Nuclear Notes - Center for Strategic and International Studies

a report of the csis project on nuclear issues

June 2011

1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org

Editor Mark Jansson

AuthorsKevin KallmyerAnna NewbyTerrence Smith

Volume 1, Issue 1

Nuclear Notes

June 2011


Nuclear NotesVolume 1, Issue 1

Editor Mark Jansson


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About CSIS

At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to decisionmakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS conducts research and analysis and devel-ops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.

Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world.

Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent international policy insti-tutions, with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focused on de-fense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000.

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

About the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues

Many of the most pressing national and international security challenges are tied to nuclear weap-ons. The need to reduce the prevalence of nuclear weapons globally and prevent their use by states and non-state actors runs parallel with the need to maintain certain nuclear capabilities and the intellectual assets that support them. Both tracks present long-term challenges that, to be managed, will require sustained effort by talented and dedicated professionals. The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) seeks to help improve the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear strategy and policy through profes-sional development and networking activities that target the next generation of leaders in the field.

PONI maintains an enterprise-wide membership base; hosts four major conferences and sev-eral smaller events each year; maintains an online blog; holds live debates on critical nuclear weap-ons issues; runs a six-month academic program for young experts; organizes bilateral exchanges involving young experts from the United States and abroad; oversees a working group of top young professionals; and distributes biweekly news and event announcements to members.

About Nuclear Notes

Nuclear Notes is a biannual publication of the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) featuring innovative thinking by rising experts. Its goal is to advance the public debate about nuclear weap-ons strategy and policy. We welcome submissions of 1,500–2,000 words on contemporary topics pertaining to nuclear weapons strategy or policy. Submissions can be sent to PONI Deputy Direc-tor Mark Jansson ([email protected]) for review by PONI staff and senior members.

Cover photo credit: Department of Defense, USS Hopper (DDG 70), equipped with the Aegis inte-grated weapons system, July 30, 2009, http://www.flickr.com/photos/39955793@N07/3785351205/.

© 2011 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel: (202) 887-0200 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org

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Missile Defense: An Alternative to the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO Kevin Kallmyer 1

Making Progress at the 2012 Middle East Conference— With or Without IsraelAnna Newby 8

Containing the Proliferation Risks of Nuclear Energy: From Monitoring to ControllingTerrence Smith 13

contents

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Kevin Kallmyer1

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) recently released its Strategic Concept, the docu-ment that will guide Alliance strategy over the next decade. The Strategic Concept issued signifi-cant policy statements for the Alliance, in particular, the maintenance of current nuclear sharing arrangements and a commitment to pursue NATO missile defense.2 Proponents of NATO nuclear sharing have argued that tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)3 play a critical role in NATO’s deter-rence policy and Alliance solidarity, but there has been relatively little discussion regarding viable alternatives that could replace this role.4 If the Alliance is truly committed to developing missile defense, then NATO could use this commitment to replace the political role of forward-deployed TNWs and gain the potential benefits of ending NATO’s often-criticized nuclear sharing policy. However, if the primary reason for development of NATO missile defense is symbolic, then allies should be cautious that a political, symbolic decision does not engender further security risks.

Critics of NATO nuclear sharing argue that current TNW policy undermines the nonprolif-eration regime, provides an opportunity for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, and could undermine strategic stability in a crisis situation, in addition to being an expensive weapon program to maintain and modernize.5 If NATO missile defense were to replace the role of for-

1. Kevin Kallmyer is a research assistant for the U.S. Defense and National Security Group at CSIS.2. Steven Erlanger and Jackie Calmes, “NATO Agrees to Build Missile Defense System,” November 19,

2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/20/world/europe/20prexy.html.3. TNWs do not have an agreed-on definition, but for practical purposes, this paper uses the term

“TNWs” to refer to U.S. short-range gravity bombs. Nikolai Sokov, “Issue 4: Tactical (Substrategic) Nuclear Weapons,” Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership (Monterey: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July 2009), 69–100, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_6_issue_4.pdf.

Included in this definition are the estimated 150–200 TNWs deployed in Europe, stored in six bases within Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, and Italy. During the Cold War, the United States at one point had 7,300 TNWs deployed in Europe. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen,, “US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no. 1 (January/February 2011): 64–73, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/1/64.full.pdf+html.

4. Additional alternatives discussed are declaratory statements of the role of strategic nuclear weapons within NATO’s nuclear deterrent, increased military exercises and presence in Europe, updating NATO war plans, and integrating France into the Nuclear Policy Group.

5. Sam Nunn recently argued that NATO TNWs are a “terrorist’s dream.” Sam Nunn, “NATO, Nuclear Security and the Terrorist Threat,” New York Times, November 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes .com/2010/11/17/opinion/17iht-ednunn.html. Additionally, the international community has argued that NATO nuclear sharing violates Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Further, NATO doctrine that includes a role for forward-deployed TNWs may undermine U.S. nonproliferation credibility regardless of its compliance with the letter of the NPT, because “the message NATO is sending is that nuclear weapons remain intrinsically valuable—essentially in opposition to statements by Obama and Kissinger et al.” Bob Van Der Zwaan and

missile defensean alternative to the role of tactical nuclear weapons in nato

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ward-deployed TNWs, then the Alliance could gain these security benefits from eliminating its forward-deployed TNWs with relatively little cost. To determine if NATO missile defense is a viable replacement for forward-deployed TNWs in Europe it is necessary to understand the role that TNWs play within NATO. There are three possible explanations for the continued presence of TNWs on European territory.

