Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good

volume13,no.9 may2013

Murdoch on the

Sovereignty of Good

Kieran SetiyaUniversity of Pittsburgh

2013 KieranSetiya

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

T hough she is as well-known as any figure inBritishphilos-ophy since 1950, Iris Murdochs impact on the philosophicalfieldsinwhichshewroteishardtomakeout.SheiscitedasaninfluencebyCoraDiamond,JohnMcDowell,HilaryPutnam,CharlesTaylor,BernardWilliams,andSusanWolf.1Butsheisrarelymentionedin recentwork.Theremustbemanymoralphilosopherswhohaveneverread,orhardlythoughtabout,herbestandmostsystematices-says,inThe Sovereignty of Good.Thereasonsforthisneglectarevarious.Murdoch leftheracademicpositionatOxford in 1963.She stoppedpublishinginphilosophyjournals.Andsheproducedfeweressaysofanykind,forthemostpartwritingnovelsinstead.

Alongwith these sociological facts, there are difficulties internaltoMurdochswork.Herwritingcanbeopaque,herviewsobscure.Itisnoteasytoidentifyarguments,ifshehasthem,orclearobjectionstoopposingviews.Andwherewedofindobjectionsandarguments,theirtargetsoftenseemdatedorirrelevant.TheIdeaofPerfectionisframedasacritiqueofStuartHampshiresThought and Action,whichthesedaysissurelyreadandcitedlessthanMurdochherself.2Rylesallegedbehaviourismisinthebackground:nolongeraliveconcern.In moral theory, Murdochs interlocutors are R.M. Hare, whoseinfluence has also waned, along with caricatures of existentialismandofKant.Theresult is thatMurdochisnotcitedordiscussedbymostcontemporaryworkinmoralpsychology,atopicwhosecurrentincarnation owes much to her.3 She is, if anything, less visible inmoralepistemology,inthemetaphysicsofmorals,andinthestudyofpracticalreason.

IfMurdochistospeakmoreaudiblytocontemporaryphilosophers,so that she cannot be ignored, her ideas must be reframed asinterventionsinexistingdisputes,herargumentsmustberecovered,

1. See Diamond 1995;McDowell 1979; Putnam 2002; Taylor 1989;Williams1985;Wolf1990.

2. Originallypublishedin1964,TheIdeaofPerfectionisthefirstessayinThe Sovereignty of Good(Murdoch1970).TheothersareOnGodandGoodandTheSovereigntyofGoodOverOtherConcepts. Iwillcite theseessaysastheyappearinthebook.

3. OnMurdochandmoralpsychology,seeBroackes2012:36n.77.

ImprintPhilosophers

kieransetiya Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good

philosophersimprint 2 vol.13,no.9(may2013)

1. How to Be an Ethical Rationalist

Inmyperhapsunconventionalusage,ethicalrationalismistheprojectofderivingstandardsofpracticalreasonfromthenatureofagencyorthewill,as thecapacitytoact forreasons.5Thisproject isethical inthewidestsense.Therationalistneednotmakeclaimsformoralityasasourceofreasonsorfortherationalityofconcernforothers.Buthissubjectispractical:howweshouldliveandact.HistreatmentofthissubjectisaformofrationalisminthatitgeneralizesafamiliarreadingofKant inGroundwork III.6On this reading, itbelongs toagents, assuch,toactundertheideaoffreedomandsotoberesponsivetothemorallaw.Notthateveryagentdoesrespond,butthepropensitytodosoiscontainedinthecapacitytoact.Itsrealizationisthusanaspectofpracticalrationality.Thegeneralizationofthisapproachleavesroomforspeciesofrationalismonwhichweactintentionallynotundertheideaoffreedombutundertheguiseofthegood,7oronwhichweaimatself-knowledgeorthesatisfactionofdesire,sothatitistheobjectofpracticalreasontoachievethegood,togainself-understanding,ortogetwhateveryouwant.8Inanalternativeidiom,ethicalrationalismisconstitutivismaboutpracticalreason,wheretheconstitutiveviewneednotbeKantianinresult.Thestandardsthatflowfromthenatureof agencymaybe ones of self-interest ormeans-end efficiency, notmoralduty.

Whatever its specific content, the rationalist projectmoves frommetaphysicalpremisestonormativeconclusions,fromthemetaphysicsofagencytothenormsofpracticalreason.Acentraltaskforethicalrationalistsistoexplainthistransition.Howdowegetfromtheisof5. This section draws on Setiya 2012: 1521 and on Setiya forthcoming; its

frameworkderivesfromSetiya2007.

6. Kant1785.

7. Inthatouractionstrikesusasgoodinsomerespect;fortheguiseofthegoodseeVelleman1992.

8. SeeReasons without Rationalism (Setiya 2007: 145), citingKorsgaard 1996;Railton1997;Velleman1989,2000;Williams1979;Dreier1997.To this list,onemightaddKorsgaard2009;Raz 1999,2011;Vogler2002;and,ononeinterpretation,Smith2009,2010.

andherconclusionsmadeclear.Withnotableexceptions, fewhavetaken up this task; there is a lot to be done. In this essay, I try tomakeprogresshere,tobringouttheforceandcogencyofMurdochsthinkingbyrelatingittoanissuethatiscertainlylive:thatofethicalrationalism and the question, Why be moral? My aim is not toevaluateMurdochsviewsbuttomakethemplausible,intelligible,and,sofaraspossible,argumentativelysharp.Whatemergesis,Ibelieve,aconceptionofgreatoriginalityandtheoreticalpower.Ifitiswrong,it iswrongin interestingways; tosaywhattheyare liesoutsidemypresentscope.

Thisessayhasfourmainparts.Inthefirst,Iintroducetheideaofethicalrationalismandrelateittotheproblemofmoralreasons.Inthesecond,IsetoutMurdochsstrikingclaimthattruevisionoccasionsright conduct and explain its importance for the rationalist debate(Murdoch1970:64).Thoughitstruthwouldbesignificant,Murdochsclaim is problematic. It seems possible, off-hand, for someone tosharethevisionthatoccasionsrightconductwithoutactingwell.Insectionthree,IshowhowMurdochanticipatesthischargebytracingit to a defective theory of concepts. That the theory goeswrong isthemoralofhermostfamousexample,thatofMandD.4Igoontoexplore theentanglementof factandvalue inMurdochsview,howitdiffersfromtheappealtothickmoralconcepts,andhowitdrawsonaPlatonictheoryofconcept-possession.SectionfourthenturnstotheimageoftheGoodasatranscendentmagneticcentre(Murdoch1970: 73), working through the odd mix of empirical psychology,moral exhortation, and speculative metaphysics in The Sovereignty of Good.Murdochs theoryof concepts, introduced in thefirst essayofSovereigntyanddeveloped in thesecond,provides thebasis foramoralargumentwhoseconclusionismetaphysical:thattheGoodisnot,afterall,illusory.Ifthisisright,Murdochsworkhasimplicationsnotonlyforpracticalreasonandmoralmetaphysicsbutforthescopeandambitionofmoralphilosophy.

4. Murdoch1970:1623.



or tend towards, an aim that theymay not realize evenwhen theysucceed in acting for reasons.11 The achievement of this aim doesnot sort behaviour as intentional ornot: it offers an ideal towhichintentional actionmayormaynot conform. It isnot a conditionofactingforreasonsthatonehitthetargetinquestion,onlythatoneaimatdoingso.Thisstructureallowsfordefectiveactionintheframeworkofethicalrationalism:thecapacitytoactforreasonscanbeexercisedimperfectly,inwaysthatdonotfullyachieveitsend.12

The idea of an aim or function that figures in the rationalistargumentneednotbemysterious.Sincerationalistshopeforstandardsof practical reason that apply to agents, as such, regardless of theirbiologicalform,theydonotappealtospecificallybiologicalfunction.13 Nordotheyappealtoaparticularintentionordesire.Insteadtheyturntodispositionsthatconstituteagencyor torulesandprinciples thatguideusifweactforreasonsatall.Thereisroomtobeflexiblehere.Ifwethinkoftheaimasfixedbyadispositionofeverypossibleagent,we end upwith what is called internalism about reasons: agentshavethecapacitytobemovedbyanyreasontowhichtheyaresubject.(Moreonthisbelow.)Alternatively, tobeanagent is toapproximate thepossessionofdispositionswhosetargetistherebyconstitutedastheaimofagents,assuch.14Whenagentsfallshortoffullpossession,internalism fails. Eitherway, one canmanifest thedispositions thatconstituteagency,totheextentthatonehasthem,eitherimperfectlyorinfull.Intentionalactionistheproductofsuchdispositions,whichsetatargetforagentstomeetinwhattheydo.

ThesecondassumptionoftherationalistargumentiswhatIhavecalled Excellence. It is worth stressing howmodest this principleis. Not only does it not require the more contentious elements of

11. For this requirement, framedas anobjection toVelleman, seeClark2001:58185.

12. Ontheapparentdifficultyhere,seeRailton1997:3;Korsgaard2009:Ch.8.

13. Smith2010:1245.

14. TheroleofapproximationisemphasizedinDreier1997:8991,978,andSmith2009:669.

whatitistobeanagent,tohaveawillorthecapacitytoactforreasons,totheoughtofpracticalrationality?

