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Political Reflection Magazine Vol. 3 | No. 1
Citation preview
Chairman Özgür TÜFEKÇİ
Executive Editor Alper Tolga BULUT
Managing Editor Hüsrev TABAK
Assistant Editors Rahman DAĞ | Ali Onur ÖZÇELİK | Yusuf YERKEL
World Stories Editor Aksel ERSOY
Interview Editor Jean-Paul GAGNON (Dr.)
Turkey Review Editor K. Kaan RENDA
Europe Review Editor Paula SANDRIN
Eurasia Review Editor Duygu UÇKUN
Caucasus Review Editor Zaur SHIRIYEV
Middle East Review Editor Murad DUZCU
China Review Editor Antony OU
Latin America Review Editor Jewellord Nem SINGH
Global City Analysis Editor Fatih EREN
Brief History Editor Tamer KAŞIKÇI
Film Review Editor Alaaddin F. PAKSOY
Contributors Gabriel Siles BRUGGE | Cemil CENGİZ | Enes ERBAY |Can ERBİL (Dr.)|
Zurab GARAKANIDZE (Dr.) | Kurtulus GEMİCİ (Dr.) | Bülent GÖKAY
(Prof.) | Ayla GÖL (Dr.) | Bayram GÜNGÖR (Prof.) | Alpaslan ÖZER-
DEM (Prof.) | Füsun ÖZERDEM (Assist. Prof.) | James PEARSON |
Paul RICHARDSON (Dr.) | Richard ROUSSEAU (Assoc. Prof.) | İbrahim
SİRKECİ (Prof.) | Aidan STRADLING | Talat ULUSSEVER (Dr.) | H. Akın
ÜNVER (Dr.) | Dilek YİĞİT (Dr.) |
Web producer & Developer Serdar TOMBUL (Dr.)
ADVERTISING Contact Hü srev Tabak (Managing Editor) [email protected] SYNDICATION REQUESTS Contact Alper Tolga Bülüt (Execütive Editor) [email protected]
©2012 By the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis.
All rights reserved. Political Reflection and its logo are trademarks of the Centre for Strategic Research and Analy-sis, which bears no responsibility for the editorial content; the views expressed in the articles are those of the aüthors. No part of this püblication may be reprodüced in any form withoüt permission in writing from the püb-lisher.
Political Reflection Magazine Established in 2010 by Mr. Özgür Tüfekçi
Submissions: To submit articles or opinion, please email: [email protected] Note: The ideal PR article length is from 800 to 3500 words.
POLITICAL REFLECTION
VOL. 3 - NO. 1 SPECIAL ISSUE: CHINA and The WORLD
2012 | “ADVANCING
DIVERSITY”
4 WORLD STORIES
5 NEWS OF CHINA 2011
8 DOMESTIC ANALYSIS
The Cosmopolitanisation of
Cartography? Raising the
Specter of Legitimacy in
Geography
BY DR JEAN-PAUL GAGNON
16
China as a Law-Ruled
State: From Top-Down
Rhetoric to Bottom-Up
Expectations
BY ANNA KLOEDEN
20 New Regulations Governing
Social Organizations in
China: A Civil Society on
the Rise?
BY KOSTANTINOS D.
TSIMONIS
28 China in the 21st Century:
Is Global Leadership
Possible? Sustainable
Development, Political
Legitimacy and
Foreign Policy
BY GEORGI IVANOV
34 The Case for Li Yuanchao
as Premier
BY NICHOLAS MILLER
38 Return to Countryside:
A New Attempt of
Rural Financial
Transformation
BY JIAN GAO
42 CHINA AND THE WORLD
Sino-Indian Relations:
Competition or Cooperation?
BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE
48 Russia and China: Reconcilia-
tion or Strategic Friendship?
BY LIN REN
52 Asia’s New Great Game?
The Geopolitics of the South
China Sea
BY TILMAN PRADT
56 China’s Aid Program in Africa:
A Primer
BY SAM BYFIELD
60 ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYS-
TEMS?
An Interview with Professor
Sonny Lo:
Political Reflections in Hong
Kong
BY DR JEAN-PAUL GAGNON
64 Cross-Strait Relations and HK
BY MATTHEW KENNEDY
70 The Impact of Renminbi
(RMB) Appreciation on the
Hong Kong Property Market
BY SUNNY LAM
76 CULTURAL ANALYSIS
Bitter Love: A Silenced Movie
of China and Its Implication
BY ANTONY OU
82 Kang Youwei’s (1858-1927)
Study and Vision of the Chi-
nese Calligraphy
BY MASSIMO CARRANTE
88 RECENT BOOKS
28
34
48
64
76
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 4
WORLD STORIES | BY AKSEL ERSOY
South Korea’s national assembly ratified a free-trade agreement with the United
States, four years after the two countries first signed the deal and a month after it
was approved by Congress. Despite a projected boost to the Korean economy and, the prospect of closer ties
with America at a time of worsening relations with North Korea, the agreement was strongly resisted by the
opposition. One assembly member disrupted the vote by letting off a tear-gas canister.
Kazakhstan’s long-serving president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, called a parliamentary
election for January. The vote was supposed to usher in a multiparty system,
though the only other party expected to join the race is sympathetic towards Mr Nazarbayev. The president
brought forward the date of the election, he said, in anticipation of a global economic crisis; politicians should-
n’t be campaigning at such a time, apparently.
Japan released the captain and crew of a Chinese fishing boat, three days after
they were arrested for entering Japanese coastal waters. A similar case last year in
disputed waters sparked a diplomatic confrontation, but China called this incident a “regular fishery case” and
accepted Tokyo’s handling of it.
Kyrgyzstan’s first presidential election as a parliamentary democracy was won by
Almazbek Atambayev, leader of the Social Democratic Party. He will replace Roza
Otunbayeva, the country’s interim president, who took office after a coup unseated her predecessor in 2010.
True to her word, Ms Otunbayeva did not run for re-election. The new president-elect announced plans to
close a large American military base.
Authorities in Thailand gave people five days off work to allow residents of Bang-
kok to leave the capital ahead of expected flooding. The government had already
imposed rationing on food. Hundreds of people have been killed by the deluge in other parts of the country
and thousands of factories closed.
Vietnam confirmed that the last rhinoceros in the country was killed earlier this
year, most likely by poachers. It was the last of its kind to have lived on the Asian
mainland; a few dozen remain on Java. Other species of large mammals in Vietnam are in imminent danger of
extinction, because of deforestation and illegal trade in wild-animal parts.
The Malaysian government promised to repeal the Internal Security Act, a draconi-
an law that allows the authorities to detain people charged with a crime indefinite-
ly and without trial. In Singapore former political prisoners urged their government to follow suit.
China again accused the Dalai Lama of encouraging Tibetans to commit suicide.
The latest claim came after the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader offered prayers for
eight monks and a nun who have set themselves on fire to protest against Chinese rule in Tibetan parts of Si-
chuan province. China said the self-immolations were “terrorism in disguise”.
Haiti got a new prime minister, at last. Having rejected the first two nominees pro-
posed by Michel Martelly, who took office as president in May, the country’s Sen-
ate approved Garry Conille for the job. Aid donors had become increasingly alarmed by the lack of a govern-
ment. Mr Conille has worked for Bill Clinton in his role as a UN envoy to Haiti.
25.11.2011 | South Korea
19.11.2011 | Kazakhstan
11.11.2011 | Japan
4.11.2011 | Kyrgyzstan
28.10.2011 | Thailand
26.10.2011 | Vietnam
22.10.2011 | Tibetans
24.10.2011 | Malaysia
08.10.2011 | Haiti
Com
pile
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orld
New
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es
NEWS OF CHINA 2011 | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS
Ai Weiwei:
The Chinese artist Ai Weiwei
has become an icon for critics
of the CCP and proponents of
free speech, as he continuous-
ly exposes the party’s authori-
tarianism and hypocritical
stance in a wide range of is-
sues. Ai Weiwei has also
gained the support of netizens throughout the country,
who in an act of defiance in November collected dona-
tions to help the artist pay what they perceive as a po-
litically motivated fine imposed by the Chinese authori-
ties on the charge of tax evasion.
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 5
Chen Wei:
On December 23rd, Sichuan
dissident Chen Wei (photo),
42, received a sentence of 9
years of imprisonment for
allegedly attempting to
“subvert state power”. Chen
has published 26 essays in
China and abroad calling for
constitutional democracy and an end to the CCP’s au-
thoritarian rule. He has also signed the “Charter 08”, a
political manifesto for democratic reform that was co-
authored by the imprisoned dissident and 2010 Nobel
Peace Prize Winner Liu Xiaobo.
Mai fangzi:
Limits on home pur-
chases and require-
ments for high
down-payments in
order to qualify for
mortgages have
brought China’s
property bubble
under control dur-
ing 2011, with pric-
es only marginally
increasing and in
some cities even dropping in comparison to last year.
PLA:
In January the PLA
tested successfully
China’s first home-
grown Stealth
Fighter, the J-20.
Although the fight-
er will not be opera-
tional any time
soon, Taiwan mili-
tary experts have
raised their concern
about the prospect of the PLA’s air supremacy and its
increasingly sophisticated war machinery.
Wenzhou train accident:
On July 23rd, a collision involving two
high speed trains resulted in 40 deaths
and many injuries, raising concerns on
the safety of China’s latest fleet of bul-
let trains. Initially the government
wanted to hastily wrap-up the story,
blaming the collision to a lightning
that supposedly struck one of the
trains, issuing directives to limit media coverage, and speedily concluding the rescue
operations. However, the cover-up attempt sparked public outrage among online com-
munities and invited criticism by media outlets, even those state-controlled.
NEWS OF CHINA 2011 | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS
The Wukan incident:
On September 21st months of
fruitless peaceful petitioning es-
calated on an uprising in the vil-
lage of Wukan in Guangdong
when disgruntled villagers vio-
lently ousted local officials accusing them for illegal land
sales. The protesters took the administration of the vil-
lage in their hands, set up barricades and elected a 13-
member village committee. Initially the government
responded violently to the first ever fall of CCP local au-
thority during a rural protest, abducting 4 village repre-
sentatives, one of whom died in custody, and forming a
blockade of the village using riot police.
South China Sea:
Tensions over the unresolved
South China Sea dispute have
remained high throughout
2011 as Beijing feels threat-
ened by the renewed interest
of the US in the region that
the PRC leadership interprets
as a plan to contain China. In November, Secretary Clin-
ton signed an agreement with her counterpart from the
Philippines to increase defense cooperation between
the two countries, while President Obama attended the
ASEAN Summit and announced plans for an expansion
of US military cooperation with Australia.
The CCP turns 90:
The Chinese Com-
munist Party celebrated
the 90th anniversary of
its founding with large-
scale commemorative
events, extravagant TV shows with plentiful revolution-
ary kitsch, and smaller interventions in everyday life
such as billboards, flower displays, videos in the sub-
way, banners on popular websites etc. Throughout the
country, students and employees in state-owned en-
terprises and the government were mobilized to watch
a new propaganda movie on the CCP’s founding titled
“The Beginning of the Great Revival”.
One anniversary, two mean-
ings:
Celebrations for the 100th anni-
versary of the 1911 revolution
took place in both sides of the
Taiwan straights but with mark-
edly different content and mean-
ing. In Taiwan the “100th anniver-
sary of the Republic of China” was
celebrated lavishly with large public events and pa-
rades. In the Mainland, CCP leaders commemorated the
“100th anniversary of the Xinhai revolution” in small-
scale events, carefully designed not to outshine the 90th
anniversary of the founding of the CCP.
Ethnic Tensions:
In December new clashes between Uy-
ghurs and Han Chinese in Urumqi re-
sulted in Hu Jintao skipping the G8
Summit in Italy in order to deal with the
crisis. Previous clashes in Xinjiang last
July left 20 dead. On the Tibetan “front”,
2011 marked the 60th anniversary of the
annexation of Tibet by the PRC and 12 monks set themselves on fire protesting against
Chinese rule. In December, Tibetan students of the Chengdu Railroad Engineering
School were attacked by their Han classmates who were allegedly angry over the pref-
erential treatment given to minority groups.
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 6
NEWS OF CHINA 2011 | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS
Local elections:
Approximately 140
independent candi-
dates throughout
the country decided
to stand in local
elections for peo-
ple’s congresses dur-
ing 2011. Many of
them were harassed
and threatened by
the authorities in
order to withdraw
their candidacies.
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 7
Haimen:
Between December
20th to 22nd villagers
of Haimen went on
protest against local
government plans to
expand a coal-fired
power plant that has already caused environmental deg-
radation in the area, reducing the villagers’ annual fish
catch. A police crackdown followed, reportedly leaving
between 1 to 6 villagers dead and around 200 injured.
On December 21st, Zhou Yongkang, China’s Security
Chief, commented that authorities “should enforce the
law in a civil manner to avoid further disputes”.
State of the
Internet:
On April 5th,
China an-
nounced the
establish-
ment of the
State Internet
Information
Office (SIIO),
the government’s latest Internet surveillance agency. In
December, new regulations by the SIIO stipulated that
microblog users are now obliged to provide their real
identities.
Leadership
reshuffle
ahead of 2012
transition:
In the second
half of 2011
China initiated
the very secre-
tive process of
reshuffling ministers, chiefs of agencies, provincial gov-
ernors and top economic officials ahead of the power
transition in 2012. The changes will be concluded in the
18th Party Congress next year and then be rubber-
stamped by the NPC annual session in 2013.
Intellectuals and protest:
Despite accusations for conformism, Chinese
intellectuals last year took the lead in advo-
cating reforms and protesting over local is-
sues. Their criticism was directed on issues
such as the railway management system and
the College Entrance Exam, while in Novem-
ber professors in Yangtse University publicly
protested against a highly polluting steel
plant. In the same month, one of China’s most prominent legal scholars, Professor
Jiang Ping (photo), warned that China is increasingly resembling a dictatorship while
addressing a gathering of more than 50 legal scholars.
Com
pile
d b
y K
osta
nti
nos
D. T
sim
onis
from
Dif
fere
nt
Wor
ld N
ews
Sou
rces
I ntroduction
This work is about arguing that the maps of the
world should be reconsidered in a global dia-
logue: in a process that opens the dispute of
boundaries between union-states, regions, zones,
or other similar geo-political terms. David Mar-
quand, in his important opus The End of the West
(2011) reminds us that West and East perhaps
never existed and in the case wherein we are told
that they do, have, and are: such are parochial
and illegitimate claims.
We shall have to put the (Indian) inventors of
Arabic numerals in our pantheon alongside
the Greek inventors of geometry, and Ibn
Rushd alongside Aristotle. We shall have to
abandon our self-centred and patronizing
belief that democracy and free discussion
were exported to a backward “East” by a pro-
gressive “West,” and reconstruct our mental
universe to take account of the indigenous
Indian tradition of public reasoning and reli-
gious toleration that long antedated the
“Western” presence in the subcontinent. More
generally, we shall have to recognize that the
familiar “Western” narrative of global history,
in which uniquely precious and, in evolution-
ary terms, uniquely successful “Western” val-
ues moulded the modern world in our great-
grandparents’ image, is a parochial distor-
tion of a far more complex truth. (Marquand,
2011: 176-77)
His argument, I feel, is important because it chal-
lenges what many in this world have come to
take for granted. In the case of this paper, it is the
maps we are familiar with, the design of the globe
that we have on our desks or which are offered to
our children, which are parochial and relics of
imperial abuses. This discussion is a needed one,
as we have for example, no clear indication as to
where Europe stops and that indigenous peoples
for example have not had the inclusive and legiti-
The COSMOPOLITANISATION
Of CARTOGRAPHY Raising the Specter of Legitimacy in Geography
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON*
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 8
mate chance to contest the territorial boundaries
which often split their nations. It is an attempt to
bring a democratic legitimacy to cartography
which is patently lacking.
This will be done firstly by discussing in a broad
and simple way why current maps are parochial
and relics of imperial domination. We will then
follow this argument up with another broad argu-
ment detailing how we could begin a global dia-
logue designed to spark debate over maps and to
form a call for the democratic reform of cartog-
raphy. Essentially, it argues that we must give
people and groups a chance to define their
boundaries and not have them imposed on us by
those holding the Maxim Gun. Lastly, we will en-
gage this discussion in relation to China’s territori-
al claims.
The Imperial History of Maps
Depending on climatic conditions, hunter-
gatherer societies have a population density
from 0.1 to 1 person per square kilometre,
while the invention of agriculture permits
densities to rise to 40-60 per square kilometre.
Human beings were now in contact with one
another on a much broader scale, and this
required a very different form of social organ-
ization. – Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of
Political Order, 2011
A new work by Francis Fukuyama has established
a logical understanding of the way in which hu-
man beings probably came to organize them-
selves politically through evolutionary terms.
Should we consider Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau
for example, their conceptions of the social con-
tract began with the heuristic device of a “blank
slate.” From this blank slate (or state of nature)
human beings were theorised to have joined for a
variety of reasons. Fukuyama takes the aforemen-
tioned evolutionary approach and argues rather
that it is perhaps improbable to trace wherein we
exactly developed our methods of socio-political
organization (those parameters which even un-
derpin hunter-gatherer humanoids). Rather, we
were perhaps born into already established sys-
tems and contributed to them over millions of
years.1 Because of this potentiality, we perhaps
never had a chance in our history to collectively
decide in non-violent democratic processes not
only how we should like to organize ourselves
politically, or what our deepest desired long-term
goals are, but also (for the purposes of this paper)
how our union-states or nation-states are bound-
ed territorially.
This discussion has a variety of comparative ex-
amples to support it. One of those can perhaps be
the way in which nation-states were formed from
the inception of the Treaty of Westphalia (or earli-
er during the Qin Dynasty in 221 BCE China, see
Fukuyama 2011 for more). We need only ask if
individuals and groups informing a variety of pre-
modern ethnicities were present when not only
Europe but parts of Asia and Africa were being
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 11
Francis
Fukuyama
territorially defined in imperialist discussions. It is
common knowledge at this stage that they were
not.
When the union-states and, in much more limited
circumstances, nation-states, in North America,
Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific, and so
forth were territorially determined, this was not
done in a manner that could be considered dem-
ocratic or republican. There was little to no inclu-
sion of local populations in this decision making
and as commonly known, many indigenous na-
tions had and continue to suffer because of this.
Such is perhaps commonly seen with the difficul-
ties Palestinians have in forming their own sover-
eign state: normatively and consistently blocked
for the most part by a minority of individuals
within the current and previous Israeli administra-
tions. This might also be said in reference, but not
limited, to the Kurdish Nation, the Welsh, Cornish,
Scottish, Corsican, Aboriginal and Torres Straight
indigenous and a wide variety of indigenous
Americans.
It is, of course, an anachronism to expect that ref-
erenda, “town hall meetings,” polling, and other
such practices would have been held during the
mapping of the world and other regions therein.
From the Middle Ages onwards to perhaps even
post-modern times (some argue this period be-
gan in post-war Europe) democracy and republi-
canism were not normative and might even be
said to be in the practical minority today despite
the amount of rhetoric these two bodies receive.
Both realpolitik and soft-power were mechanisms
by which empires expanded to try and perhaps
fulfil the material and power desires of the auto-
cratic polities and cultures found during those
times (like Great Britannia, Imperial France, Portu-
gal, Spain, Belgium, the USA, China, Russia and so
forth).
This discussion is purposefully broad to convey
this message. Even a cursory glance at various
bodies of literature dealing with the history of
geo-politics will add robust evidence to this argu-
ment. The point is that in majority (at least to my
paltry knowledge) this argument is not typically
made. Yes, certainly, we have a great deal of sepa-
ratist contestations in many union-states by eth-
nic nations seeking recognition and some greater
degree of sovereignty and or autonomy. But what
we do not have are the much “higher” politics of
individuals and groups throughout the world
challenging the way in which the world is territo-
rially depicted. Where, in fact, has our say been in
the way our countries look on a map? If we are an
oppressed peoples, like indigenous Americans,2
or the Naga of India: where is our right to distin-
guish our boundaries in discussion with other
citizens and not those with the Maxim Gun (e.g.
sometimes violent state governments)?
Democratising Maps
This is why I would like to call for a democratisa-
tion of maps using cosmopolitan theory. It is in-
creasingly evident that union-states and whatev-
er nation-states might be left are losing their terri-
torial legitimacy. It makes greater sense to let eth-
nic nationalities determine if they wish to sepa-
rate than to try and keep them within a bounded
territory through violent means (see Chechnya for
an example). For one, it may for the most part
diminish or remove the impetus for violence. For
two, it may add another sovereign trading part-
ner and player on the international scene. And for
three it will be a step supporting democracy over
autocracy.
But how could we go about doing this? Is it not a
bit dreamy? I reason that the answer lies in our
budding international civil society. Via interna-
tional non-governmental organizations, indige-
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 10
Via international non-governmental organizations,
indigenous organizations, national organizations,
and supranational bodies, we might have the capacity
to form an international movement of solidarity for
the cosmopolitan democratisation of cartography in
order to give legitimacy to what we see visually in geo
-politics.
nous organizations, national organizations, and
supranational bodies, we might have the capacity
to form an international movement of solidarity
for the cosmopolitan democratisation of cartog-
raphy in order to give legitimacy to what we see
visually in geo-politics.
Another question concerns the solidarity
of “what.” To contextualise the spectre of
legitimacy we must throw our support and
solidarity behind the premise that democracy is
part of the human story. That it is not something
that must be exported, but it is something
that humans have had since arguably pre-modern
(if not pre-human) times. For a great example
of this I encourage the reader to investigate
Fukuyama’s (2011) work The Origins of Political
Order, or an interview I conducted with Benjamin
Isakhan (2011) or his latest edited volume the
Secret History of Democracy (2011). If we
understand democracy as a pre-modern and post
-modern probability and as something of a
natural predisposition for social organization
(a.k.a politics and governance) then the spectre
must be that of global or cosmopolitan democra-
cy.
Addressing China3
With the aforementioned points made, we would
do well to begin discussing cases. And in this in-
stance, I should like to address China and formally
challenge its claim to territorial sovereignty. This
extends not only to Taiwan, Macau, Hong Kong,
and Tibet, but also to Inner Mongolia, the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, and all other re-
gions within “mainland China”. For a country that
maintains it is a socialist democracy, where in fact
is the legitimacy of democracy in this State? Sure-
ly any boasted “victory” stemming from 1949 and
the violence over the Chinese plurality that then
ensued concerning the Great Leap Forward and
the Cultural Revolution cannot convey legitimacy.
Those living within the “Greater China Region”
must have the opportunity opened to them to
discuss and decide if and how they want to be a
part of the current PRC. In this regard, none of
what we see on the
map has any meaning.
Without legitimacy,
the boundaries of Chi-
na are emptied of
significance. They in
turn become symbols
of illegitimacy and
must come to be
challenged. China’s
territorial lines are a
visual depiction of
boundaries that were
established through
dynastic and ideologi-
cal empire: one that
secured not the con-
sent of the plurality
but rather the fear and
bloodshed of a great
number of individuals
– further entrenching
evolutionary autocra-
cy.
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON
People in Greater China, as well as those through-
out this world, must come to think of their coun-
tries in this manner. We must come to terms with
evolutionary autocracy and realize that rarely (if
ever) in human history have we established peri-
ods wherein there was a complete and demon-
strable process of pluralistic, transparent and ac-
countable involvement of people concerning
questions of “national” importance: in other
words, deciding on a matter central to everyone
in a manner that established a democratic legiti-
macy.
With this heuristic device employed, it is reasona-
ble to say that the plurality of nations that have
become absorbed by illegitimate imperialist
Chinas (over time) have the right to reconsider
their role in the union-state. Collectively, the
Chinese plurality has the right to call into
question the union-state itself as little if any of it is
democratically legitimate. Will Tibet, Inner
Mongolia and the Xinjian Autonomous Region
want to be part of the PRC or will they wish
to form (or rather reform) their own sovereign
states as they come to recall the independence
of their nations lost to violent absorption? Will
this be mirrored by Macau, Hong Kong and the
separate/inseparate Republic of China? It is
hoped that we may one day come to answer the-
se questions. And to be fair to those that hold the
PRC near and dear, this argument can be made
concerning any other union-state (not just China)
and this article is not meant to lambast a geo-
political space that has made many important
and significant achievements through time and
space. The PRC is but one example in a world
filled with examples and we would all do well to
start thinking of our geo-political spaces in this
way.
Conclusion
The aforementioned will certainly take a
great deal of time, but time is of course a neces-
sary component of communication (which in it-
self is a parameter of democracy preferably de-
signed to trump violence). I should like to ask for
greater minds to comment on this paltry piece
which will undoubtedly allow me to create a
much stronger call for solidarity and a more ro-
bust argument.
Notes:
* Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political the-
orist with a Ph.D. in political science. He completed
his doctorate at the Queensland University of Tech-
nology under the aegis of Australia’s prestigious En-
deavour Award.
