Nugent family brief seeking prosecutor's recusal

CAUSE NO. 1997-C-103

THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE DISTRICT COURT§

v. § PANOLA COUNTY, TEXAS§

BERNHARDT TIEDE, II § 123RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF PROSECUTOR PRO TEM AND INQUIRY REGARDING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

Crime Victims Rod M. Nugent, Jr., Alexandria L. Nugent, Susan Nugent Jenull,

Shanna Nugent Cobbs, and Mathew Tod Nugent (collectively “Crime Victims”) file this Motion

seeking the appointment of a prosecutor pro tem in order to protect the Crime Victims’ rights,

and requesting that this Court conduct an inquiry regarding ethical conflicts which would result

from the Panola County Criminal District Attorney’s Office participation in the re-sentencing of

the Defendant, Crime Victims would respectfully show the Court as follows:

I. STANDING

Crime Victims have standing to enforce their rights as provided in Section 30 of the

Texas Constitution. Tex. Constitution, Section 30(e). The Texas Constitution specifically

provides “[a] victim or guardian or legal representative of a victim has standing to enforce the

rights enumerated in this section…” Id. Crime Victims additionally have standing pursuant to

the Texas Crime Victims Rights Act, which also extends as a matter of law certain rights to crime

victims. Texas Cr. Code Ann. Section 56.02.

II. FACTUAL SUMMARY

CRIME VICTIMS’ MOTION AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT PAGE 1

Marjorie Nugent’s story has not been told. The only procedure for assessing a fair and

considered sentence for Marjorie Nugent’s killer is for the facts surrounding Marjorie Nugent’s

murder to be fully told.

Defendant Bernie Tiede was engaged in an on-going, long-term scheme to defraud

Marjorie Nugent. Mr. Tiede, an assistant funeral director with no background or training in

financial advisory services, gained the confidence of Marjorie Nugent, an elderly widow, and

convinced Mrs. Nugent to trust him with the control, investment discretion and accounting of

Mrs. Nugent’s substantial estate and the trusts established for the benefit of her grandchildren.

Over the course of several years, Mr. Tiede stole between $3 million and $4 million

from Mrs. Nugent before murdering her. During that same time period, Mrs. Nugent’s son and

grandchildren became increasingly concerned about their mother and grandmother, and her

unusual relationship with Mr. Tiede. The grandchildren requested an accounting of the trusts that

had been established by their grandparents on their behalf. Mr. Tiede, who was managing Mrs.

Nugent’s finances, and who (it was later discovered) had stolen money from these trusts for his

personal use, refused to give the grandchildren such an accounting of the trusts. Eventually, the

grandchildren petitioned a local court for access to the books and records of the grandchildren’s

trusts. Subsequently, Mrs. Nugent agreed to resign as trustee of the grandchildren’s trusts and

the Court appointed the Longview Bank and Trust (currently known as the Texas Bank and Trust,

the “Bank”) to serve as the Trustee for the grandchildren’s trusts. Upon becoming trustee of the

grandchildren’s trusts, the Bank had Mrs. Nugent’s investment accounts closed and the funds in

those accounts transferred to the Bank’s control. This process quickly revealed the unaccounted

for funds that had been diverted by Mr. Tiede. A trust officer with the Bank scheduled a meeting

with Mrs. Nugent and Mr. Tiede, in order to obtain an explanation for the missing funds.


Within hours of the scheduled meeting between Mr. Tiede, Mrs. Nugent and the newly-

appointed trustee from the Bank, Mr. Tiede shot Mrs. Nugent four times in the back. After

cleaning up the murder scene, and concealing Mrs. Nugent’s body, Mr. Tiede attended a rehearsal

of Guys & Dolls, treating the cast and crew to a post-rehearsal pizza dinner (which he paid for

using one of Mrs. Nugent’s credit cards). The next day, Tiede forged and cashed a personal

check to himself on Mrs. Nugent’s personal account for $20,000, an account to which he had

never previously had access. And for the next nine months, while Mr. Tiede concealed the

murder of Mrs. Nugent and lied to Mrs. Nugent’s family, friends and law enforcement, Mr. Tiede

continued to steal an additional $600,000 to $700,000 from Mrs. Nugent’s estate.

This story was never presented at the criminal trial in 1999. The District Attorney did

present evidence of Mr. Tiede’s shooting the elderly widow in the back four times, and he did

present evidence of Mr. Tiede concealing the murder and lying to family and friends about Mrs.

