chinese doctrine has been influenced by Soviet doctrine on modern warfare and by difficulties

23

MILITARYDOCTRiNE

engendered by the dispute between Peking and Meacow. The doctrine has also been influenced by military thinking in the United States, and it has been stimulated by the deployment of US forces in the western Pacific and hy the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. It reflects Pekings military weakness and the economic underdevelopment of the mainland.

Evidence that the Chinese recognize the key military implications of nuclear weapons is provided in the 29 issues of the secret Krmg-tso Tunghsurr (Bulletin of Activities) of the General Political Department of the Peoples Liberation Army. These BrrUetirrs were recently released by the US Government and cover the months January into August 1961.

The material in these issues produces UOsensational or dramatic revelations about Chineee military doctrine or strategy which were not

This article was digested from the original, publckhed in THE CHINA QUARTERLY(Great Britain) April-June 1964, under the title, Chinas Secret Military Papers: Military Doctrine and Strategy.

The autkor is a staff member of the Social Science Depai_tment of the RAND Corporation, s?Jecializing in Chinas external political and military yroticies. Her article, Red China and Nuclear War, appeared in the February 1961 issue of the fvflL-ITARYREVIEW.

Sketch of Marshal Yeh Chierrping is from the authors book, Communist Chinas Strategy in the Nuclear Era. @ 1962. Reywoduced by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Engfewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

previously available to the careful 9 reader of Chinese military literature. It does, however, offer a few new ; insights into the thinking of Chinas t military leaders. It also establishes a 1 nseful yardstick for future developments in doctrine, particularly as ( China progressively moves toward the 11 acquisition of a nuclear delivery capa.

Y bility. o

Chinese military doctrine, as a revealed in the 1961 issues of the m Bulletin, takes into account several ar types of war: surprise strategic air attack with nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland; invasion of the mainland by ground forces armed with conventional weapons; chemical or bacteriological warfare, both strategic and tactical; and lower level conflicts such as local wars in contig. uous areas.

Outbreak of War A[though the Chinese

to regard war as very apparently believe that,

do not sesm likely, they

if war should occur, it might well take the form of a surprise nuclear attack against the mainland. Chinese officers, like most military men, place a high valne on the element of surprise and expect an enemy to do the same.

1Chinas military leaders appear to 11be particularly aware of the danger

of surprise attack. They propose to meet this danger by the improvement of their air defenses and by tbe dispersal, hardening, and camouflage of military installations and military industrial sites.

They expect a surprise attack to take the form of a bolt from the blue. There are no references to strategic warning or to the possibility of a surprise attack developing from a crisis situation. There is a suggestion, however, that they recognize tbe POs

MilitaryRwim

MILITARYDOCTRINE

sibility that limited politico-military activities or a 10caI conflict may esca-Me into a larger war, particularly if the United States chose to intervene. TIMImage of Future Wars

In a speech to a Military Affairs Committee conference on training in lateJanuary 1961, Marshal Yeh Chien. ying, the leading military spokesman of the party, admitted, in effect, that a strategic air attack could be enormously destructive to urban, military, and economic targets. The significanceof the initial phase of the war was likewise recognized by Yang Cheng-wuwhen, in discussing vulnerabilities in command control, he pointed out that the effectiveness of our defense against a surprise enemy attack is the key to how effective we mll be in the next phase.

Yet Chinese mi~itary doctrine also presupposes the possibility of a protracted war on Chinas soil, requiring large+conventional ground forces. It insists that nuclear weapons cannot be the means of achieving victory against a country with a large territory and population. Victory is said to require an army, regular weapons, andoccupation. It is further asserted that the United States must rely on nuclear weapons rather than manpower to win a victory over China and the Soviet Union. But, because nuclear weapons alone cannot defeat China, the United States must contemplate the use ofbiological warfare.

In brief, the Chinese envisage a protracted war, in which the enemys position is weakened by time and space, but tacitly recognize that this strategy is vulnerable to chemical and bacteriological weapons.