First, one could argue that forward-deployed TNWs are militarily useful because they main-tain the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. Those who take this view claim that the existence of forward-deployed nuclear weapons forces adversaries to question the benefits of aggressive ac-tion against NATO member states. Additionally, forward-deployed TNWs allow NATO to exercise proportional retaliation against Russian TNW use, which may strengthen the credibility of NATO deterrence against Russia’s TNW arsenal and, in the case of Russian TNW use, could prevent the escalation of conflict to strategic weapon use.6

Second, others argue that forward-deployed TNWs are a physical symbol of the political-military link between U.S. commitment and NATO’s nuclear deterrent.7 Thus, the withdrawal of U.S. TNWs from European territory may signal, rightly or wrongly, the withdrawal of U.S. commitment to the Alliance and make NATO’s nuclear forces appear “soft.”8 As some have put it, NATO would not be having a debate on whether to base U.S. TNWs in Europe if they were not currently there, but given that they are, the United States should not remove its symbol of politi-cal commitment.9

Tom Sauer, “Time to reconsider U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 23, 2009, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/time-to-reconsider-us-nuclear-weapons-europe. Lastly, some have argued that TNWs invite a war-fighting mentality. TNWs use could be more easily contemplated because they are categorized as a battlefield weapon, as opposed to an “absolute weapon.” In a crisis situation, NATO might move its TNWs closer to the conflict theater in an attempt to signal resolve. However, in a fast-moving battle such signaling could be misperceived by the adversary and create incentives for pre-emption, which in turn creates”use them or lose them’ pressure.” Therefore, “the vulnerability of TNWs…contains an inherent imperative to employ them early in warfare… miscalculation and panic on the part of the weapons bearers can mislead them into firing their TNWs even without objective tactical necessity.” William C. Potter, Nikholai Sokov, Harald Muller, and Annette Schaper, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), 38–39, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-136-X-en.pdf.

6. Łukasz Kulesa, “Polish and Central European Priorities on NATO’s Future Nuclear Policy,” ISN, International Relations and Security Network, November 2010, http://tacticalnuclearweapons.ifsh.de/pdf/Nuclear_Policy_Paper_No2.pdf.

7. David Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” International Affairs, 85, no. 4 (2009): 772–773.

8. Lukasz Kulesa, panelist, “Are the Requirements for Extended Deterrence Changing?” Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/npc_extended_deterrence4.pdf.

9. “Nuclear weapons are kind of like the wedding ring of the marriage—there are those in cultures that don’t wear wedding rings who are perfectly committed to their spouses, and others who wear them who don’t really have much of a commitment at all. But once you start wearing one, it means something entirely different to be seen without it than it does for someone who never wore one.” Elaine Bunn, “Implications of Extended Deterrence for the 2009–2010 Nuclear Posture Review” (meeting discussion notes, CSIS, Washington, D.C., June 3, 2009), p. 6, cited in Clark A. Murdock and Jessica M. Yeats, Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, December 2009), 31, http://csis.org/files/publication/100222_Murdock_NuclearPosture_Print.pdf.

a report of the csis project on nuclear issues | 3

Third, proponents of keeping TNWs in Europe argue that forward-deployed TNWs are an im-portant mechanism for Alliance burden sharing. Given that the pillar of NATO is collective secu-rity, then the security and economic burdens of that task must be shared throughout the Alliance. If the United States discontinued the basing of TNWs in NATO member-state territory, it would eliminate a critical tool for Alliance burden sharing and, as a result, undermine Alliance solidarity. Lack of European commitment to burden sharing could call into question Europe’s commitment to NATO and, in turn, create the perception of Europe’s insignificance to U.S. strategic interests.10

Ultimately, although it is true that other NATO forces cannot replace a specific military func-tion of forward-deployed TNWs, the military utility of these weapons is negligible. Therefore, retaining TNWs in Europe because their capability is necessary for NATO deterrence does not appear to be a compelling rationale for the status quo. The foundation for this point can be noted in NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which recognizes collective defense as the primary mission of the Alliance:

The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our popu-lations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.…Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.…The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strate-gic nuclear forces of the Alliance.11 [emphasis added]

As a result, while NATO still requires a credible deterrent, including a nuclear element, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, in addition to the Al-liance’s conventional superiority, are more than sufficient to respond to any meaningful military contingency.12 Forward-deployed sub-strategic nuclear weapons no longer add any deterrent value to NATO’s military forces and thus are no longer needed to attain the “appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities.” In fact, General James Cartwright, the outgoing vice chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs and former STRATCOM commander, stated that there is no remaining military mission for aircraft-delivered TNWs that cannot be performed by either U.S. strategic nuclear weapons or conventional forces.13 If a crisis were to arise, it is unlikely that NATO would even consider using TNWs because the Alliance could not be certain that TNW aircraft delivery vehicles would either promptly or reliably reach their target as a result of their susceptibility to

10. Franklin Miller, George Robertson, and Kori Schake,” Germany Opens Pandora’s Box,” briefing note, Centre for European Reform, February 2010, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/bn_pandora_final_8feb10.pdf; NATO Group of Experts, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, May 17, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm, quoted in Kulesa, “Polish and Central European Priorities on NATO’s Future Nuclear Policy.”

11. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,” 2010, http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

12. Miles Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Sokov, “Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” Survival 52, no. 1 (February 2010): 80.

13. “QUESTIONER:…Obviously, our forward-deployed systems in Europe are—it’s a political-military issue…But if I can just separate the military for a moment, is there a military mission performed by these aircraft-delivered weapons that cannot be performed by either U.S. strategic forces or U.S. conventional forces? CARTWRIGHT: No.” Council on Foreign Relations Meeting, “Nuclear Posture Review,” April 8, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/Council_on_Foreign_Relation.pdf.


anti-aircraft defense systems and long response time.14 More importantly, any adversary that com-mitted to TNW use against a NATO country would require absolute confidence that the United States would not escalate to use of strategic nuclear weapons in response to a TNW attack. In turn, the adversary’s uncertainty about whether the United States would retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons makes the initial use of TNWs highly unlikely and, moreover, ignores the obvious alter-native that NATO could rely on TNWs based on U.S. carriers deployed to the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf.15 Thus, it appears that the core reason why TNWs are still based in Europe derives from their political value to the Alliance, both as a signal of U.S. commitment and a means to implement burden sharing.