Nugent’s whereabouts for nine months. But when the District Attorney attempted to introduce

the financial evidence in order to establish Mr. Tiede’s motive for the murder, Mr. Tiede’s

lawyers objected, arguing that motive was not an element to the crime. Ex. A, Tr. Vol. 8, pp. 723-

28; Vol;. 10. Pp. 164-167. And because Mr. Tiede never argued that he had experienced a

“dissociative episode” when he murdered Mrs. Nugent, the District Attorney was prevented from

raising this evidence in rebuttal. Id. Indeed, the trial judge specifically warned Mr. Tiede’s

lawyers that he would consider admitting the financial evidence “if this should become relevant

in rebuttal.” Ex. A, Tr. Vol. 8, p. 727.

In the end, Mr. Tiede elected not to present any case in his defense. The State’s theory of

the case, that the “homicide was committed to help conceal the theft,” was never presented. Ex.

A, Vol. 10, p. 165. And the financial evidence that directly establishes that Mr. Tiede murdered


Marjorie Nugent in order to conceal his financial crimes was never admitted into evidence. The

Bank trustee who had identified missing funds never testified. The grandchildren whose trusts

had been pilfered were prevented from mentioning their losses. The law enforcement officers

who had conducted a forensic audit which documented Mr. Tiede’s fraud scheme over the years,

and provided extraordinarily powerful evidence of Mr. Tiede’s state of mind on the day of the

murder, never took the witness stand.

Fifteen years later, Mr. Tiede raised his “newly-discovered” evidence in the habeas

proceeding. However, the evidence of Mr. Tiede’s fraud scheme and his motive to conceal that

theft scheme directly contradicts this “newly-discovered” evidence regarding dissociative

episodes. Mr. Tiede successfully excluded the financial evidence from the trial, and he was able

to exclude this financial evidence for the very reason that he never raised any suggestion of a

dissociative episode. Now that Mr. Tiede has indicated that he will introduce his expert’s

theories regarding his motive, justice requires any fact finder to consider this evidence of the

financial crimes that directly rebut these theories. If Mr. Tiede wants to present new evidence of

his motive, then Marjorie Nugent’s family respectfully asks that Marjorie Nugent’s entire story

be told. If Mr. Tiede wants to present new evidence of his motive, then this Court should also

consider the overwhelming evidence that Mr. Tiede shot Mrs. Nugent in the back four times in

order to conceal his financial crimes.

III. MOTION TO PROTECT CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS BY APPOINTMENT OF A PROSECUTOR PRO TEM

Crime Victims respectfully move this Court to find that the Crime Victims are entitled to

the rights guaranteed under the Texas Constitution and the Texas Crime Victims Rights Act, and

that the only procedure for ensuring the Crime Victims are extended those rights is the


appointment of a prosecutor pro tem. Given the unusual circumstance surrounding this case, the

Panola County Criminal District Attorney’s Office (the “District Attorney”) should recuse itself

in order to protect the rights of the Crime Victims and the integrity of the District Attorney’s

Office.

A. Crime Victims are Entitled to Certain Rights Provided by the Texas Constitution.

The Texas Constitution clearly provides that the victims of violent crimes have the right

to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victims’ dignity. Tex. Constitution, Section

30(a)(1). Specifically, the victims have the right to confer with the prosecutor. Tex.

Constitution, Section 30(b)(3). Victims have the right to notification of court proceedings and to

be present at all public court proceedings. Tex. Constitution, Sections 30(b)(1) and (2). Victims

are entitled to notice of trial settings, sentencings, and appellate proceedings. Id.

This Court specifically recognized that the Crime Victims had these rights, when the

Court inquired at the May 2014 hearing whether the District Attorney had provided such notice.

See Exhibit B, Hearing Tr., May 6, 2014, p. 10. At that time, the District Attorney represented to

the Court that he had conferred with the Crime Victims. Id.

B. The District Attorney’s Office Has Failed to Notify the Crime Victims’ as Required by Law.

Notwithstanding the Court’s inquiry on May 6, 2014 regarding the victim’s notification

rights, and the District Attorney’s representation to the Court that he had made such notification,

the District Attorney has not notified the victims regarding any of the court proceedings since the

Defendant filed his habeas petition. See Exhibit C, Affidavit of Roderick M. Nugent, Jr.

