Peacekeeping and Peacebuildwwing in Post-Conflict Environments

8/11/2019 Peacekeeping and Peacebuildwwing in Post-Conflict Environments

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D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 9

IPCS Research Papers

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Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Environments

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Copyright 2009, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies(IPCS) The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies is notresponsible for the facts, views or opinion expressedby the author.

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS),established in August 1996, is an independent thinktank devoted to research on peace and security from aSouth Asian perspective.Its aim is to develop a comprehensive andalternative framework for peace and security in the

region catering to the changing demands ofnational, regional and global security.

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Web: www.ipcs.org


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IPCS Research Paper 23

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CONTENTS

I. UN, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding............................................................................ 6

II. The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) ............................ 8 III. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) .....................................................14

IV. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) ......................................................16

V. The question of sovereignty...........................................................................................19

VI. Alternatives to UN led missions...................................................................................21

VII. The road ahead ...........................................................................................................24

VIII. Bibliography ..............................................................................................................24


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Introduction

There have been 63 United Nations (UN)peacekeeping missions since the UNsinception in 1945. The number ofoperations has increased steadily over theyears and at present almost 116,000personnel are serving on 17 peacekeepingoperations led by the United NationsDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations(UN DPKO). In addition to these missions,there are also 15 special political and orpeace-building missions under themanagement of the UNs Department ofPolitical Affairs.1 This paper seeks toevaluate the UN approach to peacekeepingand peacebuilding in post-conflictenvironments. This will be done by lookingat three case-studies; the UN missions in

Timor-Leste, Nepal and Liberia. These casestudies provide an insight into the UNapproach in both an Asian and an Africancontext. All three countries beingconsidered are emerging from prolongedperiods of political instability and armedconflict. Despite their geographical polarityand the fact that the situation in Liberia isparticularly complex, they face very similarchallenges. This paper looks at possiblealternatives to UN peacekeeping andpeacebuilding missions with a view toestablishing if there are organizations orother interested parties, which may be moreeffective than the UN in terms of bringingstability to post-conflict environments. Theissue of sovereignty will also be considered

with the aim of assessing whether theinternational communitys current stance onthis issue is hampering the UNs ability tofulfill mission mandates.

1 United Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations and the United Nations Department ofPublic Information. 2009. Fact Sheet: United

Nations Peacekeeping . pp. 1-3. For information

regarding missions led by the United NationsDepartment of Political Affairs seehttp://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ppbm.pdf

Prior to embarking on an analysis ofpeacekeeping and peacebuilding in post-conflict environments it is first necessary todefine both terms. Knight states that the

Figure 1. Map of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions 2

term peacebuilding became a part ofofficial discourse in 1990 when it was usedby Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for

Peace. The then UN Secretary-Generaldefined peacebuilding as action to identifyand support structures which will tend tostrengthen and solidify peace in order toavoid a relapse into conflict. BoutrosBoutros-Ghali also stated that peacebuildingis conceived as the construction of a newenvironment in terms of politics, culture,economics and security and can be viewedas a direct counterpart to preventativediplomacy, which seeks to avoid the

breakdown of peaceful conditions.3

Mohamed explains that in contrast to peacebuilding, peacekeeping sets out to

2 This map only shows UN missions led by theDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations. It isavailable athttp://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm3 Knight, W. Andy. 2005. The United Nations and

International Security in the New Millennium.Perspectives on Global Development andTechnology . Vol. 4(3-4). pp. 533-534.


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5

enforce and police formal peace. 4 Thus peacekeeping involves a military presenceand involves the physical enforcement of

peace whereas peacebuilding relates to theestablishment of the conditions required to

enable the establishment and maintenanceof political and economic stability. It isimportant to note that in recent UNmissions these roles have oftenoverlapped. Integrated missions are a goodexample of this, involving military,

political, legal and humanitariancomponents. Due to this overlap, the termsare often used interchangeably. However,for the purposes of this paper

peacekeeping and peacebuilding will bereferred to with the aforementioneddefinitions in mind

4 Mohamed, Saira. 2005. From Keeping Peace to

Building Peace: A Proposal for a RevitalisedTrusteeship Council. Columbia Law Review . Vol,105(809). p. 819


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6

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IUN, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The UN has faced much criticism over itsapproach to both peacekeeping andpeacebuilding. It is therefore necessary toconsider issues pertaining to UN missionsand more specifically the key areas ofdiscussion as highlighted by academics andUN officials alike whose focus area isanalyzing the efficacy of the UN and itspeace operations over the last few years.

Following the publication of the BrahimiReport in 2000, which gave acomprehensive overview of the failings ofthe UN, reform in the area of peaceoperations was implemented. According to

Weir, there were numerous pre-reformproblems with UN peacekeeping missions.She states that lack of communication,duplication of efforts, and a failure to adaptstrategy to the new tactics of belligerents

meant that the UN family was ineffectiveat best. At worst, agencies found that thelack of coordination and standardization

was actually feeding into the cycle of war. 5 Some would argue that despite reform, theseproblems remain. This is highlighted by thethree case studies which follow and by theUN Peacekeeping Operations UpdateReport discussed below.

The UN Peacekeeping Operations Update

Report outlines the capacity and resourceproblems facing the UN. One of the mainissues is troops related. The UN reportstates that many of the traditional troopcontributors (European and Latin

American countries) no longer have thecapacity to contribute troops due to theirdeployment in non-UN operations.Moreover, new contributors of troops are

5 Weir, Erin A. 2006. Conflict and Compromise:

UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative . Kofi Annan International PeacekeepingTraining Centre. Monograph No.4. p. 5.

developing countries whose forces lack theequipment, infrastructure and training toeffectively integrate into complex missions.

This is depicted by Figure 1, which showsthat Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nigeria

were the largest contributors of uniformedpersonnel to UN peacekeeping operationsas of April 2009. The global lack of bothavailable and qualified police and civilians

also presents a problem.

Figure 2. Chart showing the Top 20 Contributors ofUniformed Personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations 6

The report also argues that capacity ishindered by inflexible staffing rules and theglobal financial crisis.7 Capacity constraints

will be looked at in the context of the three

missions selected as case studies for thispaper. It seems clear that this is one of thekey problems facing the UN. Staff shortages

will make it almost impossible for the UNto fulfill its mandates in post-conflictenvironments, especially in the initial stagesof deployment. There is also a danger

6 United Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations and the United Nations Department ofPublic Information. 2009. Fact Sheet: United

Nations Peacekeeping . p.3.7 United Nations Security Council. 2009. UNPeacekeeping Missions: Update Report . No. 2. p.2.


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capacity restraints will result in missionsbeing downsized too early. This often servesto counteract any progress that has beenmade earlier on in the missions deploymentand can result in renewed conflict.

According to Caplan when a UN peaceoperation is established, it is assumed to bea temporary measure that will endure until,in the best case, a lasting solution to theconflict can be found that will allow the UNto withdraw without jeopardizing the peaceor, in the worst case, circumstances on theground deteriorate and a continued UNpresence is no longer thought to be able to

contribute to maintaining the peace.8

Theproblem with this premise is that it relies ongood judgment. It may seem that a lastingsolution to a conflict has been found andthe UN may withdraw or make preparationsto withdraw only to find conflict andtensions resurfacing. This was the case in

Timor-Leste when peacekeepers withdrewonly for violence to break out again in 2006.

