Prelude to Chickamauga.pdf

7/27/2019 Prelude to Chickamauga.pdf

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A thesis presented l o h e Facult! o f the C.S. ArrnyCommand and Ciencral Staff Collcgc in parlial

fullillmcnt of thc requirctnents li)r thedcgree

M A S T E R 01: M I I . I ' I ' A l lY A R T ANL) S('I I :NCl:

hM A R K A . S A M S O N . M AJ ; U SA13.A.: I!nivcrsity ofAri7cma. Tucson. Arizona. 1984

Iort Leaven\rorth. Kansas1997

Approved li)r public rclcasr: distribulion is unlimited.


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REPORT D.OCUMENTATlON PAGE Fwm Approved1 OMBNo 0704-0188- . .. - . -.I. AGENCY U SE ONLY (LeeveblankJ 2. REPORTDATE ' 3 . REPO RTWP E AND DATESCOVERED7 June 1997 :Master's Thesis. 4 Aug 96 - 7 June 97-- - -.-.-........ . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .- . . . .I.TITLEAND SUBTilLE ' 5 FUNDINGNUMBERSlppon unite s Lost: Prelude t o Chickamauga

. . . . . . .. . . . . .- ............ -.i. AUTHOR(S)dajo r Ma rk A Samson, U S Army... . -. .. PERFORMlNGORGANIZATIOWAME(S)AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMINGORGANIZATREPORTNUMBERJ.S A m y Command and General Sta ff CollegeLTTN ATZL-SW D-GD'on Leavenw onh Kansas 66027 - 13.52

.. - .- -. ................ . . . . . . . . . . ..... -. SPONSORING1 MONITORINGAGENCY NAME(S) ANDADDR ESS(ES ) 10. SPONSORING1 MONITORIAGENCYREPORTNUMBE

. .- . . -- .-. -. -I. UPPLEMENTARYNOTES

..-- - ... - .. -- .......?a.DISTRIBUTION AVAILABIUWSTATEMEN Tpproved for p ublic release: distr ibutio n is unlimited

..-- ..... - - - . . -- .- ..I.ABSTRACT (Max,mum200rwrds)his the m investigates the history o f he Confedelate Army of T e ~ e s w erom formation under command o f Braytoroug h the eve o f the battle o f Chickamauga. The specific question t o be answered is whether the .Armv of Tennessee~po nun itie s o destroy the Union Arm y o f he Cumberland before the battle o f Chickamauga. and if so why they werken advantageof Answe ring this queslion requires an examination o f the histon. o f the Arm y of Tennessee prior to:ptember 1863. w ith emphasis on Brags's persona lity and abilitiesi is thesis provides a basic overview o f the actions o f he r h y f Tennessee prior to Chickamauga. discusses commoblems that developed between Hragg and many o f his'imp onan t generals. and assesses ho w those problems conrnhe battlefield results

...-. . . .. ............. -- . -. .-SUBJECTTERMS . 15. NUMBEROF PAGEanion Bra=, Pe rr y~ ll e.Murfreesboro. liardec. Polk. McLemore's Cove 9 i. . . . . . .16. PRICE CODESECURlWCLASSlFlCATlON 18. SECURlNCLASSlFlCATlON 19. SECURlTYCLASSlFlCATlON 20 LIMITATIONOF ABSOF REPORT . OF THISPAGE OFABSTRACTUNCIASSIFIED CUCL.;\SSIFIED UNCI:\SSIFIED IJNCL;\SSIFIE


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MASTER 01: MILITARY ART A N D SCIENCETIIE SIS API'ROVAI. PAGE

Name c Major Mark A. SamsonThesis Title: Opportunities I.ost: Prelude to Ch ic ka ma uy

Approved by:

Accepted this 6th day o f June 1907 b?:

Philip J. Brookes. PI1.D.

Thesis Committee

Membcr

Chairman

, Director, Graduate DegreePrograms

I'hc opinions and conclusions expressed herein arc those o f the student author and d o notnecessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Com mand and General Staff College or any otherGovernment agencq. (Rck renc es to this study should include the foregoing statement.)


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O P P O R f l J N l ' f I I ~ SLOST: PRELLD t T O ( :H I CK A M A lX A b! MAJ M ar k A. Samson.I ISA. 86 pages

This .;tud) investieatcs the history o f the C:onkderatc Arm y o f ' l cnnessec from formution undercommand o f Uraxton Hragg through the cve ofC:liicknmauga. 'l h c specitic qucstion to heanswered i s whcthcr the Arm! of Tcnnesscc wa, presented opportun ities to de,tro) the lln io trArmy of the Cumbcrland p rio r to C'hickamaupn. and i f so why they wcre not taken ad\antage ol:Anrw cring this question requires an examination o f the history o f the Arm y ot'Tenncssec prior toSeptenibcr 1863. with cnrphasis on Hrax~on


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TAB1.t. Ot COKTF.XTS&igc

APPKOVAI.PAGE ................................................................................................................ ii.... ..ARSTKAC I ......................................................................................................................... 11 1

CIIAPTEKPREI'ACE ......................................................................................................................... 1I TI IE ROAD 'I0 CI IATTANOOGA ...................................................................... 32. BRAG( IN COMMAND ........................................ ... 16

..................... JUNE - SEYIEMI3I!K 1863 .... 414 . OI'PORTIJYI'I'IES I.OST .................... 635 . CONCLIJSIONS ..................................................................................................... 86

RIl3I.IOGKAI'HY .............................................................. 94INITIAI I)ISTRIBl!'I'ION l.lST ......................................................................................... 97

I.IS1 OF FIGUKI:SI-IGIJRE

I THE WKSTERN THEA'I'CR ................................................................................... 362. MII)I)I.ETLNNI.SSI~I. ............................................................................................ 593. 'I'lIK; CI-IAT~I~ANOOCiAREA 82


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In the summer 01' 186.3 tllc Co nlic de rnc bras ree ling lio n1 the lash o f Vickshurg and t l icdeleat at Ciettyshurg. Confederate President [)a\ is decided that the bc5t rema ining hope for a~n i l i tar y o lut ion to the war lay u i t h General D ra x to ~ ~3raggas Arm! o f the Icnn o>c c and sentCimeral B rag g reinforcemcnts from the Arm! o f Northern Virgin ia in hopes ofc nsu ring a muchnecdcd victory . The Arm ) o f'Tenncsscc was based in Chattanooga. l'cnncssee. a principalsouthcrn rai l huh and r l ~ c atena! IO A l l a ~ ~ t a .acing tl~ cn i cross t ltc I nnesscr riv er was l.!nionGeneral Rosccrans' Arm) ol't l ic Cumherl;~nd. D ck at o f Braf g mould opcn Georgia to the Union:southcrn victor y n o u ld regain the initiative lost at Gctt! \bu rg and Vick,burg and pcrli;~ps eturnthe i!nion to the dek nsivc .

'I he Ar111yof rh c Cumherland struck l i rst . In August 1863 ( jc~ lcra lRosccram ilianeuveredI h g g out o f C'liattanooga. 13clie\,ing the Am y o f Tenncsscc to he i l e c i ~ ~ go11t11 e launched an ill-conceived pursuit. dispcrring the tl ircc l!nion Corps o\ cr titi) m i l o apart. I h g g ' s A rm y w i s notrarcating, hut was consolidating south o f Chattanooga. As the tl ircc separated iin io n Corpsemcrgcd from mountain passes (ieneral I3ragg was presented with an oppo rtunity to dcfedt hisenemy in detail. rh is was pcrhaps the Conlkdcrnte Army 's last great opp orlun ity to deal a decisiveblow to the i!nion ill he H ' o t and turn the tidc ol'thc war. Ur;~gg aw the opp ortun it j and on 0Septcmbcr 1863 issued ordcrs to attack. The attack did not happen. Ag ain on 12 SeptemberD r a g ssued attack ordcrs. and again i t ua s not done.

General l3ragg had reco gn i~c dhe opportunit!.. was ideally positioned wit h superior forces.twice issued ordcrs fi)r attack, and tu ce nothing happened. As a consqucnce (ienc ml Kosccrans\bas gi \c n time to safel! consolidate the Arm! oTttie Cumh erland. and what should have b ~ w n


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strategic masterstroke for thc south instead bccame h c nconclusive. bloodbath o f Chickamauca.I his thesis w il l explorc why (.icneral Hragg's Arm y failed to take advantage ol'lhe

dividcd l!nion Arm y o ft he Cumberland prior to lhc Rattle o f Chickamauga. The answers billprove relevant to h c enders o f todaj's arm!. Uow as then. victory depends on a cornmandcr'sabil i ty to ~ rans limm is personal vision into the coordinated. concerted action o f thwsan ds.I.cssons learned lio rn l3ragg's fi ~i lu rc s an assist roday's commander turn his vision into victor!.1.his thesis w i l l a lso providc usel il l h a c k g r o d nlbrmation for thost studyins thc batt le o fChickamauga.

This thesis examines General Brag$ history in lhc .Army ot'Tenncssee and covers indevail the Chattanooga campaign from Kosecrans' init ial movements in August I8 63 throu ph l iSepteniber 1863. The hattlc ot'Chickamauga is not covered. and Union h c c s arc only examined tolhc extent nccessury to answer the thesis question.

Sources include published histories ofthc C:i \ i l War: the Cotn?i lation of th c Off ic ialRecords o f the Union m d ConI-es, and unp ublished docum~.nts n the ('o ~n rnan darid-(icnrral StatTCollcge CS1 department lilcs.


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S t r u c Overvie\v: Su~rinierAs .lunc 1803 hcg in. the Confederac! \\:is at its height of sl ~c ce ss nd power. In the cast

General I .eefs Arm) of ho rt l icr n V irs inia rested after i t \ Ma> victor> o\cr tl ic Army ol ' theI'olorriac and propared li)r an itn os ion ol'lhe N orth . Alo ng the Missi.;sippi l.ieutenant GeneralJohn Pemborton's ibrccs conlinued to thw;~rta11 of1 Jn ion M a jo r Cicncral 1J.S. Cirant's attempts l olakc the r i w r fimress of Vicksburg. In Tcnnesscc (.ieneral Bra gg sti l l controlled the \.i tal ra i l townol ' ( :hatt ;~n~x~ga.y Au gu sl all tbrtu nc had deserted the C:onfetlerac!; the Confed crate's onl)remaining hope o f offensive victory o \e r the l!nion was (;encr;il l3raxton l3ragg's Arnly o fTcnncssee.

War in the EastAtie r his success at (.:hancellors\ille in M a y 1863. General Ko be rl E. I.ec saw two clcar

courses of ac tion i n thc 1:ast. He cou ld take the oll'ensc w it h an in\asion o f he north or maintainhis dcfensivc positions and protect Riclimond. I he l iui ts o f a successlid invasion ae rc al luring:cncourapclrient 10 he northerners n h o desired to end the war on tcrrnc, possible recognition of theConfedcrac) hy France and Great Britain, and h o un ti ti ~ l ro\isions. courtesy o f Pennsylvaniatlmncrs. fir southern mcn :11id Imrses grc wn thin hy three \o:irs ol'w ar. tic ricr al LC C ecided oninvasion and in mid-May submitted his plan to Richmond for apprw al . Approval liom I'residcntDa vis and his cahinct was not irnm edia~ c. Sonic sa u the greatest threat i n the West aridrccomnicnded a co~ice ntration f hrc cs against General Grant's fbrces ill cuppor l o f Vicksburg.


