This dissertation has beenmicrofilmed exactly as received 69-10,602

KRAUSS, Wilma Rule, 1925-TOWARD A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF ELECTORALAND LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION BYPUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: AN EXPLORATORYSTUDY OF SOME HAWAIl AND PHILIPPINEADMINISTRATORS.

University of Hawaii, Ph.D., 1968Political Science, public administration

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

TOWARD A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVE

PARTICIPATION BY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: AN EXPLORATORY

STUDY OF SOME HAWAII AND PHILIPPINE ADMINISTRATORS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

SEPTEMBER 1968

by

Wilma Rule Krauss

Dissertation Committee:

Robert Staurrer, ChairmanRobert CahillFred W. RiggsMichael ShapiroRobert Van Niel

iii

PREFACE

The author wishes to thank especially Dr. Jose

Abueva~ Graduate School of Public Administration, Uni-

versity of the Philippines and Mrs. Edna Taufa§iau,

Director, Department of Personnel, State of Hawaii, with-

out whose help this dissertation could not have been

undertaken. I also wish to thank Harry Friedman, Director

of Training, State of Hawaii; Robert MacDonald of the

Hawaii Government Employees Association for assistance in

classifying levels of administrators; Dr.·Milton Bloombaum,

Professor of Sociology, for making available the Smallest

Space Analysis tape; Dr. Rudolph Rummel, Professor of

Political Science, and the DON project for use of their

computer programs; Dr. Harry Friedman, former chairman of

the Department of Political Science, for encouragement

and assistance in the early phases of this study; Mrs. Jean

Pararras of the Computing Center for guidance in program-

ming, and my colleague, Amefil Agbayani for help in

obtaining and coding the data and for invaluable criticism.

iv

TOWARD A COMPARATIVE THEORY OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVE

PARTICIPATION BY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS: AN EXPLORATORY

STUDY OF SOME HAWAII AND PHILIPPINE ADMINISTRATORS

by

Wilma Rule Krauss

The electoral and legislative participation o~ two

sets of public administrators, one from Hawaii and one

~rom the Philippines, was analyzed in order to develop a

comparative theoretical framework which could serve as a

model for description and verification o~ such participa-

tion. Data were gathered from 52 Philippine bureaucrats

and from 57 Hawaii administrators. The Philippine group

was enrolled in a graduate course in public administration

at the University o~ the Philippines, and most o~ the

Hawaii group were attending a training class under State

auspices.

Rigorous statistical methods were utilized to

ascertain the electoral and legislative participation

patterns o~ the Hawaii and the Philippine public adminis-

trator groups, to rank individuals in terms of influence

behaviors, and to relate their personal backgrounds to

their political activities.

The ~indings showed that in both Hawaii and

v

Philippine study groups there was a range of electoral

activities of bureaucrats which corresponds to Lester

Milbrath's gladiatorial, transitional and spectator

behaviors. Also there was a hierarchy of bureaucrats.who

could be categorized as_gladiators, transitionals and

spectators. It was found that legislative and electoral

activity vary together and that as the number and range of

electoral behavior increases, so does legislative partici-

pation.

For the Hawaii bureaucrats, socio-economic status

variables--income, rank, and education--explained 46% of

the variance in political activity, with party membership

and preference adding another 12%. The variables associ-

ated with electoral and legislative behavior of the Philip-

pine bureaucrats were personal qualifications and party

-2reference which together explained 38% of the variance,

while SES variables added another 7%. For both sets of

bureaucrats voluntary associational membership was greater

among the less influential administrators, and family back-

ground contributed about 2% of the variance in electoral

and legislative behavior.

In order to explain the findings in this research

a simple theoretical model of electoral and legislative

participation of public bureaucrats was developed. The

main elements of the P (participation) model are B

(benefits) + M (mobility) + R (resources). Participation

vi

was related to benerits vs. costs or political activity

in a more merit-oriented bureaucracy (Hawaii) and a less

merit-oriented bureaucracy (Philippines), to legal norms

and to psychological satisraction rrom "doing one's duty."

It was hypothesize~ that when these ractors are held

constant that desire and activity to rise in social status,

i.e. vertical mobility, could explain rurther variance in

electoral and legislative participation. It was proposed

that when benefits and mobility have been taken into

account ~hose bureaucrats with more political resources

(R) are more likely to take part in political activities.

In conclusion, it was suggested that future research

investigate not only the in-puts of electoral and legis-

lative participation by public administrators but policy

outcomes as well.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE .

ABSTRACT

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS • •

CHAPTER

iii

iv

viii

x

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

INTRODUCTION • . • • . • • • • • • • • .

PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVEPARTICIPATION: 1. THE HAWAIIBUREAUCRATS • . • • . • • . . . • . .

PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVEPARTICIPATION: 2. THE PHILIPPINEBUREAUCRATS ••• • • • . • . . • • .

INFLUENCE AND ELECTORA~ AND LEGISLATIVEPARTICIPATION •• . • . • • . • • • •

SOME POSSIBLE PREDICTORS OF ELECTORAL ANDLEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION PATTERNS:1. THE HAWAII PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS •.

SOME POSSIBLE PREDICTORS OF ELECTORAL ANDLEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION PATTERNS:2. THE PHILIPPINE PUBLICADMINISTRATORS • • . • . . . . . • • .

CONCLUSION: TOWARD A COMPAF~TlVE THEORYOF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVEPARTICIPATION BY PUBLICADMINISTRATORS • • • • • . • • • • . •

1

14

49

67

92

123

141

APPENDIX A.CITIZEN ACTIVITIES QUESTIONNAIRE 170

APPENDIX B.SMALLEST SPACE COORDINATES, FIGURES 1-6. 175

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table

I.

II.

III.

Page

Subset A(l) of' Cluster A, Behavior Patterns,57 Hawaii Bureaucrats · . . · · · · · · · · 23

Subset A(2) of' Cluster A, Behavior Patterns,'"57 Hawaii Bureaucrats · . . · · · · · · · · 25

Subset A(3) of' Cluster A, Behavior Patterns,57 Hawaii Bureaucrats · · · · · · · · · 26

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

Cluster A, Behavior Patterns, 38 HawaiiMiddle Level Bureaucrats .•••.•

Cluster B, Behavior Patterns, 38 HawaiiMiddle Level Bureaucrats •...••

Cluster C, Behavior Patterns, 38 HawaiiMiddle Level Bureaucrats ...•..

Cluster D, Behavior Patterns, 38 HawaiiMiddle Level Bureaucrats .•..•.

Cluster E, Behavior Patterns, 38 HawaiiMiddle Level Bureaucrats •••.••

40

41

41

41

42

IX. Cluster A, Behavior Patterns, 52 PhilippineMiddle Level Bureaucrats •.• . • • • •• 54

X. Cluster C, Behavior Patterns, 52 PhilippineMiddle Level Bureaucrats ••• . . • . •. 55

XI. Cluster D, Behavior Patterns, 52 PhilippineMiddle Level Bureaucrats •. . . • • • •• 56

XII. Electoral and LegisYative ParticipationScale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

XIII. Hawaii and Philippine Middle LevelBureaucrats Typologized By Responses toGuttman Scale of' Electoral andLegislative Participation • • • . • • • 81

XIV. Stepwise Multiple Regression of' LegislatorsAsk Me to Prepare Bills Upon PersonalBackground Variables of' HawaiiAdministrators . • . . • . . • . • . . •. 103

Table

ix

Page

xv. Stepwise MUltiple Regression of RegularlyAttend Rallies Upon Personal BackgroundVariables of Hawaii Administrators G • •• 108

XVI. Stepwise MUltiple Regression of Gave Timet. ~ampaign of Candidate Upon PersonalBackground Variables of HawaiiAdministrators • . • • • • . • • • • • III

XVII. Basic Electoral and Legislative PatternIndicators and Grouped Personal BackgroundPredictors of Hawaii Bureaucrats • • • .• 114

XVIII. Stepwise Multiple Regression of Gave Time toCampaign of Candidate Upon PersonalBackground Variables of the PhilippineMiddle Level Bureaucrats • • . • • . • 125

XIX. Stepwise Regression of Will Be a CandidateUpon Personal Background Variables ofPhilippine Middle Level Bureaucrats. • •. 127

XX. Stepwise MUltiple Regression of SolicitedFunds Upon Personal Background" Variablesof Philippine Middle Level Bureaucrats •• 129

XXI. Basic Electoral and Legislative PatternIndicators c~nd Grouped Personal BackgroundPredictors of Philippine Bureaucrats • •• 131

Figure

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

x

1. Smallest Space Diagram--Behavior Patterns,57 Hawaii Bureaucrats • . • • • . . . •. 21

2. Smallest Space Diagram--50 HawaiiBureaucrats' Proriles ••••• 29

3. Smallest Space Diagram--Behavior Patterns,36 Hawaii Middle Level Bureaucrats • •• 37

4 . Smallest Space Diagram--38 HawaiiBureaucrats' Proriles •••.•.. 43

5. Smallest Space Diagram--Behavior Patterns,52 Philippine Bureaucrats • . . . • . •. 51

6. Smallest Space Diagram--50 PhilippineBureaucrats f Proriles ..•••.. 58

7. Hypothesized Model: Inrluence as a Functiono~ Participation with Typology orBureaucrats on Inrluence Line • . . . •. 77

8. Hypothesized Relationships or Some Systemsor Inrluence in Hawaii • • . . • •• 87

9. Hypothesized Relationships or Some Systemsor Inrluence in the Philippines • . • •. 89

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The objective or this dissertation is to explore

the electoral and legislative participation of two sets

of public administrators, one from Hawaii and one from the

Philippines, for the purpose of developing a comparative

theoretical framework which may serve as a model for

description and verification of such participation.