The criteria for deciding when the UNpresence is no longer able to contribute to

maintaining the peace must be clearlydefined in order to avoid such errors.

Weir offers an interesting analysis of thechanging face of peacekeeping operationsand the reasons behind the difficulty ofimplementation. She states that the UNsystem, designed to respond to interstateconflict, had difficulty adjusting to the newprevalence of intrastate crises. She addsthat a new sort of warfare emerged, which

was increasingly brutal and targeted civilians.She summarizes stating human sufferinghad become a weapon, and the struggle tocombat it necessitated a newmultidimensional approach topeacekeeping.9 The case studies in this paper

8 Caplan, Richard. 2009. Managing Transition: ExitStrategies and Peace Consolidation in ManagingComplexity: Political and Managerial Challengesin United Nations Peace Operations . International

Peace Institute.9 Weir, Erin A. 2006. Conflict and Compromise:UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian

all reflect the effects of this new form ofconflict. Moreover the peacekeeping andpeacebuilding missions in all three cases

were especially designed to deal with thiskind of complex conflict scenario.

In her analysis of UN integrated missions, Weir reminds us that international policymakers have yet to articulate and apply aclear doctrine for international lawenforcement. 10 This renders theimplementation of peace operations fraught

with difficulties. Moreover, there is noindependent body, which oversees the workof the UN and which would ensure theapplication of such a doctrine were it to be

decided upon. Until such time as a body ofthis kind is in place the obstacles discussedabove and the mission specific problemslaid out below will continue to prevent theUN from fulfilling its full potential both interms of peacekeeping and in terms ofpeacebuilding.

Imperative. Kofi Annan International PeacekeepingTraining Centre. Monograph No.4. p. 7.10 Weir, Erin A. 2006. Conflict and Compromise:

UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative . Kofi Annan International PeacekeepingTraining Centre. Monograph No.4. p.9.


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II The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

(UNMIT)

UNMIT was established on 25 August 2006, with an initial mandate of six months. Itreplaced the United Nations Office in

Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), its politicalpredecessor. UNOTIL was preceded by twopeacekeeping missions, the United NationsMission of Support in East Timor(UNMISET) and the United Nations

Transitional Administration in East Timor(UNTAET), and a political mission, theUnited Nations Mission in East Timor(UNAMET). These missions are generallybelieved to have been too passive in theirapproach to peacekeeping and this passivityis considered to be one of the factorsbehind Timor-Lestes 2006 security crisis.

UNMIT has drawn up a Medium-TermStrategy. The strategy outlines a series of

objectives and sub-objectives referred to asbenchmarks, the achievement of which theUN believes will provide the foundationsfor a stable and sustained democratic statein Timor-Leste. Progress towards achievingthe benchmarks is monitored and used as ameans of assessing whether changes toUNMITs mandate are needed and toestablish when UNMITs presence in

Timor-Leste will no longer be required. 11

The first objective set out in the Medium Term Strategy relates to security issues andrequires a stable security situation, andsecurity sector institutions that respect andprotect human rights and are sufficientlyeffective and accountable to guaranteesecurity and stability in the short term, whileat the same time contributing to the ongoingstrengthening of security and stability overthe long term. 12 Benchmarks falling underthis objective include clearly defined roles

11 UNMIT. 2009. Medium Term Strategy . p.1.12 UNMIT. 2009. Medium Term Strategy . p.2.

for security sector institutions and adequatecapacity and resources in order for theseinstitutions to be able to operateeffectively.13 This paper focuses on thepolicing aspect of this objective but in termsof the broader picture it is important to notethat while the security situation in Timor-Leste remains fragile, there have been

marked improvements. The only majorsetback was the attempt by rebels led by Alfredo Reinaldo to assassinate President Jose Ramos-Horta and Prime MinisterXanana Gusmao on 11 February 2008.Reinaldo was killed during the shooting thatensued. Arguably one of the greatest threatsto Timor-Lestes stability was thuseliminated, reducing the risk of a return to

violence. According to the UN, the attackhad the potential to destabilize Timor-Leste

but the rational manner in whichgovernment forces responded to the attacksprevented a breakdown of law and order. 14 On the one hand, this suggests thatsignificant progress has been made towardsestablishing a stable security environment.However, the fact that such an incidentoccurred at all indicates that much remainsto be done if the security of Timors leadersand citizens is to be safeguarded.

Timor-Leste is currently experiencing aperiod of transition with responsibility forpolicing the country gradually being handedover to the National Police of East Timor(PNTL). The number of United NationsPolice Officers (UNPOL) operating in thecountry will remain unchanged despite the

13 United Nations Security Council. 2009. Reportof the Secretary-General on the United NationsIntegrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period

from 9 July 2008 to 20 January 2009). p.19. 14 UNMIT. 2008. Report on human rightsdevelopments in Timor-Leste . p.3.


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handover. UNPOL will assume an advisoryrole, monitoring PNTLs progress andproviding support where necessary. It willreassume responsibility for law enforcementif required.15 To date, responsibility for

policing has been handed back to PNTL inManatuto, Oecussi and Lautem districts. 16 As the handovers have been recent, it is asyet impossible to gauge their success. Aperiod of at least six months will be requiredbefore assessments of PNTLs policing canbe made. It is however possible to look atPNTLs progress prior to the handovers inorder to gain an insight into the challengesfacing the PNTL as they resume control ofpolicing and whether they have the capacity

to meet them.

Bu Wilson, wrote a paper on the PNTLscapability in 2008. She expressed herconcern that rather than rebuilding thePNTL, the UN mission may be insteadbequeathing a weak and unstable policeforce to Timor -Leste . 17 She cites poorrelations between UNPOL and the PNTLas being behind this, claiming increasinglyPNTL does what it pleases, regardless of

what UNPOL might think.18

Wilsonsargument raises questions about PNTLsability to take full responsibility for policingin Timor-Leste. It also suggests thatUNPOL will have difficulty in fulfilling theirrole as advisors. The extent to which there

will be cooperation between the two forcesafter the handover remains to be seen. It ispossible that given responsibility and adegree of sovereignty over policing, thePNTL will adapt well to their new role but

this seems unlikely. It is vital that thegovernment takes steps to ensure thatPNTL cooperates with the internationalforces in Timor-Leste. Failure to do so will

15 UNPOL Brochure.http://unmit.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIT/unpol/Brochure%20web%20PNTL.pdf.16 UNMIT. 2009. UNMIT Newsletter 3 August2009 . No. 95. Dili. p.1.17 Callinan, R. Missing the Beat. Time SouthPacific (Australia/ New Zealand edition). Issue 48.18

B. Wilson. 2009. Timor-Leste: the curious caseof the fake policemen. East Timor Law Journal.13 th February.

seriously impede the countrys progresstowards a stable security situation and willfurther delay UNMITs departure. It is

worth noting that a lack of cooperationbetween UNPOL and local police forces is

not unusual where peacekeeping missionsare concerned. This is an issue, which mustbe addressed if there is to be progress inSecurity Sector Reform (SSR) in any of thecountries in which the UN has apeacekeeping mandate.