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l ln dc r the liorce o f I eets personality thesc gli~ ilnie ring s f a national military stratcgy werc set asidefor thc time being. and l.ec was given permissicu to advance north. B y I 0 June 1x63 the A r m ol'Northern Virginia was moving towardr I'ennsylvania. 1

General l.ee met the h i o n Army ot'the Potomac at (iettyshurg I Jul) 1863. On 14 Julythe trail units o f his battercd army limped across the Potomac. back into V irginia . I heunsuccessful campaign had cost 1.w over 20.000 ca rualtics and gained noth ing but honor. The

-,Army o f Northern Vi rg in ia u oul d remain on the dcfens ivc for t l ic rest of the ~ , a r . ~

War in thc ~VCSIT he fo rtress t o ~ n f Vicks burg was critic al to thc C:onkderac). \%'it11the i!nion

con troll in^ most of the M is s i~ i p p i c t w w ~ l ew Orleans and Ohio. Vickshurg was the conncctionhetwcen the castern Con liderac y and the manpower and resources o f Texas. Arkansas. andI.ouisiana. I.oss o f Vic ksh urg wou ld isolatc these states. ncarly one-1i;ilfol'Contkdrrate territor)and cut access to their recruits. provisions. and materiel. Ahraha m l.incoln rccognizcd that the(.:onfedcrate c ontro l o f Vickshu rg meant "hog and hominy without limit . frc rh troops li o m all thcstatcs ol'tlic fhr south. and a cotton countr) wherc they can raise the staple uith ou t interlkrcnce."I 'he guns o f Vicksburg also deriicd the 1;nion t k d o r n o f navigation on thc Mississippi Kivcr.preventing the nmvenicnt o fl ln io n troops and ships between the northern states and the Gull: W ithVicks burg out o ft h e way the Unio n would gain the advantage of stratcgie nio bility in the Wcst,al lowing rapid m as in g and sustainnicnt of forces anbwhcre along tlic Confederacy's MississippiKiv cr tlank.'

Sincc Octobcr 1862 l.ieutcnant General John C. Pcmherton's f i~ rcc s ail foiled a ll oI'Grant's ell'orts to take thc ci ty . On 30 Ap ri l 1863 Grant finally succecdcd in landing his forcecouth o f Vickrhur g. and hc boldly set out to attack the Vicksh urg dcknses fr om the landwardsitlc.4

As Grant m o\ ed closer to Vickshurg. Confederate strategic indecision prcvenrcd efl'ectivccon ccn tri~t ion gainst the threatening IJnion am!. I'emhcrton's superior was (ienc ral Joscph

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.lohnston. 0 1 12 Mu! he ordered Pemberton to move out o f Vickshurg and unitc with his own forcel i ~ r coordinated str ike against Grant. Pembcrton. armed u i t h di f i r in g instructions t i c ~ r nCon lkdcrate I'rcsident Davis. remained in Vicksbu rp. O n I 8 May: wi th Grant on l j a fcw milesli o m Vicks bury. Johnston ordered I'crnherton to evacuate Vick shu rg as the tou n was sure to bclost. Pemberton called a cou ncil o f war wit h his suho rdinatr co~nrnanders o discuss the order.The decision was to oncc ayain disreya rtl orders and renl:~in ll l l lc Vichsburc deknses.)

Pemherton's s tr at ep was to l ~ o l d nti l sufl icicnt reinlbrcementr arrived to raise the Llnionhicge of Vickshurg. By early June troops liom 'Ie~inessee.Georgia, and South Carolina rakedPcmberlon's strength to 3 1.000 men. Yet. bottled up in Vick sbu rg n i t h dwind ling supplies and nohopc o f relief from the outside. I'enihcrton evcntuall! re a li ~ cd e must either ev:~cuateVicksburg orsurrender. When the question uas put to hi5 divis ion and brigade commanders on I July 1863most agreed that the siege had physically worn the troops to thc extent that breakout was no1possible. On July 4th 1x03 I'embcrton surrendercd Vick shu rg and 30.000 men to Grant . TheC:onfedcracy had been split, and Conlkdcrate co ~ ~m an dc rsould ha\,e to guard against L:nionetTorts along a vastly increased front.6

Th c 1:ourth o f July 1863 was a black day for the Conk deracy. W ilhin two days GeneralI.ec's Arm? o f Northern V irginia was t lcfeated at ( iatys hurg and ( i e ~~ cr a lJemherton surrendercdVickshurg. I he ellcct o l'this rapid change o f ti)rtunc on thc Southcrn nation was dcscribcd b>C:oloncl Josiah Cioryah. CSA:

l ivents have succeeded onc another wit h disastrous rapidity. One hrie f month agowe w r c apparently at thc point o f succcss. Lce \cas in Pcnnsy kania threateningl larr isb urg and w e n I'hi ladelphia. Vickshu rg see~ncdo laugh all Grant's efforts toscorn . . . A ll looked hripht. Now the pictu re is jus t as somber as i t was brig ht thcn .Lee hi le d at Gcttyshurg . . . Vickshu rg and Port I udsnn ca pitulated. surrendering35.000 men and 45.000 arms. It seems incredihlc that human power could effectsuch a change in so h ri c fa spacc. Yesterday n c rode on the pinnacle of success.today absolute ruin seems to be our p ortion . The Confederacv totters on to i t sdestruction.7


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'I enncsscel~ h o u g h istressing. events were not ~icc ess arily s somhcr as Co loncl (iorgas helicvcd.

( iencral l h x l o n l3ragg and his 45.000 men of th c Army o f ' l cnnessec h l i l l held Chattanooga.Chattanooga was a southern rail low n second in imporlance only to Atlanta. Alon g its tracksrolled provisions liorri Ahhama. Tcnnessec. and north (icorgia bound fhr Lec's army and thc restof th e Confedcrac!. For thcsc reawns Linion (icncral W ill iam S.Rosccrans' X5.000 man Army ol'h e Cunibe rland was m akin g preparations to m arch on H ragg, destroy his arm y and sci7.cChattanooga. Union succcss might tvc ll be the dcatli knell for the Confcdcracy. bu t southernvic tor! over the Army of th e Cumherland could e t cv iw Conlkderate l i~ r lunes. r h c

(:onli.dcracy were to be saved it mo uld bc in lenncssce. and the savior would he (icn cra l R raxtonI h g g .

R raxton I 3 r uRraxlon l 3 r q g cntcred West I'oint in 1833. Thc scvenrecri e a r- o ld cadet's classmates

includcd Joseph I ooker. .lohn Pcrnherlon. and Juhal liarly . Thc energclic and oulg oing CadelI3ragg impressed some as o pinio nalcd and tactless. wh ile others who perhaps knew him b cttcr helda d i f i r c n t impression. Joscph l.looke r recalled Hragg as "bright and cncrgetic." and adm ired his"~nanlines s. ndependcncc and unhcnding inregrib." Ih ax to n 13mgg prated a good studcnt.graduating titi h in his class. I ooker wrote that Bm gg contiriwil ly "dcvcloped in physical andintelle ctua l strength and characlcr." and considered Hragg's class standing "highly honora ble. as hispreparation had hcc r~ imite d and he had won his ,landing on thc academic rolls w ithout havingbeen considered a laborious studcnt." W ell thoughr of h\ peers and instructors. and he ll preparcdfor active scrvice, l..icutcnant Rra gg yraduatcd in 1x37 and received orders to report to lblorida.X

In July 1x37 Licutenanl Bragg reported to !he Th ird Ar ti l lcr y Regimcnt in Florida. Thcunit was seriously understrength a t k r 1mo \:ears o l'g l~e rril lawar apninst the Seminoles andwelcomed B rag8 as a much needcd rcplacemcnt. Appointed comm issary ol'liccr and adjutant.I3 ra g san l it t le t igh~ ing nd hecanic ill in the hoctilc env iro~irnent. In the spring ol' 1838 tic was

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sent home 11)N or th Carolina to recupcrate. fh is was thc first indication that l3raxto11kagg'sphysical constitution might not be suitahle ior arduous l ield scr\,ice. ' l ' lic rest o f his carccr w u l dbc rnarkcd b y periodic episodes or sickness.9

Upon his rccovery in 1840 Hrapg was ordered ro return to his unit. ov cr his protests to theadjutant general. Over the next three ycnrs l.icutcnant Hragg xr v e d as a battery and h r rcornmandcr and gained a rcputarion as hard\vorking. strict. and concerned for his men's welfarc.I-lealso built a reputation as a young of'l iccr not alia id to q ~ ~ a r r e lith his supcriors. T ypica l is aletter tlra gg scnt to ihc adjutant general in Junc. 18-12:

:About live neeks since I addressed yo u a comm u~~ ica t ionn an off icialwb ject. an answcr to which involvcs the corrcct discharge o fm dutics as an ofticcr. and upto this t ime ? ou h:wc not condescended to no ricc me . . . why adopt so extraordinary a coursetowards a junio r who has no redress for the insults thus offered hi m except in violation o foff icia l respect which thc law requires him to n iai~ itainowards his superiors?10

The Adjutant (icneral ensured (i~ m er al f the Arm! W infi eld Scott saw the letter. thenrcplied to Hragp with a stinging adm onishrncnt. Nonctheless Rragg continued to stand up tosupcriors \vhcn he k l t he was right. Shortly afier rccc iving his rebukc l.ieutcnant B r a g wrotcanother scathing lctter to the AcJ ju~nnt icncr nl concerning his soldiers' i~radcquaic uarterslj lysscs S. (irant knew H ragg at the timc. re calling hini as "A remarkably intell ipent and ue llinl'ornied man." w ith an "irascible temper. and was noturall! disputatiou s . . .as a subordinate hewas always on the look out to c;itch his commanding officer inl iin gin g on his prerogative. as a postcomrnandcr he ua s equally vigilant to detcct the slightest neglect." I I

In 1844 rhc Third A rti l lery lcft F lorida for South Carolina. and Rragg continued to makehis opinions know n on what hc saw as Iiaults in the iirni y. l l e wrote ii series o r anonym ous articles;~dvoc ating c f h n s in the Arnlfs organization. Though 13rogg claimed his purpose \\as the"correction o f abuses which h a\c crept int o service." he also uscd the forum ro conduct pcrsonalattacks on (ieneral W infie ld Scott, callin g him a "vain. petty. conniving inan.""

Hrapg soon had an opportunity to take direct action against General Scott. A n ongoingk u tl had split the arm? hetween supporters o f Scott and those o f Majo r (icneral Edmund 1


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Gaines. \vho fsvo rcd reforms. I n M arc h 1x44. wI1e11Congress hcld h earings on the situation.Hragg happcncd to he in Washing1011 n leavc. I here i s no proo f hc %S tlierc to contrihutc to thelkud. hut he did have inlbrrnal discussions on thc issue with several congressmen. I he AdjutantGeneral prom ptly ordered B r a g o leavc Washington and report back to his unit. Whileconsidering his next movc B ragg was suhpoenacd to testil! h e h e Congress and was unablc tolca ie in accordance with his ordcrs. In Ap ril Bragg uas court-tnartialed and convicted on a chargeofdisrcspcc t to his superiors and given a com pa rat ivc l l ight scntcnee o f tu o months suspension o frank.

