Morocco RBF Project, April 2016 Field Visitcompact2.cg.gov.ma/sites/default/files/annexe_6_-_final_report... · morocco rbf project, april 2016 field visit table of contents executive

Instiglio, Inc. www.instiglio.org

1

FINAL REPORT: TECHNICAL DIRECTIVE I

Morocco RBF Project, April 2016 Field Visit

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2

I. CONTEXT OF THE VISIT 3

1. PARAMETERS OF THE PROJECT 3 2. BACKGROUND OF THE VISIT 3 3. OBJECTIVES OF THE VISIT 4

II. THE PROCUREMENT AND DISBURSEMENT PROCESS IN MOROCCO 5

1. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN WHICH ANAPEC OPERATES 5 1.1. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND BUDGET 5 1.2. MECHANISMS OF EXTERNALIZATION OF ANAPEC’S SERVICES 6

2. THE PROCUREMENT AND DISBURSEMENT PROCESS REGULATING THE EXECUTION OF ANAPEC’S

PROGRAMS 7

III. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RBF PRACTICES 9

1. PAST AND CURRENT RBF PROGRAMS 9 1.1. PREVIOUS ANAPEC PROGRAMS: ACCOMPAGNEMENT INTEGRAL & ACCOMPAGNEMENT A

L’INSERTION 9 1.2. CURRENT ANAPEC PROGRAMS: TAEHIL 10

2. SERVICE PROVIDERS’ EXPERIENCE 12 2.1 DELIVERING TRAINING AS OPPOSED TO ENSURING PLACEMENT 12 2.2 BOTTLENECKS IN THE PROCEDURE 13 2.3 POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE EXPERIENCE 14

3. ANAPEC’S PERSPECTIVE 15 4. DIAGNOSIS OF CONSTRAINTS LIMITING THE SUCCESFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF RBF MECHANISMS

TARGETING VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IN MOROCCO 16

IV. POTENTIAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 18

1. WILLINGNESS OF THE DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS TO COLLABORATE WITH MCC/MCA 18 1.1 ANAPEC 18 1.2 MINISTRY OF EMPLOYMENT 18 1.3 MINISTRY OF FINANCE 18

2. ANAPEC’S SUGGESTIONS FOR THE RBF PROJECT 19 3. ANAPEC’S VISION FOR A POTENTIAL COLLABORATION WITH MCC/MCA 19

V. NEXT STEPS 20

ANNEX – LIST OF MEETINGS 21


2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In March – April 2016, Instiglio conducted a second field visit in Morocco. With the help of the Core Team, meetings

were held with a range of stakeholders: ANAPEC, other Governmental actors such as the Ministry of Employment and

the Ministry of Finance, and service providers who are currently working with ANAPEC. This second field visit was

designed as a technical one, in order for Instiglio to identify the constraints affecting RBF practices in intermediation

services in Morocco and provide MCC with information that would inform the design of the project in the following

stage.

The first objective of this visit was to identify potential barrier to RBF mechanisms in Morocco. The study of the

procurement and disbursement system in Morocco confirmed that there is no significant obstacle to the implementation

and the scaling up of RBF practices in the services externalized by ANAPEC:

The Fund through which ANAPEC’s budget is channeled allows for the flexibility required for RBF contracts.

The legal framework regulating procurement processes is also compatible with such practices.

All stakeholders (ANAPEC, Ministry of Employment and Ministry of Finance) place a strong emphasis on results

and have been involved in the implementation of RBF practices since 2006.

The second objective of the visit was to study the current RBF practices in order to identify their strengths and

weaknesses. Through information gathered during meetings with service providers and ANAPEC, Instiglio concludes

that ANAPEC’s RBF programs face severe challenges and could be significantly improved within the scope of this project:

Providers mostly lack the capacity and are not appropriately incentivized to conduct placement activities.

There are clear bottlenecks in ANAPEC’s procedures, which result in significant delays and heavy administrative

burden for providers. In addition to limiting the impact of RBF mechanisms, the procedural issues identified also

discourage other providers (some of which might have more expertise with intermediation services) from working

with ANAPEC.

During meetings held with several Heads of Departments and the Assistant Director General, ANAPEC

acknowledged the issues mentioned above and recognized their detrimental impact. A reflection process has already

been initiated within the agency with the aim to improve current practices. These discussions confirmed the

alignment of interest between MCC and ANAPEC.

ANAPEC’s ability to reach vulnerable population is also crucial to this project. There is a clear alignment of interests

between MCC and ANAPEC regarding the beneficiaries of this project, as ANAPEC’s new strategy is targeting

vulnerable populations in particular. However, the agency’s leadership has recognized the following constraints:

ANAPEC considers not-for-profits as the best best-placed potential providers to reach vulnerable populations but

thinks that they currently lack capacity to implement intermediation services.

As other providers, not-for-profits might also be discouraged from working with ANAPEC due to the bottlenecks

in the procedure. As not-for-profits tend to be smaller structures and are not generating revenues from the private

sector, they are more vulnerable and are not always able to assume the risk involved when working with ANAPEC.

Finally, the third objective of the field visit was to assess potential institutional arrangements for this project. The

suggestion made after the first field visit to work in collaboration with ANAPEC to improve its current RBF practices

was evaluated as a viable and potentially most impactful opportunity.

In the course of this field visit, all stakeholders confirmed their interest in collaborating with MCC as well as their

agreement with the strategic framework.

ANAPEC suggested a number of activities that could be undertaken as part of the RBF project, amongst which are

included technical assistance activities and processes aimed at improving current RBF practices.

ANAPEC has also expressed its willingness to discuss with MCC the scope of the project and define a concrete

plan of action in the next stage of the process.


3

I. CONTEXT OF THE VISIT

1. PARAMETERS OF THE PROJECT

As defined during previous stages of this project, the long-term goal of the RBF project is the improvement of the cost-

effectiveness of intermediation programs with a focus on scale and sustainability.

