Moolenaar - Slavoj Žižek and the Real Subject of Politics

7/30/2019 Moolenaar - Slavoj Žižek and the Real Subject of Politics

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/moolenaar-slavoj-zizek-and-the-real-subject-of-politics 1/40

Slavoj Žižek and the Real Subject of PoliticsAuthor(s): R. MoolenaarReviewed work(s):Source: Studies in East European Thought, Vol. 56, No. 4, The Many Faces of Slavoj Žižek'sRadicalism (Dec., 2004), pp. 259-297Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20099885 .

Accessed: 08/01/2012 21:52

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Studies in East European

Thought.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20099885?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20099885?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer



R. MOOLENAAR

SLAVOJZIZEK AND THE REAL SUBJECTOF POLITICS

ABSTRACT. Slavoj Zizek's refusal to sketch an alternative to the global

liberal-capitalist order, combined with his claim that there is an urgent need

for a repolitization of, most of all, the economy, raises the question of the

possibility of radical political thought and action. Considering fundamen

talisms and politically correct multiculturalism not as oppositional, but as

correlative to the 'depolitization' of post-modern societies, Zizek invokes the

emancipatory legacy of Europe in an attempt to reinvent Marxism in a way

similar to what Lenin, thrown into an open situation, had to do in 1917

between the revolutions. A single question confronts political philosophy

today: is liberal-capitalist democracy the ultimate horizon of our political

practice, or is it possible to open up the space for another political articu

lation? The key to a repolitization is to identify with the "symptom" of the

existing global order's false claim to Universality, with the excluded "part of

no part" who politicizes it's predicament by claiming to stand for the real

universal. In order not to discard political struggle as "unrealistic", today's

cynical"realist" consensus must be broken.

Taking thingsas

they "reallyare" has become the dominant ideological mode that keeps people from

thinking about alternatives. The remedy is to show that things never are

"really"as

theyare.

KEY WORDS: capitalism, depolitization, ideology, Marxism, political

philosophy, realism as ideology, repolitization, universality

INTRODUCTION

Slavoj Zizek is, no doubt, a provocative thinker-

not in the

least when it comes to politics. How to consider, for example,his proposal to 'retrieve Lenin' as a signpost for intervening in

the political situation of our times? The fundamental problem

of today's philosophical-political field, as Zizek has repeatedly

stated, is best expressed by Lenin's old question "What is to be

done?" Hisown

translation of this question: "How do wereassert on the political terrain, the proper dimension of the

act?" (CHU: 127) Or, how to 'reinvent the political space' in

?* Studies in East European Thought 56: 259-297, 2004.

r* ? 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



260 R. MOOLENAAR

today's conditions of globalization? (TTS: 222) At stake in

these questions are the (im)possibilities of radical political

thought and practice today; the (im)possibilities of radical

politics in today's world, where the collapse of Marxism givesfree reign to the only surviving proponent: neo-liberal thought

(CHU: 91).When reading Zizek one cannot miss that he takes in his

work, as Ernesto Laclau has said, 'a patently anti-capitaliststance' (CHU: 205). Time and again he argues against the

acceptance of capitalism as 'the only game in town', and therenunciation by 'post-modern post-politics' of any real attemptto overcome the existing liberal-capitalist regime (CHU: 95).But as Laclau argues in his noteworthy discussion with Zizek, it

remains very unclear what 'overcoming liberal capitalist

democracy' would actually amount to and what alternative

model of society Zizek has inmind. What does itmean to really

change the existing capitalist liberal order? Does this mean, for

example, that Zizek wants to socialize the means of productionand abolish market mechanisms? And what would then be

Zizek's political strategy to achieve this, in Laclau's eyes,

'peculiar aim'? (CHU: 206) This 'peculiar aim', however, seems

for Zizek precisely the point when he repeatedly pleads for 4a

kind of direct socialization of the productive process' as the

only solution' in the present global situation, 'in which private

corporations outside public political control are making deci

sions which can affect us all, even up to our chances of survival'

(TTS: 350-357).The growing insight that the unrestrained rule of the market

presents a real danger and thus has to be constrained throughsome

socio-politicalmeasures

-in general,

a more effective

democratic control of the economy-

seems in itself encourag

ing, but this is for Zizek by far not radical enough. For under

the present circumstances these kind of 'palliative measures'

would only serve as a kind of 'damage control', by which the

worst effects of unbridled globalization might be avoided, but

without in any way posing a real threat to the 'reign of Capital'

(TTS: 395, n. 34). For even if today there can be found a

growing awareness for the need to counteract the reign of the

'depoliticized' global market with a move towards politization,



THE REAL SUBJECT OF POLITICS 261

so that crucial decisions are taken away from experts and state

planners and put the into the hands of the individuals and

groups concerned, this need ismostly conceived in terms of a

revitalization of civil society: active citizenship, broad publicdebate and so on. Although these kinds of proposals are to be

welcomed, they usually stop short of putting into question the

very basics of the anonymous logic of market relations and global

capitalism, which imposes itself today more and more as the

neutral framework accepted by all parties and which becomes,

as such, more and more depoliticized (TTS: 351).The main result of our 'post-political age', which preaches

'the end of ideology', is the radical depolitization of the sphereof the economy, so that the way the economy functions is ac

cepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. As

long as this fundamental depolitization of the economic sphereis accepted, Zizek warns us, all the talk about active citizenship,about public discussion leading to responsible collective deci

sions, andso

on, will remain mostly limited to the 'cultural'sphere of religious, sexual, ethnic and other way-of-life issues,

without actually encroaching upon the level at which the longterm decisions that affect us all are made (TTS: 353).

The burning philosophical-political question Zizek is

struggling with inmost of his recent work is how to reformulate

a leftist, anti-capitalist political project in our era of global

capitalism and of, what he considers as its inherent product, the

violent rise of all kinds of 'irrational fundamentalisms' (TTS:

4). Although Francis Fukuyama's thesis on 'the end of history'has been somewhat discredited, we on the whole still silentlyassume that the liberal-democratic capitalist global order is

somehow the finally found 'natural' social regime. The threats

posed to it by outbursts of irrational violent passions are

mainly considered as anachronistic 'left-overs' from the past

(TFA: 10;WDR: 132). In contrast to this, Zizek maintains that

today's rise of 'irrational violence' should be conceived as

strictly correlative to the 'depolitization' of our post-modern

societies, that is, to the disappearance of the proper political

dimension, its translation into different levels of rational expert

social administration (WDR: 132). In post-modern, post-poli

tics the clash of global ideological visions is replaced by the



262 R. MOOLENAAR

collaboration of expert managerial bodies, negociating the

interests of amultiplicity of particular social strata and groups,

reaching a compromise in the guise of a more or less universal

consensus. But, paradoxically, the final arrival of this trulyrational 'concrete universality'

-the abolition of old ideological

divides, the 'mature' universe of the negociated coexistence of

different groups and interests-

coincides with its radical

opposite, with thoroughly contingent outbursts of (pseudo

naturalized ethnic-religious) violence (TTS: 202). What looks at

first like amultitude of irrational 'remainders of the past', thatshould be gradually overcome with the ongoing spread of a

tolerant multiculturalist liberal-democratic order, is to be per

ceived, however, as this liberal order's very mode of existence

(WDR: 133). In this regard there is for Zizek ultimately onlyone question which confronts political philosophy today: is

liberal-capitalist democracy the ultimate horizon of our political practice, or is it possible effectively to comprise its inherent

limitation and thereby to open up the space for another political articulation? (TWN: 221).

The sad thing about our situation today, however, is that,

after the breakdown of the Marxist alternative, none of the

critics of capitalism,none of those who describe so

convincingly

the 'deadly vortex' into which the so-called process of globalization is drawing us, has any well-defined notion of how 'to getrid of capitalism' and radically change things. What we see

today are unprecedented changes in production, caused by

groundbreaking technological innovations, which have a radi

cal transformational impact on our societies, but the ultimate

outcome of this still remains very obscure. At the same time, all

this obscure and frenetic change is accompanied by a kind of

lethargy in the domain of politics-

which leads some radical

thinkers to argue that the epoch of groundbreaking politicalacts is, at least for the time being, over (DST: 137). Zizek

himself is even prepared to admit that perhaps a fundamental

economico-political change is not really possible, at least not inthe foreseeable future (TTS: 352). So in this sense Laclau is

definitely right: Zizek does not have a clear alternative-

other

than, somehow (but how?) 'socializing the means of production'

-and he does not provide a clear-cut strategy that would




put us on the right track to achieve this. But it is precisely with

regard to this deadlock that Zizek evokes the name of Lenin:

not as the nostalgic name for old dogmatic certainty, but Lenin

as the one who found himself, in his time, also 'lost' in a 'cat

astrophic new constellation' in which old coordinates proved

useless, and who was thus compelled to reinvent the entire

socialist project anew.

