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Negotiating TTIP:

the Impact of Transparency on Informal Working Practices in EU Trade Negotiations

Paper presented by Evelyn Coremans1, FWO PhD fellow at KU Leuven, for the ECPR Joint Sessions,

April 24-29, 2016, Pisa (Italy).

Work in progress. Please do not cite without author’s permission.

Abstract

Recent experiences with international trade agreements, like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment

Partnership (TTIP), have shown how previously uncontroversial negotiations can suddenly spark large-

scale public protests. People all over the European Union are rallying for more transparency in the

Union's internal decision-making process about such trade negotiations. EU decision-making on trade

agreements has always been a highly secluded process, ranging from expert discussions in technical

working groups to high-level informal lunches and dinners. The reason is the difficult balance actors

need to take into account when deciding at one level something that will impact those they represent

on another level: the balance between responsiveness to that public and using private information

obtained during negotiations. Changes in transparency are expected to affect the dynamics that

determine this balance: the type of public, negotiator behaviour, negotiation mode and practices, and

ultimately negotiation outcomes. This paper aims to understand whether the increased demand and

resulting supply of transparency in the negotiation of TTIP has engendered such a change in

negotiation practices. More specifically, the paper will present the hypothesis that under conditions of

public preference crystallisation, increasing transparency leads to informalisation of decision-making

practices. To do so, it gives an overview of the informal practices of EU decision-making in trade

negotiations and the impact of the recent developments in the TTIP negotiations. The original empirical

material exists of interviews, fieldwork notes, and document analysis probing into former and

contemporary working practices.

Keywords:

European Politics, European Union, Institutions, Negotiation, Trade

1 evelyn.coremans@soc.kuleuven.be

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Introduction

“No man who has taken such a stand before the attentive eyes and ears of the world

can in full public view agree to a compromise without looking like a fool and a knave.

[…] He must defend the position initially taken, and so must the other side. Neither

side being able to retreat or advance, a phony war of positions ensues. […] This

degeneration of diplomatic intercourse into a propaganda match is then, the inevitable

concomitant of the publicity of the new diplomacy.” (Morgenthau, 1954, pp. 519-521).

International negotiation is a secretive process by nature, mainly for the reason illustrated in Hans

Morgenthau’s “vice of publicity”-argument above. During the second half of the 20th century, the

coverage of ‘international relations’ shifted from foreign policy diplomacy to include global trade,

economic, environmental, climate, and development issues. These went beyond pure security

questions and used to be governed almost exclusively on the domestic level. Whereas on the national

level a body of transparency regulations had been developed for discussing these issues, the

international negotiations abided to the standard of confidentiality and state-controlled secrecy of

traditional foreign policy discussions (Roberts, 2004). Public criticism on such secrecy has evolved in

congruence with the rising impact of international decision-making on the domestic level.

This paper aims to understand whether the demand for more transparency in international negotiation

– and its subsequent supply – has affected negotiation practices in the way we might expect from

Morgenthau’s argument. The empirical case – EU trade agreement negotiations – is a prime example of

how international impact on domestic regulations has prompted rising public interest and consecutive

demand for more input and insight into international decision-making processes.

In the days of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, predecessor of the World Trade

Organisation), decision-making took place in “a matrix of long-term first-name contacts and friendly

personal relationships” between isolated trade officials whom concerned themselves with technical

“low politics” (Weiler, 2000, p. 5). This “ethos of confidentiality” also marked the start of the European

trade policy process in 1957 and remained largely unquestioned by the wider public until the 2000s

(Meunier, 2003). National parliaments are far removed from the EU level decision-making process and

the European Parliament (EP) was intentionally left out of the Treaty trade chapters for almost 50

years.2 European member states have thereby successfully prevented parliamentary influence in trade

policy issues throughout this period, officially “for fear that these would be captured by protectionist

interests” (Woolcock, 2010, p. 7).3 The Council of Ministers’ Trade Policy Committee (formerly known

as the Article 113 or 133 Committee, further on referred to as TPC) was and today still is an extremely

secluded – yet pivotal – arena for Commission-member state communication.

Despite several efforts to open up decision-making, this innate technocratic nature has remained intact

and trade policy continues to be dominated by an inner-circle of national and Commission officials in

2 The first minor appearance of a formal obligation to consult the EP only appeared by 1997 in the Amsterdam Treaty: Art. 113(5) TEC stated that the EP had to be consulted when deciding whether Art. 113 applies to international negotiations and agreements on services and intellectual property. 3 From a realist perspective, trade policy is considered susceptible to collective action problems caused by a diffused set of small winners and a concentrated set of big losers. To prevent the policy process being captured by the latter group, decision-making authority is delegated to executive bureaus whom concern themselves with the technocratic nitty-gritty to produce objective policy outcomes (Meunier, 2003).

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the surroundings of the TPC and assorted Council committees (Woolcock, 2010). The 1999 Ministerial

Conference of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Seattle marked a global shift in the nature of

public interest in international trade policy. Civil protests against specific WTO policies and

globalisation in general reached new dimensions of mass-organisation via the internet (Meunier, 2003;

Roberts, 2004; Stasavage, 2004; Woolcock, 2010; Zimmermann, 2008). At EU level, the Commission

and the Council Presidency started to consult the EP more often and introduced several transparency

initiatives, such as “Consultation Forums” with NGOs in response to their increasing interest in trade

policy decision-making.4 However, the 2001 Access to Documents regulation has not done much to

alleviate the perceived secretiveness surrounding trade agreement negotiations, which has continued

to spark protest amongst NGOs and members of the EP in particular (Abazi & Tauschinsky, 2015). In

2004 the World Wildlife Fund contested the lack of transparency in the TPC and filed a court case

against the Council (UNECE, 2015). Early 2009 several civil society organisations sent a letter to the

Commission, criticising secretive information policies within DG Trade. The trigger was a leaked

internal memo advising the DG’s staff to be more selective about what they write down in e-mails and

documents that may be disclosed later on (Agence Europe, 2009). Also in 2009, member of the

European Parliament (MEP) Sophie In ‘t Veld took to the ECJ when the Council refused access to a

document on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme agreement (Hillebrandt & Abazi, 2015).5

The fight for more transparency in international trade negotiations culminated in the EP’s rejection of

ACTA in 2012: criticism on a continued lack of transparency and – not unrelated – the content of the

final agreement led to the first ever veto by the EP on a trade agreement.6 The secluded nature of the

ACTA negotiations fed into misunderstandings that “transformed issues that were too technical to

capture public consciousness into matters lay people could understand and relate to.” (Yu, 2011, p.