This study is the first in which pUblic bureau-

crats in the United States and in an Asian country have

been studied systematically on the basis of responses to

the same questionnaire concerning their electoral and

legislative behaviors and their personal backgrounds. Data

were gathered from 52 middle level bureaucrats employed by

the government of the Republic of the Philippines, civil

servants who were enrolled in a graduate course in public

administration at the University of the Philippines in the

summer of 1966. 1 The Hawaii group consisted of 57 public

administrators most of whom were attending a training class

in supervision under the auspices of the State of Hawaii in

lThe Philippine data were gathered by Dr. JoseAbueva, professor of Public Administration, Universityof the Philippines.

2

the rall or 1966. In the Hawaii group, 38 or the public

administrators are middle level personnel, 8 are in the

lowest rank or supervisory personnel, and 11 are top-level

2appointed cabinet members and deputies. Neither group

comprises a random sample and consequently no inrerences

may be made concerning the universes or pUblic adminis-

trators in either Hawaii or the Philippines. In comparing

the two sets or administrators care is taken throughout

this research to contrcl ror rank levels. The question-

naire utilized consists or two parts, one concerning

"citizen activities," electoral and legislative behavior,

the other, personal background. 3

The terms "public administrator," "public bureau-

crat" and "public orricial" are used interchangeably in

this dissertation. These terms are not meant to imply any

analytic or empirical content but are used as nominal

expressions. The nominal derinition4 or these terms is

2Nineteen or the administrators in this study werenot in the training class. These include the 11 cabinetmembers and their deputies, 6 division and 2 branch chiers.

3The questionnaire is contained in Appendix A.4For a clear statement or the analytic distinction

between politics and administration see Fred W. Riggs,Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: HoughtonMirflin Co., 1964), p. 54.

Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals or Concept Formationin Empirical Science (Chicago: The University or ChicagoPress, 1952), distingUishes among the nominal, analyticand empirical definitions. The purpose or the derinitionused in this dissertation is to stipulate in nominal rormthat the terms xl or x 2 or x 3 are equivalent to the terms

3

stipulated as follows:

public administratoror public bureaucrator public official

=Df

An individual holding anoffice in a non-militarysector of the executivebranch of government.

By electoral participation is meant taking part in

activities directed toward the election of candidates,

including preparation of party platform or policy state-

ments, party membership, soliciting funds, distributing

handbills, following political developments in the news-

papers, and voting. Legislative participation includes

writ~ng and advocacy of bills, and contacting legislators.

y, and to study the electoral and legislative behaviors ofxn • In the nominal definition, the definiedum, the

expression on the left, need not contain something "new";hence it may be stipulated, for example in the definiens,that a "public official" is one who holds "office."Webster's dictionary definition of office includes,"position of trust, ministration, or authority; esp. aposition of trust or authority conferred by an act ofgovernmental powers, for a certain term, with specifiedduties, and with emoluments ••. 11 If our research focushad been upon distinguishing between administration andpolitics an analytic definition might well be employed.However, our purpose has been the study of patterns ofparticipatory behavior in order to develop a theoreticalmodel which would explain these behaviors.

Another possibility would have been an empiricaldefinition on the order of:

X pUblic = If and only if X implementsadministrator DF policy.

Such an expirical definition requires verification andthis would be beyond the confines of the present researchbut a fruitful subject for another study.

Other definitions of public administration arediscussed in Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: AComparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 2.

Review o~ Literature

The literature regarding electoral and legislative

participation o~ public administrators shows little empir-

ical and theoretical work in this area. Tingsten5 ~ound

that government employees in Western nations had the

highest rate o~ voting o~ any occupational group. ROkkan's

research6 shows that Norwegian salaried public employees

had the highest levels o~ participation in electoral

activities. Recently the U.S. Commission on Political

Activity o~ Government Personnel concluded a survey o~

the electoral behavior o~ ~ederal civil servants. Data

~rom this study indicate that attendance at rallies,

political contributions, and voting percentages are con-

siderably above the average ~or the public as a whole.

Voting compares ~avorably to the college-educated group

although only 36.4% o~ the U.S. ~ederal civil servants

have some college education or more. 7 U.S. Commission

5Herbert Tingsten, Political Behavior: Studies inElection Statistics (London: P. S. King & Son, 1937).

6Stein Rokkan's study is reported in S. M. Lipset,Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1960),p. 186.

7The Commission reported that 22% o~ the ~ederalemployees had attended a political meeting or rally; thiscompares to Milbrath's approximation o~ 10% o~ theelectorate as a whole who engaged in this behavior. Amonetary contribution was made by 17% o~ the U.S. FederalEmployees compared to 10% in the electorate who donatemoney ~or political campaigns. Eighty-~ive percent o~the ~ederal employees stated that they had voted in the1964 presidential election. See U.S. Commission

5

rindings indicate that electoral activity varies with

position in the bureaucratic hierarchy: the higher grades

are most active, with the exception or the lower-ranking

postal workers who are also highly participatory.8

Research with regard to candidacy or bureaucrats

ror pUblic orfice is scanty, although observers have re-

ported that government orricia1s in France, Germany and

Japan commonly run for orrice. 9

On a more general level Milbrath has summarized

the literature on electoral participation and rinds that

there is a hierarchy or political involvement: (1) certain

electoral behaviors highly intercorre1ate, e.g., soliciting

runds and attending a political caucus; (2) citizens

comprise a hierarchy rrom more politically involved to

least with those who are highly active engaging in most or

the acts or those at lower levels or participation. 10

Although Milbrath rerers to Tingsten's and other research

regarding political activism or government workers,ll he

on Political Activity of Government Personnel, Research,Vol. II, pp. 6-7. Also Lester W. Milbrath, PoliticalParticipation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), p. 19.Also see Robert E. Lane, Political Lire (N.Y.: The FreePress, 1959), p. 85 ror voting data.

8u.s. Commission, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 28-39.9Heady, op.cit., pp. 44, 51.

10Mi1brath, op.cit., p. 16.

11Ibid ., p. 126.

6

does not specifically relate the hierarchy of political

involvement to their behaviors. In Milbrath's summari-

zation of extensive research on electoral behavior and

its relationship to background variables, he states that

participation varies with socio-economic status--income,

education and occupational level--and with activity in

voluntary associations. 12 He also reports on the impor-

tance of other background variables such as party member-

ship and sense of political efficacy.13

Considerable attention has been given to legal

norms--laws, regulations and legal practices--regarding

electoral activity of government personnel. In Australia,

France, Germany, and Sweden legal restrictions regarding

political activity by government personnel have been

removed, and in England all but the higher civil servants

14have full citizenship rights under the law. Although

Japanese law prohibits political activity of civil servants,

observers have noted that it is common practice for the top

three ranks to be actively engaged in electoral activity.15

In the United States the Hatch Act restricts active

12Ibid ., pp. 16-17. 13Ibid ., passim.

14See U.S. Commission on Political Activity ofGovernment Personnel, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 158-160.

l5For legal restrictions~on political activity seeibid., p. 163. For political activity of the higher civilservants in Japan see Robert E. Ward, "Japan," pp. 100-101.in Ward and Roy C. Macridis, eds., Modern PoliticalSystems, Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,1963) •

7

partisan behavior of federal employees, but systematic

enforcement under the law applies only to the middle and

lower ranks. According to Anchor Nelson, M.C., and member

of the Commission on Political Activity of Government

Personnel, there are 370,000 top-ranking "excepted" em-

ployees or 14.8% of the federal workers who are immune

from Civil Service Commission authority.16 In the Philip-

pines a recent statute allowing the employee the right to

express his views on political problems and candidates

supersedes the prohibition in the Constitution of all

political activity by government workers. The current

Philippine Civil Service rules primarily warn employees

not to participate in political management or political

campaigns, nor to become publicly identified with any

political faction or candidate. 17 In the United States 33

of the 50 states or 66% allow government employees full

citizenship participation; 18% have laws similar to the

Hatch Act and 16% prohibit all political activity.18 The

State of Hawaii allows the civil servant full citizenship

16see U.S. Commission on Political Activity ofGovernment Personnel, Findings and Recommendations, Vol.I, p. 25. Also Library of Congress, Legislative Refer-ence Service, The Hatch Act, p. LRS-194, for Nelson'sstatement.

17Republic of the Philippines, Civil ServiceCommission, Memorandum Circular #25, August 8, 1963,expecially pp. 92-93.