Subsequently, the District Attorney failed to notify the Crime Victims of several, subsequent


hearings, including the hearing before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the hearing

scheduled for March 3, 2015, or the hearing now scheduled for March 31, 2015.

C. The District Attorney’s Office Has Failed to Show Respect for the Dignity of the Victims.

Certainly a district attorney must evaluate the credibility of every witness, including

those witnesses who are victims of violent crimes. However, as a representative of the State, a

district attorney must exercise a modicum of discretion when discussing the victims of violent

crimes. Aside from the professionalism and respect that is expected from public officers

representing the State, the Texas Constitution requires a prosecutor to treat victims with dignity

and privacy throughout the criminal justice process. Tex. Constitution, Section 30(a)(1).

In this case, the District Attorney has gratuitously and repeatedly insulted the Crime

Victims. In a series of self-promoting speeches, the District Attorney has reinforced the

Hollywood version of the storyline surrounding the murder of Marjorie Nugent. The District

Attorney has flippantly portrayed the deceased victim as anti-social and universally despised,

and her family members, who also were victimized by the crime, as uncaring and motivated by

greed. See Ex. D (press reports of Mr. Davidson’s speeches after the release of the movie,

Bernie).

The District Attorney’s comments are inappropriate at multiple levels. The comments are

offensive to an innocent widow who was murdered and to her children and grandchildren. The

District Attorney’s comments violate the constitutional duty to treat these victims with dignity.

But perhaps worst of all, the comments directly contradict the evidence that the District Attorney

introduced at the Defendant’s murder trial. Although not captured by the movie script, numerous

trial witnesses presented by the District Attorney testified that Marjorie Nugent was very

friendly, gracious and very honest. At trial, the District Attorney introduced evidence that Mrs.


Nugent’s son and granddaughter were searching for the deceased (after being lied to by the

Defendant), discovered the deep freezer bounded by duct tape, and reported the evidence of the

crime to the police.

However, in stark contrast to the evidence presented at trial, after the release of the

Hollywood movie version of this case, the District Attorney gave several publicity interviews

and speeches, demeaning Mrs. Nugent as friendless and temperamental. The District Attorney

misstated that the family was unconcerned about Mrs. Nugent’s welfare and made no attempts to

contact Mrs. Nugent for more than nine months. Id. One reporter wrote that the District

Attorney “said with a shrug, ‘Her family was not looking for her, but they got real mad when

they found out he’d spent a bunch of her money after her death.’” Id.

The District Attorney’s change of heart has been publicly documented. In March 2012,

before attending various receptions, screenings and fundraisers with celebrities, Mr. Davidson

told reporters, “This movie is not historically accurate . . . The movie does not tell [Mrs.

Nugent’s] side of the story.” Ex. E. In 2013 and early 2014, Mr. Davidson attended multiple

events with the celebrity director and actors associated with the movie. See Ex. F (pictures and

articles regarding Mr. Davidson’s attendance at screenings, fund raisers, and other galas). By

April 2014, Mr. Davidson completely reversed his critical evaluation, stating “For the most part,

‘Bernie’ . . . was accurate in its portrayal of the case.” Ex. G. During the trial and up until 2012,

Mr. Davidson emphasized that the Defendant killed Mrs. Nugent in order to conceal his financial

crimes and repeatedly lied to minimize his culpability. In his 2014 interviews and in his affidavit

submitted in support of the Defendant, Mr. Davidson makes no reference whatsoever to the

financial evidence, no reference to Mr. Tiede’s self-serving, false statements to law enforcement,

no suggestion of “Mrs. Nugent’s side of the story.”


These inaccurate and insensitive comments from a law enforcement officer are not only

offensive; these comments violate the rights of the Crime Victims.

D. During the Crime Victims Attempts to Confer with the District Attorney, the District Attorney Has Agreed to Recuse Himself and His Office from these Proceedings.

Counsel for the Crime Victims has attempted to confer with the District Attorney to

convey the Crime Victims’ evidence and opinions. During these conversations, the District

Attorney repeatedly indicated that he had decided to withdraw from this case based on potential

conflicts presented by ethical rules (see Motion for Inquiry, below). See Ex. H, Affidavit of

Johnny Merritt, Counsel for Rod M. Nugent, Jr.

As a result, the Crime Victims have not conferred with the District Attorney regarding the

merits of the case or the State’s positions. Nor have the Crime Victims received an opportunity

to exercise their rights to discuss their beliefs and opinions with the prosecutor for the State.