Without any doubt 'Lenin is dead', and we have to recognizethat his particular solution failed, even failed monstrously, says

Zizek. So the idea is not to 'return' to Lenin, but to 'repeat' himin a Kierkegaardian sense, that is, to retrieve the same impulsein today's constellation. To 'repeat Lenin' in a Kierkegaardiansense is not to repeat what Lenin did, but rather what he failed

to do, his missed opportunities: the Lenin Zizek wants to re

trieve is, to put it in Kierkegaard's terms, the 'Lenin-in

becoming', the 'Lenin-thrown-in-an-open situation', and not

'Lenin-the-Soviet-institution' (RAG: 15).1Are

we,asks

Zizek,within our 'late

capitalistclosure' of the

'end of history', still able to experience the 'shattering impact'of such an 'authentic historical openness'? If not ... the only

option for the left would, in Zizek's view, indeed be a kind of

damage control-

that is to say, palliative measures which,

while becoming resiged to the dominant course of events, re

strict themselves to limiting the worst effects of the inevitable. If

that would really be the case, Zizek argues, one should at least

fully acknowledge this and thus admit that the much applauded

'proliferation of new political subjectivities', the emergence of

new social movements, and the demise of the 'essentialist' fix

ation of social-political struggles (the proverbial 'disappearanceof the working class'), manifest themselves against the back

ground of a certain silent renunciation and acceptance: the

renunciation of the idea of a global change in the fundamental

relations in our societies and consequently, the acceptance of

the liberal capitalist framework which remains the same, the

unquestioned background, in all the dynamic proliferation of new political subjectivities and socio-political issues

(CHU: 321;TTS: 354).In Zizek's eyes, today's rise of multiple political subjectivi

ties is simply not political enough, in so far as they silently



264 R. MOOLENAAR

presuppose a non-thematized, 'naturalized' framework of eco

nomic relations (CHU: 108). It should be clear by now, that

Zizek himself does not want to accept this existing capitalistframework. He does not want to accept the New World Order

as an inexorable process which allows only for moderate palliative measures: he continues to think, 'in the old Marxist

vein', that today's capitalism, in its very triumph, is breedingnew 'contradictions' which are

potentiallyeven more

'explo

sive' than those of standard industrial capitalism.

As Zizek explains, the moment of victory of a political forceis the very moment of its splitting. The triumphant liberal

democratic 'new world order' is more and more marked by a

frontier separating its 'inside' from its 'outside'- a frontier

between those who manage to remain 'within', the 'developed',

to whom the rules of human rights, social security, etc. apply-,

and the others, the excluded, who are condemned to lead a

spectral life outside the domain of the global order, blurred in

the background, submerged in the formless mass of 'population'. The main concern of the 'developed' with regard to

'them', the excluded, is to contain their explosive potential,even if the price to be paid for such containment is the

neglect of elementary democratic principles (TWN: 222; CHU:

313, 322-323).

Most of what he has written about this 'explosive potential'dates before the devastating impact of the 9-11 WTC-attacks,

but in his philosophico-political essay The Desert of the Real,

that appeared in reaction to this event, Zizek argues for the

thesis that the only way to conceive of what happened then is to

locate it in the context of the antagonisms of global capitalism.

(WDR: 49). If militant 'fundamentalist' Islam is widely per

ceived as the main threat today, one should recognize at least

that Muslim fundamentalists are not 'true' fundamentalists-

theyare

already 'modernists', aproduct and a

phenomenon of

modern global capitalism (WDR: 132, 52). Jihad and McWorld

are two sides of the same coin: Jihad is already McJihad. In this

regard the notorious 'clash of civilizations' thesis is to be totally

rejected. Probing into different cultural traditions is preciselynot the way to grasp the political dynamics of these conflicts

(WDR: 34). What we are witnessing today are rather clashes




within each civilization that is to say conflicting ways of dif

ferent groups to cope with or to accommodate oneself to global

capitalism. The Muslim fundamentalist target is not only global

capitalism's corrosive impact on social life, but also the corrupt

'traditionalist' regimes in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, which are

fully integrated into Western capitalism (WDR: 41). So instead

of endless analyses of how Islamic 'fundamentalism' is intol

erant towards our liberal societies, and other clash of civiliza

tion topics, we should rather focus on the interplay of socio

economic and geo-political interests at the background (WDR:

42, 43, 34). In this regard the 'perverted' position of the truly

'fundamentalist' conservative regimes provides the key to the

often-embarrassed conundrums of American politics in the

Middle East: they stand for the point at which the USA is

forced explicitly to acknowledge the primacy of economy over

democracy (WDR: 42). It is simply of vital interest to the USA

that these countries remain undemocratic, so that they can be

counted on for their oil reserves. And if one still wants to holdon to the 'clash of civilizations' topic, one should recognize how

pseudo-naturalized ethnic-religious conflicts are precisely the

form of struggle which fits the frame of global capitalism. In

our age of'post-polities', when 'politics proper' is progressively

replaced by the decisions of powerful expert managerial bodies,

politicizing one's predicament is prevented and the only

remaining legitimate form of struggle is cultural, ethnic, reli

gious

tension. These kinds of tension, however, are to be

regarded as a displacement of the real antagonism.Are not all real-life 'clashes' today somehow related to global

capitalism? The most horrifying slaughters inAfrica take placewithin the same 'civilization', but are also clearly related to the

interplay of global economic interests. In all so-called 'ethnic'

conflicts the shadow of other interests is easily discernible. So

with regard to all this Zizek pleads indeed for a proper dose of

'economic reductionism' (WDR: 42).

Repeatedly Zizek argues for a radical repolitization of the

economy (TTS: 353). In this respect, he speaks about the direct

multinational functioning of Capital as a form of 'auto-colo

nization', whereby global corporations, as it were, cut the

umbilical cord with their 'mother-nation' and treat their



266 R. MOOLENAAR

country of origin as simply another territory to be colonized.

What we encounter here is a paradox of colonization in which

there areonly colonies, no

colonizing countries-

the colonizing

power is no longer a nation-state but the global company itself.

So, according to WTO sponsered investment agreements-

which are elaborated and discussed behind closed doors-

corporations will be able to sue sovereign states if they impose

'overstringent' ecological or health and labor standards. In the

long term, Zizek warns us, we shall all not only wear Banana

Republic shirts but also live in banana republics (TTS: 215-216;TFA: 55).

We need to counter this process and moveurgently towards

a society in which global decisions about the fundamental

orientation of how to develop and use the productive capacitieswould somehow be made by the 'entire collective of people'affected by these decisions. And the only way effectively to

bring about a society in which all kinds of risky long-term

decisions would ensue from a public debate involving all concerned, says Zizek, is some kind of radical limitation of Capital's freedom and the subordination of the process of

production to social control. Correcting Clinton's dictum 'It's

the economy, stupid', Zizek states emphatically, 'It's the polit

ical economy, stupid'-

and, of course, this means at the same

time an obvious reminder of Marx (among others) (TTS: 347

vv.).2

EXPLOSIVE CONTRADICTIONS.... OR LIVING

ON BORROWED TIME

As I have said, Zizek continues to think, 'in the old Marxist

vein', that today's capitalism, in its very triumph, is breedingnew 'contradictions' which are

potentiallyeven more

'explo

sive' than those of standard industrial capitalism.

Although he acknowledges the 'breakdown' of the Marxistnotion that capitalism itself generates the force that will destroyit in the guise of the proletariat, Zizek is still fond of repeating

Marx's old formula that the 'limit of capitalism is capital itself,

i.e., the capitalist mode of production-

but in repeating this




formula, he gives it a somewhat different twist. For this

notion of 'capital as its own limit' can be read in two different

ways, says Zizek. The first would be that of a simplistic his

toricist reading, according to which the incessant growth of the

'productive forces' (pushed along by new technologies) is fol

lowed by its appropriate 'social framing'-

the 'relations of

production'. From this point of view, Marx's formula indicates

that the capitalist 'relations of production', which first allowed

for the fast development of the productive forces, become at a

certain point an obstacle to their further development. The

productive forces have outgrown their frame of social relations

and this demand a 'social revolution' by which a new balance

would be found. The problem with this reading, however, be

comes clear when asking the question at what point, precisely,the capitalist relations of production becomes an obstacle to the

further development of the productive forces? Or at what point,

precisely, one could speak of a 'balance' between productive

forces and the relations of production, in regard to the capitalist mode of production? The answer to both questions is that

neither themoment of becoming an obstacle nor the moment of

a new balance can be indicated or defined in itself The reason

for this is that the 'contradiction' or discord between forces and

relations of production is to be recognized as an internal

antagonism of capitalism, which precisely causes its permanent

development. Thus, contrary to the above-mentioned 'simplis

tic evolutionary idea', it is rather capitalism's very imbalance, its

fundamentally distorted frame of social relations, which drives

forth the development of its productive forces. In other words,

incessant development is the only way for it to 'resolve' or come

to terms with its own constitutive imbalance or 'contradiction'.

This means, however, that capitalism has no 'normal', balanced

state: its normal state is the permanent production of excess;

the only way for capitalism to survive is to expand (as Hegelknew already...). The elementary feature of capitalism consists

of its inherent structural imbalance, its innermost antagonisticcharacter: that is to say, the constant crisis, the constant rev

olutionizing of its conditions of existence, whereby the systemcan only survive as its own excess. Herein lies the ultimate

paradox proper to capitalism, and its 'last resort': capitalism is



268 R. MOOLENAAR

capable of transforming its limit in the source of its power, so

that its limit, far from constricting is the very impetus of its

development (TWN: 209; RL: 20). This spiral of productivity,

however, is ultimately nothing but a kind of desperate flightforward to escape its own inherent contradictions

-until itwill

no longer have any 'substantial content' outside itself to feed on

(TFA: 17;TTS: 358).As Zizek states, in a way Francis Fukuyama was right

-

capitalism is the end of history, not just a historical epoch

among others. A certain excess which was as itwere kept undercheck in previous history, perceived as a local outgrowth, as an

excess, a deviation, is in capitalism elevated into the very

principle of social life, in the speculative movement of money

begetting more money, of a system which can survive only by

constantly revolutionizing its own conditions (RL: 20). Marx

already, perceived clearly how capitalism unleashed the

breathtaking dynamics of self-enhancing productivity, and he

also perceived clearly how this capitalist dynamics is propelledby its own inner obstacle or antagonism (TFA: 17).Marx lo

cated the elementary capitalist antagonism in the oppositionbetween use

-and exchange-value: in capitalism the potentials

of this opposition are fully realized, the domain of exchangevalue acquires autonomy and is transformed into the specter of

self-propelling speculative capital, which needs the productive

capacities and the needs of actual people only as its dispensable

temporal embodiment (RL: 20). The very notion of crisis is

derived from this gap: a crisis occurs when reality catches up

with the illusory self-generating mirage of money begettingmore money

-this 'speculative madness' cannot go on indefi

nitely, it has to explode in ever more severe crises.