1002).

We have seen a similar spiral develop in the case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partership

(TTIP) agreement, currently under negotiation with the US.7 More recently, the Trade in Services

Agreement (TiSA) is also being contested on grounds of procedural secrecy (Viilup, 2015). The

negotiation process for TiSA is similar to that of ACTA, with a number of WTO members plurilaterally

negotiating in an informal format outside the WTO framework (Sauvé, 2014; Yu, 2011). The repeated

calls for more transparency in the negotiations and the process through which the ACTA, TTIP and

TiSA negotiation mandates became public – first leaked and then officially published – are near

identical, as are the justifications for restricting transparency throughout the negotiation process

4 Meunier (2003, p. 83) discusses the “Trade Dialogue with civil society” that was launched by DG Trade in 1998 in more detail. These Civil Society Dialogues have been part of the Commission’s communication strategy ever since (Coffey International Development & European Commission, 2014). Examples of other initiatives since the 2000s are the 2002 Transatlantic Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency, the 2005 European Transparency Initiative, the 2011 Transparency Register, and the launch of the Transparency Portal in 2012. 5 The court case was finally concluded in 2014 in favour of In ‘t Veld, and is seen as an important precedent for future access to document requests in the context of international agreements at large. 6 It was also the first agreement the EP could veto on, as this provision stems from the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 218 TFEU). It must not be forgotten however, that several European governments – starting with Poland – had halted the national ratification process a few months before due to domestic pressures. This made Council ratification of the agreement highly unlikely, meaning things might have turned out differently without these national developments (Dür & Mateo, 2014; Lane, 2012). 7 According to leaked minutes from the Dutch Presidency at the time, the European Commission in February 2010 was already wary of possible precedents the ACTA transparency controversy could set for bilateral trade agreements (Yu, 2011).

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(Curtin, 2013; Yu, 2011).8 The fact that the US is a partner in all of these negotiations, is not particularly

helpful due to its attitude about opening up access to negotiation documents (European Parliament

INTA Commitee, 2015; Levine, 2011; Woolcock, 2015; Yu, 2011).

The bilateral and plurilateral nature of TTIP, TiSA and ACTA also contributed to the limited degree of

transparency compared to multilateral negotiations in the WTO (Yu, 2011). In the latter case, at least a

somewhat regulated framework for transparency applies (Roberts, 2004; Yu, 2011). A jointly drafted

document by the ACTA negotiation parties from 2009 aptly summarizes the secrecy rationale often

defended for international trade negotiations:

“[I]t is accepted practice during trade negotiations among sovereign states to not

share negotiating texts with the public at large, particularly at earlier stages of the

negotiation. This allows delegations to exchange views in confidence facilitating the

negotiation and compromise that are necessary in order to reach agreement on

complex issues. […] A comprehensive set of proposals for the text of the agreement

does not yet exist. […] It is important to note that discussions are ongoing; new

issues might come up and other issues may finally not be included in the agreement.”

(European Commission, 2009, p. 1, emphasis added).9

This excerpt points at the difficult balance actors need to take into account when deciding at one level

something that will impact those they represent on another level: the balance between responsiveness

to that public and using private information obtained during negotiations. Changes in transparency are

expected to affect the dynamics that determine this balance: the type of public, negotiator behaviour,

negotiation mode and practices, and ultimately negotiation outcomes. This paper aims to understand

whether the increased demand and resulting supply of transparency in the negotiation of TTIP has

engendered such a change in negotiation practices. More specifically, the paper will present the

hypothesis that under conditions of public preference crystallisation, increasing transparency leads to

informalisation of decision-making practices.

The following section will address the terminology used throughout this paper, in order to provide

clarity on the main concepts and definitions. The third section elaborates on the extensive theoretical

framework that has been built around similar questions about public preferences and negotiation

dynamics. The fourth section then goes deeper into the empirics of the research. This is predominantly

based on 16 interviews, the large majority of which took place in Brussels with Council, Commission,

EP and national officials involved in EU trade policy. The respondents were selected based on their

function within the institutions, which means for the Commission officials within DG Trade, from the EP

officials involved the International Trade (INTA) committee, and officials from the Council’s Directorate

for Trade. National representatives originated from Belgium, France, Luxemburg and the United

Kingdom, including both former and current national officials. In terms of substance, the interviews

covered current and pre-Lisbon working practices regarding the negotiation of multi- and bilateral

8 In the case of ACTA the mandate was released after conclusion of the negotiation, whereas (evidently) for TTIP and TiSA the mandate was released beforehand. 9 Similarly, George Mason considered the secrecy of the US Constitutional Convention meetings as essential for averting “mistakes and misrepresentations until the business shall have been completed, when the whole may have a very different complexion from that in which the several parts might in their first shape appear if submitted to the public eye.” (Farrand (1967) as cited in Prat, 2005, p. 869). Stasavage (2004) mentions that Madison followed this same rationale.

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trade agreements, as well as the current transparency controversy. Answers were cross-referenced

between officials of different institutions and member states. 10 Complementary sources included

institutional documents, meeting notes, agenda’s and invitations, as well as non-participatory

observation in one meeting. Any documents were obtained via the interviewees. Clarifications and

factual corrections were obtained via follow-up contacts with interview respondents. The conclusion

summarizes the findings.

A word on terminology and conceptualisation

Transparency – secrecy

Critique on the secrecy of negotiations is an indication that there is not enough information available

about the ongoing discussions between negotiating partners (Abazi & Tauschinsky, 2015; Meijer,

2015).11 Information can be lacking on the procedures used to coordinate a common EU position, on

whether this common position is in their interest, as well as what negotiation partners are proposing to

the EU during the actual negotiations. In countering such accusations, the EU can therefore provide

(requested) information through documents, live streaming or recordings of meetings, press briefings

or stakeholder meetings (Meijer, Curtin, & Hillebrandt, 2012). Transparency then, can be defined as

“the availability of [regime relevant] information about an actor that allows other actors to

monitor the workings or performance of the first actor.” (Meijer, 2013, p. 430; addition from

Mitchell, 1998, p. 110). The regime relevant information also encompasses information about the

process through which a decision is made.