The key principle of project design is to ensure the sustainability of the benefits of the project beyond the duration of

the Compact. Other principles include:

• Aim for a gradual progression.

• Align the design to the Moroccan context, political priorities and implementation capacities of all stakeholders.

• Optimize administrative systems for the implementation of RBF contracts

• Adopt an approach that is rigorously informed by local and international experiences, and based on continuous

learning.

2. BACKGROUND OF THE VISIT

Instiglio conducted with MCC a first field visit in January 2016, which lead to the following conclusions:

A Social Impact Bond might not be the most appropriate and impactful solution for the Moroccan context;

ANAPEC, the Government agency responsible for intermediation services, already has RBF contracts in place;

Service providers have generally low capacity and not-for-profits are reticent to work with ANAPEC;

ANAPEC is a potential partner for MCC and would ensure the scale and sustainability of the benefits of the project.

Helping ANAPEC to improve and strengthen its current RBF practices was therefore identified as one of the key

options to be considered for this project.

Following this first field visit, Instiglio organized in coordination with MCC and the Core team a second visit to Morocco

in order to address the gaps that were identified.


4

3. OBJECTIVES OF THE VISIT

The previous field visit conducted in January 2016, Instiglio’s visit to Washington D.C. in February 2016 as well as

continuous conversations with MCC and the Core team, informed the design of a strategic framework by which MCC,

the Core Team, and ANAPEC will guide the next phases of the project..

Instiglio’s April field visit covered Stage 1 as described in the diagram above. Its objectives were threefold:

1. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of ANAPEC’s current RBF practices;

2. Identify the barriers preventing the implementation of partnerships between ANAPEC and a wider range of

providers, including not-for-profits;

3. Assess different options for the institutional implementation of the RBF project.

These objectives were chosen to allow MCC to define the roles of all stakeholders in the RBF project. This clarification

process would allow MCC to move forward to Stage 2, during which a plan of action would be designed.

In order to meet these objectives, we identified three axes of work for Instiglio’s visit in Morocco:

1. Study the procurement and disbursement system in Morocco in order to identify any legal and procedural barriers;

2. Study ANAPEC’s current RBF experiences both through interviews with service providers currently working with

ANAPEC, and meetings with Heads of Departments in ANAPEC;

3. Meet with a range of potential stakeholders in Morocco to assess their interest in collaborating with MCA on this

project and initiate a discussion on roles and potential activities that could form part of the project.


5

II. THE PROCUREMENT AND DISBURSEMENT PROCESS IN MOROCCO

1. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN WHICH ANAPEC OPERATES

The institutional framework in which ANAPEC operates provides flexibility at an operational and financial level. This

flexibility has allowed ANAPEC to implement RBF practices in its programs. However other stakeholders such as the

Ministry of Employment and the Ministry of Finance play a crucial role in the design of placement programs and the

disbursement of funds.

1.1. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND BUDGET

ANAPEC is the government agency, under the supervision of the Ministry of Employment (Ministère de l’Emploi et des

Affaires Sociales), that is formally responsible for implementing employment programs to facilitate intermediation in the

labor market.

The Ministry of Employment plays a very important role and works very closely with ANAPEC:

It is the actor responsible for providing strategic direction and defining the political framework with regards

to employment. As placement programs fit within these responsibilities, the Ministry of Employment designs

policies which ANAPEC executes.

Although ANAPEC has autonomy to execute policies, the Ministry of Employment also ensures that

ANAPEC’s actions remain in conformity with its mission and the regulatory framework. ANAPEC regularly

reports its activities to the Ministry of Employment.

Financially, ANAPEC is independent from the Ministry of Employment and has its own budget. However, it is

the Ministry of Employment that delegates to the General Director of ANAPEC the legal capacity to execute

this budget.

ANAPEC’s budget is entirely made up of subsidies from the Moroccan State and is administered by the Ministry of

Finance. It is channeled through a Fund called Fond pour la Promotion de l’Emploi des Jeunes.1 This Fund represents about

700 million Dirhams in 2016 and is divided between several agencies:

ANAPEC,

The Ministry of Vocational Training,

The Ministry of Industry and Trade, and

The Ministry of Agriculture.

The portion allocated to employment programs is the most significant and totaled 478 million Dirhams in 2016. The

Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Employment jointly determine the share attributed to each program.

Although the Moroccan Government operates with annual budgets, this Fund offers greater flexibility as there is no

requirement to spend the budget within a year of its allocation. Most of the employment programs last longer than a

year and the portion of the budget that has not been spent can simply be left in the Fund until its execution.

Within the Fond pour la Promotion de l’Emploi des Jeunes, ANAPEC’s budget comprises three components:

ANAPEC’s operating costs;

The budget allocated to each of ANAPEC’s current programs, amongst which the RBF programs;

The outstanding balance of previous years’ budget.

1 Article 15 of the legislation regulating the implementation of this Fund specifically mentions funding for providers delivering training

services targeting in particular young graduates who have been searching for employment for at least a year. See Dahir n° 1-94-282

du 15 safar 1415 (25 juillet 1994) portant promulgation de la loi n° 13-94 relative à la mise en œuvre du Fonds pour la promotion de l'emploi

des jeunes.


6

In 2016, the outstanding balance represented about 200 million Dirhams, accounting both for the remaining balance of

another agency’s programs (former OFPPT) and expenditures related to ANAPEC’s current programs. The latter

include expenditures which had been budgeted for previous years but have not been disbursed yet. Reasons for late

disbursement will be explained in Section III of this report.

The flexibility of the Fond pour la Promotion de l’Emploi des Jeunes enables ANAPEC’s existing RBF mechanisms to be

improved and replicated in other programs.

1.2. MECHANISMS OF EXTERNALIZATION OF ANAPEC’S SERVICES

ANAPEC is responsible for implementing employment programs but was not designed to deliver training and does not

have the capacity to do so. Training, and to a smaller extent, placement of beneficiaries is externalized to service

providers, whilst ANAPEC assumes the responsibility of most placement activities. For each of the programs that require

externalization of the services, a Technical Committee is established. It is composed of the following entities:

ANAPEC,

The Ministry of Employment, and

The Ministry of Finance.