It is likely that Chinese concern shout the possibility of chemical and bacteriological war stems from their

belief that Chinaa advantages in manpower and territory impose important obstacles to any invaaion attempt based on the use of nuclear or conventional weapons. That this fear is real is evidenced by training programs which mention the use of chemical and bacterial weapons, but emphasize training in defense against these weapons. Chinese Capabilities

& to the position of the Chinese in the event of war, Marshal Yeh readily admitted that:

In accordance with our situation, if there is a war within three to jive years, we will have to rel~ on hand weapons. . . . The enem~ is stronger than we are in a distant war, bnt short distance fighting, and especially jace to face fighting, is where our strength lies. We have to avoid the strengths and take advantage of the weaknesses of our enemy. In face to face fighfing fhere can only be used hand grenades, bayonets, or jlarnethrowers. We havq to use close fighting, nigh f fighting, or trench warfare todefeaf fhe enemy. . . .

In the eventof war wifhin fhe next few ~ears zce can defeat the enemy by using close combat although we have no special xeapons.

Although Yeh insisted that China needed to walk on two legs, his statement may well have reflected a rough estimate of the time within which the Chinese expected to detonate a nuclear device and, perhaps, acquire a few nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the Chinese had little alternative but to emphasize the role of their conventional forces, particularly their ground forcee, in frustrating an enemy invaeion ar in defeating the enemy in limited war.

Yeh also admitted Chinas lack of

1Mmary1965 25

MILITARYDOCTRINE

nuclear weapons and the superiority of the United States in advanced weapons and in distant war, In April 1961 he emphasized the need to understand our own situation as well as our enemys and insisted on the need to take measures to survive nuclear attack. This underlined the continuing weakness of Chinas armed forces, the caution that dominated her military policies, and her intention to avoid a direct confrontation with US forces.

Such statements do not suggest that the Chinese are likely to become reck. less or lack caution as they progressively move toward the acquisition of a nuclear delivery capability. Self-preservation is likely to remain an important element in Chinas calculations. The Chinese have no illusions

Marshal Yeh Chien-ying

about the mere acquisition of nuclear weapons ipso facto providing them with a military status equal to that of the United States or, for that matter, the Soviet Uniom

The Brdletslw make no reference to high-yield nuclear weapons although they do refer to tactical nuclear weapons. Training directives emphasize the use of advanced weapons and defense against such weapons. Defense

training against nuclear, chemical, and bacterial weapons was to be uni. co

versally given and was stated to be Gthe key task for units below battalion level. Units above the regimental level Ml were being instructed not only in defense, but also in the use of nuclear po and chemical weapons, and even in es methods of exploiting the results of no Chinese-initiated surprise attacks th with nuclear and chemical weapons. of

Consequently, it must be assumed T] that the Chinese are already consid. of

SCering the battlefield use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese may view the ty

haequipping of their ground forces with thtactical nuclear weapons as one way

of deterring US intervention in local re poconflicts or of keeping US intervention

at a nonnuclear level, thus compelling eq the United Statss to fight at the conventional level to Pekings advantage, \vl

gtLack of Soviet Support m

By 1961 Chines@ military doctrine th reflected the deterioration in Sino

m Soviet relations and the Soviet Unions al refusal to use her nuclear deterrent T)in support of Chinas objectives in

m Asia.

w The general tenor of the Brdletim ar

strongly suggests Chinas acceptance to of a policy of self-reliance or of going it alone. By early 1961 it appears nt that the Chinese did not expect much In Soviet assistance in modernizing ti Chinas armed forces or Soviet mili- at tary backing for Chinas foreign e)policy. P:

In any event, Chinas military cau- 9( tion has been and remains partly a in function of her military dependence 01 on the Soviet Union. So long as , ir Chinas military power falls short of tl that Of the United States, China will remain dependent on Moscow in any Oj military acVIonwhere US interests are ml involved. Hence, for a &ng time to f(

MilitaryReiiew II 26

MILITARYDOCTRINE

come,Soviet heh or lack thereof, will remain an essential component in Chinese doctrine and risk calculation. ModernTechnolow

In the lruUati?w, too, the Chinese pointed out that they had adequately estimated the ability of modern technology to influence battles and war, that they had aeeessed the influence of nuclear bombs and guided missiles. They admitted that the development of modern techniques of military science and the appearance of new types of weapons would undoubtedly have great effects on warfare. But they concluded that war is finally resolved by human beings and their political system, not by techniques or equipment.

This reiteration of the man-overweapons theme, however, cannot disguise Chinese recognition of the Importance of nuclear weapons. Until the Chinese can effectively deliver nucle+r weapons, they have little alternative but to repeat this formula. Thereiteration of the theme bolsters internal morale, eerves to reinforce party leadership over the military, and rationalizes the emphasis given toground operations.

