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Paper Presented at the ISA – FLASCO Conference “Global and Regional Powers in a Changing World” University of Buenos Aires, School of Economics, Buenos Aires, Argentina July 23rd-25th

Annita Montoute1

The BRICS Quest for Global Justice in a Neo liberal World 2

Abstract

During the Cold War, developing countries challenged the developed world and called for a

New International Economic Order (NIEO), characterized by justice and equity. This call was

informed by political ideology with strong sentiments of South - South solidarity. In the post-

Cold War context, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) are calling for a

restructuring of the global economic order. This current dispensation, having neoliberal

underpinnings, places this call in a different context, with the BRICS having strategic economic

interests and arguably a desire to benefit from the existing system. This paper seeks to (a)

outline the elements of the new global economic order that the BRICS are calling for (b)

evaluate the rhetoric and policies versus the behaviour of the emerging economies for a just

global economic order (c) using constructivist lens, explore the role of research in the BRICS’

1 Annita Montoute is Lecturer, at Institute of International Relations, the University of the West Indies, St

Augustine Campus, and Trinidad and Tobago. Email: annita.montoute@sta.uwi.edu 2 This paper is a preliminary draft version, comments are welcome.

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project for a new International economic order; and (d) assess the extent to which the BRICS

may be perpetuating change and/or continuity in the global economic order;

Introduction

Broadly, this paper is about economic orders and how they are changed. The specific focus is

this current neo liberal order, the call by the emerging (BRICS) economies for a new

international economic order and their ability to foster a fundamental shift in the current order.

During the Cold War, developing countries challenged the developed world and called for a

New International Economic Order (NIEO), characterized by justice and equity. This call was

informed by political ideology with strong sentiments of South - South solidarity. In the post-

Cold War context, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) are calling for a

restructuring of the global economic order but this current dispensation, having neoliberal

underpinnings places this call in a different context, with the BRICS having strategic economic

interests and arguably a desire to benefit from the existing system (See Laryea, 2014; Senona,

2010). Specifically, we outline the elements of the new international economic order that the

BRICS are calling for; evaluate the rhetoric and policies versus the behaviour of the BRICS in

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their call for a new global economic order; use constructivist lens, taking into account the role

of ideas emanating from “epistemic communities”, to explore the degree to which the BRICS

are able to realistically create a new international economic order; and assess the degree to

which the BRICS may be perpetuating change and/or continuity in the global economic order.

Background

Evolution of the International Economic Order

As H.W Singer noted, “If there is to be a new order, then presumably it must be contrasted with

an old order...” (Singer, 1978: 539). The 19th century liberal economic order was centred on

the five pillars of free trade, laissez faire, the gold standard and free mobility of capital, free

labor mobility, and international property rights. This system began to disintegrate in the

interwar years: the US Smoot-Hawley tariff by the United States brought an end to free trade;

the banning U.S. banks loans to foreign governments, and the collapse of the gold standard

giving way to different types of interventions in the payments regime, brought an end to free

capital mobility; and free labor mobility was curtailed with the rise of the welfare state (Lal,

2005:503- 504).

The United States sought to create a new liberal economic order in the aftermath of the Second

World War as a means of reversing their isolationist posture in the interwar years, which had

been a key factor in causing global economic upheaval and the destruction of the first British

constructed liberal order of the 19th century (ibid:503). After the War, at Bretton Woods, the

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United States sought to recreate three of the pillars of the 19th century liberal economic order:

free trade, the gold standard, and free capital mobility. However, there was a fundamental

difference between the US and that of the 19th Century British model. While with the latter,

the pillars were manifested through treaties and imperialist practices, with the United States,

the pillars were given life through the creation of transnational institutions in 1945: the World

Bank (the International Bank for Reconstruction), the International Monetary Fund and the

GATT in 1948, which was later incorporated into the World Trade Organisation several decades

later (ibid: 504).

This post war economic order was based on the vision of John Maynard Keynes, who envisaged

that the system was to have core pillars: finance, development and trade - with corresponding

institutions - a World Central Bank, a World Development Agency and an International Trade

Organisation. The two former materialised in the form of the International Monetary Fund and

the World Bank for Reconstruction (The World Bank).The International Trade Organisation did

not come to fruition because the US Congress did not ratify the treaty which would have

established the organisation (Singer, 1978: 541). Consequently, international trade came to be

governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) until the formation of the

World Trade Organisation in 1995.