The Technical Committee is responsible for drafting a Manual of Procedure, allowing ANAPEC to conduct a

procurement process for service providers on an annual basis.

Manuals of Procedures are available for each of ANAPEC’s programs. These Manuals are very detailed and include the

following provisions:

Definition of the objectives of the program and its legal / regulatory framework;

Target population, eligible employers and service providers;

Details of the procurement procedure to select and contract service providers;

List of activities that service providers are required to conduct;

Payment modalities and disbursement procedure;

Annexes containing all documents required from service providers for the procurement and disbursement

processes.

These Manuals are therefore crucial as they define in a very precise manner the implementation modalities of ANAPEC

programs, including the functioning of RBF mechanisms. The strengths and weaknesses of ANAPEC’s RBF practices

observed through interviews with a range of stakeholders are therefore rooted in the provisions of the Manuals.

The Ministry of Finance plays a particularly important role at all the stages of this externalization process:

First it participates in the determination of the budget allocated to ANAPEC and its programs and requires evidence

of results (i.e. services delivered) when doing so. This focus on results initiated by the Ministry of Finance has been

a key factor in the introduction of RBF mechanisms in employment programs.

It participates in the Technical Committee responsible for drafting the Manual of Procedures and designing the

implementation and payment modalities of each program.

The Ministry of Finance mandates the Contrôleur d’Etat to control the conformity of the procurement process

during which ANAPEC contracts service providers.

The treasurer representing the Ministry of Finance (Trésorier-Payeur) manages the disbursement process for

ANAPEC’s budget. He is responsible for controlling all expenses in order to ensure full adherence to the Manuals

of Procedure.


7

The Manuals of Procedures define the implementation modalities of each of ANAPEC’s programs. These Manuals

are crucial to this project as they establish the technical design of RBF programs. Any modification to existing

practices would therefore require a meeting of the Technical Committee in order to revise the Manuals of

Procedure. The role of the Ministry of Finance should also be stressed as particularly important in the externalization

process of ANAPEC’s programs.

2. THE PROCUREMENT AND DISBURSEMENT PROCESS REGULATING THE EXECUTION OF

ANAPEC’S PROGRAMS

Two pieces of legislation2 regulate the procurement process (passation des marchés) for the externalization of services

in Morocco. We can summarize it as follows:

1. Beginning of the procurement process

The first stage consists in identifying the needs for each particular components of the programs and securing the

corresponding budget. According to these, the contracting agency initiates the procurement process. A cahier des charges

specifies the requirements for service providers and lists activities they would be contracted to carry out, in accordance

with the Manual of Procedures. The Ministry of Finance standardized some aspects of the cahier des charges. It also

mandates the Contrôleur d’Etat to verify the conformity of this document to the legal framework and prevent anti-

competitive behaviors. However, in theory, payment modalities can vary according to the service sought and there is a

certain degree of flexibility.

2. Request for proposals and evaluation of applications

The Moroccan legislation establishes a strict framework and clearly defined steps for evaluating service providers’

proposals. The procedure encompasses both a technical and financial evaluation3 and the legislation requires some of

2 Code des marchés (Décret du 20 mars 2013) and Cahier des Clauses Administratives Générales EMO. 3 This evaluation is led by a commission called ‘Commission d’ouverture des plis’ or ´Commission d’appel d’offre´. It comprises of a

representative of the contracting agency acting as President of the Commission, two other representatives of the contracting agency,


8

these meetings to be held publicly. Importantly for RBF contracts, the contracting agency enjoys the flexibility to

determine which weight to give to technical factors versus financial ones. The contracting agency also estimates the

price of the service and publishes it along with the request for proposals, in order to guarantee transparency for all

potential providers.

3. Signature of the contract

Following the selection of the successful candidate, the cahier des charges is transformed into a contract. The terms of

the contract are copied from the Manual of Procedures, which leaves no room for negotiation between the contracting

agency and the service provider.

4. Implementation of the contract

During the implementation phase, the provider implements the activities and delivers the services established by the

contract and the Manual of Procedures.

5. Preparation of payment files

Upon completion of the activities (in this case, training and in some cases placement), service providers gather a number

of documents demonstrating that these took place. Manuals of Procedures establish a strict list of required documents,

which is reproduced in the contract.

6. Verification of the conformity of the files & approval of payment

The Trésorier-Payeur is responsible for evaluating the conformity of the documents with the Manual of Procedures and

for authorizing the payment when he is satisfied with the validity of every single piece. If the Trésorier-Payeur identifies

an issue with a file, ANAPEC returns the file is to the service provider for correction.

There is no incompatibility between the Moroccan procurement process and RBF:

Some of ANAPEC’s current contracts with service providers already include RBF mechanisms. Although these

contain lists of activities that service providers are required to conduct, there does not seem to be any rule

preventing this list of activity to be removed from future contracts and payments to be linked to results further.

The content of the cahier des charges, and therefore of contracts, is mostly left to the discretion of the contracting

agency, although the Ministry of Finance reviews them.

one of which from the relevant department; one representative of Tresorerie Generale and another representative of the Ministry

of Finance for contracts above 50 million Dhirams (Art. 35 du Code des marchés).


9

III. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RBF PRACTICES

1. PAST AND CURRENT RBF PROGRAMS

Instiglio’s meetings with ANAPEC, staff of local ANAPEC agencies and service providers provided a good overview of

the different programs implemented by ANAPEC. This report focuses exclusively on programs with an RBF component,

which we summarize below:

1.1. PREVIOUS ANAPEC PROGRAMS: ACCOMPAGNEMENT INTEGRAL & ACCOMPAGNEMENT

A L’INSERTION

Accompagnement intégral and Accompagnement à l’insertion were two programs initiated in 2006. Their objective was

to externalize placement services by contracting service providers to accompany job seekers in the search process,

orientate them and help them secure an internship or employment contract. If needed job seekers could be referred

to trainings, but these two programs were exclusively designed around placement. The population they were targeting

was different: Accompagnement à l’insertion focused on graduates whilst Accompagnement intégral was designed to

target those harder to place, i.e. job seekers registered with ANAPEC for more than a year.