Transparency has two dimensions: the existence of a certain practice can be known by or hidden from

outsiders, or its existence may be known but not its substance.12 It logically follows that transparency

in existence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for transparency in substance: the precondition

for requesting and accessing information on the content of the decision-making process is knowing

that such information actually exists in a distributable form. On the intersection between transparency

in existence and substance, the transparency issue links up with the formal-informal distinction in

institutional procedures. While not entirely related, whether or not decision-making is perceived on the

public plane as being transparent is partly determined by the use of formal and informal working

practices inside the institution: “where decisions are de facto taken in an inaccessible and

undocumented arena, the ‘essential transparency of the legislative process’ is put at risk.” (Reh, 2014,

p. 826, emphasis original). If there is no collective record of decision-making, it is not possible to

access or request information about those records themselves. Nevertheless, no collective recording

does not in and of itself preclude the possibility of transparency in existence or substance.

10 The limited number of interviews and relatively limited diversity of member state nationalities, combined with a relatively small percentage of formal documentation (inherent to this research subject) constitutes a major limitation of this paper. 11 While transparency and secrecy in reality find themselves on a continuum, for the purpose of clarity they are conceptualised in this paper as a dichotomy. 12 These dimensions have also been referred to as deep and shallow secrecy, respectively (Pozen, 2010).

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Formal – informal

Definitions of what determines whether decision-making practices can be classified as “informal”

widely differ in strictness and focus, but the majority includes the following two characteristics.13 A

decision-making process or procedure is informal when (a) there is no collective codification of the

exchanges between the participants and (b) exchanges are not publicly enforceable or

sanctioned (Christiansen, Føllesdal, & Piattoni, 2003; Christiansen & Neuhold, 2013; Helmke &

Levitsky, 2004; Héritier, 2012; Mak & van Tatenhove, 2006; North, 1999; Reh, Héritier, Bressanelli, &

Koop, 2011). Note that the formal-informal characteristic refers to the rules circumscribing the practice,

for instance a meeting between trade officials, while the transparent-secret trait refers to a quality of

the practice itself. Formality is exogenously given, whereas transparency is an endogenous quality.

This implies that formality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for transparency: practices

can be formal but still secret in both existence and substance, or they can be informal and fully

transparent in existence.14 Informal practices can become transparent in substance, if participants

decide to share that substance afterwards.

Theoretical framework

Deliberative Democracy and Negotiation theory

Changes in the level of transparency are expected to have an effect on the workings of institutional

procedures guiding negotiations (Cross, 2013; Hagemann & Franchino, 2016; Stasavage, 2004).

Scholarly debate on what this effect may be, is split between two theories that differ in their

assumptions of the nature of the public towards whom the transparency is directed. On the one hand,

deliberative democracy theory departs from a public of public-regarding citizens open to rational

justifications for what objectively and rationally constitutes the best policy. Negotiation theory, on the

other, is based on a conception of the public as constituents who have already made up their minds

about what they consider the best policy outcomes in order to maximise their own interests (Naurin,

2006). These different assumptions determine the formulation of hypotheses on how transparency to

that public affects working practices of negotiations, in particular decision-maker behaviour and

negotiation outcomes.

Deliberative democracy theory argues that transparency in terms of increased visibility of negotiation

proceedings has positive effects on decision-maker behaviour (Cross, 2013). 15 By increasing the

chances of publicity, transparency acts as a “civilising force of hypocrisy”: when making statements in

a transparent environment negotiators are likely to be more responsive to public demands and less

focussed on self-interested purposes (Elster, 1999a, p. 111; see also Cross, 2013; Hagemann &

Franchino, 2016; Heritier, 1999; Naurin, 2006; Risse & Kleine, 2010; Risse, 2000). Increased

13 Contrary to the relationship between transparency and secrecy, the formal-informal distinction is purely dichotomous in nature. 14 Any meeting we can actually classify as formal or informal is essentially transparent in existence, because we first need to know it has taken place or will take place before we are able to identify the rules that circumscribe it. 15 Note that transparency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for publicity and that increased transparency may occur without increased publicity, in which case the effects on negotiator behaviour may not actually unfold (See Naurin (2006) on the difference between transparency and publicity, and Curtin & Meijer (2006) for an initial assessment).

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transparency therefore reduces the moral hazard problem that comes with principal-agent

relationships – i.e. the risk that the agent pursues his own interests which may diverge from those of

his principals (Stasavage, 2004). If the public can observe the actions of decision-makers, it is easier to

assign accountability to the final outcomes and the consequences thereof, hence promoting “output-

oriented legitimacy” (Scharpf, 1999, p. 6 as cited in Naurin, 2006, p. 190; Prat, 2005; but see Curtin &

Meijer, 2006 for a more critical view). Increased transparency is also linked to higher-quality decision-

making outcomes, as it assures more impartial decision-taking (Naurin, 2006; infra).

Negotiation theory departs from a functionalist understanding of transparency as a possible

impediment to reaching agreement in a context of representatives with diverging interests, aiming to

maximise the interests of their respective publics (Cross, 2013). Negotiation theorists argue that there

is a point where negotiators can be tempted to forego the use of private information in favour of

(demonstrating) responsiveness to public demands which may be (unintentionally) biased or

insufficiently informed (Stasavage, 2004). In those circumstances, transparency results in posturing,

polarization and more uncompromising and self-interested position-taking (Niemann, 2006; Stasavage,

2006). Under conditions of sufficiently strong reputational concerns amongst negotiators, the

polarisation of policy positions may lead to less than Pareto-efficient or suboptimal outcomes or to

failure to reach a decision altogether (Cross, 2013; Stasavage, 2004). In the latter instance, shrinking

win-sets of negotiating parties make any agreement impossible (Hagemann & Franchino, 2016;

Putnam, 1988).

Prat (2005) shows how transparency about the actions of an agent alone – without (sufficient)

transparency about the consequences of those actions – may trigger pandering behaviour by the

agent. Pandering describes “a situation where elected representatives choose policies based on voter

opinion, even if representatives themselves believe that voters are incorrectly informed about their true

interests.” (Stasavage, 2004, pp. 672–673, emphasis added). High transparency may also motivate

negotiators to apply so-called “public commitment strategies”, which increase the transaction costs of

moving away from a publicly-stated win-set of policy positions (or preference strength) (Elster, 1999a,

p. 111). Negotiators may install limitations on their room for manoeuvre based on strength of domestic

interests and thereby deprive themselves of options for reaching common ground (Schelling, 1960).

When negotiators try to demonstrate that they are effectively representing their publics’ interests, they

may become more rigid in their policy positions and resort to posturing at the expense of rationally

justifying policy positions (Hagemann & Franchino, 2016; Naurin, 2006, 2009): “human experience

teaches us that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candour with

a concern for appearances and for their own interest to the detriment of the decision-making process.”