The Bretton Woods system remained intact for 25 years - from I946 to 1971 - gradually

crumbling from a series of events – the OPEC oil embargo and high oil prices in late I973; the

end of “free convertibility of the U.S. dollar as the world's main reserve currency into gold at a

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fixed low price…”(Singer, 1978: 541); the I972 world food crisis which increased the price of

food – all caused declining confidence in the US Dollar “as the main reserve currency, and an

un-willingness to hold dollars because of the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit.” (ibid). Singer

(1978) suggests that it was not the old economic order per say that led to the call for a new

international economic order but the “disorder” that was created as a result of the breakdown

of the existing system - recession, slow growth, increasing unemployment and high inflation in

developed countries; slow growth in developing countries including oil producing OPEC

countries (See also Gardner and Vambery 1975; Corea, 1977; Hirch, 1976). Additionally, there

was also a call for addressing inequities and inequalities between developed and developed

countries, in terms of wealth, military, financial and economic, technological, industrial,

commercial, food and corporate power and dominance of international organisations, all in

favour of developed countries (Singer, 1978: 542).

The Current (dis)order

The existing international economic order is an ‘ad hoc arrangement’ consisting of fragmented

elements that were created in a very piecemeal manner over a period of time rather than being

created from a grand systematic plan. The monetary aspect is an improvisation of the Bretton

Woods system “still based on the US dollar, and centered around the IMF…” ; The trade aspect,

still includes the GATT, and the system has been expanded in terms of scope and its law, but its

orientation and decision making procedures remain the same; that is, it is based on: “liberal

trade access,… non-discrimination in treatment and…exchange of concessions among and

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between members through sovereign state action with equal treatment regardless of trading

capacity.” (Sakbani, 2005: 11). A key change to the GATT framework is the equal treatment

that is meted out to all members under the same rules, regardless of their level of development

– except for varying lengths of transition periods for liberalization. The World Bank – “an

important source of development funds for poor countries and an instrument for bringing their

policies under the scrutiny of the dominant members” - only addresses some aspects of the

financial system; other aspects are handled by profit seeking private agents who have no

agreed code of conduct or rules to follow at the risk of system sanctions.” (ibid). Following

from Singer’s argument, the 2008 financial crisis, brought instability to this system that led to a

coordinated call from the BRICS for a new international economic order.

We argue that the BRICS rhetoric and good will are not sufficient to bring change to the current

global economic order; neither are their words sufficient to establish whether they are

promoting change in the system. We need to not only examine their policy statements and

proposals but to examine the behaviour of the BRICS as well – their concrete actions. But, still

we must push beyond concrete action to assess whether the possibility of change exists – we

need to also examine factors that could either constrain or aid the BRICS in bringing change to

the existing order. In sum, we argue that it is concrete action, backed by the emergence of an

alternative paradigm, engendered by a consensus around a new set of ideas that will shift the

international economic order. For this, we use, broadly, constructivist lens and within it, the

role of ‘expert’ consensus around ideas, in driving political processes and the call of the BRICS

for a new international economic order.

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Constructivism and the role of Epistemic Communities

Constructivism in international relations is founded on sociological theories that attempted to

explain human behavior – for example, the work of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim whose

work is founded on the view that facts are not neutral and do not exist outside of the meaning

people attribute to them – “social facts” (cited in Ruggie, 1998: 857). Thus a core concept “of

constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the

basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.” (Wendt, 1992: 396 – 397; see also

Guzzini, 2000). “Social constructivism (thus) rests on an irreducibly intersubjective dimension of

human action…(and) constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international

life.” (Ruggie, 1998: 857) “(I)t is a theory about the construction of social reality (Guzzini, 2000:

160).

Constructivists claim that what distinguishes them from other related schools of thought is, the

former is not merely analytical frameworks for supporting “instrumental accounts but in certain

circumstances they lead states to redefine their interests or even their sense of self.” (cited in

Ruggie, 1998: 868). It is with this aspect of constructivism that this paper is concerned, ie.,

whether there are ideas providing the BRICS with a framework for a new International

economic order to influence and change other states’ interests in the same direction.

Constructivism is well suited for this kind of exploration because “the possibility of change is

basic to the constructivist understanding of the international system,” (Guzzini, 2000: 155).

