NPP-Nuclear Island Design From conceptual design to

NPP-Nuclear Island Design From conceptual design to Project execution

Atoms for the Future

Paris – SFEN - October 14, 2014

D. Lanchet

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SFEN - Atoms for the future – Paris, October 14, 2014


Introduction

Conceptual phase

Basic Design

Project execution

Conclusion

Division 2

Division 3

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Introduction

Stakeholders:

Designer/Vendor, Utilities/Investor, Safety Authority, Government

Time measured in decade till project execution

Huge financial and intellectual investment

Sequences are well known but definition of each phases are

arbitrary and boundaries between them could be fuzzy.

Conceptual Design (relatively short)

Basic Design ( several years)

Detailed – Manufacturing design (several years)

Focus on industrial models (not reactor at R&D phase)

Conceptual Design Basic Design

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Detailed Design Preparation

2012

Generic Detailed Design

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Introduction

Conceptual phase

Basic Design

Project execution

Conclusion

Division 2

Division 3

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Conceptual phase

What to be considered keeping in mind our stakeholders:

Technical performance

Economic and market goals (competition)

Safety features, compliance with regulation, environmental aspects

Wide range of approaches between start from scratch or

evolutionary

level of investment and risks

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Conceptual phase Technical performance

Type of reactor (PWR, BWR…)

Power level, core size

Number of loops (main equipment sizing)

Flexibility in operation

Type of Fuel, MOX capability

Human factor

Availability, maintenance in service, dose reduction

Plant life time

Capable of, in terms of climatic, seismic, environmental conditions

(river, sea, water and air temperatures…)

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Conceptual phase Economic and market goals – competition

Price for investment (total and €/KWi), for production (€/KWh)

Lead time

Construction time (modularity)

Power level (Grid acceptability) and need for flexibility

Proven technology

Utilities requirements: EUR, EPRI-URD

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Conceptual phase Safety features, regulations, environmental aspects

Compliant with GEN 3+ requirements + REX (i.e. post-Fukushima)

Core damaged frequency, Large release frequency

AIEA, US regulations and codes and standards (US, Europe, Japan…)

Licensibility for which country in front of which safety requirements

Safety concepts:

Air Plane Crash

Passive and Active safety functions

Redundancy, Diversity, Number of trains

Severe accident strategy

Beyond design basis events

I&C concept (digital, analog, back-up)

Waste quantities, Dismantling

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Consistent approach for AREVA EPR and ATMEA1™

Environmental Protection

Lower volume of final waste

Reduced collective dose

Energy Supply Certainty

Gen III+ based on evolutionary designs

Integrated supply chain strategy for critical components

Proven Digital Safety I&C technology

Large commercial airplane crash resistance

Advanced features for core melt and releases management

Optimized level of redundancy, diversity of systems and incremental mitigation of abnormal events

Outstanding Safety

Key

Benefits

Business Performance

Maximized availability design target >92%

Short outages

High thermal efficiency

Minimized global power generation costs

Low O&M costs

Fuel cycle flexibility

MOX fuel

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EPR- The Best from French and German Technology

German

KONVOI (~1300 MWe)

• Neckar 2

• Emsland

• Isar 2

French N4

(~1450 MWe)

• Chooz 1- 2

• Civaux 1-2

The EPR™ design is built on experience of over 100 plants, 87 of which are PWRs.

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High adaptability to Market

1,000 MWe range adapted to various grid capabilities

Could cope with multiple country regulation

High seismic areas, 50Hz/60Hz, …

Customer’s satisfaction for economy, reliability, and operability

Superior efficiency and generation cost

Competitive construction duration

Flexible operation and maintenance capability

Relief of people around site area

No evacuation required, less impact for environment

Clear logic for Severe Accident, Air Plane Crash

ATMEA1™, a Gen III+ Plant Based on proven AREVA and MHI Technology

Improved economics, Enhanced safety, Minimized waste

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Introduction

Conceptual phase

Basic Design

Project execution

Conclusion

Division 2

Division 3

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Basic Design Before starting

Freeze conceptual design (First step of configuration)

Make sure high level requirements are exhaustive, clearly expressed and consistent.

Identify possible customers support (possible external reviews, financing)

Decide what will be the licensing strategy to get some approval in principle by a safety authority of the safety concepts used for the model

And finally, set the goal for Basic Design output (and obviously budget and schedule)

Deepness of 3D model, I&C architecture, specifications, Bill of Quantities, construction principles, ready for quotation and offer.