Specifically, the Crime Victims have not conferred with the District Attorney regarding the

financial evidence that supports the theory of premeditation.

The Crime Victims file this Motion in an abundance of caution and to ensure their

constitutional and statutory rights are protected. If the District Attorney recuses himself, as he

represented he would, the Crime Victims specifically request that the newly appointed prosecutor

be directed to enforce these rights. The Crime Victims have thoughtfully considered remedies

other than recusal, but no other procedures reasonably appear to protect their dignity or ensure

consideration of their positions. If the District Attorney reverses his stated position and fails to

voluntarily recuse himself, the Crime Victims respectfully move the Court to order such a

recusal.

E. This Court Should Appoint a Prosecutor Pro Tem in order to Protect the Crime Victims’ Rights.


The Crime Victims’ rights to confer with the prosecutor will only be meaningful when the

prosecutor fully and fairly considers the Crime Victims’ factual evidence and personal opinions

before forming a final evaluation. In this case, the District Attorney has expressed his final

evaluation about an appropriate sentence, even though he has not conferred with the Crime

Victims. If the District Attorney were to confer with the Crime Victims at this time, there is no

guarantee the Crime Victims’ input would be considered. The only way for the Crime Victim’s

constitutional rights to be protected is to appoint an independent prosecutor who has no

preconceived conclusions, and who could incorporate the Crime Victims statements into his or

her evaluation.

Accordingly, this Court should appoint a prosecutor pro tem.

IV. MOTION FOR INQUIRY REGARDING ETHICAL RULES

This Court should inquire whether the District Attorney has actual or potential conflicts

of interest or other violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules which would compel the

withdrawal of the District Attorney from representation of the State in this case.

A. Conflicts of Interest Prevent the District Attorney from Representing the State.

1. Rule 3.08: A Lawyer Cannot Serve as Both the Prosecutor and a Witness in the Same Criminal Prosecution.

a. Ethical Rules Prohibit Lawyers From Continuing a Representation of a Client if the Lawyer Will Likely be Testifying to Essential Facts in Cases.

A lawyer cannot serve in the dual roles as a party’s advocate and as a fact witness in the

same proceeding. The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibit an

individual serving as an advocate for a party and as a testifying witness in the same proceeding.

Tx. Disc. R. Prof. Conduct 3.08; see also Gonzalez v. State, 117 S.W.3d 831, 841 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003).


Multiple Texas Ethics Opinions specifically recommend that an elected district attorney

decline to represent the State and seek appointment of a prosecutor pro tem if the district attorney

is also a witness in the case. Tex. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 399, V. 44 Tex. B.J. 201

(1981); Tex. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 454, V. 51 Tex. B.J. 1060 (1988).

b. The District Attorney Will Likely Be Called as a Witness at a Contested Sentencing Hearing.

In this case, the District Attorney is likely to be a witness in an adversarial sentencing

hearing. Specifically, the District Attorney could be called as a testifying witness either (1)

because of his previous testimony in the habeas corpus proceeding, (2) because of his public

comments on the credibility of other fact witnesses, or (3) because he would be called as a

witness by the defense. If the District Attorney were to be called as a witness in the sentencing

hearing at which he was also representing the State, a clear violation of Rule 3.08 would occur.

First, the District Attorney could be called to testify regarding his testimony as a fact

witness in the habeas proceeding. See Exhibit I, Affidavit of Criminal District Attorney Danny

Buck Davidson. Specifically, the District Attorney filed an affidavit testifying to his view of a

proper disposition of this case -- a controversial position, an issue to which only this witness

could establish, a position that was previously contested by the State, a position for which the

District Attorney has personally stated to the Texas Attorney General’s Office that he possesses

evidence that rebuts or refutes, and ultimately, a position that should be decided by a jury. See

Ex. J (Letter to Attorney General in response to Public Information Act request). The District

Attorney also specifically comments on the weight of certain evidence and the veracity of the

Defendant’s statements regarding the motive for the murder. See Exhibit I, Affidavit of District

Attorney (“I now believe child abuse ultimately led Mr. Tiede to kill Mrs. Nugent along with

other factors.”) Going forward, the fact finder at the resentencing will have to determine the


Defendant’s motive and the proper disposition of this case, the exact issues that the District

Attorney addressed in his affidavit. If the State presented any evidence or argument that the fact

finder should consider any other motive or disposition than those expressed in the District

Attorney’s affidavit, then the District Attorney could be called to refute that position.

