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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF NIGERIA

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

ON MONDAY 7TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2013

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON JUSTICE O. A. ADENIYI

SITTING AT COURT NO. 26 APO – ABUJA

SUIT NO: FCT/HC/CV/134/12 MOTION NO: M/6553/13 MOTION NO: M/8999/13

BETWEEN:

SUNDAY O. OGUNMOLA JUDGMENT-CREDITOR/RESPONDENT

AND

NIGERIAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE JUDGMENT-DEBTOR/APPLICANT

CORPORATION (NDIC)

AND

CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA GARNISHEE/APPLICANT

RULING

On 27/03/2013, this Court made an Order nisi, pursuant

to the ex parte application filed by the Judgment-

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Creditor, requiring the Garnishee, that is the Central

Bank of Nigeria, to show cause why judgment-debt

awarded in favour of the Judgment-Creditor, with

accrued interests, all totalling the sum of

N25,890,862.00, shall not be paid to him from funds

standing to the credit of the Judgment-Debtor (on

record), that is the NDIC, in her custody.

Upon being served with the Order nisi, the Garnishee

filed a motion on notice on 25/04/2013, whereby she

prayed this Court for the reliefs set out as follows:

1. An Order extending time within which the

Garnishee can apply for the setting aside of the

Garnishee Order nisi made by this Honourable

Court on 27th March, 2013, attaching the sum of

N25,890,862.00 (Twenty-five Million, Eight Hundred

and Ninety Thousand, Eight Hundred and Sixty -

two Naira, Sixty - two kobo), belonging to the

Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation

(Judgment-Debtor/Respondent) and in the

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custody of the Central Bank of Nigeria

(Garnishee/Applicant), for the satisfaction of the

debt allegedly owed to the (Judgment-

Creditor/Respondent), by the Judgment-

Debtor/Respondent for want of jurisdiction.

2. An Order setting aside the Garnishee Order nisi

made by this Honourable Court on 27th March,

2013, attaching the sum of N25,890,862.00

(Twenty-five Million, Eight Hundred and Ninety

Thousand, Eight Hundred and Sixty - two Naira,

Sixty - two kobo) only, belonging to the Nigeria

Deposit Insurance Corporation (Judgment-

Debtor/Respondent) and in the custody of the

Central Bank of Nigeria (Garnishee/Applicant),

for the satisfaction of the debt allegedly owed to

the (Judgment-Creditor/Respondent), by the

Judgment-Debtor/Respondent for want of

jurisdiction.

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3. An Order discharging the Garnishee/Applicant

from the Garnishee proceedings.

4. An Order deeming the processes filed in this

application as having been properly filed and

served, the proper fees having been paid.

The grounds upon which the application was brought

were also set out in the body of the motion paper.

Also, upon becoming aware of the Order nisi, the

Judgment-Debtor (on record), in turn filed a motion on

notice on 24/06/2013, whereby she prayed this Court

for the reliefs set out as follows:

1. An Order extending the time within which the

Applicant may apply to set aside the order of this

Honourable Court joining the Applicant as a

party to this suit in place of Liberty Bank Plc.

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2. An Order setting aside the order joining the

Applicant as a party in this suit in place of Liberty

Bank Plc.

3. An order striking out the name of the Applicant

(described as Judgment-Debtor), from the

Garnishee proceedings as leave of Court was

not obtained before the name of Liberty Bank

Plc. was substituted with the name of the

Applicant.

4. An Order nullifying the proceedings against the

Applicant as the requisite Pre-Action Notice was

not served on the Applicant.

5. An Order nullifying the proceedings against the

Applicant, particularly the Garnishee

proceedings describing the Applicant as a

Judgment- Debtor, as it is in violation of sections

414, 417 and 425 (1) (a) of the Companies and

Allied Matters Act.

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6. An Order striking out the name of the Applicant

from the Garnishee proceedings describing it as

Judgment-Debtor as it cannot be sued in its own

name in the circumstances of this matter.