M uc h ort hc army was hchind Brugg and agrccd with l i is vie\\>. Buoyed by this supportlie continued to aggressively dcfend what he saw as his rights and the good of t ll c army. Shortl!u l icr his court-martia l B r a g entcrcd a dispulc w ith his rcgiment;il com mandcr 1,ieutcnnnt Colonc lW ill iam Gates ovcr I3raggtsassigned quarters . Bra gg f t his quarters intolerah lc and wasofk nd ed when hcttcr quarters were assigned a ricwly a r r i v d unio r officer. In u letter toL.icutenant Colone l (iatcs, l3repg threatened to hrin g the issuc to the attention ol'M ajc>r GeneralJohn E. Wool. I.ieutcnant Colon cl Gatcs' superior. Incmscd. Gales accused Brag g o f "indu lgingin a freedom o f wri t ing that i s offcnsive l i o m a junior to a senior. and of undertaking to dictate by areference to the regulations what i s my duty." Gates thought H ragg was tryin g to "make a scriousmatter o f a tri l lc." The muttcr was eventually rck rre d to Ma.ior Cicncrnl Wo ol h r a Court o fInqu irv, tvhich in January 1x45 found in l3ragg's favor. Lieutenant Colonel Gates was puhl iclyrcpriman dcd for not adhering to regulations. I3rag g though cxoneratcd. was ccnsured by GeneralWo ol i'or the disrcspectful tone o f his Ictter. I 4

B y thc spring o f 1843 Licutenant B rngg had carned a rcputation as the "most cantankerousman in the Arm \ ." Co urt-n iartialcd, convictcd . and ccnsured. hc \\as hated b) the Co mm and ingGcneral o ft h c Arm! and his ow n regimental comm andcr. Yet his friends and supporters knenh c r c ws niorc to the man then a hot temper. Soon I3ragg uo uld have occasio~io display his morc


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positive qualities l o the army and the nation. I n June 1845 Rragg and his hatter! were ordered to,join M ajo r General Zachary 'I'a\ lor in the war a$ain$t Mcxicc!. l5

Bragg and his light artillery battery reported to (iene ral 'I';i)lor a1 Co rpus Chris ti. Iexas.in July 1845. The lo llo w ing months were ones of horedom. sickness. and indis cip li~ w s thevolunteers and regulars waited out ongoing peace neyoliations. B r a g wrprisingly ctayed well anddrilled his men hours each day. One observer recorded his impressions ofl3 rap g: " 'l' l~ call. spareIbrrri . . . his large hlack eyes and heavy.bronc : and nervous. tremulous voice. attracted notice:and his industr): attention to duty and ctrict regard for discipline. ensured the efticiency andgallantr) . . . cubsequcntly displayed on the lie ld of l3uena Vista." When the army lina lly m ovedsou th in Ma rc h 1846. Rragg's batte r) mas read!.. 16

General Tayl or cons tructed an earlhen fort on the K io (irandc and left 500 men to dclkndit . inc lud ing B ra g . On 3 Ma y I8 46 the Mexicans surrounded the fort. and Hragg got his firsttaste ofco rrihat as the Mexica ns kept up a continuous homhardment. B r a g 's guns respondedsmartly. and upon the litt ing o f the siege 0 M ay I3ragy was promorcd to breve1 captain. Du rin g thefollowing months Rragg continued his relenrlcss dr i l l and earned a repulation l i ~ rltention to de tail.A id lo w off icer repor ted "B ra s. a s k il l l i~ l nd courageous ofl icer. is . . . distinguished for hisattention to the min utia o f his profession: a merit to he estccmed no less than heroic daring. whcn ilis remembered what disasters niay result in critica l niornents from the most tr ifl in g c a s i~ a lt ie s ." '~

Captain Ijragg's next action came HI Mon tcrey i n September. Over several days o f furiouscombat in the restricted streets o ft hc city, B ra g 's \\ell-dri lled hatter? once again distinguishedi tse lf . and B r a g demonstrated personal gallantry throughout the liy lit . He illso demonstrated hismeticu lous nature. st ripp ing tack and harness olt'dead horses. under lire. to ensure tht: equipmentwould not he lost. One lieutenant was ordered to return to the st ill contested battle lield to see ifany equipnicnt had been lc li behind. O n the v.ny he met General Ta ylo r who told h im to forge1nhout los l equipment. hut the lieu~e nan t ever ibrgnve 13ragg fbr the "pic ayt~ ne" rder. The nextday: whcn a horse driver kll dead. B r a g ordered this of l icer to r e t r k e rhc dead man's sword: "1


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d id so . . . and took Srom his pocket a kn ilr . Ibr I l~o ug ht ~ ni ph t e sen1 back i f 1 did not retrievethat too." Hragg rcfused the knil'e hccausc "i t was not public p roperty . . . I write down thcsc littlethings. l il r lhc) give instances o f the ohscrvance ol'details. characteristic o f this ofiiccr. notohtained lion1 tiistory." Monterey surrcndcrcd on 24 Scpicnibcr 1846. and I h p g mlncdiatclybegan lo rcbu ild his ravaged haltc ry. 18

In January 1847 General Scott stripped T ;~ylor's army ot'most ol'irs rcgular troop s andadvised Cicneral 'I lor to remain on the defensive. Outrag cd at Scott's action, Ta ylo r determincdto take the oll'ensivc u i t h his remaining kwcc ol'5.000 volunteers and a fcw regulars. includin gUragg's arti l lery. On 23 February. 1847 Taylor's arln \ met the Mexicans at l3uena Vista. Tlicaction quick ly bccarric desperate as lhe poorly trained volunlccrs rctrcated fro m the Mcx ica r~attack. 'l'imc and again [ ) r a g and his batter! gallopcd to n threatened point. dcstroyed theattackers with w ell-placcd canister. and movcd to the next crisis. Fina ll?. only Colone l J c fi rs o nI lavis ' Mississippi volunteers stood between the M cxicans and victor!. Ihc Mississippians hadjust begun lo break wlicn Hragp arrived: "I m happy to hclicvc . . . that m y ra pid firc. opened justin time. held the enemy in check until Coloncl L)nvis could gain a position. and assume a stand."Colon cl D avis took now o f Hragg's courage. remarking that the buttcry. "though en tirclyunsupported. rcsolutely held i t s position." Uhc Americans held, and during the night the Mc xicn nArm y departcd thc lield. I 9

Hraxton Bra& ini l int ivc and gal lantry w r e decisive hcto rs in the victory. In his of t ic ialreport (icncral T aylor stated that "Captain I3ra gg. . . saved the day." As imp ortant to thc victoryas l3ra&s courag e was his allen tion to detail and disc ipline . 'Ihese trail, had resulted in thc wcl l-traincd and equippcd gunners that dclivcrcd accurdte vollc>s in the t i c e ofs cvcrc Mex ican lire .(ieneral T ay lor rewarded r3ra.g wit h a prom otion to hrcbct lieutenant coloncl.20

General Tay lor's army re turned to Montere:. where once again Uragg unde rtook to rch ui ldhis battery. Uy October 1x47. dchpitc attacks ot 'h tip uc and illr~css. e reported his battery in"bcttcr condition than i t has bccn since I oined it." Uecause o f his wcll-know n ahility to instil l


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discipline. he was given administrative contro l o f thc army cam p at Mo nlcrc y. Uragg quickl!instituted order among the borcti soldiers and lax oflicc rs. A n observer larcr wrote that mostregular officers considered B r a s 7hc hcst disciplinarian in thc l jn ite d States Army." Somethough t his means too severe. Tw ice disgruntled so ldicrs made attcmpts on Bragg's lilk 'l'houghmost soldiers i'earcd 13rage. many respected his willingne ss to dclcnd their w clfare. W hil e inMon rcrcy. Rragp contested tlic Adjutant Cicneral's order that thc men musl b u new unifi)rms. and

7 1at least once Bragg stood up ibr a descrtcr who hc kit was rchahilitared.-I n June 1848 Hragg reccivcd orders to return to the States. D ur ing his three years in

Me xico Bragg had built a reputation as ;I pallant oi'licer and superb disciplinarian and had bcenprom otcd from licutcnant to brcv ct lieutenant colonel. Even the long-rutl'ering Adju tant (.;enera1

79admitted in 1849 that "Co l. I3raxp i s one o f our bcst artillcr! officers."-'Bragg returned home a national hero. Afte r the battle o f Bucna Vista, ncwsp apcrs had

printed a story concerning lhim and (ic ~l cr al achary 'I'aylor. The story described a hard-pressedBragg rid ing up to I'aylor on the battlefield. reporting hc was abou~o he o \ w w l i c l ~ ~ ~ e dnd askingfor instructions. Taylor's supposed reply was "Give them more grapc. Cap tain Urngg." Ihis muchemhcllished version o frh e truth made Rragg a household name and "M ore (irapc" a nationalslogan. I3ragg was dined and celebrated cverywhcrc he went: and the Ar m y namcd a post inC a li fi m ~ ia tter h i m Du ring this period Hragg learned his old hatter! was to be reassigned fromMexico ti1 the liont ier. Sccthing at uh at he saw as an injustice to his war-weary unit. U ragg wentto the Secretary o f War and had the ordcrs changed to a marc civilized de~tination. 'or tI ca\.r.nworth.23

Wh ile waitin g for his battery to a rriw . Bragg returncd to his crusade to rcfbrn i the army.His targct bas thc oldcr ol l iccrs in rhe ar rr ~j :he "lbgies ." In a pcrson al lctter l3ragg scnted that thca r m must be purgcd of "old l i lgier who did nothing in the ficld w ilhout consultinp and relying on


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youngcr men." Du ring a public speech in M ob ile l lra gg inskted thal the soldiers arid juniorol l icers d oc r\ cd "most of the credit. ho ugh i t has been heslow ed on those w ho accident. not merit.p laced ovcr them." Mcx ico had not mellowcd Uraxton ~ r a g g . ~ "

In Scptemher 1849 Hrayg. ncn ly married. l ina l lyioincd up ui th his battery in Jc hr so nllarrac ks; Saint I.ouis. H c spent the ncxt three ycars try ing to accum ularc the men: horscs, andequipment to re lit his unit. Ma ny times Bragg wrote tl ic Sccrctary o f War to coniplain about thcacute shortages. to no i ivail. Mo st ~ e x i n g f a11 was an army decisidn to reorganize I3ri i g's batter)o f mou nted "f ly in g artiller!" as a foot hatter!. 111 1853 Br agg wrote an appeal to Sccrctary o f WarJcllicrson Ih v i s lo restore horsc arti l lery. L)avis turned him d o ~ n : nd ordered Bragg's hatter! tofrontier duly in Texas and the Indian 'Icrritory . Bragg was furious. I ib l i icn d Wil l iam ' I '.Shcrnian ohserved "Hragg hated Da\is hiwrly" (i>r sending liirn to the (inntier 10 "c lm e Indians

-l r i t h 0 pountlcrs."i"I n 1855. (rd up wi th lio nt icr duty and his inahilit! lo organize and cquip his battery as he

saw l i t . I3rayg rcq~ ~cst ednd rc c c ix d leavc. He went to Jefhrs on Dav is to plead his case to havchis unit trans krrcd o f f the l iontier. Dav is insisled h a t it remain. l l tte rly Srustrated. Braggsubmitted his resignalion on 3 1 1)cccmher 1855. I h v i s accepted it."'

Urupg wrote th al hc resigned "under a pr ew lrc o f 'ou ~w nrd ircunistances which I resistedun til disgusted and worn down. Find ing my command destroyed. m usct'ulness gone . . . Iconcluded to retire l io rn the unequal co n te ~ t. "~ ' .orty-ycar-old Rraxlon l l rag g retired to a sugarplan tation in 1.ouisinna. Six years later Jefferson l h v i s nou ld hnve nccd of him again.

B> the time ol'his resignation l3raxton B ragg's personal and proScssional qualities werewell kno wn and deeply ingrsined. As an of lic cr hc possessed unquestioned physical courage. wasindustrious lo lhc p oint o f exhaustion. and had a passion for attending to ihc smallest de~ ail . Hi5style ol'lcadership was effective in executing lhc relatively modest responsibilities o f batterycomm and hut had not heen tcstcd in any pos ition ofg rc at importance.