Inoneofthemostexplicitdevelopmentsofethicalrationalism,J.DavidVellemanpresentsintentionalactionashavingaconstitutiveaim,which is self-knowledgeor self-understanding.9More recently,ChristineKorsgaarddescribestheaimofagencyasself-constitution.10 Inworkingoutthebasisoftherationalistapproach,wecangeneralizethese claims.On each account, agency is, in effect, a functional orteleologicalkind,definedbyanendorgoal.Thisschemacanapplytootherviews. Itmightbe in thenatureofagents toaimatperfectautonomy,atmeans-endcoherence,oratthehighestgood.Oncewethinkofagencyintheseterms,wecantracethepivotalmoveoftheethicalrationalisttoafunctionargumentinspiredbyAristotle.Recallthat,forAristotle,humanbeingshaveadefiningfunctionoractivity,whichistheuseofreason,andwhateverhasafunctionfindsitsgoodin performing that function well. There are standard objections. Isit right to speak of a human function?Does the argument conflatewhatisgoodforanFwithbeinggoodasanF?Eveniftheyaresound,however,thesequestionsdonottouchtheprincipleweneed.

Excellence:WhenFshaveadefiningfunctionoractivity,agoodFisonethatperformsthatactivityorfunctionwell.

Ifwhatitistobeanagentistoaimatautonomy,orself-knowledge,orwhatever,whatitistobegoodasanagentistoaimatthesethingseffectively.Sincepracticalreasonisthevirtueofagency,assuch,oneistothatextentpracticallyrational.Therationalistaccountgoesthrough.

Wecanspelloutthedemandsofthisargumentmoreslowly.First,itreliesonacertainstructureinthefunctionofagency:notjustthatagentsaredefinedbyanactivitydoingthingsforreasonsbutthatagencyhasatarget,likehappinessormeans-endcoherence,ofwhichitcan fall short. Itbelongs to thenatureofagents tobedirectedby,

9. See,especially,theintroductiontoVelleman2000.

10. InKorsgaard2009.



isnottopresupposethetruthofrationalism;onecanacceptitevenifonedoubtsthatthenatureofagencyisasourceofrationalnorms.Ifstandardsforbeinggoodquaagentdonotflowfromthenatureofagency,assuch,theirgroundsmustlieelsewhere,perhapsnotinthefunctionofanything.Still,theyarestandardsofpracticalreason.

Schematically,then,theargumentforethicalrationalismtakesthisform:First,agencyisdefinedbyafunctionoractivity,anaimorendtowhich it isdirected, justassuchthough it isnotaconditionofacting forreasonsthatonerealize thisaim. It followsbyExcellencethattobegoodasanagentistoachievetheaimbywhichagencyisdefined.Practicalrationalityconsistsinbeinggoodquaagent.Sotobepracticallyrationalistoachievetheaimofagency.Sinceitisadefectofpracticalreasontobeunmovedbyareasontoact,thisconclusionwillconstrainwhatthereisreasonforustodo.Ifyoucanachievetheaimorendofagencywhilebeingindifferenttothefactthatp,thisfactisnotapracticalreason.Finally,iftheaimisfixedbythedispositionsofanypossibleagent,wecanderiveamorefamiliarconstraint:

InternalismaboutReasons:IfthefactthatpisareasonforAtof,Aiscapableofbeingmovedtofbythebeliefthatp.

Sinceeveryagentisdisposedtoachievetheaimorendofagency,assuch,andsotobepracticallyrational,everyagenthasthecapacitytorespondtothereasonsforhertoact.

The interest of ethical rationalism, internalist or otherwise, liesprimarilyintwothings.Oneappearstobeavirtue.Ethicalrationalistscanassimilatethemetaphysicsandepistemologyofpracticalreasontothefunctionaluseofgood.Theideaofareasontoactis,onthisconception,nomoremysteriousthanthatofagoodthieforagoodclock.17Theotherthreatenstobeavice.Byplacingconditionsonwhatthereisreasonforustodothatbindittothenatureofagency,ethical

17. Formetaphysicalandepistemicargumentsforethicalrationalism,orsome-thinglikeit,seeVelleman2000:1739andSmith2010.

Aristotles function argument, it does not purport to be a generalaccountofgood.Thatgoodhasafunctionaluseisquiteconsistentwith its being used in otherways, too, aswhenwe speak of goodoutcomes,what is good for an individual, or evenwhat is goodsimpliciter.15TheapplicationsofExcellenceareinnocentenough.Ifthefunctionofclocksistotellthetime,agoodclockdoessobothlegiblyandreliably.Ifthedefiningactivityofathiefistostealothersproperty,agoodthiefisonewhogetsawaywiththeloot.

Puttingthefirst twostepstogether:whenthenatureofakindisdefinedindispositionalterms,andwhereithasatargetofwhichitcanfallshort,tobegoodofthatkindistomanifestthatdispositioninfull.ItisnotenoughfortheapplicationofExcellencethatthedispositioncan fail to be exercised altogether: there must be such a thing asits imperfect or incomplete manifestation. Where an object meetstheseconditions, itcanoperatewellorbadlyas thekindof thing itis.Thus,ifbeinganagentisbeingdisposedtoacertainend,atleastbyapproximation,andonecanexercisethisdisposition,totheextentthatonehas it,moreor lesswell, tobegoodasanagent is fully toachievethatend.16

In its final step, the argument identifies practical rationalityinthe sense that involves, but is not exhausted by, responding toreasonswith being good qua agent. This premise draws ona compelling thought: that judgements of practical reason areassessmentsofagency,notsomeotheraspectofourlives.Tosaythis

15. ComparethediscussionsinGeach1956andSetiya2007:PartTwo,2.

16. DoesExcellenceapplytothedispositionsofobjectsthatarenotartifactsorlivingthings?Inprinciple,yes,butonlywhentheconditionsinthetextaremet. Ifamagnet isbynaturedisposed toorient itself incertainways,andthisdispositionisoperativewhenitorientsitselfinroughlytherightway,itis functioningwellasamagnetso faras itmanifests itsdisposition to thehighestdegree.Ifthissoundsodd,theproblemisnotwiththeapplicationofExcellencebutwiththeconceptionofmagnetsonwhichitrests.Magnetsaredefinedbytheir intrinsicproperties,notbydispositionsthattheymanifestmoreorlesswell.Iftherearephysicalkindsthatdohaveasuitablenature,itwillmakesensetoevaluatetheirfunctioningthoughdoingsowillnothaveimplicationsforpracticalreason,asthefunctionofagencydoes.



help, that failing todoso ismorallywrong.Alternatively,wemightappeal to the fact that itwould be good to help. It is this fact thatjustifiesaction,notthebarefactofhumanneed.Itisnotclear,however,howmuchwegainbythismove.Therearethreedifficulties.First,howcanthefactthatsomeoneisinneedmakeitwrongnottohelpthem,orgoodtodoso,ifthisfactisnot,byitself,areasontohelp?Second,byturningtofactsaboutrightandwrong,orwhatisgood,weforgothemetaphysicalandepistemicvirtuesofethical rationalism.Thesefactsraisetheusualpuzzles:theyciteaspectsofpracticalnormativitythathavenotbeenabsorbedbythefunctionaluseofgood.Finally,evensuchloadedreasonsplacedemandsonthetheoryofactionthatwillnotbeeasytomeet.Thepictureofagentsonwhichtheyactundertheguiseofgoodishistoricallyinfluential.ItderivesfromPlatoandAristotle,anditpersistsinmorerecentwork.19Butitiscontroversial,andIhavearguedagainstit,atlength,elsewhere.20Inshort:whileitmaybetruethatrepresentationsofthegoodareessentiallypractical,wecansaywhatitistobeanagentwithoutthem.Thedispositiontobemovedbyappearancesofthegoodisnotonewemustpossessorapproximateinordertoactforreasonsatall.Ifthisisright,itisnotadefectofagency,andsonotadefectofpracticalreason,inrationalistterms, to be indifferent to the good. The corresponding claims areevenmoredubiousformoralrightandwrong.Whyshouldagencybeimpossiblewithoutspecificallymoralthought?

Theupshotofthesereflectionsisthatethicalrationalismanimatesoneversionof thequestion, Whybemoral? Itprovides thebasisfora sceptical challenge to thegeneralityofmoral reasons.On thefaceofit,wecanresistthischallengeonlybydisputingtheargumentforrationalismorbyderivingmoralreasonsfromthenatureof thewill.Sincethesecondtasklooksdifficult,wemaybetemptedbythefirst.Butthisisequallyhard,forwhattheargumentassumesisweak.While many doubt that agents have autonomy or self-knowledge

19. Forvariations,seeRailton1997;Raz1999,2011;Tenenbaum2007.

20.InPartOneofReasons without Rationalism(Setiya2007)andmorerecentlyinSetiya2010.

rationalismcreatesaproblemfor thegeneralityofmoral reasons. ItisthisproblemthatprovidesthecontextformyinterpretationofIrisMurdoch.Ispendtherestofthesectionspellingitout.

Suppose,tobeginwith,thatAisconfrontedwithacircumstanceinwhich someone is in seriousneed, and the right the thing todois to offer them help. It would be morally wrong to ignore theirdifficulty, and the sacrifice involved in answering it is not extreme.WemightbetemptedtoconcludethatAshouldofferhelp,allthingsconsideredthatthisiswhathehasmostreasontodo.Atanyrate,ifmoralreasonsarecategorical,iftheyapplytoeveryone,Ahassomereasontohelpthepersonhefindsinneed.Suppose,however,thatAiscompletelyunmovedbythis.Heknowswhatthecircumstanceis:thattheneedisseriousandthecostismodest.(Letussetaside,fornow,beliefsaboutrightandwrong.)Butthishasnoimpactonhim.IfwehopetodefendtheconvictionthatAhasreasontohelp,whatcanwesay?Intherationalistframework,ouroptionsarelimited.WecouldhopetoshowthatAispracticallyirrational,thathecannotfullyachievetheaimorendofagency,assuch.Butthisamountstoaheroictask: that of deriving, from themetaphysics of agency, a sensitivitytomoralconcerns.Weneedanaccountoftheaimofagency,assuch,onwhichitcannotbemetbyanagentlikeA.Thefunctionofagencycannotbethesatisfactionofdesire,regardlessofitsobject;itcannotbeautonomyorflourishing,conceivedinwaysthatallowforindifferencetoothers.Itmustbelongtothenatureofthewill,asthecapacitytoactforreasons,thatitsaimsmakeonesusceptibletoothersneeds.Somewillaccept thisclaim,hoping toderive fromtheconstitutiveaimofactionsomecommitment to themoral law.18Butmosthavedoubts.Thereisaproblemofmoralreasonsontherationalistapproach.