While the District Attorney is obligated to follow the Texas Disciplinary Rule 3.09, which

requires him to seek justice, the District Attorney must follow all of the ethical rules, and cannot

violate other ethical rules in the course of fulfilling such obligations to pursue justice. See

Landers v. Texas, 229 S.W.3d 532, 533 (Texarkana – 2007), affirmed Landers v. State, 256

S.W.3d 295, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (district attorney may not violate the ethical rules

regarding former representations, even if the district attorney is upholding ethical rules requiring

pursuit of justice).

Indeed, we recognize that there are situations in which a district attorney can be placed in

a difficult position, in which the prosecutor cannot fulfill all of these Rules at the same time. In

situations such as this one, the proper course is for the District Attorney to protect the integrity of

his Office and ask the Court to appoint an independent prosecutor. Tex. Comm. on Professional

Ethics, Op. 454; Ex Parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1979).

Second, and independent of the habeas testimony, the District Attorney could be called as

a witness to testify regarding his public statements about the credibility and character of several

witnesses and victims. In the wake of the publicity and interest created by the high-profile

Hollywood movie loosely-based on events in this case, the District Attorney has commented

publicly (and inaccurately) regarding the character and actions of Marjorie Nugent and the Crime

Victims. Specifically, the District Attorney has commented on the character of the deceased,

referring to the deceased victim as “mean-spirited” and “not very nice.” See Exhibit D.


(Henderson Daily News article) and (Athens Daily article). Setting aside the appropriateness of

a public servant insulting a murder victim, the District Attorney has publicly commented on the

culpability of the victim and bolstered the opposing party’s affirmative defense. Indeed, this was

a central issue in the trial and at the original sentencing, when the State introduced evidence

establishing that Marjorie Nugent was a sympathetic victim. See e.g., Testimony of Penny

Beason, Vol. 7, pp. 670-72 (describing the deceased as “very friendly,” “very nice,” “a good

friend.”)

Additionally, the District Attorney has publicly commented on the conduct and credibility

of the family members. The District Attorney stated that the family members did not make any

attempts to contact their mother and grandmother for nine months after the murder. See Ex. D

(Henderson Daily News article). The District Attorney has also suggested the Crime Victims

lacked compassion and were motivated by money. The District Attorney’s comments are not

only inappropriate, but also are directly contrary to trial testimony of the witnesses. See Exhibit

K Tr. Vol. __, pp. __ (testimony of Alexandria Nugent, formerly known as Jennifer Nugent).

These issues – issues on which the District Attorney has expressed personal opinions –

are essential issues for the fact finder to evaluate at the sentencing. The Defendant will attempt

to establish that his actions were the result of “sudden passion” disassociation caused in part by a

“mean-spirited” victim. The State has substantial evidence to the contrary, and could present this

evidence to rebut this sudden passion defense. But the District Attorney, who knew the victim

personally and has publicly stated that she was “mean-spirited,” cannot credibly advocate for the

State and for the deceased in a fair light without being subject to cross-examination about his

own statements.


Because the District Attorney has provided previous testimony in the habeas proceeding,

and because the District Attorney has publicly commented on the credibility and conduct of the

State’s witnesses and victims, it is proper for a prosecutor pro tem to represent the State in any

future proceedings in this case.

2. Rule 1.06: A Lawyer Cannot Continue a Representation When the Representation Reasonably Appears to Be Limited by the Lawyer’s Own Interests.

Texas Disciplinary Rules require a lawyer to withdraw from a representation if it

reasonably appears that the lawyer’s own interests are limiting his representation of his client.

Tex. Disc. R. Prof. Conduct, 1.06(b)(2) and n. 1, 4. When a lawyer’s own interests or

responsibilities become impaired in a manner that the lawyer is unable to consider, recommend,

or carry out an appropriate course of action for one’s client, the lawyer must withdraw from the

representation. Id.

The Crime Victims respectfully request this Court to inquire whether the District

Attorney has a personal interest in perpetuating the fictional version of the murder of Marjorie

Nugent as portrayed in the movie, “Bernie.” This request is based upon (i) the documented

benefits that the District Attorney has received from his association with the movie, (ii) the

documented changes in the District Attorney’s positions since the District Attorney’s

participation in the publicity events associated with the movie, and (iii) the District Attorney’s

refusal to clarify whether he has received any personal or financial benefits in exchange for his

association with and support of the movie.