The Chinese acknowledge the vulnerability of their military targets, industrial complexes, and communicationscenters to destruction by nuclear attack. Like the Soviets, they do not expect a purely counterforce campaign. They are, therefore, making someattempt to locate military and industrial sites at some distance from other vulnerable targets and are tak

, mg measures to harden and camouflagethese facilities.

Chinese recognition of the danger of sudden nuclear attack is also reflectedin their concern over air de. fense vulnerabilities. Specific vulner

abilities include delays in the construction of airfields deeper in the interior, shortages of equipment and fuel, poor aircraft maintenance, numerous accidents, radar shortcomings, weaknesses in defense against low-altitude attack, and lack of intelligence about the enemy.

Training directives of the air force in 1961 emphasized the need to correct these deficiencies and, in particular, to strengthen defenses against low-altitude attack. Training was to be intensified. Radar units were require~ to improve their low-level scanning. Antiaircraft units were instructed to improve their low-altitude firing to force enemy aircraft up to a medium altitude.

Similar concern was reflected in the continual criticism of communication units. Tbe point was made time and again that, under tbe conditions exi@ing in 1961, the communications system was unlikely to survive a surprise enemy attack and that, once communications were paralyzed, commands would be paralyzed. The Role of the Air Force

Chinese military doctrine assigns to the air force the chief role in resisting tbe enemy and in protecting essential targets. As in the Soviet Union, air force training directives emphasize mobility to cope with any surprise attack. However, it is surprising that training in this area commenced as late as 1960.

Certain nonoperational units of the air force were subjected to a 50-percent selective reduction in 1958, while a 10 to 20-percent reduction in some staffs and units was to take place in 1961. The 1958 reduction, limited largely to staff and administrative functions, may simply have been an attempt to reduce unneces

1Mary 1965 27

MILITARY DOCTRINE

sary o,verhearb+ The 1961 retrenchment, which may have included both operational and nonoperational units, can be explained by the cutoff in Soviet deliveries of aircraft in 1959; by , the attrition of operational aircraft in the Communist Chinese Air Force; by the deteriorating economic situation, including setbacks in national defense production; and by tbe need to economize wherever possible.

Developments in the air force shouId be viewed in the Iigbt of Nikita Khrushchevs remark to W. Averell Harriman on 23 June 1959 that the USSR had sh]pped numerous rockets to China. Other reports that Moscow has supplied Peking with short-range missiles and that the Chinese are testing missiles over ranges of 800 to 1,100 kilometers should ak,o be considered.

The evidence suggests that at some point in 1958-59 the Chinese may have decided to give priority to tbe development of a missile capability and to downgrade the development of an advanced aircraft delivery capability. The Role of Ground Forces

The Chineee recognized that their armed forces lacked advanced weapons and were technologically inferior to US forces; hence, they emphasized their considerable experience in ground combat, a form of warfare in which they felt they excelled and in which they possessed an advantage over the enemy. Chinas ally, the Soviet Union. had been rehwtantto pro. vide the Chinese with the type and amount of military assistance and support the Chinese felt they needed. In advanced weapons, in so-called distant war, the United States admittedly possessed superiority, go the Chinese prepared to do the best with what they had.

CW:nas military leaders clearly con. sider the capability for ground combat as a deterrent to invasion, but they recognize important limits to the of. fensive nse of ground forces. They probably do not see these forces ss enabling them to engage in prolonged high-level actions that would requir? extensive logistic support. They can no longer count on the type of logietic support which the Soviet Union msde available to them during the Korean War. Indeed, cutbacks in industrial production, including that for national defense, curtailment of deliveries of equipment from the Soviet Union, and shortages in fuel oil had by mid-1961 seriously handicapped the development of Chinas ground forces. Limitations

While it may be assumed that the situation has improved somewhat since June 1961, there probably still remain, in addition to the lack of ef. fective tactical air support, important materiel restraints on the use of Chinas ground capability for any prolonged and large-scale operations, Chinas ground strength ia probably viewed as a dual politico-military instrument which enables the Chinese, within limits, to pursue a go-it-alone policy and to make certain gains without Soviet support. More specifically, in view of Chinas long-range objectives in Asia, her ground capability may be viewed as permitting the Chinese to seek gains by way of political, covert, and low-level military activities in contiguous areas.