Itmightseem,sofar,thattheproblemcanbecontained.Wehavefocusedonreasonsthatconsistintheneedsofothers,askingwhetheronemustrespondtosuchneedsinachievingtheaimorendofagency,assuch.Indoingso,wemayhaveignoredthemoresalientreasonto

18. Mostnotably,Korsgaard1996,2009.



and moral effort. [] One is often compelled almostautomaticallybywhatonecansee.(Murdoch1970:356)

Theplaceofchoiceiscertainlyadifferentoneifwethinkintermsofaworldwhichiscompulsivelypresenttothewill, and the discernment and exploration of which isaslowbusiness. []If Iattendproperly, Iwillhavenochoicesandthisistheultimateconditiontobeaimedat.(Murdoch1970:38)

Inthestarkformulationat theheartof thefollowingessay,realism[]isakindofintellectualabilitytoperceivewhatistrue,whichisautomaticallyatthesametimeasuppressionofself[]truevisionoccasionsrightconduct(Murdoch1970:64).

ThatMurdochmakesthesestrikingclaimsissometimesrecognized.Whatislesswellunderstoodiswhytheymatter.Wecanbringthisoutbyfinding thedisputed conceptionof choice in thebackgroundofsection1.Thepictureoffreedomasautonomy,notdeterminedbytheplainfactsofonescircumstance,issharedbyrationalistsofdifferentkinds,byinstrumentalistsandKantiansalike.Theproblemofmoralreasonscouldbesolvedbygivingitup.Inraisingthisproblem,weimaginedsomeonewhoisfullyawareofthecircumstancethatrequireshimtoofferhelp,ofseriousneedandmodestcost,butwhoremainsunmoved.Thetaskthatlookeddifficult,withintheconfinesofethicalrationalism,wastoexplainwhyheshouldbemoved,whythesefactsprovidehimwithreasonstoact.Wemusttracethenecessityofbeingmoved to the nature of thewill.Murdochs intervention is to findanalternativeview.ForMurdoch, thenecessityofbeingmovedbymoralreasonsliesnotinthenatureofthewillbutinthemotivationalimportofcognition.Despiteappearances,theagentweimaginedisimpossible.Onecannotfailtobemovedbyanadequateconceptionof the facts that require a response: true vision occasions rightconduct.Thereisthusnoneedtoenterthemazeofoptionsinwhichwegotlostbefore.

as an essential aim, let alone conformitywith themoral law,mostassume that they are disposed to takemeans to their ends: to bemeans-endcoherentintheirintentionsordesires.21Eventhisclaimisenoughfortheethicalrationalist.Therearedispositionswemustapproximateinbeingagents,andtheycanbecastasdispositionstoconformtoanideal.Tobegoodquaagentistomeetthisidealandsotobepracticallyrational.

Theissuessurroundingethicalrationalismarecomplicated,andIcannothopetoresolvethemhere.22Myaimhasbeenmoremodest:to showwhat is compellingabout the rationalistviewand tomaketheoptionswithwhichitpresentsussufficientlytroublingthatwearewillingtolookforanotherwayout.Weseemtoconfrontadilemma:Given the argument for ethical rationalism, deny the generality ofmoralreasonsorderivethemfromthenatureofthewill.ItisinsearchofafurtheroptionthatweturntoMurdochsbook.

2. True Vision and Right Conduct

InreadingThe Sovereignty of Good,itwillproveusefultostartattheendofthefirstessay,notthebeginning.WhatMurdochworkstowardsinTheIdeaofPerfectionisanalternativetothepictureoffreedomonwhichtheagentchooseshisreasonsintermsof,andaftersurveying,the ordinary facts which lie open to everyone (Murdoch 1970:34). It is this picture that serves as commonground for her severalantagonistsbehaviourist,existentialist,andKantian.And it isonethatsherejects.

I suggest [that] we introduce into the picture the ideaof attention, or looking [] I can only choose withinthe world I can see, in the moral sense of see whichimpliesthatclearvisionistheresultofmoralimagination

21. ThisthoughtisexplicitinDreier1997:958,Vogler2002:13546,andSmith2009:667.

22. InSetiya2007,2010,forthcoming,Idefendaminimalistconceptionofagen-cyonwhichtherationalistargumentcannotbegin.



Toexplainanactionweregardasvirtuous,wetypicallyformulate a more or less complex characterization oftheactionscircumstancesaswetaketheagent tohaveconceived them. Why should it not be the case []that the agents conception of the situation, properlyunderstood, suffices to show us the favourable lightin which his action appeared to him? [] There mayseem tobe adifficulty:mightnot anotherpersonhaveexactly the same conception of the circumstances, butseeno reason to act as the virtuouspersondoes? If so,advertingtothatconceptionofthesituationcannot,afterall, sufficetoshowus the favourable light inwhichthevirtuous person sawhis action. []We can evade thisargumentbydenyingitspremise:bytakingaspecialviewofthevirtuouspersonsconceptionofthecircumstances,according to which it cannot be shared by someonewho seesno reason to act as the virtuouspersondoes.(McDowell1978:80)

The virtuous persons conception of the circumstance includes thereasons forwhich he acts for instance, that someone is shy andsensitiveandsoneedstobeputatease(McDowell1978:856).Itdoesnot claim that theyare reasons,or therewouldbenothing specialabouttheviewonwhichitcannotbesharedbysomeonewhoseesnoreasontoactas thevirtuouspersondoes.Onamodestreading,theclaimismerelythatknowledgeofthecircumstancecanmotivateactionwithouttheneedforadesirethat isnot itselfexplained,andmade intelligible, by this knowledge.25 But what is actually said ismore ambitious: that the relevant conceptions are not somuch aspossessedexceptbythosewhosewillsare influencedappropriately(McDowell1978:87).WhatweappeartohaveisthenaninstanceofHyper-Internalism:

25. Onthemotivationofactionbybeliefalone,seeNagel1970:2730;Wallace1990:3734;Setiya2007:1006.

Accordingtoasimpleversionofthisidea:

Hyper-Internalism:IfthefactthatpisareasonforAtof,andAknowsthatp,Aismovedtofinproportiontoitsstrengthasareason.

Murdochs final view ismore complex. But the simple formulationbrings out some crucial points. First, in the usual contrast betweenjudgement and existence internalism, between claims about themotivational significance of thinking that there is reason to f andmotivational conditions on the existence of reasons, Murdochsinternalismfallsonthesideofexistence.23Itfollowsfromsomethingsbeing a reason to f, according to the hyper-internalist, that if oneknowsthefactthat isareason,oneissuitablymoved.Weneednotadd the further condition thatonebelieves this fact tobe a reason.Second,Hyper-Internalismisvastlystronger thanInternalismaboutReasons.Itisnotjustthecapacitytobemovedbutactualmotivationthat follows fromknowledgeof reasons. Finally, the truthofHyper-Internalismdoesnottelluswhatthereisreasontodo.Itdoesnotimplythatfactsabouttheneedsofotherpeopleprovideuswithreasonstoact.Itsroleisnottosupportanargumentforthatclaimbuttopreventit frombeing threatened by ethical rationalism. If facts of this kindjustifyaction,itfollowsthatwearemovedbytherelevantbeliefs.Weneednotderivetheirstatusasreasons,considerationsbywhichwearemovedinsofaraswearerational,fromtheaimofagency,assuch.Ironically,bytighteningtheconnectionbetweencognitionandchoice,wemakethisconnectioninonewayeasiertodefend:itneednotgothroughthemetaphysicsofthewill.24

AsimilarthoughtcanbefoundinanearlypaperbyJohnMcDowell,AreMoralRequirementsHypotheticalImperatives?:

23. Forthisdistinction,seeDarwall1983:534.

24. This claim is qualified towards the endof section 3,where I speculate onMurdochsconceptionofagency.



indifferentistoospecialtobebelieved.Itisafactoflifethatpeopleareunmovedevenbydecisivemoralreasons.AsMcDowellacknowledges,[failure]toseewhatacircumstancemeans,intheloadedsense[whichentailsmotivation] isof course compatiblewith competence,by allordinary tests,with the languageusedtodescribe thecircumstance(McDowell1978:86).Hedoesnotseemperturbedbythis,sayingonlythatitbringsouthowloadedthenotionofmeaninginvolvedintheprotestis(McDowell1978:86).Butmanywillbeputoff.Ifsomeoneis competent by ordinary tests, they grasp the relevant conceptsandknow the relevant facts. If they arenotmovedby them,MoralInternalismfails.WhatgoodisitthatMurdochmakessenseofmoralreasonsifshedoessowithanindefensibleclaim?

3. A Platonic Theory of Concepts

AkeytothestructureofSovereignty is thatMurdochanticipatesthiscomplaint.29InthefirsthalfofTheIdeaofPerfection,thepartwhosetargetscanseemdistantfromus,MurdochcriticizesageneticanalysisofmentalconceptsthatderivesfromabroadlybehaviouristreadingofWittgenstein.Onthegenetictheory,[mental]lifeis,andlogicallymustbe,ashadowoflifeinpublicsince,ingeneral,thepossessionof[a]conceptisapublicskill(Murdoch1970:7,11).Murdochillustratesthistheorywiththeconceptofdecision.