(US vs Nixon case ruling, 1974, as cited in Prat, 2005, p. 869).

Arguing, bargaining and informality

The discussion between deliberative democracy and negotiation theorists about the effect of

transparency on the behaviour of negotiators branches out into discussions on the different negotiation

modes that result from those behavioural changes (Elster, 1999b; Risse & Kleine, 2010). From a

negotiation theory perspective, secretive negotiations promote rational arguing (“the transformation of

preferences via the exchange of rational arguments”) over bargaining (“the aggregation of preferences

via the exchange of threats and promises”) (Naurin, 2006, p. 190, also 2009; Elster, 1999b). Hence,

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closed-door negotiation promotes optimal conditions for problem-solving “characterised by a

cooperative attitude, rich information-sharing and participants candidly speaking their minds” (Naurin,

2006, p. 191; see also Checkel, 2001; Naurin, 2009; Risse & Kleine, 2010). This rationale underlies

several national freedom-of-information-laws with built-in short-term secrecy, regulating restrictions on

access to information before on-going decision-making processes are concluded (Frankel, 2001).

Deliberative democracy theorists have argued the exact opposite: transparency may promote coherent

reason-giving, impartial and other-regarding arguing and prevent self-regarding arguments as well –

earlier referred to as the “civilising force of hypocrisy” (Elster, 1999a, 1999b; Naurin, 2006). One way in

which this situation may present itself is by opening up new types of information sharing amongst

negotiators themselves. Hagemann & Franchino (2016) illustrate that increased transparency through

publication of legislative decision-making records increases credibility of policy positions. They find

that transparency helps overcoming incomplete information problems regarding preference strength

and raises the reputational costs of reneging amongst negotiators. By doing so, it can actually lower

risk of negotiation failure and help screen out marginal amendments.

Discussion on arguing and bargaining dynamics also underlies another major theoretical field that

concerns itself with informal institutions and practices. For instance, informality may serve a similar

purpose of overcoming incomplete information and may also prevent negotiation failure by

accommodating political uncertainty between negotiators (Kleine, 2013). From a purely functionalist

perspective, negotiators may choose informality in order to safeguard the effectiveness and efficiency

(reaching agreement in an acceptable timeframe) of the negotiations: "If you were to stick to the formal

procedures, it would take ten years every time […]. The more there is disagreement, the more the

informal is necessary" (Middlemas, 1995 quoted in Jönsson, Bjurulf, Elgström, Sannerstedt, &

Strömvik, 1998, p. 326–327; see also Christiansen & Neuhold, 2013; Elgström & Smith, 2000).

Informality “allow[s] for changes in timing, extent, and distribution of adjustment costs” related to

formal alternatives and are therefore often considered useful to avoid decision-making deadlock

(Kleine, 2013, p. 308; see also Héritier, 1997).

From a more constructivist viewpoint, the confidentiality of informal negotiations has been found to

promote a “focus on problem solving rather than hard bargaining because ministers do not have the

opportunity to present themselves as defenders of national interests in public.” (Lewis, 2010; Puetter,

2003, p. 117). This observation ties in with arguments provided by negotiation theory, because it

suggests that informality can be a tool for shielding negotiators from being tempted to rely on public

commitment strategies at the expense of sincere private information sharing. In addition, by avoiding

problems of hierarchy and representation, informal negotiation is conducive to open discussion,

development of trust, and policy learning (Elgström & Jönsson, 2000; Puetter, 2003).

When public preferences start to take form, the level of transparency that positively influenced

negotiation effectiveness and efficiency – as predicted by deliberative democracy theory – may

become detrimental. Because publicity on its own does “not eliminate base motives, but forces or

induces speakers to hide them” (Elster, 1999a, p. 111), increasing the chances of publicity under

circumstances of crystallising public preferences may have the perverse effect of rendering

negotiations less transparent as regards revealing genuine negotiation behaviour. When decision-

makers are more certain about the preferences of their audiences (whose consent they will require after

the negotiations are finished), the social norms induced by negotiating in a transparent environment

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“lose their constraining effect” and negotiators may be more tempted to use rhetorical instead of

rational reasoning to motivate their positions (Risse & Kleine, 2010, p. 714; see also Elster, 1999a, p.

104).16

Issues of balancing the level of transparency with a need for flexibility and quick decision-taking are

already widespread in formal procedures. In informal procedures, it becomes even more problematic.

Because exchanges through formal procedures are collectively codified and publicly enforceable, any

attempt at diverging from transparency provisions is relatively easily detected and sanctioned if

desired: the existence of formal meetings is much easier to uncover, as is the content because it is

collectively codified in documents. But when moving into the informal remits of decision-making,

where exchanges are neither collectively codified nor publicly enforceable, departures from

transparency regulations are much more difficult to expose and subsequently enforce by outsiders.17

Choosing to ‘go informal’ therefore allows decision-makers to circumvent (formal) requirements to

reveal what has been said and by whom – i.e. transparency regulations – and maintain the option of

genuine information exchange.

A few studies touch upon the co-existence of transparency and informality in EU legislative processes

(Cross, 2014; Häge & Naurin, 2013; Shackleton & Raunio, 2003). The majority of these address the

trilogues that are organised within the remit of the co-decision procedure in order to facilitate first

reading conclusion of domestic legislation. 18 The popularity of trilogues is considered a clear

contradiction with the multiple transparency initiatives that have been constructed over the course of

that same timeframe, as well as the efforts to increase openness through EP involvement (Eibauer,

2012; Häge & Kaeding, 2007; Rasmussen, 2011; Reh et al., 2011; Shackleton & Raunio, 2003).

Contrary to popular expectations, increased post-Lisbon involvement of the EP does not automatically

result in more transparent decision-making (Curtin, 2014; Häge & Naurin, 2013; Reh, 2014).

