Persons and Family Relationscases

8/10/2019 Persons and Family Relationscases

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lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to thedistributive shares to which each person is entitledunder the law, the controversy shall be heard anddecided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alonesufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11September 1995 it declared null and void the 27November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988order of the trial court, and directed the remand ofthe case to the trial court for further proceedings.[8]On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]

Should this case be remanded to the lower court forfurther proceedings? Petitioner insists that there isno need because, first, no legal or factual issueobtains for resolution either as to the heirship of thePadlan children or as to their respective shares inthe intestate estate of the decedent; and, second,the issue as to who between petitioner and private

respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is oneof law which can be resolved in the present petitionbased on established facts and admissions of theparties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision reliedupon by respondent court is clear: If there is acontroversy before the court as to who are thelawful heirs of the deceased person or as to thedistributive shares to which each person is entitledunder the law, the controversy shall be heard anddecided as in ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute existseither as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children toinherit from the decedent because there are proofsthat they have been duly acknowledged by him andpetitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs ofArturo Padlan;[10] nor as to their respectivehereditary shares. But controversy remains as towho is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.The trial court, after the parties other than petitionerfailed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23October 1987 of the motion for immediatedeclaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simplyissued an order requiring the submission of therecords of birth of the Padlan children within ten(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with orwithout the documents, the issue on declaration ofheirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motionprivate respondent raised, among others, the issueas to whether petitioner was still entitled to inheritfrom the decedent considering that she had secureda divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twiceremarried. She also invoked the above quoted

procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied thatArturo was a Filipino and as such remained legallymarried to her in spite of the divorce theyobtained.[12] Reading between the lines, theimplication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipinocitizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. Thisshould have prompted the trial court to conduct ahearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose ofa hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters inissue with the aid of documentary and testimonialevidence as well as the arguments of the partieseither supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in herfavor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v.Escao.

Then in private respondent's motion to set asideand/or reconsider the lower court's decision shestressed that the citizenship of petitioner wasrelevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.

Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorcesabroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,provided they are valid according to their nationallaw. She prayed therefore that the case be set forhearing.[14] Petitioner opposed the motion butfailed to squarely address the issue on hercitizenship.[15] The trial court did not grant privaterespondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded toresolve her motion with the finding that bothpetitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens andwere married in the Philippines."[16] It maintainedthat their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine

jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on theircitizenship pertained solely to the time of theirmarriage as the trial court was not supplied with abasis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the timeof their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whethershe was still a Filipino citizen when their divorcewas decreed. The trial court must have overlookedthe materiality of this aspect. Once proved that shewas no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of theirdivorce, Van Dorn would become applicable andpetitioner could very well lose her right to inheritfrom Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue onpetitioner's citizenship;[17] it did not meritenlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In thepresent proceeding, petitioner's citizenship isbrought anew to the fore by private respondent. Sheeven furnishes the Court with the transcript ofstenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during thehearing for the reconstitution of the original of acertain transfer certificate title as well as theissuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereofbefore another trial court. When asked whether she


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was an American citizen petitioner answered thatshe was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree ofdivorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in thesame year. Petitioner however did not bother to filea reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty abouther citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factualissue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trialcourt. Consequently, respondent appellate court didnot err in ordering the case returned to the trial courtfor further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to bedetermined by the trial court should be limited onlyto the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as hissurviving spouse. Private respondent's claim toheirship was already resolved by the trial court. Sheand Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while theprior marriage of petitioner and Arturo wassubsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriageconsidered void from the beginning under Arts. 80

and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not asurviving spouse that can inherit from him as thisstatus presupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]

As regards the motion of private respondent forpetitioner and her counsel to be declared incontempt of court and that the present petition bedismissed for forum shopping,[21] the same lacksmerit. For forum shopping to exist the actions mustinvolve the same transactions and same essentialfacts and circumstances. There must also beidentical causes of action, subject matter andissue.[22] The present petition deals with

declaration of heirship while the subsequentpetitions filed before the three (3) trial courtsconcern the issuance of new owner's duplicatecopies of titles of certain properties belonging to theestate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason todeclare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Thedecision of respondent Court of Appeals orderingthe remand of the case to the court of origin forfurther proceedings and declaring null and void itsdecision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and RupertoT. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. Theorder of the appellate court modifying its previousdecision by granting one-half (1/2) of the nethereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely,Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan,instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, islikewise AFFIRMED. The Court howeveremphasizes that the reception of evidence by thetrial court should be limited to the hereditary rightsof petitioner as the surviving spouse of ArturoPadlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel incontempt of court and to dismiss the presentpetition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------* The name of private respondent Blandina Dandanappears as Blandina Padlan in the proceedingsbefore the lower courts.

[1] No. L-19671, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 355.

[2] Id., p. 367.

[3] Then Art. 190 of the Civil Code provided that inthe absence of an express declaration in themarriage settlement, the separation of propertybetween spouses during the marriage shall not takeplace save in virtue of a judicial order. Quite inrelation thereto, then Art. 191, par. 4 of the sameCode provided that the husband and the wife mayagree upon the dissolution of the conjugalpartnership during the marriage, subject to judicialapproval.

[4] Decision penned by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo Jr.of RTC-Br. 105, Quezon City; Appendix "A" of Brief

for the Oppositors-Appellants; CA Rollo, p. 15.

[5] Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides thatshould brothers and sisters or their children survivewith the widow or widower, the latter shall beentitled to one-half of the inheritance and thebrothers and sisters or their children to the otherhalf.

[6] Appendix "B" of Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; See Note 4.

[7] Article 998 of the Civil Code provides that if awidow or widower survives with illegitimate children,such widow or widower shall be entitled to one-halfof the inheritance, and the illegitimate children ortheir descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,to the other half.

[8] Decision penned by Justice Pacita Caizares-Nye with the concurrence of Justices Romeo J.Callejo Jr. and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis; Rollo, p.39.


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[9] Id., p. 42.

[10] Id., p. 180.

[11] Rollo, p. 196.

[12] CA Rollo, p. 29.

[13] G. R. No. 68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA139.

[14] CA Rollo, p. 30.

[15] Record on Appeal, pp. 24-26.

[16] Rollo, p. 206.

[17] Brief of Oppositors-Appellants, p. 13; CA Rollo,p. 15.

[18] Brief of Appellee; Id., p. 17.

[19] Rollo, pp. 225-226.

[20] Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries andJurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,1979 Ed., Vol. III, p. 264.

[21] Rollo, pp. 129-132.

[22] Professional Regulation Commission v. Courtof Appeals, G. R. No. 117817, 9 July 1998.