10

Both of these programs included RBF mechanisms:

Accompagnement intégral: 70% of payment for training activities and 30% for placement4

Accompagnement à l’insertion: 1000 Dirhams for placement in an internship and 2000 Dirhams for placement in a

CDD or CDI (fixed-term or permanent employment contracts).5

Accompagnement intégral was particularly relevant to this project as it addressed more specifically MCC´s target

population. However, both of these were cancelled in 2008. ANAPEC gave a number of reasons to explain their failure:

ANAPEC found that few NGOs with the expertise sought were willing to participate in the procurement process;

The target population (harder to place job seekers) was a new one for ANAPEC as well as for the providers and

they both lacked expertise and capacity;

ANAPEC did not provide the appropriate level of support and capacity-building for providers;

There was not enough training available for beneficiaries when a need for it was identified;

The programs were implemented nationwide but job seekers were often located far from the providers.

ANAPEC concluded that the programs were too ambitious and not in line with the capacity of both the agency and the

providers at that time. It felt that the approach needed to be reviewed and stopped the programs. ANAPEC indicated

that there was interest in revisiting these programs but it would favor a more gradual approach in the future with pilots

in certain regions rather than a national scale. It should be noted that some of the reasons mentioned above are also

relevant to other programs still in operation such as TAEHIL FQR.

1.2. CURRENT ANAPEC PROGRAMS: TAEHIL

The TAEHIL program comprises several components. Two of them include RBF mechanisms: Formation Contractualisée

pour l’Emploi (FCE) and Formation Qualifiante ou de Reconversion (FQR). These two particular programs, established

in 2008, have very different characteristics and face different challenges. Overall ANAPEC and service providers consider

FCE as a successful program whilst FQR faces additional challenges.

Formation Contractualisée pour l’Emploi (FCE)

FCE is a tripartite program between ANAPEC, service providers and employers. It follows several steps:

1. Employers initiate the process by identifying a need for training in their recruitment process and contact ANAPEC.

2. Once ANAPEC validates the demand, the employer is free to choose a service provider, which ANAPEC also has

to approve.

3. The employer and the service provider design the content of the training in collaboration, it is tailor-made for the

employer’s particular needs.

4. The employer is also involved in the monitoring of the training activities and often significantly involved throughout

the process.

Employers select themselves the candidates but commit to recruit them if they consider the training to have been

successful. However, the definition of what constitutes success of the training is left to the discretion of the employer.

If the employer is not able to recruit at least half of the trained candidates, it has to justify its reasons to ANAPEC.

4 Articles 5A and 6A of the Manual of Procedures refers to a successful placement as ‘placement in a company’ and does not define

these terms. 5 The Manual of Procedures (Art. 4C) only specifies the type of contract (fixed-term or permanent) and does not establish any other

requirement.


11

Providers set the cost of training, although the Manual of Procedures establishes an upper limit of 40 Dirhams per hour

of training. In addition, this program includes an RBF component as providers receive an additional payment (20% of the

gross value of the contract multiplied by the placement rate) for each candidate successfully placed (i.e. who has signed

an employment contract), either with the employer who initiated the training, or another one. However, providers will

only receive the payment corresponding to the training if they ensure the placement of at least 60% of the group.

Overall the actors interviewed during the field visit consider FCE a successful program. The involvement of the

employer throughout the training considerably facilitates placement. ANAPEC estimates that the placement rate for

FCE is around 75%. However, it is impossible at this stage to determine whether these beneficiaries would have

been successfully placed without ANAPEC’s funding. In addition, this program targets a population of graduates

(those with at least the baccalauréat or a vocational training degree) and employers are responsible for selecting the

candidates. TAEHIL FCE does not specifically target vulnerable and hard to place populations.

Formation Qualifiante ou de Reconversion (FQR)

The other relevant TAEHIL program, FQR, does not involve employers. It follows several steps:

1. On a yearly basis, ANAPEC undertakes a prospective study during which local agencies anticipate the need for

training in some specific sectors in their area. Regional agencies gathered the data and present it in the form of a

training map.

2. Based on the needs identified by region and by sector, ANAPEC publishes a Request for Proposals as described in

Section II.

3. Once providers have been selected, they sign a contract (Convention) with ANAPEC. This contract specifies the

activities they are bound to implement, including the particular type of training and number of hours.

4. Training provided within the framework of FQR lasts for 3 months and is more standardized than in FCE’s case.

During the course of the training, the local ANAPEC agency conducts regular visits and controls the training

program, number of beneficiaries present and number of hours of training delivered.

As in FCE, payment comprises two elements: training and placement. Each provider sets the cost of training in their

proposals within the upper limit of 30 Dirhams per hour established in the Manual of Procedures. In addition, for each

candidate placed upon completion of the training, providers can claim 2000 Dirhams.6 If service providers do not ensure

the placement of the beneficiaries 3 months after completion of the training, these can also benefit from ANAPEC’s

regular intermediation services.

The population targeted by this program is broad but ANAPEC is responsible for pre-selecting candidates and makes a

particular effort to reach out to those that they consider hard to place, i.e. who have been registered for more than a

year. After this shortlisting process, service providers are in charge of selecting the candidates, in order to ensure their

motivation and fit for the job. The latter is particularly important in this program, as a large portion of beneficiaries

comprises graduates who are qualified in a sector for which there is no demand in the labor market and are being re-

oriented towards a different occupation.

6 Providers are not required to demonstrate that the placement was obtained as a result of the training but must submit a copy of

the employment contract to receive the portion of payment related to placement. The Manual of Procedures only indicates that the

role has to correspond to the training undertaken but does not define placement any farther.