Simultaneous occurrence of transparency-increasing initiatives and informalisation has also been

observed in other contexts. From 1992 to 2006 the Council introduced several transparency measures

under the influence of a Nordic pro-transparency coalition (Hillebrandt, Curtin, & Meijer, 2014). But,

while the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds have formalized official COREPER procedures, they also

introduced more informal coordination at the COREPER level through telephone calls, e-mails and

“informal talk in the couloirs of the Justus Lipsius building.” (Lempp & Altenschmidt, 2008, p. 515; see

also Lewis, 2010). On higher decision-making levels, the publication of voting records of Council

16 The social norms that positively influence negotiators in a transparent environment can be divided into three types. The first one is the imperfection constraint: “[b]ecause a perfect coincidence between private interest or prejudice and impartial argument is suspicious, self-interested or prejudiced speakers have an incentive to argue for a position that differs somewhat from their ideal point.” The second norm is a consistency constraint: “once a speaker has adopted an impartial argument because it corresponds to his interest or prejudice, he will be seen as opportunistic if he deviates from it when it ceases to serve his needs.” (Elster, 1999a, p. 104). Thirdly, negotiators may also alter or modify the substance of their proposals, because in a deliberative setting there are powerful norms against the use of threats (which are typically used in bargaining contexts). So threats become warnings, which are subject to a plausibility constraint: “[the speaker’s] validity claims have to be plausible and verifiable.” (Risse & Kleine, 2010, p. 713). 17 That is, if they know that there have been informal exchanges to begin with. 18 The number of trilogues increased to 80% of all new legislation over the past 20 years (Brandsma, 2013; Carrera, Hernanz, & Parkin, 2013; Christiansen & Neuhold, 2013; Häge & Naurin, 2013). This means that, compared to almost 20 years ago (the first trilogues took place in 1995), one informal procedure has now become the norm in early agreement co-decision on EU legislation (Broman, 2008).

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meetings gives the impression that Council decision-making has become more transparent to those

who disregard the consensual practice of deciding without formal vote (Stasavage, 2006).19

Heremans (2011) considers this confluence of increased transparency and informalisation the result of

an evasion tendency. Naurin refers to it as “decision-making leakage” (Naurin, 2006, p. 192). Based on

observations of the Swedish publicity principle, both authors indicate the possibility of actors resorting

to informal decision-making procedures when pressure for transparency becomes too high:

“Indeed, quite likely the fear of disclosure has already led to a decrease in the ‘paper trail’,

although currently probably still limited to a practice of ‘selective conservation’, i.e. an ex post

screening of the documents which are to be kept as part of a file. However, if also documents

forming part of ongoing procedures would become subject to disclosure, a shift from written to

oral procedures in controversial or sensitive matters seems plausible. Indeed, some have argued

that this is precisely what has happened under the Swedish system, resulting in so-called ‘empty

archives’. Clearly, this would hamper the efficiency of the Commission’s decision-making process

as well as de facto reduce the degree of transparency.” (Heremans, 2011, p. 71, emphasis

original).

Yet, informalisation does not necessarily need to form a threat to transparency. Depending on the

nature of the public to which the transparency is aimed and its preferences, informalisation may

actually limit detrimental effects of transparency – i.e. hiding underlying motives in favour of

demonstrating responsiveness to public demands. Informalisation may also explain why criticisms

continue to be expressed, while transparency is being increased because it complicates access to

decision-making procedures. Based on the above observations and in order to explore the role of

informality at the intersection of deliberative democracy and negotiation theory, the following

hypothesis will be probed:

Under conditions of public preference crystallisation, increasing transparency leads to informalisation of

decision-making practices.

The following section will explore how transparency increased throughout the TTIP negotiation process

– both towards the broader public and regarding inter-institutional access to documents – and how

both acted as drivers for change in terms of inter-institutional working practices.

19 Similar discrepancies have also been observed on the international scene, where new forms of international transparency coincide with informalisation within and outside international organisations (Daase, 2009; Mayer, 2011; Reh et al., 2011).

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Decision-making in EU trade negotiations: recent changes and effects of TTIP transparency

controversy

Transparency through access to documents

The public protests against ACTA, TTIP and TiSA have re-introduced the momentum of the mid-2000s

and brought trade policy back into the public sphere (Cremona, 2015). The result is an unexpected

shift in paradigm for EU level decision-makers, who are now faced with a new and delicate balancing

exercise of keeping both the negotiation partners and home front satisfied. The Commission as

principal negotiator for the EU has taken unprecedented steps towards a more proactive approach to

transparency, bringing along several institutional changes (Cremona, 2015). The first and most obvious

move towards more transparency concerns the provision of negotiation documents.

In response to public demand, the Commission made several EU position papers, proposals for

negotiation rounds and matching layman summaries freely available on its website since February

2015, except for those on tariffs, services, investment and procurement (European Commission,

2014).20 In addition, the Commission started a much more proactive approach in explaining content of

ongoing negotiations by publishing factsheets, brochures and videos (European Commission, 2015).

The final TTIP text will also be published online before legal scrubbing and translation (Mungengová,

2016). While these initiatives were aimed at increasing transparency and thereby understanding of the

agreement under negotiation, they have not had the desired effect. The perceived seclusion of the TTIP

negotiations has led to the same kind of negative public perception as existed over the ACTA

agreement, even though public transparency has never been higher. Since October 2014, the Stop

TTIP campaign has collected 3,417,964 signatures (“Stop TTIP: European Initiative against TTIP and

CETA,” 2016). Access to information about what is being negotiated has promoted crystallisation of

public opinion and continued protests have enlarged public pressure on national officials and MEPs

(Agence Europe, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d; Zalan & Teffer, 2015).

The main reason for the EP’s current activism in trade matters may lie exactly in this growing

politicisation of the EU’s trade agenda, which makes it a much more interesting area for maximising its

competences (Interview 13, 15, 15).21 Because they are now more certain about the preferences of

their audiences, the social norms induced by negotiating in a transparent environment “lose their

constraining effect” and negotiators – who are concerned about their reputations – may be more

tempted to use rhetorical instead of rational reasoning to motivate their positions (Risse & Kleine, 2010,

p. 714; see also Elster, 1999a, p. 104). Following this line of argument could also explain why MEPs

continue to criticise their ‘limited’ access to information about politically salient trade negotiations while

there have been significant changes in the amount, frequency and manner in which documents are

shared inter-institutionally, especially between Commission and EP (Interview 7, 8, 15).

By opening up access to documents for MEPs, the Commission counted on the mechanisms of

representative democracy to appease public criticisms of secrecy and seclusion. By 2010 the

20 Which is still a good year and a half after the mandate was given and the start of negotiations in June and July 2013, respectively. 21 This politicisation is also affecting the European External Action Service and the European Council’s involvement in trade negotiations (Interview 15). It may also explain the EP’s focus on TTIP and TiSA, while the Japan agreement is equally important in terms of economic impact.