FIRST DIVISION[ G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000 ]

PAULA T. LLORENTE, PETITIONER, VS. COURTOF APPEALS AND ALICIA F. LLORENTE,

RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision ofthe Court of Appeals[1] modifying that of theRegional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35,Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente(herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners ofwhatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo

N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo")may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) yearsthat they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlistedserviceman of the United States Navy from March10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner PaulaLlorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") weremarried before a parish priest, Roman CatholicChurch, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzodeparted for the United States and Paula stayed inthe conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,

Camarines Sur.[5]

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted toUnited States citizenship and Certificate ofNaturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favorby the United States District Court, Southern Districtof New York.[6]

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by theAmerican Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted anaccrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wifeand he visited the Philippines.[7] He discovered thathis wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and

having an adulterous relationship with his brother,Ceferino Llorente.[8]

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boyregistered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as"Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating thatthe child was not legitimate and the line for thefather's name was left blank.[9]

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her.In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew awritten agreement to the effect that (1) all the familyallowances allotted by the United States Navy aspart of Lorenzo's salary and all other obligations forPaula's daily maintenance and support would besuspended; (2) they would dissolve their maritalunion in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3)they would make a separate agreement regardingtheir conjugal property acquired during their maritallife; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula forher adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted herfault and agreed to separate from Lorenzopeacefully. The agreement was signed by bothLorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula's


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father and stepmother. The agreement wasnotarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]

Lorenzo returned to the United States and onNovember 16, 1951 filed for divorce with theSuperior Court of the State of California in and forthe County of San Diego. Paula was representedby counsel, John Riley, and actively participated inthe proceedings. On November 27, 1951, theSuperior Court of the State of California, for theCounty of San Diego found all factual allegations tobe true and issued an interlocutory judgment ofdivorce.[11]

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree becamefinal.[12]

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to thePhilippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F.Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had noknowledge of the first marriage even if they residedin the same town as Paula, who did not oppose themarriage or cohabitation.[14]

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia livedtogether as husband and wife.[15] Their twenty-five(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luzand Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Willand Testament. The will was notarized by Notary

Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzowith attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, FranciscoNeibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzobequeathed all his property to Alicia and their threechildren, to wit:

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R.FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot,located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,Philippines, including ALL the personal propertiesand other movables or belongings that may befound or existing therein;

"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wifeAlicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, inequal shares, all my real properties whatsoever andwheresoever located, specifically my real propertieslocated at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, CamarinesSur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur;Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, CamarinesSur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,Nabua, Camarines Sur;

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively untomy wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children,Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties locatedin Quezon City Philippines, and covered by TransferCertificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands inAntipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by TransferCertificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both ofthe Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,Philippines;

"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personalproperties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold andconveyed to any other persons, but could only besold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by andamong themselves;

"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be

the sole executor of this my Last Will andTestament, and in her default or incapacity of thelatter to act, any of my children in the order of age, ifof age;

"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named hereinor her lawful substitute should served (sic) withoutbond;

"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills,codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretoforeexecuted, signed, or published, by me;

"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, norelatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente'sSide should ever bother and disturb in any mannerwhatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and mychildren with respect to any real or personalproperties I gave and bequeathed respectively toeach one of them by virtue of this Last Will andTestament."[17]

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with theRegional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, apetition for the probate and allowance of his last willand testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Aliciabe appointed Special Administratrix of hisestate.[18]

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied themotion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo wasstill alive.[19]

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was dulyexecuted, the trial court admitted the will toprobate.[20]


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On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could beterminated, Lorenzo died.[21]

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the samecourt a petition[22] for letters of administration overLorenzo's estate in her favor. Paula contended (1)that she was Lorenzo's surviving spouse, (2) thatthe various property were acquired during theirmarriage, (3) that Lorenzo's will disposed of all hisproperty in favor of Alicia and her children,encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in theconjugal property.[23]

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testateproceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for theissuance of letters testamentary.[24]

On October 14, 1985, without terminating thetestate proceedings, the trial court gave due courseto Paula's petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order waspublished in the newspaper "Bicol Star".[26]

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued ajoint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so foundthat the divorce decree granted to the late LorenzoLlorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,therefore the marriage he contracted with AliciaFortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise

void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorentefor the issuance of letters testamentary is denied.Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any sharefrom the estate even if the will especially said so herrelationship with Lorenzo having gained the statusof paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

"On the other hand, the court finds the petition ofPaula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declaresthe intrinsic disposition of the will of LorenzoLlorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declaresher entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primarycompulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled toone-third of the estate and then one-third should goto the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly,all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition inequal shares and also entitled to the remaining freeportion in equal shares.

"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legaladministrator of the estate of the deceased, LorenzoLlorente. As such let the corresponding letters ofadministration issue in her favor upon her filing a

bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00conditioned for her to make a return to the courtwithin three (3) months a true and completeinventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits,and estate which shall at any time come to herpossession or to the possession of any other personfor her, and from the proceeds to pay and dischargeall debts, legacies and charges on the same, orsuch dividends thereon as shall be decreed orrequired by this court; to render a true and justaccount of her administration to the court within one(1) year, and at any other time when required by thecourt and to perform all orders of this court by her tobe performed.

"On the other matters prayed for in respectivepetitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

"SO ORDERED."[27]

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion forreconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]

On September 14, 1987, the trial court deniedAlicia's motion for reconsideration but modified itsearlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorenteare not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzosince they were not legally adopted by him.[29]Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trialcourt declared Beverly Llorente as the onlyillegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third(1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the freeportion of the estate.[30]

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed tothe Court of Appeals.[31]

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgatedits decision, affirming with modification the decisionof the trial court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from ishereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION thatAlicia is declared as co-owner of whateverproperties she and the deceased may haveacquired during the twenty-five (25) years ofcohabitation.

"SO ORDERED."[32]

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Courtof Appeals a motion for reconsideration of thedecision.[33]

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34]denied the motion for lack of merit.


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Hence, this petition.[35]

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sortingthrough the various arguments raised,[36] the issueis simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the lateLorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court ofAppeals. We remand the case to the trial court forruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of thedeceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente becamean American citizen long before and at the time of:(1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3)execution of his will; and (4) death, is dulyestablished, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidentsare necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, orto the status, condition and legal capacity ofpersons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal propertyis subject to the law of the country where it issituated.