If, however, TNWs have been given a political value within the Alliance and that political value does not derive from their current military utility, then the political value of TNWs should (theoretically, at least) be transferable. Lukasz Kulesa, of the Polish Institute of International Af-fairs, presented this point clearly, arguing that despite the rationale for current TNW presence, policy change should not be a taboo subject within the Alliance as long as changes are “conducted in such a way that would not weaken the transatlantic link, that would not weaken the image as a credible security provider both within the Alliance and in the eyes of outside actors.”16

NATO missile defense provides the means to end forward-deployment of TNWs without weakening the transatlantic link. NATO missile defense could represent a link between U.S. and European defense policy, and create a shared sense of commitment and solidarity within the Al-liance.17 Further, a NATO missile defense system will require European countries to host land-based and sea-based missile interceptors and NATO to maintain a command and control center

14. “The readiness level for the nuclear strike role has been reduced to ‘months’ which may mean that the relevant electronic and mechanical fittings are not normally fitted to the aircraft.” Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, “‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapons: A dangerous anachronism,” NPT Briefings: 2010 and Beyond, http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npt2010%20B5%20-%20Tactical%20NWs.pdf.

Additionally, anti-aircraft defenses mean that, “unlike U.S. strategic systems, the NATO bombs could be interdicted.” George Perkovich, “Nuclear Weapons in Germany: Broaden and Deepen the Debate,” Policy Outlook (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2010), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/nukes_germany.pdf.

15. Pomper, Potter, and Sokov, “Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” 81. 16. Kulesa, “Are the Requirements for Extended Deterrence Changing?”17. “The resulting linkage between European and American defenses would, it is hoped, reinforce

the sense of common trans-Atlantic security.” Richard Weitz, “NATO’s Missile Defense Challenge,” World Politics Review, November 11, 2010, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7008/natos-missile-defense-challenge.

However, if missile defense was pursued primarily as a political commitment, without including military assistance that the allies are interested in (specifically, air defense aid to Poland), then missile defense could be insufficient to maintain the Alliance, and potentially be counterproductive to the U.S.-Polish alliance because of the domestic political costs. Marek Madej, “Obama’s Missile Defense Rethink: The Polish Reaction,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, web edition, September 30, 2009, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/obamas-missile-defense-rethink-the-polish-reaction.

Further, the potential for missile defense to generate controversy could make its political role counterproductive and dangerous to the Alliance. “Controversies can create a vicious cycle of accusations and counter-accusations, similar to the atmosphere of the 2003 crisis over the support of the US operation in Iraq.” Lukasz Kulesa, “Missile Defense Dossier: The Polish Perspective,” Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, April 12, 2007, http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/pv/defenseAntimissile/pv_20070412_eng.pdf.


that would be collectively operated.18 Both of these capabilities, like nuclear weapons, are physical objects that could symbolize American commitment to European security. In an open letter to President Barack Obama that discussed U.S. missile defense plans, several Eastern European poli-ticians have already alluded to this point:

Regardless of the military merits of this scheme and what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has nevertheless also become—at least in some countries—a symbol of America’s credibility and commitment to the region.19

Additionally, NATO missile defense could be a means to share the risk and burden of NATO’s mission.20 Not only would NATO member states share the burden by hosting interceptors and contributing to a command and control system, but NATO missile defense would necessitate contingency planning for crisis situations when movement of mobile missile defense resources is required, creating an instrument for continued consultations within NATO forums such as the Nuclear Planning Group and reinforcing the bind formed by missile defense.21 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently stated that NATO missile defense “would be a clear demonstration of allied solidarity and burden sharing in the face of a common threat.”22 At this time, however, Rasmussen and some Eastern European states would likely argue that missile de-fense is a complement to, not substitute for, TNWs.

Intuitively, there is a risk that missile defense would be an insufficient security commitment to replace the role of TNWs in NATO: missile defense is not a nuclear weapon and therefore not in-herently tied to the United States’ nuclear commitment to NATO security. However, two responses to this point seem appropriate. First, deterrence theory acknowledges an important link between offensive and defensive weapons.23 In this line, missile defense would raise the costs of aggres-sive action against NATO member states and, in turn, could be seen as a contribution to NATO’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. Second, it is hard to believe that forward-deployed TNWs are a

18. “The program includes a U.S. plan to deploy a radar base and land- and sea-based missile interceptors around Europe.… Shield specifics, such as where the command and control center would be located, are to be decided in the future, NATO envoys said. It is anticipated that the missile umbrella would be controlled through the NATO military command structure already in place.” Global Security Newswire,

“NATO Moves Ahead With Missile Shield,” November 22, 2010, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101122_4923.php. However, not all NATO countries may host interceptors, in particular because of domestic political opposition, as demonstrated by Poland’s political battle to host U.S. missile defense interceptors. Thomas Harrison and Joanne Landy, “Pushing Missile Defense in Europe,” Foreign Policy in Focus, February 20, 2008, http://www.fpif.org/articles/pushing_missile_defense_in_europe.

19. Valdas Adamkus et al., “An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe,” Gazeta Wyborcza, July 15, 2009, http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html#ixzz14ul8w2lY.

20. Burden sharing can be defined as “shouldering the costs, risks, and responsibilities of maintaining adequate defenses.” Thomas Young, “Missile Defense: The Future of NATO Burden Sharing?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1, 2010, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/missile-defense-the-future-of-nato-burden-sharing.

21. Ibid.22. Rasmussen states that the “common threat” is the proliferation of ballistic missiles that could

carry weapons of mass destruction and reach European cities. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO Needs a Missile Defense,” New York Times, October 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/opinion/13iht-edrasmussen.html.