There are countless illustrations of international phenomena being vulnerable to shifts, the end

of the Cold War being a notable example of the power of human action (ideas) in shifting the

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state of global relations (ibid). Another aspect of constructivism that we find relevant in this

paper is that is not “a form of pure voluntarism”, in other words, the concept of ideas and

beliefs does not suggest that change occurs through individual wishful thinking, but rather,

through norms, and rules and it is inter subjective (ibid: 155; Ruggie, 1998: 869). These inter

subjective beliefs become frameworks, containing a collective understanding (collective

intentionality), for what is needed to drive change in the system (Ruggie, 1998: 870).

One channel constructivist research has explored, in which norms and values are perpetuated,

is through “epistemic communities” or “transnational networks of knowledge – based experts,”

which have been found to cause or resolve policy challenges in various areas (Ruggie, 1998:

686). Kuhn argued that, ‘Any study of paradigm directed or paradigm shattering research must

begin by locating the responsible group or groups.’ (cited in Guzzini, 2000: 158). Epistemic

communities (economists) have played a key role in generating consensus around ideas

(research) which brought shifts in the global political economy. Consensus around ideas was

responsible for Keynesianism becoming the dominant thinking in developed country

democracies in the aftermath of World War II; and related ideas influenced the `embedded

liberalism' which characterised the international order up to the 1980s. The neo liberal

paradigm and related Washington Consensus also came about as a result of consensus around

of a set of ideas (cited in Farrell and Quiggin 2012: 1-2).

There are many approaches relating to the role that ideas play in creating consensus and by

extension change. One school of thought contends that though experts will not have a major

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impact on politicians objectives, the former are valuable for informing the tools that politicians

use to carry out their objectives. In this regard, “expert opinion is invaluable … because it is

disinterested and a-political.” (Farrell and Quiggin 2012:5). The second school of thought sees

the role of experts as being more political and less technical. It is believed that economic

experts play a political role in shaping the direction of economic orders. “Although their

recommendations may be sugar-coated with a technocratic glaze, they will have far reaching

political consequences, by defining the crisis, and by setting out proposals for how to solve it.”

(ibid).

Farrell and Quiggin (2012) go beyond these approaches by not only identifying the source of

consensus creation but also providing a framework for understanding the conditions under

which economic experts either “consensus or dissensus and ….under which their ideas have

political influence.” We find it worthy to quote them at length:

When all or nearly all individuals across the relevant network of experts have been infected by a given idea of set of ideas, such that they either favor these ideas or do not publicly oppose them, we may say that apparent consensus has been reached. When the network is not saturated by a given idea or set of ideas, but instead is characterized by warring contagions which have captured different parts of the network, we may say that there is dissensus rather than apparent consensus… Whether there is expert consensus or expert dissensus will have important consequences for the power of economic ideas. Where there is an apparent ideational consensus among the relevant expert community, it will be far more costly to take actions inconsistent with that consensus, and easier to take actions that are consistent with it. Because social authority is vested in economic experts, actions that run against these experts' consensual ideas will be treated as less legitimate, and will be more likely to arouse opposition. Hence, expert ideas will be most likely to shape political outcomes when they are backed by an apparent consensus. (Farrell and Quiggin (2012: 7, 10).

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Is the BRICS new International economic backed by consensus around a set of ideas about a

new international order? But first, how do we understand the BRICS call for a new international

economic order; are the really acting to bring a change in the existing order? And how

successful could they possibly be?

A New International Economic Order?

“We underline our support for a more democratic and just multi-polar world order based on

the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and

collective decision-making of all States” “…(T)he development of humanity and…a more

equitable and fair world.” (Joint Statement of the BRIC countries leaders, Yekaterinburg, Russia,

2009).

The above statement issued at first BRIC summit in 2009, outlines broadly, the BRIC/S

conceptualization of a new international economic order. This and subsequent statements bear

some resemblance to the New International Economic Order (NIEO) that developing countries

called for from the 1960s , based on:

equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all states, irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, mak(ing) it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensur(ing) steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations. (UN General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI)).

This call was situated in the Cold War context which had particular ideological underpinnings; in

this current context, the BRICS call is quite different. We outline below, more concretely, the

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elements of a new international economic order that BRICS countries have articulated, as a

group, through the various BRIC/S summits.