"However, intestate and testamentary succession,both with respect to the order of succession and tothe amount of successional rights and to theintrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall beregulated by the national law of the person whosesuccession is under consideration, whatever maybe the nature of the property and regardless of thecountry wherein said property may be found."(emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in ourjurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, theymust be alleged and proved.[37]

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded,the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law.The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to thefore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was"referred back" to the law of the decedent'sdomicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the lawof New York was not sufficiently proven, in thesame breath it made the categorical, albeit equallyunproven statement that "American law follows the`domiciliary theory' hence, Philippine law applieswhen determining the validity of Lorenzo's will.[38]

First, there is no such thing as one American law.The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the CivilCode cannot possibly apply to general Americanlaw. There is no such law governing the validity oftestamentary provisions in the United States. EachState of the union has its own law applicable to its

citizens and in force only within the State. It cantherefore refer to no other than the law of the Stateof which the decedent was a resident.[39] Second,there is no showing that the application of the renvoidoctrine is called for or required by New York Statelaw.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsicallyinvalid since it contained dispositions in favor ofAlice, who in the trial court's opinion was a mereparamour. The trial court threw the will out, leavingAlice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, withnothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. Itdeclared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whateverproperty she and Lorenzo acquired during theircohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Codeof the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and thecomplete disregard of the will, already probated asduly executed in accordance with the formalities ofPhilippine law, is fatal, especially in light of thefactual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing tothe nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of theCivil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered bythe policy against absolute divorces, the samebeing considered contrary to our concept of publicpolicy and morality. In the same case, the Courtruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,


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provided they are valid according to their nationallaw.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v.Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven thatrespondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when heobtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling inVan Dorn would become applicable and petitionercould "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized thedivorce obtained by the respondent in his country,the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we statedthat divorce and its legal effects may be recognizedin the Philippines insofar as respondent isconcerned in view of the nationality principle in ourcivil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision ofthe Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold

that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorentefrom his first wife Paula was valid and recognized inthis jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, theeffects of this divorce (as to the succession to theestate of the decedent) are matters best left to thedetermination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,wills, and other public instruments shall begoverned by the laws of the country in which theyare executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before thediplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of thePhilippines in a foreign country, the solemnitiesestablished by Philippine laws shall be observed intheir execution." (underscoring ours)The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his propertyto his second wife and children by her is glaringlyshown in the will he executed. We do not wish tofrustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, notcovered by our laws on "family rights and duties,status, condition and legal capacity."[44]

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shallinherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved byforeign law which must be pleaded and proved.Whether the will was executed in accordance withthe formalities required is answered by referring toPhilippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note thatwhatever public policy or good customs may beinvolved in our system of legitimes, Congress didnot intend to extend the same to the succession offoreign nationals. Congress specifically left theamount of successional rights to the decedent'snational law.[45]

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to passupon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Thedecision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decisionof the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES asVALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of thedeceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the SuperiorCourt of the State of California in and for the Countyof San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the courtof origin for determination of the intrinsic validity ofLorenzo N. Llorente's will and determination of theparties' successional rights allowing proof of foreignlaw with instructions that the trial court shall proceedwith all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the

deceased within the framework of the Rules ofCourt.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, andYnares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] In CA-G. R. SP. No. 17446, promulgated on July31, 1995, Lipana-Reyes+, J., ponente, Torres, Jr.and Hofilena, JJ., concurring.

[2] In Spec. Proc. No. IR-755 (In the Matter of theProbate and Allowance of the Last Will andTestament of Lorenzo N. Llorente, Lorenzo N.Llorente, Petitioner) and Spec. Proc. No. IR-888(Petition for the Grant of Letters of Administrationfor the Estate of Lorenzo N. Llorente, Paula T.


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Llorente, Petitioner), dated May 18, 1987, JudgeEsteban B. Abonal, presiding.

[3] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51.

[4] Exh. "B", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.

[5] Ibid.

[6] This was issued pursuant to Lorenzo's petition,Petition No. 4708849, filed with the U.S. Court.Exhs. "H" and "H-3" Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p.157, 159.

[7] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51; Exh."B", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Exh. "A", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 60.

[10] Exh. "B-1" Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 62.

[11] Exh. "D", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 63-64.

[12] Exh. "E", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 69.

[13] Exh. "F", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 148.


[15] Comment, Rollo, p. 147.


[17] Exh. "A", Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 3-4;Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.

[18] Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-755.

[19] Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 37.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-888.

[23] Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 38.


[25] Ibid., pp. 52-53.

[26] Ibid., p. 53.

[27] RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 37.

[28] Order, Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. Nos.IR-755 and 888, Rollo, p. 46.

[29] Citing Article 335 of the Civil Code, whichstates, "The following cannot adopt: xxx

(3) a married person, without the consent of theother spouse; xxx", the trial court reasoned thatsince the divorce obtained by Lorenzo did notdissolve his first marriage with Paula, then theadoption of Raul and Luz was void, as Paula did notgive her consent to it.

[30] Order, Regional Trial Court, Rollo, p. 47.

[31] Docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 17446.


[33] On August 31, 1995, petitioner also filed withthis Court a verified complaint against the membersof the Special Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals,Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr., CeliaLipana-Reyes + and Hector Hofilena for "grossignorance of the law, manifest incompetence andextreme bias (Rollo, p. 15)."

[34] Again with Associate Justice Celia Lipana-Reyes+, ponente, concurred in by AssociateJustices Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Hector Hofilena(Former Special Thirteenth Division).

[35] Filed on May 10, 1996, Rollo, pp. 9-36.

[36] Petitioner alleges (1) That the Court of Appealslost its jurisdiction over the case when it issued theresolution denying the motion for reconsideration;(2) That Art. 144 of the Civil Case has beenrepealed by Arts. 253 and 147 of the Family Codeand (3) That Alicia and her children not are entitledto any share in the estate of the deceased (Rollo, p.19).

[37] Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, 110Phil. 686 (1961).

[38] Joint Record on Appeal, p. 255; Rollo, p. 40.

[39] In Re: Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v.Helen Garcia, 117 Phil. 96 (1963).

[40] 139 SCRA 139 (1985).

[41] 300 SCRA 406 (1998).


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[42] 174 SCRA 653 (1989).

[43] The ruling in the case of Tenchavez v. Escano(122 Phil. 752 [1965]) that provides that "a foreigndivorce between Filipino citizens sought anddecreed after the effectivity of the present civil codeis not entitled to recognition as valid in thisjurisdiction" is NOT applicable in the case at bar asLorenzo was no longer a Filipino citizen when heobtained the divorce.

[44] Article 15, Civil Code provides "Laws relating tofamily rights and duties, or to the status, conditionand legal capacity of persons are binding uponcitizens of the Philippines, even though livingabroad." (Underscoring ours)

[45] Bellis v. Bellis, 126 Phil. 726 (1967).

FIRST DIVISION[ G.R. NO. 162580, January 27, 2006 ]

ELMAR O. PEREZ, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OFAPPEALS, FIFTH DIVISION, TRISTAN A.CATINDIG AND LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG,

RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule

65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25, 2003Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 74456 which set aside and declared as null andvoid the September 30, 2002 Order[2] of theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84,granting petitioner's motion for leave to fileintervention and admitting the Complaint-in-Intervention[3] in Civil Case No. Q-01-44847; and itsJanuary 23, 2004 Resolution[4] denying the motionfor reconsideration.

Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married LilyGomez Catindig[5] twice on May 16, 1968. The firstmarriage ceremony was celebrated at the CentralMethodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita,Manila while the second took place at the LourdesCatholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. Themarriage produced four children.

Several years later, the couple encountered maritalproblems that they decided to separate from eachother. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decidedto obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a

Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judgeof the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, DominicanRepublic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute adivorce action under its laws.[6]

Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the privaterespondents filed a joint petition for dissolution ofconjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court ofMakati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in theDominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutualconsent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,Branch 133, ordered the complete separation ofproperties between Tristan and Lily.

On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner ElmarO. Perez in the State of Virginia in the UnitedStates[7] and both lived as husband and wife untilOctober 2001. Their union produced oneoffspring.[8]

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that thedivorce decree issued by the court in the DominicanRepublic which "dissolved" the marriage betweenTristan and Lily was not recognized in thePhilippines and that her marriage to Tristan wasdeemed void under Philippine law. When sheconfronted Tristan about this, the latter assured herthat he would legalize their union after he obtains anannulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristan furtherpromised the petitioner that he would adopt theirson so that he would be entitled to an equal share inhis estate as that of each of his children with Lily.[9]

On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for thedeclaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed asCase No. Q-01-44847.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave toFile Intervention[10] claiming that she has a legalinterest in the matter in litigation because sheknows certain information which might aid the trialcourt at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of theannulment case, which the trial court granted onSeptember 30, 2002. Petitioner's complaint-in-intervention was also ordered admitted.

Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibitionwith the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orderdated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. TheCourt of Appeals granted the petition and declaredas null and void the September 30, 2002 Order ofthe trial court granting the motion for leave to fileintervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention.


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Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied,hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filedunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitionercontends that the Court of Appeals gravely abusedits discretion in disregarding her legal interest in theannulment case between Tristan and Lily.

The petition lacks merit.

Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrievedparty from a decision of the Court of Appeals is apetition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of theRules of Court. However, if the error subject of therecourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complainedof was granted by a court with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the properremedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 ofthe said Rules.[11] This is based on the premisethat in issuing the assailed decision and resolution,

the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion, amounting to excess of lack ofjurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Aremedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate ifit will promptly relieve the petitioner from theinjurious effect of the judgment and the acts of thelower court.[12]

It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner toestablish that the Court of Appeals acted with graveabuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack ofjurisdiction when it promulgated the assailed

decision and resolution.

We have previously ruled that grave abuse ofdiscretion may arise when a lower court or tribunalviolates or contravenes the Constitution, the law orexisting jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretionis meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise ofjudgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Theabuse of discretion must be grave as where thepower is exercised in an arbitrary or despoticmanner by reason of passion or personal hostilityand must be so patent and gross as to amount to anevasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal toperform the duty enjoined by or to act at all incontemplation of law.[13] The word "capricious,"usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary,"conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.Thus, when seeking the corrective hand ofcertiorari, a clear showing of caprice andarbitrariness in the exercise of discretion isimperative.[14]

The Rules of Court laid down the parameters beforea person, not a party to a case can intervene, thus:

Who may intervene. A person who has a legalinterest in the matter in litigation, or in the successof either of the parties, or an interest against both,or is so situated as to be adversely affected by adistribution or other disposition of property in thecustody of the court or of an officer thereof may,with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in theaction. The court shall consider whether or not theintervention will unduly delay or prejudice theadjudication of the rights of the original parties, andwhether or not the intervenor's rights may be fullyprotected in a separate proceeding.[15]The requirements for intervention are: [a] legalinterest in the matter in litigation; and [b]consideration must be given as to whether theadjudication of the original parties may be delayedor prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights maybe protected in a separate proceeding or not.[16]

Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene,must be in the matter in litigation and of such directand immediate character that the intervenor willeither gain or lose by direct legal operation andeffect of the judgment.[17] Such interest must beactual, direct and material, and not simplycontingent and expectant.[18]

Petitioner claims that her status as the wife andcompanion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with therequisite legal interest required of a would-beintervenor under the Rules of Court.

Petitioner's claim lacks merit. Under the law,petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, henceher claim of legal interest has no basis.

When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14,1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. Thedivorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained fromthe Dominican Republic never dissolved themarriage bond between them. It is basic that lawsrelating to family rights and duties, or to the status,condition and legal capacity of persons are bindingupon citizens of the Philippines, even though livingabroad.[19] Regardless of where a citizen of thePhilippines might be, he or she will be governed byPhilippine laws with respect to his or her familyrights and duties, or to his or her status, conditionand legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless ofwhether he or she was married here or abroad,initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolutedivorce from spouse and eventually becomessuccessful in getting an absolute divorce decree,the Philippines will not recognize such absolutedivorce.[20]


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When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968,their marriage was governed by the provisions ofthe Civil Code[21] which took effect on August 30,1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano[22] weheld:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,sought and decreed after the effectivity of thepresent Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is notentitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;and neither is the marriage contracted with anotherparty by the divorced consort, subsequently to theforeign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in thecountry. (Emphasis added)Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife ofTristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroadlacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired thelegal interest as a wife upon which her motion forintervention is based.

Since petitioner's motion for leave to file interventionwas bereft of the indispensable requirement of legalinterest, the issuance by the trial court of the ordergranting the same and admitting the complaint-in-intervention was attended with grave abuse ofdiscretion. Consequently, the Court of Appealscorrectly set aside and declared as null and void thesaid order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Theassailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 andResolution dated January 23, 2004 of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario,JJ., concur.Panganiban, C.J., (Chairman), in the result.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Rollo, pp. 26-31. Penned by Associate JusticeEugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by AssociateJustices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E.Maambong.

[2] Id. at 74. Penned by Judge Mariflor P. PunzalanCastillo.

[3] Id. at 49-58.

[4] Id. at 33.

[5] Referred as Lily Corazon Catindig in some partsof the records.

[6] Rollo, p. 27.

[7] Id. at 34.

[8] Id. at 35.

[9] Id. at 28.

[10] Id. at 45-48.

[11] Delgado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137881,December 21, 2004, 447 SCRA 402, 411.

[12] Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Courtof Appeals, G.R. No. 152568, February 16, 2004,423 SCRA 122, 132.

[13] Banal III v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 167474,November 15, 2005.

[14] Olanolan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.165491, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 807, 814.

[15] RULES OF COURT, Rule 19, Sec. 1.

[16] Nordic Asia Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. 111159, July 13, 2004, 434 SCRA 195, 198.

[17] Id. at 199.

[18] Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March19, 1990, 183 SCRA 252, 257.

[19] CIVIL CODE, Art. 15.

[20] Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations,Fourth Edition, p. 23.