1. This point forms the argument of
“evolutionary autocracy.” We and our
ancestors have, over millions of years,
been born into already established systems
wherein we (in most cases) did not have
an equal voice to contest the telos of
our times. Democratic legitimacy is a
method to break this time-bound autocratic
norm.
2. When “America” is used in this article, it is re-
ferring not to the USA but to the majority of
the “Western” hemisphere.
3. Although I have taken China as a case for dis-
cussion, we may use this argument on any
other union-state in this globe.
Works Cited
Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. The Origins of Political
Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolu-
tion. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Isakhan, Ben and Stephen Stockwell (eds). 2011.
The Secret History of Democracy. London: Palgrave
MacMillan.
Isakhan, Benjamin. Interviewed by: Jean-Paul
Gagnon. 2011. “An Interview with Dr.
Benjamin Isakhan: On the Alternative Histories of
Democracy,” Journal of Democratic Theory, 1(1): 19
-26.
Marquand, David. 2011. The End of the West: The
Once and Future Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON
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W hat is the role of law in maintain-
ing spaces of order in modern
Chinese society? In 1996, Jiang
Zemin adopted a new official
policy of ruling the country in accordance with
law, and establishing a socialist law-ruled state
(yifa zhiguo, jianshe shuhui zhuyi fazhiguo), a policy
that is now incorporated into the PRC Constitu-
tion. Such law-lauding ideology and rhetoric has
been increasingly evident in China since the end
of the Cultural Revolution, and in conjunction
with decades of rapid and prolific legal institution-
building, has provided rich fodder for ample
scholarship and discourse on the trajectory of Chi-
na’s legal system, and the nature of rule and order
in modern Chinese society.
The main empirical issues addressed in this field
include the retreat of the Party-state; the evolu-
tion of the legislature, judiciary, legal profession
and administrative law regimes; and the nexus
between rule of law and economic development,
democracy and human rights. The ‘law and order’
meta-narrative is visibly played out in Party dis-
course, Five Year Plans, Constitutional evolution
and the astounding pace of development of the
formal legal system. The thickest descriptions and
predictions of the story are those that also take
into account trends and trajectories in popular
and Party legal consciousness and ideology.1
The basic distinction made in studies of the role of
law in maintaining order is between rule by, and
rule of, law:
Whereas the core of rule of law is the ability of
law and legal system to impose meaningful
restraints on the state and individual
members of the ruling elite, rule by law refers
to an instrumental conception of law in which
law is merely a tool to be used as the state
sees fit.2
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 16
CHINA AS A LAW-RULED STATE:
FROM TOP-DOWN RHETORIC
TO BOTTOM-UP EXPECTATIONS
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY ANNA KLOEDEN*
In China, the distinction has proved difficult
to make empirically (which is nicely reflected
in the lack of a linguistic distinction, both
concepts generally translated as fazhi, literally
‘law-ruled’). While generally scholars are in
agreement that the direction of legal reform
over the last three decades has been away
from rule by man and towards rule by law, the
extent to which rule of law is emerging empirical-
ly, and its optimal nature and role in the Chinese
context, are matters of much debate in the litera-
ture.
The focus of most studies of Chinese law and
order has been fixed on the most visible manifes-
tation of the working out of that nexus,
namely institution-building, rhetoric and policy
at the central/top level of the Party-state. The
rule of law question has been asked through
the lenses of globalisation, modernisation, and
economic development. Opinions diverge in
the literature on whether and to what extent
the Chinese polity possess a notion of law that is
consistent with that required by rule of law.
Alford, for example, argues that ‘the principal
state architects of China’s post-Cultural Revolu-
tion law reform project have a genuine
ambivalence toward their undertaking’.3 Dowdle,
on the other hand, argues that any such
ambivalence ‘manifests itself in practice, not
conception. Normatively, the Chinese, including
the leadership, are overwhelmingly consistent in
proclaiming the supremacy of law over other
forms of political authority and over private inter-
ests’.4
However, the ‘top-down’ approach, predicated on
these meta-narratives, and focusing on official,
state-endorsed conceptions of law and order,
must be supplemented by increased attention to
the experiences and expectations relating to law
and order (which I will broadly term ‘legal
ideology’) of citizens in society. Traditional and
historical cultural factors, in which Chinese con-
ceptions of law and order are grounded, have
been discussed in depth in the literature,5 but
tend, like the rule of law debate generally, to be
examined at the level of the elite polity. If, as
Peerenboom argues, rule of law is a function of
both institution-building and legal culture, the
question must be asked: to what extent is central
law-lauding rhetoric penetrating local spheres in
which ‘law’ (fa) is traditionally regarded as an infe-
rior means of social ordering than ‘reason’ (li)? To
what extent are Beijing’s winds of change, includ-
ing the state’s ‘verbal homage to the sanctity of
law’,6 penetrating the local sphere and popular
ideology?
A useful case through which to examine the local
state-society interface is that of grassroots, citizen
-led NGOs. China’s NGO sector has been steadily
growing in size, visibility and power since 1978,
accompanied by a dramatic increase of state
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY ANNA KLOEDEN
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 15
A Mosaic Law
by Frederick
Dielman
oversight and ostensible regulation of the sector.
Through the promulgation, beginning in 1989
with the regulations on ‘Social Organisa-
tions’ (shehui tuanti), of a number of new laws
relating to charities and NGOs, the Chinese gov-
ernment has evinced its concern with maintain-
ing tight control over the newly emerging state-
society relationship. While NGOs are increasingly
seen as indispensable to economic and social de-
velopment, they are also seen as potentially
threatening for the civic organisation and
agendas they represent.7 Accordingly, although
laws provide a pathway to recognition and
legal status for NGOs, in practice such registration
is difficult to obtain. For example, a recent
study by Ashley and He of Beijing NGOs found
that registration status is in practice ‘limited
to [government-organised NGOs] and similar
organisations with continued close government
ties’.8 It remains the case that most NGOs in
China today are not registered with the
Ministry of Civil Affairs (at the end of 2008 there
were approximately 415 000 registered NGOs in
China, of an estimated two to eight million in to-
tal).9
Existing ‘civil society’ literature tends to focus
on registered NGOs at the state-dominated
end of a spectrum of autonomy, simplistically
assuming that ‘[unregistered] grassroots NGOs …
do not encounter too much interference from
the government’, and are not directly
controlled in any way by the government
in the absence of registration,10 there being
a supervision gap which allows for greater
NGO freedom. However evidence from the
author’s research on charitable organisations
run by the underground Catholic church of
Henan province suggests that, on the contrary,
at the local interface between state and
society, oversight and control are at times also
very much evident, but in much more veiled, and
less formal/policy-centric ways than we see cen-
trally.
At this local interface between state and society,
ordinary citizens and government officials
bring their own traditions, histories and
expectations about law to their engagement
with the legal system and the officials who
represent it. In the case of the underground
Catholic church and its unregistered/quasi-legal
charities, most players demonstrate deftness
at functioning in the absence of legally defined
relationships, and negotiating paternalistic/
disciplinarian-type interactions with local
officials. In fact, the local picture painted therein
is one in which law is not supreme, either in
practice or rhetorically, and many features
of even a thin conception of rule of law are
missing. The ‘real’ rules of engagement between
grassroots charities and the state are more to do
with attaining legitimacy, garnering supportive
connections, and ‘giving face’ to local govern-
ment by treading politically-contentious lines
(such as evangelism and drawing attention to
gaps in government provision of welfare) careful-
ly.
Above all, the dominant expectation regarding
law at this local level is not that law will be
impartially, consistently and unambiguously
defined and applied, but rather than flexible
norms will govern individualised, paternalistic
relations with the state. This is not widely
regarded as problematic, or in fact widely
regarded at all, due to a lack of esteem for the
notions of ‘law’ and ‘legality’ as intrinsically/
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY ANNA KLOEDEN
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 18
...most NGOs in China today are not
registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs
(at the end of 2008 there were approximate-
ly 415 000 registered NGOs in China, of an
estimated two to eight million in total).
ideologically valuable. It may be surprising, from
a Western law-centric perspective, that the pic-
ture that emerges from this particular (non) le-
gal ideology is not one of ‘lawless chaos’.11 In-
stead, the local snapshot is one imbued with
themes of paternalism, game-playing, give-and-
take, suspicion and subordination. Above all, it
is one of order – not, admittedly, a type of order
associated with rule of law and its threshold re-
quirements such as predictability and certainty,
but order nonetheless.
Chinese and foreign scholars alike have put
forward a vast array of opinions and descrip-
tions, from conservative to liberal, on how
the macro legal culture of China continues to
be shaped by the winds of change blowing from
Beijing and (purportedly) throughout China.
But further empirical studies and examination of
the law-order nexus locally is required to better
understand the extent to which such winds
have penetrated notions and ideas about law
and order in Chinese culture and society. By
moving in this way from the macro to the micro,
texture and distinction is added to our under-
standing of the ideologies and traditions in
which ‘law and order’ concepts in China contin-
ue to be grounded today, and a contribution
will also, reflexively, be made to the bigger pic-
ture themes of rule of law and legal conscious-
ness.
Notes:
* Anna Kloeden is a PhD candidate in law at the
University of Oxford.
1. See, for example, Randall Peerenboom,
China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law
(CUP, New York 2002) especially Chapters
2–3; Geor Hintzen, ‘The Place of Law in
the PRC’s Culture’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dy-
namics 167; Zhiping Liang, ‘Tradition and
Change: Law and Order in a Pluralist
Landscape’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics
215; Karen Turner, ‘The Criminal Body and
the Body Politic: Punishments in Early
China’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics 237;
Thomas Stephens, Order and Discipline in
China: The Shanghai Mixed Court 1911–27
(Asian Law Series, University of Washing-
ton Press, Seattle 1992).
2. Peerenboom (2002) 8.
3. William Alford, ‘A Second Great Wall? Chi-
na’s Post-Cultural Revolution Project of
Legal Construction’ (1999) 11 Cultural
Dynamics 193, 198.
4. Michael Dowdle, ‘Heretical Laments: Chi-
na and the Fallacies of ‘Rule of
Law’ (1999) 11 Cultural Dynamics 287,
301.
5. The most seminal works include
Peerenboom (2002) and the 1999 special
edition of Cultural Dynamics, with contri-
butions from (inter alia) Alford, Hintzen,
Turner, Dowdle, Defoort and
Peerenboom, and Liang.
6. Peerenboom (2002) 217.
7. Qiusha Ma, ‘The Governance of NGOs in
China since 1989: How Much Autono-
my?’ (2002) 31 Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly 305, 311.
8. Jillian Ashley and Pengyu He, ‘Opening
One Eye and Closing the Other: The Legal
and Regulatory Environment for
“Grassroots” NGOs in China Today’ (2008)
26 Boston University International Law
Journal 29, 55.
9. China NPO Website <http://
www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/listTitle.do?
dictionid=2201> accessed 30 November
2009;
10. Tony Saich, Governance and Politics of
China (Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire
2004) 232.
11. Compare with Hintzen (1999) 169,
arguing that the picture that emerges
on examining the social realities
behind ‘China’s vociferous legal
aspirations’ is ‘one of lawless chaos,
where status, connections and money set
the ‘real’ rules’.
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY ANNA KLOEDEN
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 19
O n November 22, 2011 Chinese me-
dia reported that the Guangdong
provincial government published
the ‘Plan Concerning Further Foster-
ing and Regulating Social Organizations of
Guangdong Province’, which contains new provi-
sions governing the establishment of social or-
ganizations in the province. According to the new
regulations, to come into effect on July 1, 2012,
social organizations may directly apply to civil
affairs departments for registration without the
requirement set by the ‘dual registration system’
of first securing sponsorship by a state agency or
organization.
Eliminating dual registration is an important de-
parture from the status quo. Under this system
social organizations are required to register and
receive periodic inspections by the local civil af-
fairs departments, and seek the professional
sponsorship of a state agency or organization in a
related policy area. The sponsoring unit is allowed
significant involvement in the social organiza-
tion’s internal operation and decision-making.
This system has prevented many organizations
from registering, as either due to their “sensitive”
area of work or the weak social capital of found-
ing members with local authorities, they do not
succeed in securing such a sponsorship. Conse-
quently, this policy has either driven most of the
social organizations underground or has led them
to use a loophole in the system and register as
business units, a practice that exposes them to
taxation. It comes to no surprise that the dual reg-
istration system is often presented as the most
clear indication that social organizations in China
lack autonomy. Therefore, initial reactions to the
announcement of the changes in Guangdong
province have been very positive. Scholars in the
mainland argue that if this provincial level legisla-
tion finds its way to national level policy, it will
signal a “breakthrough” for the development of
“civil society” in China, as the requirement of se-
curing institutional patronage will be removed
from the equation between state and social or-
ganizations.
For academics outside China who work on state-
society relations, the new regulations in Guang-
dong and their possible adoption as a national
policy will inform the ongoing discussion on the
form and direction of state-society relations in the
PRC. In the last 30 years since the initiation of the
reforms, sociologists, political scientists and area
studies scholars and students, have been preoc-
cupied with a series of interrelated questions: Is
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 20
NEW REGULATIONS GOVERNING
SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA:
A CIVIL SOCIETY ON THE RISE?
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS*
China developing a civil society that will eventual-
ly challenge the Party-state? Can the social envi-
ronment as developed after the reforms, sustain a
civil society that will begin from sectorial de-
mands and eventually push for liberalization and
political reform? Is, perhaps, the concept of cor-
poratism closer to describing the direction of so-
cial organization in China as Unger, Chan and oth-
er scholars have argued1? So far, the regulatory
framework has hindered this discussion as the
very visible top-down authoritarian dynamic has
distorted actual trends on the ground. If the
state’s immediate grip on social organizations in
the form of the sponsorship requirement is re-
moved, the actual structural configuration be-
tween state and society will be unveiled, allowing
researchers to examine how social organizations
are utilizing the freed social space to advance
their aims and influence policy making. Are they
going to break free and even antagonize state
authority or they will remain directed to the state,
largely seeking cooperation in exchange of its
assistance and resources? Ultimately, the pro-
spect of removing the dual registration system
could permit a more convincing answer to wheth-
er a civil society or a corporatist arrangement is
actually present or not. In fact, this discussion
exceeds the confines of academic life. How one
perceives the future directions of China’s sphere
of social organization has repercussions for: (a)
foreign policy making, by fueling or diffusing
arguments on China’s “peaceful evolution”; (b)
international bodies and NGOs seeking to fund
impactful projects and social organizations in
China; (c) China itself, as projecting an image
of “normality” is essential in the way it is per-
ceived abroad either as a “threat” and the authori-
tarian “other” or as a “partner”; and (d) the
social organizations in China themselves that will
operate in a new institutional context. Thus,
for academics and policy-makers alike, the remov-
al of restrictions in the operation of social organi-
zations, such as the dual registration system,
could signal a “moment of truth”. Are we to
expect the slow rise of a civil society in China? The
answer given here to this question is a negative
one.
By applying concepts such as ‘civil society’ and
‘corporatism’ that are so heavily associated with
western historical experience we may obscure
more than we actually explain as we adopt a
certain agenda of what to look for and how to
interpret it. Wong2 alerts us to this danger saying
that “even as Chinese historical changes are sepa-
rated from European developments, they are reu-
nited as functional equivalents to European
changes”. Consequently, our understanding of
social developments in China remains implicitly
defined by European experiences. In the Chinese
experience of state-society rela-
tions we can identify elements of
Leninist organization; corporatism
in its state or societal forms; and
even characteristics associated
with civil society. If this coexist-
ence of such a plethora of trends
seems “contradictory” to us, this is
because we expect to see some-
thing else, something more famil-
iar. Wong’s remark that “the mod-
ern world is filled with states but
the ones we have today still bear
the marks of the different paths
they have travelled” serves as an
important guide in how we ap-
proach state-society relations in
China and elsewhere.
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS
19
Lenin Prof.
Roy
Bin
Wong
The discussion on social organizations in China
initially developed within a framework construct-
ed around civil society-centred explanations that
have exhibited serious empirical limitations. For
example, why in the context of marketization,
many social organisations in China continue to
seek the state’s recognition and patronage rather
than pursuing independence? And how can the
ambiguously named Government Organized
NGOs (GONGOs) be approached by social scien-
tists trained in the works of de Tocqueville or Ha-
bermas? In this discussion, the preoccupation
with civil society in the 80s and 90s gave its turn
to ‘corporatism’, a concept that captures some of
the institutional arrangements at place, yet only
partially.
What we may identify as ‘corporatist arrange-
ments’ can be approached as state responses in
old problems with deep roots in China’s late im-
perial past. The 1998 regulations on the registra-
tion of social organizations are direct ascendants
of similar attempts by the Nationalist state, that in
turn reflect the Chinese experience of state mak-
ing since the late empire and its central concern
with penetrating local society in order to finance
the modernisation program and retain social or-
der. The late imperial state had to rely on the local
gentry and its institutions in order to finance its
attempt to meet the challenge of imported
‘modernity’, its guns, trains and ideas. Its National-
ist successor aspired to penetrate local rural and
urban society to an unprecedented degree as a
means of extraction or resources and for social
control. The Chinese state today is trapped be-
tween opposing social dynamics of market re-
form and its continuing attempt to hold a (much
more pluralistic) society under control and in line
with its developmental and political goals. The
enduring feature in all historical phases is that the
ability of the state to penetrate society depends
on the state’s “capacity to create new organiza-
tions in the localities and influence, if not control,
those that are non-governmental”3. But does this
process need to create patterns of state-society
relations that are identical with western experi-
ences and the ways they have been codified in
concepts like ‘corporatism’ and ‘civil society’?
Acknowledging variation in historical experiences
can explain phenomena such as the ‘Government
Organized NGOs’, and the shifts and
“contradictions” in the orientation of China’s so-
cial organizations between greater ‘relevance’ to
the social groups they target, or ‘loyalty’ to the
state, that cannot be captured by ‘corporatism’
and ‘civil society’, unless we redefine the content
of these concepts. Saich4 examining the develop-
ment of social organizations argues that both
‘civil society’ and ‘corporatism’ when applied in
the Chinese context, have serious explanatory
limitations; he describes, instead, a symbiotic rela-
tionship, and multiple models of state-society
relations that are operating at the same time. The
picture that Saich presents is that of a continuous
process of negotiation that takes place within the
state (as broadly defined to include party organs,
state agencies and the mass organizations), and
between state and society. Dickson5 also disa-
grees with arguments that see corporatism as a
process of decay of the Leninist political system
either through a transformation from state to so-
cietal corporatism6 or as a tendency of civil associ-
ations evolving to the direction of civil society.7
According to Dickson, the transformation from
state to societal corporatism is the outcome of
political reform, not the dynamic behind it, hint-
ing that democratization is a prerequisite to soci-
etal corporatism rather than the opposite. In-
stead, he identifies simultaneously practiced ex-
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 22
The Chinese state today is trapped
between opposing social dynamics of
market reform and its continuing
attempt to hold a (much more plural-
istic) society under control and in line
with its developmental and political
goals.
clusionary and inclusionary policies within state
corporatism that may account for trends identi-
fied by scholars without “stretching the concept
of societal corporatism beyond recognition”. Yiyi
Lu, in her recent book8 has argued very convinc-
ingly that careful empirical research shows a so-
cial reality that exceeds the analytical capacity of
the western-centric concepts of civil society and
corporatism. According to her analysis, social or-
ganisations in China exhibit more autonomy than
imagined under the corporatist prism while sim-
ultaneously they are more directed to the state
than western civil society organizations. Lu de-
scribed the relation of social organisations to the
Chinese state as “depended autonomy”.
The difficulty of capturing social realities in China
by using west-centric models becomes more ap-
parent when attempting to interpret conditions
observed on the ground. During fieldwork in
north China, I visited an “NGO” that operates in
the area of migrant workers’ welfare. The organi-
zation succeeded due to the devotion, skills and
passion of its founder, a migrant worker himself,
who started by establishing a hotline for legal
issues, offering advice on workers regarding Chi-
na’s labour law. After a few years of operation the
organisation expanded by opening a community
centre offering classes and after-school care for
children of migrant workers, followed by the es-
tablishment of an additional recreation and edu-
cation centre within an industrial park. In each
step, the founder was very careful to include the
local state agencies in his initiatives in order to
gain support, a strategy that secured him great
autonomy, despite setting up a Party, Workers
Union, Youth League and Women’s Federation
branch within his organisation. The founder
gained financial support and accepted material
contributions from local authorities in the form of
facilities and equipment that made the expansion
of the organisation’s services and presence possi-
ble. More importantly, the official backing it re-
ceived from one of China’s major mass organiza-
tions enabled the organisation to present itself as
an advocate of the rule of Chinese labour law,
fending away suspicions from factory owners. The
latter now often require its assistance in order to
educate the workers on their lawful rights and
thus prevent them from making demands that
transcend the legal obligations of the employer.
The organization educates Chinese migrant work-
ers on their rights on a daily base, making a valua-
ble and immediate contribution to raising their
level of awareness on legal affairs. In addition, it is
building a community of migrant workers by of-
fering welfare and recreational services. Part of
the organization’s success was that it consciously
pursued the state’s help, accepting its penetra-
tion by agencies and mass organizations, but sim-
ultaneously maintained a very high degree of
autonomy in terms of its operation, internal or-
ganisation and activities. Thus, while the organi-
sational setting is antithetical to a ‘civil society’
entity, the high degree of autonomy of the organ-
ization does not fit a corporatist model either.
This is only one example of many similar cases
recorded by scholars working on state-society
relations in China who argue that a close relation-
ship with the state is a strategy often pursued by
social organizations that seek access to resources
and official sanctioning of their work in order to
be more effective and autonomous9.
The above argument against interpreting state-
society relations under the distortive lenses of
‘civil society’ or ‘corporatism’, reorients the ex-
planatory framework of the new changes in the
dual registration system from the ‘grand theory’
level to more immediate interpretations. The new
guidelines are simultaneously a recognition and a
very pragmatic answer to the failure of the cur-
rent registration policy for social organizations.
From the state’s perspective the current frame-
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS
A Chinese Migrant Worker
work is counterproductive in two ways. First, the
registration regulations drive social organizations
underground, to a level that state agencies can-
not monitor or control. It is estimated that more
that 3 million non-registered NGOs operate in the
mainland presently for which the authorities
know little or nothing about, approximately 10
times more than the registered ones. My own re-
search on the Communist Youth League has re-
vealed that communication with its own approxi-
mately 3 million branches -a large number of
which is only nominally active- is hardly main-
tained, while CYL Committees throughout the
administrative hierarchy of the PRC are in the dark
regarding the exact number of youth social or-
ganizations operating informally. Second, in the
context of the state’s “declining capacity to imple-
ment policy consistently”10 towards a society that
is demanding more state attention in the form of
welfare services in order to ameliorate the ine-
qualities created by marketization, the social
functions of these social organizations are often
welcomed by local authorities. These social
services are targeted on groups under heavily
moralistic institutionalized prejudice, such as the
case of AIDS-related NGOs and those operating
in the field of sex workers, or those gaining in-
creasing public and official sympathy such as
welfare services for children of migrant workers.
Therefore, by removing the “bottleneck” of offi-
cial sponsorship, state authorities will not only
benefit from the social welfare functions of these
organizations, but will also get a better access to
them, as the latter will seek registration in order
to start operating openly, making themselves
known.
In addition, the Guangdong guidelines should be
viewed in comparison to other local and national
state initiatives in the field of governance of social
organizations. In 2008 Shenzhen was the first city
in China to abolish the dual registration system
for social welfare and charity organizations, which
now only have to register with the Civil Affairs
departments, a decision that was regarded as ex-
perimental and served as a blueprint for future
policy changes. Then, in April 2010, the central
government, in an attempt to control the inflow
of donations from foreign institutions, enforced
stricter regulations regarding foreign money
transfers to Chinese social organizations. Next,
in February of 2011 Beijing municipal govern-
ment allowed industry and commerce, charities,
welfare and social services’ organizations to
register directly with the civil affairs departments
without the requirement of dual registration.
This announcement was followed by reports
on the press last summer regarding discussions
for an eminent nationwide elimination of the
dual registration requirement in 2012. Therefore,
the recent Plan by the Guangdong provincial
government, falls in line with an attempt to
streamline the operation of social organizations
by making use of their social work capacities,
exposing them by ‘luring’ them over ground,
and devising new ways to influence their activi-
ties and growth. The new Guangdong Plan also
permits the establishment of more than one
business associations for the same industry
from the prefecture (diji) to the township level
(xianji). Furthermore, it stipulates that the
sponsorship units formerly offering ‘professional
management’ will now be in charge of
‘professional guidance’, a term that remains
unclear as of its exact content. The above are
indications of the CCP’s careful and pragmatic
approach regarding the governance of social or-
ganizations, that solves the problems of current
regulations and partially harmonizes law with
social reality.
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 24
It is estimated that more that 3 million non-
registered NGOs operate in the mainland
presently for which the authorities know little
or nothing about, approximately 10 times
more than the registered ones.