How do I learn the concept of decision? By watchingsomeonewho says I havedecided andwho then acts.HowelsecouldIlearnit?AndwiththatIlearntheessenceof thematter. I donot moveon fromabehaviouristicconcepttoamentalone.[]Adecisiondoesnotturnouttobe,whenmorecarefullyconsidered,anintrospectiblemovement.Theconcepthasnofurtherinnerstructure;itisitsouterstructure.(Murdoch1970:123)

29.Here I am indebted toBroackes 2012: 3948, though I differ fromhim, atleastinemphasis,ontheroleofmoralperceptioninMurdochsview.Seethediscussionofthickconceptsbelow.

MoralInternalism:Ifthefactthatpisadecisivemoral reason for A to f, and A knows that p, A is decisivelymovedtof.26

MurdochrestrictsthescopeofHyper-Internalisminasimilarway:

[We]arenotalwaysrespondingtothemagneticpullofthe ideaofperfection.Often, for instancewhenwepayourbillsorperformothersmalleverydayacts,wearejustanybodydoingwhatisproperormakingsimplechoicesforordinarypublicreasons.(Murdoch1970:41)

Thecontoursofthisrestrictionarenotentirelyclear.Forsimplicity,IwillworkwithHyper-Internalismfordecisivemoralreasons,stressingthatthepointisaboutthemotivationalforcenotofthebeliefthatanactisrightorwrongbutofthefactsthatgiveitthatstatus.27

As I have portrayed it, the attraction of Moral Internalism is toprevent the problem of moral reasons from being posed. We cansavethegeneralityanddecisiveforceofsuchreasonswithouthavingto worry about the argument for ethical rationalism and withoutattemptingtheheroicderivationofmoralcommitmentfromtheaimorendofagency,assuch.Itsonlyflaw,youmightsuspect,isthatitisfalseindeed,obviouslyso.28Thespecialviewonwhichthevirtuouspersons conception of the circumstance cannot be shared by the

26. In later work, McDowells commitment to Moral Internalism is less clear.Thus,inVirtueandReason,theknowledgethatissuesinrightconductisknowledgeofanactionundersomesuchdescriptionasthethingtodoonthebasisofaconsiderationapprehendedasareason(McDowell1979:51,54;seealso57).Herethevirtuouspersonsconceptionofthecircumstanceincludesexplicitlynormativeclaims.

27. Becauseitisrestrictedtodecisivereasons,thisisnotafullaccountofmor-almotivation, evenwhenwe ignorebeliefs about rightandwrong. In thecaseofso-calledimperfectduties,decisivereasonappliesnottodiscreteorlocalizedacts,suchashelpingrightnow,buttoonesthatoccupyindefiniteperiods,likedoingenoughtohelpthoseinneed.ThemotivationofthelatterfallsunderMoralInternalism;themotivationoftheformerdoesnot.

28.ThischargeisvividlyexpressedbySmith1994:1215.



MsvisionofDbecomesmorelovingandmorejust,sothatsomethingofmoralsignificancehasgoneon.

What is the point of this example? Because two issues are runtogether, one of them is easy tomiss.30 It is obvious thatMurdochiscontestingtheneglectofprivatemoralactivitybythebehaviouristobsessedwithoutwarddeeds.Butthisisonlypartofit.MoreimportantisthenatureofMsactivity,whichisrefiningthewayinwhichsheseestheworld.Hergraspoftheconceptswithwhichsheoperatespert, ceremonious, undignified, gayis transformed and improved, andherdescriptionschangeaccordingly.Itisthisphenomenon,inwhichonesunderstandingofaconceptgoesbeyondwhatoneknewinacquiringit, or being competent by ordinary tests, that the genetic theoristcannotcomprehend.Theargumentagainstthegenetictheoryisthatthephenomenonisreal:fullpossessionofaconceptcantranscendthemasteryofitspublicuse.TheexampleofMandDissupposedtomakethisvivid.Innocentoftheory,Murdochbelieves,wewillbetemptedtodescribethecaseasoneofprogresstowardsperfectioninthegraspofmentalconcepts.

It might be argued, instead, that the story is one of progresstowards perfection in understanding another person. But there isnoconflicthere:wecansaythat,too.AndwehavetoreadMurdochas concernedwithgraspof concepts inorder tomake senseofherbook.TheexampleofMandDisframedbythegenetictheory,anditsinsightsareappliedtorepentanceandlove.31Ineachcase,hertopicisconceptualmastery,and it is this topic,perhapsamongothers, towhichtheexamplespeaks.Murdochsconclusionmakesthisclear:

Theentryintoamentalconceptofthenotionofanideallimit destroys the genetic analysis of its meaning. []Is love amental concept, and if so can it be analysedgenetically?NodoubtMaryslittlelamblovedMary,thatisitfollowedhertoschool;andinsomesenseoflearn

30.See,again,Broackes2012:478.

31. Onrepentance,seeMurdoch1970:25.

Althoughthis issomethingofacaricature, the ideathatmentalandotherconceptsareanchoredintheirpublicuseisnotanachronistic.Versionsofitarestillproposed.WhatmattershereisthattheoriesofthiskindsupportthechargeagainstMoralInternalism.Onthegenetictheory, nothing that is not apparent in the public acquisition of aconceptcanbeessential to itscontent.Someonewhogoes throughthe ordinary training, andwho is competent by ordinary tests, haseverythingrequiredtograsptheconceptexpressedbyaword.Thus,thepersonweimaginedinsection1canknowabouthiscircumstanceexactlywhatthevirtuouspersonknows.Hecanknowthefactsthatprovideamoralreasonwithoutbeingmoved.ThisiswhatMurdochmustdeny,asshedoesinlanguageechoedbyMcDowell:

Therearetwosensesofknowingwhatawordmeans,oneconnectedwithordinarylanguage,theotherverymuchlessso.[]Wedonotsimply,throughbeingrationalandknowing ordinary language, know themeaning of allnecessarymoralwords.(Murdoch1970:28)

The question is:What is her argument?Howdoes she dislodgethegenetictheoryandotherslikeit,theoriesonwhichtheobjectiontoMoralInternalismgoesthrough?Theanswerliesinasecondkeyto Sovereignty: a correct interpretation of the example of M and D.Theexampleitselfismorefrequentlycitedthananythingelseinthebook.Amother,M, feelshostility toherdaughter-in-law,D,findingherpertandfamiliar,insufficientlyceremonious,brusque,sometimespositivelyrude,alwaystiresomelyjuvenile(Murdoch1970:167).ThisdoesnotaffectMsoutwardbehaviour,which isperfect throughout.Yetsheexperiencesmoralprogress:MreflectsdeliberatelyaboutDuntilgraduallyhervisionofDalters. []D isdiscovered tobenotvulgarbutrefreshinglysimple,notundignifiedbutspontaneous,notnoisybutgay,nottiresomelyjuvenilebutdelightfullyyouthful,andsoon(Murdoch1970:17).Wearetoimaginethecaseasoneinwhich



ineluctably bound together (Williams 1985: 140). BernardWilliams,whomakes a great deal of such concepts inEthics and the Limits of Philosophy, creditshisappreciationof their importance toaseminartaught by Philippa Foot andMurdoch in the 1950s (Williams 1985:218n.7).ForWilliams,thickmoralconceptsaredistinctiveinbeingatonce world-guidedand action-guiding.Theyareworld-guided inthattherearenecessarylimitstodivergenceintheiruse.Thosewhograsp the relevant concepts are bound to agree in their application,exceptatthemargins(Williams1985:1401).Inthisrespect,theyaremeanttodiffer fromthinconcepts likeoughtandgood, thoughthedifferenceispresumablyoneofdegree(Williams1985:1512).33Thickconceptsareaction-guidinginthattheyarecharacteristicallyrelatedto reasons and because one cannot grasp them unless one shares,at least through imagination, their evaluative point (Williams 1985:1402).Inpossessingathickmoralconcept,oneparticipates,perhapsvicariously,inasensibilitythatmayhavemotivationalforce.Ineffect,itisthroughthissensibilitythatusersoftheconceptareablegooninthesameway:thisishowmotivationoraffectisbuiltintotheconcept.

ItisundeniablytemptingtointerpretMurdochinlightofWilliams.34 Murdochinvitesthisreadinginherreferencetonormativeepithetsand secondarymoral words in connectionwithM andD, and indisparagingtheimpersonalworldoffacts(Murdoch1970:18,22,24).Thetemptationisespeciallystrongwithpassageslikethis:

If we picture the agent as compelled by obedience totherealityhecansee,hewillnotbesayingThisisright,i. e.,Ichoosetodothis,hewillbesayingThisisABCD(normative-descriptivewords),andactionwillfollow

33. Evenwiththinconcepts,therearelimitstodivergence.AsFootobserved,ifsomeoneproclaimsasanultimateprinciple[thatitis]wrongtorunaroundtreesrighthandedortolookathedgehogsinthelightofthemoon,wewilldoubtthathegraspstheconceptsofmoralrightandwrong(Foot2002:xiv).

34.Asevenhermostperceptivereadershavedone;see,forinstance,Broackes2012:145:Itisparticularlyascriptionsofthespecializedterms[correspond-ing to thick moral concepts] that are (in relevant situations) immediatelymotivating.

wemightwelllearntheconcept,theword,inthatcontext.Butwithsuchaconceptthatisnottheendofthematter.[] A deepening process, at any rate an altering andcomplicatingprocess,takesplace.(Murdoch1970:28)

Thoughit isnotmypurposetodefendherview,Murdochsurelyhasapoint.Herdescriptionsofconcept-possessionringtrue.Wesaythatourunderstandingofrepentanceandlovehasgrown,notmerelythatwehavelearnednewfactsaboutthem.32Ifwearerighttodoso,thegenetictheoryiswrong.TheobjectiontoMoralInternalismthuscannotrelyonthegenetictheory,oranythinglikeit,forsupport.Thereisroomfortheviewthat,whilesomeonemayappeartobeunmovedbyknowledgeofdecisivemoralreasons,theirgraspofthesereasonsisimperfect,sincetheydonotpossesstherelevantconceptsinfull.