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Basic Design

Select the regulations and codes on which the design works will be

based

Decide the methods and tools to be used (IMS, PLM…)

Goal for basic design

Define the technical options which will enable to reach the performance, safety

concepts and economics decided in the conceptual phase

Design, Integrate, verify and validate these technical solutions, (feasible,

consistent, and meeting the conceptual phase requirements)

As far as possible, validation in principle of the safety concepts by the safety

authorities

Plot plan, 3D model with Catalogues

Perform the necessary FOAK tests on new features

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EPR Basic Design

Technical choices for severe accidents mitigation

Division 2

Division 3

Containment designed to withstand hydrogen deflagration

Spreading Area Protection of the Basemat

Prevention of high

pressure core melt by

depressurisation

means

Containment Heat

Removal System

In Containment Refueling

Water Storage Tank

(IRWST)

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EPR Basic Design Protection Against Internal Hazards

Nuclear Auxiliary Building Fuel Building

Safeguard Building

Division 1 Safeguard Building

Division 4

Safeguard Building

Division 3

Safeguard Building

Division 2

2 t 2 t

2 t

2 t

-11.70

-8.60

-11.70

HOT PIPING

SE

RV

ICE

CO

RR

IDO

R

RETENTION

FPP PUMP

CVCS PUMP

EB

S P

UM

P

KTA/RPE

VALVE

PIPE DUCT

KGB/TEP

DEMINERALIZED WATER PUMP

EVAPORATOR

WASTE GAS COMPR.

FL

OO

R D

RA

IN 2

FL

OO

R D

RA

IN 1

PR

OC

ES

S D

RA

IN

PR

IMA

RY

SA

MP

LIN

G 2

SAMPLING

ACTIVE LABORATORYCONTENSATE

CA

BL

E S

HA

FT

SERVICE CORRIDOR SECONDARY SAMPLING

SE

RV

ICE

CH

EM

ICA

L

PR

IMA

RY

SA

MP

LIN

G 1

SECONDARY SAMPLING

KB

F/T

EP

QNB/DER

CHRS SUMP

SE

RV

ICE

CO

RR

IDO

R

CCWS PUMP

EFWS PUMP

AN

TE

RO

OM

AIR

CHRS PUMP

LHSI PUMP

SUMP VALVE

MHSI PUMP

SE

RV

ICE

CO

RR

IDO

R

SERVICE CORRIDOR

MHSI PUMP

VALVE

LHSI PUMP

CCWS PUMP EFWS PUMP

KT/RPE

ANTEROOM

SERVICE CORRIDOR

KBB/TEP FEED PUMPS

DR

AIN

TA

NK

VALVE

TR

AIN

4

CA

BL

E S

HA

FT

TR

AIN

3

PASSAGEWAY

EFWS PUMP

KT/RPE

CCWS PUMP

SERVICE CORRIDOR

LHSI PUMP

ANTEROOM

FPC PUMP

DISTRIBUTION

FPP

CVCS PUMP

FPC

FPS PUMP

DISTRIBUTION

HOT PIPING

PASSAGEWAY

MHSI PUMP

AN

TE

RO

OM

EFWS PUMP

SE

RV

ICE

CO

RR

IDO

R

SUMP

LHSI PUMP

CHRS PUMP

SUMP VALVE

AIR

CCWS PUMP

SUMPSUMP SUMP SUMP

IRWST IRWST

SPREADING AREA

EB

S P

UM

P

PUMP

PUMP

VALVE

LOCK CHRS

SUMP

PIT

VALVE

LOCK

ROOM

PUMP

COUNTING

WASTE GAS COMPR.