12

FQR suffers from more significant challenges, which will be examined in detail in the following sections. ANAPEC

estimates that 53% of beneficiaries have found an employment within a year of completion of the training.7 As for

FCE, it is also difficult to know if the outcome would have been the same for the beneficiaries without the training

funded by ANAPEC and if successful placements were the result of the provider’s effort, ANAPEC services or

beneficiaries’ own endeavor.

2. SERVICE PROVIDERS’ EXPERIENCE

This section examines the experiences shared by service providers who are currently working with ANAPEC on either

of the two relevant TAEHIL programs: FCE and FQR. These included mostly private providers as well as one public

provider (OFPPT). These interviews highlighted two types of constraints affecting TAEHIL FCE and FQR:

1. Many providers lack the expertise and capacity to ensure placement of beneficiaries. In addition, the payment

offered does not provide an adequate incentive to encourage them to exert additional efforts to ensure placement.

2. Bottlenecks in the procedure can discourage providers from demonstrating their placement results to ANAPEC. It

can also be assumed that the challenges incurred by ANAPEC’s rigid disbursement system dissuade other providers

from working with the agency.

2.1 DELIVERING TRAINING AS OPPOSED TO ENSURING PLACEMENT

Although both training and placement are objectives of the TAEHIL programs, these are two different types of services.

Not all of the providers currently working with ANAPEC are prepared or willing to undertake both.

Some of the providers Instiglio interviewed during the visit are experienced training centers delivering degrees but

have no experience or capacity to assist job seekers in their search. These providers are currently working with

ANAPEC because they cover their costs and generate profit from the hourly training rate. However, they do not

aim to help place beneficiaries.

Other providers have existing networks in some specific industries and are able to provide some intermediation

services between beneficiaries and employers. For instance, they might organize workshops with the presence of

local businesses or circulate offers for internships or employment. These providers might help beneficiaries but do

not necessarily pursue placement as an objective.

It therefore appears that in most cases, TAEHIL FQR program is not meeting its objective of placing beneficiaries. Some

providers have informed Instiglio that they considered the incentive for ensuring placemen too low to make this a

profitable activity. In the current state of the labor market in Morocco, the 2000 Dirhams offered by ANAPEC for each

successful placement do not seem to provide appropriate revenue for providers to pursue additional activities in which

they often lack experience. The difficulties encountered in demonstrating placement to ANAPEC also represent

additional costs for providers, as detailed in the following section.

In the case of FCE, placement rates are higher due to the involvement of the employer from the selection of beneficiaries

to the completion of the training. Most of the time providers are only expected to deliver good quality training and

guaranteeing placement8 does not require any additional effort. However, in some cases employers decide not to recruit

the totality of beneficiaries trained. In this case providers will not receive the portion of payment allocated to placement,

unless they can place the person trained with another employer. Although RBF was designed in this program as a quality

control mechanism for the training provided, in some cases employers’ decision not to hire are due to external

7 Statistics provided by ANAPEC from the satisfaction survey completed amongst beneficiaries of TAEHIL FQR in 2014. ANAPEC

was not able to reach 47% of beneficiaries. 8 As for FQR, providers are not required to demonstrate that the placement was obtained as a result of the training but must submit

a copy of the employment contract to receive the portion of payment related to placement.


13

circumstances or changes in the business’ strategy. If the employer decides to recruit less than 60% of those who have

been trained, the provider is not even able to claim payment for the training activities. This rule is not established by

the Manual of Procedures and is not included in the contract signed between ANAPEC and providers, but originates

from an internal ANAPEC document. Providers have therefore frequently mentioned this threshold for placement

results as a challenge.

2.2 BOTTLENECKS IN THE PROCEDURE

All the providers interviewed considered bottlenecks in the procedure as significant challenges when working with

ANAPEC, that can add to the cost of delivery. We have identified bottlenecks at different stages of the procedure, as

shown in the diagram below, and expand on the most salient ones below.

Stage 3: Signature of the contract

Following completion of the procurement process, providers often experience delays affecting the date at which they

are able to start the training. In the case of FQR, several steps are needed from the signature of the contract to the

shortlisting of beneficiaries by ANAPEC and the final selection operated by the providers. Similarly, for FCE, ANAPEC

is responsible for validating the employer’s request through a physical visit to the business and approving the provider

if it has not previously worked with ANAPEC. This process can take a few months. It is not uncommon that by the time

approval has been secured and the contract signed, the beneficiaries who had been selected are no longer available.

Stage 5: Preparation of payment files by providers

Major challenges have been brought to Instiglio’s attention regarding this stage of the procedure:

The Manuals of Procedures for both TAEHIL programs establish a list of documents that providers are required to

submit to ANAPEC in order to receive the payment. This list includes documents proving the identity of each of

the participants and trainers as well as confirming the number of hours of training delivered.

The file ultimately requires approval of ANAPEC’s Trésorier-Payeur who is responsible for controlling its

conformity with the Manual of Procedures.

In the event that the provider has made a mistake (e.g. a mistake in the exact name of one of the participant or any

similar detail), the Trésorier-Payeur automatically rejects the file, which is returned to the service provider for


14

correction (see stage 6 for details on the process). However, it is sometimes impossible for service providers to

correct the mistake, as they are not always able to contact beneficiaries after the training has been completed. In

such case, providers are in practice compelled to forsake the payment of the training for this particular beneficiary.

In the case of FCE, as the employer works closely with the service provider, demonstrating placement is not an issue.

However, in the case of FQR, providers face additional difficulties. In order to receive the 2000 Dirhams offered by

ANAPEC, they have to provide a certified copy of the beneficiary’s employment contract. In most cases, unless providers

have existing ties with local businesses, employers are reluctant to provide such confidential documents and are not

incentivized to do so. In addition, even beneficiaries are reluctant to reveal their current employment status to service

providers or ANAPEC staff members after program completion. They fear that if they inform ANAPEC that they have

found employment, they might not be able to access better opportunities. Providers working on the FQR program have

recurrently referred to this cumbersome process and many claimed to have ensured placement for a large proportion

of beneficiaries but to never have received any payment from ANAPEC for these results. Following such frustrating

experiences, most of the providers interviewed indicated no longer pursing payment for placement.

