The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework

Programme FP7/2007-2013 under grant agreement n°284678.

Regional Organization Study: Council of the Baltic Sea States

July 2013

Authors:

Simon Hollis and Magnus Ekengren Swedish National Defence College

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Executive Summary1

This study describes the current state of play and historical context of intergovernmental

cooperation through the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and its engagement with civil

security. It addresses the organizational, institutional, and cultural frameworks of the CBSS, as well as

the international context within which it is embedded. This provides an important backdrop for

describing the civil security system, which the CBSS has fostered for over 20 years. Beginning with

the establishment of an expert group on nuclear and radiological safety in 1992, the CBSS now

participates in a wide range of cooperative endeavours, such as information exchange on forest fire-

fighting and environmental pollution. This study also assesses CBSS civil security along three

indicators that highlight the extent to which the system is effective, efficient and legitimate. It is

argued that the CBSS is a regional organization that finds its strength as a platform for facilitating and

encouraging cooperation on civil security; however, its actual capacity as an actor in civil security

area remains low.

1 This case study represents one of Regional Organizations (RO) compiled in the context of the Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe (ANVIL) Project. The ANVIL Project aims to map the variety and similarities in Europe's regional civil security structures, practices and cultures and investigate how variety affects the safety of Europe's citizens. The results give policy stakeholders a clear overview over civil security architectures and EU-added value to the debate concerning “not one security fits all”. The ANVIL project is funded by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme. Read more at www.anvil-project.net

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Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. 2

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 4

2. Analytical Dimensions ..................................................................................................................... 4

2.1. Cultural and historical aspects ................................................................................................ 5

2.1.1. The establishment of the CBSS ........................................................................................ 5

2.1.2. The evolution of the CBSS membership .......................................................................... 5

2.1.3. The member characteristics of the CBSS ......................................................................... 6

2.1.4. The cultural milieu of the CBSS ....................................................................................... 8

2.2. Legal and institutional aspects the CBSS dealing with civil security ....................................... 9

2.2.1. The current legal basis of the CBSS ................................................................................. 9

2.2.2. The current institutional framework of the CBSS............................................................ 9

2.2.3. Decision making process ............................................................................................... 11

2.2.4. Activities related to civil security ................................................................................... 11

2.2.5. Crisis management cycle ............................................................................................... 12

2.2.6. The crisis management approach ................................................................................. 13

2.3. The relations between the CBSS and member states’ citizens, governments and stakeholders ...................................................................................................................................... 14

2.3.1. Citizens .......................................................................................................................... 14

2.3.2. Relations between the CBSS and member states’ governments .................................. 15

2.3.3. Relations between the CBSS and stakeholders ............................................................. 16

2.4. The role of the private sector in maintaining civil security ................................................... 17

2.5. Relations with the EU, UN and other ROs ............................................................................. 18

3. The Quality Issue .......................................................................................................................... 20

3.1. Effectiveness .......................................................................................................................... 20

3.2. Efficiency ............................................................................................................................... 20

3.3. Legitimacy .............................................................................................................................. 22

4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 22

Annex I: Coded Data .............................................................................................................................. 24

Annex II: Resources ............................................................................................................................... 31

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1. Introduction2

After 20 years of cooperation, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) is now an established

regional organization whose 11 members represent the entirety of the Baltic Sea region (BSR) and a

significant proportion of the European economy. Its historical genesis is located on a guarantee for

economic and social stability in the immediate years after the Cold War. This period is characterized

with an avid concern to support the developing democracies of the Baltic States, and a desire to

deepen economic development cooperation. Based on a German-Danish initiative, the CBSS was thus

formed in 1992. Attention to civil protection has developed from its original focus on nuclear and

radiological safety to include a wide range of manmade and natural disasters. Due to its geographical

location, maritime security is clearly a focus that involves an array of different actors from private

energy companies, international organizations, local and national governments, and regional

organizations. According to the CBSS, civil security cooperation entails the ‘protection of people, the

environment and property in the event of man-made, technological and natural risks or emergencies

(CBSS n.db).’

The main purpose of the CBSS is to provide a platform for enhancing contacts, networks and dialogue

under five key issue areas: the environment, economic development, energy, culture and education,

and civil security. Within these areas of cooperation, the organization increasingly sees itself as a

project-orientated entity that aims to support existing projects, such as the EU strategy for the Baltic

Sea region, as well as develop its own forms of cooperation, such as the task force on organized

crime. These cooperative endeavours are carried out under the goal of complementarity to existing

cooperation in order to avoid duplication (Germanas 2009). The CBSS has not diverted from its

original goal of establishing economic and social stability; it has rather built on these initial concerns

by expanding its portfolio into the area of economic development and social cohesion. Its fairly lean

institutional structure and intergovernmental system of governance has also meant that it has not

been overburdened with administrational details, but free to pursue the interests of its member

states through collaboration.

2 We would like to thank Carl-Einar Stålvant and Gunilla Reischl for their valuable comments on this case study.

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2. Analytical Dimensions

2.1. Cultural and historical aspects

2.1.1. The establishment of the CBSS

The ten states that surround the Baltic Sea region (BSR) – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany,

Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden – met in Copenhagen to agree on a new form

of regional cooperation and coordination. The Copenhagen Declaration was subsequently signed on

5-6 March 1992 that brought into existence the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). This form of

cooperation was considered necessary for underpinning a new and secure European region at the

end of the Cold War. This is well reflected in the introduction of the Copenhagen Declaration: ‘[t]he

Ministers agreed that the recent dramatic changes in Europe herald a new era of European relations

where the confrontation and division of the past is replaced by partnership and cooperation….This

cooperation will strengthen the cohesion among these countries, leading to greater political and

economic stability as well as a regional identity’ (CBSS 1992, I). The most apparent ‘dramatic change’

was the reclaimed independence of the three Baltic States. Combined with Russia’s glasnost policy,

this change of events provided much impetus for closer cooperation. Spearheaded by the German

and Danish foreign ministers, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, the foreign

ministers of the BSA met in Copenhagen to discuss this new form of regional cooperation.

The original mandate of the CBSS, as reflected in the declaration, covers six main areas of

cooperation (Ibid, II).

1. Democratization. Support, protect, and develop democratic institutions. The members agreed to cooperate with the Council of Europe, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, and other relevant bodies.