In conclusion, the new regulations will consist
a ‘breakthrough’ only to the degree that they
will allow existing underground organizations
in the field of social work to come to the surface
and new ones to start their operation with
less red tape in their registration process. Howev-
er, the actual impact of these changes is far
from certain as the conservative reflexes of
bureaucracies tend to dilute institutional reforms,
while social organizations, as the case of last
year’s changes in Beijing demonstrated, remain
vigilant and apprehensive of new state regula-
tions. Ultimately, despite the gradual abolish-
ment of the ‘dual registration system’ there is
no indication of a swift in the priorities of the
local and central state on the one hand, and
social organizations on the other. State and socie-
ty relations in the PRC will continue to develop in
a symbiotic context that is malleable to the
center’s political priorities and pressure from
the base, yet it is very unlikely that a ‘civil society’
mirroring western historical experience is on
the rise.
Notes:
* Konstantinos D. Tsimonis is a PhD candidate
at the School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London. His doctoral research is on
China’s mass organisations and their potential
as political representation mechanisms, using
the Communist Youth League as a study
case. During 6 years of study and work for various
organisations in China, he has published on
current Chinese affairs, North Korea, social
research methods and modern Chinese literature
(translation).
1. Unger, Jonathan and Chan, Anita, ‘China,
corporatism, and the East Asian Model’ The
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No 33
(Jan 1995) ; Jonathan Unger (ed.), Associa-
tions and the Chinese State: Contested Spac-
es (M.E. Sharpe Inc: New York, 2008)
2. Wong, Roy Bin, China Transformed: Histori-
cal change and the Limits of European Expe-
rience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997)
3. Ibid:192
4. Saich, Tony, ‘Negotiating the State:
The develoment of Social Organizations in
China’ The China Quarterly No161 (March
2000)
5. Dickson, Bruce J., ‘Cooptation and Corpo-
ratism in China: The logic of Party Adapta-
tion’ Political Science Quartery Vol 115, No 4
(winter, 2000-1)
6. Unger and Chan, op. cit.
7. White, Gordon ; Howell, Jude and Shan
Xiaoyuan, In Search for civil society
(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1996)
8. Lu, Yiyi, Non-govermental organisations in
China (Routledge: London, 2009)
9. See characteristically the book of Lu Yiyi in
which she analyzes similar centripetal dy-
namics at play in the case of 55 Chinese
“NGOs”, that inform their relation to the
party-state.
10. Saich, op. cit. p. 133
References:
I. Dickson, Bruce J., ‘Cooptation and Corpo-
ratism in China: The logic of Party Adapta-
tion’ Political Science Quartery Vol 115, No 4
(winter, 2000-1)
II. Lu, Yiyi, Non-govermental organisations in
China (Routledge: London, 2009)
III. Saich, Tony, ‘Negotiating the State: The
development of Social Organizations in
China’ The China Quarterly No 161 (March
2000)
IV. Unger, Jonathan and Chan, Anita, ‘China,
corporatism, and the East Asian Model’ The
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No 33
(Jan 1995)
V. Unger, Jonathan (ed.), Associations and the
Chinese State: Contested Spaces (M.E.
Sharpe: New York, 2008)
VI. White, Gordon ; Howell, Jude and Shan
Xiaoyuan, In Search for civil society
(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1996)
VII. Wong, Roy Bin, China Transformed: Histori-
cal change and the Limits of European Expe-
rience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997)
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY KOSTANTINOS D. TSIMONIS
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 25
Joürnal of Global Analysis endeavoürs to become the foremost international forüm for academics, researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the disciplines of polit-ical science, international relations, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and hüman geography.
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Joürnal of Global Analysis endeavoürs to become the foremost international forüm for academics, researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the disciplines of polit-ical science, international relations, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and hüman geography.
Joürnal of Global Analysis is an interdisciplinary refereed e-joürnal, edited by a groüp of interna-tional scholars indicated in the Editorial Board and International Advisory Board. The joürnal is püblished at its own web site http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Joürnal of Global Analy-sis welcomes sübmissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the joürnal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in social sciences.
Prospective aüthors shoüld sübmit 4.000 - 15.000 articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-compatible format. For more complete descriptions and sübmission instrüctions, please access the Editorial Güidelines and Style Güidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Contribütors are ürged to read CESRAN’s aüthor güidelines and style güidelines carefülly before sübmitting articles. Articles sübmissions shoüld be sent in electronic format to:
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Publication Date: Winter issüe — Janüary 01
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Peer-reviewed
Academic journal
By CESRAN
(Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis)
Editor-in-Chief
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Managing Editor
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Gready, University of York, UK | Prof. Fen Hampson, Carleton University, Canada | Prof. Mohammed Hamza, Lund
University, Sweden | Prof. Alice Hills, University of Leeds | Dr Maria Holt, University of Westminster, UK | Prof. Alan
Hunter , Coventry University, UK | Dr Tim Jacoby, University of Manchester, UK | Dr Khalid Khoser, Geneva Centre for
Security Policy, Switzerland | Dr William Lume, South Bank University, UK | Dr Roger Mac Ginty, St Andrews' Universi-
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ford, UK | Prof. Roger Zetter, University of Oxford, UK
www.cesran.org/jcts
T he Journal of Conflict Transfor-
mation and Security (JCTS) pro-
vides a platform to analyse conflict
transformation as the processes
for managing change in a non-violent way to
produce equitable outcomes for all parties that
are sustainable. Security is understood as encap-
sulating a wide range of human security con-
cerns that can be tackled by both ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ measures. Therefore, the Journal’s scope
not only covers such security sector reform is-
sues as restructuring security apparatus, reinte-
gration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive
remnants of war and cross-border management,
but also the protection of human rights, justice,
rule of law and governance.
The 21st century is witnessing the decline of the
United States as the foremost power in the world,
and the gradual emergence of a multipolar order
with China at the top, on track to becoming the
world’s economic powerhouse. The purpose of
this paper is to provide an overarching survey of
China’s future role in the world, in parallel with
some of the challenges it faces in the coming
years and decades. The central theme is going to
talk about sustainable development and the cor-
responding need for China to provide both politi-
cal leadership and the lead in materializing poli-
cies that respect and work with the natural envi-
ronment, rather than destroy it. At stake is the
idea and vision that will replace the American-led
world order since the end of the Cold War and it
may very well fall to China to provide the needed
leadership and insight.
Why is China important?
Since the death of Mao Tse Dong in 1976, China
began a gradual opening to world markets, in a
framework that combined strong political control
of economic policy with a capitalist-influenced
model of production and demand. For over three
decades now, China has grown at astounding
annual rates and has effectively become the se-
cond largest economy in the world after the Unit-
ed States1. Alongside, it has overtaken America as
the biggest exporter and consumer of energy2. In
the foreseeable future, we are going to witness
America’s gradual decline from the world stage,
to be taken up by China in the 21st century. Amer-
ica came to the fore after World War II largely due
to the fact that it was the only intact economy not
destroyed and decimated by war. However, today
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 28
CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
IS GLOBAL LEADERSHIP POSSIBLE? Sustainable Development, Political Legitimacy and Foreign Policy
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV*
C hina’s rising star on the world stage is accompanied by significant economic challenges that
bring extensive domestic and foreign political implications. To ensure its growth and stability,
China must turn to sustainable development, which, accompanied by rising personal wealth,
will cause problems for the current one-party political system in China. Beijing must adjust to
allow more political pluralism if it hopes to gain the internal political legitimacy to be a global leader in
legitimating a multilateral foreign policy in the context of an increasingly multipolar world.
we live in a unique time – our world is bigger and
more connected than anytime in recorded histo-
ry. China is becoming a central engine that must
not only provide economic leadership, but also a
vision for the world with the political will to carry
it out.
Sustainable Development
On a world scale, fossil fuels continue to be the
primary method of meeting the energy needs of
major countries. One exception is France, whose
energy mix is heavily favoured towards nuclear
power. However, since sustainable development
became a mainstream phrase in the 1980s, the
ecological footprint of human activity has be-
come an important consideration for projects
both in developed and developing countries. The
first step in sustainable development lies in devel-
oping power generation techniques that mini-
mize the reliance on fossil fuels. In the first decade
of this century, we have seen several major mile-
stones achieved toward renewable energy pro-
duction. In absolute numbers, the growth of solar
and wind investment has been startling, but rela-
tive to overall world energy production, still re-
tains a very small share3. Policy-wise, Europe is a
leader in encouraging the development of re-
newable energy: by 2020, 20% of power generat-
ed in the EU must come from renewable sources4.
While China’s investment in renewable energy is
greater than that of any other country, it is still
only having a small impact on the overall energy
mix of the country and it is necessary for Beijing
to implement a long-term focus in this regard5.
However, the emissions of CO2 emitted by China
in the coming years are set to increase, and that
must be taken into account when talking about
renewable energy targets.6
Sustainable development extends beyond power
generation. It also encompasses industrial capaci-
ty, particularly capital-intensive industries, such as
mining and heavy industry. As the world’s manu-
facturing center, emissions and waste products
from factories in China are a growing environ-
mental and health problem. Polluted air in cities,
acidified soil, unacceptably quality of drinking
water and the negative impact on groundwater
and rivers are fundamental challenges for Beijing
to address, if it has any pretensions for becoming
a superpower in this century7. Carbon neutrality is
a term that refers to developing manufacturing
processes that ideally have a net emission of no
sulphur and carbon-based gases. On a practical
level, it means developing means of scrubbing
emissions for harmful gases, storing them under-
ground or developing links with other industries
that might have a use for these waste products;
they are not limited to gaseous emissions, but
also solid waste products that can be used in dif-
ferent manufacturing processes.
An additional challenge that comes to China with
a rapidly growing economy is increased prosperi-
ty. While a new wealthy class of industrialists,
bankers and other professionals is taking shape in
China, the average person will also feel the effects
of a more powerful economy: better wages and a
higher level of consumption of both goods and
services. When talking about 1,3 billion people,
one needs to consider the kind of demand in-
creased consumption will create on existing infra-
structure, energy usage, the surrounding natural
environment, and the global impact it might have
from additional imports as demand for more and
different kinds of goods increases. The response
by the Chinese government can take a number of
dimensions: from slowing the growth of incomes,
and thus, demand, to creating a culture in the
general population that is sensitive to environ-
mental issues, or promoting goods and services
that are construed with an appreciation of mini-
mizing their ecological impact. In essence, the
role of the government is central in creating a
hybrid of these policies that will give priority to
ecologically-sensitive consumption habits and
the goods and processes that will support them.
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 29
Policy-wise, Europe is a leader in encouraging
the development of renewable energy: by 2020,
20% of power generated in the EU must come
from renewable sources.
Overall, the premise of this section is as follows:
the first tier of China’s coming global role is found
in encouraging and implementing sustainable
development. The three main themes are an em-
phasis on emission-free power generation (wind,
solar, nuclear), reforming heavy industry and capi-
tal-intensive activities to ultimately achieve car-
bon neutrality, and finally encouraging ecologi-
cally-friendly habits in a large population that will,
on average, become increasingly wealthier in this
century and consumer more as a consequence.
China must consider these three areas very care-
fully, because they can set the paradigm for envi-
ronmental global leadership by the Celestial Em-
pire.
Implications of Economic Growth for Internal
Political Challenges and Foreign Policy
The growing affluence of China is going to bring
with it a set of political problems that the coun-
try’s one-party rule will find increasingly difficult
to confront. The first challenge is that the average
person will have the ability to increasingly ques-
tion the existing order, catalysed by greater per-
sonal wealth. In other words, democratic tenden-
cies in a population are correlated with increased
economic means and this development will come
to odds with the paradigm of one-party rule in
China.
The effective question is qualitative: can pluralism
exist in the context of a charismatic or one-party
political system? The historical precedents point
to a negative answer: the USSR, for instance, or
Franco’s Spain, show that this kind of regime does
not stand the test of time and once collapsed, is
replaced by imperfect, nascent pluralism.
The trouble for China’s Communist Party is that
economic growth has the potential to hasten the
demise of its political legitimacy. The historical
experience of the last major democratic throes in
China is not flattering: the forceful suppression of
the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprisings raised
questions about Beijing’s ability to deal with large
-scale protest8. Dealing with dissent is crucial for
political legitimacy, because a regime that does
not have ability to change in the long run is not
sustainable. In other words, China needs to find a
different, peaceful means of handling difference
of opinion and dissent in order for the current
regime to maintain political legitimacy.
Domestic political legitimacy, gained through
wider spaces for public discussion, participation
and influence in the political process, will be cru-
cial if Beijing is to have a more influential global
role in turn. There are several political reasons for
this: one is that predictable domestic politics with
conflict management methods that do not in-
volve military means give China the ability to pro-
mote political predictability in other conflict-
prone areas of the world, such as the Middle East
or conflict-ridden areas of Africa without being
perceived as hypocritical. The second reason is
the heightened trust credit it would receive from
other major international partners on issues relat-
ed to a wide variety of policy types: security coop-
eration, environment, economic and trade rela-
tions and peace promotion.
Chinese foreign policy will operate in a multipolar
world.9 With the gradual exit of the United States
as the dominant power in international relations,
there is no single power to replace it that can ex-
ercise the kind of political, economic and military
dominance that the United States did for the se-
cond half of the 20th century. In effect, we are see-
ing the formation of several power centres in the
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 30
The trouble for China’s Communist Party is
that economic growth has the potential to
hasten the demise of its political legitimacy.
The historical experience of the last major
democratic throes in China is not flattering:
the forceful suppression of the 1989
Tiananmen Square uprisings raised questions
about Beijing’s ability to deal with large-scale
protest
world, of which China will be likely the most pow-
erful, but not the dominant one.
Decisions in a multipolar world are taken in a mul-
tilateral manner. The unique circumstances of our
world that I mentioned in the first paragraph –
population and interconnectivity – will mean that
the problems we face in the world will be global
in nature, and so will their solutions. This is pre-
cisely the challenge to Chinese foreign policy: if
America set global paradigms according to its
own prisms in the 20th century, China has to in-
vent the prisms of effective multilateralism in the
21st to a much higher degree than any country
has up until this point in history that also con-
verge its national interests with those of other
countries to equivalent depths – also a practice
without precedent in history in the perceived
complexity it will have when applied to the mod-
ern international system.
However, to meet the above goal, Chinese politics
have to mature to a higher level, to match the
accelerating economic influence of the country.
The challenge there, as also mentioned above, is
to bring about effective domestic pluralism in the
medium to long term, if a multilaterally-based
leadership on foreign policy is going to have any
credible legitimacy on the international stage.
One might ask why cannot tight political control,
tied with gradual economic liberalization, as is the
current trend in China, not produce an outcome
that would make China a world leader in produc-
ing a style of effective foreign policy that is com-
prehensive, robust and multilateral in nature and
make it a global trend of foreign policy design?
The answer is straight-forward and complex at
the same time: this kind of foreign policy requires
a culture of nuanced decision-making that is hard
to find in the current behaviour of Chinese do-
mestic, let alone foreign policy.
Contemporary practices of Chinese domestic and
foreign policies are not encouraging: the impris-
onment of political dissenters10, a more confron-
tational military presence in Southeast Asia11, and
shaky and unstable relations with some regional
powers – such as Japan and India – need to be
resolved before China can effectively begin to
think about a global presence in political, and not
just economic terms.12
The point of this section is simple: China will have
the economic might to be one of the global lead-
ers in a multipolar world, and perhaps the most
influential one, as the United States gradually de-
clines over the 21st century. Yet, to become that
leader, a political maturation is required that
would enhance the political legitimacy of the
Communist Party in China through much greater
political pluralism and from there, give Chinese
foreign policy both the culture of nuance and the
needed legitimacy to become an effective multi-
lateral leader in the emerging multipolar world.
Conclusion
To sum up the paper, China’s economic growth
makes it one of the engines of the global econo-
my and it gives Beijing an enhanced position in
global affairs. Yet, a focus on sustainable develop-
ment through the implementation of environ-
mentally-friendly electricity production capacities
and vast industrial reform that will not only make
industry cleaner, but also sustain its rate of
growth, must become the two main policy objec-
tives if China’s economic experiment is to be sus-
tainable in the long term. The more important
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 31
consideration concerns the political implications
of China’s more influential global position, be-
cause it is happening in a time of increasing pres-
sures to open up space for political pluralism,
which has the potential to overwhelm the current
regime. Combined with the two unique aspects of
our world, in terms of population and intercon-
nectivity, the challenge is doubled when Chinese
foreign policy is taken into consideration, be-
cause it will have to function in a multipolar
world; in that world, the legitimacy of foreign pol-
icy is derived from the domestic political legitima-
cy of the regime. The reason is that China will nev-
er be able to replicate American unilateralism of
the post-war period – the world is simply too big
and complex now. To function in a multipolar
world then, Chinese foreign policy needs to learn
to be grounded in popular public legitimacy and
have a nuanced approach to global problems and
solutions that involves negotiating and convinc-
ing a number of international partners. Much of
this attitude can be learned through opening up
space for pluralism domestically, and it is the only
way for China to mature politically to have the
foreign policy needed in a multipolar world – thus
the imperative for Beijing to focus not just on
growing the economy, but also to vastly improve
its political sophistication as soon as possible.
Notes:
* Georgi Ivanov is a graduate student in political
science and international affairs at Carleton Uni-
versity in Ottawa, Canada.
1. The British Broadcasting Corporation. (2011,
Febraury 14). China overtakse Japan as
World’s Second-Biggest Economy. The British
Broadcasting Corporation.
2. Oster, Shai and Swarts, Spencer. (2010, Jul
18). China Tops U.S. in Energy Use. The Wall
Street Journal.
3. Al-Jaber, Ahmed et al. (2011). Renewables
2011: Global Status Report. REN21. P.18
4. European Commission. (2010). The EU Cli-
mate and Energy Package. Retrieved August
25, 2011, from European Commission Web-
site http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
package/index_en.htm
5. Harvey, Fiona. (2010, November 29). China
Surges Ahead on Clean Energy Investment.
Financial Times.
6. Grumbine, R. (2007). China’s Emergence and
the Prospects for Global Sustainability. Bio-
Science, Vol. 57, No. 3 (March 2007), pp. 249-
255. P.252
7. Harris, Paul and Udagawa, Chihiro. (2004).
Defusing the Bombshell? Agenda 21 and
Economic Development in China. Review of
International Political Economy, Vol. 11, No.
3 (Aug., 2004), pp. 618-640. P. 619
8. The British Broadcasting Corporation. (1989,
June 4). 1989: Massacre in Tiananmen
Square. The British Broadcasting Corporation.
9. Kampf, David. (October 20, 2009). The Emer-
gence of a Multipolar World. Retrieved Octo-
ber 23, 2011, from Foreign Policy Associa-
tion Website http://
foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/10/20/the-
emergence-of-a-multipolar-world/
10. Foster, Peter. (November 5, 2010). Chinese
Artist Ai Wei Under House Arrest. Retrieved
October 23, 2011, from The Telegraph Web-
site http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/china/8112700/Chinese-
artist-Ai-Wei-Wei-under-house-arrest.html
11. Weitz, Richard. (March 16, 2010). Global In-
sights: China’s Military Build-up Stokes Re-
gional Arms Race. Retrieved October 23,
2011, from World Politics Review Website
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
articles/5283/global-insights-chinas-military-
buildup-stokes-regional-arms-race
12. Miks, Jason. (November 4, 2009). To Balance
China, India Turns to Japan. Retrieved Octo-
ber 23, 2011, from World Politics Review
Website http://
www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
articles/4553/to-balance-china-india-turns-
to-japan
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY GEORGI IVANOV
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 32
T he Central Committee met over the
weekend of October 15, 2011 to de-
termine how the upcoming succes-
sion during the 18th Party Congress
in 2012 should occur the current candidate to suc-
ceed Hu Jintao is Xi Jinping with Li Keqiang, one of
the Vice-Premiers is believed to succeed Wen Jia-
bao as the Premier at the 12th National People’s
Congress in 2013.
There has been less focus by the media and China
Watchers on who will succeed Wen Jiabao as Prem-
ier. While Li Keqiang is considered to be the front-
runner and is the current ‘senior’ Vice Premier, I
contend that Li Yuanchao, former party boss of
Jiangsu Province and current head of the Organiza-
tions Department, still has an equally suitable can-
didate for the position of Premier. Mainland Chi-
nese news sources have described Li as one of Chi-
na’s most ‘unconventional leader’, ‘independent
minded’, and known for strong ‘forward thinking’
concerning how China should be governed. Li Yu-
anchao has the most hands on experience
amongst the elites in implementing policies for the
problem areas that the CCP need to manage in the
21st century. During his reign as Jiangsu Party Boss
he improved Party relations with the people,
curbed corruption, implemented inner-party de-
mocracy on a provincial level, improved the condi-
tions of migrant workers, and brought greater gov-
ernment attention to the dangers of environmen-
tal pollution.
Nothing is ever certain in Chinese politics. One of
the more recent examples of what China Watchers
thought was a certain event that did not go as pre-
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 34
THE CASE FOR LI YUANCHAO AS PREMIER
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY NICHOLAS MILLER*
dicted was the failure of Xi Jinping to be promoted
to Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commis-
sion (CMC) during the Fourth Plenum of the 17th
Party Congress in September of 2009. Though the
Party gave no reason as to why he was passed over
for promotion it left analysts wondering that per-
haps there was infighting amongst the elites and
that Xi could be experiencing a fall from grace.
Eventually Xi was promoted to the Vice-Chairman
position of the CMC at the Fifth Plenum of the 17th
CPC in 2010. It should be noted that a military lead-
ership position is not a requited position for one to
become Party Secretary. China Watchers inferred
the importance of this position because Hu Jintao
held this position before he was made Party Secre-
tary and it was believed that Xi would follow Hu’s
path. The Party’s failure to promote Xi’s only high-
lights the unpredictability of accurately forecasting
elite level politics and how ‘certainties’ can be
wrong.
In May and June 2010 there were widespread
worker strikes and migrant unrest throughout sev-
eral provinces. Premier Wen Jiabao highlighted
that the Party must work to ensure better treat-
ment and more resources need to given to migrant
workers. Wen also commented that the govern-
ment must do more to curb environmental pollu-
tion and incorporate green development into Chi-
na’s ‘rise’. This shows the prescience of Li Yu-
anchao’s policies in Jiangsu Province as he sought
to widely improve the lives of migrant workers and
spur greater environmental reform since 2002. Li’s
policies seem to have taken greater notice by high-
er Party officials otherwise he would have never
been promoted to the Organizations Department
during the last Party Congress.
It is standard procedure for the state media not to
speculate about the upcoming succession or reveal
information about the inner workings of the Polit-
buro. This is done to prevent outsiders from seeing
any public displays of internal fighting. While China
analysts have more information at their disposal
today the CCP still remains determined to keep
outsiders always uncertain about what happens
behind the closed doors of the Politburo.
Li Yuanchao - The Dark
Horse
Li Yuanchao was born in
Changzhou City, Jiangsu
Province in 1950. His father
was Li Gangcheng, a veter-
an Communist official,
while his mother was Lu
Jiying, was a revolutionary
veteran, whose first hus-
band, Li Chaoshi, was a
general in the Red Army
who was executed by the
Kuomintang (KMT) in 1931.
By birth Li Yuanchao
should be considered apart
of ‘princeling’ faction,
which is comprised of
elites who are descended
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY NICHOLAS MILLER
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 35
from important Party officials but since Li’s career
was advanced through the Chinese Communist
Youth League (CCYL) this puts him a member of
‘populist’ faction. The populists are elites that rose
from more humble backgrounds and have ties to
the CCYL and Hu Jitano, who previously ran the
CCYL in the 1980s.
Like a majority of today’s elites within China Li
Yuanchao was sent to work as a laborer during the
Cultural Revolution. After the revolution he
received a Bachelor’s Degree in Mathematics from
Fudan University in Shanghai in 1982, a Master’s
Degree in Economic Management from Beijing
University in 1990, and a PhD in Law from the
Central Party School in 1995. Li’s political career
started in 1983 when his first patron, Chen Pixian,
the former Party Secretary of Shanghai, recom-
mended him to Hu Yaobang to serve as CCYL Sec-
retary in Fudan University. By the end of 1983 Li
was made Vice Minister of the CCYL Central Com-
mittee.
During Li’s tenure as Deputy Party Secretary of
Jiangsu Province in 2000 and Party Secretary of
Jiangsu Province in 2002 he implemented a variety
of political and administrative reforms such as
‘service-orientated government’, fuwuxing zhengfu,
in which the public evaluated government leaders
and those who received the lowest evaluations
were either demoted or fired. His reforms im-
proved Jiangsu standing from the 5th most peti-
tioned province to 23rd in 2006.