[21] Republic Act No. 386 (1950).

[22] 122 Phil. 752, 765 (1965).

SECOND DIVISION[ G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010 ]

HERALD BLACK DACASIN, PETITIONER, VS.SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:


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The Case

For review [1] is a dismissal [2] of a suit to enforce apost-foreign divorce child custody agreement forlack of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American,and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila inApril 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie,born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999,respondent sought and obtained from the CircuitCourt, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois(Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner.[3] In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the

marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded torespondent sole custody of Stephanie and retainedjurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.

On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondentexecuted in Manila a contract (Agreement [4] ) forthe joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chosePhilippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicatedisputes arising from the Agreement. Respondentundertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order"relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.

In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional

Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) toenforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that inviolation of the Agreement, respondent exercisedsole custody over Stephanie.

Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaintfor, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of theIllinois court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce thedivorce decree.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial courtsustained respondent's motion and dismissed thecase for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that:(1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over thesuit considering the Illinois court's retention ofjurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, includingits order awarding sole custody of Stephanie torespondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding onpetitioner following the "nationality rule" prevailing inthis jurisdiction; [5] and (3) the Agreement is void for

contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the CivilCode [6] prohibiting compromise agreements onjurisdiction. [7]

Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the newargument that the divorce decree obtained byrespondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is nobar to the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction overthe case.

In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial courtdenied reconsideration, holding that unlike in thecase of respondent, the divorce decree is bindingon petitioner under the laws of his nationality.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner submits the following alternative theoriesfor the validity of the Agreement to justify itsenforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement

novated the valid divorce decree, modifying theterms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;[8] or (2) the Agreement is independent of thedivorce decree obtained by respondent.

The Issue

The question is whether the trial court hasjurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's suitand enforce the Agreement on the joint custody ofthe parties' child.

The Ruling of the Court

The trial court has jurisdiction to entertainpetitioner's suit but not to enforce the Agreementwhich is void. However, factual and equityconsiderations militate against the dismissal ofpetitioner's suit and call for the remand of the caseto settle the question of Stephanie's custody.

Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdictionto Enforce Contracts

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. Atthe time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courtsexclusive original jurisdiction over civil actionsincapable of pecuniary estimation. [9] An action forspecific performance, such as petitioner's suit toenforce the Agreement on joint child custody,


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belongs to this species of actions. [10] Thus,jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.

Indeed, the trial court's refusal to entertainpetitioner's suit was grounded not on its lack ofpower to do so but on its thinking that the Illinoiscourt's divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. Thisconclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois courtretained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose ofenforcing all and sundry the various provisions of[its] Judgment for Dissolution." [11] Petitioner's suitseeks the enforcement not of the "variousprovisions" of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, theaction lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court's so-called "retained jurisdiction."

Petitioner's Suit Lacks Cause of Action

The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannotenforce the Agreement which is contrary to law.

In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free tostipulate the terms of agreement subject to theminimum ban on stipulations contrary to law,morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.[12] Otherwise, the contract is denied legalexistence, deemed "inexistent and void from thebeginning." [13] For lack of relevant stipulation inthe Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippinesubstantive law serve as default parameters to test

the validity of the Agreement's joint child custodystipulations. [14]

At the time the parties executed the Agreement on28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1)Stephanie was under seven years old (having beenborn on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner andrespondent were no longer married under the lawsof the United States because of the divorce decree.The relevant Philippine law on child custody forspouses separated in fact or in law [15] (under thesecond paragraph of Article 213 of the FamilyCode) is also undisputed: "no child under sevenyears of age shall be separated from the mother x xx." [16] (This statutory awarding of sole parentalcustody [17] to the mother is mandatory, [18]grounded on sound policy consideration, [19]subject only to a narrow exception not alleged toobtain here. [20] ) Clearly then, the Agreement'sobject to establish a post-divorce joint custodyregime between respondent and petitioner overtheir child under seven years old contravenesPhilippine law.

The Agreement is not only void ab initio for beingcontrary to law, it has also been repudiated by themother when she refused to allow joint custody bythe father. The Agreement would be valid if thespouses have not divorced or separated becausethe law provides for joint parental authority whenspouses live together. [21] However, uponseparation of the spouses, the mother takes solecustody under the law if the child is below sevenyears old and any agreement to the contrary is void.Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for(1) children under seven of (2) separated ordivorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within thisage bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), thelaw decides for the separated or divorced parentshow best to take care of the child and that is to givecustody to the separated mother. Indeed, theseparated parents cannot contract away theprovision in the Family Code on the maternalcustody of children below seven years anymore

than they can privately agree that a mother who isunemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict,insane or afflicted with a communicable disease willhave sole custody of a child under seven as theseare reasons deemed compelling to preclude theapplication of the exclusive maternal custodyregime under the second paragraph of Article 213.[22]

It will not do to argue that the second paragraph ofArticle 213 of the Family Code applies only tojudicial custodial agreements based on its text that"No child under seven years of age shall be

separated from the mother, unless the court findscompelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit thisprovision's enforceability to court sanctionedagreements while placing private agreementsbeyond its reach is to sanction a double standard incustody regulation of children under seven years oldof separated parents. This effectively empowersseparated parents, by the simple expedient ofavoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policyvesting to the separated mother sole custody of herchildren under seven years of age "to avoid atragedy where a mother has seen her baby tornaway from her." [23] This ignores the legislativebasis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows ofa mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."[24]

It could very well be that Article 213's bias favoringone separated parent (mother) over the other(father) encourages paternal neglect, presumesincapacity for joint parental custody, robs theparents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated parents. [25]However, these are objections which question the


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law's wisdom not its validity or uniformenforceability. The forum to air and remedy thesegrievances is the legislature, not this Court. At anyrate, the rule's seeming harshness or undesirabilityis tempered by ancillary agreements the separatedparents may wish to enter such as granting thefather visitation and other privileges. Thesearrangements are not inconsistent with the regimeof sole maternal custody under the secondparagraph of Article 213 which merely grants to themother final authority on the care and custody of theminor under seven years of age, in case ofdisagreements.

Further, the imposed custodial regime under thesecond paragraph of Article 213 is limited induration, lasting only until the child's seventh year.From the eighth year until the child's emancipation,the law gives the separated parents freedom,subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree

on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly,even supposing that petitioner and respondent arenot barred from entering into the Agreement for thejoint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiatedthe Agreement by asserting sole custody overStephanie. Respondent's act effectively brought theparties back to ambit of the default custodial regimein the second paragraph of Article 213 of the FamilyCode vesting on respondent sole custody ofStephanie.