11

Commission already shared all trade-related documents that are transmitted to the TPC, with the INTA

Committee as well (OJ 2010, L304). From December 2014 onwards the Commission had extended

access to TTIP documents originating in the Commission and classified as ‘EU Restricted’ to all MEPs

in reading rooms (Malmström, 2015). Regarding the so-called “consolidated TTIP documents”

containing textual proposals from both sides, Parliament and Commission agreed that the INTA Chair,

Vice-Chairs, Coordinators, Rapporteur and Shadow-Rapporteurs for US, as well as the Chair and

Rapporteur of other relevant committees – as long as the documents concern their competence –

could access them in a secure reading room (European Parliament INTA Commitee, 2015). By

December 2015, access to confidential TTIP documents including the consolidated texts was

extended to all MEPs (European Parliament, 2015). Starting from 2016, national reading rooms for

national parliamentarians are being created, next to the ones that were already accessible only to

national government officials in US embassies. Germany was the first to install such a reading room for

parliamentarians and the UK plans to do the same soon (Soubry, 2016; von Daniels & Orosz, 2016).

Despite the detailed and restrictive security rules surrounding these new transparency provisions

(especially since the inclusion of the consolidated texts), the mere fact that these reading rooms even

exist and that MEPs and national parliamentarians have access to negotiation texts is a complete

overhaul compared to how trade negotiations were conducted previously. However, access to

documents is only a small part of inter-institutional cooperation on trade policy. An example of the

limits to document regulations can be found in a complaint by the World Wildlife Fund of 2004, where

the NGO filed a court case against the Council contesting the lack of transparency in the TPC. The

complaint was dismissed in 2007 partly because the requested information simply did not exist in

written form (UNECE, 2015). The Court concluded that an institution is only obliged to provide

information contained within documents: “[…] access to information — within the meaning of [the

Council v Hautala] judgment — may be granted only if that information is contained within documents,

which presupposes that such documents exist” (Case T-264/04, §76; see also UNECE, 2015). In

addition, the institution is not obliged to draft such documents about meetings when these are of an

informational nature: “[t]he purely informative nature of that item at the meeting and the fact that it did

not call for any specific implementing measure explain why it was not considered necessary to minute

it and why the item was not recorded in a summary report or other subsequent document of the

Committee.” (Case T-264/04, §62). In order to address the main question of this paper (whether

increased transparency in EU trade negotiations has engendered a change in negotiation practices and

if so, how?), a proper overview of the different working practices outside access to documents is

therefore imperative.

Working practices: below the waterline

Whenever the EU negotiates a trade agreement the Commission acts as the main negotiator on behalf

of the member states, represented collectively through the Council of Ministers. The Council needs to

authorise the initiation of negotiations, may issue negotiation directives, and has a decisive vote on the

agreement once the negotiations have ended. Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 the

EP also has this formal right to veto any concluded trade agreement, which they used with ACTA

(supra). As said, the main decision-making about the EU’s common position takes place in the TPC.

This committee meets in three formats: full members (biweekly), deputies (weekly) and services &

12

investment (fortnightly) (for a much more elaborate mapping of the TPC, see Adriaensen, 2016;

Johnson, 1998). These are the broad guidelines, as determined by the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 207 and 218

TFEU). If we zoom in on how the system works in practice, it quickly becomes clear that Treaty

arrangements and even document sharing systems are merely the tip of the iceberg. As almost 80% of

the issues are already agreed upon at the TPC level, I will focus on the TPC and lower levels for

Commission-Council and Commission-member state communication, and the INTA committee and

lower levels for Commission-EP coordination (Interview 12).

With regards to Council-Commission communication a range of communication takes place in

preparation of the weekly TPC deputies meeting, where the majority of decision-making takes place

(Interview 12, 15). After the previous meeting on Friday, the agenda for the coming week is discussed

and sent to the Presidency and Council Secretariat (Unit 1A) for approval. On the Monday after, it is

sent via e-mail to the member states, who can then suggest changes or adaptations should they wish

to do so. This happens via e-mail or phone. On Wednesdays the Presidency and Council Secretariat

go over the agenda point-by-point and member states continue to call in whenever they would like to

discuss an additional point. On Thursdays DG Trade meets the Presidency and Council Secretariat in

the Council building in so-called “briefing meetings”, which are organised by the Presidency to

communicate any last alterations of the agenda. At these meetings, the Council Secretariat may advise

the Presidency on some last-minute member state requests, issues that may potentially pose

problems, objections and possibly legal aspects that may come up during the actual meeting the next

day (Interview 12, 15). Along the way, the Council Secretariat can also communicate any important

offensive or defensive member state interests directly to the Commission. This preparation process is

very much built upon personal relations and friendships crossing institutional borders, and daily

communications happen primarily over the phone or via e-mail (Interview 12, 13). These are based on

“extremely good working relations” between the Council Presidency, Secretariat and DG Trade as they

share the same basic objective: facilitating the Commission in negotiating with external partners and

the Council in taking decisions (Interview 15).

DG Trade also communicates directly with the member states on a bilateral and collective basis.

Bilateral meetings usually occur on demand from member states, for instance when they do not want

other member states to know about a certain national position (Interview 12). It is their task to defend

their own national economic structure, which means that their interests may clash with those of other

member states. Hence, member states often phone DG Trade before a TPC meeting to elaborate on

the reasoning behind a position. Moreover, they may also call to inform the Commission about a

position they will defend in the upcoming TPC but which in reality is not as inflexible as they may have

it appear (Interview 12). Again, daily contacts between DG Trade officials and member state

representatives result in personal ties and amities: “For us [DG Trade officials], member states are the

friend we see every week, whose birthday party we attend on Sunday” (Interview 12).

Collective meetings between Commission and member states are a more recent phenomenon in their

more institutionalised form. Informal sub meetings of the TPC organised were used during the Uruguay

Round for ground clearing, clarifying issues and looking for technical solutions (Interview 7, 8, 9). These

enabled the Commission to judge what was likely to be acceptable to member states and what was

not. Today, this function has been institutionalised – bear in mind that this does not equal formalisation

– and taken over by what are now called “Informal Technical Meetings” or ITMs in EU jargon (Kleimann,

13

2011; Coremans & Kerremans, forthcoming). ITMs differ from the TPC in that they are organised by DG

Trade (whereas the TPC is a Council-run body). ITMs are organised whenever the Commission senses

a need for a collective, rather than a bilateral, discussion on some detailed and technical issues. They

do not have any legal basis, register, attendance lists, formal invitations or agendas, minutes, written

reports or press briefings afterwards (Interview 1, 11). 22 Even though all are invited, there is no

obligation for member states to attend. ITMs were first introduced during negotiations on the EU-Korea

free trade agreement (mid-2000s) and have since become one of the main contact points between

member states and Commission for ongoing international trade negotiations.23 The main reasons for

the popularity of ITMs are the increased technicality and scope of trade policy, the increased number

of trade negotiations going on simultaneously, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (which have made the

obligatory tour de table in the TPC a much lengthier process), a need for a more flexible negotiation

format, and finally the demand for more informal discussions from member states who do not want

their words to be traceable (Interview 11, 12, 13).