Is this analysis not more than apt today? On the one hand,we have crazy solipsistic speculations about futures, mergers

etc., following their inherent logic; on the other hand, reality is

catching up in the guise of ecological catastrophes, poverty, the

Third World collapse of social life. The problem with capital

ism, however, is not just this 'solipsistic mad dance', but that it

continues to disavow its gap with reality and that it presents

itself as serving 'real needs of real people' (RL: 21). So in

this sense it is far too simplistic to say that the specter of this




'self-engendering monster', which pursues its path regardless of

any human or environmental concern, is only an ideological

abstraction, and that one should not forget that behind this

abstraction there are real people and natural objects on whose

productive capacities and resources Capital's circulation is

based. The trouble is that this 'abstraction' is real in the precisesense of determining the very structure of material processes:

the fate of whole strata of populations, sometimes of whole

countries, can be decided by 'the solipsistic speculative dance of

Capital', which pursues its goal of profitability with a blessedindifference to the way itsmovement will affect social reality, so

that a country can be 'financially sane' even ifmillions in it are

starving (TFA: 15-16; WDR: 36).

The fundamental divide we should consider, is the one be

tween those included into the sphere of (relative) economic

prosperity and those excluded from it. The result of globalization and the rise of the global village is the ghettoization of

whole strata of the world population; the result of decolonization is that multinationals treat even their own country of

origin as just another colony; the result of the much praised

'disappearance of the working class' is the emergence of mil

lions of manual workers in the Third World sweatshops, out of

our western delicate sight (CHU: 322). And instead of the

political subject 'working-class' demanding its universal rights,we find in our western societies on the one hand themultiplicityof social strata and groups, each with its own particular rights,

problems, needs and interests, and on the other the uncon

trolled flux of illegal immigrants, ever more prevented from

politicizing their predicament of exclusion (TTS: 199).In regard to all this, the state

-far from 'withering away'

under influence of the much praised liberal 'deregulation'-

plays a crucial role in the 'obverse side' of globalization: all

kinds of protective measures, trade barriers, border police.What lies beneath these protective measures is the simple

awareness that the present model of late capitalist prosperitycannot be universalized (WDR: 149-150). And the very sad

thing is that (whatever remains of) the traditional working class

ismore aware of this and therefore even more sensitive to the



270 R. MOOLENAAR

protection of their relative privileges than the big corporations

(WDR: 150).The sad irony is thus that today, because of its populism, the

Right ismuch closer to articulating the actual ideological stance

of this traditional working class (CHU: 129, n. 9).When the

populist right accuses big multinational corporations to

betray the 'ordinary decent working people of our nation', it is

moving to occupy the terrain that is left vacant by the Left.

While post-modern 'radical' politics accepts the thesis of the

'disappearance of the working class' and its corollary, the

growing irrelevance of class antagonism, it is the Right which

pretends to speak now on behalf of this proverbial 'disap

pearing working class' (DST: 237-238). The new Rightist politicians are the only 'serious' political force today which

addresses the people with an anti-capitalist rhetoric, albeit in a

repulsive nationalist / racist / cultural / religious clothing (DST:

242). Deplorable as it is, the new populist Right is the only

serious political force which is today 'alive': it takes the initiative, sets the pace, determines the problematic of the political

struggle, while the liberal center is reduced to a 'reactive force'.

Itmostly limits itself to reacting to the populist Right's initia

tives, by either posing them vehemently from an impotentLeftist posturing, or by translating them into acceptable liberal

centrist wordings: 'while we reject the populist hatred of the

immigrants, we have to admit that they are addressing issues

which really worry people, so we should take care of the

problem, and introduce tougher immigration and anti-crime

laws' (WDR: 151-152).

By serving as the negative common denominator of the

entire center-left liberal spectrum, the new populist right actu

ally plays a key structural role in the legitimacy of the

liberal-democratic hegemony. They are the excluded ones -

unacceptable as the party of government-

who through this

very exclusion provide the negative legitimacy of the liberal

hegemony, the proof of their 'democratic' attitude. In this way

their existence displaces the true focus of the political struggle-

which is, for Zizek, the stifling of any Leftist radical alternative- on to the solidarity of the entire 'democratic' bloc against the

Rightist threat (DST: 242). This 'solidarity', however, succeeds



THE REAL SUBJECTOF POLITICS 271

at the same time in excluding the last reference to

anti-capitalism and class struggle. Here the liberal-democratic

'New Center' plays a double game: it suggests that Rightist

populists are our true common enemy because of their intol

erance, the spreading of hatred etc., while it actually manipulates this Rightist scare in order to hegemonize the 'democratic'

field, to define its terrain and win over or discipline its true

adversary, the radical Left (DST: 243).The question of how, from a radical 'Leftist' perspective, it

would be possible to really undermine the global capitalist

system is for Zizek not just a rhetorical one. He doesn't want to

engage in a ritualistic incantation of old formulas, be it those of

'revolutionary Communism' or those of the 'Welfare State

reformist Social Democracy'. He is not preaching a simple re

turn to the old notions of class struggle and socialist revolution,

but he also does not want to accept the New Left 'radical

center' attitude of 'stripping naked' by getting rid of the last

vestiges of the 'proper leftist discourse' (TTS: 353). How then,to contest today's predominant consensus according to which

the age of ideologies-

notwithstanding some 'fundamentalist'

and/or 'populist' backlashes-

is over, since we have entered the

post-ideological era of rational negotiation, planning and

decision-making, based upon neutral expert-knowledge about

economic, social, demographic, ecological etc. processes?

(CHU: 323).3The first thing to note is that the supposedly neutral refer

ence to the necessities of the market (usually invoked in order

to categorize grand ideological projects as unrealistic utopias) is

itself to be regarded as one among the great modern Utopian

projects of our times. In this sense one cannot simply speakabout the withering away of the Utopian impetus in our soci

eties, for this impetus is alive and well, especially among the

advocates of the market economy, who still sincerely believe

that the global mechanism of the market, if properly applied,

will automatically bring about the optimal state of progress and

happiness for the whole of society (or the whole of the world,

for that matter). The second thing to note is that ideology is not

just utopia: for no less ideological is the anti-utopian stance of

the 'realists' who devalue every global project of radical social



272 R. MOOLENAAR

changeas

'utopian', that is, as unrealistic dreamingor as

harboring a dangerous totalitarian potential. This 'realist'

stance is precisely today's predominant form of ideology, which

prevents us from imagining a fundamental social change

(CHU: 324).The ultimate answer, however, to the reproach that leftist

proposals for a radical transformation areUtopian and unreal

istic should be that the 'true utopia' is the belief that the present

liberal-democratic capitalist consensus could go on indefinitely,

without major disasters and/or radical change. So in order to be

trulya 'realist', one must consider breaking out of the con

straints of what appears 'possible' or 'feasible' today, that is by

opting for the impossible, that is for that what seems impossibleor 'utopian' today (RL: 24). According to Zizek the old '68

motto, Soyons r?alistes, demandons l'impossible!, still holds

(CHU: 321, 326). The only 'realistic' prospect is to hold on to

this impossible Utopian place of the global alternative, holding

this place open

-

even if it remains empty, living on borrowedtime, awaiting the content to fill in (CHU: 326; TTS: 199).

BEYOND THE REALITY PRINCIPLE

What should be, in regard to this, the task of philosophy? Zizek

takes recourse to the traditional sense of 'amazement' that

marks the

origin

of

philosophy.Philosophy begins the moment

we do not simply accept what exists as given (TWN: 2). The

original philosophical sense of amazement was precisely a

rupture from being submerged in the accepted 'reality' of the

mythical universe (OBN: 118). The specificity of 'Western his

tory' can be understood as a history of ruptures as to what

counts as 'reality' and how 'we' are related to it. In this way

historicity itself is nothing else than a series of ruptures through

which, time and again, our sense of 'reality' is being defined or

symbolized anew. The proper philosophical stance would pre

cisely be to hold on to this moment of rupture, of a gap,

maintaining it's distance toward any given Master-Signifier, or

key signifying element, by which the symbolic structuring of

'reality' is 'closed of, and thereby established as a certain




'Order of Being'.4 Philosophy requires the suspension of any

reigning Master-Signifier (TWN: 2).

With Lacan, Zizek distinguishes between the 'discourse of

the Master' and the 'discourse of the Analyst'. The discourse of

the Master establishes a new symbolic universe, whereas the

discourse of the Analyst affirms the rupture, the gap that

momentarily suspends the Order of Being. Although this is a

moment of 'radical negativity', it should at the same be re

garded as something 'positive' or productive- as a generating

core to be encircled repeatedly by the subject's symbolic activity

(TTS: 162-165). Psychoanalysis enables us to grasp this plu

rality of symbolizations itself as amultitude of responses to the

same impossible Real kernel: an original trauma, an impossiblekernel that resists symbolization. In this sense one has to rec

ognize that there is no ultimate 'big Other' to guarantee the

consistency of the symbolic space we dwell in: there are only

contingent, local, inconsistent and fragile points of stability

(TFA: 117).To understand this we have to realize how Zizek makes use

of the Lacanian distinction between 'reality' and the Real,

whereby reality is the external domain that is ordered en

delineated by the socio-symbolic order, while the Real is pre

cisely that which resists any symbolization, the point of inher

ent failure of symbolization. The Real is not something

external, but internal to the symbolic: it is the impossibility of

the symbolic fully to become itself, an inherent limitation

(CHU: 120). The paradox of the Lacanian Real is that it is an

entity which in itself does not exist-

in the sense of really

existing-

but which is present only as failed, missed, in

a shadow, and dissolves itself as soon as we try to grasp it in

its positive nature. In a way 'the Real' is nothing but

the impossibility of its inscription-

an impossibility which

persists and which is only to be grasped by its distorting effects

(SOI: 163).