23. D. G. Brennan, “The Case for Missile Defense,” Foreign Affairs 47, no. 3 (1969): 433–448.


necessary nuclear commitment to the Alliance, as they do not currently serve any military func-tion, especially considering NATO’s other nuclear assets. In contrast, the Strategic Concept states that the proliferation of ballistic missiles “poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area,” and that the Alliance views “the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence.”24 With this assessment in mind, it appears that NATO missile defense would constitute a more significant commitment to NATO’s security than would TNWs.25

Further, NATO missile defense could be a more productive means than TNWs to implement burden sharing. Forward-deployed TNWs are based in only five countries, with no presence in the Eastern European countries that most express the wish for their continued presence in the Alli-ance.26 Additionally, European defense spending trends generate the potential that NATO member states may insufficiently invest in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter delivery vehicle for TNWs, creat-ing the conditions for a crisis in TNW burden sharing over the next decade.27 In contrast, burden sharing for missile defense could extend to a larger pool, because more than five countries could host interceptors and, as the Obama administration’s recent announcement that it will deploy missile defense interceptors in Poland indicates, interceptors could be placed in Eastern European territory to provide a more visible form of assurance to those governments.28

However, even if it is feasible for missile defense to replace the political role of forward-de-ployed TNWs, whether it is sound policy to do so is a separate question. NATO missile defense, especially on Eastern European soil, could potentially provoke Russia and create new security concerns for the Alliance. If missile defense is built to assure allies—thus logically giving NATO an advantage over its adversaries—the dilemma, then, is that the more it assures allies, the more it could provoke adversaries and contribute to arms race instability. For example, if missile de-fense does not pose a credible threat to Russian offensive forces, then why would it assure Eastern European states of their security vis-à-vis Russia? In contrast, if it does pose a threat to Russia’s of-fensive forces, then Russia will likely respond with new weapons programs to nullify the advantage missile defense gives to NATO member states.

24. NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept.” 25. Young, “Missile Defense: The Future of NATO Burden Sharing?”26. Nikolai Sokov, “Issue 4: Tactical (Substrategic) Nuclear Weapons.” 27. Over the next decade, European leaders may substantially reduce procurement of the F-35

Joint Strike Fighter (the delivery vehicle for TNWs), because “leaders are likely thinking of national aircraft procurement decisions between now and 2020, politically challenging when the role of these systems is controversial, opaque and when defense budgets are already stretched tight. Widespread and entrenched public opposition toward continuing nuclear deployments on their territories could sink any such investments before they make it onto any budget line.” Chris Lindborg, “Considering NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons after the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review,” BASIC Backgrounder, British American Security Information Council, April 7. 2010, http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/114719/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/f2c7789d-2bcc-4112-ae45-b47b7def15e7/en/BASIC-USNPR-TNW.pdf. The fear, which has not yet materialized, is that even small reductions in procurement could then lead to “death spiral” that endangers the F-35 program’s viability, because fewer purchases could increase the plane’s price, which in turn leads to further reductions in purchases. John Reed, “Austerity Budgets Seize Control in Europe,” DefenseNews, July 19, 2010, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4713205.

28. Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Affirms Plan to Deploy Missile Interceptors to Poland,” NTI, December 9, 2010, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101209_8838.php; Young, “Missile Defense: The Future of NATO Burden Sharing?”


The choice between assuring NATO allies and provoking Russia is a false one, however. NATO does not intend to field missile defense capabilities that could nullify Russia’s offensive arse-nal—rather, it is focused on denying countries like Iran the strategic utility of acquiring ballistic missiles;29 Russia’s arsenal is simply too large to develop an effective and affordable missile defense system to counter it. Importantly, such capabilities are not necessary to assure Eastern European allies, who are more afraid of abandonment by NATO and the United States in a dispute with Rus-sia than they are of any vulnerability from the absence of a specific capability to defeat Russia.30 NATO missile defense could address that fear of abandonment through its symbol of commitment, even if it were unable to pose a credible response to Russian aggression. For this reason, the com-mitment to pursue NATO missile defense would not necessarily lock the Alliance into a new arms race with Russia.

Nonetheless, Russia’s fear that NATO missile defense represents a latent capability that could one day threaten Russia’s national security speaks to the importance of pursuing missile defense transparently and cooperatively when possible. While the unilateral development of missile defense by NATO could potentially renew Russian arms competition,31 cooperative movement on missile defense represents an opportunity to overcome NATO-Russia mistrust and improve the prospects of future arms control efforts.32

Any political or military benefit garnered by NATO missile defense must be measured against potential unintended consequences created by an adversary’s response to counter NATO’s new capabilities. Whether missile defense is merely a symbolic policy or a concrete contribution to Alliance security will depend on the Alliance’s ability to create a robust and effective system that is responsive to the specific threats NATO faces. Therefore, NATO should be cautious. An inherent problem with reliance on symbolic policies to maintain Alliance solidarity is that the policies may also generate new security dilemmas. In this instance, if missile defense is pursued for political reasons, regardless of the systems’ effectiveness, then NATO risks provoking Russia and spend-ing substantial amounts of resources because the Alliance relies on symbolic weapon systems to maintain its cohesion. Shared interests, common values, and dialogue, not symbols, serve as the foundation for effective alliances.

Regardless of whether NATO missile defense is a wise policy choice, the Strategic Concept has de-cided to pursue it, and that decision is unlikely to be reversed. It is time to focus on the best way to imple-ment the Alliance’s missile defense system and maximize benefits in other areas. Using missile defense as a political commitment to replace the political role of TNWs would allow NATO to garner the additional nonproliferation and security benefits of ending its often-criticized TNW policy at little or no cost.

29. Brad Roberts, “Statement of Dr. Brad Roberts,” House Armed Service Committee, April 15, 2010, http://www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/us/congress/house_representatives/01.pdf.

30. Kulesa, “Polish and Central European Priorities on NATO’s Future Nuclear Policy.”31. Global Security Newswire, “Failure of Antimissile Talks Would Spark ‘Arms Race,’ Medvedev Warns,”

NTI, November 30, 2010, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101130_9145.php.32. Strobe Talbott, after a visit to Russia to discuss post-New START arms control, stated, “I came

away with the sense that if there were to be genuine, clearly worked out cooperation between the United States and Russia, and even between NATO and Russia on missile defense, it might be a real game changer of the most positive kind for the next stage of strategic arms control.” Strobe Talbott, panelist, “Sustaining U.S.-Russian Leadership on Nuclear Security,” Brookings Institution, October 15, 2010), 10, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2010/1015_nuclear_security/20101015_nuclear_security.pdf; Global Security Newswire, “NATO Missile Shield Needs to Include Russia, Medvedev Says,” May 16, 2011, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110516_7006.php.

