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Sachin RadhakrishnanEthnic ConflictKyle Joyce/Jakub Benes19 March 2012

Natural Resources and Civil War:An Analysis of Three Studies

Introduction:

The link between natural resources and intrastate conflict is a widely discussed

relationship in civil war literature. Conflict, which includes nonviolent protest, rebellion,

and more widely studied, civil war, is considered to be a result of greed and/or grievance

and the control of resources. The rebel group and government’s ability to fund an

uprising or suppression, respectively, through the exploitation of natural resources

validates the relationship as well. However, questions over the types of resources, level of

conflict, and affect on duration have prompted several scholars to undertake further

research into the correlation. Recent literature that will be further examined in this paper

includes, Michael Ross’s 2004 article How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War?

Evidence From Thirteen Cases, Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth

Gilmore’s A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource in 2005, and Patrick

Regan and Daniel Norton’s 2005 work, Greed, Grievances, and Mobilization in Civil

Wars.

Michael Ross examined the effects of resource wealth on civil war onset, war

duration, and intensity of conflict (casualties). The few, shaky linkages between natural

resources and promoting conflict in civil war literature motivated Ross to undertake

serious scrutiny into the causal mechanisms of resources and civil war onset in thirteen

cases. The chosen cases provide optimal examples for causal mechanisms to aid in a

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more general study. His findings support the relationship between the promotion of

conflict and oil, non-fuel minerals, and drugs, and no evidence to include legal

agricultural commodities. Effects of resources on war duration reveal ambiguities as the

case studies show wars being both prolonged and shortened (Ross, 35-38).

Patrick Regan and Daniel Norton’s work examines intrastate conflict at three

different stages: nonviolent protest, rebellion, and civil war. They looked at the roles of

inequality, repression, and resource exploitation in causing conflict at these three levels.

Their catalyst for researching internal conflict came from disagreement with the widely

considered belief of grievances and inequality leading to conflict. Both authors believed

that grievance alone could do little to promote conflict as collective action would still

require financial resources in addition to motivation. Also, the notion of inequality versus

repression describes two separate situations in which a person reflects on the former as a

grievance compared with others while the latter is compared with his/her own

expectations. This implies that inequality does not provide adequate grievances in the

first place to lead to civil war while repression does so by creating a collective problem

with the government rather than amongst one’s peers. Their findings claim that different

factors contribute to each level of violence, government responses are crucial to rebel

group behavior, and the idea of diamonds as inconclusive in matters of civil unrest

(Regan and Norton, 319-327).

Päivi Lujala et al. researched the relationship between diamond production, both

primary and secondary, and the incidence and onset of civil war. They also examined this

relationship within poor nations, countries with high ethnic fractionalization, and the

period following the Cold War. The opportunity to undertake such extensive research on

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the role of diamonds arose when a new database on diamond deposits and production

called DIADATA came into being for purposes like their study. The authors find a

significant relationship between secondary diamond production and civil war onset,

especially in nations with high ethnic divisions and production in the post-Cold War era.

Primary diamond production was found to actually to make the onset and incidence of

ethnic war less likely (Lujala et al., 538-540).

For the remainder of this paper, these three articles will be discussed more in

depth. I will first be examining the hypotheses for each article and the theoretical

arguments behind one hypothesis per article. Then a comparison of the theoretical

arguments and hypotheses between the authors will follow. After, I will outline the

various data sets and research designs per article, then compare and contrast these

components as well. Lastly, an empirical analysis for each article’s hypothesis links the

statistical data with the theoretical arguments. An overall comparison of the respective

analyses rounds out the last section of the paper, which is then followed by the

conclusion. I will conclude by examining the results as a whole in what they provide the

field of civil war literature and the implications for the future for each article.

Theory:

Although the three articles deal with natural resources and their effects on

promoting civil conflict, similar and different theoretical arguments provide backing for

the several unique hypotheses that arise from the six authors. Ross’s theoretical

arguments can be split between explaining resources affecting onset of civil war, duration

of war, and intensity of conflict. Regan and Norton’s arguments are divided between

factors that support either greed or grievance at different levels of conflict. Lujala et al.

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contend separate theoretical explanations for the type of diamonds that causes war and

the context certain countries face ethnically, economically, and temporally.

Michael Ross’s work includes five broad theoretical frameworks that guide his

research. 1.) Lootable natural resources provide the rebel forces the funding necessary to

start war with the government. 2.) The government’s exclusive control over natural

resources could also create a grievance for rebels to fight. 3.) The exploitation of

resources can either provide funding to rebel groups or the government. If the weaker

side controlled those resources, it would be able to sustain conflict and increase duration,

but oppositely, if the wealth goes to the stronger side, it increases their effectiveness in

militarized conflict which would shorten wars. 4.) Provided resource exploitation is more

attractive during wartime than peacetime for combatants, fighting will ensue rather than

peace if the opposite is true. 5.) Similarly, Ross concludes that if war leads to more

economic profit for rebels, the intensity of conflict will rise, but if peace provides profit,

the heightened incentive for peace will lower the intensity of conflict (38-46).