Here, the gap that forever separates the domain of (symbol

ically mediated, i.e., ontologically constituted) reality from the

elusive and spectral Real that precedes it is crucial: what psy

choanalysis calls 'fantasy' is the endeavor to close this gap by

(mis)perceiving the 'pre-ontological Real' as simply another,



274 R. MOOLENAAR

'more fundamental', level of reality. This means that 'fantasy'

projects on to the pre-ontological Real the form of constituted

reality (as in the notion of another, suprasensible reality, or in

the Kantian notion of das-Ding-an-sich). This pre-ontological

dimension, however, is best discerned, says Zizek, through the

Hegelian gesture of transposing epistemological limitation into

an ontological fault, so that the limitation of our knowledge-

that is, its failure to grasp the Whole of Being, the way our

knowledge gets inexorably entangled in contradictions and

inconsistencies - is simultaneously the limitation of the very

object of our knowledge, so that the gaps and voids in our

knowledge of reality are simultaneously the gaps and voids in

the 'real' ontological edifice itself. The very innermost 'motor' of

the Hegelian dialectical process, as Zizek sees it, is precisely the

interplay between epistemological obstacle and ontologicaldeadlock. This brings us to what Zizek calls the fundamental

feature of his 'dialectical-materialist' ontology: the minimal gap,

the delay, which forever separates an event 'in itself from itssymbolic registration / inscription. Of crucial importance here is

the difference between this dialectical-materialist notion of

'symbolic inscription' which, 'after the fact', confers (f)actualityon the fact in question, constituting it as such, and the idealist

equation esse =percipi. For the act of symbolic registration

always comes after a minimal delay and remains forever

incomplete, cursory, a gap separating it from the Ansich of the

registered process-

yet, precisely as such, this gap is part of the

'thing itself, as if the 'thing' in question can fully realize its

ontological status only by means of aminimal delay with regardto itself. So the very distance towards the 'thing itself has to be

conceived as part of the 'thing itself (cf. TTS: 55-59).

This is not the place to retrace all the intricacies of Zizek's

often dazzling discourse on the Real. The difference between

symbolically constituted reality and the Real that resists it, can

perhaps better be made clear by way of an example. To this

end, Iwant to take a closer look at what Zizek indicates as 'the

antinomy of postmodern reason', which is of paramount

importance for rethinking the possibility of a philosophical

critique of ideology. So, let's see how Zizek points out a paradox

inherent in the two apparently opposed ideologico-political




positions that predominate today, and what ideologico-criticallesson he wants us to draw from it (DST: 165-166; MI: passim).

STEPPING OUT OF IDEOLOGY?

On the one hand we have the ideology of realism with its appealto 'reality' against false illusions: we live in the era of the end of

great ideological projects, so let's be realists and give up

immature Utopian illusions - one should come to terms with the

global market (DST: 165). Such reference to 'reality' functions

as a direct dogmatic appeal, which dispenses with the need for

any further argumentation. Is not one of the fundamental

stratagems of ideology, however, the reference to self-evidence?

'Let the facts speak for themselves', Zizek says, is perhaps the

arch-statement of ideology-

the point being that facts never

'speak for themselves', but are always made to speak (MI: 11).

While these 'facts' are supposed to show us the 'truth', plainand simple, they actually are always part of discursive gestures,

which are in the service of particular interests, for example,

legitimizing existing power relations.

As the inherent counterpoint to this 'realism' we have, on the

other hand, the 'post-modern' notion that there is no 'true'

reality, that what we perceive as 'reality' is simply the result of a

certain historically specific set of discursive practices and power

mechanisms. According to this kind of 'discourse analysis' the

very notion of an access to reality unbiased by any discursive

devices or conjunctions with power is ideological. So para

doxically, here, the ideological criticism of illusions on behalf of

reality is universalized and inverted into it's opposite: realityitself is the ultimate illusion (DST: 155).Would the final out

come then be the inherent impossibility of isolating a 'reality'

whose consistency is not maintained by ideological mecha

nisms?

The 'realist' pretence of stepping out of ideology is denounced by Zizek as 'ideology par excellence'. (MI: 10) But at

the same stroke he iswarning us that when some procedure is

denounced as 'ideological par excellence' one can be sure that

its counterpoint is no less ideological.5 We should thus be



276 R. MOOLENAAR

careful to avoid the trap that makes us slide into ideology under

the guise of stepping out of it. Ifwe denounce as ideological the

very attempt to draw a clear line of demarcation between ide

ology and actual reality, this seems to impose the conclusion

that the only non-ideological position would be to renounce the

very notion of extra-ideological reality and accept that all we

are dealing with are indeed 'symbolic fictions', regulating a

plurality of discursive universes, never'reality'

as such. But as

Zizek emphatically states: such a 'quick, slick postmodern

solution' is also to be denounced as 'ideology par excellence'

(MI: 17). So where now to turn? In Zizek's view it all hinges on

our persisting in the following 'impossible' position: althoughno clear line of demarcation separates ideology from reality,

although ideology is already at work in everything we experience as 'reality', we must none the less maintain the tension that

keeps the critique of ideology alive.

What we experience as reality is, indeed, not the 'thing itself,

but always already symbolized, constituted, structuredor

schematized by symbolic mechanisms. The stumbling block

Zizek wants to highlight then, is that these symbolizations

ultimately always fail, that they never succeed in fully 'covering'the Real of reality (MI: 21). There is some 'hard kernel' which

resists, which cannot be integrated in our symbolic universe.

That is to say that 'reality' is never 'whole'. If what we expe

rience as 'reality' is to emerge, something has to be foreclosed

from it, excluded: an irrepresentable X, which is 'primordially

repressed', but on whose 'repression' reality itself is founded.

This irrepresentable X-the part of reality that escapes us, that

remains non-symbolized, 'repressed' but on whose repression

our symbolic reality is founded-

nevertheless 'returns' to haunt

it. It persists somehow, it insists and it takes on 'body' in the

form of 'spectral apparitions' or insubstantial 'illusions'.

To clarify this a bit more, let's go back to our example and

try to take the ideologico-critical lesson Zizek wants us to draw

from it.We encountered the paradox that the ideological criticism of illusions on behalf of reality (as performed by the

'realists') is universalized and inverted (by the 'discourse

analysts'), so that finally reality itself becomes the ultimate

illusion. But, as Zizek says, when reality itself is deprived of the




'hard kernel' of some Real, of that which resists simple inte

gration into our common reality (symbolization, integration in

our universe), it turns into a malleable, indefinitely plastictexture which then, precisely, loses the character of 'reality',

and turns into a fantasmatic effect of discursive practices (DST:

166). By this the discerning cognitive value inherent to the term

'ideology' is diluted. Therein resides precisely one of the main

reasons for the progressive abandonment of the notion of

ideology: this notion somehow grows 'too strong' when it be

gins to embrace everything-

including the very neutral, extra

ideological ground originally supposed to provide the standard

by means of which one should be able to measure ideologicaldistortion. Although Zizek certainly does not hold on to some

sort of neutral extra-ideological ground, he definitely wants to

keep the possibility of a critique of ideology open. The condi

tion for this is the difference between reality and the Real,

which provides the necessary 'tension' to keep the critique of

ideology alive. This means, however, that the concept of ideology should be disengaged from the representationalist problematic: the true representation of reality against illusions.

Ideology, Zizek argues, has nothing to do with illusion, in

the sense of amistaken, distorted representation of reality (MI:

7). For the obverse of the above mentioned paradox is that,

with regard to the 'realist' position, the ultimate experience of

the Real that persists somehow without being integrated is not

that of 'reality which shatters illusions', but rather that of an

'illusion' which 'irrationally' persists against the pressure of

reality, which does not give way to 'reality' (DST: 166). There is

a kind of persistence of the Real located in the illusion itself, so

that we could, ironically, speak of 'the hard rock of illusion' on

which reality stumbles. And although they can never be fully

integrated in reality, these 'illusions' (about, for example, jus

tice, solidarity, community) which persist are not only a

stumbling block but at the same time a starting point for the

impetus to change things.To illustrate this and establish the link with concrete social

struggles, Zizek evokes the example of the role of Neues Forum

and other dissident groups in ex-Communist Eastern Europe.While they seem to display all the features of ideology, Zizek



278 R. MOOLENAAR

maintains, these groups actually providean

example of non

ideology (MI: 6).

THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe was experienced by many of its participants as the moment of sublime

enthusiasm, as the promise of global panacea, as an event that

would realize freedom and social solidarity (CHU: 316; TWN).

There is no need to insist that a big gap between what they

wanted, expected, hoped for and what they actually got with

the passage from real existing socialism to real existing capitalism. It is clear that the protesting crowds at the time 'wanted

something else', a Utopian object of impossible fullness designated by a multiplicity of names ('solidarity', 'human rights'

etc.), not what they actually got: capitalist democracy, with all

its impasses (CHU: 316). But should the 'third way' project ofNeues Forum therefore retroactively be dismissed as nothing

but an illusion, a hopelessly outdated utopianism, in the face of

the merciless market reality, that 'cracked down' on it and

pulverized it? (TTS: 206).