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Anna Newby1

As the parties at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference observed, little progress has been made on the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which called for the formation of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the region.2 With this in mind, the NPT parties decided in May 2010 to “convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.”

Whether or not it actually attends the meeting, Israel will be an elephant in the room at the 2012 conference. Insofar as leaders in the Middle East and elsewhere are truly invested in ridding the region of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it is particularly important for Israel—the only state in the region believed to currently possess nuclear weapons—to participate in the up-coming conference.3 For the purposes of making real progress on regional arms control and con-fidence building efforts, it is in the long-term interests of Israel, the Arabs and Iranians, and the broader group of NPT stakeholders for Israel to attend and take part in constructive discussion.

Despite Converging Interests in Arms Control, Obstacles RemainFor Israel, the current policy of nuclear opacity is problematic and fraught with complications that ultimately undermine the country’s national security. The hoped-for ambiguity has eroded as more states have become convinced that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal. While Israel has not formally introduced nuclear weapons into the region, the government has “contaminate[d] the region’s politics into a nuclear politics,” as Israel expert Avner Cohen has argued.4 In the long run, Israel’s persistent refusal to participate in arms control talks with its regional rivals is not sustain-able. Its security is closely linked with regional WMD negotiations, which could foster regional

1. Anna Newby is the program associate at the Project on Middle East Democracy in Washington, D.C.2. United Nations, “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document,” June 18, 2010, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20%28VOL.I%29; United Nations, “Resolution on the Middle East,” NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex, September 17, 2008, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/Resolution_MiddleEast.pdf

3. “Arab Countries Put Spotlight on Israel at IAEA Meeting,” The Hindu (Madras), June 10, 2010, http://beta.thehindu.com/news/international/article451941.ece.

4. Avner Cohen , “Touching On Israel’s Nuclear Secrets,” interview by Robert Siegel, All Things Considered, National Public Radio, July 6, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128342093.

making progress at the 2012 middle east conference—with or without israel


confidence building and possibly lead to negative security assurances, contributing to Israel’s security in the long term.5

It is also in the interests of the larger community of NPT stakeholders for Israel to participate in the upcoming conference. The NPT regime’s implicit acceptance of Israel’s non-declared nuclear status has been damaging to its legitimacy,6 and the lack of concerted action on the persistent calls to establish an arms control framework in the region has increased frustrations with the NPT, as well as added to perceptions that it is ineffectual. These considerations, among others, have prompted many experts to call for fresh thinking on Israeli security, particularly vis-à-vis nuclear weapons.7

In spite of the many benefits to Israeli participation in the upcoming conference, however, there are a myriad of obstacles to getting an Israeli voice at the table. For one thing, most Israeli leaders do not perceive arms control to be in Israel’s national interest right now and have con-sistently demanded that the Arab-Israel conflict be fully settled before arms control is discussed. Furthermore, the actual logistics of hosting an Israeli delegate are tricky. From the Israeli side, official participation might amount to or even require a declaration of its nuclear status, which would be highly problematic for Israel’s leadership. For some Arab governments (as well as Iran), sitting down at the table with an Israeli official would violate official state policies. It would also, of course, be difficult for Israel, as entering into talks would put Israel at the same table as some states that have called for its destruction.

However, to the extent that the Arabs and Iranians also genuinely desire a WMD-free Middle East, it is also in their interests to engage constructively with Israel on the subject. As President Obama has emphasized, “the conference will only take place if all countries feel confident that they can attend.”8 By sincerely reaching out to Israel in the lead-up to the conference, it is of course possible that the other governments in the region can increase Israel’s incentives to participate. And there are alternative options for Israeli participation that might be worth exploring—for example, some nongovernmental representative could speak to Israel’s position, though not on its behalf. Alternatively, another government could somehow serve as a liaison for the Israeli voice.

It is unclear, however, exactly how these alternatives might play out, and each clearly poses a host of sticking points. Ultimately, although it would be ideal to have Israel’s full participation at the 2012 conference, prospects for that becoming reality seem bleak.

5. Chad O’Carroll, “Making the 2012 Middle East Conference Work,” Policy and Research, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, n.d., http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/making_the_2012_middle_east_conference_work/.

6. See, for example, Gerard C. Smith and Helena Cobban, “A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 3 (1989): 53–70, accessed through JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044008; Ramesh Thakur, Jane Boulden, and Thomas G. Weiss, “Can the NPT Regime Be Fixed or Should It Be Abandoned?” Dialogue on Globalization, Occasional Papers, no. 40 (October 2008), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/05760.pdf

7. “Israel Needs a New Nuclear Policy,” Haaretz, July 5, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/israel-needs-a-new-nuclear-policy-1.288851.

8. Office of the Press Secretary, White House, “Readout of the President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel,” July 6, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/readout-presidents-meeting-with-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel-0.


Progress Still Possible without Israeli Participation Importantly, the 2012 Middle East conference can be meaningful even without the participation of an Israeli delegation. Regardless of whether Israel joins the conference, there will be considerable pressure on the governments that do participate to make the summit a success. It is not completely clear what will define a “successful” meeting. The Review Conference document outlines the general purpose of the conference (to “contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East”), as well as some initial steps (such as appointing a UN facilitator and host government, as well as preparation by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and other relevant organizations of background documents). However, the document mentions

“making progress” only as a goal for the participants.9 What “progress” means in terms of concrete achievements remains undefined. As such, the participants themselves will need to agree on how the success or failure of the conference will be judged.