18u. s • Commission on Political Activity ofGovernment Personnel, op.c~t., Vol. II, p. 92.

8

rights. 19 There has been very little empirical work

relating actual electoral behavior to the legal norms

outlined above.

With regard to legislative activity o~ civil

servants~ very little is known. Heady~ in summarizing the

literature, reports that French 3 German and Japanese

higher civil servants intimately participate in program

planning; however~ the ~orm and degree o~ this participa-

tion is not described. 20 Woll~ who examines the U.S.

~ederal bureaucracy~ states that legislative initiative

is in the hands o~ the public administrators who have

lobbying star~s and who mobilize their clients ~or passage

o~ bills. 2l Riggs has noted that in the post-colonial

developing countries the power position o~ the bureaucracy

has increased whereas parliamentary bodies are weak. He

writes:

A phenomenon o~ the utmost signi~icance intransitional societies is the lack o~ balancebetween political policy-making institutionsand bureaucratic policy-implementing structures.The relative weakness o~ political organs meansthat the polit~~al function tends to be appro- 22priated~ in considerable measure, by bureaucrats.

19State o~ Hawaii~ Personnel Rules and Regulations~January 13, 1964~ Regulation XII--Political Activity.

20Heady~ op.cit.

2lpeter Woll, American Bureaucracy (N.Y.: W. W.Norton & Company~ Inc.~ 1963)~ Chapter 4.

22Fred W. Riggs in "Bureaucrats and PoliticalDevelopment: A Paradoxical View" in Joseph La Palombara,ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton~

9

What are the explanations given ror these electoral

and legislative behaviors? Lipset hypothesizes that since

government employees have the greatest involvement in

government affairs, it rollows that they would have the

highest rates or electoral participation. 23 Marsh holds

that the political involvement or government workers is

characteristic or highly-specialized Western society.24

The merit system or the bureaucracy and the high

prestige or administrators in France, Germany, and Japan

account ror the important role or their orricials in

policy-making, according to Heady.25 Riggs associates the

relative power position or bureaucrats in post-colonial

developing countries vis-a-vis other political structures

in part to the inerrectiveness or the "constitutive

system" which he derines as a composite of' political

parties, popular elections and elected assemblies. 26

New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 120.

23Lipset, op.cit.

~.4Robert M. Marsh, Comparative Sociology (N. Y.:Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967), p. 150.

25Heady, op.cit.26 .Oral communication. For a derinition and expli-

cation or "constitutive system," see Fred W~R-iggs, "TheStructures or Government and Administrative Ref'orm"(Social Science Research Institute, University of' Hawaii,October, 1967), mimeo. ms., pp. 24-27. Cited on ~rmission f'rom the author.

10

Questions ~or Study

Research in this dissertation is directed toward a

number o~ questions pertinent to the literature just cited.

The questions are as ~ollows:

1. Is there a hierarchy o~ electoral behaviors among

the bureaucrats under study? Do the bureaucrats

~orm a hierarchy ~rom highly-involved persons to

those least active politically?

By investigating this question data will be

obtained as to whether these bureaucrats have electoral

activity patterns common to the citizenry in general or

whether their behavior varies ~rom this norm, as outlined

by Milbrath.

2. Does legislative activity ~orm a separate cluster

o~ behaviors ~rom the electoral?

In this study an opportunity is provided to inves-

tigate whether or not these pUblic bureaucrats engage in

both types o~ activity or specialize in one or the other.

3. How does the proportion o~ the bureaucrats who

participate in in~luential behavior compare to

the citizenry as a whole?

Following a de~inition o~ in~luence and a ranking

o~ bureaucrats on a participation scale, a comparison with

activities in Milbrath's hierarchy o~ political involve-

ment will be made to ascertain whether or not these public

administrators participate more as a group in in~luential

11

behavior than the citizenry as a whole.

4. What personal background variables are associated

with the electoral and legislative participation

of the two groups of public administrators?

The importance of socio-economic status and other

personal background variables such as party membership and

preference, age, marital status, and membership in volun-.

tary associations in explaining electoral and legislative

behavior will be studied.

5. In what ways do the electoral and legislative

behaviors o~ these Hawaii and Philippine adminis-

trator groups compare and contrast? Do background

variables associated with their participation vary

between the two sets of administrators?

Electoral and legislative activities and background

variables o~ the bureaucrats will be compared and con-

trasted in order to determine pattern similarities or

unique aspects o~ the two groups of administrators. 27

6. What inferences, if any, may be made concerning

the relationship of electoral and legislative

participation of the two groups of administrators

to (a) bene~its and costs of political involve-

ment; (b) merit or non-merit systems in the

27See Nimrod Raphaeli, "Comparative Public Ad-ministration: An Overview,ll in Raphaeli, ed., Readings inComparative Public Administr'ation (Boston: Allyn andBacon, Inc., 1967), pp. 4-5, for a brief discussion ofcomparative method.

12

bureaucracies; (c) legal norms concerning

political participation; (d) specialization or

their respective societies and (e) parties,

elections and elected parliaments?

Inrerences with regard to (a) through (e) will be

considered rollowing analysis of the patterns of electoral

and legislative behavior of the two study groups.

Methods of Analysis

The five major questions outlined above will be

investigated by the use of rigorous statistical methods.

Propositions suggested by the findings will be stated

seriatim. These will be summarized in the last chapter

of the dissertation and an explanatory model will be

presented. 28 The criteria for the model are broadness of

scope and degree of factual confirmation; that it be

capable or being operationalized and that it be formally

simple. 29 The theoretical framework will take into account

the five items listed above in question 6.

In Chapters II and III patterns of electoral and

legislative behavior of the groups of Hawaii and Philippine

bureaucrats will be ascertained by means or Smallest Space

Analysis, a multivariate clustering technique. In Chapter

28See George C. Homans,"Briilging Men Back In,"American Sociological Review, 29 (December, 1964), pp.809-818, particularly pp. 813-814 for comments on thedevelopment of theory.

29Hempel, op.cit., p. 46.

13

IV these bureaucrats will be ranked by participation in

the influence process by means of a Guttman scale con-

structed for this purpose. Chapters V and VI employ

stepwise multiple regression analysis whereby basic

indicators of ele~toral and legislative behavior are

related to the personal background variables of the public

administrators. Chapter VII summarizes the propositions

suggested by this research and offers a simple explanatory-

model which may serve as a basis for future research.

CHAPTER II

PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVE

PARTICIPATION: 1. THE HAWAII

BUREAUCRATS

Milbrath, in summarizing the literature on elec-

toral participation notes that there is a hierarchy of

political involvement: (1) certain electoral behaviors

intercorrelate with one another; (2) individuals form a

hierarchy from more politically involved to least, with

those most active engaged in electoral behaviors at a

higher level as well as those activities at lower levels

in the hierarchy of political involvement. l

Briefly, the behaviors in Milbrath's hierarchy of

political involvement are as follows: gladiatorial

activities--holding public and party offices, being a

candidate for office, soliciting political funds, attending

a caucus or a strategy meeting, becoming an active member

in a political party, contributing time in a political

campaign; transitional activities--attending a political

meeting or rally, making a monetary contribution to a

lLester W. Milbrath, Political Participation(Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), p. 16.

15

party or candidate, contacting a public orricial or a

political leader; spectator activities--wearing a button

or putting a sticker on the car, attempting to talk

another into voting a certain way, initiating a political

discussion, voting and exposing oneselrto political

stimuli. Those who engage in gladiatorial activities,

the gladiators according to Milbrath's ter~inology, also

participate in transitional and spectator behaviors;

those who engage in transitional activity also are active

in spectator behaviors.

Is there a hierarchy or electoral behaviors among

the bureaucrats under study here? Are there highly inter-

correlated behaviors and what are these syndromes or

electoral activity, if any, for publi~ bureaucrats? Do

the bureaucrats rorm a hierarchy or highly involved

persons to least active politically? Does legislative

activity rorm a separate cluster or behaviors rrom the

electoral? Do public oureaucrats engage in both types of

activity--electoral and legislative--or do they specialize

in one or the other?

The above questions are guides to this and the

next chapter. In this chapter the electoral and legis-

lative behavior patterns of the Hawaii bureaucrats are

examined, and in Chapter III, the Philippine data are

analyzed. Our focus in both chapters is two-rold, upon

the patterning of the 36 items in the citizen question-

naire and on groups of individual bureaucrats. Since 12

16

or the 36 items in the citizen activities questionnaire

correspond to Milbrath's hierarchy or political involve-

ment, their interrelationships are studied as well as the

patterning or other electoral items in the questionnaire--

such as participation in writing a party platrorm or

policy statement and passing out handbills--and certain

legislative activities.