I3ragy's o\vn high standards. coupled wit h his n atural outspokmncss. made him quick


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to cr it ic i~ c uperiors he 1i.h did not measurc up. Uragg l ~ a i lcarned he could a ttack hiscommanders with imp unity in publ ic ibrum and with pol i t ical influence. S h o rt l al ier his court-martial in 1844. upon learning that his mentor Ma jor (ieneral (iaincs was irq ing to get himassigned to his dibision. Hragg w rt ~l e i 'r icnd " post of honor fir disobedience ol'ordcrs, and

' 8contcrnpt and disrcspcct to my commanding ol l icc r. I his i s a strange world."-B r a g di d not on'er au lo~ na tic espect and obedience to his superiors: l ic w ould dccidc who

was aort l iy o f his ohedicncc. He genuincl) believed his acts o f nsubordination wc rc fo r the goodol'the army. not pcr rona l p ii n . When these samc tactics wcrc latcr used against him. howcv or.Hragg would not scc the atuck crs as nlt ru is ii c -t l~ y ere diwbc dient subordinates attacking hirn

personally.Hrag g also exhibitcul a trait rarcly remarked upon. n sinccrc concern h r hc welPare of his

soldiers. I c fought for a dcccnt posting Ibr his men afier thc M exican war and later would cx prndgreat ellbrt or ga ni in g the bcst possible hospital system ib r lhis soldiers in the Arm y o f Iennessec.(!nlbrrunately. lhis sidc o f him was only r isihle to those who kn cu him rvell enough t o penctratclhis publ ic ly br uy ue and co ld manner .


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IEdw in R. ('oddinton, The (icuysb11rg Cam_pa& ( K e n Yo rk : Scribner's Sons. 1968). 4--I .

" Wil l iam C:. Everhart. V&s.hurg and the O pm in g o ft he Mis &ip pi Kiver, 1862-1863.(N ati on al Park Service. 1986 ): 1':xcerpt rcprin ted in CS Arm y Command and Stall'Collcgc.The Eb duti on ol'M(dcr11 W arf ire (Fort i.ca\,enworth : LISAC'GSC, August 1906). 300: l'dwinCole Hearss. B e icksbur ~Carn paipn vols. ( ,Dayton : Morningside. 1986). 3:13 12.

8~osel)hHooker. "Kecollcctions ol'Cadet l.ifc." Ar my and Navy Journal . XXXI X ( Ju n c14. 1902): quoycd in Grady McW hiney. Dra xtor ~B r a w and the Confedcraw Defeat (Nc w York :Co lum bia Uni ve rs ity Press. 1961)). 10.74.

13ragg to Jones. 5 May 1842. Letters Recicvcd. AGO. quotcd in McWhincy. 32I lJllyssc s Granr. "Pm~dvemoirs" 2 vols. ( N c n York : C.L. Wcbster and Co.. 1885-

1886). 2:68.'? A Subaltern: "Notes on Our Army." S ou the ud &m r). Mes,engcr (1 844). 86-88,quotcd in McWhinc!. 36 .

14Tcstimonyand Vcrd ic~.B ra gg C ou rt d l n q u i r y ( I5 January 1845). Na tional Archives;and Tcstimon! ol' lic nr y R. Judd and Ahrahanl Myers, l3ragg Cour t of lnquir!. (1 5 January 1845),Nalion al Archives. quoted in Mc W hi nw : 47-50.

I 5 ~ r a g o Jon?s: 18 June 1845, Lcttcrs Recicvcd, AGO: and Jones to Bragp. and Jones toW ill ia m Gates. 18 June 1845. Lcttcrs Sent. AGO. quoted in McW hiney . 5 I .

ICadmus Wilco x. History ol.thc Me xican War (Washington : Chu rch News I'uhlishing.1892). 118.

I 71.uther Giddings. Sketchcs oft he Campa kg in N o r t h c r n M g x h New York : GeorgcPutnani Co.. 1853). 76: and McW hine ): 6 1.


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Ix~ am ue l rcnch. TVO Wars; A~~ toh ioc rdp l&Nash\~i l lc.190 1 ). 62-64. quoted inMcWhiney. 65: and McWhiney. 65-70: and Wilcox. 93-97: Justin 11. Smith. The War withMexico (New York : MncMillan. 1910). 251: 251.-

I 0 ~ c W l i i n e > .6-85: and Wilcox. 234. 238: and Smith. 300 - 3 0 2 .

' ~ c W h i n c y . 7 - 100; and The War o ft he Rebel lion: A C om ~i la ti on of he (=ca!m l < c c o r d ~f he Ln ion and Confedcrate Arnlies. 128 Vols. (Washington : Ciinernment PrintingOffice. 1880-1001). series I . \ d m c l 6 . part I. 348.(Cited !iereaftcr as OK. and unless othcrw iscindicated a ll references are to series 1).

22 ~o nc 's ndorsement on Br ngg to Jonc's. 7 Ma rc h 1849. Lcu crs Kccieved. AGO. quotedin McWIiine!.lOO.

2 . ' ~ c ~ h i n e y . 01-103: and Bragg to l lammond. 20 OctobrrIX48. I lamm ond I'apers.quoted in McWhiney. 107." B r a g t o I amrnond. 20 October 1x48. I arnmond Papers. quoted in McW hine ), 107.Z5Wi l l i am T Slxrman. M-emoirs of.W ill ia m T. Sherman (Westport : Greenwood

Press. 1972). 162.

2 7 ~ r a g go (Cieorgc Stuart'?). 3 I Ma y 1856: (ieorge I ay Stuart I'apers. I.ihrary o fCongress: quoted in McWhinc). 107.

%agg l o 1)uncan. I 6 June 1x44. 1)uncan papers. lln it cd States M ili ta ry Acadcm)q u c ~ dn M cWhiney. 44.


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CHAPTER Z

BRAGG IN COMMAND

P c n s d a t n WBraxton Bra% and thc lead elements of h ~ s0,000-man A m y of M ississipp~ rrivcd in

Chattanooga on 29 July 1862. .4 full General. B r a g had earncd his rank and posit1011 hroughoutstanding servlcc to the Confederacy in the precediny slxtccn months Ap po~ nted BrigadierGeneral by Jcffcrson D a m in March 186 1 , Bragg had contmued to budd on his pre-war reputattona s gallant officer, able organizer, and strict d~sc ip lmar~an

,As comm andcr of Confederate forces at Pensacola, Florida, Bra% turned his 6,000 rawrecrults into one of the best-trained forces in the South Promoted to h lajor G eneral and givencommand of west Florlda and Alabama, he quickly r~ % rga n~ ze dactory p roduct~o n, ecrwttralnmg, and transportation to m ore cffe aw ely supp ort the war effort. In February 1862 he and 111stroops were ordered to join Gcneral Albert Sidney Johnston In Corinth. M issis s~p pi, o help repelUnion forces threatening western Tennessee I

Arriving 111 March 1862, Bragg was appalled at the indisciplme and d ~ s o y a n ~ z a t ~ o nf the40,000 sold ~ers athcred at Corinth. Many of th e raw voluntecn lacked any rn~ l~ ta ryraining, andlootmg and descrtion were common. General Johnston, knowing Brag& abilities, appo ~n tcd imnot only a corps commander, but also h ~ shief of staff, charged with tra m ng and organ~ zingheuntr~edl-oops. Surveying his task, B r a s wrote h ~ s ife that "stem , d~c tatori al ieasurcs arenecessary, and as far as my influence ~ o c s ~ ll e adopted " Am ong h ~ sirst actlons as chief ofstaff was to organize an arniy staff and publish an order d~ rc c t~ n ghe death penalty for plunderers


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and deserters But time to organizc was short On 3 Ap r~ l, 862 Johnston movcd the army north-,to confront Un ~o n orces reported near Pinsburgh Landmg. Tennessee

B r a g stayed in the thick of thc actlon throughout thc bitter fisht at S h~ loh n 6-7 April,personally directing assaults against the Hornet's Nest and having several horses shot out fromunder him. Withdrawing only aftcr repcatcd ordcrs from h ~ superlor General Beaurcgard, B r a gwas one of the last Confederates off thc battlcfield He covcred the army's w~tlldra walo the lastand d ~ d ~ sest to organizc the night tnnc retreat back to Corin th D ur ~n ghc fight Br a g , hkemost of the other inexpe rienced Confedcrate commander's, stuck t o the tactics learned in Mexico.Failing to properly coordinate the actlons of his corps , hc repeatedly cornm~tted egiments andbr~ ga dc s ~ecc mea l gainst the strongest Union posit~ on s,w~th out roper mass, coordination. andartdlery support. B r a s never fully lcarned the lesson that well-coordinated, Innovatwe tacticswere requ~red ~ ai ns the rifle musket. Thls was not thc only lcsson of Sh ~l oh .BraL%'ssubordinates, shortly after ttic fight, were qulck to learn that B r a g would not acccpt soleresponsibility for his un~ t's ailures In his official rcport B r a g cla~ me dhe d~ff icul t~cst theHornet's Nest wcre duc "entircly to want o f proper handling" by his brigade and regimentalcon~m ander ' s . ~

Though the battle was a draw and many nilstakes wcre made, the South needed heroesBraxton B ra g' s bravely and devot~on o duty wcre r cc op ~z edhroughou t the Confederacy . As II Ithe days of "More grape, Captam B ra g. " newspapers praised his valor and poems were publishedin his honor. On 12 Aprd 1862 President Davis promoted h m to full Gcneral, the fifth rankingofficer of the Confedcracy. By Jimc the Confedcrates had completed their withdrawal to Tup clo,M~ ssissip pi, nd B ragg had superseded thc a1l1n3Beauregard as com mandcr of Confederate forcesi n thc west.

4

In Tupelo B r a g once agam conccntratcd on what he did best, or g a n i z ~ ~ ~ gnd trainmg hisarmy He rea d~ ly ~sk ed is nat~o nal opularity by taking the firm measures he fclt werc necessary

17


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to prepare his troops and officcl-s for futu re battlefields. Concerned at the low qu al ~t y f h ~ sofficers, Bra% lnst~tutedcg~ mcn tal romotion boards to confirm the competencv o f elcctcdofficers, despite pol itica l backlash fro m Richmond Survey ing his general officers, Bra= wroteConfederate Adjutant General Cooper In Richmond o f h ~ sonccrns:

Some general officers appointcd o r promoted withou t recornmcndat~ons rom t h ~ s uarterarc only encumbrances and wo uld be better out o f hc way O f all the Ma lor Generals in th sarmy but one can now be regarded as a sunable commander o f hat grade. Co uld thcdepartment b y any wholesome ewerclsc o f power or pol icy rel~evehis a m ~ yrom a par t o fth ~ s ead-wei&t it wou ld surely gw e confidcncc to the troops and add much to ourcfficiencv . . the safety o f our cause may depend on it

Reh ev~n g enerals was fraught w ~ t h oli t~ ca l erd, and no help was forthcoming from Jcffcrson

D av ~s Bra% promoted Hardee , he "surtable commander." to command o ft he Arnmy o f he%i~ss~ss~pp and rcmoved M aj or General Leon idas Polk fro m command o f h i s corps by appomtm ghim second in command o f Br ag 's forces. Both would f igure prominently in B r a ~ ' suture

5endeavors:

HardccWdham J Hardee graduated from West Point in 1838 and rcma~ned career soldier. He

distinguished h~ ni se lfn combat in the Mexican wa r and in anlon s agalnst the Indians. Before thewa r Hardee had been a protcgc o f Jefferson Davis. Dircctcd by Secretary o f W a r D a v ~ so revlsethc army drd l manual, thcn M aj or Hardee produccd t lar&&Rh-d L l g h t l n f a n l y ~ c s , hedri l l pr imer for both sides in the Civd War In 1856 D av ~s ppomted him commandant o f WestPoint, charged with mdoctrmating the cadets in the new drdl svstcni Hardee and Dams' closeassoc~ation esulted In a lifclo ng friendship When Georgia seceded Hardcc, thcn a L~ euten antColonel, resigncd fro m the regular arm y and accepted a conimlsslon as a Colonel in theConfederate Arm y At Sh ~lo h c was a Majo r Gencral commanding a corps under Albert SJohnston

Hardee was well respected as a sound tactl aan and supcrb drdlmaster HIS rainmgabhtie s were crucial to Bragg during the rebuilding of the Army o f Mis sis s~p p~t Tupelo. As a