The PNTL is hampered by severeequipment shortages. Writing in 2008, RoryCallinan described poorly equipped, poorlypaid police officers living in tents without

access to proper sanitation facilities.19

WhileCallinan was describing conditions as of oneyear ago, there can be no doubt that thesituation has seen little improvement, theproblems described being too serious to beresolved in a matter of 12 months. If thePNTL is to be effective in policing a stableand secure Timor-Leste then provisions willhave to be made for the supply ofequipment and police infrastructure. This isanother obstacle, which appears to be

hindering progress towards SSR across allthe UN peacekeeping missions and which was highlighted by the 2009 UNPeacekeeping Operations Update Report.

There are also obstacles hinderingUNPOLs effectiveness. Among them is thefact that officers are typically deployed for aperiod of six months. The resulting highturnover of police officers means that feware familiar with the local context.

Moreover, in order to reduce expenditure,there is no overlap between departing andarriving UNPOL officers so no handover ofinformation takes place. 20 This situation isuntenable with UNMITs success beingseriously compromised by the lack of

19 Callinan, R. Missing the Beat. Time SouthPacific (Australia/ New Zealand edition). Issue 48.20 B. Wilson. 2008. Smoke and Mirrors in

Democratic Governance in Timor-Leste:

Reconciling the Local and the National edited byDavid Mearns. Charles Darwin University Press:Darwin. p.106.


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coordination and cooperation betweenUNPOL staff. The capacity constraintsoutlined above are an example of thosedescribed earlier on in this paper, when thecapacity problems facing the UN were

discussed.

It seems that UNMIT may have started thehandover of responsibility for policing toosoon, potentially jeopardizing the securitysituation by giving responsibility to a poorlyequipped, inexperienced force, which hasnot received adequate training or mentoring.Haste has often resulted in significantsetbacks for the UN in post-conflictenvironments and as such the wisdom of

this early handover has to be questioned. This is especially the case in Timor-Leste where violence broke out in 2006 in theaftermath of the UNs withdrawal of itspeacekeeping troops in 2005.21

Dr. Atul Khare made a very valid point inhis speech at the Lowy Institute in 2008. Hestated it is clear to me that training of apolice service that is impeccably turned outfor a parade takes a few months, provision

of necessary professional skills, such asfirearms training, might take another year,but the development of internal controlsand an institutional culture that is consistent

with the principles of a democracy, such asneutrality, transparency, adherence to therule of law and self-restraint, requires asocietal change that takes a generation ormore. 22 Unfortunately, Timor-Leste, likeall nations emerging from a period ofprolonged conflict, does not have the luxury

of time. If the country is to feature on theglobal stage and to fulfill its regionalaspirations, in particular becoming amember of the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN) then change must

21 UNMISET, a peacekeeping mission, wasreplaced by UNOTIL, a political mission, in May2005.22 Speech by Special Representative of theSecretary-General for Timor-Leste Dr. Atul Khare.

The challenges of nation-building in a post-conflict society: the role of neighbouringcountries. 18 June 2008.

come immediately. This is a key problem forall post-conflict nations. The West hadhundreds of years in which to build up itsinstitutions, yet countries like Timor-Lesteand Liberia are expected to achieve the same

in just a matter of years. There appears to beno solution to this dilemma. Countries thatchoose to take their time in the nation-building process will surely find themselveslagging behind the rest of the world whilecountries which rush this process in order tocatch up will find themselves withineffective and partially functioninginstitutions.

UNMITs second objective, as set out in the

Medium term Strategy, relates to justice andhuman rights. It requires a situation in which the institutions and capacities of thejustice sector are adequately developed andstrengthened, resulting in an effective,accessible and credible judicial and penalsystem. The rule of law and theindependence of the judiciary are respected;impunity is not tolerated and isappropriately addressed. Accountability andjustice are achieved for the serious criminal

offences of 1999 and April through May2006, including as recommended by theIndependent Special Commission ofInquiry. 23 Benchmarks under this objectiveinclude effective accountability mechanismsto enhance the integrity of the judiciary andthe Provedoria for Human Rights and

Justice serving as both an independent andtransparent human rights institution. 24

On 20 May 2008, the President issued a

pardon or partial commutation of sentencefor 94 of Timor-Lestes 179 prisoners.Former Minister of Interior, RogrioLobato, who was involved in the 2006 crisis,

was amongst those whose sentence wascommuted. The President has also pardonedthose imprisoned for the 1999 violence and

while the Truth Commission which looked

23 UNMIT. 2009. Medium Term Strategy. p.6.24 United Nations Security Council. 2009. Report

of the Secretary-General on the United NationsIntegrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the periodfrom 9 July 2008 to 20 January 2009). p.19.


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into the deaths of 200,000 people during theIndonesian occupation has resulted in anadmission of guilt by Indonesia, nobody hasbeen brought to justice. 25 More recentlyMartenus Bere, one of the perpetrators of

the Suai Church massacre, which occurredin September 1999, was arrested as a resultof investigations by UNMITs SeriousCrimes Investigation Team (SCIT). He wasreleased just weeks after his arrestprompting renewed concern regarding thejustice and human rights situation in Timor-Leste. It is difficult to understand why

Timor-Lestes President has taken thisstance. While the idea of looking forwardand working towards a new future is

laudable, this should not come at theexpense of justice. Continuing calls for anInternational War Crimes Tribunal fromboth the international community and

Timorese groups have failed in persuadingthe government to change their stance. In

view of the current leaderships position onthis issue it is possible to surmise thatprogress on this front will not occur unlessthere is a broadening of the UNs mandatein Timor-Leste. This is unlikely to happen,

so at present there is little cause foroptimism in this matter.

In terms of human rights, there were anumber of reports of PNTL Task Forceabuses in the period between the formationof the task force in December 2007 andFebruary 2008. Allegations includedexcessive use of force and ill-treatmentduring arrest, abusive behaviour andunlawful searches of houses. There were

also reports of human rights abuses by theF-FDTL PNTL Joint Command 26

25 2009. Burying Asia's savage past. The Economist . (392)8637.26 The F-FDTL PNTL Joint Command wasformed in response to the attempted assassinationof Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao and PresidentJose Ramos-Hortas on 11 February 2008. The JointCommand continued to operate until 19 June 2009,when it was officially disbanded. A state of siegewas in place between 11 February and 22 May

2008 during which freedom of movement wasrestricted and the right of freedom to assemble anddemonstrate was suspended. See UNMIT. 2008.

following the assassination attempts on thePresident and the Prime Minister in 2008. 27

This is yet another area in which progresscan only be made if the governmentcooperates with the UN. As progress on this

front is vital if the UN is to considerdownsizing with a view to ending itsoperations in Timor-Leste, it is essential thatsome headway is made.

After the 2006 crisis, UNMIT introduced acertification system for PNTL members.Under this system existing PNTL membersand new recruits had to undergo a processof registration, provisional certification andfinal certification. PNTL members would be

screened, undergo five days of training,additional firearms certification and sixmonths of mentoring. 28 The aim of theprogramme was to uphold standards ofintegrity and capacity among police officers.