In making that judgment, it is important for leaders in the Middle East and elsewhere to ac-knowledge that improving security requires more than merely solving the problems between Israel and its regional rivals. Rather, there are a host of WMD-relevant regional tensions that do not involve Israel, as well as other possible flashpoints that can and should be addressed. For example, ongoing Sunni-Shiite tensions (exacerbated, in some cases, by ongoing protests across the region) have prompted some factions throughout the region to push for maintaining stocks of WMD or building indigenous nuclear capabilities; the proliferation of civilian nuclear technology has sparked some concern about nuclear security and broader energy security issues; and finally, con-cerns about Iran’s IAEA compliance issues may be something that the conference participants can discuss. There are a host of tensions among states in the Middle East—not exclusively focused on Israel—that inhibit progress toward a WMD-free Middle East, and some of these could be points of discussion at the 2012 meeting.10

Turning the conference spotlight on Israel—or on Iran, for that matter—would suggest that a WMD arsenal is the only substantive issue to discuss, which neglects other relevant topics. Put differently, drawing attention to Israel whenever possible puts a singular focus on a multifaceted and highly complex set of challenges and ignores other issues that need to be resolved between and among parties in the region. Denouncing Israel only hardens Israeli leaders’ positions and reinforces the logic behind their refusal to engage. Thus, while it is important to acknowledge the benefits of Israel’s participation in the regional arms control process and to strongly encourage all Middle Eastern leaders to help facilitate Israel’s attendance, framing the meeting so narrowly could distract from broader goals of the conference.11

Assuming that Israel does not attend the summit, the other Middle Eastern governments can take certain concrete, realistic steps that would amount to meaningful—albeit limited—progress

9. United Nations, “1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part 1,” May 12, 1995, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/1995NPT.shtml.

10. Dominic Moran, “Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Front and Center,” Disarmament Times, NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace & Security, July 3, 2010, http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=361:middle-east-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-front-and-center&catid=147:disarmament-times-summer-2010&Itemid=2.

11. Chad O’Carroll, “Making the 2012 Middle East Conference Work, Policy and Research,” Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, n.d., http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/making_the_2012_middle_east_conference_work/.


toward the ultimate objective of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Rhetorically, leaders can reaffirm and strengthen their commitments to particu-lar goals, such as ridding the region of certain weapons, eventually engaging at some future point in comprehensive arms control talks (that include both Israel and Iran, and that address all rel-evant weapons systems), and building or incorporating a verification regime that meets the needs of all states in the region. They can also take as a starting point that a mutual interest for all parties is mitigating the risk of miscalculation and accidental use of weapons of mass destruction. Stat-ing these goals and interests concretely is an important element of building trust among regional governments and makes it easier to hold leaders accountable to their commitments down the road.

More substantively, the parties at the 2012 conference could agree on specific benchmarks that would mark progress toward those broader, stated goals. For example, universal ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty could be a useful metric to measure progress toward a WMD-free-zone. In addition, state parties could lay out an explicit, long-term work plan. This could include a timetable for future conferences, goals for domestic decisionmakers to pursue within their respective legal and bureau-cratic frameworks, and cooperative exercises (even small or mundane ones) that would lay the groundwork for a more robust arms control infrastructure in the region.

One step that would be decidedly unhelpful to the broader arms control process in the Middle East would be for conference participants to use the meeting as a stage for continuing to criticize Israel. As U.S. envoy to the IAEA Glyn Davies has argued, singling out Israel in international arenas is both counterproductive and inappropriate and will ultimately impede progress on arms control.12 Such statements, while potent for some domestic audiences, are only damaging to the larger process of trust building and will not contribute in any positive way to the development of a regional security infrastructure. Leaders in the Middle East should understand that if they are serious about realizing these goals, continuing to excoriate Israel will only exacerbate existing obstacles to progress.

Prospects for a Meaningful 2012 ConferenceThere is no question that Israel’s absence at the 2012 Middle East conference would inhibit prog-ress toward the realization of a WMD-free Middle East. Moreover, if the conference were to take place without Israel’s participation, it could be considered unfair that other regional governments are being expected to make difficult concessions without Israel needing to do the same. Israel’s ab-sence could also make Iran reluctant to participate, out of fear of sitting alone in the hot seat. For these and other reasons, it is important that regional governments and other NPT stakeholders stress to Israeli leaders the importance of their attendance and take steps to create an environment conducive to Israeli participation.

As discussed above, however, this does not mean that Israel’s absence would make it impos-sible for regional governments to extract some concrete benefits from the summit. It is essential, therefore, that Middle Eastern governments and the larger international community seek progress in certain areas, even if Israel does not attend. To this end, conference planning must be done with

12. Glyn Davies, “U.S. Statement Regarding Agenda Item 8(b), Israeli Nuclear Capabilities,” IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, September 13–17, 2010, United States Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna, http://vienna.usmission.gov/100916inc.html.


care. Because it is difficult to prepare for a conference when it remains unclear who will show up, early efforts to set the agenda should not assume any one state’s participation. This could open the door for more governments to join the talks, and the conference agenda could be tailored accord-ingly as the attendee list is settled.

By approaching the conference with the intent to pursue a set of common goals, leaders can positively affect the regional security environment in both symbolic and practical ways. Symboli-cally, a demonstration of forward motion on the 1995 resolution would show continued commit-ment to the international nonproliferation regime and would bolster its credibility. It would also be a sign that challenges like Iran’s noncompliance with IAEA protocols and Israel’s non-accession to the NPT are being taken seriously. As noted, the conference presents an opportunity for leaders to agree on a concrete set of long-term goals as well as on some initial steps toward making those goals a reality. In addition, the act of sitting down together and treating the meeting seriously can enhance trust, which is a critical stepping-stone toward normalizing relations between regional governments and improving security.

It is widely acknowledged that the conditions for a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East do not yet exist.13 However, there are practical steps that can help regional gov-ernments move toward that objective. Even without Israel’s participation, Middle Eastern leaders can achieve concrete gains in arms control and confidence building at the 2012 conference and should therefore approach the meeting with a genuine intent to make progress, with or without Israel’s attendance. This means pursuing limited but concrete aims, as well as engaging in a sincere discussion that focuses not on Israel or Iran but on broader, core arms control challenges facing the region.

13. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Secretary Clinton Press Availability After NPT Conference Remarks,” May 3, 2010, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-engligh/2010/May/20100504083914bpuh0.331814.html.

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Terrence Smith1

The projected expansion of nuclear energy programs worldwide could, even under best-case scenarios, result in a greater potential for nuclear weapons proliferation.2 The intimate connec-tion between civil and military nuclear programs makes it difficult, if not impossible, to guarantee the prevention of weapons development while allowing the spread of nuclear energy programs. The safeguarding capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are inherently limited and insufficient for halting determined proliferators. Therefore, the international commu-nity should consider further action to contain proliferation risks, such as discouraging states from pursuing indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities through the promotion of IAEA-controlled international fuel banks.