2. Economic development. The declaration aims to help with the transition from planned to market economies through financial aid and support. Additionally, the members agreed to enhance economic cooperation by investing in research and development.

3. Humanitarian aid. To provide basic provisions to a number of Baltic states in the form of food, medicine and fuel. Enhancing health and social affairs in these countries is also mentioned.

4. Environmental protection. To address the pollution of the Baltic Sea and to cooperate in the field of energy. In particular, to share information and collaborate on ensuring safer nuclear energy.

5. Culture. To develop a ‘regional identity’ through promoting inter-exchange between (non)governmental organizations and individuals. This would be done by promoting cultural and academic exchanges.

6. Infrastructure. To enhance and develop transport and communication links in order to promote the economies of the BSA.

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These goals reflect a concern for the short-term economic and democratic development of the Baltic

States in the early 1990s and the long-term investment of the BSA economy and security. Within the

past 20 years, since the signing of the Copenhagen Declaration, the aims and goals of the CBSS have

not changed fundamentally. Rather, the goals have been streamlined and have increased in

specificity. This is depicted in the 2008 Declaration on the reform of the Council of the Baltic Sea

States, which highlights five priority areas of cooperation: (1) economic development, (2) the

environment, (3) energy, (4) culture, and (5) civil security (CBSS 2008, p. 2). In comparison to the

original goals, the 2008 agenda de-emphasizes the original short-term concerns for democratization

and humanitarian aid, and reemphasizes the original long-term goals of economic, environmental,

and cultural cooperation. Importantly, it also expands on nuclear safety to include cooperation

against trafficking in human beings, on the protection of children’s rights, civil protection, consumer

protection, youth affairs and the promotion of tolerance under the general rubric of civil security

(Ibid).

Future cooperation under CBSS is unlikely to reveal any large surprises. Based on the Vilnius

Declaration, A Vision for the Baltic Sea Region by 2020, the CBSS member states plan to maintain

their core focus on economic development and competitiveness, and social cohesion (CBSS 2010b).

The goals of CBSS were initially understood to build on or complement existing framework

agreements and institutions connected to the BSA, such as the Committee for Cooperation and

Security in Europe, the Council of Europe, the Helsinki Commission, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter

of Paris and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Now, current

declarations and agreements refer more to the need to synergize efforts and coordinate with other

regional organizations in the BSA, such as the Northern Dimension or HELCOM, and also with the EU

and its strategy for the region (cf. CBSS 2008, 2011b).

2.1.2. The evolution of the CBSS membership

The original ten member states and the European Commission welcomed Iceland as an additional

member in 1995. This has been the only additional member to CBSS since its creation in 1992.

However, the number of observer states and strategic partners has increased. In 1999 the CBSS

Council adopted regulations for observer states. This has resulted in the inclusion of an additional ten

countries that are encouraged to actively participate in CBSS activities. These countries include

Belarus, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, the Ukraine, the United Kingdom

and the United States of America. Since 2001 other organizations and institutions that share the

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goals of CBSS have been included as ‘strategic partners’. Some examples of the 16 strategic partners

include the OECD, the Baltic Sea Forum, HELCOM, and the Baltic University Programme (CBSS n.dc).

The council decides on the acceptance of a new observer and the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO)

decides on the acceptance of a new strategic partner. The CSO also organizes annual consultations

with observers and strategic partners. Third parties may be invited to CBSS meetings at any level, for

a specified agenda, or for the entire meeting. They can be given permission to speak, but they may

not participate in decision making (CBSS 2009). Permanent membership has not altered since the

Copenhagen declaration.

2.1.3. The member characteristics of the CBSS

The ten permanent members of CBSS are characterized by much diversity and few similarities. The

populations of member states range from 320 thousand in Iceland to 142.96 million in Russia; the

area of land and water range from 43 thousand sq km in Denmark to 17 million sq km in Russia; and

GDP (in current prices) ranges from 11 million euro in Iceland to 2 trillion euro in Germany. Perhaps a

closer similarity is the degree to which a majority of these countries are democratic, with the

exception of Russia. For a full comparison of these features please refer to Table 2.1.

Except for Norway and Russia, all of the member states are also full members of the EU. Germany is

the only founding member (1952) followed by Denmark that became a member in 1973. Sweden and

Finland became members in 1995 and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland became members in

2004.

Table 2.1. Member state characteristics

Permanent Members of CBSS

Population (m)

Area (sq km)

Regime Type GDP (€m)

Government Democratic Index

Denmark 5.57 43,094 Parliamentary Full democracy 9.52 248,954.3

Estonia 1.34 45,228 Parliamentary republic

Flawed democracy

7.61 17,942.8

Finland 5.36 338,145 Presidential Full democracy 9.06 198,610.3

Germany 81.78 357,022 Presidential Full democracy 8.34 2,697,835.2

Latvia 2.07 64,589 Parliamentary Flawed democracy

7.05 23,370.5

Lithuania 3.22 65,300 Parliamentary Flawed democracy

7.24 34,481.3

Norway 4.95 323,802 Parliamentary Full democracy 9.8 416,208.2

Poland 38.53 312,685 Presidential Flawed democracy

7.12 398,578.2

Russia 142.96 17,098,242 Presidential Authoritarian 3.92 1,420,507.3*

Sweden 9.45 450,295 Parliamentary Full democracy 9.5 423,981.9

Iceland 0.32 103,000 Presidential Full democracy 9.65 11,119.8

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Total 295.55 19,201,400 n.d. n.d. n.d. 5,891,589.8

EU 503.66 43,24,782 Regional Organization n.d 13,006,096.9

Sources: EIU 2011; EUROSTAT 2013a; 2013b; UNSTAT 2013a; 2013b; CIA 2013 *Note that the GDP figure for the Russian Federation (at current US prices) was taken from UNSTAT database for 2011 (most recent) and calculated on the current exchange rate of 1USD=0.764EUR. All other GDP statistics come from EUROSTAT (at current market prices) for 2013. Note also that area includes land and water in sq km.

2.1.4. The cultural milieu of the CBSS

According to the World Value Survey – a quantitative database that measures national culture – the

value score for survival and self-expression are helpful for explaining the transition from an industrial

to a post-industrial society. An industrial society typifies values centred on survival, such as economic

and physical security. A post-industrial society, on the other hand, typifies values centred on self-

expression, such as subjective well-being and quality of life. The main reason for this division of

societal values, is that the latter takes survival for granted based on a long period of prosperous

growth. Based on a number of surveys conducted over the last 30 years, these values have been

collated and are displayed in Table 2.2. The division between the two typifications are graded

between survival (-2) and self-expression (+2).