18


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corps commander he would oRcn offer Bra% valuable ad v~ ce n terram and tactlcs, ad v ~c eha twas not alw avs taken 7

PolkLeon~dasPolk graduated from West Point m 1827 but S IX months later resigned his

commlsslon to enter the E pisco pal~a r~inistry. As B~s hop f L ou na na and founder of theUn~ versity f the South in Tennessee, he wa s well known and respected before the war Polk'sfr~ en d nd fellow cadet Jefferson D av ~s ffered the m~litarilymexperienced Polk a commiss~onupon the outbreak of war Major Gm eral Polk was thc first commander of the A m y ofMiss~ss~pp i ,cmg superseded by Albert S Johnston in latc 1x61

As a cor ps commander at S hdoh, he proved fa~ rl y ompetent considermg his lack ofnnlitary e xperonce and ex h~bit ed reat personal bravery. A natural leader of im pos ~ng ndd ~ g n ~ f i e dppea ranc e, Polk wa s well liked by his soldiers and fellow officcrs As a b~ sh o p olk wasaccustomed to occupying a po sit~on f prominence. and he contmued to use h ~ solitical andpersonal connections durlng the war to report c on d ~t ~ on ss he saw tlmn in Bras's commandPolk's relat~onshipwith B r a g got off to a bad start when, upon cornmentmg on the disorderevident at Corinth B r a s ~dentifiedPolk as one o f the major offenders, calling Polk a "plunderer "Later d~ fic ult ies n the approach to Shiloh contributed to B r a s 's poor first mprcsslonNone theless; Bra= would have to rely on the "Bisho p" In the fut ure .9

The health, disciphne, and spirit of the troops rapidly improved under B ra g 's regimen ofIntense daily drill and iron d~ sci plm e.The soldiers would never love B r a g , but manyacknowledged h ~ sffectiveness. W rote one, after he ar ~n g f scveral executions "So far aspatriot~smwas concerned, wc had forgotten all about that, and d ~ dot now love our country asmuch as we feared Bra.% ' X a t c r on, the same soldier had ro a d m t that the troops had "recoveredtheir health and s p~ rit s Io

By July 1862 B r a s had his army ready to f i a t . Colonel Wdliam Preston Johnston, anInspector for Jefferson Davis. wrote the President on July 15

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The dis c~p lm c f the arniy seems excellent The or d~ na ry oniis of rcspect to officers seen?chcerfidly p a d The respect for private property is very cred~tabl e . . The olderregiments show great skill and promptness in drdl and the progress of th e new l ev ~e s ssatisfactory. I I

Genera l Bra-gg him self wa s pleased w ~ t hhe state o f h ~ sorce. Hc wrote 111s w ~ f en JulyThe yrcat changes of command and commanders here has well mgh overburdened me . . Ihope yet to mark the cnemy bcfore I break d o m . S m c our arrival hcre great and markedImprovement has taken place 111 thc army, s o that we are now in a hi@ s tatc ofcffic~ ency , ealth and tone. W e shall be on the move very soon and you m ay expect to herefrom us before vcry long I2

With his army ready, B r a g had to de c~ dc here to movc. Union forces under Grant,Sherman. and Rosecrans threatened M i s s ~ s s ~ p p ~nd V icksburg, whde another under Major

General Buell was in north A labama moving towards C hattanooga. Loss of Chattanooga wouldd~ sr up t rmcal Confederate rad transportation; threaten Atlanta: and prcsent the lj n ~o n route intothe dt q- so ut h. Confederate Major Gcneral Kirby Sm ~t h, omniand~ng11east Tennessee. felt helacked sufficient forces to stop Bucll, and scnt frcquent d~s pat che so Bra% and Richmondrequcstlng remforcemcnts. Determining that the greatest thrcat lay to Chattanooga, B r a g dcc~ dedin July to m ove the ma jority of his arniy there, and 111 cor!junction with K ~ r b v n i~ th strikc allcffective blow throu@ midd le Tc nne ssw , gainmg the cncniy's rca r. cuttm g off 111s supp hes anddividing his forces so a s to encountcr them in d etail."13

On 23 July. 1862 B r a g bczan movlng 30.000 men from Tupelo to Chattanooga, 'The776-m~le ad Journey was typ~ cally ell o rgan~zed nd d~sciplmed .Upon jolmng K ~ rb y mith'sforce in Tennessee. B ra% had an army in pos tion not just to threaten Buell, but als o the supplylines of all the Union forces in Miss~ssippi A dec ~si ve onfederate drive north through middleTennessee. morc than just saving Chattanooga: could return thc inmatwe in thc west to theConfederates

Campaign i a h t u c k ~Upon his arrival in Chattanooga B r a g conferred with Kwby Smith on strategy They

agreed that S m ~t h, ow freed of respo nsibd~ty or Chattanooga, would im med~atelvmove to retake20


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thc Cumbcrland Gap from Federal forces. Oncc done, and upon the arrival and orga nm tion o f a l lB r a s 's troops, they w ould unite in a drwe north through m iddle Tennessee to destroy Buell Ifsuccessful, they wo uld contlnuc thc jomt campalgn and seize Kentuc ky fo r thc ConfcdcracyAlmost from the start B ra g' s plans werc frustrated b y h ~ sack o f command authority over Smith.B r a g outrankcd h ~ m , ut as commander o f he independent dcpartmcnt o f East Tennessee K ~ r b ySmith rece~ved is orders from President D a m Any jomt efforts wou ld be effected throughcooperation. Smith, after sc mn g thc Cumbcrland Gap. decided to niovc ~m mcd iatclymtoKcntucky, leavlng B r a g o move alone against Buell in middle Tennessee. T o protect Sm th'sfla nk B r a g was forced to move qu~c kly , lnilng to destroy Buell in battle or maneuver h m out o fTcnncssce l 5 (See Figure l )

In Chattanooga B r a g organized his 30,000 man army Into tw o corps o f wo div~s ionseach. He was st i l l not sat~sf icd ~ t home o f his subordmate conimanders Bra= cons~deredM aj or Gcncra l Hardcc vcry capablc, but s till believed the other corps commander, Major GcncralPolk, unfit for command Polk, pol itica lly powerfill, could not be removed, but Bra gg was able tore l~cvehrce gcncrals and co urt-m art~a l w o others Stdl, Bra gg felt handicrrppcd by incompctcntofficcr s and pollt ica l appointees. l6 e once again wrote Pres~dentDav is seeking help:

I o not hesltatc to asscrt that a fourth o f our cff icicncy is lost for want o f suitable Brigadeand D ~ v i s ~ o nommanders . . . no appolntlng power can avoid errors through which in tm eeach grade must become encumbered wi th some incapable and in effic ~e nt fficers. whocannot be employed w ~t ho utmatcrial p rcjudlcc to the servlce

Davis refused B r a g blanket permiss~o no remove and p romote o ff ice rs as he saw f and B r a scont~nucdo dcnouncc those he cou ld not remove from command 17

B r a g also reorganized his own staff. Surprismgly fo r one exper~encedn organizat~on,B r a s selectcd some staf f o ff icers o f questionable ability and dec~de do be h is own ch ief o f s ta f fHav ing thus mcreased his own burdens, d~ stru stfu l f some o f his officers and spurred on b y KirDvSmith's undateral change o f plans, Bragg m oved his army north out o f Chattanooga on 28 August1862 l 8


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In three weeks of hard marching Bragg nianeuvered Buell out of Tennessee and moved intoKentucky On 17 September the Confederates defeated a small Un~ on arrison at Munfordsville.Kentucky, and there awaited Buell's attack B r a g realized his army was worn from the n p ~ dadvance and suspec ted Buell outnumbered him, so preferred to fight a defensive battleWhen Buell failed to press an a ttack, B r a g moved further north, seeking provlslons and aimmg to

unite with Kirby Smith's command at Bardstown, Kentucky K ~ rb v mith once agam foiledBra& scheme to mass them forces agalnst Buell At Bardstown B r a g rcceived a message fromSniith saying his forces were fully oc cu p~ ed ith other missions and unable to join Bragy. W ~ t hBuell now safely in strong posltlons at Louisville, B r a g took the opportunitv t o rest 111s men atBardstown

Bra% was fatigued and frustrated by the fa ~l ur e f 111splan to unite Confederate forcesagalnst Buell Not only had Kirby Sniith offered less than enth us~ astic ooperation, butConfederate forces in M~ssissippi nder Major Generals Van Dom and Brcckinr~dge ad failed tojoin h ~ m s planned Equally frustrating was the failure of Kentucky recruits to join h ~ srmy. On28 September Bragg went to confer w ~ thKirby Sm~thnd oversee the installation of a ConfederateKentucky governor Major General Polk, who ranked Hardee, was left in comm and of the army atBardstown. l 9

Battle of Pe rry illeOn 2 October. while s t i l l in Lexington, Bra= received reports that Bucll's niam body was

advancing on Kirby Smith at Frankfort, Kentucky B r a s saw t h ~ ss the opportunity to finallysmash Buell in battle His plan was for S m th to attack Buell head on and fix h ~ m place whdcPolk m oved north out of Bardstown and struck the Union army's flank Bragg's orders to Polk wereto prepare the army for an ~mm ediatemarch, and should Polk learn for certain that Buell wasnioving on F rankfort, "Strike without further orders " A few hours later B r a g sent add~tionalinstruct~ons-The enemy is cert a~ nly dvancmg on Frankfom Put your whole available force 111


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niotlon . . . and s t rike h ~ mn flank and rear l fw c can combinc our movements he 1s certainlylost 'ZJ

On 3 October, B r a g went to Frankfort, convinced the fight would be them and bel~cv ingPolk wa s enroute. As intelligence updates came in, however, B r a g decided the move on Frankfortniig l~t e a femt At 8 P M. he sent Polk updated lnstru ct~o ns "I have sent you many dispatchess m e yesterday morning desiring you ro move your force on the enemy. who wa s mak~n!: a descenton this point That move has proved to bc only a femt and has ceased. You will ac t accordm gly,but I de s~ rc ou to hold your command ready for a junc t~on t any mom ent."21

Polk, un kn ow ~o B r a g , had not yet moved Polk bcllevcd that Buell's entire force was

moving on him in B ar ds to w and that a move north would be d~s as tro us Polk did not share thisassessment w ~ th r a g Instcad, he ca ll ~d council of his corps and d iv ~ s~ o nommanders whoapproved a decision to retreat west, to Danville, in defiance of B ra g 's orders and intentApparently only one officer, Br~ ga die r eneral Patton Anderson, fa v o rd obeymg Bra& ordersMonths later Smith wrotc B r a g on what transp md

On the third of October I was present at G eneral Polk's quarters at B ardstown. Your dispatchfrom Frankfurt of 1 p.m . Oct 2nd wa s read and after an mtcrchange of wew s in rega rdto our m ilitav condit~on , sjunlor officer present, I was called upon by Gene ral Polk togive niy v~ e w s s to what was best to be done. I hesitated to d o so. whereupon G eneralPolk mq u~re d s to the cause of my reluctance to ad v~ se course which seemed so clearand 1 replied, that your order just read did not seem to adniit of any other cou rse than that ofcompliance, and that if any other altem atw e than that of obedience to the order was adopted,~tmight involvc you and the force s with you near Frankfort in grcat embarrassment if notdefeat-that in your dispatch you distma ly statcd that Genl. K ~r by m ~ th ould attack theenem v then in your front, and that w e must move upon him ... nd st r~ ke m in flank andrear '2

Polk had decided to retreat while B r a g thouzht him moving north in obedience to his lastorders On the e v e n q of 3 October Polk infomied Bra% of the decision

The last 24 hours have developed a condition of th ~ n g s n mv front and left flank wh ~c hmakes compliance with this order not only emm ently inexpedient, but in~p ractica ble I havecalled a council of Wmg and Div is~on ommanders, to who I have submitted the matter. andfind that they . . mdorse my vlews 1 shall therefore pursue a d ~ffere nt ourse assured thatwhen the facts am subm tted to you will justifv niy de c~sio n.3