Indeed, one could say that Neues Forum's proposal of an

Utopian 'third-way' beyond capitalism and real existing

socialism, the sincere belief and insistence of these passionateintellectuals that they were not just contributing to a restora

tion of western capitalism, proved to be an insubstantial illu

sion. But, says Zizek, precisely as such- as a thorough illusion

without any substance-

it was strictu sensunon-ideological,

because it did not 'reflect', in an inverted-ideological form, any

actual relations of power (MI: 7). According to Zizek, the no

tion of non-ideology is absolutely indispensable. There is a non

ideological longing for authentic community life, which is to be

fully asserted (TTS: 185). It iswrong to condemn or denounce

this longing as proto-totalitarian. There is nothing 'wrong' with

it as such. This 'authentic longing' becomes ideological only

when it is distorted, displaced or manipulated by a specific

'articulation' through which it functions as the legitimizationof a definite set of social relations. So, according to Zizek, the




non-ideological Utopian character of an 'authentic popular

longing for a true community and social solidarity against fierce

competition and exploitation' is to be fully asserted (TTS: 185).What makes it 'ideological' is its specific articulation.

We find a very precise illustration of this with the East

German crowds demonstrating against the Communist regime,when the authentic longing for true community and solidarity

against oppression turned into its ideological distortion with

seemingly only a slight change in the slogan they put forward.

First they shouted 'Wir sind das Volk', which turned within a

couple of days into Wir sind ein Volk. As Zizek points out, with

the first version of the slogan the crowds claimed that they-

the

excluded counter-revolutionary 'scum' of the official 'Whole of

the People', who had no proper place in the official space other

than as 'counter-revolutionaries', hooligans',or 'victims of

bourgeois propaganda'- were the people, that they stood for

'all'.When the slogan changed however, this signaled the clo

sure of the momentary authentic political opening, and thereappropriation of the democratic impetus by the thrust to

wards the reunification of Germany, which meant rejoiningWestern Germany's liberal-capitalist system

-at the time

probably the most 'realistic' option (TTS: 189).A 'realistic' political standpoint, however, can be quite

accurate as to its objective content, yet thoroughly ideological.All along there had been forces opposing Neues Forum who

thought that, realistically, the best move would indeed be the

quickest possible annexation toWest Germany, and who re

garded the people around Neues Forum as nothing but daydreamers. Although this position proved quite 'true' as to its

content, it was, according to Zizek, none the less ideological.The reason for this is that the conformist adoption of theWest

German model, and thus the integration of the former GDR in

the world-capitalist-system, implied an ideological belief in the

unproblematic, non-antagonistic functioning of the late capi

talist 'social state'. By now, of course, this belief has turned

sour, as it is caught up in the confusing turmoil of ruthless

commercialization and economic colonization, the continuing

split between Ossies and Wessies, the emergence of neo-Nazi

skinhead violence, and the strange phenomenon of Ostalgie-



280 R. MOOLENAAR

the nostalgia for the communist past among intellectuals as well

as ordinary people in the now defunct German Democratic

Republic.For this Ostalgie there could, no doubt, be given several

explanations. Probably it mostly consists in a conservative

nostalgia for the security of the constrained, self-satisfied way

of life going on in a benevolent boredom (RAG: 20). Peoplecould appreciate their luck: while social life went on in a

predictable way, without great efforts or shocks, one was al

lowed to withdraw into one's private world. Although life was

'poor and drab', there was no need to worry about the future,

for the Party took care of everything (TTS: 339). Particularlyin its late 'stagnant phase', Real socialism was conceived as a

society one could live in peacefully, avoiding the capitalist

competitive stress. This was even 'the last line of defense'

when, after the fall of Khrushchev, it became clear that Real

socialism was losing the competitive edge in its war with

capitalism. And yes, one should say, actually people in a waywere happy then. For, as Zizek points out, three fundamental

conditions of happiness were fulfilled. First, material needs

were basically satisfied: brief shortages of some goods re

minded people that they should be glad that these goods were

generally available. Secondly, there was always the Other (the

Party) to be blamed for everything that went wrong. There

was actually a perverse kind of liberation in this possibility of

shifting

the burden of

responsibility

on to the Other:

realitywas not really 'ours' (the ordinary people's), it belonged to

Them; its grayness bore witness to 'Their' oppressive rule and,

paradoxically, this made it much easier to endure. And

thirdly, at the right distance, not too far away, not too near,

there was an Other place, the consumerist West one could

secretly dream about. This fragile balance was disturbed with

the developments resulting in the collapse of communism, the

people finding itself in a system now, in which the vast

majority is definitely less happy. Even the 'drab grayness' of

the socialist environment in a way seems more desolate and

depressing now than before, since its reality is no longer

'Theirs', but has to be conceived as 'ours'. This is a difficult




thing to cope with, as the strange twists of this phenomenon

of Ostalgie is bearing witness to.

But then, says Zizek, couldn't one maintain that the ultimate

cause of Ostalgie is perhaps a longing, not so much for the

communist past, for what actually went on under Communism,

but, rather, for what might have happened there, for the missed

opportunities of another Germany (WDR: 24). In this sense,

ultimately, even the post-Communist outbursts of neo-Nazi

violence are, inZizek's view, a negative proof of the presence of

emancipatory chances, symptomatic outbursts of rage dis

playing an awareness of missed opportunities. The 'void of the

missed revolutionary chance', says Zizek, canexplode in 'irra

tional' fits of destructive rage, as kind of 'defense-formation',

covering up 'the void of the failure' to intervene effectively in

the social crisis (WDR: 23-24).

So, coming back toNeues Forum, one can say that in regardto the 'factual truth' , their position

-taking the disintegration

Communism as theopening-up

of a new form of socialspace,somehow reaching beyond the confines of capitalism

- was

doubtless 'illusory'. But in a sense this illusion 'insists' or 'per

sists', even if it is in the form of a displaced rage and resentment

or as an 'ostalgie' longing. Shouldn't one say therefore that

precisely by the 'scandalous' and exorbitant nature of the pro

posals of Neues Forum, it attested to an acute awareness of the

social antagonisms that pertain to late capitalism? In this regardZizek maintains that during the confused months of transition

from 'real existing socialism' into capitalism, the 'illusionary'idea of a 'thirdway' was the only point at which antagonism was

not obliterated. The 'negative' gesture implied in the (impossible project of a 'third way'

-saying 'no' to both (existing)

communism and (existing) capitalism-

counted more than its

later failed positivization. Herein lies one of the tasks of a 'postmodern' critique of ideology, Zizek argues: to designate the

elements within an existing social order which -be it in the guise

of insubstantial illusions-point towards the system's antagonistic character, and thus 'estrange' us to the self-evidence of its

established identity (MI: 7).



282 R. MOOLENAAR

(THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF) SOCIAL ANTAGONISM

The crucial point Zizek is concerned with each time is the

awareness of the antagonism that is always involved in society.

Ideological is the articulation in which this antagonistics is

obliterated, denied or, as is often the case, displaced to some

thing 'outside' the social whole- for example to put the blame

for every social wrong to the 'Jews', the 'immigrants' , the

'foreigners', the 'evil-doers'. According to an old Marxist topos,

the evocation of an 'external enemy' always serves to displace

the focus from the true origin of tensions: the inherent antag

onism of the system.

To elaborate this, Zizek often evokes the case of anti

Semitism, which is not just a 'special case' of ideology, but

perhaps the purest incarnation of ideology as such (SOI: 125).

The 'basic trick' of anti-Semitism is to displace the inherent

social antagonism into the antagonism between the sound

social body, and the Jew as the force corroding it. Thus it isnot society itself which is 'impossible', based on antagonism,but the source of corruption is located in a particular entity,

the Jew, conceived as an external intruder. This displacement,

says Zizek, is facilitated by the standard association of Jews

with financial dealings. According to this association, the

source of exploitation and of class antagonism is located, not

in the basic relation between the working and the ruling

classes, but in the relation between the productive forces and

the merchants who exploit the productive classes, thereby

replacing organic co-production with class struggle. What

gives 'energy' to this displacement, however, is the way the

figure of the Jew condenses a series of heterogeneous antag

onisms: economic, political, moral-religious, sexual. So 'the

Jew' is portrayedas a

profiteer,a schemer, morally corrupt,

a

seducer of the sexually innocent, etc. In this way the figure of

the Jew is a symptomatic knot, a fantasy construction by

which the inherent antagonistic split, the antagonistic fissure

that traverses society, is simultaneously disavowed and dis

placed-externalizing or 'projecting' it into an outward positive

cause, whose elimination would finally allow for a restoration

of order, stability and identity (SOI: 124-128). But this




disavowal/displacement of the fundamental social antagonism,

this externalization/projection of the cause of social antago

nism into the figure of the Jew, clearly avoids confrontation

with social antagonism.6In this way the so-called 'Nazi-revolution' is at the same time

an exemplary case of pseudo-change, of a frenetic activity in the

course of which many things did change, but precisely so that

something-

that which really mattered-

would not change

(CHU: 125). As Zizek argues, Nazi anti-Semitism drew its en

ergy from anti-capitalist resistance. The Nazi ideology was thedream of having 'capitalism without capitalism', that is, capi

talism without its excess of social imbalance and disintegration

(WDR: 130-131). The reason for this disintegration was pre

cisely attributed to the figure of the Jew, whose 'excessive'

accumulation and greed were presented as the cause of social

antagonism. The dream was that, since the excess was intro

duced from outside, as the work of an alien intruder, its elim

ination would make it possible to obtain again a stable socialorganism: the reassertion of the corporatist ideology of societyas an organic Whole, a society in which the relation between its

parts is complementary, harmonious and balanced (TWN:

210).

This corporatist temptation, says Zizek, is the necessary

reverse of capitalism: it is the dream to have capitalismwithout capitalism, that is to say capitalism without its excess,

without the antagonism that causes its structural imbalance

(TWN: 210). Doesn't this also account for the disturbing

reality which emerged in Eastern Europe after the transition

period with its democratic enthusiasm, when one saw the

weakening of liberal-democratic tendencies in the face of the

growth of corporate national populism, with all its usual

elements, from xenophobia to anti-Semitism? (TWN: 200).