A clear division can be seen among the CBSS member states; Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and

Germany are post-industrial compared to Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Latvia, and Estonia which have

remained industrial. This means that the former would be more inclined to value policies that

encourage quality of life, while the latter would prioritise policies that promote economic and

physical security. Indeed, the main goals and priorities of CBSS – as reflected in the original

Copenhagen declaration and the more recent Declaration on the reform of the Council of the Baltic

Sea States (CBSS 2008) – tend to agree with these cultural values: economic growth and security

conjoined with an increased focus on civil security. Furthermore, civil security’s wide approach that

pays less attention to traditional inter-state security issues also seems to reflect a more post-

industrial organization that is concerned with increasing the well-being and quality of life for the BSR.

Indeed, despite Russian efforts to push an agenda based on state-controlled economics and

traditional security issues, CBSS is rather based on a ‘soft’ civil security agenda (Oldberg 2012, p. 2).

Table 2.2. Societal values of survival and self-expression in the member states of the CBSS

Country Year of Survey on Survival (-2) to Self-expression (+2) Values

1981 1990 1995 2000 2006

Denmark 1.44 1.20 n.a 1.87 n.a

Finland 0.82 1.26 1.01 0.94 1.12

Sweden 0.85 1.54 1.99 2.09 2.35

Norway 0.53 0.79 1.33 n.a 2.17

(W)Germany -0.07 0.69 1.52 0.44 0.74

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Lithuania n.a -0.64 -1.45 -1.00 n.a

Poland n.a -0.27 -0.41 -0.60 -0.14

Russia n.a -1.34 -1.85 -1.88 -1.42

Latvia n.a -0.60 -0.89 -1.27 n.a

Estonia n.a -0.88 -1.30 -1.19 n.a

Source: Ingelhart, n.d.

2.2. Legal and institutional aspects the CBSS dealing with civil security

2.2.1. The current legal basis of the CBSS

As noted above, the main legal document outlining cooperation between the members of the CBSS

was negotiated in 1992 and formulated in the Copenhagen declaration, and the Terms of Reference

(CBSS 1992a; 1992b). These documents were updated in 2009 with a new Terms of Reference (CBSS

2009). While some of the content and goals of the organization have changed over this time, its legal

standing as an intergovernmental cooperative forum that decides by consensus has remained the

same. That is, an intergovernmental forum that can (1) act as an umbrella for all intergovernmental

and multilateral cooperative endeavours in the BSR (2) facilitate information-sharing and

coordination (Szacawa 2012) and, (3) provide political guidance for the Baltic Sea States Summits of

heads of state (CBSS 2009, §7). It is in this sense that the CBSS has continued to support, encourage,

and promote collective cooperation according to its four main substantive areas of cooperation:

environment, economic development, energy, education and culture, and civil security and the

human dimension (CBSS 2008). While the CBSS has undergone reform in 2008 resulting in the Riga

Declaration, the Vilnius Declaration and the new Terms of Reference, these documents only specify

existing modes of cooperation. There are no reforms foreseen in the near future.

Like most CBSS undertakings, crisis management cooperation has no real legal standing. Cooperation

in crisis management, just like economic development and environmental sustainability, is

implemented by expert groups in coordination with the Committee of Senior Officials.

2.2.2. The current institutional framework of the CBSS

The CBSS is governed by a yearly rotating presidency (from July 1 to June 30): a role that a

permanent member takes on except for the Commission. The presidency is responsible for hosting

and preparing summit and the council meetings. The Baltic Sea States Summits occur once every two

years and are attended by the heads of governments for each member state. The council meetings

are convened at the end of each presidency. The attendees of the meetings are member states’

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ministers of foreign affairs.3 Since 2003 the foreign ministers’ meeting and the heads of state meet

alternatingly (Kasack, p.139). The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) – consisting of high-level

officials from the foreign affairs ministries and a European Commission representative – are

responsible for implementing the decisions of the council and for coordinating cooperation through

the establishment of expert groups. The CSO decide on relevant projects and their implementations,

acts as the main decision-making entity between ministerial meetings, and coordinates all of the

CBSS institutional structures (Szacawa 2012). The CSO also prepare the sessions for the council as

well as providing regular reports. The agenda for the CSO is directed by the presidency and assisted

by the CSO members and the secretariat. As each presidency only lasts for one year, a troika is also

composed of the former, incumbent and incoming CSO members of the presidency to ensure a

smooth transition. This is a fairly new development that first appears in the 2009 terms of reference

(CBSS 2009, §20). The CSO meet approximately eight times each year. For an overview of the

institutional framework see Figure 2.1.

After some competition between permanent members and an offer from Stockholm, a permanent

international secretariat was established in 1998 to service the growing institution. Its function is to

assist the presidency in preparing for ministerial sessions and other meetings with CBSS officials. It is

also tasked with increasing public awareness of CBSS and to act as a spokesman for the organization

(CBSS 1998). Its budget is derived from annual contributions by member states as well as project

funds. The maximum yearly amount for the first five years was capped at 2 million Danish kroner.4

There are 20 full-time people working in the secretariat. The secretariat was restructured in 2008 in

order to ‘better facilitate project identification, fund raising and project management’ (CBSS 2008,

§6). The member states also plan to increase the general budget line for project development (CBSS

2011b). The secretariat additionally service expert groups and other ministerial meetings. The latter

include meetings on energy, culture, the environment, civil security (est. 2002), education and the

economy. The former includes inter alia the expert group for cooperation on children at risk (est.

1999), the expert group on nuclear and radiation safety (est. 1992), the expert group on youth affairs

(est. 1998), and the task force against trafficking in human beings.

In addition to the abovementioned working groups and task forces, the CBSS has established

networks for prosecutors general, and tax cooperation, and a task force on organised crime

3 Ad hoc meetings between other ministers can also occur. In this case, the member state hosting the event is

also responsible for coordination. 4 The contributions are divided according to the following percentage: 4 percent each from Estonia, Iceland,

Latvia, and Lithuania; and 12% each from Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden.