Proliferation Prevention Capabilities Are Severely Limited Historically, the international community has had mixed results in detecting and preventing the use of civil energy programs for military purposes.3 A 2008 report from the Strategic Studies Insti-tute concludes that although the IAEA can perform important fuel production monitoring tasks, even now “it cannot actually do so in a manner that can assure timely detection of a possible mili-tary diversion.”4 The IAEA and its inspectors have limited authority and can perform only those functions that member states allow them to do. Moreover, increasingly the IAEA is encumbered by a combination of inadequate resources, a lack of authority, and a shortage of international will

1. Terrence Smith is the program coordinator for the New Defense Approaches Project at CSIS.2. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), approximately 60 countries are con-

sidering pursuing new nuclear energy programs, and up to 25 countries are expected to bring their first nu-clear power plants on line by 2030. This is in addition to the planned extension and expansion of programs already in existence. Yukiya Amano, “Statement to the Sixty-Fifth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 8, 2010. For a list of existing and aspiring nuclear power states, see Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Power without Nuclear Proliferation?” Dædalus 138, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 10.

3. India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa all successfully developed nuclear weapons in the shadow of energy programs. Libya, Syria, and Iraq all were close to development before their programs were discovered and either forcibly stopped or voluntarily given up.

4. Henry D. Sokolski, Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of The Peaceful Atom (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2008), 8, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub841.pdf.

containing the proliferation risks of nuclear energyfrom monitoring to controlling


to fully support its agenda.5 The result is an IAEA that is unable to do all that is necessary to fulfill its mandate. If trends continue, as energy programs grow in size and number, the IAEA’s safe-guarding and monitoring responsibilities will increasingly exceed the agency’s realistic capabilities to perform them. By acquiring enrichment and reprocessing capabilities for energy programs, more countries are becoming, in the words of former IAEA director Mohamed ElBaradei, “virtual nuclear weapon states.”6

Further, even if the IAEA received increased funding, enjoyed expanded authority to inspect nuclear facilities through the wider adoption of the Additional Protocol , and secured a more inviting, cooperative safeguarding culture, the agency would still be limited to an imperfect detec-tion role and ultimately unable to stop diversion.7 The expansion of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants around the globe will only increase the IAEA’s struggles. So, while strengthening the IAEA’s monitoring capabilities would be a useful nonproliferation goal, it is only a small step.

The Difficulties of Restricting the Spread of Fuel Production CapabilitiesThe role of peaceful nuclear programs in combating energy shortages, counterbalancing concerns about greenhouse gas emissions, and in the medical industry has led many to argue that the spread of this technology is, overall, a positive thing. Because of its civil utility and countries’ legal right to pursue it under current interpretations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), strategies seeking to prevent proliferation by denying countries access to nuclear energy and tech-nology are likely to fail. For now, the focus must instead be on discouraging the spread of domestic enrichment capabilities by providing other means of access to nuclear fuel, primarily by promot-ing international fuel banks.

Recent DevelopmentsUntil recently, the fuel bank proposal had lay dormant for more than five decades– its roots going back to the Acheson–Lilienthal Report and the resulting Baruch Plan in 1946. However, the rev-elations about the Khan network, growing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, and the pro-jected expansion of nuclear energy demand have renewed interest in the idea. The plan is already gaining substantial momentum in the governments of Russia, the European Union, the United States, and areas of the Middle East such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.

5. IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards, “Overview,” Vienna, Austria, November 1–5, 2010, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/Symposium/2010/resources/docs/Overview_2010-11-30.pdf.

6. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Addressing Verification Challenges,” IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards, Vienna, Austria, October 16, 2006, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2006/eb-sp2006n018.html.

7. IAEA monitoring capabilities are limited by the difficulties presented by various issues including undeclared facilities and host countries denying visas to inspectors and rejecting information requests from the IAEA. Further, even if the IAEA detects noncompliance, enforcement is left in the hands of the UN Se-curity Council, which is also limited by the complexities of international politics and state sovereignty issues.


At its December 2–3, 2010, meeting, the IAEA’s 35-member governing body finally approved the establishment of a new fuel bank that will be owned and managed by the IAEA.8 The idea was strongly endorsed by President Obama, who promised to provide one-third of the $150 million budget for the project (the U.S.-based Nuclear Threat Initiative will provide another one-third of the funding, and the rest will be supplied by other IAEA members).9 This comes one year after the approval of the world’s first fuel bank in Angarsk, Russia.10 These recent events signal significant progress on a debate that has been stalled for most of the last 50 years.

Benefits of International Nuclear Fuel Banks International fuel banks regulated by the IAEA provide two main benefits: (1) they allow countries secure, stable access to the benefits of nuclear energy in a cost-effective manner, while (2) they aid the nonproliferation regime by discouraging the spread of nuclear fuel production technolo-gy.11 The establishment of fuel banks, and the precedence they would create, could also serve as an important step in a wider internationalization of all aspects of the fuel cycle, further reducing proliferation risks.

First, IAEA-controlled fuel banks could guarantee countries access to nuclear fuel on “a non-discriminatory, non-political basis.”12 Second, as the 2005 IAEA Expert Group report claims, because “uranium enrichment facilities are extremely capital intensive,” there is also a positive economic argument for many countries to buy into the fuel bank plan.13 The “economies of scale” principle suggests that the size of international versus national programs will encourage many countries to opt for fuel banks. Furthermore, housing a fuel bank will bring many benefits for host countries, including large capital investment and job creation.

The development of a fuel bank system would not necessarily bar countries from developing their own fuel production systems. However, its existence would reduce countries’ incentives for doing so by providing them reliable access to the benefits of nuclear energy without requiring them to develop the expensive infrastructure needed for domestic production. The existence of fuel banks, therefore, theoretically “remove[s] the need for countries to develop indigenous fuel cycle capabilities,” or at the very least diminishes the supporting rationale.14

8. Global Security Newswire, “IAEA Board Approves Nuclear Fuel Bank,” National Journal Group, De-cember 6, 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20101206_9591.php.