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Polk had fa iled t o ad v m B r a g o f h ~ sehef that B uc ll was niasslng at B ardstown. notFrankfort: had disobeved Braass order to movc north; and whcn infor mm g B r a g o f he d e c ~ s ~ o nto retreat faded to pam t 111s commander a plcturc o f he tac t~ ca l ~tuationmaking the niovcncccssary. .4t thc time Bue ll's forccs were spread out between Fran kfort and Bardstown, and it 1sl ikely Polk could have made r o F rankf or t and l ~nk ed p w ~ t l i ~ r b y m ~ t h , n~ f v i ng r ag ' sforces.24

B ra g 's ~ntcll igence as stdl unclear on Bucll 's intent~ons . He knew both Smith and Polkhad forces to their front, but d id not kn ow whcrc the greatest threat lay. On 4 October he stillbelieved the bcst strategy was for Polk tolo111w ~ t h ni i th and bel~eved olk was enroite When hereceived word o f Polk 's decision to retreat, B r a g was forced to abandon his strategy; and h e askedSmith to move south to jo in up w ~ t h olk at Harrodsburg, ten miles north o f Da nv ~ll e.5

Arrlvm g at Harrodsburg the afternoon o f 6 October, B r a g discovered Polk was stillconcentrating at Danville, not moving to l inkup with Smith at Harrodsb urg as ordered. B r a g 'sadjutant once again sent orders to P olk "The General corn ma nd~ ngr~stm cts e to renew thedirections . to yo u to concentrate your command at this pomt as ra p~ d ly s possible . . hc doesnot des~rel iem to move to Danvi l le

Later that day B r a g eceived reports f rom his comniar~dcrs nd~ catm ghe niam enemyforcc was threatenmg Srn~th ,ifteen miles north o f Harrod sburg at Versaillcs, and Polk was facmga smaller forcc Sn iith was "beg yn g fo r hclp," whde Polk's niessagc rcad "I a w d~rected encralHardee to ascertain the strength o f he encmy . I annot think it largc ." Based on these reportsB r a g sent two divisions north to a id K ir b y Smith and directed P olk to mo ve to Vcrsailles as soonas pos s~b le Bra&s order told Polk to "give the enemy battle immediately, rout him, then movc toour support at Versail lcs no time should be lost In thcse movements." Around m idn ~g tit OctoberB r a g eccived a message from Hardee that caused h ~ n io reconsider. Hardee lmplied he wasfacmg a large force, and that the Confcdcrates in the south were i n yravc dange r.

Pcrmit me. from the fr~ en dl yelations so lon g existmg between us, t o wr ite yo u pla inlyD o not scatter your forces There 1s one rule in our profession whlcli should never bc

24


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forgotten. ~t s to throw the m asscs of your troop on th c fractions of the enemv If it bcyour pol~cyo strike tlic enemy at Versadles take your whole force with you and make the bloweffective; if, on the contrary, you should de c~ deo strike the enem y in fron t of me. first let it bedone w~ th force which will make the success certaln. Strike w ~ t h our whole force first to theright thcn to the left. I could not sleep quietly tonight without giving expression t o these viewsIf you w ~ s hmy opinio n, it 1s tha t in view of the posit1011of vour depots you ought to strike t h ~ sforce first

Hardee was advising B r a g to concentrate his forces, the very thing he had been attempting sincecrrtermg Kentucky Still, Hardcc's message had the de s~ re d ffect of alerting Bragg that the threatmi&t lie 111the south. At dawn Bra% rode for Polk's headquarters at Perryvtlle 2 7

Brag$ beliefthat Polk was still obeymy his orders of 7 October to " gv e the enemy ba nkimmediately" was reinforced upon receiving a message from Polk, wrltten at 6 A.M. 8 October.stating Polk's intent to "a nack at dayhgh t " Instcad, B r a g found upon h ~ srrwal at 9.30 A IMthat Polk was in a defense, w a h g for the Union forces to attack hmi. Once again Polk hadconsulted his subordinates and dcc~dedo disregard B r a g 's orders and intent This time Polk hadnot just faded to keep B r a g informed. he had told h ~ sommander he was gomg to attack whdeintending to defend. B r a g corrected defic~enciesn Polk's dispo sit~on s nd though still unsure ofjust exactly what he faced, launchcd an afternoon attack on the Federals

The fight at Pcrryvdle was hard and b loody, with many veterans of Shdoh clain i~n gPcrryville was the worse of th e two. By nightfall Bragg's arm y had pushed the 60,0 00 U n~o ntroops back tw o m ~l es , nd the fight stalled as the Fedcrals took up strong defensive posit~o nsThrou ghou t the fi&t Bra= and Ills principal commanders stuck to the tacttcs that had worked inMexico and cost so much a t Shiloh, frontal attacks. All show ed a tendency to piecemeal inregiments rather than massing them at a deciswe point and time. Bra% achtevcd a tactical v ~c tor y,but re aliz~n g e was outnumbered hc dctcrnwwd to fall back the next day andJ oln up w ~ thKirbySmith Polk and Harde e agreed w1tJ1 the move. Early on the ninth B r a g ' s amiy moved toHarrodsburg The next day Smith's force jo~ ned ~ mhere.29

On 12 October Bra% decided to lw vc K entucky. Short of supplies and facing an enemyof increasing strength, the final straw was the defeat of Van Dorn's force at C or ~n th,M i s s ~ s s ~ p p i .


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Van Don1 was to move north and cover Brag& left f lank. w~t ho ot ~ m ragg thought h ~ sosit1011in Kentuck" untenable The Con fedcratcs retrea ted t o east Tennessee "'

B ra g' s ca m p a q had faded to c la im Kentucky for d ie Confedcracy or to in f l~ c t c rushmgdefcat on B uell, yet hc sti l l achieved some tactical succcss B r a g pointed out in h is of f ic ial reportthat hc had recovered north Alabama, much o f Tennessee, and the C~ ~n ib er la ndap, k~l led.wounded, or captured 25,000 o f h c cncmy at the cost o f 4,000 casualties; and captured muchn d e d armanicnts and supplies, al l thc whde li v ~ n g f f he land Thcrc were also lessons to beleamcd. if B r a s chose to do so Principal among thcsc were the Importance o f goodreconnaissance, the need to a n rcsolotely b a s ~ d n best ava~la bleacts, and thc d if f iculty o f rc lymg

on subordinates who felt no conipunc tlon to obe" the letter or mtent o f orders 'I

RecriminationsNcwspapers and pol~ t ic ians ere qu~ ck o blamc B r a g or the fa i lurcs in Kentucky

Iro n~ ca lly , ne o ft h c most cornnion charges was that tic had scattered 111s forces at P c rr y il le Theed ~ro r f he Richmond Dispatch wrote on 23 October

Gcnl. B r a g s unqucst~on ably n cxcellent d~sciplma rian, nd a vcry brave man, but he seemsto have been sreatly dcficicnt in some o f he other qualit~e s hich constitute a greatcommander. N o doubt, servlng under some man o f great miln ary genius. he wou ld havemade an cxcellent subordinate The talcnr o f separatc command, however. is vcry rare.and he at least does not seem to posscss it

This charge, that B r a g was an able organizer and disciplinarian, yet lackmg thosc th ~n gs hichmade a great commander, wo uld be increasingly throw n at h im in the ensuins months.

Prcs~dentDavis dismissed t l ic pubhc complaints asamst B r a g as uninformed or po l~ t~ ca l l vmotivated, and called Bra.% to R ~c hn ion do personally report on the Km tuc ky camp aign Bra=lef t R ichmond w ~ t h avis' full support. B r a s 's adjutant, Lieutcnant Colonel Brent, reported"Genl. Bra= returned from Richmond. He brought the gratifym g fact that his conduct in Kentuckyhad been approved o f b y the President ''33


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President Davis was most concerned w~thhe rumors that B ra g 's am iv and commandershad lost faith in him Indeed. Polk and Hardee had publ~ cly isparaged B r a g In a lettc r toJefferson Davis' a ~ d e ardec listed the m~ stak es e felt Bra% had made in Kentucky, concludmg"Bragg has proved a failure, it is true , but . . . have we anybody w ho will do better'?" Daviscalled Polk and Kirby Sm ith to R ichmond , where both blamed Bra-% for the K entucky fa~ lu re s,cla ~n icd e had lost the confidence of his men, and requested he be rcplaced by G cneral Joseph E.Johnston. Smith told Davis he refused to work agam with ~ r a g g . ' ~

Davis' reasons for retamins B r a 8 in command are best art~ cul atedn his October 29 letterto Kirby Smith

I havc had long and free conversations with Gcnl B r a g He has cxpla~ nedn a d~ rec t ndfrank manncr the circumstances of his campaign and h as evinced the most self denyingtempcr in relation to h ~ suture pos ~tio n That another Genl might excltc more enthusiasm isprobable. but a s all have their defects 1 havc not swn how to make a change w ~ th dvantageto the pu bl~ c ~MU : HISadministratwe capacity has been felt by the Army of M ~ s si ss ~ p p ~ .~ sknowledgc of the troops is intimate and a new man would not probably for a tmie with evenye at er abdity be equally useful. Of all the Generals, Cooper is at the head of the Bureau. Leeis in comm and of the army in V irgm a, Johnston still d~s ab led y the wound reccwed at SevenPmes, Beauregard was tried a coniniander of the army o f the West and left it w~ tho ut cave.when the troops were demoralized and the country he was sent to protect was threatenedwith conquest. Bra% succeeded to th e command and orsrui~z edhc armv and m arched toyour support w~ th f ic ~e ntroops. ''Bragg rema~neda command. Though Polk and Hardce had turned against him, many of

h ~ s~vlsion nd brigade commanders still offered sup po n. One brigade conimandcr, BrigadicrGeneral J . K. ackson: wrote

I still think he is as good a Gencral as we have in the Con fedcn cy. Th e ncwspapers andstreet com er warrlors abus c everybody in relation to the conduct of the war, abo ut whichthey know nothing It is true the army was disappointed when we were ordered to fall back.but cvery man and officer is now sat~sfiedha t it was the very best th ~ n ghat could have becndone. The opinion of the army sustams Gcneral Br a g , he is the idol w ~ thhemnotwithstanding the censure of the newspapers ''Jackson may have overstated B ra g 's support, but it was substant~al.St~ ll , ra% had two

corps commanders publicly against h ~ m ,nd a resurgen t U n~ on orce to be defeated in Tennessee


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blurfrccsboroThe westcrn Confederacy was now tllreaterlcd by tw o Un1on armlcs Ulvsses Grant's force

was preparlng to m ove south on V~c ksbu rg, nd the U n ~ o n rn iv o f he Curnberland, under its newcommander W illi am S. Rosccrans. had occu p~ed as hv ~ll e Pres~dentDav is wanted Bra% andK ~ r b y m ~ tho once agam cooperate, t h ~ slmc agalnst Nashv~ llc.B ragg s ~ n i e dager to attack.writ ing Gcncral Pemberton o f 111s plans- "W e are moving o u r a d a b l e f orce s as r a p ~ d l y sposs~blento m ~d dl c cnnessee to resume thc offcnsive t h ~ shrows us in the rear o f your

'opponent and ought to create some d ~ v c rs ~ o ~ i. "'Wi th in two weeks B r a w had changcd h ~ s ind. Respectful o f Rosecrans' po w c rf i~ l

pos ~tio n t Nashvdle and concerned about h ~ sw n a rm v's reduced s t r e n ~ ~ ,c wrote Beauregardon I 2 November that hc would attack if he enemy Icft his posit~ons .On 17 Novcmber Braggconferred with his generals and dec~ ded gainst any imm ed~a te ffensive. He wrote AdjutantGeneral Cooper that an attack on N ashville would be an "Act o f mprudence, to sav thc least . . .should the Department differ w ith me, howevcr. I i l l undertake it ""