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established by the 1st CBSS prime ministerial meeting in 1996. Most of the meetings and expert

groups have a low amount of autonomy as they are firmly connected to the organizational structure

of the CBSS. An exception to this is the Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation which was

established at a CBSS conference in 1996, but is fully independent from the CBSS. The establishment

of these and other projects reflects the growing norm and raison d’être of CBSS as a project-

orientated organization (CBSS 2011b).

As noted above, observer states and other third parties are also able to participate in the

abovementioned areas of cooperation; from ministerial meetings to expert groups. Indeed, third

parties and other organizations are actively encouraged to help achieve the goals and programmes

designed by the CSO.

Figure 2.1 Institutional framework of the CBSS

Source: Szacawa 2012

2.2.3. Decision making process

The decision making process within CBSS is based on consensus and steered by the presidency (CBSS

2009, §22). The main decision making body is the CSO. While the ministers and heads of state hold

more authority, their meetings and the agenda are largely formulated and driven by the CSO. As

noted, CSO members make up the troika, and also decide on what projects ought to be instigated

and decide on how they will be carried out. The area of civil security, however, is slightly different

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because they are more closely connected to the meetings of ministers of CBSS and consequently by-

pass the CSO. Thus, the network on civil protection appears to hold more decision-making authority

than other working groups. The decisions taken are generally non-binding on member states, and it is

intergovernmental and not supranational cooperation. This also means that accountability

arrangements are fairly weak.

2.2.4. Activities related to civil security

Attention to civil security was raised at the first ministerial meeting establishing the CBSS in the area

of nuclear safety (CBSS 1992). This resulted in the establishment of the CBSS Expert Group On

Nuclear And Radiation Safety (EGNRS) in the same year. For the first part of the 1990s the threat of

nuclear and radioactive disasters was thus the main prioritized threat. This somewhat narrow focus

then expanded to include ‘civic security’ in the first Presidency Declaration in 1996, noting that they

wish to enhance ‘civic security in the Region, be it through co-operation between civilian authorities,

be it in fighting organised crime, be it in promoting maritime safety and nuclear safety’ (CBSS 1996).

The threat perception thus expanded to include the environment and organized crime. Six years

later, the civil protection network was established. This network consists of the directors general of

member state civil protection authorities that meet annually to exchange information on risk

analysis, crisis management and disaster preparedness. For example, the civil protection network

organized a Finish-Russian seminar on forest fire prevention in 2012 in Vyborg (CBSS 2012a). The

chairmanship mirrors the current revolving CBSS presidency. Senior experts also meet at least once a

year to organize and manage joint projects (CBSS 2011a, 74; CBSS 2012b, 11). Principal attention has

focused on environmental and marine pollution and accidents.

As part of a programme launched by CBSS in 2006, entitled the EUROBALTIC Programme for Civil

Protection, the CIVPRO Civil Protection Network was established. The aim of the network is to act as

a platform for on-going research related to civil protection in the BSR. In particular it aims to provide

access to research, build Web-based knowledge, collaborate with experts, and advocate civil

protection issues to the wider academic community, governments, and the private sector (CIVPRO

2007).

Cooperation on civil security has also been strengthened through the 2009 EU strategy for the Baltic

Sea region that will be updated in 2013. The 2009 strategy – the EU’s first official strategy with a sub-

regional group in Europe (EU 2012b) – introduces a number of priority areas, goals and targets.

Among these is Priority Area (PA) 13 and 14. The former concentrates on maritime safety and

security that include eight flagship projects, such as a pilot project for integrating maritime

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surveillance systems and establishing a formal risk assessment for liquefied natural gas carriers in the

Baltic Sea area. The later (PA 14) focuses on maritime accident response capacity. PA 14 has three

flagship projects that include an assessment of volunteer troops for maritime pollution response

(14.1), mapping existing marine pollution response capacities (14.2), and to ‘develop scenarios and

identify gaps’ for major hazards that affect the region including floods and storms (14.3) (EU 2012a;

CBSS 2012b, 11). These projects entail, inter alia, conducting comparative analysis on civil security

systems to increase coordination, dissemination of best practices, joint training courses, defining

standard operative procedures, increasing interoperability, and exercises between the CBSS

countries.5 Furthermore, it is envisioned that by 2020 there will be a Common Information Sharing

Environment (CISE) in all maritime and coast guard authorities, a permanent regional cooperation

framework for national coastguard, and a Baltic Sea region e-navigation forum (Commission 2009,

p.118). The strategy is also based on the so-called ‘three no’s: no new funding – no new legislation –

no new institutions’ (EUSBSR 2012); a position that may be reflective of an aversion to duplicating

existing civil security functions and creating unnecessary institutions.

The current Russian presidency has made civil protection in the BSR a priority – in line with flagship

project 14.3 – which is supported by the secretariat and the St. Petersburg University of State Fire

Service of EMERCOM.

2.2.5. Crisis management cycle

As mentioned in section 2.2.4, the main focus on civil security cooperation centres on preparedness.

That is, a focus on joint exercises, research projects, common information sharing, and

interoperability. There is comparatively less in the area of prevention and even less in the area of

response, although this may be slowly changing with the new initiatives conducted through ‘priority

area 14’ of the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. The CBSS does not offer any equivalent role to

the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) in the European Commission, which facilitates

response activities between member states. Instead, attention is focused on streamlining different

approaches in order to make collective cooperation more efficient in the future, which remains on

multilateral or bilateral agreements. In this sense, the CBSS is a forum that provides for discussion

and support for projects such as the EUSBSR. CBSS can also be categorized as playing a more

administrative than operative role in the area of civil security, as its main functions are to (1) support

the civil protection network and (2) support and implement inter alia projects related to civil

protection.

5 See, for example, the sub-regional risk of spill of oil and hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea (BRISK) project (HELCOM, n.d).

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2.2.6. The crisis management approach

As there is currently little operative cooperation through the CBSS, there is correspondingly a weak

crisis management approach. CBSS does not yet facilitate responses to natural or manmade

disasters. However, if it does so in the future or if it begins to conduct simulation exercises, the use

of civilian and military assets will have to be assessed, as well as the allocation of responsibility and

developing lessons-learned and best-practices from cooperation.

