Political Theories of Development Cooperation

7/29/2019 Political Theories of Development Cooperation

1/84


2/84

POLITICAL THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIONA Study of Theories of International Cooperation

Lauri SiitonenUniversity of HelsinkiInstitute of Development Studies

May 1990

This study was undertaken within the research project onineral-based Industrialization Strategies and Internationaldustrial Cooperation, with Special Reference to Zambia" undere auspices of UNU/WIDER through the Special Programme Fundntributed by the Government of Finland.


3/84

CONTENTS

Preface iIntroduction iiNotes to Introduction iiiI. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL DISCOURSE UPONTHE PROBLEMATIC 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The Problematic of International Cooperation 5

1.2.1. An Introductory Definition of Cooperation 51.2.2. On the Political Philosophy of InternationalCooperation 81.3. Conclusions 11II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 172.1. Introduction 172.2. Cooperation and the Realist Paradigm 192 . 3 . C o o p e r a t i o n a n d t h e L i b e r a l P a r a d i g m 2 32.4. Cooperation and the Socialist Paradigm 28III. COOPERATION WITHIN CHANGING WORLD STRUCTURES 333.1 Introduction 3 33 . 2 . C o o p e r a t i o n A f t e r H e g e m o n y 3 53.3. Cooperation After Institutionalism 373.4. Cooperation After Imperialism 3 9IV. TOWARDS A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENTCOOPERATION 4 54.1. Criteria for Cooperation 454.2. Act ors and Structur al Condi tions

for Cooperation 4 74.3. Tow ard s a New Synthe sis 55

NOTE S AND REFE RENC ES 59BIBLIOGRAPHY 7 3


4/84

iPREFACE

This report is the first part of a research projecton industrialization strategies and industrial cooperationin southern Africa. This part is devoted to studying thetheories and policies of international cooperation.

The research project is part of the WIDER specialprogrammes financed out of the Finnish Government SpecialProgramme Fund. The researcher is preparing his doctoralthesis on the same topic at the University of Paris VII(Laboratoire des Tiers-Mondes), under the guidance of Dr.Monique Chemillier-Gendreau.

Besides Mme. Chemillier-Gendreau, some of thestudents and colleagues at the IDS, University of Helsinki,have given valuable comments on different parts andversions of this text. The author wants to thank all ofthem, and the WIDER for the publication of this report.


5/84

iiINTRODUCTION

A story tells that in the Middle Ages, the booksin the libraries were sometimes arranged according to thecountry of their origin, or the place where their authorswere born, or the place where they should have been born.Thus, the books that the creators of the library considered books of falsehood, or incoherent with the official truth, were labelled with a warning: Africa, hicsunt leones. /1 Now, in our days, this seems to be thecase with the role of the studies of politics in economicdevelopment.

Indeed, there seems to be a particular tendencyin development studies to ignore the "political", or, atleast, to treat the political aspects of economicdevelopment as a kind of "black box"; i.e. somethingbeyond and unattainable by means of ordinary socialscience. Since the warning is continuously repeated, itis no wonder that anthropologists, economists and sociologists are frightened off and discouraged from claimingan understanding of the political aspects of socialdevelopment in the Third World. /2

The problematic of international developmentcooperation is a case in point. /3 Already the use of theterm "cooperation" is illuminating ("Everybody is forcooperation!"). The common way to see cooperationunanimously as an 'apolitical' solution to social problems


6/84

iiitends to cover the mechanisms of dominance and the powerstruggle as operating through cooperative relations. Thisis the primary reason for studying the political dynamicsof development cooperation.

Notes to Introduction/l See, Umberto Eco: The Name of The Rose, pp. 310-3 20. London: Pan Books 1984./2 For a critical state-of-art review of the studyof political aspects of development, see a specialissue of IDS Bulletin 18 (1987):4 ("Politics inCommand"), Sussex./3 The word "problematic" is a translation of theFrench noun problematique and it refers to asubject area of study and the particular means ofinquiry employed to analyze it. The word is saidto be imported first by structural anthropologists. K.J. Holsti: The Dividing Discipline.(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), p. 13.


7/84

1I. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL DISCOURSE OVER THEPROBLEMATIC

1.1 Introduction

Development cooperation is a new mode ofinternational relations. In the modern sense of the word,development cooperation has been carried out only afterthe Second World War. But in a short period of time, ithas become an institutionalized mode of internationalrelations. Today, almost every country is engaged indevelopment cooperation in one way or in another. Researchof development cooperation is, thus, a challenging taskfor the study of international relations.

Problems of development cooperation have beenstudied first and foremost as an issue of developmentstudies. However, the development problematic can notalone explain the dynamics of development cooperation.Whatever forms the internal development in a "developingcountry" may take, no cooperation can rise out withoutthe desire of partners to cooperate.

It is, thus, no wonder that development cooperationis inevitably laden with political and moral aspects. Inan international system with increasingly widening gapsbetween national welfare levels, any coherent vision of apeaceful global change can not miss the problematic ofcooperation between rich and poor nations. Thinking about


8/84

2the theory of international relations, the study of thisproblematic may contribute to the development of ourtheoretical understanding of the conditions of cooperationand conflict among nations.

However, the very concept of development cooperation is rather problematic: Even if we put aside, for awhile, the difficulties of defining "social development",we are still left with a vague word of "cooperation".Largely cited in international vocabulary, it is oftenused - even in scientific literature - without anyprecision at all (take the example of the division betweencooperation and competition). But there are, of course,more substantial problems, too.

The first problem is of a theoretical nature: Howare we to explain the dynamics of internationalcooperation? Or, what are the political criteria to bemet, for cooperation to emerge among international actors?And what are the structural conditions that are likely tolead to cooperative efforts in an international system?At least in social sciences, the choice of adequatestrategies of explanation is related, first, to thequestion over factors internal versus external to theprocess to be explained: Should we emphasize the actors,or the structural environment of international cooperation?And what are the relevant actors - or the social context- of development cooperation? Second question concernsthe relevant level of analysis: Should we emphasize the


9/84

3level of the societies concerned, or that between thenations (the "international" level)?

Without a general theory of its own, the study ofinternational cooperation has to combine differentapproaches, structural as well as actor-oriented ones. Inaddition, the combination of approaches implies the usageof va rio us metho dol ogi cal instruments; analytical,historical, as well as empirical. In practice, this canbe made in succession (thought not necessarily in thefollowing order): The first task is to identify theinternational actors in question, and to determine thecriteria for cooperation among them. Second, as thecooperation never takes place in a void, the structuralenvironment, or factors affecting the conditions ofcooperation, will be analyzed. The hypothesis thusdeveloped can then be tested by means of empirical studies.Finally, the relevance of the results obtained, and ofthe methods applied, should be judged within a wider context.

Altogether, these questions will be quoted in thefollowing as the "problematic of cooperation". I willstart by defining the concept of cooperation. Subsequently,there will be a short discourse on the political philosophyof international relations, in order to clarify relevantcriteria for international cooperation. The discoursewill also serve as an introduction to a study of thepolitical economy of cooperation, aiming to identify the


10/84

4principal actors of development cooperation. Third, thestructural conditions of development cooperation will beexamined in the light of the recent changes in the worldeconomy since the early 1970's. The theoretical discoursewill be concluded with a formulation of a model forstudying the political dynamics of development cooperation in the changing international system.