Considering the difficulties they face in obtaining and demonstrating placement results, providers working with ANAPEC

on the FQR program have all recognized covering their costs and generating profits from their training fees, thus

discouraging them from applying any particular effort to facilitate placement. Some of them recommended to increase

the amount awarded for placement to 50% of the overall cost in order to provide additional incentives to providers.

Stage 6: Verification of the conformity of the files & approval of payment

The last stage of the procedure has also been identified as a bottleneck and a significant challenge for providers working

with ANAPEC. As ANAPEC currently has no information system allowing for the electronic circulation of documents,

files physically go through several transfers:

1. Once the provider has sent the file, a local ANAPEC agency reviews it.

2. The local agency sends it to the regional agency.

3. The regional agency then sends it to ANAPEC’s headquarters in Casablanca.

4. ANAPEC staff verifies the file.

5. When ANAPEC staff is satisfied with the file, it transmits it to the Trésorier-Payeur.

6. The Trésorier-Payeur verifies the conformity of all documents and approves the payment.

In the best of cases when the Trésorier-Payeur finds no issue with the file, providers have estimated that the payment

is made within a few months. However, when even a single issue is identified, the file is sent back to the provider through

the same channel. Instiglio interviewed providers who waited for 3 years in total to receive payment for the training

they provided. It has been stressed that the local ANAPEC agency plays an important role in verifying the files prepared

by providers and that those who had more experience working with ANAPEC were less likely to make mistakes in the

documents and therefore to get their files rejected. In addition, because of the lack of information system, service

providers are currently unable to locate their files and determine whether it is being held at the local, regional or central

level.

These challenges significantly discourage some providers from working with ANAPEC. All the providers interviewed

during this field visit were despite this working with ANAPEC, but most of them claimed that they realized the major

part of their revenue working directly with the private sector (which pays significantly higher hourly rates) or, to some

extent, with TAEHIL FCE. They might be hesitant to work with ANAPEC, in particular with the TAEHIL FQR program,

more than they currently do. These bottlenecks in the procedure are therefore likely to limit ANAPEC’s ability to

partner with a wider pool of service providers, in particular not-for-profits that do not have the financial capacity to

mitigate these risks.

2.3 POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE EXPERIENCE

Despite these challenges, all the service providers Instiglio interviewed during this field visit were still working with

ANAPEC. To explain their decision, they most often referred to the collaborative attitude of ANAPEC staff, who


15

accompanied them as much as they could, and the social nature of the program. The existing ties between ANAPEC’s

local agencies and service providers are therefore often responsible for the continuity of the professional relationship.

There was an overall recognition that challenges associated with working with ANAPEC were due to the rigidity of the

procedure rather than to the attitude and willingness of the agency itself.

3. ANAPEC’S PERSPECTIVE

In the course of several meetings with Instiglio and the Core team, ANAPEC acknowledged all the issues mentioned

above and expressed its intention to work towards an improved and simplified procedure.

Regarding the procedural bottlenecks observed, ANAPEC’s conclusions were as follows:

Both ANAPEC staff in charge of verifying the files and the Trésorier-Payeur mandated by the Ministry of Finance

recognized the significant delays in the payment procedure. They also expressed concerns about the issues these

delays cause to service providers.

The root cause of the procedural bottlenecks was identified in the Manuals of Procedures, which establish the list

of documents required for payments to be approved.

The lack of information system was also mentioned by ANAPEC as slowing down the payment process and limiting

transparency.

ANAPEC recognized that these procedural challenges discourage some providers from working with them.

In addition, discussions held with ANAPEC provided context on the current preoccupations regarding the results of

RBF programs:

The placement results generated by the FQR programs (according to data generated by ANAPEC’s local agencies

and call centers which conduct follow-up surveys with beneficiaries) are considered as low (35-45%). This is

particularly striking when they are compared to FCE’s placement results (around 75%).

ANAPEC also acknowledged that extremely few payments are being made for placement results to service

providers working on FQR and that the verification system (requiring a certified copy of the employment contract)

is heavy for providers.

ANAPEC wishes to review the hourly rates for training and the incentives provided for placement. As tariffs have

not been revised since 2008, aligning them to the market is expected to attract providers with more expertise in

intermediation services.

Although placement results are still considered very important, the Ministry of Employment and ANAPEC also wish

to put more emphasis on beneficiaries’ employability. They consider that there is an intrinsic added value in training

programs as they provide tools to beneficiaries, enabling them to find employment independently. Although there

is currently no established method for measuring the quality of the training delivered, the Ministry of Employment

and ANAPEC have both expressed interest in designing appropriate indicators.

It appears clearly that there is willingness within ANAPEC to improve current practices and implement more effective

RBF mechanisms. All of the TAEHIL programs are currently under evaluation: a procedural evaluation should be

completed shortly and will be followed by a quantitative evaluation. These results are expected to provide compelling

arguments for reforms. Two proposals in particular are being actively considered and developed:

An information system which would allow service providers to view the status of their payment and to submit

documents online; and

A revision of the Manuals of Procedures, which would simplify procedures and reduce the list of documents

required. This move towards a more flexible approach in order to reduce the administrative burden would be

accompanied with the implementation of external and independent control mechanisms.

ANAPEC has made recent efforts in the same direction in other non-RBF programs. For instance, the Manual of

Procedures of another TAEHIL program has reduced to three the list of required documents for payment. It has also


16

allowed service providers to upload some documents online. Similarly, in FCE, the responsibility for approving the

contract between ANAPEC and service providers has recently been transferred to the regional level. This devolution

process should provide more fluidity and speed to the procedure. These examples show that there is an

acknowledgment of the challenges currently faced by all actors in the intermediation market, and a shared interest of

all Governmental stakeholders to work towards an improvement of current practices.