2.3. The relations between the CBSS and member states’ citizens, governments and stakeholders

2.3.1. Citizens

The establishment of the secretariat is perhaps the first significant achievement for providing some

coverage to citizens, which is also part of its official mandate (cf. Section 2.2.2). In 2010, CBSS

adopted an Information and Communication Strategy, reflecting a growing realization that

communication is important to maintain and improve its legitimacy and to further its goal of

establishing effective social and professional networks in the BSR. The strategy identifies four ‘tools’

for communication: the CBSS website; official publications; reports, seminars, workshops and

conferences; and the use of the CBSS flag (CBSS 2010, p.2). The target groups are also identified as

intermediaries (member state officials, representative of other regional organizations, strategic

partner, parliamentarians, media representatives, and librarians) and end users (NGOs, international

organizations, the business community, researchers, experts and students, and the general public).

From this list, it is clear that citizens, or the ‘general public’, are not given the main priority as end

users. It would thus appear that the connection between the citizen and the CBSS is currently poor.

Indeed, the use of the website as the main tool for dissemination purposes means that citizens have

to be proactive in locating and informing themselves on the CBSS. In saying this, the website is very

well equipped with information on the CBSS and its expert groups and task forces. In particular, the

website offers inter alia annual reports, the ‘Balticness’ Journal, factsheets, and an audio, photo, and

video gallery. There is no identifiable link between the citizen and CBSS work in the area of civil

security except for the information supplied in the website. An exception to this is the Task Force

against Trafficking in Human Beings (TF-THB), which has targeted citizen awareness more directly

through various media outlets such as Sweden’s Aftonbladet, Sverige Radio, and Stockholm City

(CBSS, n.db).

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2.3.2. Relations between the CBSS and member states’ governments

Governments of the CBSS member states show their commitment to the regional organizations

through (1) participation in executive-level and high-level meetings and (2) financially supporting the

secretariat with on-going projects, such as the expert groups. As official participation at the executive

level – heads of state or foreign ministers – only occurs once per year, the level of commitment is not

considered particularly high. There are very few powers, responsibilities and activities that are

delegated to CBSS from its member states. It remains a forum for consultation, the exchange of

ideas, and the promotion of collective projects that can provide collective goods for the BSR.

Furthermore, the high-level officials of the member states that are members of CSO also have a

strong hand in supervising and controlling CBSS activities.

In the field of civil security member states are able to provide strategic and policy guidelines to CBSS

through the civil protection network, which is attended by the general secretaries of member state

civil protection authorities. This high-level group is answerable and able to provide policy guidelines

to the CBSS meeting of ministers. It should also be pointed out that through the EU strategy for the

Baltic Sea region national contact points have been set up to aid in implementing the programme.

This has resulted in specific institutional or legislative adaptations to foster the vertical link between

the EU, CBSS and states. For example, a special unit has been established in Sweden’s Prime

Minister’s Office, an inter-ministerial group has been created in Estonia, and the Lithuanian

Parliament has requested the government to prepare a national action plan that is in-line with the

EUSBSR (Commission 2011, pp. 5-6). The strategy also connects local actors or sub-national groups.

Some partners and stakeholders recognised through the EUSBSR include: Blekinge, Västerbotten,

Kalmar, and Skåne in Sweden; Hamburg, and Mecklenburg-Vornpommern in Germany; Helsinki, and

Southwest Finland in Finland; Pomorskie in Poland; and Zealand in Denmark (Commission 2011, p.7).

National parliaments do not play a direct role with the CBSS. However, there is a working relationship

between the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) and the CBSS. The BSPC meets annually and

is comprised of parliamentarians of the BSR.6 The BSPC have been interested in becoming more

involved with CBSS, noting in 2001 that is wished to ‘evolve towards a permanent parliamentary

assembly supporting the actions undertaken by the CBSS with democratic procedures’ (BSPC 2001,

cited in Kasack 2005, p. 140). While this aim has not yet eventuated, the CBSS and the BSPC do

interact through the exchange of information, joint meetings, and via common projects such as the

Northern Dimension Action Plan (Kasack 2005, pp. 140-142).

6 Note that membership also includes members of multinational parliament bodies, such as the European

Parliament, the Nordic Council, and the Baltic Assembly, as well as sub-national bodies such as the German states.

16

2.3.3. Relations between the CBSS and stakeholders

The CBSS relationship to stakeholders is the raison d’être of the CBSS activities: its main aim is to

foster and strengthen cooperation between relevant business, private and state-based organizations

in order to stimulate the economy, provide social cohesion and increase general safety and

wellbeing. There are four identifiable methods the CBSS uses to relate to its stakeholders. The first is

through the various projects developed and overseen by the CSO. The second is via the networks and

meetings held under the auspices of the CBSS ministers meetings. The third is through strategic

partners and third-party participation. The fourth is through the EU strategy for the BSR. Each of

these areas of cooperation is expanded upon below.7

Table 2.3 Areas of CBSS Cooperation

Areas of CBSS Cooperation – expert groups, networks, and initiatives Environment Economic

development Energy Culture Civil Security

Expert Group 1 1 3

Network 1 5 1 2 2

Projects/working groups

12 5 1 4

Task Force 2

Total 14 11 1 3 11

Expert groups, task forces and projects. As noted above and illustrated in Table 2.3, there are many

expert groups, task forces and projects that are currently active under five broad issue areas of CBSS:

the environment, economic development, energy, education and culture and civil security. For

example, the ‘expert group on sustainable development – Baltic 21’ acts as a forum and as a platform

for stakeholders – governments, organizations, and individuals – working on environmental

sustainability to interact and create new networks. The Task Force on Organized Crime (TF-OC) is an

example of a CBSS task force. Its aim is to cooperate closely with member state law enforcement

agencies to prevent and fight organized crime. This includes the exchange of information, joint

operative measures, judicial cooperation, and joint training (Security and Society 2007). The CBSS

Project Support Facility (PSF) is an example of a project in economic development. The main goal of

this initiative is to ‘facilitate the initiation, development and implementation of Baltic Sea regional

cooperation projects by co-financing projects, which would bring added value for the Baltic Sea

7 The source of this information can be found in the CBSS official website: www.cbss.org

17

Region’ (CBSS n.dd). The PSF is also designed to cover and promote cooperation in the area of civil

protection.

Networks. There is also an array of networks that the CBSS helps to facilitate. These include, for

example, the Civil Protection Network (discussed above), the Prosecutors General Network, and the

Ars Baltica Organising Committee. The latter is an informal network that has established ‘National

Desks’ in inter alia member state miniseries of culture that regularly cooperate on developing

projects (ARS Baltica 2011).