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree'salleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court

lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decreeviolated Illinois law, but because the divorce wasobtained by his Filipino spouse [26] - to support theAgreement's enforceability. The argument thatforeigners in this jurisdiction are not bound byforeign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v.Romillo [27] settled the matter by holding that analien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorcedecree obtained abroad. [28] There, we dismissedthe alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting ofalleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejectedhis submission that the foreign divorce (obtained bythe Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction inthis wise:

There can be no question as to the validity of thatNevada divorce in any of the States of the UnitedStates. The decree is binding on private respondentas an American citizen. For instance, privaterespondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband,in any State of the Union. What he is contending inthis case is that the divorce is not valid and binding

in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to locallaw and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principleembodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, onlyPhilippine nationals are covered by the policyagainst absolute divorces the same beingconsidered contrary to our concept of public policyand morality. However, aliens may obtain divorcesabroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,provided they are valid according to their nationallaw. In this case, the divorce in Nevada releasedprivate respondent from the marriage from thestandards of American law, under which divorcedissolves the marriage.

x x x x

Thus, pursuant to his national law, privaterespondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.

He would have no standing to sue in the case belowas petitioner's husband entitled to exercise controlover conjugal assets. As he is bound by theDecision of his own country's Court, which validlyexercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decisionhe does not repudiate, he is estopped by his ownrepresentation before said Court from asserting hisright over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasissupplied)

We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[29] to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed

by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreigndivorce decree) against his former Filipino spousebecause he no longer qualified as "offendedspouse" entitled to file the complaints underPhilippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clearby now that a foreign divorce decree carries asmuch validity against the alien divorcee in thisjurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien'snationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding

Justify Remand

Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner's suit,the logical end to its lack of cause of action, weremand the case for the trial court to settle thequestion of Stephanie's custody. Stephanie is nownearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outsideof the ambit of the mandatory maternal custodyregime under Article 213 and bringing it withincoverage of the default standard on child custody


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proceedings - the best interest of the child. [30] Asthe question of custody is already before the trialcourt and the child's parents, by executing theAgreement, initially showed inclination to sharecustody, it is in the interest of swift and efficientrendition of justice to allow the parties to takeadvantage of the court's jurisdiction, submitevidence on the custodial arrangement best servingStephanie's interest, and let the trial court renderjudgment. This disposition is consistent with thesettled doctrine that in child custody proceedings,equity may be invoked to serve the child's bestinterest. [31]

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional TrialCourt of Makati City, Branch 60. The case isREMANDED for further proceedings consistent withthis ruling.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.Abad, J., see separate opinion.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure.

[2] In the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June

2005 issued by the Trial Court of Makati City,Branch 60.

[3] Petitioner did not contest the proceedings.

[4] Denominated "Compromise Agreement on ChildCustody and Support."

[5] Under Article 15 of the Civil Code whichprovides: "Laws relating to family rights and duties,or to the status, condition and legal capacity ofpersons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,even though living abroad."

[6] This provides: "No compromise upon thefollowing questions shall be valid: x x x (5) Thejurisdiction of courts[.]"

[7] The trial court held (Records, pp. 157-158):

[H]aving expressly recognized the validity of theIllinois Court's judgment [petitioner] is bound by itsprovisions including the provision that the Courtwould maintain sole jurisdiction to implement and

enforce the provisions of the said judgment whichnecessarily included guidelines for the child'scustody.

[Petitioner] being admittedly an American, followingthe nationality rule which Philippine civil lawsadhere to, the Judgment of the Illinois Court wouldbe binding upon him since the judicial dispositionrefers to matters of status or legal capacity of aperson.

x x x x

Moreover, this Court cannot act upon [petitioner's]prayer to enforce the terms of the said CompromiseAgreement the said agreement being invalid andtherefore, void, precisely because it seeks totransfer jurisdiction over the issue of child custodyfrom the Illinois Court to this Court by agreement ofthe parties, when the previous Court had already

effectively asserted its authority to act upon allmatters relating to the said issue.

In this regard, Art. 2035 of the Civil Code expresslystates that no compromise upon the questions ofcivil status of persons, validity of marriage, or legalseparation, future support, jurisdiction of courts andfuture legitimate shall be valid.

[8] As a corollary claim, petitioner submits that thestipulation in the Agreement "vesting" exclusivejurisdiction to Philippine courts over conflicts arisingfrom the Agreement, even if void for being contrary

to Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, isseverable from and does not affect the validity ofthe other terms of the Agreement on joint custody.

[9] Section 19, paragraph 1, Batas Pambansa Blg.129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,provides: "Jurisdiction in civil cases.- Regional TrialCourts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of thelitigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; x x xx"

[10] See Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v.Herrera, 205 Phil. 61 (1983).

[11] Records, p. 17 (emphasis supplied).

[12] Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides: "Thecontracting parties may establish such stipulations,clauses, terms and conditions as they may deemconvenient, provided they are not contrary to law,morals, good customs, public order, or publicpolicy."


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[13] Article 1409, paragraph 1 of the Civil Codeprovides: "The following contracts are inexistent andvoid from the beginning: (1) Those whose cause,object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, goodcustoms, public order or public policy; x x x x"

[14] It can be inferred from the terms of theAgreement that the parties intended to be bound byPhilippine law on its intrinsic validity (this is evident,for instance, from the stipulation selecting Philippinecourts as exclusive forum to settle "any legal issueor dispute that may arise from the provisions of [the]Agreement and its interpretation x x x" (Records, p.19; emphasis supplied). At any rate, Philippine lawhas the most substantial connection to the contract,considering its object (custody of a Filipino-American child), subject (Filipino-American childunder seven years of age, born of a Filipino mother,both of whom reside in the country) and parties(Filipina mother and alien father).

[15] Including those marriages whose vinculum hasbeen severed (see Sempio-Dy, Handbook on theFamily Code of the Philippines 67-68 [1988]).

[16] The provision states: "In case of separation ofthe parents, parental authority shall be exercised bythe parent designated by the Court. The Court shalltake into account all relevant considerations,especially the choice of the child over seven yearsof age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be

separated from the mother, unless the court findscompelling reasons to order otherwise." (Emphasissupplied)

[17] Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals (Res.),G.R. No. 174485, 11 July 2007, 527 SCRA 320(reversing the Court of Appeals' ruling mandatingjoint custody and awarding sole custody to themother).

[18] Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014(1996). For children over seven, custody decisionsare guided by the standard of "best interest of thechild."

[19] Our discussion in Pablo-Gualberto v. GualbertoV, G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 450,471-472, on the statutory genealogy and policygrounding of the second paragraph of Article 213 isenlightening:

[A]rticle 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of theCivil Code, which reads:

Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody,education and property of children, the latter'swelfare shall be paramount. No mother shall beseparated from her child under seven years of age,unless the court finds compelling reasons for suchmeasure.