Still, wemay doubt that the only source of resistance toMoralInternalismisabadphilosophyofmind.Theideathatonecangraspthe needs of others without beingmoved by them can be elicitedwithoutthegenetictheory.Consider,forinstance,avirtuouspersonwho undergoes moral deterioration, becoming indifferent or weak-willed.Isitplausibletoclaimthathisgraspoftherelevantconcepts,previously flawless, has failed? More generally, we are entitled toaskwhy fullpossessionofcertainconcepts,alongwith theircorrectapplication to the circumstance, entails motivation or choice. Howdoesthisfollowfromtheconditionsofconcept-possession,onamoreadequate account? It is not enough forMurdoch to reject a theorythatconflictswithherclaims;sheneedstosketchanalternativethatsustainsthem.

HerewereachathirdkeytoSovereignty:thefalseassimilationofMurdochs theorytoanemphasisonthickmoralconceptssuchascoward, lie, brutality, gratitudeinwhichdescriptionandevaluationare

32. This point is emphasized by Alice Crary in Beyond Moral Judgment (Crary2007:413).AlthoughshecitesMurdochanddrawsattentiontothepracticalupshotofconcept-possession,CrarydoesnotarticulateMoralInternalismorthePlatonictheoryofconceptsexploredbelow.



usedtodescribeaspecialreason-constitutingconceptionofasituationneednotbeexplicitlyevaluative(McDowell1978:86).Theresultisamuchdeeperthreattothedistinctionbetweenfactandvaluethanthe mere expansion of moral concepts envisaged byWilliams. OnMurdochsview,thedescriptionofacircumstanceinmentalbutnotexplicitlymoraltermscanhaveapropertyoftenthoughttodistinguishethical concepts from others: that knowledge of its application isessentiallymotivating.Whatwe expected to fall on the fact sideofthe fact/value distinction turns out to have the attributes of value.Thishastransformativeimplicationsformoralepistemologyandthemetaphysicsofmoralproperties.

Takemetaphysicsfirst. Ifanythingiscommongroundamidstthedisarrayofcontemporarymeta-ethics,itisthea priorisupervenienceoftheethical:whatfallsunderethicalconceptEdoessoinvirtueoffallingundernon-ethicalconcepts,N,suchthatnecessarily,whatfallsunderNfallsunderE.Virtuallyno-onedisputesthisclaim,whichistakenasaguidetothenatureofethics.35Theclaimisplausiblenotonlyforthinconceptssuchasoughtandgoodbutfortheconceptsofspecificvirtues.IfMurdochisright,however,thepsychologyofvirtuegoesbeyondtheseconcepts,tothegroundsoftheirapplication.Thereasonswhyanact is justorunjust,kindorunkind,rightorwrong,will satisfy Moral Internalism. They will motivate those who fullypossessthem.Inthisrespect,theycountasmoralfacts,eventhoughtheydonotinvolvethestandardmenuofmoralconcepts,thickorthin.Nor is ita priori thatsuch factsfor instance, factsabout theneedsofothersandthecostofhelpingthemsuperveneonanythingelse.Sincemoralphilosophylooksdirectlytothesefacts,supervenienceisnotessentialtotheconceptswithwhichitworks.Norcanweassumethat explicitly moral concepts apply on the basis of facts that arenot themselvesmoral, since the facts inquestionmaysatisfyMoral

35. RareexceptionsincludeGriffin1996:448andSturgeon2009,thoughStur-geonsdoubtspertainmoretotheformulationofsuperveniencethantothetruthofsomethinginthevicinity.

naturally.Astheemptychoicewillnotoccurtheemptywordwillnotbeneeded.(Murdoch1970:401)

Buttheapproachisquitemisleading.First,whatMurdochemphasizesintheconceptsthatinterestherisnotthedegreeofconvergencetheyexhibitbutthepotentialforaspecializedpersonaluseofaconceptin ways that may be private or idiosyncratic (Murdoch 1970: 25).Similarly,Murdochsclaimisnotthatthosewhouseagivenconceptnon-vicariously,theparticipantsforwhomithaslife,areboundtobemovedbyitscorrectapplication.Itisonlytruevision,aperfectionwerarelyapproach,thatguaranteesrightaction.

More significantly,Murdochs focus is not on the conceptswithwhichwe describe our optionsjust, courageous, cruelandwhoseapplicationguidesaction,butontheconceptswithwhichwedescribeourcircumstanceandthepeoplewithwhomweinteract.ThinkbacktoMandD.Whatthemothergainsisnotadeeperapprehensionofherownmoralcharacter,orofherbehaviour,butofherdaughter-in-lawandwhatsheisreallylike.NordoesMurdochconfineherselftoconceptsthatcarryaspecificvalence,positiveornegative,liketheonesonWilliamslist.AsbecomesincreasinglyclearinthesecondessayofSovereignty,theknowledgethatconstitutesvirtueisnotknowledgeoftheGood, or evenof particular virtues, but of the real existence ofotherpeople:Themoretheseparatenessanddifferentnessofotherpeopleisrealized,andthefactseenthatanothermanhasneedsandwishesasdemandingasonesown,theharderitbecomestotreatapersonasathing(Murdoch1970:64).

In general,Murdochs talk of moral conceptsmust beheard inrelation to a parenthetic remark: (That mental concepts enter thesphereofmorality is, formyargument,precisely thecentralpoint.)(Murdoch 1970: 234) The moral reasons full cognition of whichentailschoice,accordingtoMoralInternalism,arejustdescriptionsofonescircumstance,as,forinstance,thatsomeoneisinseriousneedandonecanhelpthematlittlecost.McDowellsdiscussionpicksuponthis:astheexampleofshyandsensitiveillustrates,thelanguage



appliestoallconcepts,notjusttothosewhicharemorallyrelevant:Arethereformsofmud,hairanddirt?Iftherearethennatureisredeemedinto the area of truthful vision. (My previous argument assumesofcourse, inPlatonic terms, that thereare.) (Murdoch1970:86) Inoutline,thetheoryisthis:eachconceptisassociatedwithnormsforitsproperuse,bothpracticalandtheoretical;thesenormsdescribewhentheconceptshouldbeappliedandwhatfollowsfromitsapplication,bothcognitivelyandinrelationtothewill;tograspagivenconceptistoapproximate,inonesdispositionsofthought,aconformitywiththesenorms.Concept-possession thus comesbydegree andpointstoalimitwemayneverreach:perfectcompliancewiththenormsbywhichourconceptsaredefined.

ThispictureofconceptsisrelatedtoDavidsonsconstitutiveidealofrationalityandtothenormativityoftheintentional.AmorerecentPlatonist,RalphWedgwood,makesasimilarclaim:

[The]doctrine that the intentional is normative canbeviewedasawayofcashingoutPlatosmetaphorthattheFormoftheGoodistotheunderstandingwhatthesunis to vision (Republic, 507b509a).We count as sightedbecause we are appropriately sensitive to light, theultimatesourceofwhichisthesun;inasimilarway,wecountasthinkersbecauseweareappropriatelysensitiveto normative requirements, the source of which is a

relevantpassageisthis:

Plato assumes the internal relation of value, truth, cognition.Vir-tue (as compassion, humility, courage) involves a desire for andachievementoftruthinsteadoffalsehood,realityinsteadofappear-ance.[]Learninganythingproperlydemands(virtuous)attention.Heretheideaoftruthplaysacrucialrole(asitdoesalsoinKant)andrealityemergesastheobjectoftruthfulvision,andvirtuousac-tionastheproductofsuchvision.Thisisapictureoftheomnipres-enceofmoralityandevaluationinhumanlife.Onthisviewitwouldseemmadtobeginphilosophybyassertingacompleteseparationoffactfromvalue,andthenattemptingtogiveasatisfactoryaccountofmorals.(Murdoch1992:39)

Internalism.Without the assumption of supervenience,meta-ethicswouldbealmostunimaginablydifferent.

In epistemology, the consequence is, if anything, more striking.Beliefsaboutrightandwrong,orwhatthereisreasontodo,mayraiseepistemic problems. But perhaps they can be ignored.Allwe needis knowledge of the facts that constitute reasons, plain facts aboutourcircumstance,which influence thewill.Assumingwecanknowtheapplicationofmentalconcepts,thereisnoproblemaboutmoralknowledgeinitsmostbasicform.

No doubt these proposals raise questions of their own. Perhapstheresultistomaketheepistemologyofthementalmoremysteriousthanitseemed.Wewontpursuethatissuehere.OurtaskistofindinMurdochatheoryofconceptsthatmakessenseofMoralInternalism.She rejects the genetic theory, and her claim is not merely aboutthick concepts but about the whole range of thoughts with whichwearticulateoursocialworld.Whataccountdoesshegive?Theclueto Murdochs picture lies in the invocation of realism, which weencounteredinsection1.InaPlatonicmode,Murdochconnectstherealismofvirtuewith the appreciationofbeauty inart andnature,whichisacompletelyadequateentryinto(andnotjustanalogyof)thegoodlife,sinceitisthecheckingofselfishnessintheinterestofseeingthereal(Murdoch1970:63).36GreatartsharesintheexactnessandobjectiveattentionMurdochassociateswithmorals.Thesameistrueoftechnaiingeneral:inanintellectualdiscipline,Iamconfrontedbyanauthoritativestructurewhichcommandsmyrespect.[]Attentionis rewardedbyaknowledgeof reality (Murdoch 1970:87).And inthemostgeneralformulationofall:The necessity of the good is then an aspect of the kind of necessity involved in any technique for exhibiting fact(Murdoch1970:64).