11/84

51.2 The Problematic of International Cooperation

1.2.1. An Introductory Definition of Cooperation

"But co-operation is, as is well known,only the reverse, positive side ofconflict, and ... what in the parlance ofpoliticians is called "co-operation" inreality quite often is nothing but aeuphemism for the new forms of powerstruggle, or the dominance of richer andmore powerful nations over poorer andweaker. Thus the study of economic cooperation, through the facts which havebeen unearthed, has itself become astudy of international economic power."/1

On a general level, the term cooperation can bedefined as any "act of working together to one end". Asused in popular speech, cooperation is usually the oppositeof competition, which means the acts of "seeking orendeavouring to gain what another is endeavouring to gainat the same time". /2

Cooperation and competition are, however, notopposites, as so loosely used in popular speech. - Infact, the difference between competition and rivalrystems from the very fact that the former implies a certainlevel of cooperation, in order to maintain the "rules ofthe game". /3 - Moreover, in a social reality, the taskof defining cooperation appears to be even more difficult, especially in the case of development cooperation,which is not only international, but usually also inter-cultural by character. When regarded as a mode of be-


12/84

6haviour, what is cooperative in one culture, may becompetitive in another, since the very goals of socialaction are culturally determined. /4

Fortunately we are not doomed to an endlessrelativism, as concerning the concept of cooperation, ifwe ignore the cooperation as behaviour, and define it interms of social relations, which are no more culturallydefined. /5 Independently of the goals of action, we candiscern the field of collective action (i.e non-individualaction), inside of which we have basically four categoriesof goal oriented action, as following:

1) In cooperation, there is a commongoal, toward which the interaction isoriented, and which is shared by theactors;2) In competition, the common goal is no moreshared;3) In assistance, there may be common goals, butthe very action of giving aid is oriented towardshelping the other part to realize his or her owngoals;4) In rivalry, the goal is to hinder another togain his or her own goals.

Basically, we are interested here on points 1)and 3 ) , in order to clarify the difference betweencooperation and aid. /6 The first difference is of analytical nature: as distinct from cooperation, aid does notimply goals to be common or shared, it suffice that thegoals of the recipient are accepted by the donor. Thesecond difference is more empirical: in cooperation, not


13/84

7only goals, but also certain resources are shared togetherby the participants. Finally, in order that an act of"working together" could be called cooperation (asdistinct, say, from forced labour), the participantsshould be in a position to refrain from it; i.e. theyshould be independent in relation to the goals set andresources claimed.

As a conclusion, by cooperation I mean any formof social interaction between actors allowing them toachieve voluntarily set common goals by sharing certainresources together. But, bearing in mind that cooperationis a positive loaded concept, cooperation should not beseen as a harmonious relationship where no conflictsexist. On the contrary, cooperation may involve hiddenpower struggles between the partners, and it may as wellbe a mode of dominance of one partner over another. Thisis related to the social context of cooperation, and,thus, to our ideas of social systems as contexts of cooperation and conflict.

What, then, is particular to internationalcooperation? According to a definition, internationalcooperatio n desig nat es all "undertakings" allowinginternational actors to achieve jointly fixed goals bysharing certain resources together. /7 Less than integration, yet more than sporadic common efforts, international cooperation denotes to established relationsbetween sovereign actors willing to share some values to-


14/84

8gether. Though, as distinguished from trade, cooperationdoes not presuppose commercial exchange of any kind (f.ex.in the case of cultural or scientific cooperation). /8

Whether international cooperation is basicallydifferent by the nature of its context, depends, first ofall, on our ideas of the international system as distinctfrom other social systems. This is an aspect of ourparticular interest in the following.

1.2.2. On the Political Philosophy of InternationalCooperation

The classical ideas of international societyoutlined two mutually contradictory approaches tointernational relations. One approach emphasizes the roleof conflicts and wars in the great turning-points of themankind. Often linked to this approach is a rather pessimistic view of the world as basically anarchic by nature./9 The other approach regards cooperation and peacefulrelations among people at least as essential as wars inexplaining the course of the human history. This ideamay be based on a belief of the existence of supra-historical laws, or a Natural Law, above the nations. /10

In the late Middle Ages, the authority of theChristian church maintained the doctrine of Natural Law,at least among the Civitas christiania. Though not


15/84

9Christian in origin, the idea of a Natural Law wasincorporated with the theology by St. Thomas Aquinas(1225-1274). /ll In many other religious doctrines, as inthe Muslim philosophy, the basic idea is similar: thecriterion of justice is something laid down by theCreator, and the positive law of states should conform toit. /12

The rupture of the feudal systems at the end ofthe Middle Ages brought a crisis into prevailing ideas onpolitics, law and morality. The ideological void was soonfilled up by emerging monarchic national states whichclaimed sovereignty over affairs of their own. Thus, byrejecting the existence of any superior authority, thenational states - as opposed to empires - became theleading actors in the concert of nations, which only laterbecame known as the international system. /13

It was among the Italian city-states that aninternational system, based on relations independent fromnominal feudal overlords, was to emerge. /14 A Florentinecivil servant, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) , was thefirst to articulate the principles of an internationalsystem. This founder of the realist theory of politicssaw virtu, or the skills of power, as the most importantfactor in politics. In addition, he claimed that, inorder to exercise the virtu in the international system,where no moral authority exists, it would be necessary toseparate a political moral from the private moral: The


16/84

10moral obligations of the "subjects" should not bind the"Prince". While the state guards and maintains laws forthe former, the interests of the state would be the onlyguide for the prince. In short, Machiavelli was the pioneerof the idea of raison d'Etat. /15

The idea of reason d'Etat was further elaboratedby Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) . He based his theory on theidea of the condition of men living in a state of nature.This rather an analytic than a historic concept refers toa state of mankind living in conditions dominated by"Warre of every one against every one". In order to avoidthis sober state of affairs, as Hobbes argues, rationalpeople will shift their sovereignty to an authority capableof keeping a social order. Within the civil society, onlya strong state power can maintain law and moral. Butoutside the civil society, on the international arena, thestate of nature would still reign. /16

Another line of thought was developed by acontemporary of Hobbes, the Swiss professor JohannesAlthaus, or Althusius (1557-1638). He sought to explainsocial relations in terms of friendship and cooperation.As opposed to the idea of raison d'Etat, Althusiusadvocated pluralist theory of politics by developing theidea of the individual's dependence on a great variety ofgroupings, besides the political. He also developed thenotion of "popular sovereignty" that cannot be surrenderedby, or alienated from, the people. /17 At the level of


17/84

11international relations, the two ideas contributed to aprinciple of federalism, suggesting integration ofautonomous regions and countries into larger units.

Yet another line of thought was introduced by athird contemporary, the Dutch jurist Huig de Groot, orGrotius (1583-1645). He recognized the separateness andindependence of states, but looked for a superstructureof legal and moral principles that should govern theinternational relations. By extending the vision of thejurist-theologians who preceded him, Grotius sought tocombine natural, human, and divine laws into a system ofjuridical relations among nations without the institution of political authority. /18 In Grotius' vision, thejus gentium provides for regulative institutions prevailingbetween states. /19 Among others, these imply that thetreaties should be binding, and wars could be begun onlyfor just cause. Thus, the law of nations expresses thewill of international society.

1.3. Conclusions

The emerging international society of separatestates was formally recognized by the Treaty of Westphalia,in 1648. The consolidation of the Westphalian systemimplied that the way back to an universal authority waslost, at least for the moment. This was to become thebasic dogma for modern theorizing in international


18/84

12relations.

Within national state, the authority is based ontwo principles, initially formulated by the French juristJean Bodin (1530-1596) as the two edifices of the modernstate: the absolute power of the Prince through the civillaw (the juridico-politic principle), and the proprietyrights through the natural law (the socio-economicprinciple). The socio-economic base would support thestate, which, in turn, is supposed to defend the socioeconomic principle; or the private propriety. /2 0 Buthow to define a legitimation for the principles governingthe interaction between sovereign states?

Hence, any theory of international relations isconfronted by the basic question over the existence ofinternational norms, a sort of a Natural Law, on which atheory could be based on. Do we have moral obligationsconcerning foreign affairs? For the realist theory ofpo li ti cs , the answe r is simply neg ative. TheMachiavellian-Hobbesian tradition of thought rejectsinternational obligations other than the pursuing ofnational interests, and looks for the rational calculationof nati on al interests as the main determinant ofcooperation and conflict among nations. Accordingly, theprimary criteria for international cooperation would bethat the requirements of a certain balance betweencompeting national interests will be taken into consideration.


19/84

13

In a normative tradition of thought, universalhuman obligations are seen as the basis of internationalrelations. Obligation to cooperate, for example, isexplained in terms of human sociability. /21 But such anobligation may come into conflict with the principle ofnational sovereignty. Potential solutions, as offered bythe normative tradition, can be foundeither through a formulation of the juridico-politicprinciples for international community, or through anextension of the existing socio-economic principles intotransnational relations. The Grotian jus gentium is anexample for the former; juridical rules are supposed togovern relations among nations, "above" the statestructures. Consequently, it can be assumed that theformation and maintenance of international norms would const it ut e the relevant criteria for interna tionalcooperation.