On 24 Novcmber President Dams trie d to un@ operations in the West b y appointinsGenera l Joscph E. Johnston commander o f al l Confederate forces between the Mi ss iss ~p piiver andBlue R~ dg c ountains An overall commander had long bccn soosht by generals and po lit~ c~ an s,and Johnston was wc ll respected b y h ~ seers. Even Bra= cl a~ m ed e asked Pres~den tD a v ~ sogwe Johnston the appointment dur ing his October tr lp to ~ i c h m o n d . ' ~

Johnston's new p os~t ion roved to have M e eal author ~ty.His m~ ssi on as to oversee thedepartments o f B r a g , K ~ r b y mith, a nd Pcmberton. but thev stdl mceived their ordcrs fr omRichmond. Ordcrs w oul d often b-ypass Johnston completely, gomg dire ctly to h is subordinatesThis made it difficult, if not impossible, fo r Johnston to implement any k ind o f coordinated theaterstratcgy 40

B r a g spent November 1862 rcbudding his tired army at Murfreesboro, recru it~ng,reorg an~z ing nits, and sccking promotions for deserwng officers. B y early Dcccniber 1862 his


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ncwly renamed A m y of Tenness~u: umbered 47.000 men. Polk, Hardce. and K~ rb y m ~t hcommanded the thrce infantry corps, and Brrsad ~erGcneral Wheeler the 4.000-man ca valry corpsGeneral Johnston arr ~v cd t Murfreesboro on 5 Decembcr on an inspection tour and rcportcd" B ra g 's troops arc In fine condition, healthy looking and well clothed. In fine sp ~ ri tsoo . I see nocvidence of thc want o f confidence and d~ssatisfact~onf wh~chwe heard so much in Richmond "4

President Da v~ s ~sitedMurfreesboro on 12 December, brmgmg u istruct~o ns or Johnstonand Bragg. Davis ordered Johnston and one of Bragg's d ~ v i s i o ~ ~ so Mississippi to operate agalnstGrant Both Johnston and Brake protested thc order, argulng that B r a s was alreadv outnurnbcredby Rosecrans and any h rt l~ c reduction in str cn gh was dangerous Davls overruled 111secentlyappo~nttvlhcatcr commander and told Bra= that should Rosecrans advance "F ~ gh tf you can. andfall back behind thc ~ e n n e s s e e . " ~ ~

Rosecrans advanced on 26 December 186 2. Bra= elected to defend just north ofMurfreesboro with Hardce's Corp s on thc lefl, Polk's on the r~gh t. nd the fordablc Stone's Rwerbetween. Onc di v~ s~ onf Kirby Srn~ th's o rps was in rcserve. Though it was not an idealposition, B ragg fclt it was the only one that allowed htm t o cover all the roads from N ashville b,hile

Rosecrans closed on the Confederate positions, but showed no haste to attack. B r a gdcc ~d ed o seize the m itiatwe, and on the night of 30 D ecember ordered Polk and Hardee to attackthe Union lcfl at dayli&t. Polk recommended the attack be agalnst the right flank. Su rpr ~s ~n gly ,Bragg agreed to Polk's suggestloll 44

Bragg's plan w as simplc, in essencc a frontal anac k by two corp s aga inst thc Union right.H ISordc rs read, in pa rt, "In making your movemcnt, the Gencral desires that your anac k shall bevlsorous and pcrslstent. In so domg, keep up the touch of clbows to the r~ gh tn order that the h emay bc unbroken " Bragg was repcatins the tactlcsof Shiloh and Perryville, dcspitc the difficulty of staying a ligned in battle and the high cost o ffrontal


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The Confederate attack at 6 A. M . on 3 1 December caught the Federals by surpnsc andmet wtth ~n lt i al uccess By 7 A M. he U nion forces: though pushed back. had consolidated th c ~ rlines and began a bloody defcnsc. B y 10 A M B r a g eallzed his attack was losing momentumand ordered Ma jor General Breckmridge to brin g his rcscrve D~ vis ionorward. It tookBreckmridge three hours to reach thc fight Wa ry o f tin ~ o norces reported to h ~ sront, he wroteBra% at 10: 10 . A M that he could not advance. B r a g sent his messenger back w ~ t h rders to"Tcll General Breckinr~dgehat unless hc was ccrtaui the enemy was upon hi in to go ahcad." St illw o rr ~e d bout the enemy supposedly in his front. Breckinridge did not move to Bra.& aid un til1 1 :30 A.M.. after receiving another mcssagc from B r a g The reports o f enemy i n Brcckmridgo'sfront proved false, and his brigades arrived too latc t o bc thrown in at the critlca l polnt. H cexplained m 111s report that "about 10.30 1 received, throu& Col Johnson. a suggestion fro m theGeneral commandmg to move against the cncmy . . . I ind Col. Johnson regarded it as an order ''46

B y 4 P M the Confederate attack had stalled, and B r a g was out o f reserves. W ithdarkness fall mg the exhauned troops o f both sides slept on the battlefield. Bra% scnt a message toR~ chm ond laiming thc Fcdcrals had been driven " fro m every position except his extremc left", andwent to bed witho ut mspecting his lines.47

1 January 1863 passed w ~ t h o serious fighting On 2 January, B r a g ordcrcdBreckmridge to attack a Union force that occupied an cntilading po s ~ t ~ o ne dld not consultHardce. Brecklnridge's commander. The bayonet assault was repulsed with great loss.48

The soldiers had now been on the cold. wet battlefield for several days and were exhausttd.At 2 A .M on 3 January B r a g eceived a message advising retreat from Ma.ior Generals W ~t he rsand Cheatham, division commanders undcr Polk. Polk had endorsed the message, w rlt lng "I erygrea tly fear the consequences o f another engagcment at th is place . . . we could now, perhaps, geto f f w ~ t home safety and cred ~t ft h c affaw is well m an ag ~d Should we fa il in the meditated attackthe consequences mi& t be very disastrous " B ra g 's rcsponsc to thc messenger was "Say to theGeneral we sl ial l mamtain our pos it~on t cvcry ha ~ a rd ." ~ '


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Hy midm orning Br as s appe;ircd to be changing hi.: mind. I:"\ro te o ~ cf l i c i i ~ l .and that Hrag g is cordiall!hated h! a largc nu n~ be r l.l iis o ffic crs ."j l

I3ragg was phy sically tired and frustrated b> the rc~ ic w cd ersecution. On 10 Jnnuar!1863 tic rcatl an article charg ing lic had lost tlic conlidence o f his arm!; and that hc had rctrea ~edagai~is t l ic advice o f his Generals. I-lc askcd his st;~SSwliethcrhis troops had indeed lo \t c onlidcnccin him. stating that i f rue he \~ o u ldcti rc . 'The srall'concluded that "under thc exis tingcircumstances the general intcrcst rcquircci that General nr ag g should ask to bc rclicved." D r a gwrotc i n a pc rs on~ ~ Ictter the same da!; " I t lios bccomc wit h me a serious question as to w ticthcr it

iwo uld not he better for the prcsidcnt to send someone out to rclic vc nlc."-'On January I I Bra gg took the extraordinary stcp o f writing a letter to his corps and

division commanders asking their op inion o f his perfi)rmnncc and rcqucsting co nlirniation that the)had advocated retrcat at blurfrccsboro:


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Findmg myself assailed in privatc and p ubhc , by the press . . . by officers and c~ tizcn s; or themovemcnt from Murfreesboro, wh ~c hwas resisted by me for some time after advised by myDiv~sion nd Corps coinmandcrs . . . It becomes necessary for me to save my fair nanic. if Icannot stop the deluge of abuse , which will dcstroy my usefulness and demoralize the arm y . .False or true, so ld~ ers ave no means ofjudgln g me rightly or gat in g the facts, and thc effecton them will be the same-a loss of confidence and a consequent demoralization of the wholearmy . I desire that you will consult your subordm ate comm anders and be candid with me IfI have m isunderstood your advice, and acted against your opinions, let me know it in justice toyourselves If, on the contra ry, I am the v ict ~m f unjust accusations, say so, and unite withme i n staying the malignant slanders being propagated by men who have felt the stmg ofdiscipline. I shall retire without a regret if I find I have lost the good opinion of my generals,upon whom I have ever relied a s upon a foundation of rock ''

Hardcc admitted he had counseled rareat: and expressed his command's lack of confidencc

I fw l that frankness compe ls nlc to say that the Gencral officers arc unanimous in theopmlon that a change :en the command of this army is necc ssa v. In t h ~ spinion I concur Ifeel assured that t h ~ spin ~o n s considerately formed, and with the h ~g he st cspect for thcpurity of your motives. your energy, and your personal character; but thcy arc convincedthat the peril of the country is superlor to all personal consid erat~o ns4Polk was not as quick to reply, givlnz B r a g time to recon s~der 11s action. M e n asked to

c larify h ~ sntciit, Bragg told Polk that he a s k d only whether his generals had advised retreat. Thepurpose of thc letter was t o verify the actlons rc lat~ ngo thc retreat, and to "relieve my mind of alldoubt, while I secured in a form to bc preserved thc m eans of dcfensc in the fiiture whcndiscussion might be proper " The "paragraph relating to my supcrsedure was only an expression ofthe feeling with which I should recelvc your rephes, shou ld thcy prove I had been misled in niyconstmction of your opinroii and advice ""

Polk never gave a candid reply to Bragg, but on 4 February lie forwarded thecorrespondencc to President Davis, along w ~ t h is oplnion of General B r a g

I feel it a duty to sa y to you that had I and my D ivision commanders answcred, our replieswould have coinc~dcdw ~ t hhosc of the officers of the other Corps You have known myopmion on this since my vi s~ to Richmond. I havc only to add, if h e were Napoleon or thegreat Frederick he could serve our cause at som c other points bettcr than he re. h4v opinion ishe had bettcr be transferred. I remember you having said . . . "I can make good use of himhere in Richmond " I have thou& that thc best disposition for him and the . . army thatcould be madc His capacity for org anm tion and d~scipline,which has not been equaledamong us. could be used by you at headquarters with ~iifinitc dvantage to thc wholc army I


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thmk . . . the best thmg t o bc done . . . would bc to g v e his command to Gcncral Joseph EJohnston. He wd l cure all d~scontent nd lnsplre the army w t h new hfe and confidencc ''By thc cnd of January B r a g scemed to reslgn h ~ m sc lfo remaining and making

the best o f the situat~on .On 27 January he wrote to one o f h ~ supporters Brig ad ~c r eneral J.K.Jackson. "W ith so l~ tt l c upport, m y aching head rcbels against thc heart., and cries for rc l~ cf : t~l l,I h all d ~ en the traces "57

Jefferson Davis was concerned and mystified when he heard o f Bra& letter and scntGeneral Johnston to invest~gate D a d mstruct~onso Johnston read in part- "Though m yconfidencc in General Bra% IS unshaken, it cannot bc doubted that ~fe is distrusted a d~s astcrmay rcsult, which, but for that cause. would h a w b w n avo~ded . givc me the adv ~ce ced. i s tha t anny i s pa n o f your command, no order wd l be ncccssary to give you au th or ~t yhere." jX

Johnston found no reason to rcmovc Bra% On 12 Februa ry he wrote P rcsident Dav is 111sfindmgs

I avc seen the whole army. Its appearance is very encourazinz, an d yives pos ltlvecv~dence f General B ra g 's capaclty to command. It is w ell clothed, healthy, and in goodspirits h ly object has becn to ascertain if he conf idence o f he t roops in the abi l i ty of th cann y to beat the cneniy is at all im paircd I ind no indicat~onha t it 1s less than w hen yo uwere in i ts cam p \hie this feeling cx~sts . nd you rc gard General Brag g as brave andski l lfnl . the fact that some or a l l o f he General of f icers o f hc army, and many o f hesubordinates, think that you m ~ g h t ~ v chem a com mander with fewer defects, cannot, I hink,great ly d imin~sh ~ saluc. T o me it seems that the operations o f his army . . . have beenconducted adm irably. I an f ind no record o f more cf fect~v eighting In modem battles than o fthis an ny in December. evincing skdl in the commander and courage in the troops

General Johnston then contmucd. warning Davis that, as a m atter o f pcno na l honor, hc wou ld notaccept the comm and if offcrcd.