In 2002 Li called for a greater focus on sustainable
development that balances growth of urban areas
with environmental protection. In 2007 rapid algae
growth caused by pollution threatened Lake Tai, Li
ordered it to be cleaned under the strictest guide-
lines, which cost Nanjing’s GDP to drop 15% that
year. The Jiangsu Provincial Government closed
2,150 chemical factories by 2008 and allocated be-
tween 10%-20% of the city and county revenues
towards environmental protection.
China’s leaders are aware that China’s economic
rise is threatened by worsening environmental pol-
lution. A Chinese governmental report that was
released in February 2010 showed that the water
pollution throughout China in 2007 was more than
two times greater than what officials originally had
originally reported. China’s leaders have begun
stressing the importance of sustainable develop-
ment and now China is one of the world’s leaders
in the development of green technology.
Li Yuanchao is one of the few provincial leaders to
make explicit calls to change how the government
stands on protecting stability throughout the
country. In 2005, he commented that some
leaders were too ‘concerned with stability’,
taiping guan, and that the government’s policies
were making minor incidents into major ones.
Li stated that China’s leaders lacked the courage
to pursue bolder reforms. Widespread social unrest
and riots in Tibet and Xinjiang show that Li
Yuanchao’s criticisms of the Party’s approach to
social stability were justified, though the CCP’s
response after the 4th Plenum was to reassert the
status quo on ethnic minorities and make it illegal
to discuss independence or separatism from the
PRC.
Yu Jianrong, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences, who is regarded as the leading expert on
the problems of peasants and migrant workers, has
reported to the central leadership that rural prob-
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY NICHOLAS MILLER
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 36
Li’s political career started in 1983 when
his first patron, Chen Pixian, the former
Party Secretary of Shanghai, recommended
him to Hu Yaobang to serve as CCYL Secre-
tary in Fudan University.
lems need to be urgently addressed if the Party
wishes to prevent social unrest on an unprecedent-
ed scale. Li Yuanchao has an advantage over
other candidates in that he has extensive
experience in improving the migrant situation.
Jiangsu Province has over twelve million migrant
workers, or 16% of the Province’s population of
76 million people. In 2006 the Jiangsu Provincial
Government began to set up free vocational
training schools and by 2011 all migrant workers
are to be trained in other skill areas, and
migrant children will be allowed access to educa-
tion, which was not normally allowed within
Chinese law.
Li’s has the experience in handling a wide range
of the problems China will need to tackle if it is
to sustain its economic growth. Though he is not
considered a front-runner to succeed Wen Jiabao
in the estimations of most China Watchers,
his overall practical experience is precisely
what the ‘fifth generation’ leadership need for the
CCP maintain its power throughout the 21st
century.
The 18th Party Congress in 2012 and the 12th
National People’s Congress in 2013 are going to
be major tests for the CCP’s ability to secure
an orderly political succession. While Li Yuanchao
may not be the front-runner in the race for the po-
sition as Premier but China Watchers should not
ignore his chances for success. Li Yuanchao’s past
success in lessening corruption, improving the ac-
countability of the government to the people, ad-
dressing environmental pollution, and migrant
worker issues are all challenges that need to be
addressed and his current position of head of the
powerful Organizations Department shows that
the elites within the CCP have tremendous faith in
his abilities.
If China wants to continue its rise throughout the
21st century it will have to address growing eco-
nomic and social inequalities, ethnic tension, and
endemic corruption. Whoever is appointed within
the ‘fifth generation’ leadership at the 18th Party
Congress and 12th National People’s Congress will
have to meet the challenges needed to keep Chi-
na’s economic rise secure.
Notes:
* Nicholas J.S. Miller is a PhD candidate at the
University of Sydney.
1. This article is an abridged version of my
Master Thesis in International Relations for
Flinders University titled, “The CCP Leader-
ship Succession After Hu Jintao in 2012.”
This article originally appeared in The Dip-
lomat as “The Case for Li Yuanchao” on Nov
30, 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/china-
power/2011/11/30/the-case-for-li-
yuanchao/
2. ‘Richard McGregor and Mure Dickie,
“China’s Political Rising Star: Li Yuanchao”,
Financial Times, 15 March 2007; Wong Wah,
“China’s Rising Star”, Asia Times, 04 Febru-
ary 2006
3. Joshua Li, “Who Will succeed Wen Jiabao?
Vice Premier Candidates for the 2008 Chi-
nese government ”, Association for Asian
Research, 25 October 2005, http://
www.asianresearch.org/articles/2719.html.
4. Alice Miller, “The Case of Xi Jinping and the
Mysterious Succession”, China Leadership
Monitor, No. 30, 2009, p. 1-9.
5. James Mulvenon, “The Best Laid Plans: Xi
Jinping and the CMC Vice-Chairmanship
that Didn’t Happen”, China Leadership Mon-
itor, No. 30, 2009, p. 1-7.
6. John Garnaut, “China’s land disputes at
crisis point as revolutionary turmoil beck-
ons, says professor of disenfranchised”,
Sydney Morning Herald, 1 March 2010.
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY NICHOLAS MILLER
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 37
I n July 2009, the China Banking Regula-
tory Commission (CBRC) issued a three-
year plan1 on the development of New
Rural Financial Institutions. The plan
proposed to set up 1294 New Rural Financial Insti-
tutions including 1027 Village Banks by the end of
2011. According to the plan, 75.2% of the pro-
posed New Rural Financial Institutions would be
set up in the area where agriculture plays an es-
sential role in local economy, 65.9% in the Central
and Western provinces and 35.7% in the poor
area. It is remarkable that the rural and underde-
veloped areas have been put in the privileged
position in this financial arrangement. To make
sure that fund could flow between the developed
and underdeveloped, rural and urban area, the
plan required that the promoters who intend to
create a new institution in urban or other devel-
oped area have to set up a counterpart in the ru-
ral or other underdeveloped area simultaneously.
However, this plan is not the beginning of the
Rural Financial Transformation. The transfor-
mation in fact has been carried out from Decem-
ber 2006 when the CBRC decided to set up exper-
imental rural financial institutions in Sichuan,
Qinghai, Gansu, Neimenggu, Jilin and Hubei Prov-
inces. The first list experimental institutions in-
cluded 21 Village Banks, 10 Rural Mutual Coopera-
tives and 5 Loan Companies. In 2007, the experi-
ment was extended to 23 provinces. By June
2009, 118 New Rural Financial Institutions had
been established, which were composed of 100
Village Banks, 11 Rural Mutual Cooperatives and 7
Loan Companies, of which 87 were in Central and
Western area. Regardless of the aggressive plan of
2009-2011, the progress from December 2006 to
July 2009 of the Rural Financial Transformation
was also conspicuous.
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 38
RETURN TO COUNTRYSIDE:
A NEW ATTEMPT OF RURAL
FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY JIAN GAO*
In the statement of the three-year plan, one fact
was particularly highlighted, which was the poor
coverage of the financial institution in rural area.
It was reflected by two issues: the first is that
there were still 1424 townships which hadn't
been covered by any financial institutions by
2008; the second is it was still difficult for rural
residents and enterprises to gain loans. Why has
the financial supply in rural area been not able to
meet their demand? Is this situation a newly
emerged problem or a long-term dilemma? To
answer these questions, we should throw light on
the financial scheme in rural area.
Financial Scheme in Rural Area before and af-
ter the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis
By 1997, the rural financial structure was com-
posed of four parts: the Big Four State-owned
Commercial Banks, the Rural Credit Cooperatives,
the Postal Savings Bank and Rural Cooperative
Foundations. During the period of late 1970s to
mid-1990s, with the deepening reforms in Chi-
nese economy, the county territory economy in
China had experienced rapid growth which was
not only revealed by its proportion within the
whole economy, but also characterized by a varie-
ty of growing financial bodies within the county
territory. In addition to the Rural Credit Coopera-
tive and local branches of the Big Four Banks, var-
ied types of Rural Cooperative Foundations had
played an active role in meeting the financial de-
mand of rural people and enterprises. In 1992,
there were 17,400 Rural Cooperative Foundations
set in township and 112,500 set in villages2. Dur-
ing the period from 1993 to 1996, different types
of foundations continued booming under the
policy supports of central government. By the
end of 1996, just before the central government
ordered emergent shutdown of the Rural Cooper-
ative Foundations, the number of foundations at
township level was up to 21,000.
However, in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial
crisis, abrupt changes in the rural financial ar-
rangements had taken place. Although Chinese
government boasted their success in fighting
against the crisis, the rural financial scheme in fact
had suffered immense setback.
In this year, due to the financial crisis and the fol-
lowing deflation in Chinese economy, the Central
Financial Work Conference decided to contract
the branches of the Big Four Banks at the county
and the township. According to the transfor-
mation plan produced in June1998, all the
branches with average savings below 500, 000
yuan per staff should be closed; branches with
average savings between 500,000 and 1,000,000
yuan per staff should be closed selectively and
branches with savings between 1,000,000 and
1,500,000 yuan per staff should be combined. In
the three years be-
tween 1998 and
2001, the Four State-
owned Commercial
Bank had closed
44,000 branches
within China main-
land. All the closed
branches were locat-
ed in rural area under
the county-level. Fur-
thermore, the Big
Four Banks have tak-
en back the authority
of loan from county-
level branches. From
then on, the major
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY JIAN GAO
business of the Big Four Banks in rural area has
become absorbing savings, which caused the
ongoing flow of fund from rural area to the devel-
oped and urban area.
At the same time, to avoid the risks involved with
the rapid development in the unofficial financial
market, the People’s Bank of China and Ministry
of Agriculture made the decision to close all the
Rural Cooperative Foundations. The order was
issued in 1999. The sudden shutdown has caused
credit crash and the run on bank in spite of the
rescue from central government. To meet the
debts, the burden had to be transferred to the
public finance of local government, which even-
tually were passed on to local people.
Why reform?
From mid-1990s, the policies in industrial struc-
ture and strategies have been skewed in favour
of urban and developed area, and the county
territory economy has fallen into recession as
a result. This situation has been worsening since
the funds were continuously extracted to the
major cities and industrial area. This unidirection-
al flow of money left a growing financial gap in
the county territory economy, which has brought
about the prosperity of underground financial
market in rural area. As far as local people
concerned, the supply of underground financial
market has been usually not reliable and
more expensive than that of official financial insti-
tutions. On the other hand, due to its illegal
identity, the underground financial market has
usually been beyond the regulation of financial
regulatory authority as well as the control of
monetary policy. It would very likely increase the
risk of government failure in Macro Economic
Control.
Another context that has to be taken into consid-
eration is the cancellation of agricultural tax since
2005. The influence of this reform is never defined
to the alleviation of farmers’ economic burden,
but concerns the relationship between the gov-
ernment and the people. The agricultural tax as
well as various levies attached has developed in-
dividual farmers’ awareness of their linkage with
the country while the government could keep
their control on grassroots by collecting the tax.
When all these charges were abolished, the local
governments, including the county and lower
level governments, had no longer direct connec-
tions with their people, and the shrinkage of local
financial income resulted from this transfor-
mation has also triggered the retreat of govern-
ance from grass roots society.
Under the above context, the extension of New
Rural Financial Institutions could not only be a
measure to meet the increasing demand for fi-
nancial service in rural area, but also be a govern-
mental strategy of the return to rural society. If we
turn to review the practice of this movement, we
can find this three-year plan is not entirely market
-oriented, but in some sense government-
oriented. Though the main components of the
New Rural Financial Institutions, Village Banks,
were claimed to be run as a profitable institution,
they are in reality subject to the admission control
which requires the promoters to set up at least
one Village Bank in rural or underdeveloped area
while creating a Village Bank in urban or devel-
oped area.
Notes:
* Jian Gao is a PhD student in Economic and So-
cial History, School of History, Classics and Ar-
chaeology, University of Edinburgh.
1. China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC) on the development of New Rural
Financial Institutions 2009-2011: Question
and Answer Session 银监会有关部门负责
人就发布《新型农村金融机构2009年-2011
年 工 作 安 排 》 答 记 者 问http://
www.songyang.gov.cn/zwgk/
xxgk/00266401_1/03/0302/201109/
t20110927_89598.htm
2. Wen Tiejun. “Rise and Fall of the Rural Co-
operative Foundations (Nongcun Hexuo
Jijinhui de Xingshuaishi 农村合作基金会的
兴衰史)”. Zhongguo Laoqu Jianshe, 2009
(9).
DOMESTIC ANALYSIS | BY JIAN GAO
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 40
Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) is for academics, policy makers and practi-tioners to engage in discussions on a wide range of peace, conflict and human security related is-sues in a multidisciplinary forum with contributions from political science, security studies, interna-tional relations, development studies, post-conflict reconstruction studies, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography.
As an international refereed e-journal, edited by a group of acclaimed scholars indicated in the Edi-torial Board, the Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security is published at its own web-site http://www.cesran.org/jcts. It welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in the social sciences. Submissions in comparative analysis, with case studies and empirical research are particularly encouraged.
Prospective authors should submit 5.000 - 10.000 word articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-compatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/jcts. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN’s author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to:
Prof. Alpaslan ÖZERDEM - Editor-in-Chief - [email protected]
Publication date: Spring issue — April
Autumn issue — October
ISS
N:
20
45
-19
03
CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS
D espite protests by the Chinese gov-
ernment, the Tibetan spiritual leader
Dalai Lama went ahead with plans to
visit a heavily militarized Tibetan
Buddhist area in northeast India in November
2009, which is the focus of an intense territorial
dispute between China and India. Dalai Lama had
re-iterated that he did not want to be the cause
for escalation of tensions between India and Chi-
na, the former being his host for past six decades.
This visit had ignited the Sino-Indian border dis-
pute and could risk making this region the proxy
battleground where both India and China seek to
proclaim their respective sovereignty. Dalai
Lama’s recent visits and public appearances in
different non-political events in India have once
again irked the Chinese officials who believe that
India is inciting anti-Chinese sentiments leading
to cancellation of high-profile talks at the govern-
mental levels.
Tension had slowly been building up between
the two Asian giants, with media commentators
further inciting the divergence of opinions. There
have been wide-spread speculations regarding
Chinese intentions to wage war on India, which is
unlikely in the current scenario. Reports had also
appeared in Chinese state media alleging that
India was moving troops and fighter aircraft to
the northeast, specifically into Sikkim and Aruna-
chal Pradesh.
The Sino-Indian border dispute continues to re-
main a cause of slightly greater concern as the
two countries have been in mutually antagonistic
and unchanging positions for decades. There also
seems to be a lack of genuine diplomatic initiative
to resolve the tension and a growing differential
in comprehensive national power which increas-
ingly favours China.1
Meeting his Chinese counter-part, Wen Jiabao on
the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Hanoi on 28
-29 October, 2010, the Indian Prime Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh set the tone by commenting
that “China’s rise is a fact of life”, implying that Chi-
na has to be engaged, and not contained,
thoughtfully and imaginatively; China needed to
be respected and not suspected, trusted and not
doubted. Referring to Prime Minister Dr. Manmo-
han Singh, the Indian Foreign Secretary Ms.
Nirupama Rao said that dealing with a “peaceful
rise of China requires close analysis, study and un-
derstanding”. 2
But the world has taken little notice of the rising
border tensions and sharpening geopolitical rival-
ry between the two giants that represent compet-
ing political and social models of development.
Even though China and India have more than 20-
years track record of cooperation, both countries
have ample justification for being cautious. On
the one hand, US hegemony and greater US in-
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 42
SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS:
COMPETITION OR COOPERATION?
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE*
volvement in Asia may push the two neighbours
toward even more cooperation. On the other
hand, the degree to which one nation perceives
the other as a threat could encourage closer ties
with the United States. According to the United
States National Intelligence Council Report on
emerging global trends, by 2015, international
community will have to confront the military, po-
litical and economic dimensions of the rise of Chi-
na and India. How these two countries manage
their relationship will have a tremendous impact
on peace and stability in the regional and, in-
creasingly, global context. Against this backdrop
of a changing international environment, the two
Asian powers find themselves locked into what
Barry Buzan has called the “security complex” with-
in which they are expected to manage their rival-
ry and develop ties of cooperation.3 Historical
evidence shows that although China has been a
major security concern for India, the Chinese were
less wary of India and concentrated more on the
pattern of superpower rivalry existing between
the United States and the former Soviet Union
during the Cold War.
After years of cold peace, mistrust and hostility
since the Sino-Indian border clashes in 1962, the
demands of realpolitik and pragmatism in policy-
making transformed one of Asia's most important
relationships - bilat-
eral ties between
India and China. The
end of the Cold War
witnessed the devel-
opment of two de-
fining characteristics
in the security envi-
ronment of the Asia-
Pacific region: First,
the United States
has become the only
superpower in the
world today. It is also
the most important
external power in
Asia, and plays a key
role in Asian securi-
ty; Second, old rivals,
China and India have emerged as strong regional
powers, as evidenced by impressive economic
growth, the development of nuclear arsenals, and
demonstrated ambitions for respective influences
in the Pacific and South Asian regions.
While China’s role as an economic and geo-
strategic player is more widely recognized, India
is slowly emerging as a regional competitor to be
taken seriously. China and India, the two largest
developing countries in the world, have a com-
monality of history, culture, economy and social
characteristics, despite certain irreconcilable dif-
ferences. Each is concentrating its resources to
expedite internal economic development, carries
out an independent foreign policy and strives for
a peaceful international environment. China is a
big power in East Asia while India is a big power
in South Asia. Each enjoys advantages and influ-
ence in their respective regions. In spite of shar-
ing a glorious civilizational past and having never
fought a single war until their emergence as mod-
ern states, security competition between India
and China is inevitable as their economies grow.
However, the positive note is that this security
competition does not have to be conflictual.
The contemporary picture in China-India relations
today is that both nations are engaged in at-
tempting to put the past behind and forge new
relationships based on the emerging global stra-
tegic realities. Trade and economic ties have
grown exponentially in the last few years and
leaders of both the countries have expressed de-
termination to find solutions to the China-India
boundary dispute which have distorted relations
in the past. The changing reality of India-China
ties is clearly reflected in economic issues which
are increasingly becoming the most vital compo-
nent of official discourse and academic enquiry
both in the Western countries, as well as, in India
and China. As a result of this growing interest
amongst experts and officials of both these coun-
tries, India-China economic engagement has
since come to be recognized as one of the most
reliable CBM (confidence-building measure) in
the trajectory of India-China political rapproche-
ment.
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012
Barry
Buzan
The post-Soviet world system has been character-
ized by the opening up of geographical bounda-
ries of the different nations in the overall perspec-
tive of economic integration. The Cold War rivalry
between two divergent political systems is no
more the parameter for choice of allies. The con-
frontational diplomacy has been replaced by con-
sensus and engagement. The new mood of en-
gagement between India and China has been
influenced by the developments in the interna-
tional sphere, which would shape their domestic
and foreign policies in the days ahead.4
China and India has embarked on what can be
broadly described as the path of “cooperative
security”.5 The concept of cooperative security
derives from the liberal traditionalist paradigm
offering a new approach to managing security
dilemmas that states face in regional and global
contexts. This approach is founded on two essen-
tial arguments. First, threats to security are no
longer solely military. They are increasingly di-
verse and multidimensional ranging from eco-
nomic underdevelopment and trade imbalances,
irregular migration of people and uncontrolled
population growth, human rights abuses and
drug trafficking, conflict over access to natural
resources and environmental degradation and
the most effective being the threat of terrorist
attacks from unidentified elements in society.
Second, the management of these emerging se-
curity issues require multilateral efforts through
the processes of discussion, negotiation and co-
operation between both the governmental (track
I approach) and non-governmental (track II ap-
proach) actors.
The divergences and convergences in Sino-Indian
interests reveal that India and China are two ma-
jor powers in Asia with global aspirations and cer-
tain specific, significant conflicting interests given
their historical legacies. As a result, some amount
of friction in their bilateral relationship is inevita-
ble. Though competition between the two
emerging Asian giants is not ruled out, their rela-
tionship should be sustained for developing a
meaningful positive relationship and contentious
bilateral issues should not deter the process.
While the prospect of a better economic interac-
tion has brought two countries closer in recent
years, external factors play a viable role in deter-
mining the future course of their relationship. The
relations of the two Asian powers with the U.S.
and Russia, the former Cold War adversaries, have
a decisive impact on the future evolution of Sino-
Indian relations. It is inevitable that their efforts
will be affected by the policies of the great pow-
ers that play a decisive role in the international
sphere. India will be closer to the US for defend-
ing their shared values of democracy, freedom
and pluralism and maintaining its policy of broad-
based engagement with the United States partic-
ularly in view of the terrorist attacks. Similarly,
India will be steadfast on its relation with Russia
based on its historical, friendly ties which will fur-
ther strengthen through economic and military
cooperation. Thus, while in the Cold War, ties with
the superpowers strained Sino-Indian relations;
now balancing India’s relationship with each of
them will determine its relations with China.
Both China and India rely heavily on Russian mili-
tary technology and equipment for moderniza-
tion of their defence systems. There has been evi-
dence that the Chinese military is engaged in a
modernization programme although it is very
paradoxical given the fact that China is keen to
develop community-building exercises with its
neighbours to foster a peaceful regional environ-
ment for overall growth and prosperity. The U.S.
Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld speaking
to Asian defence ministers at an annual security
conference about a Pentagon report on China in
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 44
The post-Soviet world system has been
characterized by the opening up of geo-
graphical boundaries of the different
nations in the overall perspective of
economic integration.
2005 highlighted that “China appears to be ex-
panding its missile forces, allowing them to reach
targets in many areas of the world, not just the
Pacific region, while also expanding its missile
capabilities. Since no nation threatens China, one
must wonder: Why this growing investment?”6
Chinese analysts have argued, Beijing's increased
defence spending is in line with the country's eco-
nomic growth and the spending is needed to
modernize a force that is well behind in technolo-
gy, hardware and logistics. The government offi-
cials have stressed that China has no intention of
threatening its neighbours or disturbing regional
stability as part of its “peaceful development”
strategy.7 Its mission, they say, is to develop a
credible deterrent such that Taiwan does not de-
clare independence. As Mr Jaswant Singh, Leader
of the Opposition, Rajya Sabha (India’s Upper
House of Parliament) can be quoted in a dialogue
of the Brookings Leadership Forum of the Brook-
ings Institution, Washington DC, on May 31, 2005
that “the People’s Republic of China is currently
so engaged with the great issues like economic
modernization that confront them as a country,
that there is no free play available to engage in
conflict. It has always been China’s strategic phi-
losophy that if your adversary is humbled without
conflict, then that is a much better way to hum-
ble.”8 Although the Chi-
nese military build-up is
not directly targeted to-
wards India, India needs to
prepare itself to face any
such challenges, in the
view of Chinese military
preparedness. The possibil-
ity of a Sino-Indian arms
race can disrupt the strate-
gic stability of the Asian
security system and jeop-
ardize the achievements in
the economic sphere.
However, the Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit
to India in April 2005 had
signalled a significant shift
in relations between the two nations after more
than five decades of mutual distrust and suspi-
cion. The statement signed during this visit em-
phasized that the two countries would promote
diplomatic relations, economic ties and work
jointly to address global challenges and threats.9
China and India have agreed that an all-round
expansion of economic cooperation between the
two countries constitutes an important dimen-
sion of their deeply entrenched relationship and
that they should make joint efforts to increase
bilateral trade volume surpassing the $61.7 billion
achieved in 2010.
Both the leadership in New Delhi and Beijing are
displaying greater caution and pragmatism in
managing the differences and working on com-
mon causes of concerns and interests. Therefore,
there continues to remain the possibilities of both
cooperation and competition between the two
countries and the decision-making processes of
their political regimes will play a critical role in
formulating the future agenda of India-China rela-
tions.
Many seem to believe that the American Presi-
dent Obama´s recent visit to India is the indicator
of the forging of a strong alliance against China.
Both China and India being more than 3,000 years
old as nations and with more than 2,000 years of
recorded contacts between them do not neces-
sarily need to tread that path. Both have respect-
ed and trusted each other from the ancient times.
Chinese society believes in maintaining order,
given Confucianism’s influence and the majority
Hindus of India is influenced by the concept of
“Basudaiva Kutumbakam” (universal brother-
hood). Therefore, it is also imperative to look at
what concepts and notions shape the societal
perceptions in these two countries, as the govern-
ment and its policies are nothing but the reflec-
tion of the society.
It is acceptable, that as two neighbours, India and
China will have their differences and they will give
vent to their dissatisfaction and at times may
pose to threaten each other to appease a small
segment of their nationalist population, it is how-
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 43
Wen
Jiabao
ever unlikely that either one of them would enter
into a serious strategic alliance against the other.