It is possible to extract from these increasingly abstract claims aPlatonic theory of concepts and concept-possession.37 This theory

36.SeealsoMurdoch1970:825.

37. PerhapsthecleareststatementofthisviewistobefoundinMetaphysics as a Guide to Morals,butthatbookistoodifficulttobeintegratedhere.Themost



Ifthisisright,MoralInternalismiscontroversialbutnotobviouslyfalse.ItisvindicatedbyMurdochsspinonacontentious,thoughnotimplausible,philosophyofmind.Herargumentsforthisconceptionarescattered,andIammoreconcernedtomakeherviewcogentthantomakeitirresistible.ButacentralthreadrunsfromtheexampleofMandD to theconclusion thatourgraspof concepts canbemoreor less ideal,wherethe limit isperfectrationalityorresponsivenesstoreason.Murdochsupportsandillustratesthisclaimwithconceptsofthenaturalworld,withart,andwithtechnai:theideaofperfectionworkswithineveryfieldofthought.

This argument does not tell us what there is reason to do. Inparticular, itdoesnot tellus that theneedsofotherpeopleprovideuswithreasonstoact.Iftherearesuchreasons,however, it followsfromthePlatonictheorythatthecorrespondingnormsarebuiltintoourconcepts.Whenthereisdecisivemoralreasontoactinacertainway,knowledgeofthatreason,includingidealgraspoftheconceptsitinvolves,entailsdecisivemotivation.MoralInternalismholds.ThisargumentanswersthequestionWhybemoral?notbyshowingthatthereisreasontodowhatisright,orbypersuadingtheamoralist,butby avoiding the dilemma posed in section 1. Even if the argumentfor ethical rationalism goes through, we can save the generality ofmoralreasonswithoutderivingtheirexistencefromthenatureofthewill.OnthePlatonictheoryofconcepts,thereisanotherpossibility:thatrationalagentsaremovedbysuchconsiderationsbecausetheyare reasonsor so we assume against the scepticand becauserationalitybelongstofullcognitionofthefacts.

ThisreadingmakessenseofmuchthatisobscureinThe Sovereignty of Good, from the role of the genetic theory, through Murdochsrealism,toherconceptionofchoice.Butitleavesanumberoflooseends.OneisspecifictothecontextinwhichIhaveplacedMurdochsviews. I have argued that she avoids the problemofmoral reasonsas it afflicts the ethical rationalist. But this may be too quick. Thetruth of rationalism would constrain what constitutes a norm ofpracticalreason.Dothenormsinvolvedinourpossessionofconcepts,

coherent system of eternal and necessary truths aboutwhatweoughttothinkordoorfeel.(Wedgwood2007:3)

OnthePlatonictheory,wemustrespondtothenormsofreason,atleast by approximation, in using the concepts we do. They are atonceaconditionof thoughtandan ideal towhichweaspire.38Thenecessity involved in any technique for exhibiting factisthenecessityofthisaspirationandthis ideal,anecessity involved inanyattempttodepictrealityasitis.

Wedgwoods Platonism differs from Murdochs in several ways.First, Wedgwood concentrates on the concept ought, not on thickmoralconceptsortheconceptswithwhichwespecifymoralreasons.39 Second,heassociateseachconceptwithasingle rule,ora specificrationaldisposition (Wedgwood2007: 169).Murdochwouldadoptamoreholisticview.Aswedeepenourconcepts,theybecomemoreintricately bound to one another: reflection rightly tends to unifythe moral world (Murdoch 1970: 56). The norms we approach inpossessing a given concept do not consist in an isolated rule; theyincludeeverynormintowhichthatconceptenters.Finally,Wedgwoodmakesnothingof theclaimthatourpossessionofconceptsmaybepartial,thatitcomesbydegree.ThesecontraststogetherexcludefromWedgwoods Platonismwhat ismost distinctive inMurdochs view:hercommitmenttoMoralInternalism.If fullpossessionofconceptsentails conformity not onlywith local norms butwith standards ofidealrationality,fullgraspofadecisivereasontofwillentaildecisivemotivation.ThetruthofMoralInternalismfollowsfromthePlatonictheoryof concepts, assuming that theknowledge towhich it refersinvolves truevisionor ideal conceptual graspand that thenormsimplicitinourconceptsarethoseofpracticalandtheoreticalreason.Itisinthissensethat[the]authorityofmoralsistheauthorityoftruth(Murdoch1970:88).

38.Antonaccio2000:52,589.

39.HedefendsthisfocusexplicitlyatWedgwood2007:978,1056.



Another loose end is Murdochs emphasis on perception of theindividualasamoralphenomenon.Does thisconflictwith,ordoesit follow from, thestoryofconceptualprogress toldby thePlatonictheory? Is there room for moral development that precedes theacquisitionof concepts, inwhichonecomes toperceivea situation,oraperson,correctly,inwaysonecannotarticulateinwords?Thesequestionsrelatetolargerissuesinthephilosophyofmind,andIcanonlytouchuponthemhere.Atemptingviewisthatshiftsinperceptionthatconstitutemoralgrowth,evenwhentheyareinarticulate,involveconceptualchange.Onemaynothavewordsforthecontentofonesperception,butonecanthinkaboutit,ifonlyindemonstrativeterms:thiskindofperson,thatwaytoact.41Iaminclinedtotakethisroute,but it isnotessential tomyargument.Amoreconcessive responseisthatthereisnoreasonwhythePlatonictheorymustexplaineveryaspectofMurdochsviewandnoreasontofearthatitconflictswithinterpretationsonwhichperceptionhasanindependentrole.

Finally, the Platonic theory casts light on Murdochs attitude todefectiveconceptsandconceptualchange.Suppose thatpossessionof a putative concept involves being disposed to think or react inimmoralways: theconcept isone thatavirtuouspersonwouldnothave. Examples might be chastity or self-denial. It is an implicationofMurdochsviewthatsuchputativeconcepts fail.Sincethenormsdefinitive of any concept are norms of reason, genuine conceptscannot be in thisway flawed.42 Thosewho use the relevantwordsmayappeartobethinking,buttheyarenot.Itisconsistentwiththisthatourpresentconceptsarelimited,thattherearefacetsofreasontowhichtheyaffordnoaccess,andthatthereispressureforustoreviseandextendourthoughts.

alsoconsistentwiththePlatonictheory,andwithMoralInternalism,torejecttherationalistargumentaltogether.

41. SeeMcDowell1994:568,againstnon-conceptualcontent.

42. For a similar argument, seeWedgwood2007: 1689, and for anopposingview,Williamson2003.

accordingtoMurdochsPlatonism,meetthisconstraint?Wecanputtheproblemthisway:AccordingtothePlatonictheory,conceptsareassociated with norms to which we must approximately conform,idealpossessionofaconceptinvolvesfullconformity,andthisisthestandard of ideal rationality.According to ethical rationalism, to bepracticallyrationalistoachievetheaimorendofagency,assuch.Wethushavetwopotentiallyconflictingviewsofpracticalrationality.Butwecanreconciletheirclaims.Ifidealrationalityisfullconformitywiththenormsinscribedinourconcepts,andtobepracticallyrationalistoachievetheaimorendofagency,assuch,theaimofagencymustbetograsptheconceptswithwhichtodescribeourcircumstance.Thoughsheisnotexplicitaboutit,thismaybeMurdochsview.Sheconceivesattentionasajustandlovinggazedirecteduponanindividualrealityandcallsthisthecharacteristicandpropermarkoftheactivemoralagent(Murdoch1970:33).Asshegoesontosay,thisisbothalogicalandanormativeclaim:ithasthesamedualcharacterastheaimofagency,fortheethicalrationalist,whichbridgestheis-oughtgap.Onthisinterpretation,whileMurdochofferssomethinglikethereverseofHampshirespicture,sheagrees,inaway,with

the only explicit ought in his psychology. We oughtto know what we are doing. We should aim at totalknowledgeofoursituationandaclearconceptualizationofallourpossibilities.(Murdoch1970:7)

Thedifferenceisinhowsheconceivessuchknowledge,notasamatterofpublic,impersonalfact,butastheobjectofjustperception,andnotasexpandingourrangeofpossibilities,butasclosingthemoffwithoutprecludingfreedom,sothatrightconductisassured.Theoughtofattentiontosocialrealitybywhichourthoughtsareperfectedistheoughtofagencyorpractical reasonand theoughtofmeetingthenormsbywhichourconceptsaredefined.40

40.Although this reading ispossible, I should stress that the textdoesnot re-quireit.WhileMurdochsviewcanbereconciledwithethicalrationalism,itis



doinginthesepassages,whyitmatterstomoralphilosophy,andhowitconstitutesaformofproof.