The success of the programme has howeverbeen questioned, as by June 2008 there hadbeen no dismissals on the grounds ofcriminal conduct or human rights abuses,despite numerous recommendations forsuch action.29 The programme undoubtedly

had the potential to succeed. However, thetraining period was hugely inadequate andfailure to dismiss those found unsuitable forpolicing destroyed the programmescredibility.

The third objective set out in UNMITsMedium term Strategy relates to democraticgovernance and seeks widespreadunderstanding, adoption of and adherenceto the values and principles of sustainable

democratic governance, throughout theinstitutions of State and society, whichcontribute to further strengthening the

Report on human rights developments in Timor- Leste .27 UNMIT. 2008. Report on human rightsdevelopments in Timor-Leste. pp.4-6.28 B. Wilson. 2008. Smoke and Mirrors in

Democratic Governance in Timor-Leste: Reconciling the Local and the National edited byDavid Mearns. Charles Darwin University Press:

Darwin. p.99.29 UNMIT. 2008. Report on human rightsdevelopments in Timor-Leste . p.8.


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institutional culture of democraticgovernance. 30 Benchmarks under thisobjective include a functioning professionaland independent media and a functioninganti-corruption regime. 31

The relative success of the 2007 presidentialand parliamentary elections can beattributed, at least in part, to the work ofUNMIT, the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) and the UnitedNations Population Fund (UNFPA). 80.5per cent of the population went to pollingstations to vote in the parliamentaryelections.32 While the elections were mostlypeaceful, there were some isolated incidents

of violence. This was to be expected and didnot mar the success of the elections in any way. However, the opposition party, theRevolutionary Front for an IndependentEast Timors (FRETILIN) continuingrefusal to recognize the ParliamentaryMajority Alliance (AMP) government, whichthey claim is unconstitutional, continues toimpede political stability in Timor-Leste.33 FRETILIN have on occasions threatened to

withdraw all their MPs from parliament,

believing that this would bring about ageneral election. They have also beenplanning a March for Peace, during whichthey would voice their claims that the AMPgovernment is illegitimate.34 Both thesemeasures are divisive, increasing the risk ofa return to violence in Timor-Leste.

On 5 November 2008, the Parliamentratified the United Nations Convention

30 UNMIT. 2009. Medium Term Strategy. p.11.31 United Nations Security Council. 2009. Report ofthe Secretary-General on the United Nations

Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 July 2008 to 20 January 2009). p.19.32 Gutteres. J.C. 2008. Timor-Leste: A Year ofDemocratic Elections, in Southeast Asian Affairs2008 edited by D. Singh and T.M.M. Than. pp.364-365.33 Ibid. p.365.34

International Crisis Group. 2009. Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency. Asia Briefing 87 . Dili/Brussels. p.9.

against Corruption. 35 This is a positive steptowards eradicating corruption in that itshows willingness to tackle the problem. Ithas however, had little impact on the levelsof corruption prevalent in Timor-Leste

today. Progress on the establishment of ananti-corruption commission has also beenslow and although the commission was setup last month it is not yet functioningeffectively. Senior officials, including thePrime Minister, have been implicated in anumber of corruption scandals over the last12 months, raising questions about theefficacy of UNMITs DemocraticGovernance Support Units (DGSU) work.

The spate of corruption scandals in recentmonths, combined with the governmentsuse of force to contain opposition anddiscontent suggest that UNMITs thirdobjective will not be achieved within themissions current mandate. The road toeliminating corruption and nepotism is likelyto be long. Corruption has penetrated thehighest echelons of government yet thePresident is unwilling to accept the fact thatsenior officials are guilty of corruption. It

will be impossible to eradicate low-levelcorruption while Timor-Lestes most seniorministers are steeped in controversy. Onceagain, UNMITs ability to rectify thissituation is limited. The mission is notmandated to compel the government to takeaction to resolve this issue. They can dolittle more than advise the Timoreseauthorities, who are at liberty to reject anyrecommendations proffered. UN missions

worldwide are often prevented from taking

affirmative action when it is most neededbecause they are limited by the constraintsof their mandates. Possible means forovercoming this problem will be consideredlater on in this paper, when the issue ofsovereignty is discussed.

UNMITs fourth objective is related tosocio-economic development and requires

35 United Nations Security Council. 2009. Report of

the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 July 2008 to 20 January 2009). p.4.


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a healthy, inclusive and sustainableeconomy which fosters social solidarity andprovides the necessary opportunities for

Timorese to support and developthemselves for more productive lives. 36

Benchmarks under this objective include thereintegration of internally displaced persons(IDPs), effective disaster managementstructures, increased employmentopportunities, access to water andsanitation, social welfare and socialprotection and a reduction in morbidity andmalnutrition.37

In July 2009 the last remaining IDP camp in Timor-Leste was closed. The event marked

a major transition for the country, signalingthe beginning of a more stable future for itscitizens. Those who had been living in thecamp were awarded a Government nationalrecovery package. However, not all thosedisplaced during the 2006 crisis have beenresettled and over 2000 people continue tolive in transitional huts.38 Moreover therehave been instances of villages rejectingreturning IDPs due to pre-conflictdisputes.39 It is essential that UNMIT,

together with other UN agencies and NGOsoperating in Timor-Leste work together toensure that these issues are resolved as soonas possible. It will only be possible for the

Timorese people to look to the future, whenthe instability and hardship they facedduring the 2006 crisis become problems ofthe past.

50 percent of the Timorese population livesbelow the national poverty line of US$0.88

per day and unemployment is rife.

36 UNMIT. 2009. Medium Term Strategy. p.15.37 United Nations Security Council. 2009. Report ofthe Secretary-General on the United Nations

Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 9 July 2008 to 20 January 2009). p.19. 38 Breakthrough as Timor's remaining IDP camp

begins to close. UNMIT. 2 July 2009.http://unmit.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=228&ctl=Details&mid=456&ItemID=4541.39 TIMOR-LEST: Returning IDPs rejected by

villagers IRIN . 11 May 2009.http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=84318

According to an IRIN report 50 per cent ofmen aged between 20 and 24 in Dili areunemployed.40 The issue of unemploymentmust also be tackled if Timor-Lesteseconomy is to become healthy and

sustainable. Not only is it hindering socio-economic development but is alsocontributing to the risk of political instabilityand higher levels of crime. However, failureto resolve these problems cannot beascribed to UNMIT alone. UNMIT is notthe only UN agency working on the issue ofsocio-economic development in Timor-Leste. Other UN agencies working in thisfield include the UNDP, the World HealthOrganization (WHO), the Food and

Agriculture Programme (FAO) and theUnited Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF).Moreover, the Timorese government alsobears responsibility for development.Greater inter-agency cooperation istherefore required to ensure that the fourthobjective is met.

It is clear that UNMIT is facing many of theobstacles described as generic limitations ofUN peace operations earlier on in this

paper. There can be no doubt therefore thatthese are real problems being experiencedby current UN missions and that they mustbe addressed. It is however important tonote that UNMITs failure to achieve themajority of its objectives to date does notmean that the mission has been a failure.

The mission has had a number of successes,most notably the presidential andparliamentary elections held in 2007. It doeshowever mean that like its predecessors, the

mission has been too passive. UNMIT mustplay a more proactive role in ensuring thatobjectives relating to SSR, justice andhuman rights and democratic governanceare met. The mission must also cooperate

with the other UN agencies and NGOs working in Timor-Leste to ensure thatprogress is made in the field of socio-economic development.