Strategic partners. The CBSS also work through strategic partners and observer states that are

officially connected to the regional organization. An institutionalized aspect of this type of

cooperation is an annual coordination meeting that is organized by the CSO chair. There are currently

18 strategic partners that include inter alia the Baltic Sea NGO Forum, the Baltic Marine Environment

Protection Commission (HELCOM), the Baltic Sea States Sub regional Cooperation (BSSSC), the Baltic

Development Forum, and the Baltic Sea Forum.

EU strategy for the BSR. The EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region has been an additional source of

cooperation and coordination between stakeholders and the CBSS. As this form of cooperation has

already been exemplified above (section 2.2.4), it should suffice to mention additional

partners/stakeholders that are participating through the strategy. These include but are not limited

to the Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Co-operation, Baltic Metropolis Network, Euroregion Baltic,

Union of Baltic Cities, Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions – Baltic Sea Commission, Baltic 7

Islands, and the Baltic NGO Forum (Commission 2011, p.7).

2.4. The role of the private sector in maintaining civil security

Except for the private sector that is connected to the CBSS through one or more of the

abovementioned communication tools, the role of the private sector in maintaining civil security is

low. The CBSS has recently established a public-private partnership cooperation network (P3CN),

which had its first conference in 2012. Some examples of participants include: ÖPP Deutschland AG,

VBI - German Association of Consulting Engineers, Vattenfall Europe, and VIFG - Transport

Infrastructure Financing Agency. The main areas of cooperation do not directly involve civil security,

but focus on street lighting, public transport, and social infrastructure (CBSS n.da). Indirectly, the

facilitation of safe public transport, for example, can provide important prevention activities for the

18

future. This P3CN can provide a useful avenue for future cooperation for the private sector in

maintaining civil security in the BSR.8

2.5. Relations with the EU, UN and other ROs

The declaration on the reform of the CBSS notes specifically the importance of creating and

maintaining cooperative links with the EU, UN and other regional organizations. In particular it notes

that along with the European Union, ‘it shall continue to coordinate its activities and seek synergies

with the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Arctic Council and the

Northern Dimension Partnerships…it shall seek complementarity and synergy with other regional and

subregional actors [sic]’ (CBSS 2008, §11-12). In terms of geographically approximate organizations

that are situated within the BSR, cooperation is active. According to a recent briefing paper to the

German presidency of the council, horizontal cooperation between other relevant sub-regional

organizations in the Baltic area, such as HELCOM or the Nordic Region, enjoys a high level of

coordination and an appropriate division of labour. However, cooperation between larger regional or

international organizations is not always seen in such a positive light. Commenting on the CBSS

relationship to the EU and UN, the authors noted that: ‘shaping the function of an umbrella

coordinator within or across sectors does not necessarily provide added value’ (Etzold and Gänzle

2012, p.9. cf. Germanas 2009 for a contra position). In an attempt to rectify this issue, the EU has

been recently searching for new areas of added value by attempting to: create synergies with CBSS

and the MIC; increase public awareness; and promote contingency planning, disaster scenarios,

communication systems, the use of technology, and joint training (Commission 2011, p. 112). The

EU’s strategy on the Baltic Sea region has certainly been a part of these efforts (see section 2.2.4).

Cooperation between the UN and UN agencies tends to be weaker than the EU. No UN-based

agencies are credited as strategic partners and only some projects – such as the Expert Group on

Sustainable Development – Baltic 21 – are connected to the UN based on a similar agenda.9 Other

international and regional organizations that connect into the BSR include NATO, EFTA, OECD, and

the Council of Europe. NATO, for example, has been influential in supporting the security dimension

of CBSS, which is reflected in the Partnership for Peace programme, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership

Council (EAPC), the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), and the Combined Joint Task Force

(CJTF) (Hyde-Price 2000, p. 6). The evolving membership of BSR countries and these organizations

can be viewed in Figure 2.2.

8 Cf. http://cbss.idynamic.lv/Economic-Development/public-private-partnerships 9 In this case, the Baltic-21 EG was created in reaction to the United Nation’s ‘Earth Summit’ in 1996.

19

Figure 2.2 The evolution of international organizations in the Baltic Sea Region: 1989-2004

Source: Szacawa 2012

While cooperation with these and other international actors could increase, the various fora of

cooperation within BSR have developed, constituting at least seven pillars. These pillars include the

EUSBSR, the Nordic-Baltic organization, HELCOM, parliamentary bodies, NGOs and networks, and the

Northern Dimension. These organizations are depicted in Figure 2.3.

20

Figure 2.3 Baltic Sea Cooperation

Source: Etzold and Gänzle 2012, p.14

The EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region has also helped to bring in a larger set of international

organizations and stakeholders. These include the European Parliament, the Committee of the

Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Investment Bank, the Nordic

Council of Ministers, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, the Hanseatic Parliament, the

Northern Dimension Partnership for Health and Social Wellbeing, HELCOM, VASAB, Baltic

Development Forum, and the Association of Northern German Chambers of Commerce and Industry

(Commission 2011, pp.6-7).

3. The Quality Issue

3.1. Effectiveness

The general lack of response or preparedness (exercises) activities facilitated by CBSS means that the

effectiveness of CBSS civil security cannot be appropriately judged according to the extent to which it

has managed or facilitated operational activity. However, framed in terms of its central aim – to

provide a forum for discussion and support for bilateral and multilateral civil security initiatives – the

CBSS has certainly been effective as a platform for BSR activities in the area of civil security; a

condition that has been strengthened by the activism of the EU and its strategy for the BSR. Because

CBSS is principally a forum of ideas, it is also difficult to establish any clear lines of causality between

the effectiveness of CBSS and bilateral and multilateral emergency management exercises in the BSR,

which are often orchestrated under other institutional frameworks such as HELCOM or Barents

21

rescue exercises. Keeping these factors in mind, the working group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety

(EGNRS) have conducted monitoring activities that are an important part of BSR preparedness and

prevention. A recent report on the EGNRS shows that cooperation has produced some effectiveness

in terms of better harmonization of monitoring programmes between member states. However,

there remains a fair amount of differences in national monitoring that make it difficult to compare

and achieve a regional risk outlook (CBSS 2011c). Another area of CBSS civil security activities is the

Task Force against Trafficking in Human Beings (TF-THB). One of the projects conducted under the

TF-THB has been diplomatic training and the creation of a handbook on how to assist victims of

human trafficking. In the period 2008-2010, seminars were conducted in the capitals of the CBSS

member states, reaching 550 diplomats from more than 90 countries that are either the origin,

destination or transit routes for victims of trafficking in the BSR (CBSS n.db). While the effectiveness

of this training cannot be assessed here, the effectiveness of the ability of TF-THB to administrative

and organize such an initiative does speak to its effectiveness as a taskforce. Overall, however, the

effectiveness of CBSS will lie in its ability to foster financial and political will against a changing

geopolitical landscape. In particular, the relationship between Russia as the only non-EU member will

be an important issue in the future that will affect its effectiveness as a regional forum for better or

for worse (cf. section 3.3.).