As Professor Chellaney continues to re-iterate10
that if relations with China need to improve, India
must have an honest and open debate on its dip-
lomatic and military options. Zeng Jianhua, Direc-
tor of Asian, African and Latin American Affairs at
the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs
(CPIFA) has also emphasized on the role of non-
governmental exchange, culture and media in
deepening mutual understanding; how to deal
with trade frictions; and how to enhance bilateral
ties between China and India.11 In the second ses-
sion of the Carnegie Europe Roundtable Series,
Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis explained how Sino-
Indian relations have changed and their bilateral
relations are now defined by a complex balance
of competition and cooperation that Tellis charac-
terized as co-engagement.12 It is understandable
that the coming decades will witness growing
interaction between the two countries on a varie-
ty of issues than ever before. The main concern is
whether those areas, in which interaction is mutu-
ally beneficial, such as increased trade, will remain
unaffected by competition over more conten-
tious issues such as both countries’ quest for en-
ergy security.13 It remains to be seen if China and
India are destined for conflict or cooperation in
the transitional multi-polar world order.
Notes:
* Ananya Chatterjee is a PhD candidate at the
University of Reading.
1. Clarke, Ryan, “Sino-Indian Strategic Rela-
tions: Constrained Competition, Con-
strained Cooperation”, EAI Background
Brief No. 612, East Asian Institute, National
University of Singapore, 1 April 2011, avail-
able online at http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/
BB612.pdf accessed on 10th July 2011
2. Das, R.N., “Fresh Impetus to Sino-Indian
relations”, Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis, November 1, 2010 retrieved from
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
FreshImpetustoSinoIndianRela-
tions_rndas_011110 on 30th November
2010
3. Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear: An
Agenda for International Security Studies in
the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed., Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991,p.209
4. Panda, Snehalata, “Sino-Indian Relations in
a New Perspective”, Strategic Analysis, Jan-
uary-March 2003, 27:1, Institute of Defence
Studies and Analysis, New Delhi
5. Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-
dong, China and India: Cooperation or Con-
flict?, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder,
2003, p.115
6. Mazzetti, Mark, “Chinese Arms threaten
Asia, Rumsfeld says”, Los Angeles Times,
June 4, 2005 available at http://
www.globalsecurity.org/org/
news/2005/050604-china-asia.htm
7. Ibid
8. Singh Jaswant, “India-U.S. Strategic Part-
nership: Perceptions, Potential and Prob-
lems”, A Brookings Leadership Forum, The
Brookings Institution, Miller Reporting Co.,
Inc., Washington DC, , May 31, 2005
9. Embassy of the Peoples’ Republic of China
in India, “ China, India agree on Strategic
Partnership”, Xinhuanet, Beijing, April 13,
2005 available online at http://
www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/
zygx/t191496.htm
10. Chellaney, Brahma, “Sino-Indian border
tensions: Let the Facts Speak for Them-
selves: Setting Boundaries” DNA, Oct 4,
2009 retrieved from http://
www.dnaindia.com/opinion/main-
article_setting-boundaries_1295064 on 30
November 2010
11. Shen, Li, “Developing Sino-Indian Rela-
tions”, china.org.cn, March 25, 2010, re-
trieved from http://www.china.org.cn/
opinion/2010-03/25/
content_19684860.htm on 30th November
2010
12. Tellis, Ashley J., “India and China’s Rise-
Competition and Cooperation?”, Carnegie
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 46
Endowment for International Peace, January
16, 2008, available online at http://
www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?
fa=eventDetail&id=1172
13. Price, Gareth, “China and India: Coopera-
tion and Competition”, Asia Programme
Briefing Paper, ASP BP 07/01, Chatham
House, May 2007 available online at http://
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/
files/9174_bpchinaindia0507.pdf
References:
I. Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear: An
Agenda for International Security Studies in
the Post Cold War Era, 2nd ed., Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991
II. Chellaney, Brahma, “Sino-Indian border
tensions: Let the Facts Speak for Them-
selves: Setting Boundaries” DNA, Oct 4,
2009 retrieved from http://
www.dnaindia.com/opinion/main-
article_setting-boundaries_1295064 on 30
November 2010
III. Clarke, Ryan, “Sino-Indian Strategic Rela-
tions: Constrained Competition, Con-
strained Cooperation”, EAI Background
Brief No. 612, East Asian Institute, National
University of Singapore, 1 April 2011, avail-
able online at
BB612.pdf
IV. Das, R.N., “Fresh Impetus to Sino-Indian
relations”, Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis, November 1, 2010 retrieved from
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
FreshImpetustoSinoIndianRela-
tions_rndas_011110 on 30th November
2010
V. Embassy of the Peoples’ Republic of China
in India, “ China, India agree on Strategic
Partnership”, Xinhuanet, Beijing, April 12,
2005 available online at http://
www.chinaembassy.org.in/eng/ssygd/
zygx/t191496.htm retrieved on 30th No-
vember 2010
VI. Mazzetti, Mark, “Chinese Arms threaten
Asia, Rumsfeld says”, Los Angeles Times,
June 4, 2005 available at http://
www.globalsecurity.org/org/
news/2005/050604-china-asia.htm
VII. National Intelligence Council, “Global
Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future
with Nongovernmental Experts”, is availa-
ble at http://www.dni.gov/nic/
PDF_GIF_global/globaltrend2015.pdf ac-
cessed 16th July 2011
VIII. Panda, Snehalata, “Sino-Indian Relations in
a New Perspective”, Strategic Analysis, 27:1,
Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis,
New Delhi, January-March 2003
IX. Price, Gareth, “China and India: Coopera-
tion and Competition”, Asia Programme
Briefing Paper, ASP BP 07/01, Chatham
House, May 2007 available online at http://
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/
files/9174_bpchinaindia0507.pdf
X. Shen, Li, “Developing Sino-Indian Rela-
tions”, china.org.cn, March 25, 2010, re-
trieved from http://www.china.org.cn/
opinion/2010-03/25/
content_19684860.htm on 30th November
2010
XI. Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh & Yuan, Jing-
dong, China and India: Cooperation or Con-
flict?, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder,
2003
XII. Singh Jaswant, “India-U.S. Strategic Part-
nership: Perceptions, Potential and Prob-
lems”, A Brookings Leadership Forum, The
Brookings Institution, Miller Reporting Co.,
Inc., Washington DC, , May 31, 2005
XIII. Tellis, Ashley J., “India and China’s Rise-
Competition and Cooperation?”, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, January
16, 2008, available online at http://
www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?
fa=eventDetail&id=1172
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY ANANYA CHATTERJEE
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 47
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 48
RUSSIA AND CHINA: RECONCILIATION OR STRATEGIC FRIENDSHIP
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY LIN REN*
N eed to Re-conciliate: From Broth-
ers to Foes
The postwar period has witnessed an unbreaka-
ble Sino-Soviet brotherhood after their joint vic-
tory in the anti-imperial Japan. The key words that
have described the bilateral relations were: ideo-
logical soul mates, peers and allies. The Soviet
Union and its Marxist-Leninist ideology was the
model of the newly established People's Republic
of China. Yet, the turning point of the bilateral
relations has happened in the late 1950s/1960s.
The former close friends have entered a long-
lasting deteriorating trend of bilateral relations
afterwards. It started with the end of the 1950s
and worsened in the 1960s. The cold war setting
pushed the Soviet to integrate China into the
camp against the U.S. hegemony, which was re-
flected in the attempting project of establishing
long-wave radio stations in China and joint fleet
in 1958. The crack between the two has originat-
ed ever since. After it has been refused, the Soviet
Union has withdrawn the large amount of Soviet
skilled experts from China and tore up 243 bilat-
eral contracts. China has gone through huge loss-
es and difficulties due to the crash of the bilateral
relations. The summit of worsening relations took
place in 1969, when the Soviet armed conflict
provoked Treasure Island. Massed troops also
appeared on the long and disputed territory line.
Why and how does the reconciliation carry out
between the two? What factors work in the case
of Sino-Russian rapprochement? Researches on
reconciliation have devoted to finding out
through what lane former hostile countries could
overcome the “zero-sum game” and arrive at a
healthy bilateral relationship. Substantive recon-
ciliation between former hostilities requires coun-
tries to learn how to live together with each other
not only without emerging conflicts but also get
convinced that the counterpart is not a threat.
The social-psychology serves as an important
foundation of a stable peace, which avoids certain
domestic backlash. Therefore, the former ques-
tions could be transferred to: Have the Sino-
Russian government as well as their societies pre-
pared to a substantive reconciliation?
Government-to-Government Reconciliation in
Complexity
The normalization of relations between the two
parties was initiated since the late 1980s. Deng
Xiaoping showed an open attitude to end the
past and have a new start with the bilateral rela-
tions. The summit meeting was realized in 1989,
which marked the rapprochement. In the 1990s,
Moscow and Beijing have shown an accommo-
dating attitude to each other. The start of recon-
ciliation is nothing about economics or other
ends but the political needs. The changing inter-
national environment and the reassessment of
strategic arrangement could explain the more
and more frequent political interaction: Yeltsin
visited Beijing in 1992 and 1996, while Jiang Ze-
min visited Moscow in 1994, 1995 and 1997.
A series of accommodating policies could be
marked by easing the territorial conflict between
the former antagonistic countries. Moscow decid-
ed to withdraw its troops from Mongolia and ac-
complished the whole process in 1992, and ever
since 1995 Russia reduced 150,000 troops from
the Far East. The two parties have also agreed on
some essential issues in the domestic, regional
and international level: on the Taiwan, Tibet, and
Chechnya issue; to reach a consensus on joint anti
-terrorism; to carry out further cooperate in the
field of trade, economy, and military.
The convergence of interests has served as one of
the main force of conducting reconciliation be-
tween Russia and China, while divergence be-
tween interests could prohibit deepening recon-
ciliation. Two great powers attract great atten-
tions in many fields, such as geopolitics, energy,
and economy. The bilateral relations have been
complex, while the driving force of further recon-
ciliation is therefore not straightforward.
China has been one of the largest energy con-
sumers, while Russia has been one of the largest
producers of oil and gas. A 1,000km oil pipeline
bridged eastern Siberia of Russia and China’s
main oil base-Daqing in 2010. Encouraging coop-
eration in this sphere is expected. Yet, in the ener-
gy sphere, Russia and China’s interest is far more
complicated than matching. Russia wanted to sell
its gas to China, while China demanded the oil
from Russia. The non-complimentary relations in
the energy sphere have kept Sino-Russian eco-
nomic integration at a moderate degree. The two
went through a long and tough negotiation but
without agreement on the price and volume of
the gas. Russia requires amounting amount of
investment, while China needs an affordable
price. But, this process cannot be reversed.
Interest convergence and divergence exists also
in the strategic arrangement of the two countries
in Central Asia. Both China and Russia have a sig-
nificant strategic interest in Central Asia. China
has more than 3,000 km long common border
and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and three
Central Asian countries. Several cross-border eth-
nic groups live along these borders. The emerg-
ing East Turkistan problem bothers China as well.
A stable Central Asia backups the economic de-
velopment in western China. CIS countries were
the Russian former sphere of influence. It has al-
ways been on the priority agenda of Moscow.
At the initiative stage of reconciliation, Russia par-
ticipated in a Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) delegation. Moscow also coordinated
China with the CIS countries. With the coordina-
tion of Yelstin, China and CIS countries have
agreed on the force reduction, limitation of re-
sorting to force, and no serious military ac-
tivities within 100km of the common border
in 1996. These accommodating policies
have brought credibility, which contributed
to the further reconciliation.
Nonetheless, the conflicts in the area of re-
sources, trade and energy have brought
instability of Sino-Russian strategic arrange-
ment in this area. Putting the interest under
an institutional framework is necessary,
which could limit conflict and identify com-
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY LIN REN
CIS Leaders
mon interest. Under this background, China and
Russia initiated the establishment of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization.
Unprepared Societies ?
Reconciliation is beyond conflict resolution. In
order to bring about a stable peace and eradicate
zero-sum perception, a substantive reconciliation
calls for a fundamental change of the social psy-
chology. As a result, researchers found it is neces-
sary to study reconciliation through socio-
economic aspects.
Are the two societies prepared for a substantive
reconciliation? The serious Pass-control to Chi-
nese tourists mirrors certain tension between the
two societies, especially in the Far East area. Ex-
cept for the positive image of Russia/Russian in
Chinese media, the people from Far East fears
that the Chinese are out to trick Russians through
unfair trade, steal their resources, and expand to
their territory through legal and illegal migration.
Despite the strategic friendship at the govern-
mental level, there has been a domestic backlash
at the Far East district. The immature of reconcilia-
tion is mirrored by the negative perception to-
wards Chinese that held by the Far East Russian.
The Russian society in the Far East has not yet
given up the hostile perception of China’s inten-
tion.
Uncertainty: Questions about Where the Bear
is heading for?
Both China and Russia have gone through
great transactions in the post-Cold War period.
The two have chosen different paths and arrived
at different results. In the term of economic
development, the current history has witnessed
a great success of the “China Model”: the annual
growth rate of GDP has remained around
10%. China gradually gains confidence on the
world stage. On the contrary, Russia has a long
history of ego-searching after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. The Russian economy has
stagnated comparably, though before the finan-
cial crisis in 2008, the mounting energy price had
contributed to the economic growth. The democ-
ratization was also questioned by the Western
media. Where should the bear heading for in a
dramatically changing world? “Swing back into
Washington’s fold”? Or engage itself more into
the Eastern, especially cooperate more with
China?
The bear has shifted its position on and on. Yelt-
sin put emphasis on the relations with China due
to the geopolitical concern. Yet, after Putin came
to power, the West turned to be overweighing
especially after 911, while amid the “colorful revo-
lution”, Moscow denied its former decision.
In sum, Moscow swayed its attention due to
the strategic arrangement. Beijing feels a psycho-
logical blockade fueled by the shifting position
of Russia. As a result, the substantive reconcilia-
tion surpasses the strategic friendship. The
bear and the dragon have transcended the
former hostility to a certain degree, but are still
distant from arriving at a substantive reconcilia-
tion.
Note:
* Lin Ren is a PhD candidate of Center for Global
Politics, Free University Berlin.
The draft of this article is based on my presenta-
tions, the feedback contributed by the other
participates and the further discussion at the
11th annual Aleksanteri Conference: “The Dragon
and the Bear: Strategic Choices of China and
Russia”.
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY LIN REN
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 50
Except for the positive image of Russia/
Russian in Chinese media, the people from
Far East fears that the Chinese are out to
trick Russians through unfair trade, steal
their resources, and expand to their territo-
ry through legal and illegal migration.
“Quarterly news-Magazine”
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WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 52
ASIA'S NEW GREAT GAME? THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY TILMAN PRADT*
T he power struggle between the Brit-
ish Empire and Russian Empire for
influence in Central Asia during the
19th century was afterwards coined
as the Great Game. In this strategic rivalry, Af-
ghanistan played a key role because the British
feared that the Russians would use Afghanistan as
a base for forthcoming invasions into the then
British colony India. The recent statements of US
and Asian policy-makers might suggest that a
new Great Game is underway, this time in the ar-
ea of the South China Sea.
The South China Sea (SCS) is the semi-enclosed
sea from the south of China to the north of Indo-
nesia and from the east of Malaysia to the west of
the Philippines. The territorial demarcations are
disputed for decades as are the questions of sov-
ereignty over the islands and islets which are lo-
cated within the SCS. Several claimants such as
Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, and
China currently possess islets in the SCS and
question each other’s rights to do so. This situa-
tion has only marginally changed during the last
twenty years, upgrading of military outposts on
the islets being the notorious exception.
There are different reasons for the importance of
these areas in the SCS, substantial fish stocks, ex-
isting and assumed energy resources (e.g., oil and
gas resources) and highly frequented sea lanes
are the main causes for interest.
The various fish stocks in the SCS build the eco-
nomic basis for millions of fishermen in the littoral
states, furthermore, the fish catch plays a pivotal
part in the nutrition of the people living in this
area. The demarcation of waters and the posses-
sion islets are important means to claim fishing
rights in the area.
In the SCS are already various offshore oil extract-
ing enterprises taking place, most of them near
the coasts of China, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In the
disputed area of the Spratly Islands are further oil
reserves expected, thus the littoral states try to
ensure their claims to participate in the subse-
quent exploitation of the oil fields.1
Last but not least, the SCS is one of the busiest
routes of global merchant ships, roughly half of
the annual trade shipping is passing through the
bottleneck at the entrance to the SCS, the Strait of
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY TILMAN PRADT
49
Malacca. These sea lanes possess further signifi-
cance since the majority of Chinese and Japanese
imported oil is transported via the SCS. An inter-
ruption of these pivotal bloodlines would have
significant consequences for the world's second
and third biggest economy, respectively. But
since the majority of European-Asian trade is
shipped through these waters, not only the litto-
ral states have an interest in these busy sea lanes.2
Combined, the economic and strategic im-
portance of the SCS makes it a hotspot of geopol-
itics. Its mixture of energy resources and strategic
sea lanes has a high potential for conflict but sur-
prisingly, the region and its conflicts waned from
the headlines of international newspapers and
the mindfulness of geopolitical strategists. Over
the last ten years, the several efforts to fight ter-
rorism in the Middle East and Central Asia gave
China free rein to arrange the relations to its
south-eastern neighbours.
But since 2010, the conflict over sovereignty
rights and territorial waters in the SCS is gaining
new attention. When Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton stated that the free passage through the
sea lanes of the SCS was an US national interest,
she provoked harsh reactions from Beijing.3
The Chinese view the SCS as their territorial wa-
ters and try to prevent any interference of exter-
nal actors. They see it as a litmus test for Sino-
American relations whether the Americans inter-
fere in these disputes or accept Chinese regional
leadership. The recent visit of President Barack
Obama at the 2011 meeting of the East Asia Sum-
mit (EAS), the first time that America attended the
Summit, further bewildered the Chinese policy-
makers. President Obama used the opportunity
to suggest that America might play a mediatory
role in the dispute over the contested areas and
that the right to free passage was in the interest
of all states.4
These statements probably worried Chinese strat-
egists who expected Beijing on the right track to
gain influence on the region in general and on
the SCS in particular. In the afterwards of the ter-
rorist attack of 9/11, American foreign policy
was focused on the war on terror. This max-
im included a shift of attention towards the
source of Islamist terror in Afghanistan and
adjacent territories. The beginning of the
Second Gulf War against Saddam Hussein's
Iraq in 2003 attracted further American at-
tention and forces, thus the Chinese felt
encouraged to expand their participation
and influence in the Southeast Asian region.
During the past ten years, China participat-
ed in various organisations in the region,
ranging from political (ASEAN, EAS) over
security related (ARF) to economic organisa-
tions (APEC). In view of the lingering territo-
rial disputes in the SCS, China pursued a
policy of bilateral negotiations with other
claimants. Overall, Beijing early promulgat-
ed the idea of shifting the sovereignty ques-
tion for the time being and to jointly devel-
op the energy resources of the region. The
intentions behind this proposal were doubt-
ed and the conducted Joint Seismic Under-
taking during 2005-2008 between Vietnam, Chi-
na, and the Philippines seems to yield a point to
its critics.5
China's growing assertiveness in the region is
causing apprehensions among its smaller neigh-
bours but also beyond the Southeast Asian re-
gion. The announcement of President Obama to
deploy American forces to the Australian base
Darwin is only the latest move of security devel-
opments in the region.
The smaller states of ASEAN are upgrading their
armies, especially their navies and air forces for
several years now, according to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the
region has become a hot spot of global arms pur-
chases.6
But besides the US, even India might feel tem-
pered to engage in the area. The Indian oil com-
pany ONGC Videsh Limited is developing Viet-
namese oil fields, exploration of the Lan Tay field
started in 2003. Now, first reflections are under-
way whether the Indian navy should be prepared
to protect Indian assets in the SCS.7
In an article for the 2011 November issue of the
Foreign Policy, Secretary of State Clinton declared
the beginning of America's Pacific Century. In a
preannouncement of President Obama’s attend-
ance at the East Asia Summit she wrote: “Our fo-
cus on developing a more results-oriented agen-
da has been instrumental in efforts to address
disputes in the South China Sea.”8
This surely incurred Beijing’s displeasure.
The following statements of President Obama at
his Asia tour in November 2011 and the subse-
quent initiation of a military base in Darwin fur-
ther illustrate the new American dedication to
developments in the Southeast Asian region. The
strategic importance and especially the sea lanes
of the region are a vital interest of American for-
eign policy and it is to be seen how Beijing will
react on this interference in its perceived regional
affairs. In a response to newly US interest in the
region, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao stated that
the disputes should be resolved by “relevant sov-
ereign states” and that “external forces should not
use any excuse to interfere”.9
Hence, are we attending the beginning of a new
round of The Great Game in Asia, this time in the
location of the SCS? As this text briefly surveyed,
there are various interests at stake and several big
and great powers involved, arguably too many for
such a small area (especially, when concentrating
on the bottleneck of the SCS, the Strait of Malac-
ca). But by analyzing the motivations behind the
big players’ engagement (i.e., the United States,
China, and India) there is reason to believe that a
potentially tragic zero-sum Great Game is still
avoidable.
First, the US has not a real interest in permanently
(and substantially) upgrading its military presence
in the region. Given the still severing US budget
situation and the persistent security situation in
the Middle East and Central Asia, policy-makers in
Washington are trying to reduce its forces de-
ployed to foreign areas not to enlarge them by
opening up a new theatre. Plus, the US is mainly
interested in the security of the sea lanes and its
guaranteed free passage, therefore President
Obama’s push on the littoral states to solve their
SCS disputes. The US is not interested in confront-
ing China directly but to put pressure on Beijing
to be more conciliatory in case of the SCS dis-
putes. The deployment of US Marines to Darwin is
merely presenting the stick not using it (imagine
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY TILMAN PRADT
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 54
...the US is mainly interested in the
security of the sea lanes and its
guaranteed free passage, therefore
President Obama’s push on the
littoral states to solve their SCS
disputes.
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY TILMAN PRADT
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 55
Beijing’s reactions to the US establishing a mili-
tary base in Vietnam).
Beijing, on the other hand, will now take pains
to somehow ease the situation in the SCS and
to regain trust among its neighbours of the
ASEAN. China has to accept that the US will now
sit at the table of future rounds of territorial
discussions and China no longer can use its
relative power in bilateral negotiations with small
ASEAN states. This is probably hard to swallow
for Chinese policy-makers given their repeatedly
stated premise that the SCS disputes shall be
solely discussed among the regional states con-
cerned. But in this changed situation, the contin-
ued refusal to accept multilateral discussions will
provoke further military build-up and confronta-
tion in the SCS.
Finally, India got only involved because of
perceived Chinese assertiveness in the Indian
Ocean. India’s military build-up and assumed
ambitions towards the SCS is a response to Chi-
na’s actions in what India perceives as its territori-
al waters. A reciprocal withdrawal will avoid fu-
ture naval confrontations among the two Asian
heavyweights.
In the past, China avoided to confront the US
directly in upcoming controversies. This time,
the conflict is located too close and strategically
too important for Beijing to be simply ignored.
The South China Sea will be the theatre of future
trial of strength between the US and China,
a struggle for diplomatic influence and economic
cooperation in the first act. The US has played its
performance well so far, it remains to be seen
what China chooses as an adequate answer. A
new Great Game in the South China Sea is still
avoidable but it needs commitment not power
play.
Notes:
* Tilman Pradt is a PhD candidate at the Freie
Universität of Berlin.
1. (Emmers, 2010)
2. (Erickson, 2009)
3. (Cerojano, 2010)
4. (Grammaticas, 2011)
5. (Lim, 2010) and
6. SIPRI (2010): New SIPRI data on internation-
al arms transfers reflect arms race concerns,
online: http://www.sipri.org/media/
pressreleases/2010/100315armstransfers
(accessed on December 10, 2011)
7. (Gupta, 2011)
8. (Clinton, 2011)
9. (BBC, 2011)
References
I. BBC. (2011, November 18). Wen warns US
on South China Sea dispute.
II. Cerojano, T. (2010, September 19). Obama,
ASEAN to call for peaceful end to sea spats.
The Guardian.
III. Clinton, H. (2011). America's Pacific Centu-
ry. Foreign Policy.
IV. Emmers, R. (2010). Geopolitics and Maritime
Territorial Disputes in East Asia. London +
New York: Routledge.
V. Erickson, A. S. (2009). Maritime Security
Cooperation in the South China Sea
Region. In S. Wu & K. Zou (Eds.),
Maritime Security in the South China
Sea - Regional Implications and International
Cooperation (pp. 51-80). Farnham:
Ashgate.
VI. Grammaticas, D. (2011, November 18).
Obama stirs up China's sea of troubles. BBC
News.
VII. Gupta, R. (2011, October 23). South China
Sea Conflict? No Way. The Diplomat.
VIII. Lim, T.-W. (2010). Oil and gas in China: the
new energy superpower's relations with its
region. Singapore: World Scientific Publish-
ing.
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 56
CHINA’S AID PROGRAM IN AFRICA
A PRIMER
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY SAM BYFIELD*
O ver the past decade China has
emerged as a major donor of inter-
national aid. China’s aid program
has effectively been regarded as a
state secret, and accordingly analysis of China’s
aid program has often lacked in nuance and tend-
ed towards hyperbole. This article will provide an
overview of the nature and purposes of China’s
aid program, and how it contributes to China’s
own foreign policy and domestic economic devel-
opment. It concludes that cooperation between
other major aid donors and China is essential to
break down mistrust and increase the effective-
ness of global efforts to reduce poverty.