40 Grappling with youth unemployment. IRIN. 16

July 2009.http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85299.


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III The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

UNMIL was established on 19 September2003. The missions predecessor was theUnited Nations Observer Mission in Liberia(UNOMIL). UNMIL is an integratedmission and like UNMIT it has a multi-dimensional remit. The mission is currentlymandated to remain in Liberia until 30September 2010. The mandate was extendedon 15 September 2009 by Security CouncilResolution 1885, which authorises UNMILto assist the Liberian government with theforthcoming elections in 2011 and cites freeand fair elections as one of the prerequisitesfor the missions final drawdown. Theresolution also authorizes a significantdownsizing in terms of the number ofUNMIL military personnel but calls for thenumber of police personnel to remainconstant.41 This is largely due to theproblems outlined below.

In terms of the security sector, there aremany similarities between the challengesfacing UNMIT and the challenges facingUNMIL. Police reform in Liberia has beendescribed as an unqualified failure. This ismainly due to problems with the vettingprocedure. Critics allege that insufficientnumbers of corrupt officials were eliminatedin the early stages of the process.42 Thisproblem has also been highlighted as one ofthe failures of UNMIT, raising questionsabout the UNs approach to police reformnot just in Liberia but globally. Others claimthat too many high-ranking officials havebeen removed due to UN mistrust.Equipment shortages are also a majorproblem for the Liberian National Police(LNP). The UNs police trainingprogramme has however been relatively

41 United Nations Security Council. 2009. Resolution 1885 . pp. 2-3.42

International Crisis Group. 2009. Liberia:Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform . AfricaReport No. 148. Dakar/ Brussels. p. 17.

successful. While the original training period was to last 29 weeks, the training period hasnow been extended to one year. 43 A furthersuccess has been the deployment of theIndian Formed Female Police Unit(IFFPU). Mbadlanyana and Onuoha arguethat the establishment of Female PoliceUnits (FPUs) in multidimensionalpeacekeeping missions has generally beensuccessful stating that they serve as a veryimportant component in law enforcementmissions.44 The success of the IFFPU isparticularly important in view of theprevalence of sexual and gender crimes inLiberia.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commissionin Liberia concluded its mandate on 30 June2009. The commission has recommendedthe establishment of a criminal tribunal toprosecute those identified as havingcommitted gross violations of human rightsand economic crimes. Liberias President,Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf is among thoserecommended to be subject to publicsanctions including being barred frompublic office for a period of 30 years. 45 The

Truth and Reconciliation Commission inLiberia has certainly received more supportthan the commission in Timor-Leste.Questions do however remain regarding theimplementation of the commissionsrecommendations and in particularregarding the likelihood of thoserecommended for prosecution and

43 International Crisis Group. 2009 . Liberia:Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform . AfricaReport No. 148. Dakar/ Brussels. pp. 17-19.44 Mbadlanyana, Thembani and Onuoha, FreedomC. 2009. Peacekeeping and Post-conflictCriminality: Challenges to the (re-)establishmentof rule of law in Liberia. ISS Paper 190. p. 11.45 United Nations Security Council. 2009.

Nineteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia.

p. 2.


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sanctions facing justice. Recommendationsthat a court be established to try individuals

who bear the greatest responsibility forserious crimes and human rights violationsduring the conflict were met with open

threats from powerful former combatants,likely to be named for prosecution. 46

Between July 2008 and July 2009, 13 seriouscases of misconduct were carried out byUNMIL staff. These included nineallegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.122 minor misconduct cases involvingUNMIL staff were also reported in the sameperiod. These included petty theft involvingitems such as fuel and computers. 47

Although UNMIL is undertaking measuresto combat these problems, the number ofincidents of misconduct is still too high. TheUN loses credibility and the support of thelocal populace when staff are found to beguilty of misconduct, especially when theyare guilty of the same crimes, that the UNmissions deplore and are supposed to becombating.

There have however been successes. The

Disarmament, Demobilization,Rehabilitation and Reintegration programme(DDRR) was officially closed in July 2009.

The programme successfully disarmed anddemobilized more than 101,000 formercombatants and more than 90,000 ex-combatants received reintegration assistancesince its inception in 2003.48 Although muchremains to be done the programmesachievements are certainly a step in the rightdirection.

46 United Nations General Assembly. 2009. Implementation of the recommendations containedin the report of the Secretary-General on thecauses of conflict and the promotion of durable

peace and sustainable development in Africa:Progress report of the Secretary-General. p.10.47 United Nations Security Council. 2009.


p. 12.48 United Nations Security Council. 2009.


p. 4.

The mission in Liberia is often cited as anexample of what not to do in terms ofpeacekeeping. The reasons for this aremanifold. Malan argues that constitutional

reform, economic recovery and povertyreduction did not form a part of the UN-ledtransition process. He also states that majorhuman rights abuses and high levels ofsexual and gender based violence prevailbecause of the weak institutional base forthe rule of law. He adds that many tasksremain to be completed including thereintegration of war-affected persons andformer combatants, the consolidation ofstate authority throughout the country, the

rehabilitation of the judicial system, ensuringaccess to justice and carrying forward thesecurity sector reform programme. 49 Therecent extension of UNMILs mandateprovides hope that at least some of theseobjectives will be achieved before the UNsdeparture from Liberia. It seems unlikelyhowever, that significant progress will bemade on all fronts by 2011, especially in

view of the fact that UNMIL is facing manyof the problems faced by UNMIT and yet is

already in the process of downsizing.

49

Malan, Mark. 2008. Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings .Strategic Studies Institute. p. 3.


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IV The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)

Unlike UNMIT and UNMIL, UNMIN isnot an integrated mission. Established on23 January 2007, UNMIN is classified as aspecial political mission and is led by theUNs Department of Political Affairs asopposed to being managed by theDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations.Its current mandate extends until 23 January2010. A gradual reduction in staff numbersis taking place. UNMIN initially provided

electoral assistance and ceasefire monitoringbut the missions current mandate coversarms monitoring, mine action and humanrights. The United Nations Country Team(UNCT) is also cooperating with UNMINon state transformation, recovery andconflict prevention and reconciliation.

Unlike the other missions discussed in thispaper and unlike other UN missions

worldwide UNMIN did not at any stage

include armed peacekeepers. UNMINceasefire observers were both unarmed andcivilian. The missions mandate did notinclude provisions for humanitarianassistance and reconstruction and it madeno provision for broader peacebuildingfunctions in the legal, political and socialfield. This was largely due to the presence ofUN agencies and international aidorganisations who were already well-established in Nepal.50

UNMINs mandate has been extended fourtimes since the missions intendedcompletion date of January 2008. Eachextension has been for a period of sixmonths. This suggests that the UN has beenunrealistic about what is achievable in Nepaland about the time frames involved. Thereis also evidence to suggest that the UN

50

Suhrke, Astri. 2009. UN Support forPeacebuilding: Nepal as the Exceptional Case .Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. p. 15.

began to reduce UNMIN staff numbers toosoon, before many of the challenges facingNepal were resolved. This is highlighted bythe fact that UNMIN has downsized despitethe fact that key issues like the failure todischarge disqualified Maoist combatantsand the continued existence of Maoistcantonments have not been met with asolution. This is a problem experienced inmany countries where UN missions are

operating and as such must be addressed atthe Security Council level, rather than at amission level.