I ave been told b y Generals Polk and Hardee that the?; havc adv~sed ou t o rcmovc GeneralBra% and place me in command 1 am sure you would agree w ~ t h c that the part I havcbonic n his investigation would rcnder it ~ncons~stcntith m y personal honor to occupy thatpos~t ion Ibe l~c vc, owever, that General Bra% should not be removed.59

Johnston was not Brag& sole supporter. O f Brag$ generals, Jackson. \Vheelcr,3;


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Withers, and Clialniers publicly vo~c cd l ~ e ~ ronfidence. and several congressmen wrote B r a gletters of support Congressman Lyons wrote him, "It 1s the fate of leadmg men in times ofexcltcmcnt and revolution t o encounter occ as~ on al buse and niisrepresentat~on-but hose things

n~60are only temporary and justice wdl pre va ~l.By the end of February B r a g felt the furor was dymg down. On the 27th he expresscd

optinlism in a note to a fncn d on General Johnston's staffI am very happy to say that all seems to be subsiding into qwet satisfactio n And the onlydissat~sfactionhat ever ex ~ste dwas fomented bv a few disappomted G enerals whosupposed they could cover th e ~rracks and rlsc on my down fall The y have failed, mainlyowmg to the discriminat~on f your noble ch~ cf .who saw at a glance the whole be ar~ ngAn expression of regret. now almost unwersal, reaches mc constantly-but I pay no heed a ~ ~ dpursuc die even turn of my wa y 6 1

As Bragg's confidence returned, the Pres~dent's im ~n ~s he d. av ~ s ad decided to removcB r a g , but was restrained by Johnston's reluctance to accept the command . On 19 Febm ary thePrcs~dentwrote Johnston

It is not given to all men of ability to excite enthusiasm and win a ffcction of their troops,and it 1s only the few who are thus endowed who can overcome the d~ stru st, nd ahen at~ on ,of their principal officers . .You l m t hc select~on f a new man. and . . object to beinsyourself the inuiiediate conimandcr I do not thmk your personal honor 1s involved, asyou could have no thing to gam by the removal of General Bracq 62

Still. D a v~ s romised not to force any actlon on Johnston that would wound h ~ ssensibility orviews of professional propriety ""

The Confederate Secretary of War, James Seddon. also urged Johnston to remove B r a g .On 23 March he wrote Johnston that though B r a g "may have bccn harshly judged, vou certamlydo not reahze the popular distrust and discontent unfortunately pervadmg all ranks of the arm ytoward h m " Seddon su ge st ed th at Johnson keep 111s headquarters with the A m y of Tennessee,oversccmg operations and us~rigB r a g as h ~ srganlzcr and adm ~nistrato r 4 Johnson refused.believmg that no arniy could have two com manders


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Mca nwh ~lc. ragg's report on the Battle o f Murfrcesboro had reached R~chm ond Hc hadc r ~ t i c ~ z c domc o f his Generals, ~n clu di ng reckumdgc and Cheatham, enraglng their supponers 111congrcss This. together with Johnston's rcluctancc to relieve B r a g . finally drovc Prcs~dcntD a mto order Johnston to assumc command o f he Arnmy of Tc~lncsscc nd send B r a g o Richmond.Johnston. sti l l not desir ~ng ra g 's command, stallcd On I 9 March he wrotc D a v~ shat Bra&w ~ f e as s~ck, ndt hc trmc was not right to relieve B r a g . B y thc tlmc M rs . Bra% was better.Johnston was bcdriddc~i. c wrotc D a v ~ sn 10 Ap rd that "I m not now able to serve in the field.General B r a g s therefore necessary hcrc." Davis did not pursue the MC If Johnston did nottakc thc conmiand, the only other optlon was Gc ~ic ra l cauregard, who Davis despiscd Prcfcrringthe status quo t o Bcauregard: D a v ~ seft Bra% in command o f he Ann! o f Tennessee ''


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' ( h ad y M c \ f i ~ n ey .Braxtm Jlraggzm I th&zrnf&m.tc D& (New )'ark : Columb~aUn ~ve rsity ress. 1969). 157-2032~ W&r of the R c ~ ~ A ~ m p ~ ~ o f t h K & t f f i c ae c ~ r d r a f t h d h m m !

Cm fd er& Ar nu a 128 vol s. (Washinyon . Government Printing O fi ce , 1880-190 ) , Series I ,volu~iie10, part 2, p.338, 3 71,373 (hereafter cited as OR, and unless otherwise ind~ca ted llreferences are to Se r~ es ); and Bra% to W ife, 25 M arch 1862, Bixby colle ct~o n f Bra&< pape rs,quoted ~nMcW hiney, 215; and Mc\Wiiney, 1.57-203; and Nath a~u elC. Hughes. G&W111!m

(Baton Rouge : L o u ~ s ~ a n atate Unive rs~ty ress, 1965), 99; and lames LCCMcDonough,W Q ~n h l l B e f ~ r ~ N i g h tKnoxville University of Tcnnessce Press, 1977) 16.'McW%mey. 235-245. and Hughes, 99, 109. 114; and McD onough, 138-139. 148-150.169-1 70; and QB,I0 (part l),466

4 ~ c ~ h ~ n e y ,53-260; and OR , 17 (part 2).6275 ~ ~ ,0 (part 1),781: andm. 17 (part 2),6?8. 6 366 ~ l c h a r d . Brcwer, "The Tul laho n~aCampaign" (MMA S Thesis, U.S Arniy Command

and Staff College, 199 ) , 46; and Thomas Lawrence Connelly, A u tu n v ~ fG lo q ! Baton Rouge :Louisiana State Un~versityPress, 197 1) . 21; and McDonou&, 70: and Hughes, 99 .

8 ~ re w er , 4; and McDonou&, 709 ~ r e w e r ,4:nd McDonough, 79; and OR, I0 (part 2), 339-340IOsa rn W atk ~n s. Co&b (New York: Collier, 1962 ); 56-58I ~ Q . R I0 (part 1),7811 2 ~ r a g go Wife, 22 July 1862, B~ xb y ollect~on f B r a g papers, quoted in McWhiney.

266."OK, I6 (part 2 ), 680,695 ,70 1.709. and Q& 17 (part 2), 65 6, and Hughes. 12 1I4CX,52 (part 2), 330; and McW hiney, 26 8-271; and Hughes, 120.1 5 ~ c ~ ~ n e y ,72-273"OR; 17 (part 2). 627 -62 8,6 54 -5.6 73 : and McW h~ney. 275 ,278 .' 7 ~ ~ ,7 (part 2). 667 -668


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~ Q ~ c ~ l i ~ n e y ,90-202; and Hughes 123- 12-12008 6 (part 2). 896-897. and Mct4hine y, 300

' O K 16 (part 2). 896-897; and Me\W mey. 301 -3022 2 ~ n d e r s o no B r a g , I S Aprd 1863. Palmer Collcc t~on f B r a g Papers, quoted 111

Mc W Iin ey ; 306. and Hushes. 124- 125"QR., I 6 (par t 1). 1094-109524 ~o nn el l y ; 8 . and McWhmey. 3077i- - ~ h l c \ ~ l i i n c y ,30526QK 6 (part 2), 91 22 7 ~ o l rent's Memoranda: 6 October 1862, quoted in Mc W i~ nc y, 09. and McWhiney.

3 12: and OR_. 16 (pa rt I) . 1092 -109 9: and Hughes. 126-128"OR, I 6 (pa n I), 10 9 : and Mc \Vl~ incy , 12. and Hughes, 1282 9 ~ c ~ h i n e y ,19-320, and Hughes, I 3 I. I3 3" ~ c \ % l n c ~ ; 323-325; and Hughes, 135

" rent D~ ar y, November 1862, quotcd in M cW h~ nc y,32634 ~o nn el ly . 2-13. and Mc\Vhnc y, 327: and Hardee to W P Johnston; 19 November

1x62. quoted in Hughes. I3 4* -- ' b a v is to Smlth, 19 October 1862, E. K ~ r b y m ~th apers, Dukc Unwers~ty, uoted in

McWhmcv. 328"lackson to "Dear Fra nk", 7 Novem ber 1862. Charles Colo ck Jones papers. Duk c

Unive rs~ty. uoted in McWhmey. 33 1j7Q!L 20 (part 2). 394: and McWh iney, 337%onnelly. 23: and I)& LO (part 2); 422: and McW hme y. 33839~onne l ls ,32, and Mc\4111ney: 339


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41~ohnso11o W~pfal l ,15 December 1862. W~gfall arn~ly apers. University of Texas,quoted 111 McWhmcy. 344

4 2 ~ ~ ,0 (part 2). 441,49 3; and McW kiney, 34543~ onn el ly , 7 ; and Q-R. 20 (part I), 663: and McWhmey, 317: and Hughes. 14044 ~o nn el ly . 2, and Brent's D~a ry , 0 Dcccmbcr 1862. quoted in McWhmey; 34945.QR. 20 (part 2), 46946Connelly, 54-56, 59: and QR; 0 @art I), 783, and McWhmey. 35 8-3 V: and Hughes,

14447 ~o nn el l y, 2, and McWhincy, 362

4 9 0 ~ ,0 (part I ) , 70 050~ onn el ly , 7 . and QK 20 (part I ) , 682,683, and McWhiney, 371: and Hughes, 145

Richmond Exam iner, 6 Januar y 1863; Youngcr,cd ,Kean Diary p.38-42, quoted inMc\%iney. 37552 ~o nn el ly , 9; and Brent 's D~ ary , 0 January 1863, quoted in McWhiney, 376; and

Bra= to Clay, I 0 Jan uar y 1863 , Clement Claibum e Clay Papers, Duke Unwcrsity, quoted injVcWhincy, 376.

"CB, 0 (part 1). 60 0.54QR.20 (part I ) , 683; and Hu&es, 147- 14855 ~o nn el ly , 5-76: and CB, 0 (part I), 701.5 6 ~ ~ ,0 (part 1). 6985 7 ~ r a = o Jackson, 24 January 1863, Jackson-Mckinney Papers , Southern Historical

Collection,University of North Carolina, quoted in M cWhiney. 376.58~ onn el ly , 7: and OX. 3 (part 2): 6 13-6 1459 ~o nn el ly ; 9-80; and QR. 3 (pa n 2); 633-63460 ~o nn el ly . 3, and Mc\%~ney, 3826 1 ~ o n n e l l y ,0; and Bra% to Ewell. February 27;1863. Benjamin S Ewell Papers


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Henry E. Huntmgton Library. quoted in M c\ W w~ ev . .384h2m,3 (pan 2) . 640-6416 3 QR, 23 @ an 2 , 6 4 0 - 6 4 164 Q& 2; (part 2) . 627: and Mc\Vhney; 38565~ onn el ly , 0-86: and QR, 23 (part 2) . 708,745. and Mc\Vhney, 387


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CHAPTER 3JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1863

Tuil.&mJune 1863 saw the Army of Tennessee in the Duck River defenses they had occupied aftcr

the battle at Murfreesboro Believing himself badly outnunibercd by Major Gene ral Rosecrans'Un ~on orces, B r a g had decided against an offensive and awaited the cncmy's nex? move. Br a g 'spos~tionwas not strong. In January Hardee had warned him that "from the nature of the country,our flanks can be turned . . . I s

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