The general rule that children under seven years ofage shall not be separated from their mother findsits raison d'etre in the basic need of minor childrenfor their mother's loving care. In explaining therationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the CodeCommission stressed thus:

The general rule is recommended in order to avoida tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn

away from her. No man can sound the deepsorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child oftender age. The exception allowed by the rule hasto be for compelling reasons for the good of thechild: those cases must indeed be rare, if themother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she haserred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty ofimprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree willordinarily be sufficient punishment for her.Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have anyeffect upon the baby who is as yet unable tounderstand the situation. (Report of the CodeCommission, p. 12)

[20] Sole maternal custody is denied only for"compelling reasons" such as "neglect,abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitualdrunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of thechild, insanity or affliction with a communicabledisease" (Id. at 476; internal citation omitted).

[21] Civil Code, Article 211, as amended.

[22] See note 20.

[23] See note 19.

[24] Id.

[25] This line of argument can be subsumed underthe rubric of "unfair state intervention" but thiscomplaint can very well be leveled against the entirefield of family law where the state injects itself on ahost of areas impinging on the decision-makingcapacity and autonomy of individuals ranging fromthe intensely personal (e.g. who can marry [Article5, Family Code], where to marry [Article 5, Family


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Code], who can celebrate the marriage [Article 5,Family Code], and how to relate to one's spouse[Articles 68-72]) to proprietary (e.g. Articles 74-125,Family Code, on property relations of spouses andArticles 194-208, Family Code, on support) tofamilial (e.g. Articles 209-233, Family Code, onparental authority).

[26] Petitioner hooks his argument on Gonzales v.Gonzales (58 Phil. 67 [1933]), Arca v. Javier (95Phil. 579 [1954]) and Tenchavez v. Escao (122Phil. 752 [1965]). These cases, involving Filipinospouses, merely applied the "nationality rule" (nowembodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code) to rejectvalidating foreign divorce decrees obtained byFilipino spouses to circumvent the no-divorce rule inthis jurisdiction. They are no authority to supportpetitioner's submission that as to aliens, foreigndivorce decrees are void here.

[27] 223 Phil. 357 (1985).

[28] Id. at 361-363.Van Dornspawned the secondparagraph of Article 26 granting to Filipino spousesof aliens who obtain foreign divorce decrees theright to remarry. (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No.154380, 5 October 2005, 472 SCRA 114).

[29] G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

[30] Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No. 166682, 27November 2009.

[31] Thus, in habeas corpus proceedings involvingchild custody, judicial resolutions extend beyond thecustodial right of persons exercising parentalauthority over the child and reach issues oncustodial arrangements serving the child's bestinterest (see Bagtas v. Santos, id., remanding ahabeas corpus petition to determine the fitness ofthe legal custodians notwithstanding that thequestion of illegal withholding of custody has beenmooted by the transfer of the child's physicalcustody to the habeas corpus petitioners).

2. REPUBLIC VS. IYOY DOCTRINE

SECOND DIVISION[ G.R. NO. 152577, September 21, 2005 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,VS. CRASUS L. IYOY, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of thePhilippines, represented by the Office of theSolicitor General, prays for the reversal of theDecision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming theJudgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of CebuCity, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the marriagebetween respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely AdaRosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 ofthe Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced withthe filing of a Complaint[3] for declaration of nullityof marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March1997. According to the said Complaint, respondentCrasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 atBradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, CebuCity. As a result of their union, they had five

children

Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert,and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. Afterthe celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasusdiscovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a naggerand extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippinesfor the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving allof their five children, the youngest then being onlysix years old, to the care of respondent Crasus.Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A.,respondent Crasus received a letter from herrequesting that he sign the enclosed divorcepapers; he disregarded the said request. Sometimein 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the

letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely gotmarried to an American, with whom she eventuallyhad a child. In 1987, Fely came back to thePhilippines with her American family, staying atCebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. RespondentCrasus did not bother to talk to Fely because hewas afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrowand the pain she had caused him. Fely returned tothe Philippines several times more: in 1990, for thewedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992,for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert;and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continuedto live with her American family in New Jersey,U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname ofher American husband in the Philippines and in theU.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herselfhad invitations made in which she was named as"Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaintwas filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left andabandoned respondent Crasus, and there was nomore possibility of reconciliation between them.Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaintthat Felys acts brought danger and dishonor tothe family, and clearly demonstrated her


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psychological incapacity to perform the essentialobligations of marriage. Such incapacity, beingincurable and continuing, constitutes a ground fordeclaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, inrelation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the FamilyCode of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with theRTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein thatshe was already an American citizen since 1988and was now married to Stephen Micklus. Whileshe admitted being previously married torespondent Crasus and having five children withhim, Fely refuted the other allegations made byrespondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explainedthat she was no more hot-tempered than anynormal person, and she may had been indignant atrespondent Crasus on certain occasions but it wasbecause of the latter's drunkenness, womanizing,and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to

contribute to the maintenance of their household.She could not have been extravagant since thefamily hardly had enough money for basic needs.Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons asrespondent Crasus had no job and what she wasthen earning as the sole breadwinner in thePhilippines was insufficient to support their family.Although she left all of her children with respondentCrasus, she continued to provide financial supportto them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children tothe U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to staybehind for medical reasons. While she did file for

divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied havingherself sent a letter to respondent Crasusrequesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers.After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus,Fely married her American husband and acquiredAmerican citizenship. She argued that her marriageto her American husband was legal because nowbeing an American citizen, her status shall begoverned by the law of her present nationality. Felyalso pointed out that respondent Crasus himselfwas presently living with another woman who borehim a child. She also accused respondent Crasusof misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which sheadvanced to him to finance the brain operation oftheir son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing,Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriageto respondent Crasus null and void; and thatrespondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely theP90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest,plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney'sfees, and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed theirrespective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both

parties the opportunity to present their evidence.Petitioner Republic participated in the trial throughthe Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]

Respondent Crasus submitted the following piecesof evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his owntestimony on 08 September 1997, in which heessentially reiterated the allegations in hisComplaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, onthe recording of the Marriage Contract betweenrespondent Crasus and Fely in the Register ofDeeds, such marriage celebration taking place on16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to thewedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, whereinFely openly used her American husband's surname,Micklus.[9]

Fely's counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, aMotion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses,

namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. andDaphne, upon written interrogatories, before theconsular officers of the Philippines in New York andCalifornia, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside.Despite the Orders[12] and Commissions[13] issuedby the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New Yorkand California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of thewitnesses upon written interrogatories, not a singledeposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Takinginto account that it had been over a year sincerespondent Crasus had presented his evidence andthat Fely failed to exert effort to have the caseprogress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05

October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waivedher right to present her evidence. The case wasthus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTCpromulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage ofrespondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio,on the basis of the following findings

The ground bearing defendant's psychologicalincapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. Asobserved, plaintiff's testimony is decidedly credible.The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibitedunmistakable signs of psychological incapacity tocomply with her marital duties such as striving forfamily unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect,help and support. From the evidence presented,plaintiff adequately established that the defendantpractically abandoned him. She obtained a divorcedecree in the United States of America and marriedanother man and has establish [sic] another familyof her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation,wherein he is married to a wife who is alreadymarried to another man in another country.