While more a question of foreign policy than of military strategy, the Chinese regard Mao Tse-tungs military thinking and their experience in close combat and night fighting as a model for national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin

MilitaryReview 28

MILITARY DOCTRINE

merica. According to Yeh Chien,ng, the Chinese were compiling reg. Iations and Ordinanees based on their istorical experience not only for lemselves, but also for the benefit of ther nations still fighting for national bsration. There is implicit in Chinese mili

$ry statements contained in the Bul,ttrz-contrary to what Peking has iid publiclya recognition and conernthat local conflicts or more limited wms of politico-military activity light escalate to a higher level of viomce, even to the nuclear level, if the hited States chose to intervene. consequently, an important consideration in Chinese military thinking uwt be the question of how to pre,ent escalation, especially in viqw of he Soviet Unione reluctance to use Ier nuclear deterrent to back Chinas

intervention by the United States. The Chinese may beIieve that, even

when they have a number of nuclear weapons, it may be best to limit conflict to the conventional level in order to inhibit use of nuclear weapons by the United States. While it is possible that the Chinese intend to equip their ground forces with tactical nuclear weapons for operations in contiguous areas, the over-all tone of the 1961 Bulletins gives the impression that conventional weapons will remain an integral part of the equipment of Chinas armed forces for a long time to come.

The Chinese may calculate that, when Chinese forces possess tactical nuclear weapons, the United States will be less likely to intervene in local crisis situations or to raise intervention to a nuclear level. Peking may

~bineseCmrrmunist leaders have said they wiIl rely on close combat during the next few years

forsign policy. AS long as they lack believe that in thie way the United sufficient nuclear weapons, the Chi- States may be compelled to accept the oese can only hope to avoid the level of violence chosen by China. strengths of the enemy, to limit In brief, the Chinese may hope that conflictto low levels of violence, and the acquisition of tactical nuclear thereby to reduce the likelihood of weapone will enhance their advantage large-scale conventional or nuclear in tlie area of conventional ground

Mruary1965 29

MILITARY DOCTRINE

forces and, at the same time, reduce the risk of, e$crdation to the nuclear level. This strategy, however, would confront the Chinese with the very problems of maintaining a conventional-nuclear force that are currently plaguing other conntries.

Pragmatic rather than theoretical considerations dominate Chinas military thinking. Chinese military doctrine, aa reflected in the Brdletins, is based on four impressively realistic assessments:

Chinas military capabilities and vulnerabilities.

US military capabilities and strengths.

. The extent of the assistance and support that China can expect from the Soviet Union.

The opportunities for exploiting Chinas limited military powe,r.

The evaluation of the military situation that emerges underlines the captiousness with which Chinas military Ieadere calculate the risks of various military operations and emphasizes the responsiveness of Chineee doctrine to both internal and external conditions.

The Chinese evaluation of their limitations and opportunities in 1961 aPPears tO have been formulated for a reasonably long period that would extend to a time when China begins to poesess a nuclear capability of her own.

From the Chinese doctrinal emphasis on self-preservation and the care. ful calculation of risk, it can be inferred that, even when she has nuclear weapons of her own, China is likely to be cantious in their use, or to attempt to manipulate the situation so as to inhibit the nse or effective counternse of such weapona by the United States. Indications that the Chinese may be planning to equip their ground forces with tactical nuclear weapons for operations in contiguous ai-eas suggest that Peking may expect the United States to re. frain from intervention against China or to keep her intervention at a non. nuclear level.

Chinaa leaders are apparently aware that opportunities exist where. by China may be able to make gains throngh a cautioua but astute uae of her evolving military power.

30

thuafy1965

NORTH VIETNAM AND THE

SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

King Chen

N IKITA Khrushchev, the target of much virulent, personal criticism from Communist China, has been removed from power in the Soviet Union. Whether the new leaders in the Kremlin will now be able to achieve a genuine rapprochement with Peking, which has already detonated its first nuclear device, remains to be seen.

For the leaders of North Vietnam, this is a crucial question. They have for several years been caught in the middle of the conflict between Peking and Moscow, and, although they have sided with Communist Chha, the evidence indicates that North Vietnam strongly desires to remain on good terms with both.