Smallest Space Analysis

To obtain patterns or electoral and legislative

behaviors or the 52 Philippine and 57 Hawaii bureaucrats

in our study population, Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) was

utilized. This technique, developed by Louis Guttman and

James C. Lingoes, is well-adapted to our dichotomous

citizen activities questionnaire data, ror SSA is a

nonmetric method or analysis. Also the data used in the

SSA need not be normally distributed nor is there any

maximal number or variables required. As such this

technique is well suited to exploratory studies such as

this where the purpose is to study interrelationships in

order to develop theory. Variables, whether they be

questionnaire items or individual prorile scores, are

plotted on a diagram in the smallest Euclidian space

pos~ible according to the rule or monotonicity which may

be simply put as rollows: variables A and B are closer

together ir the probability for their association is

greater than the probability ror association or variables

17

A anc C. Or, as stated by Guttman and Lauman: distance

(A ,B) <Pr (CIA). 2

distance (A,C) whenever Pr (B/A) :>Variables are calculated as coordinates, based

on their correlation coefficients, and plotted by the

usual Euclidian ~ormula,

distance (A,B)

m

i = 1

Those which are highly intercorrelated are clustered to-

gether and those inversely correlated, for example, are

at opposite ends of the diagram. The correlational rela-

tionship of variables may thus be visually grasped by

study of the space diagram.

Two types of SSA analyses were used, the SSA-R

where variables are clustered, and the SSA-Q whereby

2Distances between points in the small spacediagram must meet this criteria: distances between A andB are smaller than -between A and C whenever the proba-bility for an association between A and B is greater thanthe probability of an association of A and C. For eachvariable a numerical calculation for distance is madebetween it and another variable, and so on throughoutthe set. Additional calculations are made until the bestfit is obtained~ the fit being the degree to which therelationships between A and B are most closely set forthin Euclidean space. The coefficient of alienationrepresents statistically the goodness of fit. The smallerthe coefficient of alienation, the better the fit. SeeEdward O. Laumann and Louis Guttman, "The RelativeAssociational Contiguity of Occupations in an UrbanSetting," American Sociological Review, 31 (April, 1966),pp. 169-178, especially p. 172.

18

individuals are grouped. 3 These analyses are complemen-

tary, one setting ~orth group behavioral patterns while

the other clusters individuals by similarity o~ patterns.

Boundaries for both types o~ analyses are drawn by the

researcher. In drawing boundaries I have ~ollowed the

criteria set down by Campbell and Fiske, as reported by

Gordon, namely, " • the requirement that di~~erent

measurements of the same construct correlate more highly

with one another than with measurements o~ alternative

3In the Q-SSA individuals are clustered accordingto their correlation of profiles. Each cluster o~individuals intercorrelates more within the group thanwith other groups. Boundaries are drawn in the same wayas in the variable analysis, SSA-R: correlation matricesare checked to assure that lines are accurately drawn.There is a correlation matrix ~or each group in the SSA-Qanalysis. Below is presented, as an example, the cor-relation matrix for group D o~ the 50 Hawaii bureaucrats.Refer to Figure 2. A correlation o~ .273 has a proba-bility o~ .05, an r o~ .354 has a p o~ .01. Subset D(l)is also given below.

Correlation Matrix, Group D and D(l) o~Hawaii Bureaucrats

(Numbers re~er to individuals)Group D

13 16 19 20 21 22 24 27 28 3713 36 59 42 74 68 38 42 28 4216 29 66 74 50 56 47 53 6619 44 49 65 53 57 47 4420 74 53 90 63 56 8021 1. 49 74 1. 7422 47 60 60 5324 57 50 6827 52 4728 5637 Subset D(l)

16 20 24 3716 60 56 6620 90 8024 6837

194constructs." As my cutting point for clusters I chose

a correlational limit corresponding to a probability of

.05. Items. which do not intercorrelate at the level of

.05 or lower are excluded. In summary, each cluster

represents a grouping of items which intercorrelate more

with each other than with other clusters and which meet

a probability criteria of .05 or less.

The data are presented in this and the next

chapter in the following order: Chapter II (l) SSA-R and

SSA-Q for all the Hawaii bureaucrats. This group of 57

includes II cabinet members and their deputies, 38 middle

level civil servants, and 8 semi-supervisory personnel.

The findings for this group are presented first for they

give an overall view of the relationship of the electoral

and legislative variables and of individual groups of

bureaucrats, (2) SSA-R and SSA-Q for the 38 middle level

Hawaii bureaucrats. Although these data overlap consider-

ably from the previous set of analyses there are some

patterns which are unique to this group and accordingly

the entire findings will be presented. Chapter III (l)

SSA-R and SSA-Q for the 52 Philippine middle level bureau-

crats, as well as (2) statement of propositions generated

by the SSA analyses of both the Hawaii and Philippine

4 ~Robert Aaron Gordon, "Issues in the EcologicalStudy of Delinquency," American Sociological Review, 32(December, 1967), p. 936.

20

groups, and (3) summary and conclusion of Chapters II and

III.

The Electoral and Legislative BehaviorPatterns of the Total Hawaii Group

The SSA-R analysis for the 57 bureaucrats in our

Hawaii study population includes three major clusters and

eight isolated items scattered in the diagram below, Figure

1. Cluster A is a large syndrome of 24 items which covers

all of Milbrath's gladiatorial and transitional activities.

Clusters Band C include items which fall under the

category of spectator activities. The eight isolated

items include three relating to candidacy, one on revealing

and defending political preferences, one on voting and

three concerning party identification or independence.

In Figure 1 cluster A has been divided into three

parts in order to facilitate analysis. A(l) comprises the

core of clustar A and consists of eleven highly inter-

correlated behaviors. The correlations for this subset

are included in Table I.

What are the core behaviors of Cluster A, those in

subset A(l)? The item with the highest correlations is

"I give ideas for the speeches of a political leader."

This item is highly intercorrelated with such electoral

behaviors as soliciting funds and helping draft party

platform, as well as attending a caucus and helping a

candidate plan his campaign. An interesting item is "I

FIGURE I. SMALLEST SPACE DIAGRAM

B!HAVIOR PATTliANS, 57 HA"'AII BUREAUtRATS

C.A.""1000 I I I ,

.19

A

.JI

ill.,

All),,~

.a~ .L~~~ 2.,IJI ~ 18,11/

a I I I I I \:: I ILl 1:Jl I I "'""'...,.... I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

.N ."

.ID

I I I-10001 .1

..,I\)

I-'-1500 I I I I

-1000 a 1000 2000

KEY TO FIGURE 1

Cluster A

22

A(l)

A(2)

2. Regularly attend rallies4. Ideas ror speeches

12. Contact legislators13. begislators ask me to prepare bills14. Approached legislators for help17. Frequent contacts with politicians18. Considered person with political connections21. Caucus23. Helped candidate plan24. Solicited funds25. Pa~ty platform

3. Handbills6. Fund-raising dinner

11. Helped agency prepare bill15. Chier asks me to seek support19. Encouraged to be a candidate22. Helped candidate in his public relations26. Gave time to campaign of candidate

5. Contributed money9. Regarded as potential politician

20. Politician rriends used house27. Member or party34. Attend meetings, rallies36. Bumper sticker

Cluster B

29. Follow developments in newspaper32. Informal discussions

Cluster C

30. Watch TV33. Initiate discussions

Isolated Items

1. Reveal political prererences7. Lean to party8. Party, not active

10. Won't be a candidate16. Been a candidate28. Will be candidate31. Vote35. Not a party member

23

TABLE I. SUBSET A(l) OF CLUSTER A~ BEHAVIORPATTERNS~ 57 HAWAII BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)a

2 4 12 13 14 17 18 21 23 24 25

2. Regularlyattendrallies 67 70 62 67 76 83 75 67 80 71

4. Ideas f'orspeeches 60 94 56 68 63 70 76 81 94

12. Contactlegislators 65 74 71 70 61 50 69 63

13. Legislatorsask me topreparebills 61 62 58 65 71 75 88

14. Approachedlegislatorsf'or help 71 60 60 56 58 59

17. Frequentcontacts withpoliticians 75 83 58 75 70

18. Consideredperson withstrongpoliticalconnections 65 53 82 66

21. Caucus 60 78 7323. Helped candi-

date plan 70 6824. Solicited

f'unds 8525. Party platf'orm

aDecimals are omitted in this and subsequenttables.

24

regularly attend political meetings or rallies in public

places" which is, :for example, correlated .80 with solicit

:funds. Regular rallies is thus part o:f a syndrome o:f

gladiatorial electoral items, those o:f A(l). "I attend

political meetings or rallies in public places," however,

is part o:f A(3), a transitional behavioral cluster, as

in Milbrath's hierarchy o:f political involvement.

With what legislative activities do the electoral

items in A(l) correlate? Cluster A(l) includes three

legislative items--contact legislators :for support,

legislators ask me to prepare bills, and approached

legislators :for help. Thus A(l), the core o:f cluster A,

contains both electoral and legislative activities.

Subset A(2) o:f cluster A di:f:fers :from A(l) in

that the electoral behaviors are "lower order" gladiatorial

transitional activities on Milbrath's scale of political

involvement. Helping distribute handbills, helping a

political candidate in his public relations and giving

time to the campaign o:f a candidate are in the last

category o:f gladiatorUU behaviors prior to such transi-

tional acts as attending a political :fund-raising dinner.