In particular the enlargements and the increased number of trade agreements caused capacity issues

in the already jam-packed TPC in terms of time shortage and limited scope for dialogue (Interviews 1,

3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11). As a result, the TPC has become a forum where formal national statements are

repeated over and over, rather than one where views and expertise are genuinely exchanged

(Interviews 2, 3, 10, 11). As this is creating a major efficiency problem, ITMs are nowadays “the only

way to deal with the complex issues we’re faced with in trade policy” (Interview 3). Member states

consider ITMs crucial for having a better overview of what is going on in the policy process and

assuring that their voice is heard (Interview 4, 5, 10): “a few years ago, it was sufficient to attend only

the TPC. Now you cannot afford to do this anymore.” (Interview 3). Before ITMs, “the bulk of informal

meetings tended to be smaller - bilateral or trilateral – and they happened in offices, restaurants, and

margins of meetings.” (Interview 8). While those informal channels have not disappeared, successive

enlargements and more complex issues in EU trade policy have forced the Commission to develop

more “institutionalized” informal settings (Interviews 7, 8, 11).24

A Council official remarked that there may be a risk of ITMs replacing the discussions that used to take

place in the formal TPC (Interview 15). Even though no actual decisions are taken at ITMs, they have

become such a prominent part of trade policy that important parts of the decision-making process may

take place there whilst they should have taken place in formal arenas of which traceable documents

exist. While member states are vigilant in having official and written reports whenever decisions have

been taken – to make sure their “achievements” cannot be rolled back, there is a risk of real debating

slowly shifting from the formal TPC to informal ITMs and other formats (Interview 14, 15). The

frustration some member states showed with the bargaining dynamics in the TPC also indicates that

TPC meetings tend to suffer more and more of posturing and other public commitment strategies.

22 The informal nature distinguishes ITMs from any other coordination format in EU trade policy, including the Commission’s ‘expert groups’, which do have a register and to which also the MEPs need to be invited (Interviews 1, 11). 23 Around four to six ITMs are organised per month nowadays, depending on the frequency of the on-going external negotiations. It is expected that this number will continue to increase, as the TTIP negotiations on regulatory cooperation, government procurement and intellectual property rights have already shown (Interviews 1, 3, 10, 11) 24 In addition, bilateral meetings do not aim to seek agreement. They provide assurance more than anything else (Interview 10).

14

Aside from the recent addition of ITMs, the modes of communication between Council, Commission

and member states – and their effect on the decision-making process – have remained relatively stable

over the years. What is new since the Lisbon Treaty and more particularly the start of the TTIP

negotiations, however, is the increased impact of the European Parliament on the internal coordination

process. The Lisbon Treaty has installed onto the Commission the formal obligation of immediately and

fully informing the EP at all stages of ongoing negotiations (Art. 218 TFEU).25 Formal communication

happens through the EP’s Committee for International Trade (INTA) formal reporting and is framed by

the 2010 Framework Agreement, which includes the provision that all documents that go to the

member states are also simultaneously sent to INTA (OJ 2010, L304). DG Trade also distributes

documents and information via e-mail before voting in the plenary takes place (Interview 14). Every

month a table outlining upcoming agreements is sent out, as well as regular e-mails on press releases

in order to make sure the EP has every possible snippet of information on ongoing negotiations and is

able to prepare for upcoming votes. Next to the inter-institutional traffic of documents, the INTA

secretariat organises formal meetings with DG Trade on a monthly basis (Interview 16). This is about as

far as formal regulations go with respect to including the EP in the negotiation process. However,

beneath them lies an array of informal working practices and contacts that go far beyond any formal

obligations as stated in the Treaties.

First, because of the strict meeting schedules of both the EP plenary and the INTA Committee itself,

Commission-EP communication takes place in the more flexible “monitoring groups” (Interview 13, 14;

see also Brown, 2013; European Parliament INTA Commitee, 2015; Kleimann, 2011; Krajewski, 2013).

These consist of the standing rapporteur responsible for the respective trade agreement or negotiation,

the respective standing shadow rapporteurs and their assistants, and are open to all MEPs (European

Parliament INTA Commitee, 2015). The monitoring group on the US (covers TTIP) also includes

rapporteurs from other EP committees, which is a unique feature. 2015 attendance to the monitoring

group on the US was more than double the amount of the next-most-popular monitoring group on

TiSA. Interestingly, there have also been almost twice as much monitoring groups on the US than on

TiSA and Japan (Interview 16). In addition to information provided to the monitoring groups, DG Trade

also organises technical briefings with MEPs for in-depth explanations (Interview 14). Arrangements for

technical briefings are often made in cafeterias or hallways, should the responsible DG Trade official

meet an EP colleague there (Interview 14). They come closest to the ITMs organised with member

states in terms of content, as monitoring groups tend to be organised on a regional basis rather than

on a single negotiation. Technical briefings also have lower participation rates because of their

technical topics. Finally, there is also a “Schultz TTIP coordination group”, which includes more or less

the same people as the US monitoring group as well as the EP President and the trade Commissioner,

and meets once every two to three months.

25 In practice, this was already enshrined in informal agreements. In 1973 the Council under the Presidency of Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister Tjerk Westerterp accepted the possibility of an EP debate prior to the opening of trade negotiations, to “confidentially and unofficially” inform the competent parliamentary committee of the substance of the agreement after the completion of the negotiations but before signing, and to “acquaint the European Parliament with the content of such agreements, after their signing and before their conclusion.” (Commission of the European Communities, 1973a, p. 90, see also 1973b). Since 1995 the Commission informs the competent parliamentary committee of the draft recommendations relating to negotiating directives. The same 1995 Code of Conduct also confirmed that the Commission would keep the EP regularly and fully informed of the progress of negotiations (OJ 1995, No. C89).