Althusius' vision is an example for the latteroption, according to which the socio-economic principleswould offer the basis for transnational relations. In theform of popular sovereignty, the political authority issupposed to be based on social relations "under" thestate structures. Hence, social justice would offer theprimary criteria for international cooperation.

Altogether, these three traditions can be seen asthree cases of a 'philosophical paradigm' of international


20/84

14relations. /22 The respective political criteria forinternational cooperation would be 1) the rationalcalculation of national interests, 2) the formation andmaintenance of international norms, and 3) the socialjustice.

* * *

Since the consolidation of the Westphalian system,changing historical conditions have, again, causedmodifications in our ideas concerning internationalrelations. Perhaps the most significant change has beencaused by the Industrial Revolution, which has brought upthree basic developments in the modern internationalsystem: 1) increasing differences in power and wealthbetween the nations, through the distribution ofindustrial capacity, 2) an expanding world economy, basedon a system of industrial division of labour betweennations, and 3) an enlarging system of national states,covering now almost all of the land territories of theglobe. Thus, a major feature of the modern internationalsystem is a multiple state-system, inside of a worldeconomy characterized by increasing differences in industrial power and wealth among nations.

Like any social system, an emerging global systemneeds certain rules and norms, or an order, for itsmaintenance. The state system, as well as the international economic order, are the primary examples. The


21/84

15formation and maintenance of an order, in turn, impliescooperation among the international actors. With theexistence of large differences in the industrial poweramong nations within the system, certain economiccooperation has to cope with special requirements.

During the colonial era, the relationship betweenthe industrialized European countries and the areas inthe Third World were arranged largely on the basis of thecolonial order, with sovereignty belonging only to theformer. But after the World War II, with the demise ofthe colonialism and the "civilizing missions" of theEuropean powers, a new order has been emerging. First ofall, the Human Rights were declared as universal andinviolable rights in the 1948 United Nations Declaration./23 Second, the principal right of the former colonies tonational sovereignty over affairs of their own was

proclaimed in the 19 60 Declaration of independence tocolonial countries and peoples. /24 And third, nationshave assumed the responsibility to attack poverty, and aninternational obligation of the richer nations to helpthe poorer has been proclaimed. /25 "Development" hasbecome to describe these obligations and efforts. /26Thus, development cooperation, in a large sense, may betaken to mean any form of international cooperation aimedat filling the following obligations and efforts: 1)strengthening the national self-determination of thenewly independent developing countries, 2) guaranteeing thehuman rights and access to the benefits of international


22/84

16division of labour to their citizens, and 3) eliminatingpoverty through deduction of global inequalities.

In the following, we shall have a look at thetheoretical responses to these changes and challenges asposed by the shift from a European state system to aworld wide system of states and division of labour (or tothe modern international system). Meanwhile, we willleave the philosophical discourse, and focus on the political economy of development cooperation.


23/84

17II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

2.1 Introduction

The basic problematic of the political economyhas been formulated by Gilpin (1987, 4 ) , as following;

Since the sixteenth century, the primacyof the nation-state has been the organizingprinciple of the international politicalorder. The nation-state has largelydisplaced such premodern forms of politicalorganization as city-states, tribes, andempires, while simultaneously the markethas become the primary means for organizingeconomic relations, displacing otherm e a n s of e x i s t e n c e : r e c i p r o c i t y ,redistribution, and imperial commandeconomies.

The interaction between the two opposed forms ofsocial organization, the modern state and the market, hasbecome increasingly crucial to the character and dynamicsof cooperation and conflict among nations.

Our theoretical task is to explain the dynamics ofinternational development cooperation. Why do nationscooperate? A simple answer is that larger geographicareas are required for the success of higher forms ofeconomic growth, especially in the industrial sector.While the pursuing of economic growth has becomeincreasingly important for any state in the modern world,it would be beneficial for the nations to pursue economiccooperation. Yet, by the definition given above,cooperation always implies that certain resources areshared, and, thus, the national control over them. The


24/84

18abandon of national control, in turn, means a loss ofnational sovereignty, of which the only genuine sovereignpossessors are the national states. Therefore, states arereluctant to cooperate on merely economic grounds.Consequently, there is a contradiction between the economiclogic of cooperation and the logic of the politicalframework within which it takes place.

Possible solutions to our problem are given bythe modern political economy, which has been dominated bythree leading ideologies: conservatism, liberalism, andsocialism. In the context of international relations,these ideologies can be identified as more or lessanalogous to the theoretical traditions of the politicalrealism, the liberal institutionalism, and the socialistinternationalism. /27

These traditions can be defined, in turn, asparadigms of international relations. By paradigm I meanthe patterns of conceptualizing the internationalrelations, and the patterns of analyzing them. /28 Whatfollows, is a short review of these paradigms, and of theinternational system implied by them, as well as of therole of international cooperation in the internationalsystem thus defined.


25/84

192.2. Cooperation and the Realist Paradigm

The political realism, or the "power political"school of thought, is known better by the politicalscientists, but all too often ignored by the economists.Realist political economy finds its intellectual roots inmercantilist conceptions, though, a simple equation ofthe two would be absurd. /2 9 Another root was the GermanHistorical School that introduced the dynamic concept ofnation in the political economy. /30 As such, realism canbe regarded as the political theory of economicnationalism: the central idea is that governmentaleconomic activities are basically, and should also remain,subordinate to the goal of nation building.

The modern realist school of though was organizedin the United States during the inter-war years and inthe aftermath of World War II. On the background of thefailure of the League of Nations, and the dilemma ofpacifism faced by Nazism, the realists set up to criticizethe traditional legalist-moralist approach to internationalrelations as "idealism", thus calling themselves as"realists". /31 In 1948, Hans J. Morgenthau published hisfamous treatise on Politics among nations, where he setforth the three basic assumptions of the realist paradigm:First, the nation-states are the most important actorsfor understanding international relations. Second, thereis a sharp distinction between domestic and internationalpolitics. And finally, the international relations are


26/84

20the struggle for power and peace. /3 2 As defined in termsof these theses, the realist paradigm can be said to havelargely dominated post-war discussion and research oninternational relations in the United States and Europe./33

According to the realists, the internationalsociety is basically in a Hobbesian "state of anarchy",governed by the drive for power. /34 In the absence of avirtu al int ernational community, there can be nointernational actors with political authority, sinceauthority always involves a community. Yet, this does notimply that an endless state of war would reign amongnations. Instead, the states are organized in terms ofanarchic hierarchy, according to differences in power.With the help of two mechanisms, the state system can, atle as t temporally, function peacefully: hegemonicleadership, which facilitates cooperation, and the balanceof power, which discourages conflicts. On the bases ofthese principles, the states tend to create allianceswith each other. Principally, the same principles applyto economic relations as well: states create economicalliances in order to avoid trade wars. /35

A basic intellectual convention in realist paradigmis the distinction between state and civil society: therealist paradigm maintains the distinction between thetwo spheres, with foreign policy appearing beyond thesphere of civil society. The international system is


27/84

21explained in terms of national needs and wants (or"national interests") as articulated by state behaviour.The int ers tat e rel ations remain as the focus ofinternational relations thinking. /3 6 As a consequence, theprincipal international actors are nation sates, with statesystem as the unit of analysis.