The first White Paper on China’s aid program was
released in 2011. The White Paper noted that
from 2004-2009 China’s aid program increased by
roughly 30 percent each year. In 2009 China pro-
vided over 250 billion yuan (around $US 40 bil-
lion) in aid, consisting of approximately 41% in
grants, 30% in interest free loans, and 29% in the
form of concessional loans. The White Paper
notes that China’s aid focuses on agriculture, eco-
nomic infrastructure, public facilities, education,
health care, and, increasingly, climate change.
While China itself is still a developing country, this
level of expenditure establishes it as a major glob-
al aid donor.
In a similar, though perhaps more overt way to
the aid programs of other countries, China’s aid
program is based on both China and the recipient
country benefiting (particularly economically)
and is closely tied into China’s broader foreign
policy aims. China’s aid has served as a tool to
dissuade governments from providing diplomatic
recognition to Taiwan, discourage governments
from supporting Japan for a seat on the UN Secu-
rity Council, enhancing its global diplomatic pres-
ence and creating warmer relations with develop-
ing countries to garner support for China’s poli-
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY SAM BYFIELD
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 49
cies in international fora. Some commentators
have noted that China’s aid program also serves
its own development needs, facilitating the ex-
port of raw materials to China, and requiring that
50% of project materials and services are sourced
within China. This contrasts with the aid programs
of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia
and most other major aid donors, which are gen-
erally removed from their own economic devel-
opment aims. Many Chinese funded public works
– like stadiums, bridges or dams — tend to be
highly visible and offer tangible benefits; and
such activities are often announced at bilateral
summit meetings, acting as a powerful symbol of
friendship between China and other countries.
Accordingly, Chinese aid can be seen not only as
serving ‘hard’ diplomatic and security interests,
but also as an example of Joseph Nye’s notion of
‘soft power’.
China’s aid to Africa, which has increased sub-
stantially over the past few years, illustrates many
of these points. The White Paper indicated that
for the 2009 fiscal year, nearly half (46.7 per cent)
of Chinese aid was committed to Africa. Chinese
aid in Africa can be viewed as contributing to the
diplomatic objective of forging friendships with
‘non-aligned’ nations and competing with Taiwan
for diplomatic recognition. On this point China
has been successful, with only four countries in
sub-Saharan Africa still maintaining official rela-
tions with Taiwan.1 By the same token, however,
China is hardly unique in linking international
development assistance to broader foreign policy
objectives.
China’s aid program in Africa is also widely seen
as focusing on its objective of securing oil, miner-
als and broader trade opportunities for its
growing economy. An article in the Economist
noted that ‘China has become the continent’s
most important trading partner after America;
trade between Africa and China has surged
from just over $6.5 billion in 1999 to $107 billion
in 2008.’2 African oil reportedly accounts for
80 percent of China’s trade in the region and
about one third of its oil imports. China’s aid
projects are often backed by the natural
resources of recipient countries. In war torn Ango-
la, for instance, reconstruction was helped by
oil-backed loans from Beijing, under which
Chinese companies have built roads, railways,
hospitals, schools and water systems. Nigeria
took out two similar loans to finance projects
that use gas to generate electricity. As a 2010
article in Foreign Affairs noted, in poor, oil-
rich countries, which are often cursed by
their mineral wealth, ‘resource-backed infrastruc-
ture loans can act as an ‘agency of restraint’
and ensure that at least some of these countries’
natural resource wealth is spent on development
investments.’3 This leveraging of natural
resources in Africa closely resembles the relation-
ship between Japan and China in the 1970s
and 1980s, where China leveraged its natural
resources to receive loans and access to
much-needed infrastructure and modern technol-
ogy.
Joseph
Nye
Critics – particularly in Western media – have
highlighted a number of perceived weaknesses of
China’s approach to aid in Africa. Chinese aid is
often made available quickly and easily, without
the social, political and environmental safeguards
and bureaucratic procedures that major OECD
donors and multilateral financial institutions typi-
cally impose. A recent Human Rights Watch re-
port on Chinese-run copper mines in Zambia il-
lustrates these concerns, finding that Chinese-run
companies regularly flout labor laws and regula-
tions, and have consistently poor health and safe-
ty standards. This is a point the White Paper rec-
ognises:
‘China still has a long way to go in provid-
ing foreign aid. The Chinese Government
will make efforts to optimize the country’s
foreign aid structure, improve the quality
of foreign aid, further increase countries’
capacity in independent development,
and improve the pertinence and effective-
ness of foreign aid.’
China’s relative newness in the business of giving
aid partly explains some of these limitations, as
does China’s quite small aid bureaucracy – there
are only around 70 professionals in the Ministry of
Commerce’s Department of Aid to Foreign Coun-
tries, and 100 in China Eximbank’s Concessional
Loan Department.4 It should be remembered that
such criticisms – about environmental sustainabil-
ity, or human rights, for instance – are in essence
the same criticisms made about China’s domestic
development. As one Economist article notes,
‘Chinese expatriates in Africa come from a rough-
and-tumble, anything-goes business culture that
cares little about rules and regulations. Local sen-
sitivities are routinely ignored at home, and so
abroad.’5 In contemplating the Human Rights
Watch report on Zambia, it should be remem-
bered that China’s own mines are considered to
be the most dangerous in the world – it’s not so
much a case of double standards, but of an over-
all lack of capacity. It’s realistic to expect that as
China’s own governance and project manage-
ment capacity improves, so too will its approach
to the delivery of aid.
To an extent, this is already happening. Chinese
banks have recently begun to require more elab-
orate environmental impact appraisals for loans,
which are often contracted out to European firms.
Increasingly as well, Chinese aid projects in Africa
are staffed primarily by Africans, not Chinese.
There are also areas in which China is seen to be
ahead of more established donors. For instance,
the terms of Chinese loans are often better than
those deals from Western companies. Congolese
President Joseph Kabila has pointed out that a $3
billion joint mining venture in the DRC provides
his government with a 32 percent share, com-
pared with the 7 to 25 percent share that is typi-
cal of mining deals with other companies.6
The ability of developing countries to absorb the
increases in Chinese aid has been questioned,
including gin Africa. This is an issue commonly
discussed in international development, though
there appears to have been more public criticism
of China’s aid program in this area. There
have been reports in Africa of Chinese infrastruc-
ture projects falling apart or being washed
away, of classrooms with no students to fill them,
and health clinics with no supplies. The level of
Chinese aid as a proportion of GDP, and therefore
the ability of countries to service their loans,
has also been questioned. This concern has also
been raised in the Pacific. In 2009, China’s loans
to Tonga were equivalent to 32 percent of
GDP, while in Samoa and Cook Islands the figure
was 16 percent.7 While the issue of new debt
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY SAM BYFIELD
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 58
...the terms of Chinese loans are often bet-
ter than those deals from Western compa-
nies. Congolese President Joseph Kabila
has pointed out that a $3 billion joint min-
ing venture in the DRC provides his govern-
ment with a 32 percent share, compared
with the 7 to 25 percent share that is typi-
cal of mining deals with other companies.
CHINA AND THE WORLD | BY SAM BYFIELD
burden is a real one, another way of looking at
this issue is that as Chad’s Finance and Budget
Minister has noted, ‘We borrow for our industriali-
zation projects and the debt will be repaid from
their profits.’8
In international development circles ‘partnership’
is an important buzzword. It even has its own
Millennium Development Goal (MDG 8). As
the role and influence of emerging aid donors
like China and Brazil continues to grow, and
economic problems continue to impact the
West, placing pressure on the aid budgets of
OECD countries, closer engagement between
China and other donors will become increasingly
imperative. Such cooperation is a vital element of
enhancing the effectiveness of aid programs, not
only in terms of what can be learnt through the
exchanges but also as a way of reducing duplica-
tion and increasing complementarities – which,
after all, are fundamental to delivering effective
aid.
Engaging China in regional development dia-
logues and structures is one way of enhancing
cooperation. For instance, China still isn’t a mem-
ber of the Cairns Compact, which was agreed to
in 2009 by leaders in the Pacific as a means of
enhancing development cooperation and effec-
tiveness. Signing the Cairns Compact would
be valuable in terms of enhancing cooperation
with China, and would also have an important
symbolic effect in terms of some of the negative
perceptions around China’s aid program. In
Africa, engaging China in discussions around
cohesive, long term strategies for economic
growth will enhance the effectiveness of all do-
nors.
Increased transparency around China’s aid
program will also contribute to cooperation and
reduced mistrust. It should be remembered,
however, that China is still home to the world’s
second largest population of people living on
less than $1.25 per day, and that desire for
greater aid program transparency needs to
be balanced against what is domestically palata-
ble.
Notes:
* Sam Byfield works as a policy adviser in the in-
ternational development sector and was a dele-
gate at the inaugural Australia China Youth Dia-
logue in 2010.
1. Congressional Research Service, China’s
Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America,
and Southeast Asia, 2009, p9.
2. ‘Chinese Aid to Africa: hedging its bets and
its gold’, Economist 2 July 2009.
3. Deborah Brautigam, ‘Africa’s Eastern Prom-
ise’, Foreign Affairs, January 2010, p2.
4. Deborah Brautigam, China in Africa: What
Can Western Donors Learn? Norwegian In-
vestment Fund for Developing Countries,
August 2011, p10.
5. ‘The Chinese in Africa’, Economist
20 April 2011.
6. Deborah Brautigam, ‘Africa’s East-
ern Promise’, 2.
7. Mary Fifita and Fergus Hanson,
China in the Pacific: the new banker in
town’,. The Lowy Institute for Interna-
tional Policy, April 2011, 8.
8. IMF, Video of Press Briefing, Afri-
can Ministers, World Bank/IMF Spring
Meetings, 16 April 2011, accessed 25
November 2011- http://www.imf.org/
external/spring/2011/mmedia/
Christian
Georges
Diguimbaye
Chad’s
Finance and
Budget
Minister
J ean-Paul Gagnon: What do you see as
Hong Kong's democracy future?
Professor Sonny Lo: HK's democratic
future depends on two main factors: China's inter-
nal democratic changes and Hong Kong's push
for democratization. At the moment, the push for
internal democratization in Hong Kong has pitted
the pan-democratic forces against the govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). On
the other hand, Beijing as the central government
is reluctant to see a Western-style democratic
Hong Kong which will be vulnerable to Western
influences and become a means through which
foreign powers like the United States seek to de-
mocratize the mainland. As such, democratization
in Hong Kong is now touching upon the bottom
line of the central government in Beijing, which
remains a largely paternalistic regime although it
has become more politically liberalized and plu-
ralistic than ever before. It is very likely that Hong
Kong's democratic changes will proceed gradual-
ly and at a snail pace, if we use the yardstick of
measurement from the viewpoint of Western-
style democracies where there are rotations of
parties in power and competitive struggle among
political leaders for people's votes. Yet, Hong
Kong remains the most politically pluralistic socie-
ty in the PRC as many of its citizens are not only
pro-democracy in terms of supporting the direct
elections of both the Chief Executive and the en-
tire Legislative Council, but also assertive in mak-
ing their demands known and criticisms heard.
Hong Kong also enjoys a relatively high degree of
civil liberties, the rule of law and by and large
clean government under the supervision of a re-
spectable anti-corruption agency. Hence, Hong
Kong is having a large degree of horizontal ac-
countability, although not vertical accountability
in terms of competitive struggle among political
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 60
AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR SONNY LO**:
POLITICAL REFLECTIONS IN HONG KONG
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON*
leaders for people's votes, not to mention the
possibility of rotation of party in power. However,
it must be said that democratization in Hong
Kong, and the corresponding resistance from Bei-
jing, illustrate a clash of two political cultures and
civilizations, the more Western civilization held by
many Hong Kong people and the more Chinese
civilization in the psyche of the PRC leaders. As
long as the PRC is ruled by a Leninist-style Chi-
nese Communist Party, democratic changes in
Hong Kong are bound to be seen as politically
dangerous, socially unstable, economically detri-
mental to the interests of the co-opted pro-
Beijing business class, and territorially entailing
cross-border impacts on mainland China.
JPG: Is organized crime a significant obstacle to
realizing these democratic goals in HK?
SL: Organized crime does not constitute any ob-
stacle to the realization of democratic goals in
Hong Kong. Arguably, some elements of the or-
ganized crime even participated in the rescue
operations of the student democrats in mainland
China shortly after the Tiananmen incident on
June 4, 1989. Hence. organized crime in Hong
Kong has been displaying multiple political orien-
tations. On the one hand, it has remained a patri-
otic force rescuing mainland student democrats
from a humanitarian perspective. On the other
hand, it has remained an economic interest group
trying to enrich its own profits by both legal and
illegal means. The leaders of organized crime
groups in Hong Kong are also the targets of sup-
pression and co-optation by the PRC authorities.
Politically, organized crime has not yet evolved
into a political interest group keen to topple any
regime in power, in both the mainland and Hong
Kong, unlike the triads in the Qing dynasty as they
were upholding the banner of overthrowing the
Qing dynasty and restoring the Ming dynasty. The
PRC government sees organized crime as harmful
to its national security interests, and therefore its
elements have to be controlled and suppressed.
Any attempt by organized crime groups to turn
into political interest groups is disallowed, albeit
in practice they are economic interest groups
thriving in the midst of a whole range of legiti-
mate and illegitimate businesses.
JPG: Do you think mainland China will impede
these democracy developments?
SL: In the long run, Mainland China will democra-
tize but it will change in its own way at its own
pace without accepting the pressures from out-
side. China historically has been affected by for-
eign pressures, especially foreign humiliation dur-
ing the Qing dynasty. Therefore, democratic mod-
els, if experimented in mainland China, will be
basically indigenous without the need to borrow
excessively from the West, an attempt that would
counter the national pride of the Chinese people.
Although Taiwan's political transformations in the
1980s, 1990s and 2000s have demonstrated that a
Chinese society can democratize along the West-
ern model, mainland China is likely to reject this
Western-style democracy. In the first place, the
PRC harbors deep suspicions of foreign powers,
especially the United States which appear to con-
tain the PRC regime and foster the so-called
peaceful evolution. Moreover, the PRC version of
democratization entails the strengthening of the
work of the anticorruption agency, the consolida-
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012
61
tion of the audit office to check the expendi-
ture and maladministration of government agen-
cies, the emphasis on media scrutiny of the gov-
ernment in a politically loyal manner, the im-
provement in the oversight of the legislature on
the government, and the gradual consolidation of
village elections to enhance cadre and party ac-
countability at the grassroots level. These Chinese
-style characteristics will persist and it is unlikely
that the Western-style democracy would sudden-
ly emerge, even though crises, such as economic
and social crises, may suddenly propel China for-
ward along the path of a more democratic re-
gime.
JPG: Are there any paradoxes of democracy in
Hong Kong that you would like to address?
SL: Hong Kong's democratic experiments are
unique in the world. On the one hand, it has a
strong middle class where Western-educated and
locally educated citizens are increasingly embrac-
ing the Western-style democracy and values. But
on the other hand, the strong capitalist class
whose interests have been so protected by both
the colonial regime and the post-1997 govern-
ment as well as Beijing is staunchly anti-
democratic in the Western sense. Given the fact
that Beijing has to rely on the influence and rule
of the capitalists in order to maintain the capital-
ist lifestyle of Hong Kong and its related econom-
ic prosperity, the Hong Kong city-state remains
capitalistic and highly exploitative in terms of the
protection of the interests of the poor and the
needy, especially the proletariat and the lumpen
proletariat. The tax system, housing policies and
land policies are highly biased in favour of the
strong capitalist class, which however is politically
inactive and spoiled to a large extent. Yet, the
politically active citizenry and groups involve the
pro-democratic and pro-Beijing groups. The re-
sult is that Hong Kong is a deeply political divided
society where the capitalist class is politically
anachronistic and anti-democratic, where the
liberal segment of the middle class is highly pro-
democratic and pro-Western, where the pro-
Beijing local forces are tasked by Beijing to check
the power and influence of the liberal segment of
the middle class, and where the government is a
politically conservative one allying with
the capitalist class, Beijing and the pro-
Beijing forces. Yet, as class contradictions are in-
tensifying in Hong Kong where the productive
forces are growing quickly due to the develop-
ment of capitalism, sooner or later such contra-
dictions will not only split the pro-government
and pro-Beijing camp and forces, but also per-
haps propel democratic changes in Hong Kong
further. Class politics and contradictions are argu-
ably most prominent in this vibrant Chinese city,
which is like a political sandwich between a very
Chinese central government in Beijing and an
increasingly pro-Western and politically asser-
tive citizenry in Hong Kong.
Notes:
* Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon is a social and political the-
orist with a Ph.D. in political science. He completed
his doctorate at the Queensland University of Tech-
nology under the aegis of Australia’s prestigious En-
deavour Award.
** Professor Sonny Lo is the Associate Dean
(Research & Postgraduate Studies) of Faculty of Arts
and Sciences and Head and Professor at the Depart-
ment of Social Sciences at the Hong Kong Institute of
Education. Before joining HKIEd, he had worked at
the University of Waterloo in Canada, The University
of Hong Kong, The Hong Kong University of Science
and Technology, Murdoch University, Lingnan Col-
lege (now Lingnan University), and the University of
East Asia (Macau).
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY DR. JEAN-PAUL GAGNON
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 62
...Hong Kong is a deeply political divided socie-
ty where the capitalist class is politically
anachronistic and anti-democratic, where the
liberal segment of the middle class is highly
pro-democratic and pro-Western, where the pro
-Beijing local forces are tasked by Beijing to
check the power and influence of the liberal
segment of the middle class, and where the
government is a politically conservative one
allying with the capitalist class, Beijing and the
pro-Beijing forces.
CESRAN Papers
CESRAN Papers | No: 6 | November 2011 FREE CORSICA! A Study of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism By James Pearson CESRAN Papers | No: 5 | July 2011 COMPETITIVE REGULATION: Stepping Outside the Public /Private Policy Debate By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon CESRAN Papers | No: 4 | May 2011 Turkey: The Elephant in the Room of Europe By Hüseyin Selçuk Dönmez CESRAN Papers | No: 3 | April 2011 "Whither Neoliberalism? Latin American Politics in the Twenty-first Century" By Jewellord (Jojo) Nem Singh CESRAN Papers | No: 2 | March 2011 "Civil-Military Relations in Marcos' Philippines" By Richard Lim CESRAN Papers | No: 1 | March 2011 "The Paradox of Turkish Civil Military Relations" By Richard Lim
I ntroduction
Taiwan is a primary flashpoint in East Asia. Its ex-
plosiveness results from China’s ongoing insist-
ence – and Taiwan’s refusal – that Taipei fall under
Beijing’s auspices. It’s a periodic dispute which
has lasted for over 60 years. China has not openly
attempted to force Taiwan to reunify, yet there
have been several times when it has initiated bor-
derline provocations. Both sides are starting to
reconcile their differences albeit slowly and with
little progress. The key to resolving the dispute
will probably occur within one-to-two genera-
tions, plus via a currently unthoughtof solution.
The article is divided into several sections. First, it
will briefly analyze the issue; Second, the piece
will examine the current state of affairs between
Taiwan and China. And finally, the article will ex-
plore the difficulties of finding an answer to the
reunification controversy.
Analysis
The Taiwan-China Relationship is one of the most
paradoxical affiliations in Pacific Rim affairs. Both
countries have strong economic, yet strained po-
litical ties as a result of the reunification issue.
The controversy could disappear overnight, if
Beijing recognized Taipei’s status as an independ-
ent country; acknowledging Taiwan’s stature
would require China to abandon a primary
foreign policy objective. Chinese policymakers
and independent analysts have suggested a solu-
tion is for Taiwan to adopt Hong Kong and/or
Macao type model. The proposition’s difficulty is
both entities and Taiwan share dissimilar back-
grounds. Taipei would lose its de facto political
and economic independence, if it agreed to simi-
lar conditions. The other solution is for China to
force Taiwan to accept Beijing’s jurisdiction. The
scenario will probably not occur considering the
United States is obligated by American to law to
militarily intervene if China attacks Taiwan (an
issue for another article). Resolving the contro-
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 64
THE CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP: CURRENT STATUS AND POTENTIAL DIRECTIONS
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY*
versy probably won’t occur within the current
generation’s timeframe, since leaders on both
sides of the Taiwan Strait are from or are distantly
linked from the era when the dispute started.
The most likely scenario is the reunification
issue will remain unresolved for years to come –
and that a discounted and/or unconsidered solu-
tion will present itself when a new generation
of leaders occupies Beijing and Taiwan’s political
reins.
Background:
Historical roots, China’s Perspective, and Taiwan’s
Viewpoint
The Taiwan conflicts’ origins are historical and
political in nature. Its roots are traceable to
the 1940s, while the current difficulties are linked
to differences between how Beijing and Taipei
interpret a settlement of the reunification prob-
lem.
The dispute started in 1949. Throughout the
1930s forces loyal to the Chinese Communist Par-
ty and General Chaing Kai-Shek clashed in a
civil war. Both sides set aside their differences
and coordinated their efforts between 1937
and 1945 against the Japanese when Tokyo
invaded and occupied a significant part of the
country. Their dispute reemerged after Japan’s
defeat. The civil war lasted for another four years
until 1949 when Chaing Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan
after his forces were defeated by the CCP. A key
objective of the Chinese authorities has been the
reunification of Taiwan under Beijing’s auspices
since.
China’s policy towards Taiwan is defined in the
Chinese Constitution’s Preamble and the 2005
Anti-Secessionist Law. The Constitution’s Pream-
ble states,
“Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the
People's Republic of China. It is the inviola-
ble duty of all Chinese people, including
our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish
the great task of reunifying the mother-
land..”1
Beijing’s 2005 Anti-Secessionist Law further
explains China’s policies towards Taiwan. Article 2
notes that there is only “One China” and Taiwan
is a part of it. Article 5 contends Beijing will seek
reunification with Taipei under peaceful means.
Article 6 details issues China will collaborate
with Taiwan over to encourage peace and stabil-
ity in the Taiwan Straits. These subjects
range from economic activities, such as trade,
to combating crime and encouraging cultural
exchanges between both entities. Article 7
examines the steps Chinese authorities are willing
to initiate with Taiwan on the reunification
matter. These include ending hostilities, estab-
lishing procedures for the development of
cross strait relations plus a peaceful reunification,
ascertaining the political status of Taiwan’s
authorities within the Chinese government
hierarchy, determining Taipei’s international sta-
tus within Beijing’s strategic apparatus, and relat-
ed issues relevant to Taiwan’s status within China.
And finally Article 8 endows Chinese authorities
with the latitude of utilizing military force against
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012
Ma Ying-jeou
Taiwan, if Taipei’s officially declares independ-
ence from Beijing.2
Taiwan’s policy towards China was spelled out in
a June 2008 interview President Ma Ying-jeou
furnished to the New York Times. Ma called for an
enhancement of economic ties between the PRC
and Taiwan to include a broader access to China’s
markets for Taiwan’s businessmen, plus direct air
flights between Taiwan and China among many
proposals. He said Taiwan is willing to negotiate
its political status with China but only when Bei-
jing removed its short-and-medium range mis-
siles targeting Taipei.3 He officially opposes reuni-
fication4, yet the Taiwan leader is willing to con-
sider indirect discussions on the matter. Ma noted
during the 2009 Presidential Campaign that he
accepts the non-documented 1992 understand-
ing between Beijing and Taipei leaders of the
“One China” concept. What neither side resolved
is what officially does the “One-China” idea mean?
Neither side has revisited the issue since the 1992
meeting.5
The Reunification Issue:
Complexities, the Hong Kong-Macao Solution, and
Realities
The Chinese-Taiwan relationship is divided into
economic and reunification related affairs. The
direction Beijing and Taipei have made on the
issues is paradoxical in nature. Both sides have
made notable progress in the financial realm; the
political issue remains deadlocked, especially re-
garding the reunification subject.
Beijing-Taipei relations were almost non-existent
from 1949 to the early 21st century. A thaw in
the rapport started in 2004, when Taiwan elected
a president, Chen Shui-bian, who was receptive
to closer relations, unlike his predecessors. The
changed attitude led to a meeting between
China's President Hu Jin Tao and the chairman of
Taiwan's leading political party in April 2005.
Both sides increased their interactions, conse-
quently, and signed several economic
agreements shortly thereafter. Their efforts were
complimented by additional accords signed
since 2008. The agreements allowed for direct
flights, maritime and mail links, and an augmenta-
tion of trade and investment opportunities
between China and Taiwan.6 Both countries
signed a significant accord called the Economic
Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA)
in June 2010. It seeks to reduce tariff barriers
and obstacles to commercial interactions.