In addition, ANAPEC expressed its interest in revising the former RBF programs Accompagnement intégral and

Accompagnement à l’insertion. Vulnerable populations are of interest to MCC and are also a key focus of ANAPEC’s

Strategy for the next four years. M. Benkhalil recognized that partnering with not-for-profits through an improved

version of these two former programs would be the most effective way to reach this target population. Although there

are no legal barriers to signing such partnerships, this strategy would require significant adjustments to the way ANAPEC

currently externalizes its services. Aside from a few large NGOs and professional associations, most not-for-profits

tend to be smaller, less financially stable and currently lack capacity to work with ANAPEC or to invest time and

resources before receiving payment. In order for these revised programs to be successful, ANAPEC therefore

contemplates providing local not-for-profits with some upfront funding and signing partnership agreements that would

cover a number of years. With such medium-term visibility, not-for-profits could recruit staff and ANAPEC could train

them.

4. DIAGNOSIS OF CONSTRAINTS LIMITING THE SUCCESFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF RBF

MECHANISMS TARGETING VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IN MOROCCO

We can summarize the constraints and challenges in the implementation of RBF mechanisms in Morocco, as described

by service providers and ANAPEC, as follows:


17

1. Constraints affecting RBF practices

Three types of constraints affect RBF practices in Morocco and explain in particular the challenges faced by FQR:

1. Capacity of stakeholders: as explained above, many service providers lack expertise and capacity to successfully

place beneficiaries.

2. Technical design: ANAPEC and the other stakeholders involved in the Technical Committee which drafted the

Manual of Procedures, chose placement rates as the outcome metrics for the RBF mechanisms. However, the

payment rate set for placement does not seem to provide the right incentive to service providers and

discourages them from undertaking fully these activities. In addition, the Ministry of Employment and ANAPEC

also place some emphasis in the intrinsic value of the training as a tool to improve beneficiaries’ employability.

However, there is currently no established method in Morocco to assess the quality of training and providers

are not incentivized based on the value the training provides to beneficiaries. All stakeholders including ANAPEC

and service providers have highlighted the need to develop new and diversified indicators.

3. Regulatory / administrative environment: the rigidity of the verification system can also work as a discouraging

factor for providers to report their placement results (results not accounted for), or lead them to limit their

involvement in these activities (results not achieved) and can severely limit their flexibility in an RBF contract.

2. Constraints limiting ANAPEC’s ability to reach vulnerable populations through partnerships with

not-for-profits

Two types of constraints affect ANAPEC’s ability to enter into partnerships and work with a wider range of

providers:

1. Capacity of stakeholders: aside from a few large NGOs, most of the not-for-profits operating in this sector are

small structures lacking capacity, both financially and in terms of expertise, to implement a contract with

ANAPEC. Details can be found in the last field visit report (January 2016) and ANAPEC confirmed this

observation during meetings conducted in April.

2. Willingness of stakeholders: difficulties such as those incurred by the rigidity of the procedure or the

considerable payment delays, can also result in limiting the number of providers willing to work with ANAPEC.

This is particularly true for smaller structures, such as not-for-profits which do not benefit from the financial

stability that working directly with the private sector provides to other service providers.


18

IV. POTENTIAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Assessing the potential institutional arrangements for the implementation of this project was also an objective of this

field visit and was designed to help MCC define the roles of each stakeholder in the RBF project. The interviews

conducted confirmed that the different stakeholders are willing to collaborate with MCC and have made suggestions to

help shape the design of the RBF project.

1. WILLINGNESS OF THE DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS TO COLLABORATE WITH MCC/MCA

1.1 ANAPEC

ANAPEC is the most obvious stakeholder for this project. As has already been established, it is the agency responsible

for implementing intermediation and employment programs. Because of its limited capacity, but also because it sees its

future role as an ‘organizer of the labor market’ rather than an implementer, ANAPEC externalizes most of its

intermediation programs to service providers. Through this externalization, RBF mechanisms are already being

implemented in a couple of programs. However, as detailed in the previous section, all the actors involved and in

particular ANAPEC recognize that these programs suffer from challenges and that existing practices need to be

improved. In parallel with MCC’s RBF project, ANAPEC has already initiated a reflection process on these practices.

There is therefore a clear alignment of interest between MCC and ANAPEC.

Meetings with the Director General (M. Doukkali) and Assistant Director General (M. Benkhalil) of ANAPEC confirmed

their willingness to collaborate with MCC. The strategic framework designed by MCC and the Core team (see Section

I) was presented to them and did not raise any issue. At this stage, ANAPEC’s leadership indicated its readiness to

initiate a conversation on the concrete activities that MCC/MCA could support within the RBF project.

1.2 MINISTRY OF EMPLOYMENT

The Ministry of Employment confirmed its interest in the project and in collaborating with MCC/MCA. Although the

Ministry of Employment is not a direct stakeholder, it is the Ministry responsible for designing the vision and policy

directions for ANAPEC as well as for supervising its technical work. It is also involved in the design of employment

programs and would play an important role in the Technical Committee charged with revising the Manuals of

Procedures. Ensuring its buy-in is therefore key to the success of the project.

1.3 MINISTRY OF FINANCE

The Ministry of Finance is not a direct stakeholder either, but its importance for this project became apparent during

this field visit:

The Ministry of Finance initiated the focus on results, which led ANAPEC to implement RBF mechanisms in its

contracts with providers.

The strict procedures currently regulating the implementation of the TAEHIL programs (Manuals of Procedures)

were established to limit risks of abuse. The Ministry of Finance, represented by the Trésorier-Payeur, is responsible

for controlling conformity with the procedure and approving the use of public funds.

The Ministry of Finance would be involved in any revision of the Manuals of Procedures. Its approval would be

required for any simplification or change in the verification system.