4. The Sovereignty of Good

Thelanguageofmyaccountsofarhasbeenconspicuouslydifferentfrom Murdochs. I have written about the norms of practical andtheoreticalreasoninscribed inourconceptsandof thestandardsofidealrationalityintheiruse.Murdochwritesinsteadaboutperfectionand theGood.Rationality isnotacentralconcept inherbook.Thecontrasthere isnot just terminological.What isat stake in the ideaoftheGoodistheunityandcoherenceofthenormsinvolvedintheperfectgraspofmentalconcepts.ThisissueisraisedbyMurdochinheressayOnGodandGood:

Thenotionthatvalueshouldbeinsomesenseunitary,oreventhatthereshouldbeasinglesupremevalueconcept,may seem, if one surrenders the idea ofGod, far fromobvious.Whyshouldtherenotbemanydifferentkindsofindependentmoralvalues?Whyshouldallbeonehere?(Murdoch1970:55)

TobelieveintheGoodistobelievethat,inanevaluativesense,allisone.Toillustratethisclaim,Murdochcitesthepotentialunityofthevirtues: ifwereflectuponcourageandaskwhywethink it tobeavirtue,whatkindofcourageisthehighest,whatdistinguishescouragefromrashness,ferocity,self-assertion,andsoon,wearebound,inourexplanation,tousethenamesofothervirtues(Murdoch1970:56).43 Butthisdoesnotexhaustthebeliefshehasinmind.

[What]isitforsomeonewhoisnotareligiousbelieverandnotsomesortofmystic,toapprehendsomeseparateform of goodness behind the multifarious cases ofgoodbehaviour?Shouldnotthisideabereducedtothe

43. SeealsoMurdoch1970:93;McDowell1979:503.

Moral tasks are characteristically endless not onlybecause within, as itwere, a given conceptour effortsare imperfect, but alsobecause aswemove and aswelook our concepts themselves are changing. (Murdoch1970:27)

Wemayneednewandbetterconcepts inorder tocomprehendourreasons,tobringintoviewthefactsforwhichMoralInternalismholds.

This opens an extraordinary possibility. If new concepts makeavailablenewfacts,knowledgeofwhich is inextricable fromchoice,philosophycanmakemoralprogressthroughintellectualchange.Inthe last two essays of Sovereignty, Murdoch insists on the practicalnature of her project: How can we make ourselves better? is aquestionmoralphilosophers should try toanswer. (Murdoch1970:76)OnthePlatonicconception,theycan.AsMurdochwroteinVisionandChoiceinMorality:

Great philosophers coin new moral concepts andcommunicate new moral visions and modes ofunderstanding.[]Fromherewemayseethatthetaskofmoralphilosophershasbeentoextend,aspoetsmayextend,thelimitsoflanguage,andenableittoilluminateregionswhichwereformerlydark.(Murdoch1956:42,49)

GivenMoralInternalism,theextensionoflanguageandthoughtcanconstitute moral improvement. Nor does Murdoch simply observethis prospect. In the parts of her book that seemmost unorthodox,theirrhetoricmosthigh-flown,shetriestoenactit,torehabilitatetheconceptoftheGood,neglectofwhichisamoral,notjustanintellectual,vice:TheimageoftheGoodasatranscendentmagneticcentreseemstometheleastcorruptibleandmostrealisticpictureforustouseinour reflections on the moral life. (Murdoch 1970: 73) Against thebackgroundofthePlatonictheory,wecanexplainwhatMurdochis



is always a right decision, one that satisfies the norms involved ineveryconceptthatappliestoonescircumstance.BeliefintheGoodisexpressedintheidea[]thatthelinesreallydoconverge(Murdoch1970:97): the lines tracedoutby thenormsofeachconcept,whichconvergeintheGood.Forallourfrailtythecommandbeperfecthassenseforus(Murdoch1970:90).Perfectgraspofeveryconceptmaybepsychologicallyoutofreach,butitisnotimpossible.

BeliefintheGoodisaprotectionagainstdespairbecauseittellsusthateveryproblemcanbesolved.Buttheconsolationmaygofurther.Attimes,MurdochsuggeststhatfaithintheGoodisarecognitionofthe absolute pointlessness of virtue [and] its supreme importance,thatnothinginlifeisofanyvalueexcepttheattempttobevirtuous(Murdoch 1970: 845). The unity here is not just that of a rightdecision,onethatrespondstoevery fact,but that ifonemakes thisdecision,nothingelsematters:thereisnocauseforregretordismay;all other reasons are silenced.44 Murdoch emphasizes, too, thatwhileitmaybedifficult,contemplationoftheGood[is]asourceofuncontaminatedenergy,asourceofnewandquiteundreamt-ofvirtue(Murdoch1970:99).Itisapsychologicalfact,andoneofimportancetomoralphilosophy, thatwecanall receivemoralhelpby focusingourattentionuponthingswhicharevaluable:virtuouspeople,greatart,perhaps[]theideaofgoodnessitself(Murdoch1970:545).45

Murdochs discussion at times conflates the Platonic theory ofconceptswithbeliefintheGood.Infact,sheisaPlatonisttwiceover:onceinrelatingeachconcepttotheideaofitsownperfectionandthenintheideaofasingleperfectioninwhicheveryconceptshares.Asmydiscussionshows,theseideasaredistinct.ThereisthePlatonictheorywhich supportsMoral Internalism, and there is the further claimofunity in theGood.Although she is not careful to distinguish them,Murdochseestheneedtoargueforthesecondclaiminawaythatgoesbeyondthefirst.Shedoesnotendwiththe necessity of the good [as] an

44. Fortheideaofsilencing,seeMcDowell1978:904,1979:536.

45. Onthedifficultyhere,andwhethertheGoodcanbeadirectobjectofatten-tion,seeMurdoch1970:678,95,97,99.

muchmoreintelligiblenotionoftheinterrelationofthevirtues,plusapurelysubjectivesenseofthecertaintyofjudgements?(Murdoch1970:59)

Thehoped-foranswer is that it shouldnot.WecanmakesenseofadeeperunityandofasingleformofGoodbehindthevariouskindsofexcellenceintheapplicationofconceptsandresponsivenesstoreasons.

I thinkwe can understandwhatMurdochwants here by notinghowmuchthePlatonictheoryleavesopen.Accordingtothistheory,eachconceptisassociatedwithnormsforitsproperuse.Inordertograspagivenconcept,onemustsatisfythesenorms,atleasttosomedegree.Butthereisroomformorecompletepossessionofaconcept,foronetoapproachperfectionbymeetingitsnormsinfull.Nothinginthisaccountrulesoutthefollowingpossibility:thatthenormsforconceptFandconceptGareincompatible,thatwecannotperfectourgraspofboth.Suppose,forinstance,thatoneactfallsunderF,anotherunderG.Knowledge that anact is F,with full graspof the concept,entailsdecisivemotivation:thefactthattheactisFisadecisivereasontoperformit.Atthesametime,knowledgethatanactisG,withfullgraspoftheconcept,entailsdecisivemotivation:thefactthattheactisGisadecisivereasontoperformit.Itfollowsthatonecannotfullygraspboth facts, sinceonecannotmeetbothnorms.Theresult isakindoffragmentationinreason.

This description may harbour some hidden incoherence, butitdoesnot conflictwith the letterof thePlatonic theory.All that isimplied is that the standardof ideal rationality in thepossessionofeveryconceptisunattainable.Therearetragediesinwhichwehavedecisive reason to do incompatible things.Whether this is true ornotis,forMurdoch,arealquestion:Thenotionthatitallsomehowmustmake sense, or there is a best decision here, preserves fromdespair; thedifficulty ishow toentertain this consolingnotion inawaywhich is not false (Murdoch 1970: 55). If theGood exists, thenormsinvolvedinourconceptsarecompatible:therearenotragediesinwhich,whateveronedoes,oneactsagainstadecisivereason.There



tocomeapart,wewillregardthetensionasmerelyapparent,revisingouruseoftheseconceptsuntilitgivesway.TheideaoftheGoodthusoperatesasaregulativeidealforourchangingconceptualgrasp.

Now, so far, this is mere description: it is an account of howa conceptworks, in the terms set out by thePlatonic theory.But itsupports an ontological proof.46 Ask, first, whether it is rationaltomake the inferences that define the concept of theGood. If it isirrational,theGoodisnotthenameofagenuineconcept,forreasonsgivenattheendofsection3.Ontheotherhand,ifitisrationaltothinkintheseways,itisrationaltoreviseourconceptsinthedirectionofunity,toresolveapparentconflictsbetweenthem,andtoactinlightof theunderstandingswe reach. It follows that thenorms involvedinourconceptsdonotessentiallyconflict.Thereisarationalwaytounderstand these concepts on which their norms cohere with oneanother:awayinwhichweareledtounderstandthemifwereasonin termsof theGood. It follows in turn that there is always a rightdecision,onethatisratifiedbyeverynorm.Thereisalwaysananswertothequestion,WhatshouldIdo?Therearenoinsolubletragedies,andwearerighttobelieveintheexistenceoftheGood.

Thislineofthoughtisanontologicalproof,inthatitmovesfromthenatureofaconcepttotherealityofwhatitstandsfor.Ifthoughtabout theGood ispossible, if it isnot themere illusionof thought,thenonthePlatonictheoryofconcepts,itmustberational,andifitisrational,theconceptoftheGoodcannotbeempty.Ofcourse,thereisnoproofoftheantecedent.Murdochasks,aboutourinvocationsoftheGood:Canwegivethemanyclearmeaningoraretheyjustthingsonefeelsinclinedtosay?(Murdoch1970:59)ThebestassuranceofsenseisthatourputativethoughtsabouttheGoodareonesthatseemintelligibletousinordinarylife(Murdoch1970:72).Afterthat,the

46.Murdochcitestheontologicalproof,parenthetically,inrelatingperfectionorabsolutegoodtonecessaryexistence(Murdoch1970:5960).(This isoneofthepointsatwhichIthinksheconflatestherealityoftheGoodwiththePlatonictheoryofconcepts.)ThereisachapterontheontologicalproofinMetaphysics as a Guide to Morals that isbroadlyconsonantwiththereadingofferedhere;anadequatetreatmentliesbeyondourscope.

aspect of the kind of necessity involved in any technique for exhibiting fact,whichIhavetakenasanexpressionofthePlatonictheory(Murdoch1970:64).Instead,sheworries,repeatedly,thatforallitspsychologicalbenefits,theideaofanuncorruptedgoodisthemerestconsolatorydream(Murdoch1970:59).AttentiontotheGoodmaybeasourceofmoralenergy;itmaysaveusfromdespairtothinkthateverythingmakessense, thatwemustreceiveareturnwhengoodissincerelydesired(Murdoch1970:62).[The]onlydifficultyisthatnoneofitistrue(Murdoch1970:70).WhatisMurdochsargumentfortherealityoftheGood?