In a state system characterized by anarchichierarchy, economic cooperation is facilitated by hegemonicleadership. But why is it so that a hegemonic power tendto support international economic cooperation? Obviously,such a cooperation may serve direct economic interests ofa dominant power, like the maintenance of the freedom ofthe seas. But this is not the whole story. Since, thereare cases where cooperation seems to be rather contraryto the calculation of national self-interests: Take theexample of foreign aid. For those cases we may assume theexistence of a principle of diminishing returns of strictlyinternal efforts. The assumption is clearest in the caseof military cooperation: it holds that there is a definablelevel of domestic military capacity, over which a similarinvestment in the military capacity of an allied countrywould be more efficient (in terms of defence power). Thesame basic principle of "utility function" can be appliedto economic and other non-military cooperation as well. /37

Since the national states are the leadinginternational actors, one can say that the presentinternational system is (more or less) based on structures


28/84

22that are implicit in realism. /3 8 Indeed, the strength ofthe realist pattern of conceptualizing internationalrelations lies in its tendency to legitimatize the existinginternational status quo: as long as power and wealth areregarded as attributes of national entities defined asstates (and by states!), the role of civil societies ininternational relations tends to remain subordinate. As aconsequence, the coexistence of a plurality of forms ofstate/society complexes remains very largely unexplored./39

Thus, it is no wonder that realist paradigm isrelatively strong in explaining the formation of thepolitical framework in cases like the Bretton Woods systemof economic cooperation. Indeed, after the Second WorldWar, and until the late 1960's, the United States'economic, military and political superiority was uncontestable. And her hegemonic leadership, or Pax Americana,can be said to be largely conducive to the formation ofthe leading modern international cooperation organizations./40

However, as regards the cooperation between lesshegemonic powers, like small industrialized countries("the middle powers"), or less developed countries, therealist paradigm has very much lost its charm. Therealists have a tendency to look things merely from asuperpower perspective. /41 When focusing on the role ofthe struggle for power between the superpowers, alliance


29/84

23theory, for example, may provide a promising mode ofexplication for development cooperation. But, because ofthe coexistence of different forms of state/societycomplexes, as appearing in the Third World, the politicaldynamics of development cooperation remains largelyunexplained. Thus, the distinction between the state andcivil society may turn out to be untenable.

Hence, the major critic against the realistparadigm concerns the assumption of national states asunitary actors for understanding international relations.This assumption, which is sometimes called the dominantbilliard ball model, has been said to represent state asa "closed, impermeable and sovereign unit, completelyseparated from all other states." /42 The abolition ofthis basic assumption has led to competing paradigms, oneof which is called here the liberal paradigm ofinternational relations.

2.3. Cooperation and the Liberal Paradigm

The liberal tradition of the political economycan be traced back to the classical liberalism, asrepresented by Adam Smith (1723-1790) and David Ricardo(1772-1823). /43 The first manifestation of liberalism inthe international economic system can be dated from therepeal of the corn laws in 1844 to the trade wars of the1930. However, the modern version of the liberal political


30/84

24economy made its break-through only after the SecondWorld War. /44

The "idealist" international theory of the prewar era was looking for possibilities of transforming thenational state system through international law andorganizations. In the post-war era this tendency has beencontinued in what George Modelsky has called "geocentric"-rather than "ethnocentric" - approach to the international

relations. /45 Closely related to systems theory, theterm interdependence has become to characterize thegrowing complexity of a liberal international economy. /4 6

With the ending of the Cold War, by the earlyseventies, several scholars focusing on interdependencebegan to challenge the basic assumptions of the realistparadigm. /47 Fist, the assumption on the state as theunique actor was challenged by an interest in transnationalactors, notably transnational corporations. Second, thedistinction between domestic and international sphereswas contradicted by a notion of growing interdependenceamong nations, notably through economic transactions. Andfinally, the view of the international relations asstruggle for power and peace was contrasted with an ideaof long-term harmony of interests as prevailing in aliberal international economic order. /48

The basic premise of the liberal paradigm assumesan essential harmony of interests among nations. According


31/84

25to the liberal economic theory, markets will automaticallylead to optimal results through the realization ofcomparative advantages. Therefore, the liberals arecommitted to free markets and minimal state intervention,although the relative emphasis on one or the other maydiffer. The role of state is to protect the market andthe economic liberty by providing services not availablein the private market. Though, in the internationaleconomy, where no formal framework of market protectionexists, the states should cooperate with each other, inorder to form such a framework. /49

In line with the Grotian model, which recognizesthe independence and sovereignty of states, but aims fora superstructure of legal and moral principles that wouldgo ve rn the international rela tio ns, the liberalinternational paradigm seeks for an international economicorder. Such an order is crystallized in the three majorinternational economic organizations, as described byMcKinlay and Little (1986, 9 1 ) :

"The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs(GATT) prescribed a liberal free tradesystem, which was underwritten by theBretton Woods agreements, providing inturn the International Monetary Fund(IMF) that would alleviate balance ofpayments problems such that trade wouldnot be restricted, and the InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development(IBRD) that would provide investmentfinance."

Thus, ideally, the world market economy, or thecapitalist world economy, is a genuine international


32/84

26liberal economic order; i.e. a system of division oflabour and free trade, where the acts by individuals(rather than by governments) constitute the basic factorbetween the units of the system. With the help ofsophisticated methods developed by the modern economics,a relatively accurate description of the existing economicorder can be achieved. Yet, the description is by necessitylimited, because the political aspects are ignored. Or,in other words, the liberal perspective is said to lack averitable political theory of international relations./50 That is why it tends to assume the virtues of theeconomic status quo.

According to the liberal tradition, internationaleconomic institutions are there in order to maintain the"rules of the game", while the game itself should be leftfor market forces. States cooperate essentially becauseof the existence of such tasks that can not be met bymeans of the market. Consequently, the liberal politicaleconomy puts emphasis on the functional role of internationa l cooperation institutions. /51 As such, thetradition is strongest in explaining peaceful cooperationamong industrialized capitalist countries.

As regard the coo per ati on bet wee n theindustrialized "North" and industrializing "South", theliberal approach has emphasized the "partnership" and the"mutual gains" in cooperation. /52 The liberal perspectiveon economic development maintains that the duality (between


33/84

27the "modern" and the "traditional" sectors) of the economyin less devel oped cou ntri es is resp onsi ble forunderdevelopment. Economic development requires the removalof political and social obstacles (prevalent in the"traditional" sector) to the functioning and effectivenessof a market system (of the "modern" sector). Although theorganization of the domestic economy is the most importantfactor affecting economic development, developmentcooperation can help in the diffusion process. Throughdevelopment credits, trade, foreign investment, and aid,the less developed countries would acquire the exportmarkets, capital, and technology required for economicdevelopment. /53

Altogether, according to the liberal approach,economic cooperation with and among developing countrieslies in the very interest of industrialized countries aswell. However, the question over the distribution of thegains remains largely unanswered. Or, the question israther ignored, because of the inherent neglect, in theliberal tradition, of the political framework withinwhich the economic development takes place: i.e. structuresof domination of the poor by the rich. This is the startingpoint of socialist argumentation.


34/84

282.4. Cooperation and the Socialist Paradigm

Like for the other traditions, there are manyvariations among the socialist political economy. Here,by socialist paradigm I mean the theories of politicaleconomy based on the classical works by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). /54 With thisdefinition, two principal socialist traditions can bediscerned; the "scientific", or traditional Marxism, andthe "critical", or neo-Marxism. /55

Beyond the United States, notably in Europe, thesocialist paradigm of international relations has offeredone of the major alternatives to realism. /56 The mainfocus of interest in the socialist paradigm is the studyof structural features of the capitalist world economy.The traditional Marxists emphasize economic imperialismas the primary feature of modern capitalism. /57 For theneo-Marxists, it is the law of uneven development. /58

Like the liberal paradigm, the socialist paradigm,too, rejects all of the three assumptions of the realism.First, based on Marxist conceptions of social classes asthe basic unit of analysis, the state is regarded only asa derivative from the class struggle. /59 Conseguently,the distinction between state and civil society iscontradicted by a notion of transnational class relations.And third, the view of the international relations interms of struggle for power and peace is challenged by a


35/84

29view of the economic laws of the capitalist development.

In the socialist paradigm of internationalrelations, the world is defined essentially in terms ofsocial relations, with the class struggle on nationallevel, the state system at the world level, and the marketstructures mediating between the two. In the capitalism,continued class contradictions on national level, and theuneven development on the world level, are seen to leadto inevitable crises. These crises may be socio-economic,or politico-ideological by nature. /60 Even though thesecrises appear in different levels and in different modes,they are basically due to the same deep contradictionsinherent in the capitalist system. In short, only atransition from the capitalist state of anarchy to asocialist world order could solve these contradictions.