In the development of the dispute from 1956 to 1961, North Vietnam maintained a neutral position. She issued no statement on de-Stalin

31

PTHEDISPUTE

ization, welcomed Khrushchevs peace policy toward. the West in 1959-60, supported the 1960 Moscow Declaration, secured economic aid for her First Five-Year Plan (1961-65) from both Peking and Moscow in 1961, and kept silent on the Albanian issue at the 22d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The dispute did not grow into an open rift until after the Soviet 22d Congress, and North Vietnam did not become seriously involved until early 1962. ~

After the close of the congress in Moscow, Ho Chi-minh returned to Hanoi via Peking. In the Chinese capital, he held a cordial talk with Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, and Teng Hsiao-ping. There can be little doubt that the dispute was the central topic of conversation since all top Chinese leaders participated. Apparently, Ho sought to probe Pekings position on all issues as a preparation for his planned mediation. Meeting Proposed

In January 1962 the party sent letters to a number of Communist Parties proposing that a meeting be held between representatives of Communist and Workers Parties t~ settle the discord together, and that, pending such meeting, the parties cease

Th{s article was digested from the original, published in ASIAN SURVEY,September 196.4, under the t{tle, North Vietnam in the Sine-Soviet Dispute, 1962-64. ASIAN SURVEYis published monthly brj the Institute of International Studies, flniversit~ of California.

The author is Associate Professor of Political Science at the State University C0U0r7e, Oswego, New York.

attacking one another in the press and :1 over the radio. s

Hanois efforts won snpport from J]several of these parties. In March the Vietnam Dang Lao Dong Party snd [cfour other parties organized them. Ir selves as a neutral group which h proposed to hold an international Camnmnist meeting to settle the differ

1 ences. The Chinese Communists ac > cepted this proposal and sent a letter 0 to the Central Committee of the CPSU [suggesting the convention of all corn. (munist Parties to eliminate the differ. r ences and strengthen Socialist unity. e

The situation over the spring and f summer, as the Vietnam Dang Lao Dong Party said, was somewhat im- 1 proved. It was merely a hdI, however. When Sine-Indian horder fightins 1 flared up in September and the CU-ban crisis broke out in October, new arguments between Moscow and Pe- 1 king destroyed the weak foundation for a Sine-Soviet reconciliation that 1 HO Chi-minh and others had endesv. ored to build. Skro-lrrdian Border Corrf6ct

The fighting on the Sine-Indian border in October-November 1962 greatly complicated Communist bloc relations. Nehru asked arms from the United States and Great Britain, and announced his hope of securing So. viet jet fighter planes. The Soviet Union initially pressed India to accept Chinese proposals for negotiations, but, when Nehru rejected these, the Soviets retreated to the neutrality which they had previously maintained.

Meanwhile, Hanoi shifted from a friendly to a critical attitude toward India. Nhan Dan (The People), organ of the Dang Lao Dong FartY, condemned tbe Indian expansionist gronp for openly colluding with British and American imperial@ts against

MilitaryRevi!w 32

THE DISPUTE

Chinese border guards. It avoided, however, any mention of the Soviet Union.

When the Chinese suddenly announced a unilateral cease-fire and proposedconciliation on 21 November, the Hanoi regime immediately issued a statement strongly supporting the Chinese proposal and urging India to make a positive response. To reinforce his government% etatement, Ho Chi-minh sent personal letters to both the Chinese and Indian leaders on 24 November urging a peaceful settlement of the border issue. He reaffirmed his stand when Preeident Antonin Novotny of Czechoslovakia mited Hanoi in January 1963 and President Liu Shao-chi of China came m May.

Bitter arguments over the b~rder Issue between Peking and Moscow didnot begin until after August 1963 when Peking openly accused tbe So!iet~ion of collaboration with the United States and India against China, and charged that this constituted a betrayal of proletarian internationalism. Moscow retorted that Chinasattack on India without hav]ngconsulted the Soviet Union was a violationof a SinO-SOviet treaty prOmion calling for consultation on important international matters affectingeach sides interests. Furthermore, China had barred accord with India byher chauvinistic behavior,

: Avoidinginvolvement 1 Hanoi tried its best to avoid be

cominginvolved in these mutual accu-J Wions but continued to support China i against India.

