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PROPOSED STATEMENT ON APPEAL 2.13.2011

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Martin S. Friedlander (Bar # 36828) 10350 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 603 Los Angeles, California 90024 Tel. (310) 435-1519 Fax (310) 278-7330 Attorneys for Defendant Anthony Grossman

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

PRO VALUE PROPERTIES, INC., et al Plaintiff, vs. ANTHONY GROSSMAN; DOES 1 TO 10

CASE NO. 10B01962 GROSSMANS PROPOSED STATEMENT ON APPEAL.

JUDGE: Christine Ewell Defendants.

INTRODUCTION The Courts statement of decision must explain the legal and factual basis of the decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial as listed in the Request. CCP Sec. 632. As shall be demonstrated below the Court failed in its duties. A principal or material issue is one which is relevant and essential to the judgment and closely and directly related to the trial courts determination of the ultimate issues in the case. Kuffel v. Seaside Oil Co. 69 Cal. App. 3rd 555, 565 (1977) A statement of decision should set forth ultimate facts rather than evidentiary facts. Lynch v. Cook 148 Cal. App. 3rd 1072 (1983). It should provide a narrative explanation of the judges reasoning. People v. Casa Blanca PROPOSED STATEMENT ON APPEAL

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Convalescent Homes, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3rd 509,524 (1984). The findings should not be so ultimate that they are simply legal conclusions. E.g., findings that a contract existed between the parties; or that coverage existed under an insurance policy. Such findings make it extremely difficult if not impossible for the reviewing court to ascertain the basis for the trial courts conclusion that coverage existed. Employers Cas. Co. V. Northwestern Natl Ins. Group, Cal. App. 3rd 462, 473 (1980). Reversible error results where a statement of decision fails to make findings on a material issue which would fairly disclose the trial courts determination. Sperber v. Robinson, 26 Cal. App. 4th 736, 745 (1994). Grossmans objections should be specific. Ripani v. Liberty Loan Corp, 95 Cal. App. 3rd 603, 615 (1979) The undersigned contends that what this court conducted, calling it a trial was a farce and certainly did not meet the minimum expectations of Due Process of Law required by the 14th Amendment. This Court overruled Grossmans request that all witnesses take the witness stand as is required in every court that this writer attended over his 40 year career and certainly every Federal Trial the Trial Court attended as a Chief Prosecutor for the US Attorneys office for the Central District of California, major crimes division. This Court required both witnesses and attorneys to question the witness from the counsel table, which demeaned the court process as we all have known it throughout history. That irregular process prejudiced defense counsel since he had difficulty in hearing the questions and answers, which proceeded in machine gun style, partially precluding Evidence Code objections to be raised. This court arbitrarily denied Grossman a jury trial as timely requested by Grossman, arbitrarily denied Grossmans statutory and constitutional right to enforce validly served Subpoenas to extremely important and relevant witnesses who had first hand knowledge of the irregularities in the foreclosure procedure leading to the illegal sale to Pro Value. The documents and testimony of the Trustee who issued the NOS, NOD, and allegedly conducted the sale rigged in favor of Pro Value would have defeated Pro Values case. This Court stifled Grossmans counsel from posing relevant questions to the PROPOSED STATEMENT ON APPEAL -2-

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witnesses, including his narrative, by admonishing counsel to shoosh as a polite way of refusing to adhere to the Evidence Code and the Constitution. Friedlander was duly shooshed under pain of contempt. This Court abused it power by stifling Defense counsel. It appeared to defense counsel that this Court used time constraints to trump justice and due process. No reasonable bench trial could have been conducted in three 45 minute segments, especially one that required documentary evidence that needed foundation and relevance. Friedlander thus made an offer of proof but there was no court reporter to record that process to preserve the record on appeal. Thus Friedlander, on almost a daily basis, submitted memorandums of law to assist the court in following the law. THE REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF DECISION.