According to the socialist approach, the capitalistworld economy is basically of anarchic nature. /61Moreover, in line with the realist tradition, bothparadigms reject the liberal view of a long-term harmonyof interests in a competitive market economy. But thereis a fundamental difference between the realist and thesocialist approach to international relations: while theformer applies a cyclical view of the state system (withrising and declining hegemonies), the latter prefers adialectical view of the world system as developing towardsa socialist world order.


36/84

30International cooperation is explained in the

socialist paradigm in terms of historical structures.Cooperation under an imperial state system - be it a PaxBritannica or a Pax Americana - is a mechanism of imperialpower structure. In the absence of clear norms, the powerst ru ct ur e see ks "to maintain consensus throughbargaining... (where) the bargaining units (are) fragmentsof states." /62 Such a cooperation tends to ignore theinterests of the dominated classes. Only through acooperation based on equal relations, basically reflectingthe social forces beyond state structures, could theinterests of the "people" be realized. /63 In this manner,the socialist perspective on international relations isbased on the idea of the sovereignty of people. Yet, thesocialist paradigm has largely ignored the role ofpolitical and strategic factors in the formation ofnational policies. That is why the relation between thenational interest, on one hand, and the social (class)interests, on the other, has often remained unclear.

In the field of the North-South relations, thesocialist paradigm has strongly influenced to the analysisof dependent relationships, as appearing between theindustrial centre and the underdeveloped peripheries. Thedependency ("dependencia") is originally based on colonialstructures of direct dominance, but it continues to existwithin the neo-colonial system of division of labour. /64Like the liberal perspective on economic development, thedependence perspective, too, maintains dualist structures


37/84

31in peripheral economies. But, here the outward oriented"modern" export sector is seen to be responsible foreconomic dependence, and, thus, for underdevelopment. Or,the question is not "How to diffuse the development?",but "How to counteract unequal dependent relationships?".

In a neo-colonial system, the role of developmentcooperation is to support the existing power structuresby maintaining the consensus with governing elites inperipheral countries. In this manner, developmentcooperation is not distinct from other modes of economicdomination, like the credits ("the debt trap"), trade("the unequal exchange"), or foreign investment ("themultinational corporation"); in short, an instrument ofimperialism.

There are a number of alternatives to imperialcooperation, though not necessarily mutually compatible,as proposed by various socialist theories: a) cooperationwith the socialist countries (the "East-South" option),b) cooperation between developing countries (the "South-South" option), and c) autonomous, "self-reliant"development (the "Chinese" option). The common aim is,however, to detach a dependent economy from the capitalistworld economy (the de-linking option), or, at least, tooffer a substitute to dependent relationship. Yet, inthe final analysis, the model for such a "non-hegemonic",or socialist international cooperation, remains to bedeveloped. This is, partially, due to the failure of the


38/84

32socialist paradigm to appreciate the role of nationalpolitical factors in the international relations.

* * *

All in all, these three paradigms are based onmutually exclusive premises, or on different ideasregarding the international system, and the role ofprincipal actors within it, and, consequently, differentkind of dynamics of international cooperation among theactors. These premises are, in turn, deduced fromphilosophical paradigms that are different from eachother in terms of normative assumptions concerning thecharacter of international system as a social system. /65

However, whatever our ideas on the moderninternational system are, we are constantly confrontedwith new phenomena which claim explanation, orqualification of our theories and models. This is soespecially during the periods of international crisis,when the structural features of the system tend to beilluminated in a flash like manner.

In the following, we shall have a look at thepresent structural changes in the world economy, and atthe accompanying challenges that these changes pose tothe three paradigms. At the same time, we will shift thefocus to the international context of developmentcooperation, and to the related level of analysis.


39/84

33III. COOPERATION WITHIN CHANGING WORLD STRUCTURES

3.1. Introduction

The recent development of the international systemhas been strongly influenced by the world economic crisissince the beginning of the 1970's. The crisis evolved inphases, starting with a staggering of the internationalmonetary system, followed by the so called "energy crisis",and, finally, by a stagflationary development in theindustrial economies and a simultaneous debt crisis inthe Third World. Although not necessarily revealing theroot causes of the world economic dynamics, thesecoincidences are, however, symptoms of deep structuralchanges in the international system. In spite of theeconomic recovery during the last years, the crisis inthe world economy - now removed and reborn in the ThirdWorld - is a manifestation of political, institutionaland ideological crises in the framework for internationalcooperation.

At the beginning of the crisis, the economicproblems, as analyzed by intern ationa l eco nomi corganizations, were regarded to stem from a "normal"variation in the world economy and, thus, to be an issuefor conjuncture policies. It was only after a deep economic depression that conclusions of the reasons andeffects of the crisis were drawn. Although the reportspublished so far may be different in the scope and bias,


40/84

34they all agree on one thing: neither external shocks(like the "energy crisis"), nor mistakes in economicpolicies, could alone explain this crisis. /66 Instead,the crisis in the world economy should be seen in termsof structural changes in the international system.

The world economic depression, accompanied by anew wave of economic nationalism, has resulted a stalematein the global North-South negotiations. The ParisConference in 1975, was perhaps the last serious attemptto revitalize the development dialogue on a global level./67 Ever since, the North-South dialogue on a new economicorder has practically ceased. The crisis of the globaldevelopment policies emphasizes the need to look for newapproaches to international cooperation.

In fact, the crises in "reality" have brought upcrises in the theorizing of international relations andpolitical economy as well. Three structural problemsclaiming for reconceptualizing of the theories of international cooperation can be stated: The first problemconcerns the political framework for cooperation, or thechanging relation between the world market economy andthe state system. The second structural problem relates tothe institutional framework charged to intermediate betweenthe two. And the third structural problem is connected tothe contradictions between them, and the related patternsof development in the modern world system.


41/84

353.1. Cooperation After Hegemony

It has often been claimed that the present economiccrisis has a number of structural features common withthe economic crisis in the 1930's. /68 Then, too, arelatively cooperative international regime was challengedby economic crisis. The prosperous Pax Britannica, or "ahundred years' peace", came to an end with a world economicdepression, accompanied by a relative decline of theBritish economy. /69 Likewise, the economic decline ofthe dominant power, the United States, has underminedthe hegemonic stability of the post-war state system,thus challenging a basic political condition forcooperation, as presumed by the realist paradigm.

The task of explaining the role of hegemonicstate system in a liberal world economy has been set bythe theory of hegemonic stability. /70 The theory aims tointerpret the rise and operation of the moderninternational economy in terms of successive liberaldominant powers. The theory is said to be "closely butnot entirely associated with the political realism". /71

The essence of the theory of hegemonic stabilityis as following:

"hegemonic structures of power, dominatedby a single country, are most conduciveto the development of strong internationalregimes whose rules are relatively preciseand well obeyed. . . .the decline of hegemonicstructures of power can be expected topresage a decline in the strength ofcorresponding international economic


42/84

36regimes". /72

If the function of the state system can be analyzedin terms of hegemonic structures, what, then, could explainthe mechanisms of hegemonic rise and decline? A goodexample of explaining the economic factors behind hegemoniccycles is provided by the idea of long-term variation ofeconomic growth, or the "Kondratieff" cycles. /7 3 While aregularized, systemic and cyclical pattern of long-termmarket variation may be difficult to prove, the fact isthat the modern world economy has undergone Kondratiefftype of expansion and contraction about every fifty years.Moreover, there is a strong evidence that the marketcycles and the hegemonic cycles do interline in long-termhistorical patterns. /74

Altogether, the lesson to be drawn from the theoryof hegemonic stability is that, even in the most favorablepolitical environment for cooperation, the internationalmarket tends to operate according to a logic of its own./75 This is, for certain, nothing new for the liberalparadigm, or for the socialist paradigm, both focusing onthe economic factors of political economy. But thehegemonic stability theory's focus on the logic of thecompetitive state system, or the idea of the rise anddecline of the hegemon, sets forth the changing political conditions to the existence of an international marketeconomy. Hence, there seem to be two patterns, or logic,the market and the state system, both of which set condi-


43/84

37tions for economic cooperation. But how do they relatewith each other? That is a question related to the changinginstitutional framework for cooperation.