The ECFA additionally provides favorable
tariffs for over 500 types of Taiwanese exports
to China, while Chinese companies will receive
preferential tax breaks on approximately 260
products.7
The relationship’s most difficult issue relates to
reunification. Various solutions have been pro-
posed to address the matter. One suggested
idea is to place Taiwan under a similar administra-
tive arrangement as Hong Kong and Macao.
It’s an issue many Taipei policymakers oppose,
since they contend it may cause Taiwan to lose
its independence.8 The situation requires explor-
ing several questions: under what type of
jurisdiction is Hong Kong under? Is it similar to
Macao? And could Taiwan accept an administra-
tion arrangement akin to Hong Kong and Macao’s
status?
One approach to understanding the commonali-
ties/disparities between Beijing’s governorship
over Hong Kong and Macao is an examination of
the agreements China signed with the United
Kingdom and Portugal over both areas. The
prime documents between Beijing and London/
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 66
Beijing-Taipei relations were almost non-
existent from 1949 to the early 21st centu-
ry. A thaw in the rapport started in 2004,
when Taiwan elected a president, Chen Shui
-bian, who was receptive to closer relations,
unlike his predecessors.
Lisbon are called “The Joint Declaration of the
Government of the 1) the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Gov-
ernment of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong; and 2) People's Republic
of China and The Government of the Republic of
Portugal on the question of Macao.”
Hong Kong and Macao share similar administra-
tive arrangements. Both areas are described as a
“Special Administrative Region……in accordance
with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitu-
tion of the PRC”9 A second commonality is Hong
Kong and Macao are managed by the PRC’s Cen-
tral People's Government (CPG). The “Special Ad-
ministrative Region” designation allows Hong
Kong and Macao’s Executive, Legislative, and Ju-
dicial authorities to create and implement their
own laws and regulations; the designation pro-
hibits both entities from formulating their own
defense and foreign policies – a responsibility
given to the CPG.10 Another similarity relates to
the appointment of governing officials. Both Dec-
larations give the authority for assigning Hong
Kong and Macao’s chief executive to the CPG,
which will make its determination based on each
entity’s local electoral results. Both entities’ prin-
ciple officials will be nominated by the executive
officer for appointment by the CPG.11 Hong Kong
and Macao are allowed to establish economic
relations with their original London and Lisbon
overseers, plus any other nations of interest.12
The last major issue relates to the right of Hong
Kong/Macao’s citizens. Individuals from both are-
as will retain their original political, economic, and
commercial privileges under the Joint Declara-
tions; both documents mandate Hong Kong and
Macao authorities with guaranteeing these
rights.13
Utilizing Hong Kong and Macao’s administrative
arrangements with Beijing as a model for Chinese
-Taiwan reunification is unrealistic. There are
similarities between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Taipei; the differences outweigh the commonali-
ties. Hong Kong and Macao were originally
established as Colonies by the British and Portu-
guese, whereas Taiwan’s polity was formed by
the late General Chang Kai-Shek and the KMT
party. Taiwan occupies a larger geographical area,
and consists of different jurisdictional areas.
The island’s government is divided into various
“county’s”, which are similar to Japan’s Prefec-
tures or the American States with their own
local and municipal governments, unlike Hong
Kong and Macao. Taiwan has a viable military,
including an army, navy, air force, and Marine
Corps. It also belongs to several international
organizations including the World Trade Organi-
zation. The one commonality Taiwan shares with
Hong Kong and Macao is a well-developed and
modern economy.14 Taiwan is a country in all but
diplomatic circles, unlike the former British and
Portuguese colonies.
How Beijing and Taipei might resolve the reunifi-
cation issue is unknown. There are several possi-
bilities for addressing the matter. The author
failed to discover reportage of the first two sce-
narios in media and/or academic circles; while the
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY
HONG KONG
final model was suggested by Dr. Cal Clark from
Auburn University.
First, China’s acceptance of Taiwan’s status
under the condition that Taipei officially
designates itself as “The Republic of Tai-
wan”, not the “Republic of China”.
Second, Beijing’s unofficial acknowledge-
ment of Taipei’s independence with the
agreement that Taiwan does not report
China’s policy reversal in media circles.
A final possibility is for reunification to oc-
cur via an EU type model as suggested by
Dr. Cal Clark.15
The last option is the most unlikely. It would
entail Beijing allowing Taipei to possess an equal
vote in all political, economic, military, and
foreign affairs decisions. It’s probably the least
viable scenario considering the CCP might
argue Taiwan only represents of a fraction of
China’s citizenry (even those living outside
the Mainland would not equal the PRC’s
population numbers). Nothing can be discount-
ed, especially an idea an implausible as the
above.
Any resolution of the dispute must entail a
settlement whereby both sides maintain a per-
ceptual credibility in the constituents’ view –
any agreement jeopardizing this tenet could
have political consequences for the party seen
making concessions. This component of any
accord may be the hardest to achieve since
both sides’ positions are clear and seemingly
inflexible.
Resolving the matter will probably occur via
a currently unthoughtof solution plus a new
generation. Beijing and Taiwan’s present leader-
ship are directly or indirectly tied to policies
neither are apparently unwilling to deviate from.
The other aspect is probably a historical linkage
to the leaders and events resulting from the
Chinese Civil War. There is a strong possibility
the leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait
have family members who were involved in
the conflict – fathers, uncles, cousins, or related
kin. The connection may be creating a situation
where pragmatism is non-existent. The reunifica-
tion issue may be settled once a new generation
takes the reins in Beijing and Taipei; a generation
several decades removed from the events of
1949 plus who are willing to consider a new
approach and/or visit old, previously discounted
solutions.
Conclusion
The Taiwan controversy is one of the simplest, yet
most complex issues to resolve. Its simplicity is
that the problem could be resolved within a short
-period, yet there might be strategic ramifications
for the party seen as making concessions (under
the current political climate at least). Taiwan is an
independent country for all intents and purposes.
It has a well-defined political system, a modern
economy, and military. What Taipei lacks is a dip-
lomatic acknowledgement necessary for Taiwan
to function as a standard international player; it’s
a problem Beijing is stymieing because of the
“One China” issue. Any agreement between Bei-
jing and Taipei over the reunification issue will
probably not occur in the foreseeable future. This
will only change if Chinese or Taiwanese policy-
makers develop a political determination that
may adversely impact their professional liveli-
hood. The question is how high priority is the
issue among Beijing/Taipei’s leadership? And is it
a significant enough concern to make the poten-
tial sacrifices necessary to resolve the decades-old
issue? The existing evidence is that the subject is
a secondary matter, plus neither side is willing to
make the concessions needed to end the dispute.
The stalemate over the reunification issue will
most likely remain for the foreseeable future con-
sequently.
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY MATTHEW KENNEDY
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 68
Any agreement between Beijing and Taipei
over the reunification issue will probably
not occur in the foreseeable future.
Notes:
* Matthew Kennedy is a guest editorialist at Vail
Daily.
1. Constitution of the People's Republic
of China. Preamble. http://
www.usconstitution.net/china.html#
Accessed 24 November 2011, 1110am MST
2. Anti-Secession Law adopted by NPC.
Articles 2, 5,6,7, and 8. http://www.china-
un.ch/eng/zt/twwt/t187208.htm, Accessed
6 December 2011, 1043pm MST
3. “Taiwan’s Leader Outlines His Policy
Toward China.” Keith Bradsher and
Edward Wong. The New York Times. 19
June 2008. http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/world/
asia/19taiwan.html, Accessed 7 December
2011, 11:26am MST
4. “No unification talks with China if elected:
Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign
manager”. Taiwan News Network. 11 No-
vember 2011, http://
www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/
news_content.php?id=1760089, Accessed
11 December 2011, 814PST
5. “Times Topics: Ma Ying-jeou” The New
York Times. 11 December 2011, http://
topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/people/m/ma_yingjeou/
index.html, Accessed 11 December 2011,
514PST
6. “China and Taiwan sign agreements to
open finance sectors.” Robin Kwong. Fi-
nancial Times (London). 27 April 2009. P.4.
Accessed via Lexus Nexus Academic Au
gust 2011
7. “Longtime rivals China, Taiwan sign
trade pact.” Keith B. Richburg. The Wash-
ington Post. 30 June 2010. P.A08. Ac-
cessed via Lexus Nexus Academic August
2011
8. Jacques deLisle. “’Bless and Keep the SAR
… Far Away from Us’: Taiwan’s Hong Kong
Phobia, Five Years On.” Foreign Policy Insti-
tute. 16 August 2002 http://www.fpri.org/
enotes/20020816.delisle.hongkongphobia.
html Accessed 7 December 2011, 126pm
MST
9. Joint declaration of the Government of the
People's Republic of China and The Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Portugal on the
question of Macao. Article 2, Section 1.
http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/88/23/dc/en/
Accessed 23 November 2011, 1211pm MST
Joint Declaration of the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of
the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong. Article 3. Section
1, http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~pchksar/JD/jd
-full2.htm, Accessed: 23 November 2011,
1220MST
10. Ibid. Joint Declaration, Hong Kong. Article
3. Sections 2-3 Ibid. Joint Declaration, Ma-
cao. Article 2. Section 2
11. Ibid. Joint Declaration, Hong Kong. Article
3. Section 4 Ibid. Joint Declaration, Macao.
Article 2. Section 3
12. Ibid. Joint Declaration, Hong Kong. Article
3. Section 9. Ibid. Joint Declaration, Ma-
cao. Article 2. Section 6
13. Ibid. Joint Declaration, Hong Kong. Article
3. Section 5 Ibid. Joint Declaration, Macao.
Article 2. Section 4
14. United States Central Intelligence Agency.
The World Factbook. East and Southeast
Asia: Taiwan. 10 November 2011. https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world- factbook/geos/tw.html, Accessed 4
December 2011, 946pm MST
15. Cal Clark (2003): Does European Integra-
tion Provide a Model for Moderating Cross-
Strait Relations?, Asian Affairs: An American
Review, 29:4, 195-215 http://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/
df/10.1080/00927670309601506, Accessed
14 December 2011, 753pm PST
COMMENTARY | BY JAMES PEARSON
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 69
I n this article, I will point out and discuss
the effect of the reform of exchange
rate institution on the real estate
market, and the discussion suggests
that the appreciation of RMB leads to the rise of
real estate price, but as well as the possible eco-
nomic bubble in Hong Kong. The influx of capital
flows and the real estate price volatility in Hong
Kong real estate market shows that the expecta-
tion of the appreciation of RMB is one of the ele-
ments that inspires investment speculating in the
real estate market causing the possible imbalance
of demand and supply and various social prob-
lems.
RMB appreciation stimulates mainland inves-
tors to enter the Hong Kong real estate market
An appreciating RMB will impact the Hong Kong
economy and hence the real estate market in di-
rect and indirect ways. Indirectly, it spurs capital
inflows into Hong Kong in order to lower the local
interest rates, creates an accommodative mone-
tary environment and yields substantial wealth
effects from a surging stock market. As a result,
such wealth effects are expected to spill over into
the property market. Lower interest rates will also
provide incentives for increased borrowing and
boost asset prices. Under the current currency
system, an increase in liquidity would suppress
Hong Kong-dollar interest rates. If money supply
exceeds the desired money demand, inflationary
pressure will rise. The positive outlook for asset
prices and expectations of further appreciation of
the RMB might attract substantial capital flows
into Hong Kong.
Hong Kong – an alternative exit for Chinese hot
money
In the long run, it is believed that the reform of
RMB exchange rate system and its revaluation will
not have any significant adverse effects on China,
but is rather one of the steps towards China’s stra-
tegic goal of gradual appreciation and loosening
of capital control for RMB.
The domestic policy tightening in mainland China
as well as the appreciation of the RMB causes the
China investors to diversify their investment port-
folio, Hong Kong is expected to be one of the first
spots for it. Chinese investors in search of alterna-
tive real estate options, to reduce the overheating
of domestic market risk exposures. China on the
overseas property market influence eclipsed. Chi-
na real estate investors are mostly limited to in-
vestment in the domestic market, forcing the
Government to take vigorous measures to sup-
press excessive rise in prices of China's domestic
policy tightening in real estate, and the apprecia-
tion of the RMB will, analysts expect more Chi-
nese people to those high returns and low limit of
the overseas market investments such as Hong
Kong.
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 70
THE IMPACT
OF RENMINBI (RMB) APPRECIATION
ON THE HONG KONG PROPERTY MARKET
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY SUNNY LAM*
Investment Strategy Consideration
The levels of total return due to the RMB appreci-
ation offered by real estate markets in Hong Kong
are likely to be attractive to many Chinese inves-
tors. In particular, in an environment when invest-
ment in low risk assets in Hong Kong offers very
attractive returns, the income return from real
estate is likely to be an appealing characteristic
for many investors. The key to success is in the
speed, scale and timing of the investment. In con-
clusion, the RMB appreciation presents a cross-
border investor with a range of opportunities. It
also offers scope for risk diversification within the
real estate markets.
How might investors respond? Five trends may
be significant:
Increasing investment demands: Firstly in-
creasing allocations to real estate both from
traditional institutional investors (pension
funds, insurance companies and endow-
ments) but also from sovereign wealth funds
and new institutional investors.
Favorable risk adjusted return: Secondly
many investors show an elevated degree of
China heat effect. After all, if the outlook for
returns is strong in Hong Kong many main-
land investors still
keen to find out the
risk adjusted return for
their investment?
More value-
added investment
opportunities: Whilst
many risk adverse in-
vestors may likely con-
tinue to focus purely
on prime properties in
Hong Kong; I suspect
that increasingly some
risk accepting inves-
tors may start to com-
mit to investments in
secondary properties
with a value add strat-
egy to reposition the
property into a core
property as markets continues to grow.
Attractive capital flow environment: Listed
real estate tends to anticipate the perfor-
mance of direct or unlisted real estate. With
healthy balance sheets, many listed compa-
nies have access to capital to redeploy into
the wealthy real estate markets. Many inves-
tors might find this a more liquid way to par-
ticipate in the boosting market environment.
Focus on the core segment: Depending on
the risk level the investor is willing to take,
investors are suggested to invest in the core
segment as part of the overseas portfolio.
Hong Kong being a well developed city in the
region, the core segment is relative stable in
term of price growth and rental income.
So the next question is where are those opportu-
nities? There is not a simple answer to this ques-
tion, but many would answer using the real estate
specific mantra: location, location, location. It will
depend on the market, asset type and strategy to
adopt. Up to now most investors have taken a
'flight to quality' and have focused on prime mar-
kets and assets. Even though this is an under-
standable choice when the economic is still on
the bright side with historic low lending cost and
the synchronized move towards prime assets in
top markets has caused a 'bidding war' for many
opportunities. In some markets the final price has
been primarily determined by too much capital
chasing the same property, rather than by the
outlook for the fundamentals.
Chinese investors convince of the robust pro-
spects of Hong Kong are likely to find this a
tempting time to rotate into the more cyclical real
estate sectors. Some of the sectors such as hotel
and retails are particularly in the strong position
due to favorable policies driven by the central
government.
The current revaluation situation will not be
enough to solve the problem of excess capital
inflows. On the contrary, it will however further
accelerate capital inflows in anticipation of fur-
ther revaluation, intensifying the harmful stimu-
lus to the economy. On the other hand, the gov-
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY SUNNY LAM
ernment will set up various measures in order to
control the overheat market. The overheat market
would disadvantage the interior and could even
pose a threat to the city’s long term competitive-
ness. What makes Hong Kong different is that it is
an attractive destination for foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI). Hong Kong is one the largest recipient
of FDI per area in the region, due to its growing
dynamic economy and stable political environ-
ment . On the other hand, rising incomes and
economic growth have also created enormous
inflation pressure for the city.
As Mainland China is a major investment source
of investment income for Hong Kong, external
factor income flows will benefit from the currency
revaluation effect. It is particularly helpful for long
term investors for purchasing properties for rental
income purposes. The market value of investment
holdings will also benefit from the currency reval-
uation, and this could have a positive impact on
Hong Kong’s aggregate demand, and thus infla-
tion as discussed above, through the wealth ef-
fect. The author would like to conclude the fol-
lowing positive impacts on the Hong Kong mar-
ket:
1. To promote its internal economic growth. The
prosperity of fictitious capital, to increase in-
vestor wealth, stimulate consumption and
growth, changes in short-term marginal pro-
pensity to consume and hence increase its
internal spending power especially the luxury
sectors, the multiplier effect of expanding eco-
nomic growth
2. To accelerate the concentration of wealth and
capital accumulation, the process of promot-
ing social capital. Fictitious capital has
changed the way of capital accumulation, cap-
ital concentration more quickly, fast, and pro-
mote the socialization of capital, for efficient
basis for large-scale socialized production.
Property price distortions and market re-
balancing
As discussed above, one of the key factors driving
the market imbalances has been cheap money,
which, together with weak regulation of high-risk
investment, led to the potential bubbles in Hong
Kong. Many investment funds from developed
countries including US and Europe currently
make the advantage of extremely low interest-
rate policy. It brings capital flows into Asia partic-
ularly Hong Kong in anticipation of higher invest-
ment return compared to that in their own coun-
tries. It therefore further boosts the property
price. The appreciation of RMB together with ris-
ing Chinese household income and larger official
reserves mean that there will be rising demand
for diversification by Chinese investors into cross-
border assets. Hong Kong is always one of the top
destinations for such cross-border capital flow. To
facilitate these future cross-border capital flows, it
would be helpful for China to maintain a stable
exchange rate and large foreign exchange re-
serves, both of which are critically important in
reducing the Chinese and foreign investors’ un-
certainty that would result from a volatile ex-
change rate.
Implication on the Hong Kong society as a
whole
The current strong influx of Chinese hot money
causing the real estate market in Hong Kong as
one of the fastest growing investment tools for
the mainland Chinese. However, it has also be-
come an important area of investment, growing
its virtual nature, which led to many social prob-
lems such as excessive inflation, distortion of the
housing market, loss of the city’s competitiveness,
etc. Virtual capital itself is not value, but the virtu-
al capital to generate profits through circular mo-
tion to get some form of “residual value”, it can
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY SUNNY LAM
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 72
The appreciation of RMB together with
rising Chinese household income and
larger official reserves mean that there will
be rising demand for diversification by
Chinese investors into cross-border assets.
not be directly used as real factors of production
or production activities, but only the ownership
certificate, the “reality paper copy of the capital”,
reflects the debt payment. A lot of money flows
from the real economy and financial markets and
real estate market, causing economic false
prosperity as we have seen before in 1997 and
2008. If the flow of funds into the virtual economy
too much, it will cause a lack of real economic
sector funding, the development of fatigue,
there crowding out productive investment.
The fast capital accumulation in the virtual reality
of capital accumulation in the case of
interest-bearing money capital does not reflect
the reality of not only the accumulation of money
capital, and self-aggrandizement, which
led to bubble economy. Increasing the
composition of the bubble economy, people’s
pursuit of profit led to the virtual non-normal in-
flux of a lot of money the virtual capital markets,
people are keen on playing the stock / property
market, futures and other “money game” activi-
ties.
The biggest challenge for the Hong Kong policy-
makers now is how to deal with the property bub-
bles being formed by the hugh purchasing power
caused by the appreciation of RMB and cheap
money from China. As asset prices and the con-
sumer price index rise, it is important for China to
raise its interest rate. It is therefore necessary for
China to improve its capital control mechanisms,
to allow orderly cross-border capital flows for
more efficient investments.
The author would like to share the following
viewpoints:
1. Given the complex institutional and struc-
tural limitations in China, the nominal RMB
appreciation will become a key policy for
China in the near future and the rate of
appreciation is likely to be at a stable and
controlled pace. One important implication
for Hong Kong is that it will be difficult to
pursue a weak-dollar policy as Hong Kong
dollar pegs with US Dollar.
2. For short term measurement, the Hong
Kong Monetary Authority and China
Central Bank can cooperate effectively in
maintaining the stability of the exchange
rate and orderly cross-border flows of capi-
tal. A stable RMB-dollar exchange rate
seems to fit both parties interest. However,
Hong Kong is a free trade port and there is
hardly any existing tight regulation on con-
trolling cross-border capital flow. Any addi-
tional regulations may damage the reputa-
tion of Hong Kong being one of the freest
trading places in the world especially China
is the biggest trading partner for Hong
Kong.
3. The strong cross-border capital flow
may cause a sharp change in the Hong
Kong property landscape as such influx
of money is intensifying demand for
office, retail, and apartment spaces. In the
world’s most expensive high-rise cities,
such as Hong Kong, the free market axiom
that real estate should be developed for its
“highest and best use” has never been
truer.
Notes:
* Sunny Lam is a freelance journalist specialising
in city development, urban planning and proper-
ty market. He is active in various kinds of publica-
tions. He has over 10 years experience in conduct-
ing research in regional real estate markets.
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS? | BY SUNNY LAM
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A Movie of an Unrequited Patriot
History… a series of genuine history! I didn’t let
anyone rape her, and that is why I am now im-
poverished… This is a book that will not be pub-
lished until after hundreds of years. By that time,
archaeologists will dig out my bones and discov-
er this manuscript. The only thing that I wish for
is that, after reading this manuscript, they will
say, “Ah! I can’t believe that in 1976AD there was
such an honest old chap! A Miracle indeed!”
Enough! I will keep my mouth shut in Hell and be
silent for ten thousands of years…
— Bitter Love, Bai Hua
Ling Chenguang, a gifted artist without a
father, endured hardships during his childhood
with the help of benevolent people. During
his adolescence at the time of the Japanese
occupation, he was forced to join the army of
Kumingtang (KMT). He was saved by a young
lady named Lu from a fisherman’s family who
later became his wife. After joining an anti-
government movement, Ling was warranted
by agents of KMT and consequently escaped
to a foreign country. He eventually became a
successful painter who lived as a bourgeoisie.
When the New Modern China was born, he and
his wife forwent the comfort of their past and
went back to their motherland with patriotic aspi-
rations.
All the hopes were gradually gone when the
Anti-Rightist Movement and Cultural Revolution
came. As a former bourgeois and a “revisionist”
who deviated from Mao’s orthodoxy, Ling’s family
became political outcast. Together with their
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 76
BITTER LOVE: A SILENCED MOVIE OF CHINA AND ITS IMPLICATION
CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU*
daughter, they were confined and secluded in
a tiny windowless house with no sunlight
and countless spider webs. The painter was even
severely beaten up during his birthday. When
his daughter grew up, he ran away with her
boyfriend. She left him after asking, “You are bit-
terly loving this country, however, does this coun-
try return your love?”
After all the misfortunes, Ling exiled himself into
the wilderness of snow. The hermit finally used
his last footsteps to paint a huge question mark
on the snow, and he finished it with his freezing
body as the dot.
Bitter Love: A Movie of Controversy
Waves of political and social movements
have suffocated millions of common people’s
lives after the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China since 1949. The Land
Reformation, the Anti-Rightist Movement, and
the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) had all
created devastating political, economic, cultural
and environmental disasters. However, the
Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), also
known as “Calamity of Ten Years”, had redefined
the conception of political chaos— a further
advancement of Maoist orthodoxy that eventual-
ly led to almost complete collapses of
political institutions, social norms and cultural
artefacts, of which were replaced by lies, igno-
rance and greed.
Bai Hua (白樺, 1930- ), a Chinese intellectual and
former dedicated CCP member, became a
“rightist” from 1958 to 1976. During that time, he
had been deprived of his chances to write basical-
ly anything. His conviction has been removed by
Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and his play manuscript
Bitter Love (苦戀, originally known as Sun and
Man) was firstly published by the same year. It
was subsequently re-published in a Hong Kong
leftist newspaper as well. The short novel was
considered to be one of the pioneers of Scar Liter-
ature (傷痕文學): a new fiction genre that was
fermented specifically right after the waves
of Maoist political movements from the end of
1977 to 1979. It was considered as a cultural
blossom of the “Second Hundred Flowers Move-
ment”.
The work had then been made into a movie,
directed by Pang Ning and screen played by
Bai Hua and the director himself. Before the
actual movie could be possibly shown to the
public, a sample of the movie has been previewed
by the Secretariat of the Communist Party of
China Central Committee and the Committee
strongly opposed it unless the screenplay
was heavily redrafted. Nonetheless, from 1981
onwards, the movie has received an overwhelm-
ing support by intellectuals, directors, movie
critics and screenwriters. For the People's
Liberation Army General Political Department
and the Central Party School, the feelings of
their members were mixed but the majority
was against it. The situation exacerbated by
the fact that the Newspaper of the People’s
Liberation Army reminded the intellectuals
that there were four types of principles that
writers should be abided by them. Together
with tens of other government-controlled
newspaper and radio broadcasts, Bai Hua and
his screenplay Bitter Love were severely
criticized. Consequently, the movie was banned
to show anyone in public. Yet, according to
Bai Hua, the original copy of the movie was
stored in good condition at Changchun Film
Group Corporation. One should be noted that
there was a Taiwanese version (1982) of the mov-
CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 77
Bai Hua
ie, known as “Portrait of a Fanatic” in English, can
now be bought easily. Thanks to the Internet, one
can also freely download and synchronously
looped somewhere on the web with no English
subtitles.