First, greater representativeness and voice in global governance institutions. This means a

greater and more meaningful role for developing and emerging economies in international

financial institutions (IFIs) (Joint Statement of the BRIC countries leaders, Yekaterinburg, Russia,

2009). This would be made possible by giving emerging economies and developing countries

greater voting power to reflect their increased weight in the world economy (Second BRIC

Summit, Joint Statement, Brasilia, 2010). A related prerequisite to greater representativeness is

the need to have greater transparency in the selection of the leadership and senior

management of international financial institutions and appointments of all staff to be based on

merit (Joint Statement of the BRIC countries leaders, Yekaterinburg, Russia, 2009).

Second, decision - making and implementation in international financial institutions should be

conducted in a democratic and transparent manner (ibid). The general staff must also be more

representative of the diverse membership of IFIS (Second BRIC Summit, Joint Statement, 2010,

Brasilia).

Third, a trading system characterized by openness, stability, equity and non – discrimination;

protectionism and disguised restrictions on trade have no part in such a system.

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Fourth, the policy space of developing countries should be ‘guaranteed’ to allow them to

pursue sustainable development models and paths (ibid).

Fifth, a just international monetary system to meet the needs of all countries and for the

development of emerging and developing economies (ibid).

We argue that the BRICS call for a new International economic order will be challenging

because it is not embedded in or supported by a consensus around ideas, particularly in

powerful circles, that provides a real alternative to the existing order. In fact, in the wake of the

financial crisis, although there was a plethora of writings, there was little or no consensus on

the cause and solutions to it. Lo (2012), in a review of twenty one books on the financial crisis

found, “no single narrative (and)…contradictory…interpretations…underscore(ing) the

desperate need for the economics profession to establish a single set of facts from which more

accurate inferences and narratives can be constructed.”

While some analyses of the 2008 crisis outlined the flaws in the system, for the most part they

did not critique the neo liberal paradigm itself as a credible model and consequently did not

advance an alternative. The reasons for the crisis were largely seen as arising from the flaws of

the global financial system, but did not attribute the crisis to the failure of the broader

economic model. For example, some said the crisis resulted from “uncontrolled financial

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deregulation” (Lin and Treichel, 2012:72), an indication that there was need for better

monitoring and supervision of financial instruments3 (Reyes, 2013; Lin and Treichel, 2012:72).

Others concluded that there was a need for a rethinking of the international financial

architecture and how it works (Colander et al 2009; Taylor 2009). Others related the crisis to

the failure of economists because they were being able to predict the crisis and blamed it on

the lack of transparency in the economic modelling (Colander et al 2009).

Fewer blamed the crisis on the failure of the neo liberal model in general, which had become

dominant as a result of economic theorizing in which markets were given free rein. Stiglitz

(2008) for example, posited that the crisis resulted from the “failures in the financial system, to

a large extent they were doing what actors in a market system are supposed to do: pursue their

own self-interest.” Further, he stated:

Dogmas and doctrines holding that markets worked well and that they were self-correcting once again came to predominate…These ideas helped shaped the intellectual milieu which gave rise to the flawed policies that, in turn, gave rise to the crisis, and to some extent, they are shaping policies today as we attempt to respond to the crisis (Stiglitz, 2009:293).

Despite the divergent views on the crisis, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, it was widely

felt that some kind of change would take place and some thought that the crisis had challenged

the status quo and highlighted the failure of the neo-liberal model. This view came about as a

result of the use of “Keynesian policy ideas and instruments.”

3 In a panel discussion in which David Dollar was a participant, there was consensus that “the drastically

overweight global financial sector… grew because of too little regulation and transparency, too much dependence on ever-increasing consumption to drive the American economy, and too much dependence by China on its exports to meet that demand. There was also agreement on the need to re-balance the global economy with the goal of regaining stability and promoting sustainable growth.” (Leung Larson, 2010: 2) Although there was consensus among panelists that there was need for a paradigm shift, the solution proposed above indicates that it was not for an alternative or new paradigm.

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However, this political window in which Keynesianism regained some legitimacy, and

the balance between states and markets seemed to shift, was short-lived… as the locus

of the crisis…was shifted from the problems of financialised capitalism to the fiscal

problems of (some) welfare states…rival ideas from Keynesianism to the more recent

social investment perspective appear to have failed to win the battle of ideas and gain

political support. (Dukelow, 2012:1).

Next, we challenge the BRICS call for a new international order and ask, they perpetuating

change or reinforcing the existing system? In response to the Sixth BRICS Brazil Summit, one

commentary read:

Since the 1970s, poorer nations have articulated visions of a New International

Economic Order (NIEO) entailing non-exploitative interactions between the Global North

and the Global South. But it is only now, with the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and

South Africa) all set to launch ambitious new economic institutions, that we are walking

the talk. (Chaulia, 2014).