Associated with these electoral behaviors in A(2) are__

encouraged to be a candidate and chie:f asks me to seek

support :for him or agency. Together with these items is

helped agency prepare bill to be introduced in the legis·-

lature.

3 6 11 (13) 15 19 22 26

5'7 37 ( 51) 39 53 79 5950 (53) 37 42 51 47

(57) 41 45 41 37

(76)(67)(53)(50)

62 43 61

57 55

72

25

Table II presents the correlations of subset A(2)

of cluster A. It should be recalled that cluster A is

one syndrome of intercorrelated items. Each outer circle

is more intercorrelated with the core circle A(l) than

within circle items, such as those in A(2). This is

shown in Table II below by item #13 in parenthesis which

is a core legislative item from the gladiatorial subset

A(l).

TABLE II. SUBSET A(2) OF CLUSTER A, BEHAVIORPATTERNS, 57 HAWAII BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)

3.· Handbills6. Fund-raising dinner

11. Helped agencyprepare bill

(13. Legislators ask meto prepare bills)

15. Chief asks me toseek support

19. Encouraged to be acandidate

22. Helped candidatein his publicrelations

26. Gave time tocampaign ofcandidate

Subset A(3) items, on the fringe of cluster A,

fall into Milbrath's transitional range of political in-

volvement, except for #27, member of party, which is a

5 9 (13) 20 27 34 36

30 (44) 39 46 37 52

(56) 38 17 30 40

(52) (42) (46) (59)

25 29 42

56 49

34

26

gladiatorial behavior. Electoral behaviors in this group

include attending meetings and rallies, contributing money

to a candidate or party, putting a campaign sticker on

the car, and allowing politician friends to use house or

vehicle. Related to these campaign activities is liMy

relatives and folks back home regard me as a potential

politician." Subset A(3) items are presented in Table III

below. The low correlation between regarded as potential

politician and party membership is the only one above the

.05 chance level.

TABLE III. SUBSET A(3) OF CLUSTER A, BEHAVIORPATTERNS, 57 HAWAII BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)

5. Contributed money

9. Regarded aspotentialpolitician

(13. Legislators askme to preparebills)

20. Politicianfriends usedhouse

27. Member of party

34. Attend meetings/rallies

36. Bumper sticker

Again item #13 is bracketed to show that corre-

lations with A(l) are higher than within A(3) and to

indicate the relationship of this subset to the core item.

27

In summary cluster A consists or a series or elec-

toral items which ranges rrom a core or gladiatorial

behaviors to transitional to one spectator activity--

putting a bumper sticker on the car. Legislative behaviors

range rrom legislators ask me to prepare bills to helped

agency prepare bill.

Clusters Band C raIl into the category of

spectator activities. Cluster C includes initiating con-

versations regarding politics and watching TV programs

reaturing political leaders; these items correlate .38.

Cluster B includes lower order spectator behaviors. These

are rollowing political developments in the newspapers and

taking part in inrormal discussions which correlate .63.

Unrelated to the three major clusters are several

items, three regarding candidacy, three regarding party

membership or independence, one on revealing and defending

political prererences and voting. Being a candidate is an

item which is high on Milbrath's gladiatorial activity

hierarchy, but which is not part or the syndrome or gladi-

atorial behaviors in subset A(l) or cluster A. Voting is

an activity in which 100% or the Hawaii bureaucrats

participate and so it does not correlate with any items.

In summary, the SSA-R analysis of the 57 Hawaii

bureaucrats behaviors indicates three primary patterns of

behavior. The rirst is a gladiatorial-transitional

cluster with three analytic parts. The core or this

28

cluster includes "higher order" gladiatorial activities,

such as soliciting runds as well as such items as helping

legislators to prepare bills; the next subset includes

"lower order" gladiatorial behaviors, such as helping a

candidate, and transitional behaviors such as rund-raising

dinner; the third set is a transitional grouping including

putting a campaign sticker on the car. The second pattern

is a "higher order" spectator grouping and the third is a

"lower order" spectator cluster including rollowing devel-

opments in the newspaper and taking part in political

discussions.

We turn now to a consideration or the individual

proriles or the Hawaii bureaucrat group.

The SSA-Q Analysis or Individual Profilesof 50 Hawaii Bureaucrats

In order to execute the SSA-Q analysis on the tape

available, the number of Hawaii bureaucrats was reduced to

50 randomly selected administrators rrom the original group

or 57. Figure 2 presents the 50 Hawaii public orficials,

grouped on the basis or their responses to the 36 citizen

activities questions. To analyze these groups two scores

were obtained: (1) a score or political involvement ror

each respondent and (2) a score or legislative activity

ror each respondent. These scores were tallied and

averages, medians, modes and ranges obtained ror each group.

Groups were determined, as in the previous analysis, on

the basis of the highest intercorrelations. In the Key

29

,------r------r--------.i

..':

:IE4(a::04( ~i5 =...w L00 • ~~

..en •~ i ~enw :t •....I ~

KEY TO FIGURE 2

GROUP A--SPECTATOR-TRANSITIONALS (N=22)

Political involvement X ••. 3.3Legislative activity X ••• 0.0

GROUP B--INDEPENDENT TRANSITIONALS (N=7)

Political involvement X .•. 4.Legislative activity X . 1.3

GROUP C--PARTISAN TRANSITIONALS (N=5)

Political involvement X . 5.4Legislative activity X . .. .2

GROUP D--GLADIATORS (N=lO)

Political involvement X . 10.3Legislative activity X . . • 2.0

D(l) (N=6)

Political involvement X.. 9.9Legislative activity X•.• l.6

D(2) (N=4)

Political involvement X.ll.OLegislative activity X... 2.2

TOTALS

30

Number of individualsby profiles • . •

Number of isolatedindividuals • • • •

grouped.=44

• • • •= 6

Political involvement X,total group. . • • . . • . 5.7

Legislative activity X,total group • • . . . • .9

31

~or Figure 2 average score ~or political involvement (PI)

and ~or legislative activity (LA) is given ~or each o~

the ~our groups.5 Those groups with a mean PI score o~

eight or more are considered high-level gladiators, those

in the six to eight range low-level gladiators; groups

with PI scores o~ ~our to six are called transitionals,

with three or less, spectators. 6

Political involvement scores were compiled by

tallying responses on twelve items corresponding to

Milbrath's hierarchy, as ~ollows:

Milbrath's Hierarchy o~Political Involvement

Holding public and partyo~~ice

Being a candidate

Soliciting political~unds

Attending a caucus orstrategy meeting

Becoming an active memberin a political party

Political Involvement Items~rom Citizen Activities

Questionnaire

None

I have been a candidate.

I have solicited campaign~unds.

I have attended a politicalor strategy meeting.

I helped in dra~ting a partyplat~orm or policystatement.

5The mean was selected as the statistic for usein the SSA-Q analysis since it has less variability thanthe mode or median. The means, medians and modes wereclose in the clusters. For example, the range of individ-ual political involvement ,scores in group D o~ the Hawaiitotal group was 9 to 11. The median in group D was 10,the mean was 10.3 and the mode was 10. The most deviantcluster was group B where the range in individual scoreswas 3 to 6, the median was 4, the mean was 4, but themode was 3.

6Milbrath, op.cit., p. 156.

Contributing time in apolitical campaign

Attending a politicalmeeting or rally

Making a monetary con-tribution to a partyor candidate

Contacting a publicorricial or a politicalleader

Wearing a button or puttinga sticker on the car

Attempting to talk anotherinto voting

Initiating a politicaldiscussion

Voting

Exposing oneselr topolitical stimuli

32

I gave part or my time tothe campaign or acandidate.

I attenci--political meetingsor rallies.

I contributed money to acandidate or politicalparty.

I contact legislators rorsupport or pendinglegislation.

I put a campaign sticker onthe car.

None

I initiate conversation ordiscussions about poli-tics among rriends.

I vote in every election.

I rollow political develop-ments in the newspaper.

For legislative activity the rollowing items were

used:

I have helped my agency in preparing a bill to beintroduced in the legislature.

Some legislators ask me to help them prepare bills.

I am personally close to two or more legislators whomI have approached ror help.

In discussing the various groups or administrators

in the pages which rollow attention will be given not only

to their political involvement and legislative activity

averages but to other items rrom the questionnaire which

33

may be uniquely patterned.

Figure 2 has a range o~ political involvement o~

3.3 to 11, and a range o~ legislative activities vary-ing

~rom 0 to 2.2. The average score ~or the respondents

with regard to PI is 5.7 and ~or LA it is .9.

Figure 2, which is a space diagram o~ the relation-

ship o~ behavioral pro~iles o~ individual bureaucrats,

has one group, D, which is primarily gladiatorial in its

political involvement. Group D consists o~ ten individ-

uals who also have a high legislative activity score.