Pursuant to CCP Sec. 632 and CRC Rule 632, Defendant Anthony Grossman requested in writing that the Court issue a written Statement of Decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision with respect to the following controverted issues: 1. The factual and legal basis of this Court Quashing the Subpoenas served on the Seaside witnesses, in a sua sponte manner, when the law required a Motion to quash, not an objection. The court failed to do so. 2. The factual and legal basis as to whether or not Anthony Grossman was properly served with a 3 day Notice to Quit as required by statute. To be discussed later. 3. The factual and legal basis as to whether or not Pro Value was a bona fide purchaser. The court refused and failed to do so on the basis of relevancy based on the evidence that it claims it properly excluded. However the court did receive in evidence the Lis Pendens recorded by Grossman, which put Pro Value on Constructive Notice, which, by itself would have precluded Pro Value from being a BFP. The Court failed to deal with the legal consequences of that Lis Pendens in the context of a BFP. Carleen Riojas, the office managers testimony was worthless. She testified that she did not recall the telephone conversation that she had with PROPOSED STATEMENT ON APPEAL -3-

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Friedlander. Friedlander testified, without objection, that Riojas told him that she was the office manager; that she pulled the Grossman file; that she knew, before the sale that Grossman had recorded a Lis Pendens and that he had claims to the property (actual notice); she testified that was a basis of a conversation with Seaside, the Trustee, and the sales price was negotiated downward due to the impediment prior to any actual sale which gives credence to Grossmans claim that the sale was rigged. Riojas was given an opportunity to change her testimony, but she did not. Friedlanders testimony puts the lie to Riojas testimony, and she was anything but credible. Friedlander even offered into evidence a letter that he wrote to Pro Value after his conversation with Riojas, which Friedlander testified that it was his business practice over 40 years to reiterate a conversation in a letter to the other side to memorialize that conversation for a trial to take place many months or years later. Friedlander was not cross-examined. The Trial Court deliberately refused to render a factual and legal basis as to whether Pro Value was a BFP, and left it ambiguous. That is deliberate error and a denial of due process. A bona fide purchaser is one who pays value for the property without notice of any adverse interest or any irregularity in the sale proceeding. Nguyen v. Calhoun, 105 Cal. App. 4th 428 (2003). The Lis Pendens gave constructive notice to the world including Pro Value. Thus Pro Value was on constructive notice. Friedlander testified that the office manager told him that Pro Value had actual notice, a fact that has not been challenged by Pro Value. Friedlanders testimony established that not only did Pro Value have notice of irregularities in the sale proceedings, but Pro Value participated in those irregularities per Friedlanders sworn testimony as to the arrangement of the price before the sale. Pro Value offered no testimony whatsoever as to the actual sale and bidding. The Trustees Deed should not have been admitted into evidence pursuant to Judicial Notice, since it was irregular on its face. The Trial Court should have noted that the amount of the Unpaid Debt was left blank. Both Bayview and Seaside knew or PROPOSED STATEMENT ON APPEAL -4-

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should have known what the Unpaid Debt was. The Trustees Deed was not an affidavit, but a Notarial Acknowledgment that Elvia Bouche signed the document as Vice President of Seaside. It doesnt make the facts in that document true. 4. The factual and legal basis as to whether or not Bayview was an Assignee of the Original Lender on the date that it substituted Seaside as Trustee of the Grossman TD. The court deliberately failed to do so even after admitting into evidence the Allonge which stated on its face that the Note that Grossman signed in favor of the original lender was endorsed over to HSBC, an entity other than Bayview. That Allonge was faxed to Friedlander by Northwestern Trustee, the prior Trustee appointed by Bayview on a date prior to Seasides involvement, and puts the lie to the backdated and forged Assignment referenced in Pro Values Exhibit 2. This Court intentionally neglected to state that Exhibit 2 was recorded on 3/8/2010, one day before the sale. This court covered up the fraud and perjury of Bayview and Seaside by admitting that document into evidence and using that document to support its decision. It was backdated to 6/10/2009, which could not have been prepared by Seaside since Seaside was appointed on 8/3/2009 according to Exhibit 1. Since Bayview did not own the note it could not enforce the security for a note that it did not own. We will cite numerous authority in our brief, which will include a reference to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 5. The factual and legal basis as to whether or not S

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