Why these chauvinist nationalist obsessions instead of an

openness toward ethnic diversity? Why did authoritarian

nationalism overshadow democratic pluralism? Shouldnot oneaccount for the reemergence of nationalist chauvinism in

Eastern Europe as a kind of protective 'shock absorber'

against the sudden exposure to capitalist openness and

imbalance?



284 R. MOOLENAAR

"ALL THAT IS SOLID....''

Marx already was fascinated by the 'deterritorializing' impactof capitalism, the dissolution of all traditional links: the well

known theme of 'all that is solid melts into air', from the

Communist Manifesto. As Marx describes it, capitalism'sconstant revolutionizing of production goes together with the

uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, resulting in

everlasting uncertainty and agitation. All fixed, fast-frozen

relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudicesand opinions,

are swept away, all new-formed ones become

antiquated before they can ossify... (TFA: 12 vv, and 40). The

whole point of Marx' analysis is that this unheard-of dissolu

tion of all traditional forms, does not bring about a society in

which individuals run their lives collectively and freely, but

engenders a form of anonymous Destiny, in the guise of market

relations (TTS: 339).

The traditional ideological mechanism to deal with thisuncertainty has been to acknowledge the fundamental unpre

dictability of the outcome of our acts on the individual level, but

that ultimately these acts are regulated or coordinated by the

Invisible Hand of the Market. We find here the liberal-capitalistic version of the Hegelian 'cunning of reason', as the myste

rious agency that somehow re-establishes the balance: each of us

pursues his/her particular interests, but the ultimate result of

this clash and interaction of the

multiplicity

of individual acts

and conflicting intentions should be global welfare. Today

however, in ourpost-modern 'risk-society', there is no Invisible

Hand whose mechanism, blind as itmay be, somehow reestab

lishes the balance, says Zizek. Not only do we not know what

our acts will in fact amount to, there even is no global mecha

nism regulating our interactions; no fictional Other Place in

which the accounts are properly kept and are finally given their

right perspective (TTS: 339-340). At the same time, however,

when the abstraction of market relations that run our lives is

brought to an extreme, the book market is overflowing with

psychological manuals advising us how to succeed, thus makingour success dependent on our proper attitude: another kind of

mystification What we have here is the false 'psychologization'




or 'personalization' of what are in fact objective social processes. With a somewhat twisted reference to Marx, one could

say that in contemporary capitalism the 'relations between

things' (the objective market relations) assume the phantasma

goric form of pseudo-personalized 'relations between people'.The proper question should thus not be 'how did the rich and

powerful do it', but how is the capitalist system structured - and

what is wrong with it-

that some acquire disproportionatewealth and power and others are reduced to near nothingness.

For this we have to question the very basics of the anonymous

logic of market relations (TTS: 349-351).

Marx' fundamental idea was that the anonymous market as

themodern form of Fate, could be superseded by establishing a

self-transparent society in which social life was controlled and

regulated by the 'collective intellect'. At the same time, however,

this was Marx' fundamental mistake-

and in a way it is not

surprising that this project found its 'perverted' realization in

'actually [real] existingsocialism'. For

despitethe extreme

uncertainty of the individual's fate caused by periodic paranoiac

political purges, it was perhaps the most radical attempt to

suspend the uncertainties and disintegration that pertain to

capitalist modernization (TTS: 339). In this regard Zizek re

minds is of the election slogan of Slobodan Milosevic's Socialist

Party in the first 'free' elections in Serbia: 'With us, there is no

uncertainty'. This slogan exemplifies in a way the logic of what

Lacan calls 'the discourse of the Master': its role is precisely to

introduce balance, to regulate the excess. With capitalism this

function of theMaster becomes suspended. This helps perhapsto grasp the corporatist temptation and the reemergence of

nationalist sentiments in Eastern Europe. It is as if, in the very

moment when the Communist chain preventing the free devel

opment of capitalism, that is, a deregulated production of ex

cess, was broken, it was countered by a demand for a new

Master who will rein it in.What one demands is the establish

ment of a stable and clearly defined social body which will restrain capitalism destructive potential by cutting off the

excessive element; and since this social body is experienced as

that of a nation, the cause of any imbalance 'spontaneously'assumes the form of a national enemy (TWN: 211).



286 R. MOOLENAAR

Capitalism can no longer be conceived as the domain of the

discourse of theMaster. Lacan takes over the Marxian theme

from theManifesto, of how capitalism dissolves all stable links

and traditions; how, at its onslaught, 'all that is solid melts into

air'. This does not concern only and primarily material products- i.e., capitalism's breathtaking dynamics of obsolescence

that, instead of stable products lasting for generations, inces

santly produces new and newer objects, resulting in growing

piles of discarded waste-

but even more so the stability of the

'symbolic order' that provides a definitive identification for

subjects (TFA: 40-^1). In this regard all contemporary forms of

'paranoiac over-identification' should be conceived, says Zizek,

as the inherent reverse of capitalism, as an inherent reaction to

it (TWN: 220). All the different forms of a passionate 'return' to

ethnic, cultural, religiousor nationalist 'roots', the violent

emotional moment of'recognition', of becomingaware of one's

'true' belonging,are an answer to the experience of social life as

fleeting and non-substantial, of being 'adrift in the world'.These returns to 'substance', however, are

impotent in the face

of the global march of capital; they are its inherent supplement,the 'limit/condition' of its functioning (TTS: 209). The more the

logic of capital becomes universal, the more its opposite will

assume features of 'irrational fundamentalism': not as remain

ders from the past, but as capitalism's inherent product. There

is no way out of this deadlock as long as the universal

dimension of our social formation remains defined in terms of

Capital (TWN: 220).

With a reference to Deleuze, Zizek points out that the cap

italist 'deterritorialization' is always accompanied by reemerg

ing 'reterritorializations'. In this regard we should notice the

inherent split in the field of particular identities themselves: on

the one hand, so-called 'fundamentalisms', which are preoc

cupied with the Identity of one's own group, implying the

practice of excluding the threatening others; on the other hand,

there is post-modern multiculturalist 'identity polities', aimingat the tolerant coexistence of ever-shifting, hybrid lifestyle

groups and their incessant diversification into subgroups, each

insisting on the right to assert its specific way of life. This

incessant multiplication of groups and subgroups with their




fluid, shifting identities, is possible only against the backgroundof capitalist globalization, which is always ready to satisfy their

particular demands. Far from containing any kind of subver

sive potential, the dispersed, plural, constructed subject -hailed

as 'subversive', by postmodern theorists- simply designates the

form of subjectivity that corresponds to'

late capitalism' and its

commodification of everyday life: the formulas for marking

'difference', 'resistance' or'authenticity'

areeagerly provided

by it's ever-expanding life style industry (TWN: 216). Ulti

mately, says Zizek. the split between fundamentalism and postmodern pluralist identity politics should be regarded as a 'fake',

concealing a deeper correspondence: both remain stuck in

particularism, leaving the global process of Capital intact. The

only way to break out of the self-perpetuating circle of glob

alization-with-particularization is by (re)asserting a dimension

of Universality against capitalist globalization (TTS: 210-211;

TWN: 220).

TRUE UNIVERSALITY: THE EMANCIPATORY

LEGACY OF EUROPE

The key component of the leftist position Zizek wants to

elaborate is an equation of the assertion of Universalism with a

militant, divisive position of one engaged in astruggle. So 'true'

universalists are not those who preach global tolerance of dif

ferences and all-encompassing unity, but those who engage in a

passionate fight for the assertion of the truth they are com

mitted to: a truth that demands for a radical subjective stance

and, precisely as such, is addressed to all and everybody. The

division itmobilizes is not the division between different cul

tures, groups and subgroups, but a division which runs 'diag

onally' or 'vertically' to the social and cultural divisions,

between those who recognize themselves in this truth, and those

who deny or ignore it (TTS: 226). This means acknowledgingthe radically antagonistic, that is political character, of social

life and accepting the necessity of taking sides as the only way

to be truly universal (TTS: 222). True universality is not the

never-won neutral space of 'horizontal' translation from one



288 R. MOOLENAAR

particular culture to another, but, rather, the violent experience

of how, across the cultural divide, we share the same 'vertical'

antagonism. (WDR: 66).

By reasserting the notion of Universalism, Zizek proposes a

return to the fundamental European emancipatory legacy.

Disregarding facile accusations of 'Eurocentrist cultural impe

rialism', he asks if one can imagine a leftist appropriation of the

European political tradition.7 With Ranci?re he identifies as the

core of this tradition the unique gesture of democratic political

subjectivation: themoment inwhich a particular demand is not

simply part of the negotiation of interests within the existingsocial space, but aims at something more, so that this demand

starts to function as a 'metaphoric condensation', signaling the

need for the global restructuring of the entire social space (TTS:

208). This is the intrusion of 'politics proper'-

in clear contrast

to post-modern post-politics, which is the pursuit of particularissues whose resolution must be negotiated within the 'rational'

global order that is allocating each particular part its properplace.