D(2) comprises ~our persons who engage in such activities

as soliciting campaign ~unds, attending a political caucus

or strategy meeting, as well as in lobbying ~or bills,

~elping legislators prepare legislation and contacting

legislators ~or help. None, however, has been a candidate

~or o~~ice. These individuals, as the average PI score o~

11. would indicate, also participate in transitional and

spectator activities. Parenthetically it is o~ interest

that the positions o~ these highly active persons are as

~ollows: one department director and two deputies--who are

political appointees--and one division chie~, a civil

servant.

Del) with an average PI score o~ 9.9 a~d a LA score

o~ 1.6 is a somewhat.less active grou~ ~our o~ these

six do not pass out handbills, nor give ideas ~or speeches,

nor help a candidate plan his campaign, and they have not

been asked by legislators to prepare bills. Subset D(2)

34

consists of two directors and two deputies, as well as

two civil servants--a section chief and a unit chief.

There are three isolates near group D, two to the right

o~ the cluster and one to the left. They also have a

mean PI of 10 and a LA of 2 and their profiles are closest

to D(2). The main difference between these isolates and

the D cluster is that the individuals in the former group

indicate they will not be candidates for office, whereas

the three isolates state they will. These three individ-

uals consist of two department directors and one civil

servant, a division chief. The behaviors of group D and

the three isolates cover the range of citizen activities

including the core items of A(l) of cluster A in Figure 1.

Group C has a mean political involvement score of

5.4 and a legislative activity average of .2. These

persons may be considered "lower" transitionals in their

electoral behavior. They give money to candidates or

parties and put a bumper sticker on their ~ar. They also

consider themselves party members, hence the name

"partisan transitionals." Except for one person, none

has engaged in any legislative activity. Group CIS

behaviors correspond to A(3) of cluster A in Figure 1.

Group B is labeled "independent transitionals" in

the key to the SSA-Q space diagram. These seven individ-

uals consider themselves political independents. While'

their PI score is 4, somewhat less than C, their legis-

lative activity is markedly higher. All have prepared a

35

bill for their agency. Their electoral behavior includes

five of the seven contributing money to a candidate or

party, or attending a fund-raising dinner; four attended

rallies. These latter behaviors and helping agency

prepare bill are included in the behaviors of A(2) in

Figure 1.

Group A has a mean political involvement score of

3.3, but of the 22 persons in this group none engaged in

any of the three legislative activities selected for

analysis. About half contributed money or attended a

fund-raising dinner and a few put bumper stickers on

their cars and attended rallies. These persons answer

affirmatively to item #7 which is " ••. I lean toward or

am sympathetic to one party." This group is labeled

"transitionals-spectators" in the key to Figure 2, for

their behaviors range across categories. All follow

political developments in the newspapers and vote.

The Smallest Space Analysis-Q diagram when viewed

as a whole may be interpreted as a hierarchy of individ-

uals who vary from highly-involved electoral and legis-

lative activists to spectators who read newspapers and

vote. Those persons who are gladiators also participate

in transitional and spectator activities, and those who

are transitionals engage in spectator activities. In

addition, legislative activity is shown to vary with

electoral activity, as was indicated in cluster A of the

36

SSA-R analysis. An exception to this generalization is

provided by the five "partisan transitionals" in Group

C, only one of whom engaged in legislative activity.

Another generalization which may be made con-

cerning the total Hawaii group of administrators is that

electoral and legislative behavior varies with party

identification, since gladiators are all party members,

and the group labeled spectators-transitionals state they

do not consider themselves party members but lean toward

a party. The exception to this generalization is Group

B of independent transitionals consisting of seven persons

who state they are not party members and who vote for

candidates regardless of party considerations.

We turn now to an examination of the electoral and

legislative behavior of the 38 middle level bureaucrats

. in Hawaii.

The Electoral and Legislative Behavior Patternsof the 38 Middle Level Bureaucrats

Figure 3 is a smallest space analysis of the

electoral and legislative activities of the middle level

civil servants in the Hawaii study group. The items

analyzed are the 36 citizen activities questions. The

most striking difference between this SSA-R and the previ-

ous one which included the range of civil servants, as

well as political appointees, is that there are five

distinct clusters--A, B, C, D, E--with much of the same

content of Cluster A in Figure 1. Cluster A includes

37

KEY TO FIGURE 3

Cluster A

2. Regularly attend rallies4. Ideas ror speeches

12. Contact legislators14. Approached legislators ror help17. Frequent contacts with politicians18. Considered person with political connections19. Encouraged to be a candidate24. Solicited runds25. Party platrorm

Cluster B

3. Handbills21. Caucus22. Helped candidate in his pUblic relations23. Helped candidate plan26. Gave time to campaign or candidate28. Will be candidate

Cluster C

9. Regarded as potential politician13. Legislators ask me to prepare bills15. Chier asks me to seek support

Cluster D

27.' Member or party34. Attend meetings, rallies

Cluster E

29. Follow developments in newspaper30. Watch TV32. Inrormal discussions33. Initiate discussions

Isolated Items

38

1. Reveal political prererences5. Contributed money6. Fund-raising dinner7. Lean to party8. Party, not active

10. Won't be a candidate11. Helped agency prepare bill16. Been a candidate20. Politician rriends used house

31. Vote35. Not a

partymember

36. Bumpersticker

39

"higher order" gladiatorial activities, such as soliciting

runds and drarting a party platrorm or policy statement,

as well as contacting legislators ror support or pending

legislation and asking legislators ror help. Cluster C

to the right includes legislators ask me to prepare bills

and chier asks me to seek support ror him or the agency.

Clusters A and C include the A(l) and A(2) items in the

SSA-R or the total Hawaii group. B includes the electoral

behaviors in A(2) or the SSA-R or the total Hawaii group,

but no legislative activity. Cluster B is comprised or

"lower order" gladiatorial behaviors such as giving time

to a candidate, and distributing handbills. Attending a

caucus or strategy meeting is also part or cluster B

and is the one "higher order" gladiatorial behavior on

Milbrath's scale or political involvement. Cluster D

includes member or party and attending rallies which are

A(3) items in the Hawaii Total SSA-R analysis. In

addition, rive items which were part or the cluster A

syndrome in the Hawaii Total SSA-R analysis are uncorre-

lated in the SSA-R analysis ror the 38 middle level bureau-

crats. These are rund-raising dinner, bumper sticker,

contributing money and politician rriends used house,

among the electoral items, and helped agency prepare bill.

In summary, clusters A and B are gladiatorial

behaviors; B is entirely electoral in emphasis whereas C

in part concerns legislation. A combines both electoral

40

and legislative behaviors, and D is a party cluster. E

combines clusters Band C in the Hawaii Total SSA diagram

and is a spectator cluster, and not a party member is

inversely related to the gladiatorial behavi~s in cluster

A as in the previous SSA-R diagram.

The correlations ror the behavioral clusters or

the 38 Hawaii middle level bureaucrats are presented in

the rollowing Tables IV to VII.

TABLE IV

CLUSTER A, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 38 HAWAIIMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)

2 4 12 14 17 18 19 24 25

2~ Regularlyattend rallies 48 72 50 72 72 69 72 48

4. Ideas rorspeeches 35 35 35 35 70 48 1. 00

12. Contactlegislators 65 65 65 50 50 35

14. Approachedlegislatorsror help 65 47 50 28 35

17. Frequentcontacts withpoliticians 65 50 50 35

18. Consideredperson withpoliticalconnections 50 72 35

19. Encouraged tobe acandidate 69 70

24. Solicited runds 85

25. Party platrorm

TABLE V

CLUSTER B, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 38 HAWAIIMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)

3 21 '23 26 28

3. Handbills 58 57 57 5621. Caucus 36 64 61

23. Helped candidate plan 49 4726. Gave time to

campaign or candidate 4728. Will be a candidate

TABLE VI

CLUSTER C, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 38 HAWAIIMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)

9 13 15.9. Regarded as

potential46c9.ndidate 61

13. Legislators ask meto prepare bills 80

15. Chier asks me toseek support

TABLE VII

CLUSTER D, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 38 HAWAIIMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)

27 34

27. Member or a party 44

34. Attend meetings,. r.allies

41

42

TABLE VIII

CLUSTER E, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 38 HAWAIIMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)

29 30 32 33

29. Follow developmentsin newspapers 41 85 43

30. Watch TV 32 48

32. Informal discussions 3233. Initiate discussions

We turn now to an analysis of individual profiles

of the middle level Hawaii civil servants.

The SSA-Q Analysis of IndividualProfiles of the 38 Middle Level

Bureaucrats of Hawaii

While there are five major clusters of behaviors

in the middle level group of Hawaii bureaucrats studied,

there are seven groups of individuals whose profiles are

highly intercorrelated. Figure 4, the SSA-Q diagram for

the middle group, may be viewed as a hierarchy of politi-

cally involved individuals. The range in political in-

volvement on the 12 items adapted from Milbrath's hierarchy

is from 10 behaviors to 1; the legislative activity ranges

from 2 (of three items used to obtain the LA score) to .2.

The average political involvement (PI) score for the 38

middle level bureaucrats is 4.5 and the average legislative

activity (LA) score is .5.

43

uooN

T

:::!:~a::(!)« CI)

0

0 w0

J

!2

Wu.