These circumstances, taken together, create a reasonable appearance that the District

Attorney lacks independence and may not be considering appropriate courses of action. For

example, before the release of the movie, the District Attorney argued forcefully at trial that the


murder was motivated by greed. The District Attorney repeatedly attempted to introduce

financial records which indicated that the Defendant killed Marjorie Nugent as part of an attempt

to conceal a massive fraud and embezzlement scheme. Most of this evidence was excluded by

the Court, in part because the Defendant never raised a defense that his motive involved sudden

passion.

But after the release of the movie (which does not include the massive embezzlement

scheme in the storyline), and during the District Attorney’s participation in various promotional

galas, the District Attorney reversed his position. The District Attorney abandoned the stance

that the Defendant was motivated by greed and murdered Marjorie Nugent to conceal his

scheme. Indeed, the State’s expert psychiatric witness apparently changed his opinions -- that

the crime involved sudden passion, not greed -- without any consideration of the financial

records, or other evidence of the fraud and massive embezzlement scheme. See Ex. L, Affidavit

of Dr. Griphon (listing the documents he considered, omitting any reference to the financial

information or the confession). Similarly, the District Attorney limited his consideration of the

evidence that the Defendant killed Marjorie Nugent hours before she was scheduled to meet with

bankers and trust officers who would almost certainly have discovered the Defendant’s scheme.

Ex. H. (District Attorney failed to review any financial records prior to filing his affidavit in the

habeas proceeding)

This powerful evidence of motive and premeditation is not tainted or undermined by the

Defendant’s new claim of childhood abuse. And this is an important point for the Court’s

consideration: the evidence which establishes premeditation is independent of the evidence of

the Defendant’s prior abuse. Yet the District Attorney has eliminated any consideration of this

evidence of pre-meditation. Even if a fact-finder accepts the Defendant’s statements that he was


abused as a child, the fact-finder still must consider that the Defendant had committed a multi-

million dollar theft scheme, and was within hours of being discovered. The District Attorney did

not present this evidence to Dr. Griphon. See Ex. L. The District Attorney’s failure to consider

this evidence of premeditation creates an appearance of impropriety.

The District Attorney’s lack of transparency only heightens these concerns. The Crime

Victims submitted public information requests, asking the District Attorney to identify any

remuneration or gifts received for his participation in making or promoting the movie. But the

District Attorney objected to listing the benefits he has received. See Ex M. Even though it is

common practice for movie producers to negotiate releases with individuals who are portrayed in

commercially-marketed movies, the District Attorney represented that he has no correspondence

whatsoever with the producers, directors, distributors or anyone associated with the “Bernie”

movie. See Id., p. 1. If the District Attorney has entered any contract with people associated

with the movie, then the District Attorney may well be limited from considering evidence or

presenting facts that are inconsistent with the movie’s story line.

Relatedly, the District Attorney has received valuable trips and entertainment from people

legally and financially associated with the Defendant. The District Attorney has appeared

publicly at fundraiser events as well as movie gala events with the Defendant’s colleagues and

supporters. However, the District Attorney claims to have no correspondence regarding his

participation in these fundraisers and galas, and has declined the Crime Victim’s request to create

a list of the benefits he has received.

In order to protect the integrity of the judicial process and avoid the appearance of

impropriety, the Court should inquire about any agreements the District Attorney has made

regarding his role in the prosecution of this case, the scope and value of benefits that the District


Attorney has received, and affirmatively establish that the District Attorney does not have

personal interests or responsibilities that may cause him to “not be able to consider, recommend

or carry out an appropriate course of action” for the State. Tx. Disc. R. Prof. Conduct, 1.06, n.4.

CONCLUSION

The Crime Victims respectfully move this Court to protect the rights guaranteed by the

Texas Constitution by disqualifying the District Attorney or by other effective procedures. The

Crime Victims additionally request this Court to inquire regarding the potential conflicts of

interest that may limit the District Attorney’s ability to represent the State of Texas in this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

Arnold A. SpencerState Bar No. [email protected], GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD L.L.P.

1700 Pacific AvenueSuite 4100Dallas, Texas 75201Office (214) 969-2800Fax (214) 969-4343

Attorney for Crime Victims

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion has been served via

certified mail, return receipt requested upon all attorneys of record including the Panola County

Criminal District Attorney’s Office on this _____th day of March, 2015.

Arnold A. Spencer


Documents

Nugent family brief seeking prosecutor's recusal