It was precisely this 'politization proper' which reemerged

violently in the disintegration of East European Socialism: the

explosion of what Zizek (referring to Etienne Balibar) calls

?galibert?: the unconditional demand for freedom-equality

solidarity-democracy, which unsettles or'explodes' any positive

order (TTS: 207). According to Zizek, itwas amisperception of

western commentators to see this demand as the confirmation

that the people of the east also wanted what the people in the

west already had-

automatically translating this demand into

the western liberal-democratic notion of freedom (multiparty

representational political space and global market economy).For this meant to reinscribe this demand within the confines of

a given order. Despite the later disappointments, however,

something did take place at this moment of 'sublime democratic

enthusiasm', which was a moment of authentic politization,

that was obfuscated by its later renormalization.The 'true' universality Zizek speaks about in regard to this

politization, ultimately concerns the division between two no

tions of universality: the division between those who accept the

positivity of the given social order as the ultimate horizon of




knowledge and action, and those who acknowledge the effi

ciency of the dimension of a truth, which is irreducible to and

unaccountable in the terms of the existing order (TTS: 227). To

comprehend this, one has to recognize how antagonism is

inherent to universality itself - that is, how universality itself is

always split into a 'false', concrete universality, that legitimizesthe existing division of the Whole into its functional parts and

the real/impossible demand of 'abstract' universality: the uni

versality of an Ideal, of a revolutionary demand, which remains

an irreducible excess that repeatedly destabilizes the given social order (TTS: 223-224). So, the question seems to be here: is

the universal 'abstract', that is potentially opposed to any

concrete order, setting in motion a permanent insurrection

against it, or concrete, in the sense that oneexperiences one's

very particular mode of social life as the specific way of par

ticipating in the universal social order? The point Zizek wants

to make is that the tension between the two is irreducible: the

excessof 'abstract-negative-ideal' universality, its unsettling

destabilizing force, can never be fully integrated into the har

monious whole of a 'concrete universality' (TTS: 213). 'True'

political conflict concerns precisely the tension between the

structured social body, in which each part has its allocated

place, and 'the part of no part' which unsettles this order on

account of the 'empty' or 'abstract' principle of universality

(TTS: 188). This means that the 'true Universal' as opposed to

the false, concrete Universality of the all-encompassing globalWhole is that of an endless and incessantly divisive struggle

(TTS: 227). Here one should oppose globalization and univer

salization, globalization being the name for the post-political

logic which progressively precludes the dimension of univer

sality that appears or 'shines through' in politicization proper

(TTS:201).

Following up on this, Zizek argues that the Leftist political

gesture par excellence is to contest the concrete existing uni

versal order on behalf of its 'symptom', that is to say, on behalfof the part which, although inherent to the existing universal

order, has no proper place within it. By this procedure of

'identifying with the symptom', one pathetically asserts and

identifies with the 'abject', that is, the point of inherent



290 R. MOOLENAAR

exception/exclusion

of the concrete positive order, as the only

point of 'true universality' (TTS: 224). In this sense he invokes

the shadowy existence of those who are condemned to lead a

'spectral life' outside the domain of the global order-

blurred

in the background, without even a proper particular place of

their own (in our Western societies one can think of illegal

immigrants or the homeless)- as the very site of political uni

versality (CHU: 313). This points again to the way the

dimension of the Universal is opposed to globalism: the uni

versal dimension appears or 'shines through' the symptomatic

displaced element, which belongs to theWhole, without being

properly its part (TTS: 225). The paradox is thus that there is

no Universal proper without the process of political litigation,of'the part of no part', of an 'out of joint entity', presenting or

manifesting itself as the stand-in for the Universal (TTS: 201).

This is the paradox of a universal singular, a singular that ap

pears as the stand-in for the Universal, destabilizing the 'nat

ural' functional order of relations in the social body (TTS: 188).So, within a given social whole it is precisely the element

which is prevented from actualizing its full particular identity,

that stands for its universal dimension (TTS: 224). In reference

to Ranci?re, Zizek claims that in politics, universality is as

serted when such an 'agent', with no proper place, 'out of joint',

posits itself as the direct embodiment of universality, against all

those who do have a place within the global order (CHU: 313).

The Greek demos, which is Ranci?re's

privileged example,stood for universality, not because it covered the majority of

the population, nor because it occupied the lowest place within

the social hierarchy, but because it had no proper place within

this hierarchy, and was a side of conflicting, self-canceling

determinations. Something similar goes for Marx' 'proletariat',

which stands for universal humanity, says Zizek, not because it

is the lowest, most exploited class, but because its very existence

is a 'living contradiction'-

that is, it gives body to the funda

mental imbalance and inconsistency of the capitalist social

whole (TTS: 225). This identification of the 'part of no part'-

the part of society with no properly defined place within it (or

resisting the allocated subordinated place within it)-

with the

Universal, is the elementary gesture of politization which is




discernable in all great democratic events. One can think of the

French Revolution, inwhich le troisi?me ?tat proclaimed itself

identical to the Nation as such, against the aristocracy and the

clergy; or of the collapse East European Socialism, when dis

sident 'forums' proclaimed themselves representative of the

entire society-

das Volk-

against the Party nomenklatura (TTS:

188).

The universality Zizek is defending is thus not a positive

universality with a determinate content, but an 'empty' uni

versality, a universality without a positive notion that would

specify its contours, a universality that 'exists' only in the guise

of the experience of the wrong or injustice done to the particular subject who politicizes it's predicament (TTS: 244, n. 51).In this regard, however, one has to distinguish between two

different 'subjects of enunciation': the assertion of a singular

universal, that is themeasure of politicization proper can either

be the direct statement of the excluded victim itself (of the

demos in ancient Athens, of the troisi?me ?tat in the FrenchRevolution, of das Volk in the crumbling GDR, or of Jews,

Palestinians, detained asylum seekers, Blacks, women, gays,

anywhere else today), which proposes its particular plight as

representative of the universality of 'humanity', or it can be the

statement of solidarity that ismade by others, for example, the

concerned 'enlightened public'? (TTS: 230-231). It is the dif

ference between the universal Public claiming: 'We are all them

(the excluded non-part)! and the excluded non-part claiming:'We are the true Universal (the People, Society, Nation,

Humanity...). The 'identification with the symptom' by others

than the symptomatic victims, however, can work in an ex

tremely ambiguous way: it can also induce a hasty claim that

our own predicament is in fact the same as that of he true

victims, which is a false metaphoric universalization of the fate

of the excluded (TTS: 229). The measure of the authenticity of

the pathetic identification, says Zizek, lies in its 'sociopolitical

efficiency' (TTS: 230). But this is of cause very difficult tomeasure. Still, Zizek maintains that, in a hierarchically struc

tured society, the measure of true universality lies in the way

parts within the hierarchically ordered whole relate to those 'at



292 R. MOOLENAAR

the bottom', excluded by and from all others (TTS:

224).

THE AUTHENTIC POLITICAL SPACE:

'KEEPING UP APPEARENCES'

It is important to notice that this procedure of 'identifying with

the symptom' is the exact obverse of the standard ideologico

critical move of recognizing a particular content behind someabstract universal notion. The standard move is to denounce

neutral universalityas false, so that, for example, the 'man' of

human rights has to be actually identified as the white male

property owner (TTS: 224). What we have here is the old

Marxist point of the gap between the ideological appearance of

the universal legal form and the particular interests that actu

ally sustain it (DST: 245). According to Zizek, however, we

should acknowledge with Ranci?re the radical ambiguity of thisMarxist notion of the gap between formal universal rights and

the economic reality of exploitation and domination. There are

two radically different ways to read it.On the one hand, there is

the standard symptomatic way, whereby the form of universal

rights, equality, freedom and democracy, is regarded as simplya necessary but illusory form of appearance (or expression) of

its concrete social content: the universe of exploitation and class

domination (TTS: 185). On the other hand, we have a much

more subversive way to consider this gap, according to which it

is conceived as a tension whereby the 'appearance' of equality

freedom (?galibert?), precisely, is not a mere appearance but

evinces an effectiveness of its own, which would allow to pushon a process of rearticulating the actual socio-economic rela

tions, by way of their progressive 'politicization' (DST: 245).8In this connection, Zizek evokes the old L?vi-Straussian term

'symbolic efficiency': the appearance of equality-freedom is a

symbolic fiction which, as such, possesses an actual efficiency of

its own. So one should resist, what Zizek calls, 'the properly

cynical temptation' of reducing this appearance to a mere

illusion that conceals a very different actuality. For the politi

cal, argues Zizek, is precisely the domain of appearance,




opposed to the social reality of class and other distinctions, the

reality of society as the articulated social body (TTS: 195). And

there only is 'appearance' in so far as a part not included in the

Whole of the Social Body (or included/excluded in a way

against which it protests) symbolizes its position as that of a

wrong, claiming, against other parts, that it stands for the

universality of equality-freedom (?galibert?) as such. This is

precisely how we encounter 'appearance' in contrast to the

'reality' of the structured social whole.9

Today, the effort 'to keep up appearances', says Zizek,stands for the effort tomaintain the properly political space of

appearance, against the onslaught of the post-modern all

embracing social body, whereby every universal form is al

ready regarded as a kind of 'regulatory compromise' between

the many particular interests (DST: 246). In this way the

argument of the classic Marxist critique of ideology is already

'cynically' included and instrumentalized, resulting in a false

transparency.With Peter

Sloterdijk,Zizek

recognizesthat

ideology's dominant mode today is cynical, which renders

impossible or vain the classic critical ideological procedure.The cynical subject is quite aware of the distance between the

ideological mask and social reality, but he none the less still

insists upon the mask. Cynical reason is no longer naive: one

knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular interest hidden behind an ideological universality, but

still one does not renounce it. The most elementary form of

ideology is probably Marx' phrase from Das Kapital: 'Sie

wissen das nicht aber sie tun es\ The formula would then

change into: 'they know very well what they are doing, yet

they are doing it' (SOI: 29-30; MI: 8). It is the paradox of an

enlightened false consciousness. With a disarming frankness,

Zizek says, one 'admits everything', yet this full acknowl

edgement of our economic and power interests does not in

any way prevent us from pursuing them. It is as if in late

capitalism 'words do not count'; whatever one says isdrowned in the general indifference; "the emperor is naked

and the media trumpet forth this fact, yet nobody seems reallyto mind

-that is, people continue to act as if the emperor is

not naked" (MI: 18).