ROOM

KBB/TEP

ROOM

VALVE VALVE

ROOM

KBB/TEP

CO

RR

IDO

R

SUMP VALVE

SE

RV

ICE

CO

RR

IDO

R

MHSI

PUMP

A

B

A

B

KPL / TEG

KTA/

RPE

KPL / TEG

-11.1

0m

-5.90

-4.35

-4.35

-6.15 -6.15

0 2 4 6 8 10 20m

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EPR Basic Design Primary Side Safety Systems

• Four Train Safety Injection Systems

• In-Containment Borated Water Storage Pool

• No Necessity for Containment Spray for Design Basis Accidents

• Combined Residual Heat Removal System and Low-head Safety Injection System

• Extra Borating System (two trains not shown on this figure) M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M M

M

M

M

LHSI/RHR

ACCU ACCU

ACCU ACCU

LHSI

LHSI/RHR

LHSI

MHSI

MHSI

MHSI

MHSI

IRWST

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• Interconnecting headers at EFWS pump suction and discharge normally closed

• Additional diverse electric power supply for two of four trains, using two small Diesel Generator Sets

• Two 25% Safety valves and one 50% atmospheric relief valve per Steam Generator

• Four separate Emergency Feedwater trains

MSIV

MSIV

MSIV

MSIV

EFWS tank

EFWS tank

EFWS tank

EFWS tank

EFWS

EFWS

Safety & relief valves


Safety & relief

valves


Main Steam

Main Feed

EPR Basic Design Secondary Side Safety Systems

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ATMEA1™ Basic Design Core Design Features

Active core height 4200 mm Same as EPR and USAPWR

Fuel assembly geometry 17x17 Same as those used in operating PWRs

Number of fuel assemblies 157 Same as 3 loop PWRs designed by AREVA

or MHI

Fuel enrichment < 5.0 wt% Same as operating PWRs

Max. fuel assembly burn-up 62GWd/t Maximum value available without

development

Control rod absorber material AIC/B4C Used in operating PWRs

Core monitoring/protection Rh and Co SPND(*) Used in operating PWRs (Rh) and EPR (Co)

Operation method T-mode Adopted in EPR

Chemical shim Enriched Boron Adopted in EPR

Basic concept: Adopt proven / state-of-the-art technologies

(*) SPND: Self-Powered Neutron Detector

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ATMEA1™ Basic Design Reactor Building 3D views

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ATMEA1™ Basic Design I&C Architecture

PICSSICS

Non safety systems

instrumentation actuators

Safety systems

instrumentation actuators

RPS SAS

PACS

RCML

Rods

Breakers

Rods

control

Non safety systemsSafety systems

DASPAS

Level 2

Level 1

Level 0

Mainly to Safety related

Level 1 I&C Systems

To all Level 1 non safety

I&C Systems

To PACS To PACS To PACS To PACS

From other I&C systems

SA

To PACS

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Reactor Building is designed to be accessible 10 days before and 3 days after the outage

ATMEA1™ Basic Design Objective : high availability

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ATMEA1™ Basic Design External reviews

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Designed with U.S.NRC regulations, U.S. industry consensus

Codes and Standards and ICRP for radioprotection

Compliant with IAEA Safety Standards

Reviewed against the experience of Generation III+ AREVA’s

EPRTM

and MHI ’s APWR (i.e. French, Finnish, Chinese, US and

Japanese regulations)

Reviewed against the French Regulatory regime

Laws (Orders of 13/10/2003, 31/12/1999…)

Guidelines

Technical guidelines for new reactors (2004)

Applicable fundamental safety rules

ATMEA1TM Basic design Regulatory and Safety Frameworks

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Introduction

Conceptual phase

Basic Design

Project execution

Conclusion

Division 2

Division 3

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Project execution Main parameters

FOAK or NOAK project

Site Technical Data

Contract specificities (contractual mode, scope, schedule)

Lead time, construction time

Specific country regulations

Localization (Industrial capability)

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Project execution

Adjust standard basic design requirements to the Project

and re-do accordingly parts of Basic Design (Configuration Zero)

Construction license

Launch detailed design (sample of activities)

Define technical configuration strategy up to commercial operation

Adjust equipment specifications, launch manufacturing design

Safety studies: PSAR, PSA, FSAR

Systems design

I&C Hardware and Software design

Produce execution drawings

Integrate feedback from manufacturing design and equipment suppliers

Support to Construction and Commissioning

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Introduction

Conceptual phase

Basic Design

Project execution

Conclusion

Division 2

Division 3

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Conclusion

Long and ambitious venture

Require large financial and resource investment

Rely on an extensive pool of knowledge

(mix of R&D, proven technology)

Methods and tools are part of the success key

Flamanville 3 Taishan 1&2 Olkiluoto 3 Hinkley Point C

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Documents

NPP-Nuclear Island Design From conceptual design to