3.2. Cooperation After Institutionalism

Another structural change, revealed by the worldeconomic crisis, relates to the changing institutionalframework between the international market and the nationaleconomy. While the Bretton Woods system did not collapsealtogether, the demise of the world monetary order haslargely increased fears of increasing economic nationalism.The underlying tension between global market, on onehand, and domestic economies based on state intervention,on the other, poses a major challenge to the liberalparadigm. /76

In the realm of the North-South relations, demandsfor a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and thetendency towards cartel actions by the Third World producercountries have posed similar challenges to the liberalparadigm. /77 While the NIEO has, so far, shown littleprogress, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC), has been relatively successful in its attempts tomanipulate world markets. With the "energy crisis", in1974, and the "second energy crisis", in 1979, the energyissue emerged as a special topic in international economiccooperation. /78


44/84

38

The energy question is an example par excellenceof an international issue area where cooperation can befruitfully explained in terms set by the special natureof the issue area itself. Largely based on the notion ofinterdependence, the theory of issue politics has offereda model for cooperation in an international environmentcharacterized by "complex interdependence". /79

Typical to the issue areas is that power is notnecessarily transitive among them. Thus, power gained inone issue area, say for example the military strength,can prove out to be useless in another area, for examplein economic issues. Accordingly, the focus will turn fromthe realist notion of "power resources" to "powerrelations". /80

In order to manage issue areas characterized bycomplex interdependence, international actors tend tocreate and promote regimes. Regimes are defined as "setsof implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules andde ci si on -m ak in g procedures around which actors'expectations converge in a given area of internationalrelation." /81 As such, the notion of regime tends tooff er a conceptual level mediati ng between theinternational power structure and interdependencies ofpolitical economy. The regimes are bound to issue areas,thus reflecting the prevalent power structure in an issuearea, independently from the general world division of


45/84

39power. /82

The theory of transnational issue areas, or theregime theory, has evolved from the critics of realismamong the liberal paradigm. /83 The major contribution ofthe regime approach to the theory of cooperation is perhapsin the very notion of regime conceived as "changing thecontext within which the states make decisions." /84Thus, instead of a mechanistic focus on internationalinstitutions and legally binding transnational norms, thestudy of cooperation should examine the historicallyevolving regimes that affect the calculations and theoptions of the cooperating actors.

3.3. Cooperation After Imperialism

The international regimes created in the earlypost-war period separated the domestic from theinternational realm of policy making. The post-war economicpolicies rested on the Keynesian ideas of economicstimulation in the sphere of a closed economic system("the national economy"). /85 Today, however, the onlyclosed economic system in the world is the world economicsystem based on the global division of labour and on theglobal market. Yet, the lack of a total coincidence betweenthe economic processes and the state boundaries causescontradictions: The basic ideological contradiction arisesfrom the continuous global economic integration into a


46/84

40single world economic system through the intervention ofnational states. /86

A basic intellectual convention in internationalrelations has been the distinction between state andcivil society. /87 One of the most radical alternative toconventional international relations theory has beenoffered by the world-system analysis. Inspired by Frenchhistorian, Fernand Braudel's studies of the Sixteenth andSeventeenth centuries, Immanuel Wallerstein has proposeda theory of world-systems defined essentially in terms ofsocial relations. /88

The theory of world-systems is an attempt toextend Marxist analysis of capitalist development toinclude the world market, the state system and classstruggle at the world level. The theory suggest thatcapitalist development takes place unevenly, not onlycreating the gap between "core" and "periphery", butalso tending to concentrate productive advantage amongthe core states. The dynamics of development, as impliedby the world-system analysis, allows the existence ofqualitatively different kinds of core-periphery relations./89

Further, it is suggested that, in order to analysethe core-periphery relations, it is necessary to describethe structure of the world-system as a whole. Three majordevelopments that characterize the world-system structure


47/84

are found to be 1) expansion and integration of thecapitalist world-economy; 2) expansion and consolidationof the state system; and 3) subsequent changes in classrelations that progressively organize the world economy,as well as intra- and interstate politics. /90

Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of world-system isa reinterpretation of development of capitalist worldeconomy, inspired by dependency theory. /91 Whereas thelatter implies the coexistence of different modes ofproduction ("core" capitalism vs. "periphery" capitalism)linked together, the world-system is a single system ofdivision of labour in which production is for exchange,ie. a capitalist world mode of production. The emergenceof the capitalist world-economy is traced back to thecollapse of European feudalism in the "long sixteenthcentury":

In the late fifteenth and early sixteenthcenturies there came into existence whatwe may call a European world-economy. Itwas not an empire yet it was as spaciousas a grand empire and shared some featureswith it. But it was different, and new.It was a kind of social system the worldhas not really known before and which isthe distinctive feature of the modernworld-system. It is an economic but not apolitical entity, unlike empires, city-states and nation-states... It was a'world-economy' because the basic linkagebetween the parts of the system iseconomic, although this was reinforced tosome extent by cultural links andeventually..., by political arrangementsand even confederal structures. /92

Wallerstein distinguishes between world-empires


48/84

42and world-economies. The former is a socioeconomic systemin which the economic division of labour is incorporatedwithin a single overarching state apparatus. The world-economy is an economic division of labour which is overlaidby a multicentric system of states. Peculiar to Europeandevelopment is the formation of a world-economy which hasbeen capable to restrain attempts to impose a world-empireon the world-economy. /93 From the beginning, thecapitalist world-economy has been expansive and imperialistic. The early expansion of the capitalist world-economytook place in Europe, where a hierarchical division oflabour was constituted between an industrializing northernAtlantic coast, a semi-agrarian Mediterranean South and anagrarian East Europe.

In different sectors of the world-system, differentforms of labour control, and, hence, different kind oftechnology is dominant. Core areas are those whereproduction is capital-intensive and uses skilled, high-wage labour. Production in peripheral areas is labour-intensive and utilizes coercion. Semi-peripheral areasare those which include a balance of core and peripheraltypes of production.

In the course of technological change, productionmay change its character, from a typical core productionto a peripheral one. Cotton textile production, a leadingcore industry of the early nineteenth century, has becomea peripheral industry in the twentieth century relative


49/84

43to the much higher levels of capital intensity and skilledlabour employed in the contemporary core industries.Similarly, the position of particular countries withinthe system, may change, too, while the system as a wholehas expanded with the time. Portugal, once the leadingIcore country, has become peripheral in relation toEngland, whereas the United States, once a peripheralarea, has replaced England as the leading core country. /94

Changing positions of countries within the world-system is, in turn, a central factor in explainingvariations in the state power. The core countries bothrequire and have the resources necessary to finance morepowerful states. In the semi-peripheral areas, too, statepower plays an active role. But in the peripheral areas,state structures tend to be weak both in relation to thecore areas, and to the civil society. /95

Altogether], the central thesis in the world-systemanalysis implies that "political structures do not contain'economies'; quite the contrary: the 'world economy'co nt ai ns po li ti ca l structures, or states." /96Consequently, any cooperative effort between the statesis bound to follow the laws of the capitalist world-economy: "Even if every nation in the world were to permitonly state ownership of the means of production, the world-system would still be a capitalist system". /97 A deviationfrom the traditional Marxist view, the capitalism isequated by Wallerstein with a "trade-based division of


50/84

44labour". /98 In an international system thus defined, thepower of states derives from the role they play in theworld-system. And, since the capitalist world-systemcreates inequality by definition, cooperation between thecore and peripheral areas is necessarily imperialist byits character.

The major contribution of the world-system analysisto the theory of international cooperation is in that itprovides systemic variables (world 'system'), and therole variables ('core', 'semi-periphery', and 'periphery')for an analysis of different nations occupying a similarrole in evolving stages of the world-system. /99 Thisprovides a more dynamic view to the context of development cooperation than the dualist visions as provided bythe power politics (the bipolar "East-West" balance ofpower), or by the conventional development theories("modern" vs. "traditional" sector; or industrialized vs.developing countries).

* * *

As a conclusion, a dynamic view to the changingworld structures seems to offer tools richer than thoseas used in the traditional static models for analyzinginternational cooperation. An effort for a dynamic modelof development cooperation, and the related analyticaltools and methods, will be discussed in the followingconcluding section.