Norton and Regan contend three theoretical arguments that provide the basis for

their article’s contentions. 1.) The incentives to rebel against the government occur

because economic inequality creates a grim shadow of the future. This grim outlook

provides rebels the expectation of similarly low or worse utility, which incites conflict as

that poses a greater chance of achieving prosperity. 2.) Government repression will

similarly incite conflict but beyond the stages of nonviolent protest because the

government has moved beyond nonviolent means of dealing with its citizens. 3.)

Resource exploitation will increase the likelihood for rebellion and civil war, not

nonviolent protest, because it provides rebels groups funding to recruit and start/maintain

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campaigns against the government. Nonviolent protest is not included in this because the

economic resources required to carry out protest are low in the first place (323-326).

Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore’s examination of the

role of diamonds in civil war literature includes five theoretical frameworks that provide

basis for correlation. 1.) Secondary diamond production, as opposed to primary

production, provides rebel groups the economic resources necessary to recruit and retain

soldiers and acquire arms for warfare. 2.) Primary diamond sources, while not

economically aiding the rebels, could provide rebels with enough of a grievance to

motivate rebellion seeing as how a victory would equal control over valuable resources.

3.) Ethnic tension also provides a grievance, which in tandem with diamond production,

leads to conflict because both motivation and opportunity are present. 4.) Similarly,

citizens of poor countries also have a grievance against the government and will use the

resources from diamond extraction to their well-being. 5.) Lastly, the end of the Cold

War has forced rebel groups to look for financing elsewhere, as the previous bipolar

system was characterized by an environment filled with government backing of rebel

groups, and new lines of conflict other than ideological tensions have recently become

more prevalent (540-545).

In a comparison of the different theoretical arguments backing each article’s

proposed hypotheses, one can conclude that present in each article are both ideas of

natural resources providing an opportunity for rebels as well as a grievance to incite

conflict against the government. Also, the three articles relate to each other in the fact

that the resources must not simply be present in a nation, but have the crucial

characteristic of exploitability by the rebels, pre or post-war, in order for conflict to take

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place. The differences between the articles arise in subtle fashion. First, Ross

differentiates his work from the other five authors by claiming the role of natural

resources in both lengthening and curbing conflict after the onset of civil war. The other

authors solely look at prewar incentives and opportunities, and how they remain

throughout the conflict, but do not relatively examine the aspect of duration. Regan and

Norton separate their piece from the others in the sense that they recognize the effects of

natural resources at different levels of conflict like nonviolent protest and rebellion, not

just outright civil war. Lujala et al. are unique in their research of natural resource

correlation to conflict by examining the specific role of diamonds and theorize that

diamonds have been a unique factor in the past twenty years in general civil war and

ethnic civil war. With the broad theoretical arguments in place, the examination of one

hypothesis from each article provides a microcosmic insight into their general respective

findings.

The chosen hypothesis from Michael Ross’s article claims that “Resource wealth

tends to increase (decrease) the duration of civil wars when it provides funding to the

weaker (stronger) side” (43). Theoretical explanations for this proposed phenomenon

stem from literature that has developed consensus on the idea that rebel groups can

initially fund and sustain conflict once control over resources and an ability to extract

wealth from those resources is established. Ross uses two assumptions from the existing

literature to form the basis for his hypothesis. Together the assumptions entail that the

weaker side’s ability to control resources leads to increased war duration. Ross concludes

that this statement is true after evaluating other scholarly literature on war duration and

resources, but adds his own twist theory. He hypothesizes that if the stronger side were to

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gain control over those same disputed resources, the duration of war would be shortened

because it exponentially enhances the stronger side’s ability to defeat the opposition (42-

44).

The hypothesis from Regan and Norton’s work that will be further examined

theorizes that “The existence of exploitable resources will increase the likelihood of

observing rebellion and civil war; however, given the lower cost for participation in

protest activity, extractable resources will have no effect on the likelihood of protest”

(326). The theoretical basis for this hypothesis is as follows. In order for rebels to entice

their fellow citizens into rebellion or outright civil war, there exists competition with the

government to provide benefits to these people in exchange for loyalty. The rebel groups

must control and exploit natural resources in order to provide benefits to member recruits

to fight against the government. An inability to do so will give the government the chance

to either steal the loyalty of its subjects or repress them. Both actions will allow the

government to remain in power. The theory behind the second part of the hypothesis is

that the cost for nonviolent protest requires a much more insignificant amount of

resources to take place than rebellion and civil war, so its propensity for occurrence

remains constant regardless of a rebel group’s ability to exploit resources (326).

Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore’s questions over the

role of diamonds have prompted the hypothesis that “The presence of secondary

diamonds is positively associated with the onset and incidence of civil war in countries

with a high level of ethnic fractionalization” (545). Their observations of existing

theoretical explanations contend that grievances along ethnic lines are an outstanding

factor for causing civil war. Lujala et al. go on to use this theory in addition with the idea

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of resource-driven conflict to compound the two into one hypothesis. They claim that

there is a higher correlation of diamonds to war in ethnically divided countries because

there is both a strong grievance and opportunity (544-545).

Amongst the three hypotheses, all authors concur that the possibility of

exploitable natural resources is vital in fueling conflict by contending similar theoretical

arguments. Theory that claims wealth from natural resources as vital to funding rebel and

government troops alike provides the backbone for the authors’ hypotheses. Dyadic

comparisons of the articles yield differences and other commonalities. Ross’s hypothesis

versus Regan and Norton’s hypothesis both find parallels in the idea that government

access to resources could prevent civil war from occurring or significantly shortening it.

The two differ in thought as the former author’s article looks at natural resources after

civil war onset while the latter examines the effects before. Ross and Lujala et al. find

common ground in linking natural resources to opportunities for rebel groups to finance

warfare and also a portion of research dedicated to observing affects beyond onset of civil

war. They differ by the latter paper’s focus on diamonds instead of a wide list of natural

resources and attention to grievance and opportunity rather than just opportunity. Ross’s

paper also delves into unique levels of conflict. Lujala et al. compared to Regan and

Norton find a commonality in focusing on prewar effects of natural resources on civil war

onset but find two key differences in Regan and Norton’s attention to government access

to resources and Lujala et al. examining solely diamonds and the side focus of ethnic

fractionalization. Overall, the three articles are highly similar in the theoretical backings

of why exploitation of natural resources is vital in the arena of civil war, but several

differences separate the authors’ works as attention to specific resources, the parties

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involved, grievance versus opportunity, and diverse stages of conflict take the theories

into unique directions.

Research Design:

The various research designs between the three articles show some degree of

overlap but there are differences that separate the models used to test their respective

hypotheses, which may influence their various findings. Starting with Michael Ross’s

article, the research design pegs the unit of analysis as civil war-year, the temporal

domain from 1990-2000, and the spatial domain to include all civil wars (46). Patrick

Regan and Daniel Norton employ their unit of analysis as country-year, the temporal

domain from 1976-1997, and the spatial domain to include all countries (327). Lujala et

al. attribute their unit of analysis as country-year, the temporal domain from 1945-1999,

and the spatial domain to include all countries (546-547). Upon comparison of these three

unique research designs, one notices that Ross’s unit of analysis differs from the other

two articles in examining civil war-year rather than country-year. This is due to the fact

that Ross’s intentions were to study the effect of natural resources on the duration of civil

wars rather than onset. The spatial domains also differ because of the differences in units

of analysis, with Ross’s article examining all civil wars compared to all countries. The

most subsantial difference between all three articles is the varied temporal domain. All of

the articles study datasets that include the 1990’s but Lujala et al. includes the period

following the end of World War II to the end of the 1990’s. Regan and Norton’s temporal

domain skips the first half of the Cold War and starts from 1976 until 1997.

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Onto each paper’s hypothesis, with its respective dependent and independent

variables, one notices overlap in the analysis of the independent variables, but the

dependent variables reveals contrast between the research designs.

Michael Ross’s hypothesis of resource wealth positively correlating to the

prolongation or shortening of civil war duration depending on the strength of the looting

party displays the dependant variable of civil war duration and the independent variable

of wealth from the exploitation of natural resources. The dependent variable of war

duration is measured in years after looting of a natural resource takes place. Ross

examines thirteen case studies from Collier & Hoeffler’s 2001 list of thirty-six civil wars

from 1990-2000 and pinpoints the duration of time after the onset of looting. The sources

for deriving natural resource data also come from the aforementioned article, which

provides a statistical point of reference that compares primary commodity exports as a

percentage of GDP. Ross broadly defines resources as oil, gemstones, non-fuel minerals,

agricultural commodities, illicit drugs, and timber (46-49).

Regan and Norton examine civil conflict as their dependant variable, which more

specifically can be separated into nonviolent protest, rebellion, or civil war, and coin an

independent variable of wealth from exploitable resources. The Minorities at Risk project

provides a twelve-point scale for determining levels of civil conflict ranging from non-

violent opposition to outright civil war. At different points on the scale, the dummy

variables for the three components of civil conflict take on a value of 0 or 1. The

measures for extractable resources come from the Diamond Registry, the National

Gemstone Association, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, which respectively

analyze the exploitable resources of diamonds, gemstones, and opiates. The datasets

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reveal the existence of production for certain resources in a given year and are deemed

accessible to rebel groups in surrounding areas (327-328).