The implications of Hanois positionseem clear. Ihe North Trietnam

t &sedisapproved of Soviet military aid 10India, but hey could not afford to

t !riticize the SO iet Union. Indias mil

\V hbruary1965

itary buildup for the border conflict with the help of the United States and others was inexctjsable-an entirely different matter than the Indian military action against the Portuguese imperialists over Goa which Hanoi had applauded. Chinas measures in November 1962 for a settlement were reasonable although the North Vietnamese never praised the Chinese military advance.

While supporting China, Ho Chiminh continued to communicate with Nehru, making every effort to urge a peacefui settlement. When personal friendship clashed with Communist alIiance, however, Hos Marxism tri-

When the United Statas acted to keepSoviet ships from delivering offensive wearmns to Cuba, North Vietqarn strongly

supported Cubas posltmn umphed easily. And when his two Communist allies came in conflict over this issue, Ho sought to maintain his fraternal ties with both but edged closer to China because of North Vietnams own national interests.

North Vietnam strongly supported Castros regime prior to the rise of the Cuban crisis in October 1962. After the United States ordered a blockade of Cuba, China made the Cuban issue a paramount one, striking out against the American paper tiger and urging full support for the Castro government.

33

THE DISPUTE .

North Vi@nam, in a different fashion, also gave ardent support to Cuba and, in addition, warmly endorsed the Soviet 23 October statement that accused the United States of committing piratical and provocative acts which might lead to thermonuclear war. The Soviet position was described as a correct and firm stand against American imperialism.

On 28 October Khrushchev agreed to the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, and China immediately turned against the Soviets. The Chinese ridiculed the Soviet thesis that world peace has been saved and criticized the Soviet Union for having bowed to the United States when the latter was actually stepping up her military preparations for a Cuban invasion.

Although publicly endorsing Soviet policies, Hanois warning of American imperialist schemes and its insistence upon the importance of being firm indicated that North Vietnam did not entirely approve of Khrushchevs Cuban poIicy. In truth, the decisive factor affecting Hanois attitude was neither the Soviet Union nor China, but Cuba and particularly the United States. Havana and Hanoi were struggling against a common enemy. Hanoi not only wanted Havana to stand firm, but it was vital that Havana win a victory over Washington.

Urgs for Ideological Meetings At this point, the struggle between

.Moscow and Peking for the support of North Vietnam sharpened. In addition to the economic aid offered by the two disputants, military, party, and political delegations from both sides proceeded to Hanoi.

On the Vietnamese side, the interest in Socialist unity remained un

changed. Ho Chi-minh pledged that his party would make active coatri. butions to the cause of Socialist SOL clarity on the basis of the two Moscow statements. 1ss February 1963 he proposed that the Communist Parties cease their public attacks on each other and that the Soviets and Chinese arrange a meeting of all Corn. munist Parties to settle differences

In response to this proposal, the Chinese invited Khrushchev to visit Peking for talks. After thr?e weeks of deliberation, the Soviets euggested, instead, that Mao Tse-tung visit Moscow for a meeting on 15 May. FIw weeks later (on 9 May) the Chinese agreed to the Soviet proposal in principle, asking for a postponement until mid-June. Teng Hsiao-ping was cho. sen to iead the Chinese delegation.

Socialist Unity Ho stressed the importance of SO.

cialist unity when Liu Shao-chi visited Hanoi in mid-May. He said that the unity of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and China was the pillar of the unity of the Social. ist camp. He also said that it was necessary to call a meeting, fOllO~. ing the mid-June conference in Mos. cow, of the Communist and Work. ers Pariies of the whole world in order to eliminate the differences and strengthen unity through inte~ national consultations. Ho was appar. ently anxious to convene a meeting of world Communist Parties at which he might expect to play an active role as mediator.

Although the Sine-Soviet confer. ence finally took place onin MOSCOW4 July, mutual accusations continued unabated during the meetings, The talks ended on 20 July with a corn munique giving no information about the outcome, but indicating only that

34 .

THE DISPUTE

t complete deadlock had ensued. Thue, Hanoishopes for Socialist unity were shattered. $upport for China

3ino-Soviet polemice entered a new stage in August 1963 when the partial test ban treaty was eigued in Moscow.Peking not only disapproved of this treaty, but published a geriee of criticisms of tbe Soviet poeition.