3.2. Efficiency

Judging the efficiency of the CBSS presents a challenge if the general budget line is used as an

indicator. This is because the CBSS does not have a general budget or any project funds. Instead,

member states are responsible for funding various programmes administered through CBSS. This

means that CBSS is reliant on powerful financial backers, such as the EU; a position that can affect

the outcomes of the CBSS. However, this has been partly rectified. In 2012 the German presidency

established a ‘Project Support Facility budget line’, which is designed to strengthen the secretariat

and CBSS financial position (Oldberg 2012, p. 13). The secretariat itself has a budget of 2.7 million

euro (2012), which is predominantly provided by Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Russia, Poland and

Germany, while the Baltic States and Iceland pay 4 percent of the costs each (CBSS 2004). If efficiency

is defined not on budget lines but by the extent to which CBSS aims to improve the efficiency of

national civil security systems, the organisation can be characterized in a better light. The civil

protection network that gathers together directors general of member state civil protection

authorities, and various information networks, such as CIVPRO, aims to exchange information and

foster a better understanding of differences and similarities in national emergency management

activities. Furthermore, Priority Areas 13 and 14 of the EU strategy for the BSR also aim to harmonize

22

national emergency management systems, such as the pilot project for integrating maritime

surveillance systems and mapping existing marine pollution response capacities. These important

goals will only be effective however if they are backed by a legitimate institution.

3.3. Legitimacy

The legitimacy of CBSS was perhaps most clearly put into question in the period 2006-2008, when

the remainder of the permanent members also became members of the EU in 2005, except for

Russia. Commentary on CBSS at this time noted that:

The CBSS finds itself in a complicated situation, as many of its decisions are in line with the EU agenda, but at the same time they may be difficult to adopt due to Russia's position….To a great extent, the CBSS has been transformed into an EU-Russian regional forum with a ponderous and indecisive institutional organisation, which alienates the larger EU countries (Germany, Poland) from regional co-operation

Vidzemes Augstskola, 2008

While it is highly contestable whether the CBSS is, or ever has been, an EU-Russian forum, this

commentary is only designed to reflect a real tension among CBSS member states that may have

contributed to its restructuring in 2008. Indeed, Russia has endorsed and not rejected the EU

strategy for the BSR and has remained a strong supporter of CBSS, particularly as its economy has

become more dependent on Europe (Oldberg 2012, p.16). It has sought consensus and avoided

conflict (Ibid, pp. 60-61). The legitimacy of the CBSS in terms of some member states’ motivations for

cooperation may also be questionable. In particular, the Baltic States and Poland have apparently

used CBSS to gain leverage on gaining membership into the EU (Ibid, p.17). However, the challenge of

cooperation for any regional organization is to find common interests among the adverse interests.

In this sense, the legitimacy of the CBSS may be strengthened if the secretariat is given a larger role

to steer common projects. Strengthening the CBSS weak institutional framework would also be

helpful in creating a more legitimate institution in the eyes of both its participants and the

international community.

4. Conclusion

The CBSS was born out of a shifting geopolitical landscape and a common need to develop economic

and security interests as well as to promote democracy in the Baltic States. It has since developed its

original portfolio and made significant attempts to adjust to a dynamic international and regional

23

context. These growth pains have re-shaped the goals of the CBSS that now boasts a number of

important task forces and networks in the area of civil security. Amongst these include the civil

protection network, border control cooperation, the regional task force on organized crime, and the

Task Force against Trafficking in Human Beings. While the effectiveness and efficiency of these

initiatives are varied, they do represent the value of CBSS as an important forum for guiding regional

cooperation and as a platform for specific cooperative endeavours and strategic policies, such as the

EU strategy for the BSR. This has provided an important financial and substantive input into the CBSS,

which has no budget or project funds. However, this also raises an issue of possible friction between

Russia as the only non-EU member in the CBSS. The EU ought to continue to be sensitive and

inclusive towards Russia in order to maintain the legitimacy of the regional organization; an issue

that may continue in the shadow of CBSS depending on the future trajectory of domestic Russian

politics and international posture. Despite its fairly wide agenda, and the steady history of civil

security cooperation, CBSS cooperation is still hampered by a weak institutional set-up that has no

enforcement mechanisms and weak legal standing. However, in defence of the CBSS, its members

have been conscious about duplication in a region that is littered with bilateral and multilateral

cooperation. It has pursued a policy of complementarity, not competition. This is its value-added: as

a regional platform for coordination and stimulation on inter alia civil security for a safer and

prosperous region in the future.

24

Annex I: Coded Data

ANVIL PROJECT MAPPING PROTOCOL - WP3 (CBSS)

2.1

CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF RO DEALING WITH CIVIL SECURITY

YES/NOT

DEGREE High/Medium/Lo

w

SOURCE

2.1.1

The establishment of the RO

Is the formation of the RO related to the EU or other RO?

No

2.1.2

The evolution of the RO eventual membership enlargement and current membership

Does the RO have observers/associate members with a different status with respect to (founding) pMS?

No

2.1.3

The member characteristics of the RO

Are RO's pMS also EU members? Yes High

2.1.4

The cultural milieu of the RO

Recall the scores of each pMS with regard to the World Value Survey parameter on industrial/post industrial attitude:

http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_111

There is a dominant attitude among pMS? No Low

There is a great variance among pMS? Yes

Has any cultural feature of the region influenced in a substantial way the RO characters and activities? It may relate to language, religion, history, as well as deep-rooted crisis experience(s) which impacted the whole region. Yes Low

25

2.2

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF RO DEALING WITH CIVIL SECURITY

YES/NOT

DEGREE High/Medium/Lo

w

SOURCE

2.2.1

The current legal basis of the RO

Have any major changes in the legal basis framework occurred since the 1990s?