According to the UN Secretary-Generalthe modest progress witnessed in someaspects of the peace process during the firstquarter of 2009 has stalled against abackdrop of mistrust and a furtherdeterioration of relations among keystakeholders, notably between UCPN-M

and the other major parties and betweenUCPN-M and the Nepal Army. 51 Ashighlighted above, the reduction in UNMINstaff numbers does not reflect the lack ofprogress made in terms of politicalstabilization in Nepal. However, theinnumerable extensions of the missionsmandate are unsustainable. UNMIN willhave to terminate its operation in Nepal inthe relatively near future, but despiteprogress on some fronts the UN will be

departing without having truly fulfilled theirmandate.

UNMIN has received a lot of bad press andthere is a lot of resentment of what isconsidered to be outside interference inNepal. This is ironic, considering the factthat UNMIN remains in Nepal at the

51 United Nations Security Council. Report of theSecretary-General on the request of Nepal forUnited Nations assistance in support of its peace

process. 13 July 2009. p.1.


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request of the Nepalese government.Moreover, ICG argues that UNMIN doesnot have either the will or capacity toengage in any of the skullduggery that Indiadoes so brazenly, suggesting thereby, that

the resentment and the criticism, whichUNMIN faces, are largely unfounded andunjustified. This resentment wasexacerbated by the fact that in May 2009, aleaked videotape showing Prachandramaking a speech to Maoist armycommanders and personnel in Chitwan wasbroadcast on local television and radiostations. In his speech he stated that thenumber of personnel presented for UN

verification and registration had been

significantly inflated. He also claimed thatsome of the money allocated for Maoistcantonments would be used to prepare fora revolt. This prompted questions aboutUNMINs role in the verification process,

which took place in the latter half of 2007. 52

As in Timor-Leste, no progress has beenmade in terms of justice and human rights.

As yet there are no measures in place toensure that perpetrators of human rights

abuses, past and present, are brought tojustice. The criminal investigations intoallegations of human rights abuses bymembers of the Nepal Army and the Maoist

Army have also failed to progress.53 Humanrights violations continue to be a part ofeveryday life and the government showslittle inclination towards tackling theproblem.

The ICG argues that one of UNMINs key

weaknesses is its mandate, stating that themandate is limited with a primaryresponsibility to monitor the management

52 United Nations Security Council. Report of theSecretary-General on the request of Nepal forUnited Nations assistance in support of its peace

process . 13 July 2009. p.2.53 United Nations Security Council. Report of theSecretary-General on the request of Nepal forUnited Nations assistance in support of its peace

process . 13 July 2009. p.9.

of arms and armies. 54 This is arguably theproblem with a number of UN missions.

While the mission in Nepal is among the weaker UN missions, the majority ofmandates do not seem to be extensive

enough. The UN lacks the power toimplement measures, which would reallymake a difference. UNMINs progress hasalso been impeded by the continuing lack ofsupport from both India and the UNSecurity Council. India in particular has beenreluctant to allow UNMIN to broaden itsmandate55, an act which would undoubtedlyhave prevented the current stalematesituation. Nepal is a key example of thedivisiveness of interference by regional

actors when those regional actors have vested interests in the peace process.

Interestingly, Suhrke argues that UNMINhelped move the conflict over the criticalhurdle that separated the military from thepolitical arena. She states that only a neutral,third party like the UN could havesatisfactorily taken on these functions. 56 Thisis a key point. Despite its failings the UN isable to make progress in areas in which local

and regional actors, due to their own vestedinterests and regional tensions, are able toachieve very little. The UN, as aninternational organisation with aninternational staff is neutral and is thus ableto approach peacekeeping from a non-partisan perspective, making it the mosteffective organisation, in terms ofpeacekeeping, that exists today.

It seems clear that despite past failures,

UNMIN remains the best placedorganization in terms of peacebuilding inNepal. Indias political agenda and themissions weak mandate have hindered the

54 International Crisis Group. 2009. NepalsFuture: In Whose Hands? Asia Report No. 173.Kathmandu/ Brussels. pp. 28 - 29.55 Suhrke, Astri. 2009. UN Support forPeacebuilding: Nepal as the Exceptional Case .Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. p. 29.56

Suhrke, Astri. 2009. UN Support forPeacebuilding: Nepal as the Exceptional Case. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. p. 15.


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UNs ability to make significant progress inrecent months. Without a broader mandateand a boost in capacity it is unlikely thatadvances will be made before the end of themissions mandate in January 2010. Even if

those conditions were to be met, six months will not be a sufficient time period to turn

matters around. Instead of the six monthmandate extensions that have been takingplace, UNMINs mandate should beextended for one year. This would serve toincrease both the missions credibility and to

enable more effective mission planning dueto the more realistic timescale.


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V The Question of Sovereignty

One of the key discussion points relating topeacekeeping and peacebuilding issovereignty. Suhrke argues that nationalistreactions are familiar in all peacekeepingoperations. Referring to Nepal, she statesthat nationalist reactions limited UNMINspolitical room for action, and, when backedby the Indian government for other reasons,blocked the possibility for increasinginternational assistance at a juncture whenthe peace process appeared to stall. 57 Shealso argues that Nepalese ownership

weakened the peace process, citing Nepal asa definitive example of national ownershiphaving a negative rather than a positiveimpact on peacebuilding.58 A similarargument could be made when consideringthe case of Timor-Leste. The UNs inabilityto impinge on national sovereignty withregard to issues relating to justice andhuman rights has seriously impededprogress towards stability.

The drive to retain full sovereignty duringpeace operations makes successfulimplementation of UN mandatesimpossible. The UN is present because localefforts to resolve conflicts and to buildpeace have failed. It is therefore essentialthat the UN is given the necessary scope toimplement its own policies in a bid tostabilize the countries in which it operates.

The restrictions placed upon the UN bygovernments in the name of sovereigntyprevent the UN from achieving itsobjectives. A key example of this is the caseof the African Union/ United NationsHybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

The Sudanese Governments insistence on

57 Suhrke, Astri. 2009. UN Support forPeacebuilding: Nepal as the Exceptional Case .Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. p. 47.58

Suhrke, Astri. 2009. UN Support forPeacebuilding: Nepal as the Exceptional Case. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. p. 48.

being centrally involved in all decisionsrelating to UNAMID proved to be a severehindrance to the effective implementation ofthe mission. Wiharta states that in no otherpeace operation in recent history was thehost government given so much influence.She adds that the Sudanese Governmentsaim was apparently to weaken UNAMID. 59

This suggests that the UNs attempts topromote inclusiveness and local ownershipactually served to enable the SudaneseGovernment to impede the UNs ability tofulfill its mandate. This has undoubtedly alsobeen the case in other countries hosting UNmissions.