Hanois position also took a new t turn at this same moment. It refused

tosupport the treaty, condemned Tugoslav revisionism in terms identical to the Chinese line, and adopted offensivetactics and strategy for the

e 2

revolution in South Vietnam. Communist China long wanted to

,I developber own nuclear weapons. In I- a 1957 agreement with the Soviet

Union,she was guaranteed Soviet aid. But the Soviet Union, according to Peking, attempted to control Chinese ) usage of nnclear power. When the

i. Chinese refused to accept such cont trol, the Soviets scrapped the agree:s mentand withdrew their aid. u North Vietnam has neither the ca1. pacity nor the ambition to develop m nuclear weapons. The Hanoi regime hadlong supported complete and total

disarmament both for propagandistic: md economic reasons. When the par-in tialtest ban treaty was signed, Peking S suddhrly advocated the complete pro; hibition and deetruct.ion of nuclear

weapons. obviously, this was devised ~~ tobolster itg stand against the treaty.

On 31 .July the Chinese Government rewed a formal statement opposing the treaty, denouncing tbe Soviet

capitulation to US lrnperialism, and proposing a world

ed for the ~omp]ete and thorough prohibition and destruction

:t ofnuclear weapons. lwo days later, ,at ChouEn-lai gent ]etters to all gov

ernments of the world askhg that such a conference be convened..

It did not take Hanoi long to decide its position. The People quickly published editorials indicating Hanois support of Peking in opposing the treaty and in advocating complete and total nuclear disarmament. On 19 August Pham van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, announced that the Hanoi Government fully approved tbe Chinese proposal. One month later, North Vietnamese spokeemen not only supported China but criticized the Soviet Union openly ,for the firet time.

Hanoi was not merely opposing the partial test ban treaty. It had begun to defend China against Khrushcheve accusation of being warlike. Why did Hanoi shift its position ? Although one may argue that Hanoi had long supported total disarmament and that the partial test ban agreement did not meet its disarmament policy, one can scarcely deny that the treaty represented a beginning in the direction of total disarmament. Hanois all-ornothing stand showed. that it had adopted the Cbineae hard line. Yugoslav Revisionism

Yugoslavia bas increasingly been a factor in the Sine-Soviet dispnte. As the conflict has become more grave, the Soviet-Yugoelav relationship has gradually improved, and the Chinese attack upon Yugoslavia has become more bitter. Rapproeh ement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia wae well underway when Khrushchev defended Yugoslavia as a Socialist country in December 1962. At that time, he told the Supreme Soviet that:

For a long time there have been no landowners or capitalists in Yugoslavia, no private capita!, no Vivate enterprises, landed estates, or private banks. . . . The Yugoskzv Communist

35

THE DISPUTE

and their leaders are . . . developing the dconomy of socialiem. Therefore, if one proceede from objective la W.V, from the teaching of Marxism-Leniniem, itis impossible to deny that Yugoslavia ie a socialist country.

This view was upheld in the open letter of the CPSU In late August of the over, former Premier ited Yugoslavia and the Tito regime.

on 14 July 1963. same year, more-Khrushchev vis-

repeatedly lauded

Chinese attacke on Yugoslavia have elways been bitter; Vietnamese comparatively mild. In its criticism of the Tito regime prior to last fall,

fall, however, Hanoi began to shifl v its position. P

Thus, a ehower of criticism OJ P. Yugoslavia was launched. Tito wa~ denounced as a tool of tbe US im. ,s[ perialiste-a term used by Albania 1 in 1961. -The Yugoslav path to social. ism, wh]ch Khrushchev lauded in 1 1962, was severely criticized. Yugo. 1 slavia was further accused of slander. 1 ing China as a warseeker and aggres. I sor, and denouncsd for having praised i the partial nuclear test ban treaty, 1

The most significant Hanoi criti. 1 cism however, was a November 196s f Hoc Tap (Study) editorial. It not a

c

a m is .

N :

unttedN.tw.n President Tito of Yugoslavia, scmsed of revisionism by botb Peking and Hanoi

Hanoi had frequently streseed the necessity of the struggIe on two fronts against revisionism and dogmatism. When MarshaI Tito visited Latin America and the United Nations last

only followed precieely the Peking viewpoint published one month ear. Iier, but defended, for the first time, dogmatism. The editorial also hinted broadly that the Soviets were w

MtitaryWiw 36

THE DISPUTE

visionists. Indeed, Hanoi almost aPpeare