51/84

45IV TOWARDS A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The focus of this paper has been on the problematicof international cooperation. As stated in theIntroduction, this problematic includes, first of all,the definition of cooperation. Here, cooperation has beendefined in terms of social relations, or as the interactionbetween social actors allowing them to achieve voluntarily-set common goals by sharing certain resources together.Thus, unlike aid, cooperation does not necessarily involveany transfer of resources between the partners. Whetherthis general definition can be applied to the international level as well, depends on our ideas of the international system as distinct from other social systems. Thisquestion has led us into the sphere of the politicalphilosophy of international relations.

4.1 Criteria for Cooperation

When thinking about the "normative - positiveaxis" of the theorizing in international relations,basically three lines of thought can be discerned. On thepositive side, the realist Machiavellian-Hobbesiantradition insists on the qualitative difference betweenthe domestic and the international spheres, the latterlacking any virtual authority to set up and maintainnorms in the gloomy world of ours. Hence, the primarycriteria for international cooperation would be the


52/84

46requirements set by the rational calculation of nationalinterests in maintaining peace and order. On the contrary, the normative traditions claim that the distinctionbetween the two spheres is basically a misconception (theGrotian tradition), or that it is subject to change throughsocial developments (the Althusian line of thought).Consequently, the criteria for cooperation, as offeredby these traditions, are the requirements set by efficientfunctioning of regulative international institutions, onone hand, and those set by the social character of humanlife, on the other.

Un til afte r Wor ld War I, the positiveMachiavellian-Hobbesian paradigm dominated the theorizingin international relations. Since then, the internationalsystem has drastically changed, notably through a growingstate-system within an expanding world economy. Any socialsystem, even a global one, needs rules and norms, or anorder, for its maintenance. Hence the quest for a theoryof international cooperation.

This quest has been echoed, in turn, by thepolitical economy, which deals basically with theinteraction between the state and the market. The threeleading paradigms of the modern political economy are thepolitical realism, the liberal institutionalism, and thesocialist internationalism. Out of these, the realism hasbeen claimed to share the "positive" tradition of international relations, by rejecting any other universal criteria


53/84

47for cooperation than the rational calculation of competingnational self-interests, and the preservation of thesystem itself. The liberal institutionalism regardseconomic growth as a common value, and looks for efficient international rules and institutions to support coop er at io n among nations. For the socialist internationalism, the basic value to be pursued by the cooperation is social justice, thus calling for means ofinternational equality through the cooperative efforts.

With these criteria in mind, the paradigms havesought to explain the dynamics of development cooperation.As stated in the Introduction, the choice of adequatestrategies of explanation can be related, first, to thequestion over the relevant actors, and to the adequatestructural conditions that are likely to lead tocooperative efforts. Second, the corresponding levels ofanalysis can be logically deduced from the latter.

4.2. Actors of and Structural Conditions for Cooperation

Starting with the actors, there are basically threecategories of international actors: national states,international organizations, and transnational "nongovernmental" actors, notably the private multinationalenterprises. When thinking about the formation of themodern development cooperation, the role of the leadinghegemonic country has been uncontestable, indeed. From


54/84

48the Marshall Plan period (1948-52), and until the 1960's,the United States set goals, and provided resources fordevelopment cooperation more than any other singleinternational actor. /100 By means of hegemonic cooperation, the political stability could be guaranteed inWestern Europe, and a new international economic orderwere established.

Yet, since the late 1960's, the changing economicconditions have undermined the international status quo,to the extent that the hegemonic stability has partiallylost its economic basis. Meanwhile, the leading role indevelopment cooperation has been adopted by the smallerpowers, the international organizations, and the privatebusiness.

Two considerations stand out: First, the "European"national state is the historical outcome of a uniquestate building process. /101 In spite of the very factthat the colonial dependence makes the European nationalstate a matter of crucial relevance to the social andpolitical experience in the Third World, the states doplay different roles in different societies. Consequently, the fundamental distinction, as kept by the realistparadigm, between the state and civil society may turnout to be untenable, at least as far the development cooperation is concerned.

Second, a major part of the modern international


55/84

49economic cooperation is realized by the private business,notably the multinational corporations. /102 The privateforeign sector plays a significant role in the developmentcooperation as well. /103 Hence, as a level of analysis,the state system alone does not seem to provide a sufficient context for explaining the dynamics of the moderndevelopment cooperation.

Altogether, the process of widening capitalizationof Third World societies seems to characterize the moderninternational cooperation with and among developingcountries. A basically liberal solution, the multilateraldevelopment financing organizations have sought to createand manage an efficient international order capable tosupport this trend. Since the 1960's, the Bretton Woodsinstitutions have played an increasing role in developmentcooperation, both in terms of goal setting and ofresources provided.

However, with the world economic depression sincethe early 1970 's, and with the collapse of the worldmonetary order, the political base of the liberal orderhas begun to falter. The call for a New InternationalEconomic Order (NIEO), accompanied by a strong cartelaction by the petroleum exporting countries (OPEC), hasrevealed a fundamental political disapproval, as existingamong the Third World countries, with the Bretton Woodssystem. As regards the industrialized countries, anincreasing economic nationalism tends to further undermine


56/84

50the attempts to strengthen the global multilateral economicinstitutions. Altogether, there seems to be an increasinggap between the political expectations, on one hand, andthe solutions given by the multilateral institutionalism,on the other.

Among the liberal paradigm, the theory oftransnational issue areas, or the regime theory, hassought to explain this changing structural environment ofcooperation in terms of historically evolving regimes.Instead of a mec han ist ic focus on internationalinstitutions (the system level), or on legally bindingtransnational norms (the national level), the regimeanalysis focuses on the interaction as the level ofanalysis for explaining conditions for cooperation. Themajor contribution of this approach is in the way itreintroduces the political dynamics into the liberaltheory of cooperation.

So far so good. The functioning of the moderninternational system is conditioned by a hegemonic statesystem and an increasingly internationalizing worldeconomy, both of which rise up issue areas of transnationalimportance leading towards cooperative regimes among theactors involved. But why is it that certain issue areasare likely to lead into cooperative efforts, while othersare not? Or, in other words, what makes an issue area tobe classified as "global"? And to what extent is itindependent from the relations between the actors involved?


57/84

51

With the concentration of the major internationaleconomic actors, both public and private, among theindustrialized countries, the developing countries arebound to be more dependent on the industrialized countries,than inversely. The most prominent tradition of thoughtexplaining the terms of cooperation in the conditions ofasymmetric dependency is the socialist paradigm. Accordingto the socialist approach, the state system, as well asthe market system, are in the first place functions ofsocial relations. Consequently, the dynamics of developmentcooperation is conditioned by the interests of thegoverning elites in dependent societies, since these veryelites are more dependent on foreign economic relations,than their counterpart in less dependent countries. Inaddition to the logic of the Prince, and to the logic ofthe market, there is the logic of social forces on nationaland international level, all of which are likely to setconditions to the development cooperation.

Although more nationalist than socialist bycharacter, the calls for a New International EconomicOrder, and for increased South-South cooperation, can beseen as attempts to formulate an international orderbased on the idea of a more equal distribution of wealthand power among nations. With the collapse of the NIEO,and much of the cooperative efforts towards a collectiveself-reliance, alternatives to the conventional ways ofdevelopment cooperation are rather scarce. Moreover, due


58/84

52to the present economic crisis in the socialist industrialized countries, the capacity of these countries to offerany sort of alternative mode of cooperation is ratherlimited.

Indeed, the geography of international economiccooperation is far from a state of equilibrium: Not onlythe locus of international economic relations is to befound in the intra-Western sphere, but also the majorinternational economic cooperation units, both privateand public organizations, are of "Western" origin. /104Thus, while the major political actors of internationaldevelopment cooperation can be divided among the linebetween the "North" and the "South", the majorinternational economic actors, but for a few exceptions,are Western. Hence the challenge to the socialist theoryof political economy: Why is there so few economiccooperation among the developing countries?

A response, given by the world-system analysis,is that any cooperative effort between the states isbound to follow the structural conditions of the capitalistworld-economy. The dialectical development of thecapitalist world-economy generates both a differentiationbetween, and a cohesion among the countries within it.The cohesion can be expected to be highest among thegroup of countries which is on its way up to the top,i.e. emerging industrializing countries. Consequently, thepotential gains from the cooperation are highest among


59/84

53them.