Krasner supports this view, arguing thatconventional sovereignty does not work. Headvocates the implementation of sharedsovereignty whereby individuals chosen byinternational organizations, powerful statesor ad hoc entities would share authority withnationals over some aspects of domesticsovereignty would be a useful policyoption.60 He suggests that sharedsovereignty could be established throughtreaties or through unilateralcommitments. 61 A key objection to sharedsovereignty is the question of how toconvince states to accept such an agreement.Krasner argues that political leaders mightaccept shared sovereignty in order to secureexternal resources, to encourage thedeparture of occupying forces or to attract

voters. He goes on to state that shared

59 Wiharta, Sharon. 2008. Planning and deploying peace operations in SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and InternationalSecurity . p. 107.60 Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. Sharing Sovereignty:

New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States. International Security . Vol. 29 (4). p. 89.61

Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States. International Security . Vol. 29 (4). p. 108.


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sovereignty institutions would requireexternal enforcement or adequate domesticsupport in order to be durable. 62 Even withthese incentives it seems unlikely that theconcept of shared sovereignty will be

popular in countries hosting UN peaceoperations. Mohamed, on the other handargues that Liberia, Timor-Leste, Kosovoand Somalia are just some examples of cases

where the UN has discarded the mantle ofblind adherence to the principle ofnonintervention and has taken action. 63 Itseems clear however that while the UN mayhave stepped away from the extreme stance

which led to catastrophes like the genocidein Rwanda, it has not gone far enough in

terms of moving towards assuming a moreproactive peacekeeping and peacebuildingrole. This is highlighted by the stalematesituation in Nepal and the lack of progresson Security Sector Reform in Liberia. Thejustice and human rights situation in Timor-Leste also reflects this.

62 Krasner, Stephen D. 2004. Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States. International Security . Vol. 29 (4). p. 119.63 Mohamed, Saira. 2005. From Keeping Peace to

Building Peace: A Proposal for a RevitalisedTrusteeship Council. Columbia Law Review. Vol,105(809). p. 819


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VI Alternatives to UN led missions

The UN missions discussed above faceseveral common challenges. This isntnecessarily a negative factor as the fact thatmissions face the same obstacles across theboard should in theory make it easier for theUN to combat them. Yet the obstaclesdescribed above are almost impossible toovercome. This is because they are notmerely matters of policy, which can beresolved by policy reform. One of thegreatest problems facing the UN is in factfinancial. There can be no doubt thatadditional funding is required, but thequestion of where it should come fromremains. The same applies to personnelissues. Additional qualified personnel willnot simply materialize, the personnelquestion is a long-term issue. Finally, thereis the issue of cooperation between the UNand the countries, which host the missions.In many cases, a major societal change isrequired in order to bring about the stabilityand development, which the UN is workingfor. This cannot be achieved in two or threeyears. It is therefore possible to improve theeffectiveness of UN peacekeeping missionsthrough policy measures to a certain extent,but obstacles to successful implementation

will remain for the foreseeable future.

This raises the question of whether there areany alternatives to the UN. The EuropeanUnion (EU) has launched a number ofpeacekeeping missions in recent years.

These include EUFOR Tchad/RCA 64 andthe Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). It ishowever worth questioning whether the EUcan really be more successful on thepeacekeeping front than the UN. If the UNfaces resentment in parts of the world it islikely that the EU will be resented too. Inthe case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA forexample, the force was associated withFrance, the former colonial power and

64 Known in English as the European Union Forcein Chad and the Central African Republic.

perceived as a government ally by somerebel groups.65 Moreover, the EU has littleexperience of planning and conductingpeacekeeping operations as it only deployedits first missions in 2003.66 The North

Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) isalso leading a number of military operations,most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. Themilitary alliances first intervention was inthe Balkans in 1995. NATO also providessupport to the AU mission in Somalia(AMISOM) by providing airlift assistance to

AU peacekeepers. 67 It is important to notethat while the EU and NATO are bothregional organizations and shouldtechnically be looked at in the same contextas other regional organizations like the AUand ASEAN, unlike their counterparts theseorganizations largely operate outside of theirhome region. For the purposes of this paperthey must therefore be considered asinternational actors, as that is the role theyplay when they launch missions in othercontinents.

Another alternative to the UN is a smallcountry initiative. Particularly interesting isthe possibility of the Scandinavian countriesplaying an even greater role in peacekeepingand peacebuilding than they do today. Thissolution is worth considering becausebesides being economically and politicallystable, they have none of the vested interestsin the rest of the world, which shape somuch of Western policy. Moreover, theyalready have experience of conflictresolution and peacekeeping due to their

65 Wiharta, Sharon. 2008. Planning and deploying peace operations in SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and InternationalSecurity. p. 110.66 Wiharta, Sharon. 2008. Planning and deploying

peace operations in SIPRI Yearbook 2008:Armaments,67

Seehttp://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm


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significant efforts in conflict mediation andthe large number of troops they contributeto international peacekeeping andpeacebuilding initiatives. While Nordicattempts to resolve the conflict in Sri Lanka

failed, Finnish parties played a significantrole in resolving the conflict in Aceh. Thisincreased their credibility on theinternational stage. A military cooperationbetween the Nordic countries already exists.NORDCAPS was established in 1997 andsupports UN led peacekeeping operations.It also supports missions led by otherorganizations. The Nordic countries alsohave a Nordic Battlegroup, which is one ofeighteen European Union Battlegroups. As

yet neither of these organizations hasundertaken their own peacekeepinginitiative, acting instead in support of largerinternational powers. It would however be

worth evaluating the possibility ofNORDCAPS leading their own mission.

Would this be counterproductive or couldsuch a mission be more successful thanlarger coalitions like the UN and the EU?

It is also necessary to consider the role that

regional organisations can play inpeacekeeping and peacebuilding within theirmember countries. While the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) hastraditionally shied away from involvement ininternal conflicts, the organization couldplay a significant role in bringing about andsustaining peace in the Southeast Asiaregion. Indonesia proposed a Southeast

Asian Peacekeeping Force in 2004 but theplan has yet to come to fruition. 68 The

African Union is already engaged inpeacekeeping. It deployed its firstpeacekeeping mission to Burundi in 2003and a subsequent mission was deployed toDarfur in 2004. It currently has a mission inSomalia, the African Union Mission toSomalia (AMISOM).69 The EconomicCommunity of West African States

68 See http://www.aseansec.org/afp/20.htm69 Murithi, Tim. 2009. The African Unions foray

into peacekeeping: lessons to be learnt from theHybrid Mission in Darfur. Journal of PeaceConflict and Development. Issue 14. p. 2.

(ECOWAS) has also been engaged inpeacekeeping. They established theEconomic Community of West AfricanStates Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), themilitary branch of ECOWAS in 1990.

ECOMOG troops undertook, with varyingdegrees of success, peacekeeping operationsin Liberia in 1990, Sierra Leone in 1998 andGuinea- Bissau in 1998. ECOMOG troopsremain on standby for deployment at shortnotice.70

The danger of having too many partiesinvolved in the peacekeeping process is thatresources end up being spread too thinly. Ifthe EU for example, contributed the

resources used to finance and staff its ownpeacekeeping missions to the UN efforts,then the UN would arguably be moreeffective. This is again highlighted by thesituation in Chad, where there is both anEU and a UN presence (United NationsMission in the Central African Republic andChad - MINURCAT). Often missionsmandates tend to overlap and rather thancooperating to maximize the effectivenessof the peacekeeping effort, missions fail to

communicate and thus duplicate the same work in the best case and in the worst caseactually end up competing against eachother. If there are to be a number ofdifferent peacekeeping efforts, then the

various parties involved in the process mustlearn to collaborate effectively to ensure astreamlined approach to stabilization andnation-building.