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Defendant's intolerable traits may not have beenapparent or manifest before the marriage, theFAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulmentof the marriage provided that these were eventuallymanifested after the wedding. It appears to be thecase in this instance.

Certainly defendant's posture being an irresponsiblewife erringly reveals her very low regard for thatsacred and inviolable institution of marriage which isthe foundation of human society throughout thecivilized world. It is quite evident that the defendantis bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply withher marital obligations, such incapacity was alreadythere at the time of the marriage in question isshown by defendant's own attitude towards hermarriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is

defendant's psychological incapacity to comply withthe essential marital obligations which alreadyexisted at the time of the marriage in question hasbeen satisfactorily proven. The evidence in hereincase establishes the irresponsibility of defendantFely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiff's testimony which is decidedlycredible, the Court finds that the defendant hadindeed exhibited unmistakable signs of suchpsychological incapacity to comply with her maritalobligations. These are her excessive disposition tomaterial things over and above the marital stability.

That such incapacity was already there at the timeof the marriage in question is shown by defendant'sown attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. Andfor these reasons there is a legal ground to declarethe marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy anddefendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void abinitio.[15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quotedJudgment of the RTC was contrary to law andevidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment ofthe RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It evenoffered additional ratiocination for declaring themarriage between respondent Crasus and Fely nulland void, to wit Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appelleeabroad, has remarried, and is now permanentlyresiding in the United States. Plaintiff-appelleecategorically stated this as one of his reasons forseeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage...

...

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside thePhilippines in accordance with the laws in force inthe country where they were solemnized, and validthere as such, shall also be valid in this country,except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINOCITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLYCELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTERVALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIENSPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TOREMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALLLIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRYUNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the

above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd andunjust situation of a Filipino citizen still beingmarried to his or her alien spouse, although thelatter is no longer married to the Filipino spousebecause he or she has obtained a divorce abroad.In the case at bench, the defendant hasundoubtedly acquired her American husband'scitizenship and thus has become an alien as well.This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipinocitizen whose spouse eventually embraces anothercitizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under thesecircumstances, plaintiff would still be considered asmarried to defendant, given her total incapacity tohonor her marital covenants to the former. Tocondemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriagethat in truth and in fact does not exist and to remainmarried to a spouse who is incapacitated todischarge essential marital covenants, is verily tocondemn him to a perpetual disadvantage whichthis Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief byaffirming the trial court's declaration of the nullity ofthe marriage of the parties.[16]

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08March 2002,[17] denied its Motion forReconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instantPetition before this Court, based on the followingarguments/grounds

Abandonment by and sexual infidelity ofrespondent's wife do not per se constitutepsychological incapacity.


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The Court of Appeals has decided questions ofsubstance not in accord with law and jurisprudenceconsidering that the Court of Appeals committedserious errors of law in ruling that Article 26,paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable tothe case at bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondentCrasus maintained that Fely's psychologicalincapacity was clearly established after a full-blowntrial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FamilyCode of the Philippines was indeed applicable tothe marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely,because the latter had already become anAmerican citizen. He further questioned thepersonality of petitioner Republic, represented bythe Office of the Solicitor General, to institute theinstant Petition, because Article 48 of the FamilyCode of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting

attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not theSolicitor General, to intervene on behalf of theState, in proceedings for annulment and declarationof nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case andthe applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Courtfinds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

I

The totality of evidence presented during trial is

insufficient to support the finding of psychologicalincapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversialprovisions of the Family Code of the Philippines,reads ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who,at the time of the celebration, was psychologicallyincapacitated to comply with the essential maritalobligations of marriage, shall likewise be void evenif such incapacity becomes manifest only after itssolemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutespsychological incapacity. In a series of cases, thisCourt laid down guidelines for determining itsexistence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the termpsychological incapacity was defined, thus ". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to noless than a mental (not physical) incapacity thatcauses a party to be truly cognitive of the basicmarital covenants that concomitantly must be

assumed and discharged by the parties to themarriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 ofthe Family Code, include their mutual obligations tolive together, observe love, respect and fidelity andrender help and support. There is hardly any doubtthat the intendment of the law has been to confinethe meaning of "psychological incapacity" to themost serious cases of personality disorders clearlydemonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability togive meaning and significance to the marriage. Thispsychological condition must exist at the time themarriage is celebrated...

The psychological incapacity must be characterizedby

(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such thatthe party would be incapable of carrying out theordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence

It must be rooted in thehistory of the party antedating the marriage,although the overt manifestations may emerge onlyafter the marriage; and

(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if itwere otherwise, the cure would be beyond themeans of the party involved.[21]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation andapplication of Article 36 of the Family Code of thePhilippines were handed down by this Court inRepublic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[22] which,

although quite lengthy, by its significance, deservesto be reproduced below (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of themarriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt shouldbe resolved in favor of the existence andcontinuation of the marriage and against itsdissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact thatboth our Constitution and our laws cherish thevalidity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,our Constitution devotes an entire Article on theFamily, recognizing it "as the foundation of thenation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim ofthe parties. Both the family and marriage are to be"protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict onmarriage and the family and emphasizes theirpermanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacitymust be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven byexperts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.


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Article 36 of the Family Code requires that theincapacity must be psychological - not physical,although its manifestations and/or symptoms maybe physical. The evidence must convince the courtthat the parties, or one of them, was mentally orpsychically ill to such an extent that the personcould not have known the obligations he wasassuming, or knowing them, could not have givenvalid assumption thereof. Although no example ofsuch incapacity need be given here so as not tolimit the application of the provision under theprinciple of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such rootcause must be identified as a psychological illnessand its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expertevidence may be given by qualified psychiatristsand clinical psychologists.[23]

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. Theevidence must show that the illness was existing

when the parties exchanged their "I do's." Themanifestation of the illness need not be perceivableat such time, but the illness itself must haveattached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to bemedically or clinically permanent or incurable. Suchincurability may be absolute or even relative only inregard to the other spouse, not necessarilyabsolutely against everyone of the same sex.Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant tothe assumption of marriage obligations, notnecessarily to those not related to marriage, like the

exercise of a profession or employment in a job...

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bringabout the disability of the party to assume theessential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mildcharacteriological peculiarities, mood changes,occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be acceptedas root causes. The illness must be shown asdownright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,there is a natal or supervening disabling factor inthe person, an adverse integral element in thepersonality struct

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