U a~

Q.

(J) ~t-

o

KEY TO FIGURE 4

GROUP A--LOW LEVEL SPECTATORS (N=2)

Political involvement X ... 1.0Legislative activity X . .. .5

GROUP B--SPECTATOR-TRANSITIONALS (N=16)

Political involvement X 3.3Legislative activity X .2

GROUP C--SPECTATOR-TRANSITIONALS (N=3)

Political involvement X ••• 3.8Legislative activity X . .. .6

GROUP D--PARTISAN TRANSITIONALS (N=8)

Political involvement X .•• 4.6Legislative activity X . .. .8

GROUP E--INDEPENDENT TRANSITIONALS (N=3)

Political involvement X •.. 5.3Legislative activity X .•. .3

GROUP F--LOW LEVEL GLADIATORS (N=3)

Political involvement X ... 6.3Legislative activity X • .. .3

GROUP G--HIGH LEVEL GLADIATORS (N=3)

Political involvement X .10.0Legislative activity X ... 2.0

TOTALS

Number of individuals groupedby profiles . • . = 38

Number of isolatedindividuals • • • • • • • = 0

Political involvement X,total group. • . . • 4.5

Legislative activity X,total group • • • • • •• .5

44

45

Group G is a cluster of three persons whose PI mean

is 10 and whose LA average is 2. They are labeled "high

level gladiators" to indicate that the behaviors engaged

in are among the top items in Milbrath's hierarchy. They

are active in all PI electoral activities except candidacy

and writing party platfroms. They have been asked by

legislators to prepare bills and they also prepare bills

for their agency. In addition, bureaucrats in this cluster

are party members and engage in transitional and spectator

behaviors.

Group F "low level gladiators" are also party

members and they help candidates in their pUblic relations,

distribute handbills, contribute money, and attend rallies.

However, their legislative activity is negligible. Group

E is a cluster of three persons who consider themselves

politically independent and who help candidates in their

campaigns; their legislative activity is also minimal.

Group D are "partisan transitionals" and their legislative

activity mean is .8; four of the eight have prepared

legislation or engaged in other legislative activities.

Groups Band C are both labeled "spectator-transitionals"

for these persons mainly follow political developments,

discuss politics and vote. Six of the sixteen in Group B

have contributed money or attended a fund-raising dinner

and four have attended rallies; none is a party member.

C profiles differ from B in that the former answer that

tbey are considered persons with strong political

46--connections. Group CIS mean political involvement score

is also slightly higher than B's, as is their legislative

activity average. A is a set or two persons who vote and

engage in no other electoral activities; or these one

person has helped his agency prepare a bill.

When we compare the Q analysis and the R for the

middle group we note that the SSA-R shows one large syn-

drome which includes such gladiatorial activities as

solicited runds, contact legislators ror support or pending

legislation, and approached legislators ror help. These

behaviors are engaged in by the high level gladiators in

the Q analysis, and on a lesser scale by the partisan

transitionals. The low level gladiator cluster in the Q

analysis corresponds to the behaviors in B in the SSA-R.

The transitional-spectator behaviors in the R analysis--

contributed money and bumper sticker, as well as the

spectator cluster E have their counterparts in the Band

C group proriles in the Q analysis.

Do middle level bureaucrats' electoral behaviors

correlate in patterns corresponding to the Milbrath

hierarchy? The R analysis does show a patterning or elec-

toral behaviors rrom A, a gladiatorial cluster or higher

order behaviors to B, lower order gladiatorial activities,

to D transitional and E spectator activities.

Among the middle level bureaucrats is there a

hierarchy or individuals dirrerentially engaged in

47

electoral behaviors? Except ~or group E, independent

transitionals, consisting o~ 3 persons, this is the case.

In the E group, bureaucrats do give time to a candidate

but they do not engage in such transitional behaviors as

attending a meeting or rally, although they do take part

in spectator activities. The independent transitionals,

E Group, also are not party members. As was noted earlier

electoral activity varies with identi~ication with party,

except ~or the E group which has its counterpart in Group

B in the SSA-Q analysis o~ the total group o~ Hawaii

bureaucrats. The remainder o~ middle level civil servants

follow the scale pattern: high level gladiators partici-

pate in low level gladiatorial behaviors as well as

transitional and spectator activities; transitionals

engage in spectator activity and spectators only discuss,

expose themselves to the mass media, and vote.

In addition, those persons who are active in

electoral behaviors also participate in legislative

a~~airs. The exceptions to this generalization are

greater among the middle group studied than among the

total Hawaii administrator group investigated in this

research. Eleven persons in the Hawaii middle level

groups A, C, E and F in the SSA-Q do not conform to the

patterns; the remaining 27 persons' pro~iles in groups B,-~-

D and G are consistent with the generalization that those

persons who engage in electoral a~~airs are dif~erentially

engaged in legislative activities as well.

48

We turn now to an examination of the legislative

and electoral behaviors of the ?2 Philippine middle level

civil servants.

CHAPTER III

PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVE

PARTICIPATION: 2. THE PHILIPPINE

BUREAUCRATS

In this chapter the objectives are the same as in

Chapter II--to investigate whether or not there is a

hierarchy o~ electoral behaviors among the bureaucrats

studied and to explore whether these pUblic administrators

~orm a hierarchy o~ persons di~~erentially involved in- -electoral activities. Also does legislative activity

~orm a separate cluster o~ behaviors ~rom the electoral?

And do the Philippine bureaucrats studied here engage in

both types o~ activity--electoral and legislative--or do

they specialize in one or the other?

The same methods are employed in this chapter as

in the previous one. First, an SSA-R analysis is pre-

sented whereby the electoral and legislative activities

o~ the Philippine public administrators are clustered.

Then the bureaucrats are grouped according to similarity

o~ their pro~iles, using the SSA-Q technique.\

Since this chapter is a continuation o~ Chapter

II, it concludes with a brie~ statement comparing the

~indings ~or the Hawaii and Philippine bureaucrat groups,

a listing o~ the propositions generated by the SSA

50

analyses, and a summary of Chapters II and III.

The Electoral and Legislative BehaviorPatterns of' the 52 Philippine

Middle Level Bureaucrats

Figure 5 is the smallest space analysis diagram

of the electoral and legislative behavior patterns of the

middle level Philippine bureaucrat groups. There are two

large clusters, A and C, and five smaller groupings of

behaviors in the diagram. While both A and Care gladia-

torial in behaviors, A does not include a legislative

item, whereas C includes two. D mainly concerns fund-

raising and fund-giving. E includes drafting a party

platform and legislators ask me to prepare bills which

correlate .48. F is a spectator cluster of initiate

discussions and take part in informal discussions which

correlate .28. G, vote and not a party member, also has

a lower statistical relationship as may be seen from the

.30 correlation.

The correlations f'or the electoral and legis-

lative activity patterns in cluster A are presented below.

Correlations below .273 would fall above the .05

chance level; correlations at .354 or above have a prob-

ability of' .01. With the above in mind inspection of

Table IX shows some correlations which are quite low

indicating, f'or example, little statistical relationship

between party membership and attendance at rallies. The

item with the highest correlations is 19, encouraged to

FIGURE 5. SMALLEST SPACE DIAGRAM

BEHAVIOR P"TTERN8, 1& PHIL.IPPINIl BUR.EAUCRAT.5

G.A. ".~'I500, I I

.1.,

.10.(1o

~21 .11 I I I,I ,O~ t:'\ _ , .\;I ,

ol9

looe500o-500 I I I I

-500

IJ1I-'

KEY TO FIGURE 5

Cluster A

2. Regularly attend rallies9. Regarded as potential politician

15. Chief asks me to seek support17. Frequent contacts with politicians19. Encouraged to be a candidate23. Helped candidate plan27. Member of party28. Will be candidate34. Attend meetings, rallies

Cluster B

16. Been a candidate36. Bumper sticker

Cluster C

3. Handbills4. Ideas for speeches

12. Contact legislators14. Approached legislators for help18. Considered person with political

connections20. Politician friends used house21. Caucus22. Helped candidate in his public

relations26. Gave time to campaign

Cluster D

5. Contributed money6. Fund-raising dinner

24. Solicited funds

Cluster E

13. Legislators ask me to prepare bills25. Party platform

Cluster F

32. Informal discussions33. Initiate discussions

52

KEY TO FIGURE 5 (Continued)

Cluster G

31. Vote35. Not a party member

Isolated Items

1. Reveal political pre~erences7. Lean to party8. Party, not active

10. Won't be candidate11. Helped agency prepare bill29. Follow developments in newspaper30. Watch TV

-'-~ ---

53

54

be a candidate which has an r of 52 with will be a candi-

date. These items have intercorrelation with helping a

political candidate plan his campaign, as well as attend-

ance at meetings and rallies.