Organisations like the EU and NATO are

hindered by the fact that they are notrepresentative. They act on behalf of agroup of developed nations, many of whomare indirectly responsible for the conflictsthat they are now helping to resolve. TheUN is more representative and despiteclaims that the UN is largely led by USpolicy and that the Security Council isoutdated it is the one organisation, whichrepresents 192 nations and therefore the

70

Seehttp://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/peace.htm


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least likely to adopt partisan policies.Regional organisations also have a part toplay in keeping the peace, especially as theyoften have strong cultural ties with theparties involved. This can however also be a

hindrance and as such an internationalpresence in most conflict zones is to bedesired. Another argument against theinvolvement of regional organisations inpeacekeeping is that there is a disparity inthe number of resources available todifferent regional bodies and that this couldlead to a de facto class system in regionalresponses.71 Wulf argues that regionalorganizations ability to be effectivepeacekeepers and peacebuilders is hindered

by five weaknesses. He states that a lack ofcommon values, in particular politicaldifferences is one of these obstacles. Headds that contested sovereignty, overlappingresponsibilities and lack of capacity along

with the problem of dominant regionalpowers all prevent regional organizationsfrom taking on a more proactive role inpost-conflict environments. 72 This is inkeeping with the arguments presentedabove. It therefore seems clear that an

improved UN approach to peacekeepingand peacebuilding is favorable to thealternative options discussed above.

71 Cockayne, James and David M. Malone. 2005.The Ralph Bunche Centennial: Peace OperationsThen and Now. Global Governance . Issue 11. p.337.72

Wulf, Herbert. 2009. Still under Construction.Regional Organisations Capacities for ConflictPrevention. INEF Report. pp. 7-11.


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VII The Road Ahead

It seems clear that regardless of geographicallocation, current UN peacekeeping andpeacebuilding missions face very similarchallenges. There are differences betweenmissions due to mandates, capacity and thedimensions of the conflicts from which eachcountry is emerging. However, thesimilarities outweigh these differences andthus a general study of the efficacy of UNled missions provides an interesting insightinto the obstacles facing these operationstoday.

In view of the criticism faced by the UNregarding its peace operations, alternativesto UN led missions have been considered inthis paper. It seems clear however that theUN is still the most effective leader ofpeacekeeping initiatives in the world today.

This is largely due to the fact that incomplex post-conflict situations there willnever be a perfect solution. Resourceshortages are unlikely to be a short-termproblem and mistakes will always be madein high-pressure situations, regardless of

who is responsible for leading missions.Moreover, regional missions are oftentainted by the vested interests of theorganisation or the member countriesleading the missions while the EU andNATO are frequently seen as imperialistsdue to the fact that several of their membercountries have histories as colonisers. Themistrust brought about by suchmisperceptions seriously hinders theseorganisations ability to lead peaceoperations effectively. The UN has over 60years of experience in this field making themby far the most experienced peacekeepersand peacebuilders in the world today.

Yet, the UN is also tainted by its failings. The question of how the efficacy of the UNmissions can be improved remains. Listedbelow are a number of policyrecommendations detailing how the

effectiveness of the individual missionsdiscussed in this paper can be improved.

These recommendations are followed by anumber of general recommendationsdetailing how the UN approach topeacekeeping could be amended in order toincrease the UNs credibility in the eyes ofthose countries hosting UN missions and toensure a greater mission success rate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In Timor Leste

Greater collaboration between UNMIT and Timorese government agencies is essential ifthe UNs Medium Term Strategy objectivesare to be achieved. This is particularlyimportant in so far as the issue ofcorruption is concerned. Corruption has adebilitating effect on all aspects ofgovernment and thus renders it extremely

difficult for UN peace missions to fulfilltheir mandates.

It is vital that the UN takes its missionbeyond Dili. Stability will not be establishedif the poorest rural areas do not benefitfrom the UN presence in Timor-Leste. Thepoorer communities are more likely tobecome disaffected with the government iftheir needs are not met so it is essential thatthey receive support and rehabilitation

where necessary.

Increased cooperation between UNPOLand the PNTL is a key factor in the successof UNMIT. The PNTLs failure tocooperate with the UNPOL to date hasseriously impeded progress towards acomplete handover of policingresponsibilities to the PNTL.

Despite the governments reluctance to

pursue the issue of persecuting thoseresponsible for violence in 1999 and 2006, it


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is essential that UNMIT continues the drivefor an International War Crimes Tribunal tobring those responsible for crimes againsthumanity to justice. These will serve torestore faith in the government and in the

UN, providing the people of Timor-Leste with the opportunity to lay the past to restknowing that justice has been served.

More effective UNPOL-UNPOLcooperation is necessary if UNMIT is tosucceed in bringing about police reform.UNPOL officers cannot serve as effectivementors and advisors if they do not have anin-depth understanding of the situation onthe ground. It is therefore necessary for

UNPOL to ensure that there is a handoverperiod, during which outgoing officers canbrief incoming officers on the latestdevelopments.

In Liberia

It is important that the Liberian governmentundertakes steps to follow up the Truth andReconciliation Commissionsrecommendations. UNMIL must provide

the support necessary to ensure that thisprocess runs smoothly. Without suchsupport there is a danger that the process

will become sidelined and that the yearsspent investigating crimes against humanity

will have been wasted.

There must be greater emphasis on SecuritySector Reform especially with regard to thepolice. This is essential if the Liberiangovernment is to be successful in combating

the alarming number of serious crimestaking place in Liberia at present.

In Nepal

The UN must continue to provide supportto the government of Nepal to ensure thatthe target deadline for the drafting of the

new constitution is met. Stability in Nepal will not be achieved until such time as thenew constitution is in place. Delays on thisfront have been seriously hampering thepeace process.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Mission staff must play a proactive role inachieving benchmarks and objectives set out

in mission strategies and mandates. Passivitygreatly increases the risk of mission failure.

The UN needs more representative anddiverse peacekeeping forces. The emphasison recruiting peacekeeping troops almostexclusively from developing countries has insome cases led to poorly equipped andundertrained peacekeeping forces. Thistrend must be reversed and developedcountries must be encouraged to provide

troops, despite their many non-UNengagements.

Greater cooperation between UN missionsand other peacekeeping forces is vital forthe success of UN peacekeeping andpeacebuilding. It is essential that there is aslittle overlap as possible between the workof UN missions and the work of otherpeacekeeping forces in order to ensuremaximum efficiency.

.


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WEBSITES

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About the AuthorMs. Anna Louise Strachan is a Research Intern at IPCS. She holds an MSc in Asian Politicsfrom the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and a BA in MiddleEastern Studies with Arabic from the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom. Her researchinterests include intra-state conflict, territorial disputes and the role of international organisations

in conflict resolution..

Documents

Peacekeeping and Peacebuildwwing in Post-Conflict Environments