294 R. MOOLENAAR

The main political problem today is precisely how to break

this cynicalconsensus. What evaporates, says Zizek, in today's

post-ideological universe is not so much reality occluded by

ideological phantasmagoria's, but appearance itself, that is the

appearance of some binding norm or ideal, its performative

strength. For as Zizek maintains, 'realism'-

taking things as

they 'really are'- is the worst ideology (DST: 246).

NOTES

1The signifier 'Lenin' stands for "the compelling FREEDOM to suspend

the stale existing (post) ideological coordinates, the debilitating Denkverbot

in which we live-

it simply means that we are allowed to think again" (RL:

15). In this regard, compare what Zizek has to say about how our 'freedoms'

(freedom of thought etc. etc.) themselves serve "to mask and sustain our

deeper unfreedom", in the introduction, of his dazzling philosophico

political pamphlet Welcome to the Desert of the Real (WDR: 2). This title, of

course, cites the welcoming words of Morphius, the resistance leader, spo

ken to Neo, when he has freed himself from the 'debilitating' computer

generated virtual world, where 'freedom' really means enslavement- as put

forward in the first sequal of the movie triology called The Matrix.2

Elsewhere, Zizek reminds us that according to the Marxian 'critique of

political economy', the structure of the universe of commodities and capital

is not just that of a limited empirical sphere, but 'a kind of socio-tran

scendental a priori', as the matrix (compare also note 1)which generates the

'totality of social political relations' (RL: 18). In Zizek's view, the rela

tionship between economy and politics is ultimately that of the well-known

visualparadox

of the 'two faces or a vase': one either sees the two faces or a

vase, never both of them. In general one either focuses on 'the political', and

the economy is reduced to the empirical 'servicing of goods'-Arendt of

course, but also the French (or French oriented) political theorists like

Badiou, Balibar, Ranci?re and Laclau- or one focuses on the economy,

whereby politics is reduced to a 'theatre of appearances' , that is, a passing

phenomenon which will disappear with the arrival of a 'post-political'

technocratic society, in which, according to the well known phrase, the

'administration of people' will vanish in the 'administration of things'. But,

asks Zizek, does one really have to make this choice? Shouldn't one rec

ognize, precisely, that we have no 'meta-language' which would enable us to

grasp, from one and the same neutral standpoint, both levels, for the rather

obvious reason that they are inextricably intertwined? But how then to

proceed? First, Zizek says, we have to progress from the 'political spectacle'

to its 'economic infrastructure', but then, in the second step, we have to




confront the irreducible dimension of the 'political struggle' in the very heart

of the economy (RL: 18-19).3

As I have already indicated, in 'post-polities', the conflict of global

ideological visions embodied in different parties that compete for power is

replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public

opinion specialists, multiculturalist policymakers) (TTS: 198). The formula

that best expresses the paradox of this post-ideological politics, says Zizek,

is Tony Blair's characterization of New Labour as the Radical Center.

While in the old days of political division, the center was by definition

moderate, that which makes New Labour 'radical' today is precisely the

radical abandonment of old

ideological

divides.

According

to this view, one

should take 'good ideas' without any prejudice and apply them whatever

their ideological origins. The answer to the question what these 'good ideas'

are seems obvious: 'good ideas are ideas that work'. But precisely here do we

encounter the gap that separates 'politics proper' from the mere adminis

tration of social matters. Authentic politics is not simply applying some

thing that works well within the framework of the existing relations, but it

intervenes in the very framework that determines how things work . In this

sense politics should not be conceived as 'the art of the possible', but rather

as 'the art of the impossible'- that is, the art of changing the very parameters

of what is considered 'possible' in the existing constellation (TTS: 199).4A Master-signifier is the key signifying element that brings about a certain

closure of a socio-symbolic field, by way of designating the supreme Good:

God, Truth, Nation, Democracy, the Cause etc (TWN: 217).5

Ideology, Zizek says, is by definition always 'ideology of ideology'. For,

doesn't ideology always assert itself by means of delimiting itself from an

other 'mere ideology'? According to Zizek this feature is universal.

Explaining this by way of an exampel he evokes the d?sint?gration of 'real

Socialism': "Socialism was perceived as the rule of 'ideological' oppression

and indoctrination, whereas the passage into democracy-capitalism was

experienced as deliverance from the constraints of ideology - however, wasnot this very experience of 'deliverance' in the course of which political

parties and the market economy where percieved as non-ideolocal, as the

'natural state of things', ideological par excellence?" (MI: 19).6

In this regard, Zizek argues, one should say that Nazi anti-Semitic vio

lence is not only 'factually wrong' (Jews are 'not really like that', exploiting

us, deceiving us, organizing a universal plot) and 'morally wrong' (unac

ceptable in terms of elementary ethical standards), but it is 'untrue' or 'false'

in the sense of an inauthenticity which is both epistemological and ethical.

For even if rich Jews 'really' exploited German workers, or seduced their

daughters, and so on, anti-Semitism, Zizek tells us, is still an emphatically

'untrue', pathological ideological condition. What makes it pathological is

the way social antagonism is displaced-obliterated by being projected into

thefigure of the Jew (CHU: 127).



296 R. MOOLENAAR

So, again, an ideology is not necessarily 'false' as to its positive content;

what really matters therefore is not the asserted content as such, Zizek ar

gues, but "the way this content is related to the subjective position implied by

its own process of enunciation" (MI: 8). This means that we are in 'ideo

logical space proper' the moment this content -'true' or 'false', it doesn't

really matter - is functional with regard to some relation of social domina

tion, legitimizing it in an inherently non-transparent way. In this regard one

should recognize how it is always possible to lie in the guise of truth. To fully

acknowledge this is the starting point of the critique of ideology. Let's take

another example. When a Western power intervenes in a Third World

countryon

account of vilolations of human rights, itmay well be 'true' thatin this country the most elementary human rights were not respected, and

that the Western intervention will indeed improve the human rights situa

tion. Yet such a legitimization none the less remains 'ideological', Zizek

maintains, in so far as it fails to take into account the true motives of the

intervention, the usual suspects: economic and geopolitical interests (MI: 8).

(And how to take them into account without becoming cynical about it: 'Of

course these interests are also at play on the background, what would you

expect otherwise?')

Coming back to the ideological question of anti-Semitisme, one schould

recognize, according to Zizek, how todays widespread Arab anti-Semitism

articulates a resistence against capitalism in a displaced mode. This recog

nition does not in any way justifiy it. On the contrary, one should radically

condemn it.What this recognition does involve, however, is that the way to

fight this anti-Semitism is not to preach the virtues of liberal tolerance, but

designate it as a fundamental gesture of ideological mystification and then to

try an express the underlying anti-capitalist motive in a direct, non-displaced

way. According to the same line of argumentation Zizek maintains that the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, in the most radical sense of the term, a false

conflict, a lure, an ideological displacement of the 'true' antagonism, which

has ultimately to do with the 'neocolonist terror of Capital'. The Arab

Palestinian call for 'unfreedom', in the form of reactionary 'fundamental

ism', should then be regarded as a form of resistance to this colonialistic

terror. The difficult task for the Palestinians, however, is to accept that

"their true ennemies are not the Jews but Arab regimes which ideologically

manipulate their plight in order, precisely, to prevent this shift - that is, the

political radicalization in their own states" (WDR: 130-131).7When Third World countries appeal to freedom and democracy they are

endorsing the European premise of universalism. In a sense the true

opposition todayis not one between the 'First world' and the 'Third

world',but the one between the whole of the First and the Third world, the

American Global Empire and its colonies, and what remains of the 'Second

World,' that is Europe (WDR: 146-147). It is relatively easy for the

American multiculturalist global Empire to integrate premodern local tra

ditions: the foreign body which it effectively cannot assimilate is the




European modernity. In this regard Zizek speaks about the 'weird pact'

between postmodern global capitalism and premodern societies at the ex

pense of modernity proper (WDR: 146).8

Examples: why shouldn't women vote too? why shouldn't conditions in

the workplace also be of a public political concern? As much as Zizek

venerates the efforts of the 'French oriented' theoreticians of the 'political

Universal' (Ranci?re, Balibar, Badiou, Laclau), there is at least one problem

that needs to be signalled: their relative disregard for the sphere of economy

, the sphere of 'material production' as the main site of political struggle and

intervention (RAG: 18-19). But despite the importance Zizek ascribes to this

matter,his own remarks

concerningit remain

very sketchyand scattered

and quite difficult to get a hold on. Cf. TTS: 396-397, n. 41, n. 45; DST:

133-140; RL: 22-23.9

This 'appearance' does not simply belong to the domain of phenomena,

but has to do with those 'magic moments' in which another, noumenal

dimension momentarily 'shines through' some empirical/contingent phenomenon. It comes into existence in the guise of an appearance of Another

dimension, which interupts the standard normal order of appearances qua

phenomena (TTS: 197). One should introduce here a distinction within the

order of appearance between phenomenal reality and the 'magic' appear

ances of Another Dimension within it (TTS: 197). The kind of'appearance'Zizek wants us to recognize is that of a 'sublime' or 'suprasensible'

dimension, that shines through the sensible image and as it were 'transub

stantiates' some aspect of reality into something that for a brief moment

radiates something behind it, an impossible Beyond (Eternity, God, Free

dom, Justice). In a sublime appearance, the positive imaginery content is a

'stand in' for this impossible Beyond (The Thing, God, Freedom, Justice).

The moment we enter this dimension of symbolic appearance, however, the

imaginary content is always inscribed or caught in a dialectic of void and

negativity (TFA: 105). To elaborate on this one should take into account

Zizek's discourse on the Real.

3e Hugo de Grootstraat 48-hs,

1052 LM Amsterdam

The Netherlands

E-mail: [email protected].

Documents

Moolenaar - Slavoj Žižek and the Real Subject of Politics