9. Mary Beth Sheridan, “With Help from Billionaire Warren Buffett, U.N. Sets up Nuclear Fuel ‘Bank,’” Washington Post, December 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120306859.html.

10. Staff Report, “Board of Governors Approves Plan for Nuclear Fuel ‘Bank,’” IAEA, November 27, 2009, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2009/nuclfuelbank.html.

11. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “IAEA Board Agrees to Create International Nuclear Fuel Bank,” press re-lease, December 3, 2010, http://www.nti.org/c_press/release_fuel_bank_120310.pdf.

12. IAEA, “IAEA Seeks Guarantees of Nuclear Fuel,” press release, September 15, 2006, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2006/prn200615.html.

13. IAEA, “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report,” Information Cir-cular 640, February 22, 2005, circulated for discussion among IAEA member states and others, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc640.pdf.

14. Mohamed ElBaradei, quoted in “IAEA Seeks Guarantees of Nuclear Fuel,” IAEA press release, Sep-tember 15, 2006, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2006/prn200615.html.


International facilities with multinational staff would also come with built-in safeguards: An international presence creates a greater degree of visibility, access, and scrutiny that will help protect against diversion by host countries. Multinational staffing could also be designed so as to restrict or fragment knowledge to minimize risk of the dissemination of full fuel-cycle expertise.15 Further, having international facilities would also reduce the number of sites requiring extensive and resource-intensive inspections, which are politically and technically difficult to do sufficiently. The 2005 IAEA report argues that the “strong oversight of technology and staffing, as well as ef-fective safeguards and proper international division of expertise” provided by the fuel bank model

“can reduce the risk of proliferation and even make a unilateral breakout extremely difficult.”16

Remaining IssuesThe IAEA’s approval of the new bank is a significant achievement; however, current plans for the international facilities are limited in their scope and impact, particularly in comparison to the original Acheson–Lilienthal Report, which—arguing that efforts to stop proliferation through in-spections and policing were likely to fail—contended that international control over the fuel cycle was necessary. The voluntary nature of participation, the lack of additional restrictions on national enrichment programs, and the fact that the program does nothing to address the major problem of weapons programs at undeclared facilities are all understandable criticisms and concerns. As Thomas Cochran, a senior scientist in the nuclear program of the Natural Resources Defense Council, puts it: “[Fuel banks] may encourage smaller countries to not engage in enrichment, be-cause they’ll see the bank as a form of security… but it’s not going to solve Iran or other big issues of nuclear proliferation.”17

However, although the creation of international fuel banks may not fully address all prolifera-tion concerns, it does not exacerbate any of them and represents a positive step in many areas.

Finally, criticisms from countries such as Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, and Iran, which claim the plan is an attempt to monopolize the market and will deny them their rights, are unwarrant-ed.18 The IAEA has made it perfectly clear that—for better or worse—the development of fuel banks will not restrict any independent domestic capabilities.19

As the nuclear renaissance steams ahead, the world community must take care that the deli-cate and difficult balance between encouraging peaceful energy programs and preventing weapons proliferation does not get beyond control. The growing number of civil nuclear energy programs

15. George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 91, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolish-ing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf.

16. IAEA, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report (Vienna: IAEA, 2005), edited and published version of earlier IAEA Information Circular (see note 13), http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/mna-2005_web.pdf.

17. William J. Broad, “Buffett Helps Create Nuclear Fuel Bank,” New York Times, December 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/science/04nuke.html.

18. Daniel Horner, “Countries Aim for Fuel Bank Endorsement,” Arms Control Association, November 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_11/FuelBank.

19. Official “restricted fuel bank” document, quoted in George Jahn, “IAEA Board Approves Nuclear Fuel Bank,” Washington Post, December 3, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2010/12/03/AR2010120303988.html.


could all too easily open a Pandora’s box of problems. Acknowledging that potential, U.S. secretary of energy Steven Chu said in the fall of 2010, “The time to act is now.”20

The international community’s approval and funding of the IAEA fuel bank in December 2010 was a solid start. A next step could include using U.S.-led initiatives such as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), now known as the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, and President Obama’s Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) as political and financial platforms for promoting the idea of fuel banks in place of aiding the development of indigenous nuclear programs in places such as the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe.

Importantly, while increased effort and funding from the United States is vital, fuel banks will need broader international support to have a significant impact. Fuel banks warrant support even from countries that are major nuclear energy producers and have no need for using fuel banks themselves—countries like India and China—simply because of the security and proliferation prevention benefits they provide. Regarding the development of international fuel banks, Corey Hinderstein, the vice president for international programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), thus rightfully asks, “What are we waiting for?”21

To this point, the main impediments have been a lack of international will and funding. Those states that oppose fuel banks typically display a preference for indigenous enrichment programs; this is for a variety of reasons, including the prestige, the potential as a security hedge, and the reliability in nuclear fuel supply that an independent control over enrichment capabilities might provide. Global leaders must remind, convince, and reassure these countries that nuclear weapon proliferation is a major international threat and that fuel banks not only provide a safer, politi-cally feasible alternative to the inherently risky spread of domestic capabilities, they also guarantee stability in nuclear energy commerce.

As Anne Lauvergeon argues, the world could use the nuclear renaissance, and fuel banks in particular, as “a unique opportunity to enhance the culture of nonproliferation.”22 Establishing and promoting fuel banks is, therefore, a critical and instrumental step in protecting access to nuclear energy and securing a safer world.

20. Steven Chu, address, International Atomic Energy Agency 54th General Conference, Vienna, Aus-tria, September 20, 2010, http://www.energy.gov/news/9520.htm.

21. Horner, “Countries Aim for Fuel Bank Endorsement.” 22. Anne Lauvergeon, “The Nuclear Renaissance: An Opportunity to Enhance the Culture of Nonprolif-

eration?” Dædalus 138, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 91–99.


June 2011

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Editor Mark Jansson


Volume 1, Issue 1

Nuclear Notes