15

The members of monitoring groups and participants to the technical briefings function as interlocutors

for the Commission’s communication with the EP as a whole, and the meetings allow for much more

flexible yet regular contacts between DG Trade and MEPs (Interview 11, 14). They provide a much

higher degree of specialisation and knowledge of MEPs regarding the inevitable technicalities that

come along in decision-making on trade agreements. This is an added value that should not be

underestimated, considering that the INTA Committee evolved from a small committee with a low

number of members to one of the most powerful committees in just a few years (Interview 14).26 As far

as communication with third countries is concerned, it has even surpassed the Foreign Affairs (AFET)

Committee.

While informal exchanges between Commission, member states and EP have a long history, the TTIP

negotiation process has marked a breaking point in existing practices and introduced new ones as the

need presented itself. Even though ITMs have been common practice for Commission-member state

communication since the EU-South Korea negotiations, they are more and more being seen by

member states as forums where they can be more open as regards their true preferences and

preference strength. They have become a way out of complicated negotiation situations of posturing

and bargaining, with member states asking for informal meetings when they do no (yet) want their

positions to be codified and possibly up for disclosure later on.

Upgraded EP involvement since the Lisbon Treaty was expected to generate more transparency in

decision-making on international trade negotiations. And indeed, it is beyond doubt that the growing

assertiveness of the EP in external trade policy is aided by a formal recognition of its role in the Lisbon

Treaty. Based on threats of using its veto powers, it has obtained access to a wide range of policy

documents it did not have access to before, thereby extending inter-institutional transparency.

Simultaneously, in-camera sessions of INTA committee, monitoring groups and technical briefings

have increased significantly since start of the TTIP negotiations. Through these multiple informal

communication channels, EP is informed of current events in trade negotiations to a much higher

degree and in much greater detail than foreseen by formal Treaty arrangements or even via access to

documents.27

As more confidential documents are becoming available to more and more people (from Commission

and Council officials, over MEPs from the INTA Committee, to all MEPs and now even national

parliamentarians in national reading rooms), the cercle intime is being stretched to the limit. But inner

circles do not simply expand. Whenever they allow more people in, they change character and new

inner circles start to form within the now expanded “inner” circle (Interview 7, 8, 9). As EU trade policy

decision-making now incorporates more members with more knowledge of what is being negotiated,

the findings of this paper have indicated that new, informal inner circles are being formed within the

extended circle of confidants.

26 The fact that the previous chair was a Portuguese MEP (Vital Morreira), whereas now the chair is a prominent German MEP (Bernd Lange), is quite telling for this evolution. 27 But despite having access to TPC documents, the TPC remains a “black hole” for EP officials, as TPC documents only contain information about the three or four main points brought up by member states that usually are already known sensitivities regardless (Interview 16).

16

Conclusion

This paper started out from the question whether decision-making procedures on EU trade agreements

have changed in any way as a result of the public demand for transparency. The answer is twofold. On

the one hand, working practices on the ground have continued to function as they have always done.

Personal relations, diplomatic assessments and compromise-searching still are the building blocks for

constructing a common EU position. Meetings are still arranged in corridors and canteens, and

coalitions made over coffee still impact position-taking in formal arenas. Informal procedures and

practices which are prone to being less transparent and more restricted to outsiders are still

abundantly prominent, because “it is easier to find a solution if you don’t bring the discussion too

much in the open” (Interview 7, 8, 9, 15). And maybe most importantly, informal communications are

crucial for anticipating problems upstream and testing the water on whether or not agreement is within

reach at the time the issue reaches formal levels of decision-making (Interview 7, 8, 9, 11).

On the other hand, the current rise in public interest and politicisation of trade policy does affect the

way in which information flows between institutions. Interviews revealed evidence that the rigid

posturing by member states in formal negotiation formats such as the TPC is off-set by more flexible

positions in informal spheres such as ITMs. But the most obvious illustration is the intensified

communication between the DG Trade and the EP’s INTA Committee. The Commission makes sure it

stays on the safe side by providing whatever information it can to the EP, so much so that the EP’s

informal influence far surpasses any of its formal powers. But this increased inclusion into the inner

circle of trade policy making also comes at a cost: it means the EP will need to play by existing rules of

the game. This is already visible in the rules circumscribing the use of reading rooms for confidential

documents.

The risk that an increase of public access to documents will lead to less transparency in the end – as

certain actors may not want to put certain things down in writing for fear of possible leaks – cannot be

dismissed altogether (Interview 15). In trade, there will always be someone having to give in

somewhere, who does not want to be thrown to the political wolves for doing so. Yet, it is in the

interest of public officials to be as open as is reasonably possible to prevent deliberate

misunderstanding of facts by those who do not want a particular policy objective to be secured and to

avoid people from developing suspicions of sinister goings-on that are not happening at all: “if you

resist to transparency demands the information will be dragged out of you in stages, which makes it all

look much worse than it actually is.” (Interview 9).

17

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Interviews

1.   Interview Commission official (Brussels, 19-11-2013). Interview on informal technical meetings. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

2.   Interview national trade official (Brussels, 01-02-2014). Interview on informal technical meetings. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

3.   Interview national trade official (Brussels, 12-02-2014). Interview on informal technical meetings. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

4.   Interview national trade official (Brussels, 24-02-2014). Interview on informal technical meetings. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

5.   Interview Commission official (Brussels, 04-11-2014). Interview on informal technical meetings. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

6.   Interview independent respondent (Brussels, 31-08-2015). Interview on informal practices in EU trade policy. [Interview Evelyn Coremans & Bart Kerremans].

7.   Interview former national trade official (03-09-2015). Interview on informal practices in EU trade policy. [Interview Evelyn Coremans & Bart Kerremans].

8.   Interview former national trade official (03-09-2015). Interview on informal practices in EU trade policy. [Interview Evelyn Coremans & Bart Kerremans].

9.   Interview former national trade official (06-10-2015). Interview on informal practices in EU trade policy. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

10.   Interview national trade official (06-10-2015). Interview on informal technical meetings. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

11.   Interview Commission official (Brussels, 27-10-2015). Interview on informal technical meetings. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

12.   Interview Commission official (Brussels, 28/01/2016). Interview on transparency in EU trade negotiations. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

13.   Interview Commission official (Brussels, 29/01/2016). Interview on transparency in EU trade negotiations. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

14.   Interview Commission official (Brussels, 29/01/2016). Interview on transparency in EU trade negotiations. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

15.   Interview Council official (Brussels, 09/02/2016). Interview on transparency in EU trade negotiations. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].

16.   Interview European Parliament official (Brussels, 29/03/2016). Interview on transparency in EU trade negotiations. [Interview Evelyn Coremans].