7. An Order striking out the Garnishee proceedings

as it affects the management of a company

under liquidation and this Court lacks jurisdiction

to entertain a matter concerning the

management of a company under the

Companies and Allied Matters Act.

8. An Order striking out the Garnishee proceedings

as it affects the appointment and conduct of a

Liquidator appointed by a Federal High pursuant

to the provisions of the Companies and Allied

Matters Act and this Honourable Court lacks the

jurisdiction to entertain such a matter.

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This Ruling is now with respect to the two applications

which were consolidated and heard together on

02/07/2013.

In proceeding, let me quickly observe that the

Garnishee had attached an Affidavit captioned as

"AFFIDAVIT SHOWING CAUSE," to her motion on notice in

consideration. She further filed what is also captioned

as "FURTHER AND BETTER AFFIDAVIT SHOWING CAUSE," on

13/05/2013. As it is a well known procedure, a motion

on notice, without an Affidavit filed in support, cannot

be said to be a complete or competent process of

Court. It becomes a bare process and any decision

that results from such a bare motion is at best

academic or void. See Mobil Producing Nigeria

Unlimited Vs. Monokpo [2003] 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 346;

Chief of Air Staff Vs. Iyen [2005] 6 NWLR (Pt. 922) 496.

In the circumstances here therefore, it will be taken that

the two affidavits referred to in the foregoing,

purporting to be Affidavit to show cause, are Affidavits

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in support of the Garnishee's application under

consideration, filed on 25/04/2013.

The provision of section 83 of the Sheriffs and Civil

Process Act, does not, in my view, contemplate the

lumping of facts purporting to show cause with those in

support of a separate and distinct application filed by

the Garnishee, as in the instant case. An Affidavit to

show cause must be filed as a separate process from

Affidavit in support of a separate application brought

by the Garnishee.

In the instant case therefore, I hold that the Garnishee

has not filed any Affidavit to show cause, in response to

the pending Order nisi as required by section 83 of the

Act. The Affidavits captioned "AFFIDAVIT TO SHOW CAUSE,"

and "FURTHER AND BETTER AFFIDAVIT SHOWING CAUSE," shall in the

circumstances be treated as Affidavits filed to support

the motion of 25/04/2013.

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That cleared, I have proceeded to consider the totality

of the processes filed to support and oppose the two

applications, together with all the documents annexed

as exhibits. I have also given a careful consideration to

and taken due benefit of the totality of the written and

oral submission of all learned counsel for the

contending sides. The purport of the two applications

ultimately is to set aside the Order nisi made by this

Court on 27/03/2013, for different reasons; the

dominant ground, however, being that the Judgment-

Debtor (on record), the NDIC, was not a party to the

suit that resulted in the judgment that is sought to be

executed and that leave of the Court was not

obtained to so substitute the said original Judgment-

Debtor (Liberty Bank Plc., [now in liquidation]), with the

Judgment-Debtor (on record), in these Garnishee

proceedings.

For proper appreciation, it is perhaps pertinent to set

out a brief history of this case as gathered from the

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materials on record. Many years ago, the Judgment-

Creditor filed an action at the High Court of the Federal

Capital Territory for possession, arrears of rent and

mesne profits against the defunct Liberty Bank Plc., now

in liquidation, who was a tenant in his rented premises.

Judgment was delivered on 18/03/2005, whereby the

Court awarded the sum of N3,120,000.00 in favour of

the Judgment-Creditor from 01/11/2001 until the date

of judgment; and thereafter mesne profits in the sum of

N260,000.00 per month, from the date of judgment until

possession is given up. The total judgment debt was

also ordered to be paid at the interest rate of 10% per

annum from the date of judgment until the same is

finally liquidated. According to the Judgment-Creditor,

the total judgment-debt stood as N13,260,000.00 from

01/11/2001 until 18/03/2005, when the judgment was

delivered. The Judgment-Debtor was stated to have

given up possession of the premises in context on

20/09/2006.

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It further turned out that in his bid to execute the

judgment, the Judgment-Creditor was able to recover

a sum of N1,491,000.00, which was the proceed of the

auction of some of the bank's properties which were

recovered in part execution of the judgment.