Lujala et al. undertake their dependant variable for analysis as civil war onset and

incidence. Their independent variables that tie together in their previously mentioned

hypothesis are ethnic fractionalization and secondary diamond production. The

measurements for civil war onset and incidence stem from two datasets, Fearon and

Laitin’s 2003 study on 127 civil war cases from 1945-1999, and Indra de Soysa’s 2002

article that compiles the conflict studies from Uppsala/PRIO list of civil wars from 1989-

1999. The dataset for secondary diamond production comes from the Gilmore et al. paper

in 2005 that reveals the diamond deposits and production data in fifty-three countries.

The data set is known as DIADATA and helps Lujala et al. differentiate between primary

and secondary diamond production (546-548).

Empirical Analysis:

Through comparisons of the findings in the three articles, only two out of the

three aforementioned hypotheses receive empirical support. The six authors reach a

diverse set of conclusions that change the landscape of known correlations between

natural resources and civil war.

Michael Ross’s findings with regards to his hypothesis over resource wealth

influencing the duration of civil wars during the 1990’s receive significant empirical

support but uncover separately related issues that are important in civil war studies.

Through his examination of thirteen key civil war case studies that are widely known for

their involvement with natural resources, Ross concludes that there is a robust

relationship between exploitable resources and the duration of conflict. In two separate

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test models, Ross finds that looting after the onset of civil war lengthened ten out of

thirteen conflicts in one model and lengthened eight, while shortening two out of thirteen

in another model. Both examples reveal the substantial impact of exploitable resources.

Strangely however, Ross finds in tandem that rebel groups only began looting after civil

war onset, which challenges the notion set forth by others that looting leads to war (49-

55).

Daniel Norton and Patrick Regan struggle to find any substantially significant

correlation between resource wealth and the onset civil conflict. They only find a

marginally significant relationship over resource wealth and civil war onset, garnering

significance in the 95th percentile. Diamonds, gemstones, and opiates provide no

relationship to the onset of nonviolent protest and rebellion, the former which was

initially hypothesized, but more importantly, Regan and Norton find that “natural

resources are associated with a decreased probability of observing civil war.” This

conclusion is similar to the extension of findings in Ross’s article, claiming that wealth

from resource exploitation has no correlation to the onset of civil war (329-334).

Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore’s contention over the

presence of secondary diamond production in ethnically divided countries promoting

both the onset and incidence of civil war yields mixed results. While no statistical

evidence points to any positive correlation between secondary diamond production and

civil war onset, its relationship to the incidence of ethnic civil war demonstrates a

significant relationship that supports their hypothesis. In the fifth model of their statistical

research, the combined factors of ethnic fractionalization and secondary diamond

production revealed significance at the 90th percentile in promoting the incidence of civil

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war after the start. What is interesting is that the production of secondary diamonds on its

own had no correlation to civil war incidence but the aggregation of both independent

variables led to a significant finding. Lujala et al. conclude that while ethnic divisions

within a country carry significance in civil war incidence, combining it with secondary

diamond production results in a deadly duo that positively correlates with prolonging

civil wars (549-556).

Conclusion:

From the results of the three articles presented here, one can conclude that the

onset of civil war is unlikely to be affected by exploitable resource wealth. However,

natural resources have shown a tremendous effect in prolonging civil wars, especially

ethnic civil wars. It is interesting that the studies have shown negative correlations

between resource exploitation and civil war onset but positive correlations on the

prevalence of civil war. While Ross and Lujala et al. study onset and incidence, Regan

and Norton’s decision to only study onset reveals why they lacked any significant

findings. Overall, it is vital to know that rebel groups can finance warfare through the

exploitation of natural resources and should pose further research to understand why

onset is unaffected by it. Even though the three articles used widely different data sets,

the overlap in the 1990’s makes it reasonable to discuss their findings within the same

topic but still require further tests under a standard data set. In conclusion, for the realm

of civil war studies in tandem with natural resource influence, the opposite relationship

between wealth from exploitable resources and civil war onset versus incidence carries

tremendous significance for the future, revealing a source of power for rebel groups after

the beginning of a war, but the negative correlation also reveals that wealth derived

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during times of peace, even in illegal manners, will prolong peace between citizens and

their government.

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Works Cited

1. Michael L. Ross. 2004. “How Do Natural Resources Inuence Civil War?:

Evidence from Thirteen Cases." International Organization 58(1): 35-67.

2. Paivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore. 2005. “A Diamond

Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource." Journal of Conict Resolution 49(4):

538-562.

3. Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton. 2005. “Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization

in Civil Wars." Journal of Conict Resolution 49(3): 319-336.