TABLE IX

CLUSTER A, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 52 PHILIPPINE- MIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)

2 9 15 17 19 23 27 28 34

2. Regularly attendrallies 44 43 31 46 46 38 41 27

9. Regarded aspotentialpolitician 27 53 66 33 22 50 47

15. Chief asks me toseek support 25 43 43 41 16 48

17. Frequent contactswith politicians 41 31 41 20 34

19. Encouraged to bea candidate 46 33 52 37

23. Helped candidateplan 46 41 37

27. Member of party 44 1628. Will be a candi-

date 2834. Attend meetings,

rallies

The correlations ror cluster C are presented in

Table X. The most highly intercorrelated item in Cluster

C is 26, gave time to campaign or candidate, followed by

politician rriends used house. This cluster contains

gladiatorial behaviors, and legislative items as well,

55

including contacting legislators for support of pending

legislation and approaching legislators for help.

TABLE X

CLUSTER C, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 52 PHILIPPINEMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)

3 4

3. Handbills 424. Ideas for speeches

12. Contactlegislators

14. Approached legis-lators for help

18. Considered personwith politicalconnections

20. Politician friendsused house

21. Caucus22. I helped a

political candi-date in his publicrelations

26. Gave time to campaignof candidate

12 14 18 20 21 22 26

39 33 48 42 38 33 4.840 31 43 49 40 34 31

46 25 52 36 37 27

54 30 30 32 22

29 45 29 53

47 54 4730 55

48

The correlations for Cluster D are presented in

Table XI. Cluster D behaviors include the gladiatorial

item solicit funds as well as the transitional activities

of attending a fund-raising dinner and contributing money.

The positive relationship of D cluster to the C gladia-

torial cluster nearby is indicated in the SSA-R diagram

on page 51.

56

TABLE XI

CLUSTER D, BEHAVIOR PATTERNS, 52 PHILIPPINEMIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRATS

(Pearsonian Product Moment Correlations)

5. Contributed money6. Fund-raising dinner

24. Solicited funds

5 6

29

24

43

39

In summary, the SSA-R analysis for the Philippine

middle level bureaucrat group shows a hierarchy of elec-

toral and legislative behaviors. Two large clusters of

behavior, A and C, are both gladiatorial in electoral

activities, but A includes no legislative items whereas C

includes both electoral and legislative behaviors. Nearby

cluster D is a syndrome concerning soliciting or giving

funds to party or candidate. This pattern differs from

Milbrath's scale which includes soliciting funds as a

gladiatorial item and contributing money as a transitional

behavior. Party platform and legislators ask me to

prepare bills in E also form a separate cluster, the

former being a gladiatorial item. Among the spectator

items are cluster F, initiate conversation and informal

discussions, and G, not a party member and vote. Seven

of the 36 items in the citizen activities questionnaire

do not cluster. Of particular interest is helped agency

prepare bill which is not related in the SSA-R to any of

the other electoral and legislative behaviors of the

57

Philippine middle level group studied.

Now our attention will be directed to the individ-

ual profiles of the Philippine bureaucrats.

The SSA-Q Analysis of Individual Profilesof the Middle Level Bureaucrats of

the Philippines

Figure 5 presents the Philippine middle level

bureaucrats grouped by correlation of profiles of answers

to the citizen activities questionnaire. The range in

political involvement mean scores is 3.2 to 7. There are

four isolates in the diagram and their PI SCQres are 5, 6,

7 and 10. Legislative activity scores for the isolates

range from .2 to 2.5. The average score for political

involveme~t of the group as a whole is 4.9 for PI and .8

for LA--both somewhat higher than the Hawaii middle level

bureaucrats' averages.

In Figure 6 there are three small groups labeled

gladiators on the basis of the behaviors engaged in. Their

varying scores would indicate some differences as would

the placement on the diagram. Independent gladiators, C

group, of two persons state that they are not party

members. Their behaviors conform to A in the SSA-R

diagram in Figure 5. They will be candidates if circum-

stances are favorable, they give time to a candidate,~

attend caucus or strategy meetings, and attend rallies;

in addition, they prepare bills for their agency. Their

average score of political involvement is 6 because they

58

o

oo.,

go .,~I

59

KEY TO FIGURE 6

GROUP A--SPECTATOR-TRANSITIONALS.(N;:36)

Political involvement X ... 3.9Legislative activity X . .. .7

A(l) (N-15)--SPECTATORS

Political involvement X ••• 3.2Legislative activity X . .. .3

A(2) (N=lO)--INDEPENDENT TRANSITIONALS

Political involvement X ... 4.3Legislative activity X . .. .7

A(3)--INDEPENDENT TRANSITIONALS (N=ll)

Political involvement X ... 4.9Legislative activity X . 1.

GROUP B--PARTISAN-TRANSITIONALS (N=3)

Political involvement X ... ~.7Legislative activity X . 1.

GROUP C--INDEPENDENT GLADIATORS (N=2)

Political involvement X ••• 6.Legislative activity X ..• 1.

GROUP D--GLADIATORS (N=3)

Political involvement X ... 6.3Legislative activity X . .. .7

GROUP E--GLADIATORS (N=2)

Political involvement X • 7.Legislative activity X ... 2.5

TOTALS

Number o~ individuals grouped by pro~iles = 46Number o~ isolated individuals = 4

Political involvement X, total group ••• 4.9Legislative activity X, total group ••• ,8

60

do not make monetary contributions to the party or

candidates or put a bumper sticker on their car, although

they do initiate conversations and discuss politics and

vote. Nearby is gladiatorial group D consisting o£ three

persons who identi£y with a party and who put bumper

stickers on their cars; only one has approached a legis-

lator £or help or engaged in any legislative activity.

Group E o£ gladiators are also partisans who state they

will be candidates under £avorable circumstances; they

also attend strategy meetings, help candidates in public

relations, and engage in transitional and spectator

behaviors. Their PI score is but 7, £or they do not con-

tribute money nor solicit £unds. Both have helped their

agency in preparing bills, one was asked by legislators

to write bills and both approached them £or help. Con-

sequently their legislative activity average is 2.5.

Gladiatorial group D's behaviors correspond to

clusters A and B in the SSA-R diagram in Figure 5; and

group E's to the C cluster o£ behavior patterns.

The three "partisan transitionals" in B group

have contributed money or attended a £und-raising dinner,

given time to the campaign o£ a candidate, and they also

engage in spectator activities, with the exception o£

putting a bumper sticker on their cars. One has prepared

a bill £or the agency and two have approached legislators

£or help.

61

Group A, spectator-transitionals, includes 36

persons whose profiles intercorrelate. For purposes of

analysis this large grouping was divided into .three sub-

sets, whose scores increase as one procedes from the

inner core of 15 spectators to the outer circle of 11

transitionals. These persons state that they lean to one

party but that they are not party members. They engage in

such behaviors as discussing politics, following political

affairs in the newspapers and in some transitional

behaviors such as contacting a public official, but not in

contributing money or attending a fund-raising dinner.

Clusters F and G in the SSA-R analysis presented in Figure

5 correspond to the dominant behaviors in Group A.

In summary, the SSA-Q analysis for the Philippine

middle level bureaucrat group shows a hierarchy of persons

differentially engaged in electoral and, to some extent,

legislative activity. Three gladiator groups show

political involvement scores ranging from 7 to 6 compared

to the transitional and spectator means from 4.9 to 3.5.

Among the gladiatorial groups there are two partisan

ones, and one where individuals state they do not belong

to a party, and among the transitional groups there is..-"-

one partisan group and two independents. Although

gladiator group members assist candidates in campaigns,

few state that they solicit funds or contribute money to

candidates. These latter two behaviors are also not

--_.-

62

related to the central gladiatorial syndromes in the

SSA-R analysis but form a separate cluster, D, shown in

Figure 5. While the range in legislative activity varies

.3 from the spectator group A(l) to 2.5 for the group E

gladiators, there is little variation in mean scores among

the various transitional and the other gladiatorial groups.

Thus electoral behavior shows a greater range among the

Philippine middle level bureaucrats than does legislative

activity, the mean scores being comparable among five of

the seven groups.

We turn now to a brief comparison of the SSA

analyses of the two middle groups of pUblic administrators

studied.

Comparison of the SSA Analyses for theMiddle Level Bureaucrat Groups

In comparing the Philippine middle group with the

Hawaii middle in terms of their electoral behaviors, in

both SSA-R analyses gladiatorial activities form into two

separate clusters and each has syndromes of transitional

and spectator behaviors. l In both SSA analyses the two

lA minor but interesting difference between thegroups studied is the SSA-R context of the item, "Myrelatives and folks back home regard me as a potentialpolitician. It In the Hawaii middle level bureaucratgroup this item clusters with legislators ask me toprepare bills and with chief asks me to seek support forhim or for agency. In the Philippine middle levelbureaucrat group regarded as potential politicianclusters with encouraged to be a candidate and otherelectoral items, but not with legislative behavior.

To our knowledge only one study has been under-taken which systematically compares conceptualization of

63

clusters or gladiatorial behaviors dirrer.in that one

does not contain any legislative items whereas the other

does. In the Hawaii group contacting legislators regard-

ing pending legislation and approaching them ror help is

associated with "higher order" gladiatorial behavior such

as solicit ~unds. In the Philippine group the same two

legisla