Yes CBSS 2008

Does the statutory basis rely on a single law?

No

Does the statutory basis rely on fragmented statutory provisions?

No

Have there been any major changes, occurring over time, in the legal framework regulating crisis management?

No

Are there any major changes foreseen in the future?

No

2.2.2

The current RO institutional framework

Are there ad hoc ruling bodies (i.e. RO presidency, secretariat, councils/assembly of member states representatives, etc)?

Yes

Are there permanent ruling bodies inside the RO?

Yes

Does the representation mechanism involve all pMS?

Yes

Do the observers/associate members support the RO by financing it?

No

Do the observers/associate members support the RO by providing crisis management assets?

No

Do the RO agencies have a degree of autonomy?

No

Is there a division of responsibility?

Yes

Are there specific agreements, programme, budgets devoted to civil security? No

Have there been any major changes, occurring over time, in the legal/institutional framework? No

Are there accountability arrangements? No

2.2.

Decision making process

26

3

Is unanimous agreement required from all partners? Yes

Is there an agreement required by national parliaments through a formal legislative procedure? No

Is the decision making prevalently intergovernmental? Yes

Is the decision making prevalently supranational? No

2.2.4

Activities related to civil security

Is there a kind of prioritization among threats considered by RO? Yes

Are there activities related to prevention? Yes

Are there activities related to preparedness (regular exercises, exchange activities, research projects/funding, efforts in terms of standardisation, joint procurement, joint planning and common risk mapping, formation of experts networks)? Yes Medium

Are there activities related to response? No

Does the RO operate at operative level and manage executive activities? No

Does the RO operate at political level and conduct consultation activities? Yes

Is there a different approach with regards to prevention, preparedness and response? Yes

2.2.5

The crisis management approach

Does the RO use members’ civilian/military assets for responding to a crisis? No

Does the RO use its own assets? No

Is there a coordination mechanism of these assets? No

Does the RO develop a lessons-learned process or best-practices? No

27

2.3

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN RO AND pMS CITIZENS, GOVERNMENTS AND STAKEHOLDERS

YES/NOT

DEGREE High/Medium/Lo

w

SOURCE

2.3.1

Citizens

Do citizens somehow know of the existence of this regional cooperation? Yes

Does the RO enjoy support? Yes

Does the RO somehow communicate to/inform citizens of the countries involved?

Yes low

Is there a main method used by the RO across the region for informing the public on an emerging/unfolding crisis? Yes

Is there cooperation on common crisis communication systems? No

Are there central reliable website/social media or mobile application to update citizens on relevant crisis issue/security information? Yes

2.3.2

Relations between RO and pMS governments

Are governments committed to the RO (i.e. by commitment resources, by participation of high-level policy makers to related fora, by the frequency of meetings, by the declaration issue by governments regarding the RO)?

Yes

Do governments provide strategic and policy guidelines to the RO with respect to civil security?

Yes

Do governments supervise RO activities?

Yes

Are governments influenced by RO regulations/strategy/activities (i.e. documents/strategies/policies make explicit reference to RO frameworks/activities)?

Yes

low

28

Do national parliaments play a particular role?

Yes low

Have governments used RO mechanisms for civil security (i.e. transnational disaster, major disaster beyond the capacity of the country, etc.)? No

Do governments delegate specific functions to the RO? No

Does the RO contribute to the information sharing/awareness of in the pMS with respect to civil security? Yes low

2.3.3

Relations between RO and stakeholders

Does the RO have direct relations with stakeholders? Yes

Does the RO have relations with regional/provincial/local stakeholders? Yes

Do stakeholders have expectations toward the RO’s role on civil security? No

Does the RO contribute to the education/information sharing/awareness/training of stakeholders? Yes Medium

2.4

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECTOR IN MAINTAINING CIVIL SECURITY

YES/NOT

DEGREE High/Medium/Lo

w

SOURCE

Does the RO cooperate with profit-oriented and non-profit organizations in the private sector? NO

Are there any conventions or agreements existing on cooperation with private sector organizations with regard to prevention, preparedness and response to crisis? No

2.5

THE RELATIONS WITH THE EU, UN AND OTHER RO

YES/NOT

DEGREE High/Medium/Lo

w

SOURCE

Does the RO have relations with the EU and/or related institutions (i.e. European Commission) Yes

Does the RO have representatives/officers in EU institutions? No

29

Are there funding or coordination mechanisms between the RO and EU institutions? Yes

Does the RO, formally or de facto, act as a means to harmonise national legislation with the EU acquis? NO

Does the RO, formally or de facto, act as a mean to implement EU regulations/strategies/policies?

Yes

Is there any relation with UN with regards to civil security issues? Yes low

Is there any relation with NATO with regards to civil security issues? Yes

mostly in the area of military-related security (traditional)

Are there relations with other RO studied by WP3? Yes

3 THE QUALITY ISSUE YES/NOT

DEGREE High/Medium/Lo

w

SOURCE

3.1

Effectiveness

Has there been any review/evaluation/scrutiny of RO by pMS and/or EU?

Yes

Has there been any professional/political inquiry over crisis having RO involvement?

No

3.2

Efficiency

Have there been any changes in the budget's amount? Yes

Are budget details publicly available? n.a

There is no offical budget for CBSS (see section 3.2)

Is the budget for regional cooperation generally uncontested? Yes

Is there a source of controversy among and within pMS regarding the budget? No

this could be the case, but I have not come accross any material stipulating that this is the case

Is pMS' contribution to the budget proportionate to their benefits of the cooperation? No

Is there a permanent budget for “cold phase” cooperation (preparation, prevention)? No

30

Is there asset sharing and/or asset procurement through the RO which may be related to efficiency? No

Does the RO have the goal to enhance efficiency of national civil security systems (i.e. by improving standardization and/or interoperability of assets)? Yes

3.3

Legitimacy

Do countries use the regional cooperation mechanism in place when crisis occur? N.A

Do countries by-pass the formal mechanisms and contact each other bilaterally or informally? N.A

Do countries by-pass the regional organization in favor of more overarching ones, such as the EU? N.A

Are there cases where RO involvement in crisis management have strained political relations between pMS or undermined the legitimacy of a national government? N.A

31

Annex II: Resources

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32

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