Thus, the adequate level of analysis being theentire capitalist world-economy, the focus is put, first,on the systemic variables, notably on the long-termvariation of economic growth. These, in turn, setconditions to the changes in the state-system, defined interms of role variables. The latter consist of the core(industrialized "West"), the semi-periphery (semi-industrialized "East"), and the periphery (industrializing"South"). Among these areas, cohesion has been strongestin the core, while the periphery is undergoing adi ff eren ti at io n. Cooperation in a situation ofdifferentiation would be an "anti-systemic" movement.

All in all, the key to the dynamics of developmentcooperation seems to lie in the very nature of theinternational system as a succession of the inequalitiesamong nations. Depending on our conception of the world,the key opens gates to different routes, which do notnecessarily intersect with each other. (See Figure 2.below.) Only fundamental changes in the internationalsystem, like the new factors of power, are likely totransform the sources of inequality, thus calling forredefinitions in our conceptions of the world, and in ourparadigms. An attempt is made in the following.


60/84

54Figure 2. Scheme for Paradigms


61/84

554.3 Towards a new synthesis?

The case of the world mineral resources providesan example of such a new factor of power in the currentinternational system. That is why I will have a shortlook at the criteria for development cooperation in thecase of the global mineral problematic.

To start with, it is only rational to claim thatno international cooperation is likely to emerge unlessthe vital nation al interests are taken into theconsideration. The control over the national mineralwealth, on one hand, and the secured access to the rawmaterials, on the other, would be the primary criteriafor cooperation between mineral producing and consumingcountries. Yet, the growing interdependence among nationstends to rise new issues of global concern, like themaintenance of a stable economic growth, or the depletionof world mineral reserves. These issues would call for acooperation in creating efficient rules and institutionfor a global mineral regime. And still, as long as theprincipal causes of such "global" problems are concentratedin a small number of rich industrialized countries, callsfor global cooperative efforts can hardly offer a solidbasis for a more equal international order.

The control over the national mineral wealth, onone hand, and the secured access to the raw materials, onthe other, would be the primary criteria for cooperation


62/84

56between mineral producing and consuming countries. Yet,the growing interdependence among nations tends to risenew issues of global concern, like the maintenance of astable economic growth, or the depletion of world mineralreserves. These issues would call for a cooperation increating efficient rules and institution for a globalmineral regime. And still, as long as the principal causesof such "global" problems are concentrated in a smallnumber of rich industrialized countries, calls for globalcooperative efforts can hardly offer a solid basis for amore equal international order.

In sh or t, we ha ve he re thr ee criteria(rationality, efficiency, and equality) for cooperation,some of which can come into conflict with another. Whatmay be rational, say, from a national perspective, may beirrational from the global perspective. And an efficientsolution to a global problem may turn out to be highlyunequal, and so on. In the final analysis, it is apolitical question as to which criteria are preferred. Andconsequently, our first task would be to analyze how theglobal problems are set, and who has the power to imposethe goals for common efforts. A comparative study of theinternational reports on mineral issues, as publishedduring the last decades, might provide some indicativeknowledge on the general lines of thought.

Second, there is the question over the actors andstructures. Here it is assumed that the idea of a global


63/84

57community with identifiable interests of its own is amyth. Only actors can make politics, even if they do itwithin historically evolving structures. This assumptioncalls for a synthesis between structuralist and actor-oriented perspectives.

The formation of international cooperative regimesin the mineral sector is of our primary interest. Oncethe process of generation of an issue area has beendescribed, the historical experiences of respective regimescan be analyzed. This can be done by examining first thestructural conditions for cooperation: the long-termvariation of economic growth and the related changes intransnational relations (flows of trade, finances etc.).Second, with the help of appropriate role variables (corevs. peripheries), the actors can be analyzed within thecontext of a historically evolving state system.

Finally, the effects of cooperation on thedevelopment options available to developing countries isof a special importance. These options can be related,first, with the development strategies set by the statesmachineries, which, in turn, are function of the socialforces within the countries concerned. Second, the effectsof different regimes of cooperation on the developmentoptions can be analyzed, as presented in the Figure 3.below.


64/84

58

Figure 3. A Model for Analyzing International Cooperation

1. level of analysis (global):Resource power Power to imposecommon goals Generation ofcommon goals

2. level of analysis (transnational):Long-term Role variablesvariation of in the stateeconomic growth system

Regimes ofCooperation

3. level of analysis (national):Social struggle Development

StrategiesDevelopmentOptionsAvailable


65/84

59NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 G. Adler-Karlsson: The Political Economy of East-West-South Co-operation. Wiener Institut furInternationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche: Studienuber Wirtschafts- und Systemvergleiche, Band 7.(Wien & New York: Springer-Verlag, 1976), p. 15.2 The definitions are from Margaret Mead: "Introduction". In Mead (ed.): Cooperation andcompetition among primitive people. (Boston:Beacon Press, 1961), p. 16. The word cooperation

stems from latin (cooperari = "work together").3 Robert Nisbet: "Cooperation". In David L. Sills(ed.): International Encyclopedia of the SocialSciences, vol 3; (The Macmillan Company and TheFree Press, 1968), p. 390. -Besides cooperationand competition, there is a third category ofgoal -ori ente d act ion , whic h can be calledindividualistic action, or an action towardsdefinite goals without reference to others. SeeMead, op.cit. (2) .4 Mead (1961); op.cit. (2) .5 Cf. the definition given by Theodorson andTheodorson: cooperation is "social interaction inwhich individuals or groups engage in joint actionto achieve a common goal." Theodorson A. &Theodorson A.S.: A Modern Dictionary of Sociol

ogy. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969) ,pp. 78-79.6 The aid agencies, and politicians, of course, dousually mix these terms, for obvious politicalreasons, and that is all right. But the researchcommunity should not do the same; at least, oneshould be conscious of the basic difference betweencooperation and aid.7 Cf. Jean Touscoz: "Introduction". In J. Touscoz(ed.): Les contrats internationaux de cooperationindustrielle et le nouvel ordre economique international. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France,1981), p. 17.

This definition focuses on indirect cooperation,which is based on the performance of unlikeactivities that complement each other and togetherachieve a common goal. As such, the cooperationinvolves a division of labour and performance ofspecialized tasks. - In direct cooperation, theperformance of like activities are carried outside by side because the actors want to do them


66/84

60together, even though they could be done individually. Picking berries would be an idealexample. See Theodorson and Theodorson, op. cit.(5).

8 As Hugon points out, the non-commercial aspectsof social relations have largely been ignored inthe literature on international cooperation,based mainly on historically and geographicallylimited experiences. Philippe Hugon: "La cooperation Internationale". Annuaire du TiersMonde V (1978-1979); (Paris: Berger-Levrault,1979), p. 535.9 The Greek historian, Thukydides (460/455-396

B.C), who was the pioneer of the theory of balanceof power, represents this view in his classicalwork The Peleponnesian War. See especiallydiscussion in Book 5, paragraphs 89-112.10 In Sophocles's play, Antigone turns on a disputebetween King Creon, who expounds the view todayknown as legal positivism. Creon claims that thelaw is the voice of the sovereign, and must beobeyed; Antigone, representing the idea of a

Natural Law, insists that the positive law isnot valid if contrary to the 'edicts of heaven',or if it denies the fundamental rights of man.See especially 2nd. episode, paragraphs 384-469.11 Based largely on Greek, Roman, and Arabicphilosophies, Aquinas reintroduced the criterionof justice into international relations. SeeMaurice Cranston: "Aquinas", in M. Cranston (ed.):Western Political Philosophers. (London: TheBodley Head, 1964).12 In the Muslim philosophy, the religious laws canbe seen to play a similar role, as described byArab scholar Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) in TheMuqaddimah. An Introduction to History. (Originallywritten in 1377; revised and translated ed.,Princeton University Press, 1974), see esp. p.154ff.13 The term "international" was introduced only atthe end of the 18. century by Jeremy Bentham(1748-1832

Documents

Political Theories of Development Cooperation