We argue that alternatives to the Bretton Woods Institutions do not in themselves amount to a

new international economic order, if the principles are not fundamentally and philosophically

different. First, borrowing from the reasoning of Langley (2004) on proposals for a New

Financial Architecture (NIFA), we argue that in some aspects, the BRICS proposals are technical,

and a - political in nature and do not challenge the fundamentals of the existing order, i.e. its

neo liberal underpinnings. Although the proposal for ‘policy space’ suggests prioritizing

government intervention over market forces and supranational governance for developing

countries; the BRICS have not explicitly rejected the liberal paradigm.

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In fact, in principle, the BRIICS group is reinforcing the “elite club” governance structure of the

current global order. As others have noted, the participation of the BRICS countries in the G20

framework, though more inclusive than the G7/8 framework, is an exclusive club among the

developed and emerging economies with little direct or indirect participation of the majority of

developing countries. It is assumed, as has been done in the past, that those countries with

heavier economic weight, and who have the ability carry the economic burden, know how to

best to manage the rest of the world.

Furthermore, the BRICS have called for greater participation of emerging economies using

increased economic weight in the world economy.as the voting criteria, reinforcing the

principles upon which the IMF and the World Bank were founded. In the Fortaleza Declaration,

the BRICS stated that the IMF reform process should take place to “better reflect the increasing

weight of EMDCs in the world economy…(and) (t)he Fund must remain a quota-based

institution. The voting system of most international institutions was changed from equal to

weighted voting after World War 11 (cited in Gianaris, 1990: 910) and while the BRICS have

made a case for updating the existing formulas, to reflect current realities, they have not

questioned the principle behind the method.

The signing of an agreement at the Sixth BRICS Summit, to create the New Development Bank

(NDB) is seen by some as revolutionary because it creates a “new global financial order that

aims to be more inclusive than the Western-focused International Monetary Fund and the

World Bank.” Notably, however, not surprisingly, the BRICS group does not envisage the NDB as

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a replacement for the Bretton Woods Institutions; but rather as a supplement (to)…multilateral

and regional financial institutions.” (Sixth BRICS Summit, Fortaleza Declaration, 2014: 18).

Even the formation of the BRICS group, by virtue of the membership of the group based on

their phenomenal GDP growth in the global economy, reinforces the principles of the authority

and decision making structures of the Bretton Woods institutions. This perception is

highlighted by the anti - globalization type protests that also accompany G20 meetings, as is the

case with related Western dominated events.

The BRICSs proposal for a new trading system based on openness, stability, equity and non –

discrimination, without disguised protectionism and restrictions, is not radically different from

the principles of the current multilateral trading system, which is based on “trade without

discrimination”; “freer trade” - the BRICS equivalence of removal of protectionism and trade

restrictions; “predictability” – equivalent to the BRICS “openness” and “stability”; and

“promoting fair competition” – the equivalence of equity in the BRICS language. Bearing in

mind that UNCTAD is a UN body, embodying the principles of representativeness and voice that

the BRICS group espouses, the BRICS have not called for UNTACD to be the centre of global

trade, finance and investment; instead they simply “reaffirm(ed) the United Nations Conference

on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) mandate as the focal point in the UN system – not as

the centre for global trade, finance and investment (Sixth BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration,

2014).

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In conclusion, we make two points: first, there are inherent contradictions in the BRICS rhetoric

for new international order and their actions towards attaining it. In fact, even in BRICS Summit

declarations, when one reads between the lines, it becomes apparent that what BRICS call for a

new international economic order, is in fact, in some ways, referring to a reform of the existing

system/order – not a paradigm shift. 4 We propose that it will be problematic to create a new

economic order based on justice and equity within the neo liberal framework whose foundation

is based on prioritizing markets and profit maximization. Second, the lack of a coherent

alternative intellectual project, outlining the elements of a framework that should replace the

current order; and more so not having consensus – especially in powerful circles - around this

alternative, makes it particularly challenging for the realization of the BRICS vision at this

juncture.

4“We believe the BRICS are an important force for incremental change and reform of current institutions

towards more representative and equitable governance, capable of generating more inclusive global

growth and fostering a stable, peaceful and prosperous world.” This extract from the Sixth BRICS Summit Declaration suggests a reform approach to the global economic order.

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