The Ministry of Finance also mandates the Contrôleur d’Etat to evaluate the conformity of the procurement

process. His approval is required for any request for proposals.

During the course of this visit, Instiglio met with a representative of the Ministry of Finance as well as with ANAPEC’s

Trésorier-Payeur. Both expressed their awareness of the issues mentioned in the previous section, and their willingness

to contribute to improving current practices in collaboration with ANAPEC.


19

2. ANAPEC’S SUGGESTIONS FOR THE RBF PROJECT

M. Benkhalil. ANAPEC´s Assistant Director General presented to Instiglio and the Core Team a number of activities

that ANAPEC is interested in developing in order to improve its current practices and extend its reach. These can be

used as a basis for further discussions with MCC and the Core Team.

The ideas presented include the ones presented during the Appel à idées and some of them have already been introduced

in the previous section. They follow three axes:

1. Improving ANAPEC’s current practices

The key outcome of this axis would be the establishment of a new system of payment and control. This system would

be designed in order to be significantly more flexible than the current one and would be accompanied with enhanced

control mechanisms. In parallel, ANAPEC expressed interest in revising the rates currently used for training and

placement and designing clearer rate cards.

Both of these reforms would require revising the Manual of Procedures. However, this approach could significantly

improve services providers’ experience when working with ANAPEC. It is also expected to attract service providers

who have acquired expertise in the intermediation space but are currently unwilling to work with ANAPEC. Revising

the rates and payment modalities of the TAEHIL programs could similarly directly affect the impact of RBF mechanisms.

2. Development of tools and capacity building

ANAPEC suggested a number of activities in order to build its capacity:

Development of an information system which would cover the whole procedure, as well as follow-up activities with

beneficiaries and providers;

Development of online tools to evaluate candidates’ skills and orientate them towards occupations for which there

is demand in the labor market;

Development of partnerships with other organizations in order to aggregate and publish a higher number of

vacancies;

Implementation of sectorial programs in industries where demand is strong and in order to reach hard to place

populations;

Design of set programs for training in order to standardize the content and pedagogical approach;

Evaluation of the quality and added value of training for a list of about ten occupations. This activity was also strongly

suggested by the Ministry of Employment, which considers that placement should no longer be the only outcome

sought.

3. Development of a network of providers including public and private ones, as well as not-for-profits

Under this axis, ANAPEC is considering revisiting past programs such as Accompagnement intégral and

Accompagnement à l’insertion. ANAPEC would also enter into partnerships with not-for-profits, as it considers them

as the best-placed actors to reach vulnerable and harder to place populations.

3. ANAPEC’S VISION FOR A POTENTIAL COLLABORATION WITH MCC/MCA

The propositions presented above are ones that ANAPEC considers relevant to the RBF project and that according to

M. Benkhalil could benefit from MCC’s support. Although ANAPEC and other stakeholders such as the Ministry of

Employment and the Ministry of Finance have indicated that there was political will for most of the projects mentioned

above, they also believed that MCC’s influence could be used as an accelerating factor if there was an interest to

collaborate.


20

Finally, M. Benkhalil mentioned that there could be scope for MCA to experiment with ANAPEC’s existing programs,

in order to provide evidence of success to other stakeholders (Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Employment). The

data produced would therefore allow ANAPEC to scale up the revised programs and ensure sustainability.

V. NEXT STEPS

By the time of completion of the April field visit:

All the potential stakeholders (MCC, the core team, ANAPEC and Ministry of Employment) have validated the

strategic framework designed prior to the visit. The diagnosis of constraints presented in the previous sections also

corroborated its relevance to the Moroccan context.

The different stakeholders have confirmed their willingness to collaborate with MCC as well as the alignment of

their interests.

ANAPEC has presented a range of concrete propositions for technical assistance activities.

ANAPEC has expressed its expectations that the next round of discussion should focus on scoping the RBF project

and defining more concretely a plan for technical assistance, as per Stage 2 of the strategic framework.

Considering the constraints identified during the field visit, MCC is in a position to start evaluating ANAPEC’s

suggestions for a potential collaboration, taking into account the objective of the project. Instiglio will focus its efforts

on providing tools to MCC that would clarify the requirements for a well-functioning RBF system in intermediation

services. This framework would allow MCC to distinguish the most impactful activities and evaluate their suitability

and feasibility.


21

ANNEX – LIST OF MEETINGS

ANAPEC

4th of April 2016 – full day of meeting at ANAPEC’s headquarters in Casablanca

o Director General: M. Doukkali

o Assistant Director General: M. Benkhalil

o Head of the Department ‘Services to job seekers’: Ms. Barri

o Head of the Department ‘Employment programs’ : M. Oukach

6th of April 2016

o Local ANAPEC agency in Casablanca

o Trésorier-payeur of the Ministry of Finance detached to ANAPEC: M. Moussaoui

OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS

31st of March 2016 – Rabat

o Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, Director of Employment: Ms. Reghay

o Representative of the Observatory of the labor market

1st of April 2016 – Rabat

o Ministry of Finance, Department of Employment and Vocational Training: Ms. Rabih

SERVICE PROVIDERS

Public service provider:

o 30th of March 2016 – Rabat: OFPPT

Private service providers:

o 30th of March 2016 – Rabat: ECOSIAM

o 31th of March 2016 – Rabat: Venus Net

o 1st of April 2016 – El Jadida: ENIM

o 5th of April 2016 – Casablanca: Ecole des Métiers de Casablanca

o 5th of April 2016 – Casablanca: IFP

o 5th of April 2016 – Casablanca: CAFP

CORE TEAM

30th of March – Rabat

o Responsible for procurement within the core team: Ms. Bouchra Lofti

8th of April – Rabat

o Core team & M. Ladhkar, Head of the Core team.

Documents

Morocco RBF Project, April 2016 Field Visitcompact2.cg.gov.ma/sites/default/files/annexe_6_-_final_report... · morocco rbf project, april 2016 field visit table of contents executive