The Silenced Question Mark
As Maureen Duffy says, “The pain of love is
the pain of being alive. It is a perpetual wound.”
Ling, the painter, loved his country deeply, yet
in return, the country never attempted to heal
the hopeless and hapless man. He was the mod-
ern version of Qu Yuan (340BC-278BC) who
kept on demanding answers from Heaven after
having been expelling by his beloved country of
Chu. We should not enquire for whom the ques-
tion is asked; the question is asked for countless
persecuted Chinese intellectuals. Through the
painter’s life, Bai Hua asked profound questions
about the Maoist era, which are still extremely
crucial and somehow relevant to today’s China.
One of the most important questions is: What is
left in Chinese nationalism if the people of China
were remorselessly ill-treated by the Communist
Party?
According to statistics, the farce of the Great
Leap Forward has resulted in catastrophic deaths
of over 40 million people, mostly due to hunger.
The movement aimed at boosting up the steel
production of the entire country, ambitiously
claiming that the production would surpass
that of the British and American Empires. Howev-
er, when most of the citizens were brainwashed
and the system was socially re-engineered by
setting up People’s Communes, who were going
to grow crops to feed the whole population?
Exacerbated by years of serious and comprehen-
sive droughts, Mao’s political ideal became one of
the massive human exterminations in the 20th
century.
During the Cultural Revolution, innocent lives
were labelled as, very often without any substan-
tial and sound evidence, “counter-
revolutionaries”, “revisionists” and “capitalists”.
They had to go through the political processes of
“criticism” and “self-criticism”— mockery parties
held by winners of the power struggles, aiming at
condemning ones’ political stances, re-
establishing their “correct” political belief system
(i.e. Maoist orthodoxy), and eventually depriving
the will and dignity of the political, social and cul-
tural elites. During the processes, they were often
severely beaten up without any justifications. In
order to preserve ones’ personal safety, the
“dominate strategies” for them were either to
cheat, or betray, even the closest ones. Commit-
ting suicide became the only way out for some of
the victims, and for some of the others, they were
sent to Re-education Through Labour (RTL) in
various remote places like the North-east provinc-
es.
Ling the painter, like every other Chinese
by that time, was living and suffering in a
nation of poverty, chaos and a nation lack of
credibility. Bai Hua attempts to test the limits
of every Chinese patriot: Why do patriots still
love a wounded country if they can no
longer count their very own scars? Why did
some of them stay in China if exit was a
viable option (there was huge number of
illegal emigration during the Cultural
Revolution though)? If Chinese nationalism (or
nationalism in general) is a lie, what could
be an ultimate “resting place” for the Chinese
souls?
CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 78
According to statistics, the farce of the
Great Leap Forward has resulted in cata-
strophic deaths of over 40 million people,
mostly due to hunger. The movement aimed
at boosting up the steel production of the
entire country, ambitiously claiming that
the production would surpass that of the
British and American Empires.
Implications
China in the 21st century is no longer a Com-
munist nation. As Deng Xiaoping, famously as-
serted, “Only (economic) development makes
hard sense”. In post-Mao China, economic devel-
opment was the only concern of China. As a re-
sult, China is now the second largest economy
and is the world’s fastest growing economy. It has
been sustaining an average growth rate of 9.4%
for the past 30 years.
As a drawback, the economic gap between
the rich and the poor of China (Gini coefficient
in 2010: 0.47) is huge and widening. As Deng
also said, the nation should “let some people
grow rich first”, but we never know when
and how such an ideal can be realised. The
uncontrollable accumulation of wealth is concen-
trated in a handful of party members as well
as some local capitalists. In addition, the
Party firmly believes that by ensuring a high eco-
nomic growth rate leaders can maintain their
legitimacy. Nonetheless, the systematic and
structural corruption is so incurable that as a
result, the Party is losing the “hearts and minds”
of the people.
Economic progress has led to social and irreversi-
ble environmental degradation throughout
the country. Injustice in local provinces and
villages are widespread that has led victims to
point of no return. Without an independent
judiciary system, an extrajudicial political action
formally called “Letter and Complaints” or Xin-
fang in Chinese, becomes a widespread phenom-
enon. Over five million petitions have been re-
ceived each year and the victims have been
packed in Beijing to lodge complaints against
their local authorities and to protect their basic
human rights. Unfortunately, most of the peti-
tioners has failed to redeem their justice and
many of them have been severely threatened and
beaten.
Worse still, the environmental problems are
devastating. For instances, more than 30% of
water in China is not drinkable and more than
500 million people are affected. Moreover, count-
less health problems caused by pollutions are
common namely, respiratory problems, cardio-
vascular damage, heavy metal poisoning, and
cancer.
Together with the recent tragedy of the high-
speed railway system due to unacceptable
governance, ethnic minority conflicts and
terrorism, the daily violence of Chengguan
(The City Urban Administrative and Law Enforce-
ment Bureau) against the street-sellers, the
CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 79
Chengguan Officers
persecution of public intellectuals and other
countless social problems piece together a mosa-
ic picture of Modern China in the 21st century.
In an earlier article named “Hong Kong Democra-
cy: A Pessimistic Review” of Political Reflection
(PR), I contend that,
The concept of a “harmonious society” has
become an over-arching theme campaigning
over the years in China. The Chinese central
government advocates that it is necessary
to construct a “harmonious society” while
enjoying the economic prosperity. The term
has been repeatedly criticized as a strategy
that underplays the democratic reform of
China.
China is never a “harmonious” place due to its
undemocratic and injustice environment. The
“haves” are the exploiters and the “have-nots” are
severely oppressed. As I said, “the only reason for
a government to promote harmony is because
the society it governs lacks harmony.” (Political
Reflection Issue No.2, Vol.1)
In 2010, there was a successful Chinese Spaghetti
Western style movie written, directed and starred
by Jiang Wen, Let the Bullets Fly. Towards the
end of the movie, the protagonist “Pocky” and
his subordinates were about to overthrow a
local authority (Chow Yun-Fat). They at first
shot many holes onto the gate of a mansion.
Later, one of his subordinates shot an exclama-
tion mark on the gate while Pocky shot a question
mark. Pocky finally said, “Release all of your bul-
lets through that question mark dot!” The symbol-
ic messages here are clear: The gate refers to the
barrier between the people and the government.
The hundreds of fire holes are the grievances of
the people. The question mark can possibly
mean two things. It can mean thousands
of inquiries imposed by the director towards
the regime. It can also be understood
together with the exclamation mark — the
compound symbol actually looks like hammer
and sickle ( ) — meaning that the Communist
Party of China. By shooting all the remaining bul-
lets through the question mark, people can be
then “re-liberated” again.
Like Jiang Wen, the people have been tired
of waiting for meaningless slogans, official
apologies and empty promises. As we can see,
all the tragedies and reactions of the Chinese
citizens are dangerously alarming to the seeming-
ly unshakable regime. Are huge storms about
to come? I do not have a clear answer. However,
as Zhong Zukang, a Chinese author who
now lives in Norway proclaim, “I don’t want
to be Chinese again!” I am sure from time to
time, unacquainted patriots of China will
eventually wake up and strive for a better
change. If patriotism and nationalism are
mythical constructions, a liberal democratic
“irresponsible compound” might be a more realis-
tic utopia.
Note:
* Antony Ou is a PhD Researcher of University of
Sheffield, the China Review editor of Political Re-
flection Magazine, and the China Representative
of CESRAN. His monograph, Just War and the
Confucian Classics: A Gongyangzhuan Analysis,
has been published and is available at ama-
zon.com.
E-mail: [email protected]
Twitter: https://twitter.com/ouantony
Douban: http://www.douban.com/people/
ouantony/
CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY ANTONY OU
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 80
China is never a “harmonious” place due to
its undemocratic and injustice environ-
ment. The “haves” are the exploiters
and the “have-nots” are severely
oppressed. As I said, “the only reason for a
government to promote harmony is
because the society it governs lacks
harmony.”
About the
CESRAN | Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis
The CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (CESRAN) is a private, non-political, non-
profit, internet-based organization of scholars who are interested in world politics, and enthusiastic
about contributing to the field of international relations as not only academics, but also practitioners.
The underlying motive behind the foundation of the CESRAN is a need to bridge the gap between the
students of international relations and practitioners of international politics. In this regard, the main
ideal is gathering people, who come from different backgrounds and have different perspectives,
around the CESRAN in order to yield fresh and illuminating insights as to how the international rela-
tions is carried out in a globalizing world. To this end, the CESRAN aims at establishing and maintain-
ing close contact with and between politicians, bureaucrats, business people, and academics that
would lead to the development of better policies.
We invite anyone who shares these interests to become a member and participate in our activities.
Email: [email protected]
Members of the Executive Board of the CESRAN:
Özgür TÜFEKÇİ, Chairman (King’s College London, UK)
Alper Tolga BULUT, Vice-Chairman (University of Houston, USA)
Kadri Kaan RENDA, Vice-Chairman (King’s College London, UK)
Aksel ERSOY, Member (University of Birmingham, UK)
Ali Onur ÖZÇELİK, Member (University of Sheffield, UK)
Hüsrev TABAK, Member (University of Manchester, UK)
Abdullah UZUN, Member (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)
Members of the Council of the CESRAN:
Prof. Mark BASSIN (Södertörn University, Sweden)
Prof. Bülent GÖKAY (Keele University, UK)
Dr. Ayla Göl (Aberystwyth University, UK)
Prof. Bayram GÜNGÖR (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)
Prof. Alp ÖZERDEM (Coventry University, UK)
Mr Bill PARK (King’s College London, UK)
Prof. İbrahim SİRKECİ (Regent’s College, UK)
Prof. Birol YEŞİLADA (Portland State University, USA)
WWW.CESRAN.ORG
T oday, the pertinence of Kang Youwei
relevant figure and the historical role
he played in China during the turbu-
lent years between the 19th and
20th century, is no further object of discussion.
Kang Youwei, who came from a family in which
some of his members served the country as go-
vernment officials, has often been at the centre of
academic debates for his political activities and
for the philosophical content of his writings.
Amongst Kang Youwei’s characteristic traits, the-
re was a vast and heterogeneous cultural forma-
tion, derived by his widespread interest towards
different fields of human knowledge, learned
from the disciplines and the writings of the wes-
tern world and from the more traditional kind of
culture tied to his native homeland. In China, as it
is well-known, the cultural level of a person was
also judged on the basis of the depth of his callig-
raphic education, thus, his inherent knowledge
for this type of visual art, that over the centuries
had developed a strong bond with the scholar-
officials.1 Throughout his life, Kang Youwei, has
dedicated time and energy to the art of callig-
raphy, acquiring a ample theoretical and practical
knowledge, later merged in his compendium
published in 1891, entitled Guang yi zhou shuang
ji 廣藝舟雙楫.
Even in its complexity and through different ob-
servation levels, Guang yi zhou shuang ji, struc-
tured in twenty-seven chapters compounded in
six books, presents itself like a work of criticism to
calligraphy, putting in evidence Kang Youwei’s
approach towards this art which many considered
essentially theoretical. Nevertheless, he produced
an enormous amount of calligraphic works; creat-
ed a personal and characteristic style, and en-
tered, by rights (most of all for his theoretical
competence), in that circle of experts and art con-
noisseurs, who, since the middle of the Qing dyn-
asty, tried to inject into calligraphy new vital
lymph derived from the more ancient calligraphic
tradition - like those of the stone tables dating
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 82
CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE*
KANG YOUWEI’S (1858-1927) STUDY
AND
VISION OF THE CHINESE CALLIGRAPHIC ART
back to the Jin (265–420) and Northern Wei dyn-
asties (386-535) - that, in the course of history,
found themselves ruled out of the process of es-
tablishing the calligraphy classical tradition al-
ready described by Ledderose.
In the Guang yi zhou shuang ji, despite the funda-
mental conceptuality, there are some parts that
the author dedicated to eminently practical as-
pects and are concentrated in the following four
chapters: Zhi bi di er shi (執筆第二十), where Kang
Youwei offers his considerations about the right
method of holding the brush; Zhui fa di er shi yi
(綴法第二十一), discussing on the composition
method of a calligraphic work starting from the
correct movement of the writing tool; Xue xu er shi
er (學敘第二十二), in which the author speaks of
the right sequence to follow in the calligraphy
learning process; Shu xue di er shi san, (述學第二十
三), where, with a prose rich of personal details,
Kang Youwei, relays his personal experience in
studying the chinese calligraphic art, which be-
gan at the age of ten under the guidance of his
paternal grandfather, Kang Zanxiu. His grandfa-
ther, a government official, taught calligraphy in
the administrative residence of Lianzhou, in the
province of Guangdong. Later on, his illustrious
grandson, described his attendance at the course
with this words:
[At that time] I had in my mouth the sweet
taste of sugar and dates2, and I amused myself
playing with the brushes. My defunct grandfa-
ther would begin teaching with [making] imi-
tate [by the students] the Yue yi lun and the
calligraphy of Ouyang Xun and Zhao Mengfu.
The lesson was quite strict3.
On these occasions, Kang Youwei, had the role of
his Grandfather’s young attendant, whom, be-
sides schooling him in the different examination
subjects for entering the bureaucratic career, was
also getting him acquainted with the basics of the
calligraphic art. According to what Kang Youwei
describes in this chapter, for many years, his cal-
ligraphy didn’t make any substantial improve-
ments; for his demeanour, that he defines as laid-
back and slow in understanding things and also
for the absence of good calligraphy rubbings in
the house of his grandfather, with whom Kang
Youwei was living since 3 months after the prem-
ature death of his father in 1868.
Guang yi zhou shuang ji dates the first important
turning point in Kang Youwei’s calligraphy learn-
ing process back to 1876, when, following his fail-
ure at the provincial examinations held the same
year in Guangzhou, he decides to continue his
studies at Lishan, a village near the capital of
Guangdong province, under the auspices of Zhu
Ciqi (1807-1881), an ex government official and a
renowned Confucian scholar, who dedicated him-
self to teaching after his retirement from the ad-
ministrative functions thirty years before at the
Xinglin district in Shanxi province. Zhu Ciqi, de-
scribed in Guang yi zhou shuang ji as you gong bi
zha (尤工筆札) - proficient in the use of brush and
paper - was known also with his sobriquet
CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 83
Kang
Youwei
Jiujiang, from his native place, the country town
of the same name in Nanhai district, twenty-five
kilometers south-west of Guangzhou.
Kang Youwei remained in Lishan for around three
years, where besides the study of different disci-
plines as confucian classics, literature, institutions
and rhetoric, he devoted himself to the refining of
his calligraphy technique through the imitation of
renowned works as the Ouyang Xun's master-
piece Inscription on the Sweet-Water Spring at
Jiucheng Palace, the Stele of the Buddhist Monk
Daoyin written by Ouyang Tong (?-691), Yan
Zhenqing's (709-785) Stele of the Yan Family Tem-
ple, the Stele for the Xuan Mi Pagoda written by Liu
Gongquan (778-865), as well as through model-
ling after the style of Song calligraphers like Su
Shi (1037-1101) and Mi Fu (1051-1107)4.
As Kang Youwei states in his autobiography, the
time spent studying with Zhu Ciqi was for him of
fundamental importance. In the perspective of his
calligraphic education, it was relevant, above all,
in view of his acquired greater technical aware-
ness: the author of Guang yi zhou shuang ji be-
comes aware of the fact that there are no
shortcuts in the art learning process:
The study of calligraphy has a correct se-
quence; it is in fact essential, to know how to
hold the brush. For what concerns the writing,
it is necessary to begin from the structure of
the character, from the horizontal and vertical
strokes, defining first the square form, and lat-
er, concentrate on its characteristics, on its
movement, on its flexibility. Once the charac-
ters have been well traced out, it is possible to
concentrate on the calligraphic composition
with its different parts and their distribution.5
Kang Youwei dedicates the entire twentieth chap-
ter of Guang yi zhou shuang ji in describing the
procedures for achieving the correct brush grip,
and that starts with these words:
Mr. Zhu Jiujiang, in his “Method to hold the
brush”, says: “empty fist and solid fingers, hori-
zontal wrist and perpendicular brush”. Whilst
studying this method, I suffered, seeing that
by putting my wrist horizontally, I could not
hold the brush in a vertical position and vice-
versa. Hence, during daytime, I would scruti-
nize Mr. Zhu’s way to hold the brush […], ac-
cording to this method, by putting the wrist
horizontally, the brush, takes a natural vertical
position. My handwriting became more ele-
gant and balanced but not yet strong and vig-
orous6.
In the winter of 1878 determined to go back
home earlier to dedicate himself to a more indi-
vidual study and to a contemplative life, Kang
Youwei, left Zhu Ciqi’s class, and retired close to
the Xiqiao mountain, a place not far away from
his hometown and specially suited to meditation
for the beauty and peacefulness offered by the
surrounding scenery. While there, in the first
month of the following lunar year (1879), he met
a scholar and compiler of the Imperial Academy
arrived from Beijing, Zhang Dinghua, also known
with his courtesy name Yanqiu. The encounter
between the two, not easy at first, would later
prove to be of great importance. This new ac-
quaintance, led Kang Youwei to gather evidence
on the cultural tendencies of those years, induc-
ing him, to reconsider in a positive way the contri-
bution that some ancient calligraphic traditions
could give to the evolutionary process of the art.
In his autobiography, Kang Youwei wrote few
lines about this encounter:
Whilst I was living at the mount Xiqiao, the
compiler of the Hanlin Academy, Zhang Yan-
qiu, whose name in life was Dinghua, came to
CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 84
...“empty fist and solid fingers, horizontal
wrist and perpendicular brush”. Whilst
studying this method, I suffered, seeing
that by putting my wrist horizontally, I
could not hold the brush in a vertical posi-
tion and vice-versa.
a visit at the mountain with four or five of his
colleagues. […] I met him and we had a discus-
sion, finding ourselves in disagreement, we
shouted at each other, and then he left7.
The reason for this argument, is explained in
Guang yi zhou shuang ji in greater detail:
At that time, the compiler Zhang Yanqiu, told
me that all the model-books tie were only
a copy of original works and that it would have
been better to study the steles bei [of
the Northern Dynasties]. I contradicted him,
quoting the “Zhanqiu” (the felt cloth) of
Jiang Baishi (1155-1221), but I only did that,
because I was still immersed in an old way of
thinking8.
The old way of thinking that Kang Youwei refers
to, was based on the, till then, supposed superior-
ity of the southern calligraphic tradition with its
“tie” model-books, in contrast with the northern
one, mainly represented by the calligraphy stone
tablets carved during the Six and Northern Wei
dynasties; this, in short, was a calligraphic tradi-
tion of populations that Kang Youwei considered
backward and primitive. His point of view was still
far away from the position held by other im-
portant scholars of the middle and late Qing dyn-
asty, who, by re-qualifying the northern calli-
graphic traditions and combining it with the
southern ones, saw it as the way of instilling new
vigour and creative spirit to calligraphy.
Later on, Kang Youwei became a good friend of
Zhang Dinghua who, together with his teacher
Zhu Ciqi, played a pre-eminent role in Kang
Youwei's technical, teorethical and critical
growth, not only in the field of calligraphy:
From my teacher, Mr. Jiujiang, I have heard the
principles of virtues and justice of the [ancient]
sages, from my friend, Mr. Zhang Yanqiu, I
have received ample explanations on the
northern literary fashion9.
Kang Yowei's calligraphic formation was charac-
terized by a third important moment: the encoun-
ter with Shen Zengzhi (1850-1922), courtesy
name Zipei, a scholar, calligrapher and officer of
the Imperial Board of Punishments. In 1889 he
supported Kang Youwei in his writing a memorial
to the throne, asking for immediate reforms in
order to save China from its arresting decline. The
petition failed and, as Kang Youwei states in his
autobiography:
Shen Zengzhi advised me not to talk any more
about state affairs, and [told me that] I should
happily deploy my time with the study of an-
cient bronze and stone inscriptions.[…] I
planned to write a book [on this topic] but
many other scholars were doing [the same],
and so, I wrote a continuation of the work by
Bao Shichen (1775-1851), that later [I called] An
Expansion of the Twin Oars of the Ship of the Art
(Guang yi zhou shuang ji)10.
After rediscovering the importance of the calligra-
phy of northern tradition, Kang Youwei, dedicat-
ed himself to the study and the copying of differ-
ent works carved on stone tablets dating back at
various ancient dynasties, like The Stone Gate Epi-
taph, but also The Jing Shi Yu Stone Scriptures and
The Epitaph for Zheng Xi11. As a consequence to his
long practice and experience, Kang Youwei,
developed a powerful wrist for calligraphy and
created his own style. Presenting a detailed
visual analysis of Kang Youwei's particular works
CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE
goes beyond the scope of this paper; I will pro-
vide some examples to facilitate a minimal visual
contact with some peculiarities of his
brushstrokes.
Taking into exam, in particular, the characters
written in ordinary style (kaishu 楷書) or running
style (xingshu 行書), it is possible to affirm that,
although he gives particular consideration to
constant training and adequate technical
qualification as something essential for a good
calligrapher, the forms of his individual
brushstrokes are rather simple, since they
are lacking in virtuosity and attention to small
details. If we look through his works written in
the above-mentioned styles, his strokes (both
round and square) show a great sense of
strength, fluidity and freedom from the technical
orthodoxy of the calligraphy of the Tang dynasty
(618-907). Nevertheless the freedom he shows
in the way of using the tip of the brush does
not alter the balanced fundamentals of his writ-
ings.
Conclusions: the importance and the role of
calligraphy in Kang Youwei’s thought
In Guang yi zhou shuang ji, Kang Youwei, recogniz-
es the pre-eminent role played by Zhu Ciqi in
introducing him to the right techniques of
calligraphy and in helping him to penetrate
the spirit of the art. Yet, in his essay, he seems
to heighten, more his abilities as a calligraphy
critic and connoisseur rather than as a
calligrapher in the strict sense. This was
directly connected with his conception of calligra-
phy and to his personality, more inclined to the
speculation, rather than the rigid disciplinary rou-
tine that the study of calligraphy naturally re-
quires:
My personality leads me to investigate the
deeper nature of things and I have no inclina-
tion for studies that have no concrete utility.
Therefore I have been extremely lazy in study-
ing calligraphy and I only took its general
idea12.
And more:
Calligraphy is a minor art, not particularly wor-
thy for discussing it. [Nevertheless] even in
other disciplines, if we don’t aspire with deci-
sion at an advanced level of knowledge, with-
out learning something easy, how can it be
done for the more important things13?
These are the conclusive words of the twenty-
third chapter of Guang yi zhou shuang ji, in
which, Kang Youwei, describes his vision of the
art of calligraphy defining it a minor art (xiao yi),
intended as an instrument for reaching a more
important aim: forming the character for patience
CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE
WWW.CESRAN.ORG/POLITICALREFLECTION 86
and perseverance, for appraising small details and
for a correct overall view. All of these virtues,
should have been part of the personality of that
“sage” or “superior being” that he aimed to be, in
order to carry out in its entirety, the high mission
of which he felt empowered.
Notes:
* Massimo Carrante is a PhD candidate of Centre
for East Asian Studies, Heidelberg University.
1. Ledderose, Lothar, Chinese Calligraphy: Its
Aesthetic Dimension and Social Function,
Orientations, p. 35-50 (October 1986).
2. Kang Youwei talks here about a particularly
happy period of his life.
3. 廣藝舟雙楫注(清) 康有為著, 崔爾平較注, 上
海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p.173.
4. Jiucheng gong li quan ming 九成宮醴泉銘,
(632). Daoyin Fashi bei 道因法師碑 (663).
Yan jia miao bei 顏家廟碑 (780). Xuan mi ta
bei 玄秘塔碑 (841). Works carved in regular
style (kaishu) and presently preserved in
the Beilin Museum of Xi'an.
5. 廣藝舟雙楫注(清) 康有為著, 崔爾平較注, 上
海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p.169.
6. Ibidem, p.153.
7. 康南海自編年譜 (外二種), 樓宇烈整理, 中華
書局出版, 北京 1992.9, p. 9.
8. 廣藝舟雙楫注(清) 康有為著, 崔爾平較注, 上
海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p.173.
9. 康南海自編年譜 (外二種), 樓宇烈整理, 中華
書局出版, 北京 1992.9, p. 15.
10. 康南海自編年譜 (外二種), 樓宇烈整理, 中華
書局出版, 北京 1992.9, p. 16.
11. Shi men ming 石門銘 (509), Jing shi yu 经
石峪 (Northern Qi, 550-577) and Zheng
wen gong bei 鄭文公碑 (511).
12. 廣藝舟雙楫注 (清) 康有為著, 崔爾平較注,
上海書畫出版社, 2006.1, p. 174.
13. Ibidem, p. 175.
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CULTURAL ANALYSIS | BY MASSIMO CARRANTE
POLITICAL REFLECTION | SPECIAL ISSUE 2012 87
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