Looking back to the end of section 3, let us begin with this:AccordingtoMurdoch,wecanbecomemorallybetterbyseeingtheworldinlightoftheGood.Murdochoffersthisconceptpreciselyasasourceofmoralhelpanduncontaminatedenergy.Inaway,thereisnomysteryhere. It isnotmysteriouswhatwegain frombelief intheGoodorhow it canaffectouractions, ifMurdoch is right.Thisbeliefisasourceofmoralmotivation.ThepuzzleiswhatthishastodowiththeexistenceoftheGood.Whyshouldpracticalreasonsforusingaconceptorholdingabeliefshowthattheconceptisnotemptyorthatthebeliefistrue?Murdochisadamantthathersisnotasortofpragmatismor aphilosophyof as if (Murdoch 1970: 723).Weshouldnotsimplypretendthatthelinesconverge;wearejustifiedinthinkingthattheydo.

In order tomake sense of this, we need to saymore about theconcept of the Good. To think in terms of this conceptof theperfectionofthought,assuchistointerpretthenormsinvolvedinotherconceptsaspartsofacoherentwhole.AmongthenormsthatdefinetheconceptoftheGooditselfarethese:fromthefactthatthenormsofaconceptrequiresomeresponse,inferthatitisrequiredbytheGood;and from the fact that theGood requires some response,inferthatnootherresponsecanberequired.Ifwereasoninthisway,wewill conclude that thenormsof every concept are consistent inpracticewiththenormsofeveryother.Wewillbecommittedtotheresolutionofconflict.Whenthedemandsofdisparateconceptsappear



Murdoch insists that the languageofmoral reasons is unavoidablyidiosyncraticandinaccessible(Murdoch1970:33).Thereisnosingleend-pointtotheperfectgraspofmentalconcepts:theremaybeseveralways toapplya concept, and to respond to itsuse, thatareequallyandperfectlyideal.Asweevolveindifferentways,wemaybecomeincreasinglyunintelligible tooneanother,withoutanyofushavinggonewrong.47ThisfeatureofMurdochsviewmakesheroppositiontothegenetictheory,withitsemphasisonpublicstandards,especiallysharp.Butitisnotessentialtoit:aPlatonistforwhomeachconcepthasasingleperfectformwouldstilldenythegenetictheoryandcouldargueforMoralInternalisminthesameway.AnditispotentiallyatoddswithMurdochs secondPlatonism, about theunity and realityoftheGood,whichstressesconvergence,notidiosyncrasy.Isthereacontradictionhere?Inmyview,thereisnot:theappearanceofconflictissuperficial.TobelieveintheGoodistobelievethatonecanperfectonesgraspofeveryconcept.Itisnottobelievethatthereisjustonewayofdoingso.BeliefintheGoodisthusconsistentwiththeprivacyofperfectunderstanding.Still,onmyreading,thedoctrineofprivacycanbe severed from the rest ofMurdochs view: it doesnot followfromhercentralclaims.

The final theme is in a way the first:Murdoch opens her bookbylisting,amongthefacts[]whichseemtohavebeenforgottenor theorizedaway incontemporaryphilosophy, the fact that loveisacentralconceptinmorals(Murdoch1970:2).Thesecondessayof Sovereignty repeats the charge: We need a moral philosophy inwhichtheconceptoflove,sorarelymentionednowbyphilosophers,canonceagainbemadecentral(Murdoch1970:45).Apartfromitsillustrative use,my discussion has rarelymentioned love. It figuresincidentallyinreferencetoattentionthetruevision[that]occasionsrightconductasjustandloving.Butithasnotbeenexplained.

47. Murdochs claimmay be less radical: that moral development can followdifferent paths to the ideal, which may involve stages of mutual incom-prehension. I focuson thestronger reading inpartbecause it seemsmoreproblematic.

philosophicalproof[]isthesameasthemoralproof(Murdoch1970:73).ThepracticalargumentfortheGoodthatitisrationaltothinkinsuchtermsistheproofthatGoodexists.

As before, I do not mean to endorse Murdochs reasoning butto explain how it works. Her argument is controversial not just inassumingtheintelligibilityoftheGoodbutinitscharacterizationoftheconceptanditsrelianceonthePlatonictheoryofconcept-possession.Still, despite appearances,Murdoch does have an argument.WhensherecommendstheimageoftheGoodasatranscendentmagneticcentre,sheisnotengaginginmerepsychologyorself-helpbutstatingapremiseofherontologicalproof.Herconcernwiththemetaphorswe live by is not a sign that her interests are more literary thanphilosophicalbutaconsequenceofthePlatonictheory,onwhichourconceptsmaydeterminewhatwedoandonwhichwecanargue,inmoralterms,abouthowtothink.Mostsurprisinglyofall,wecanarguefortherealityoftheGoodfromitsmoralvalueasanobjectofattention,blindingbutilluminating,atthelimitofsight.

5. Concluding Thoughts

ThereismoreinThe Sovereignty of Goodthanevenanextendedstudycouldexplore.IhavearguedthatTheIdeaofPerfectionmakesroomfor Moral Internalism by rejecting the genetic theory of concepts.ThroughMoralInternalism,Murdochcanavoidtheproblemofmoralreasons. Sheneednotderive from thenatureof agencyor thewillasensitivitytomoralconcerns.TherestofthebookdefendsaformofPlatonismaboutconceptsthatvindicatesMoralInternalism,andasecondPlatonism,abouttheunityofrationalnormsandtheexistenceof theGood. I end by touching on two further themes, the first ofwhichcanbeframedasanobjection.

WiththeexampleofMandD,Murdochshowshowourgraspofmentalconceptscandeepenandgrow,howitcantranscendwhatwasapparent in their acquisition.Shegoeson tomakeamore startlingclaim, which she repeats more than once, that the movement ofunderstandingisonwardintoincreasingprivacy(Murdoch1970:28).



ontologicalproof,forasecularinterpretationofloveyourneighbourasyourself?TocompletethereadingofSovereignty,onewouldhavetoworkthroughtherelationshipoflovetotruthandtotheGood.OnewouldhavetoexplainwhyActlovingly[will]translateActperfectly,whereasActrationallywillnot(Murdoch1970:99).Andonewouldhave to square this with the fact that love is capable of infinitedegradationandisthesourceofourgreatesterrors(Murdoch1970:100).ThoughIcannotdothesethings,Iamoptimisticthattheycanbedone,thatthelinesconverge,andthatwithrefinementordeepening,wecancometounderstandtheconceptloveasMurdochdoes.50

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Murdochstheoryofloveisinitiallypuzzling.Whyshouldaccurateperceptionofanother,evenwithperfectgraspoftheconceptsapplied,goalongwithlove,notloathingorcontempt?SupposeDreallyweretiresomeandjuvenile,or,ifthosearedefectiveconcepts,considertheclear-eyedcontemplationofthemiseryandeviloftheworld(Murdoch1970:59).Musttheagentsofevilbeobjectsoflove?Murdochsthoughtisthattheymust.Theairofparadoxinthisclaimcanbedissolvedinpartby recalling that the love inquestion isnotselectiveit isnotfondnessoraffectionorthedesireforintimacybutloveasamoralemotion.48(TheexampleofMandDismisleadinginthisrespect.ItisanaccidentthattheobjectofMslovinggazeisherdaughter-in-law,notamurdereroranacquaintanceatwork.)Thelovethat interestsMurdochistheloveoneshouldhaveforonesneighbour thatis,foranyonewithwhomoneinteracts.49Ifloveinthissenseispartial,thatisonlybecausewearelimited.Loveistheextremelydifficultrealisationthatsomethingotherthanoneselfisreal(Murdoch1959:215).Sinceeveryoneisreal,weoughttolovethemall.Itdoesnotfollowfromthisthatweshouldfeelaffectionforeveryoneorthatweshouldpursuetheirinterests.Loveinvolvestruevisionandleadsustoacttowardsothersaswearemorallyrequiredtoact.Itmightbeoutoflovethatwepreventthemfromdoingharm,orberatethem,orrefusetoassociatewiththem.

The question I leave unanswered here is whether we can treatMurdochsuseof love in themoral contextasmore thanquixotic.Whatdoes loveas truevisionhave todowith love inanyordinarysense?AretherematerialsinthePlatonictheoryofconcepts,orinthe

48.CompareVelleman,whocitesMurdochinsupportofhisKantianview:re-spectandlove[are]therequiredminimumandoptionalmaximumrespons-estooneandthesamevalue,thatofpersonhoodorrationalwill(Velleman1999:366).ForVelleman,lovedisarmsouremotionalresponsesandinvolvesreallylookingatthepersonwelove(Velleman1999:361).Despitethereso-nance, this invocationofMurdochcannotbe right.The love that involvesreallylooking,forMurdoch,isnotoptionalbutrequired,anddirectednotatourrationalnaturesbutatourmorallyambiguousmentallives.

49.Onloveofonesneighbour,seeMurdoch1970:21,72,andinconnectionwithKant,Murdoch1959:21920.



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Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good1.How to Be an Ethical Rationalist2.True Vision and Right Conduct3.A Platonic Theory of Concepts4.The Sovereignty of Good5.Concluding Thoughts

References

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Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good