In the meantime, the original Judgment-Debtor, Liberty

Bank, Plc., appealed against the Judgment being

sought to be executed; but whilst the appeal was still

pending, the bank went into liquidation and the

present Judgment-Debtor, the NDIC, by the Orders of

the Federal High Court, made on, 30/10/2007, was

appointed the Liquidator.

The said appeal was eventually struck out on

22/12/2012, on the ground that the said Liberty Bank

Plc., the Appellant, had ceased to exist as a Bank.

In view of the decision of the Court of Appeal, and in

view also that the Judgment-Debtor (on record), had

taken oven the liquidated bank, the Judgment-

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Creditor has come before this Court to recover the

outstanding judgment debt, which now stand as the

sum of N25,890,862.62, against the Liquidator.

Now, in my considered view, and from the totality of

the submissions of all learned counsel, the two

applications instant have thrown up three focal

questions, which I shall now proceed to determine,

namely:

1. Whether or not it is proper in law for the

Judgment-Creditor to bring these Garnishee

proceedings against the NDIC as the Judgment-

Debtor, being the Liquidator of and in place of

the defunct Liberty Bank Plc., the original

Judgment-Debtor, without leave of Court;

2. Whether, in view of the provisions of section 251

(1) (e) and (j), of the Constitution, it is not the

Federal High Court, to the exclusion of this Court,

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that has jurisdiction to entertain these Garnishee

proceedings.

3. Whether or not the Garnishee Order nisi was

competently made by this Court in view of the

provision of section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil

Process Act, requiring the consent of the

Attorney General of the Federation to be

obtained.

In proceeding, it is also proper to restate the position of

the law that, as an exception to the general rule, any

Court of record including the Supreme Court has the

inherent jurisdiction to set aside its own judgment given

in any proceeding in which there has been a

fundamental defect, such as one which goes to the

jurisdiction and competence of the Court. Such a

judgment is a nullity and a person affected by it is

therefore entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside,

either by an application to the Court that delivered the

judgment or by another action. See Adeigbe Vs.

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Kusimo [1965] NMLR 284; Olabanji Vs. Odofin [1996] 2

SCNJ 242 @ 247; A.C.S. Plc. Vs. Losada (Nigeria) Limited

[1995] 7 NWLR (Pt. 405) 206; Ezeokafor Vs. Ezeko [1999] 9

NWLR (Pt. 619) 513; Mark Vs. Eke [2004] 5 NWLR (Pt. 865)

54.

In Associated Discount House Limited Vs Amalgamated

Trustees Limited [2007] All FWLR (Pt. 392) 1781 @ 1840,

the Supreme Court further expatiated on this legal

principle by stating the circumstances under which a

superior court of record has inherent powers to set

aside its judgment as follows:

1. Where the judgment is obtained by fraud or

deceit;

2. Where the judgment is a nullity such as when the

court itself was not competent;

3. Where the court was misled into giving the

judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties

consented to it;

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4. Where the judgment was given in absence of

jurisdiction;

5. Where the procedure adopted was such as to

deprive the decision or judgment of the

character of a legitimate adjudication.

See also Skenconsult Nigeria Limited Vs. Ukey [1981] 1

SC 12; Arcon Vs. Fasasi [No. 4] [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 42;

Alao Vs. A.C.B [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 264; A G,

Federation Vs. Guardian Newspapers Limited [1999] 9

NWLR (Pt. 618) 187; Igwe Vs. Kalu [2002] 14 NWLR (Pt.

787) 435.

On the basis of the principle of law highlighted in the

foregoing, therefore, I am not in doubt that the present

applications are competent to be heard by this Court.

Furthermore, it must also be considered whether any of

the conditions set out above are present in the

circumstances here that would compel the Court to set

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aside its Order nisi granted on 27/03/2013, of which it is

ordinarily functus officio.

I must also quickly dismiss the contentions of Mr.

Okpanachi, of counsel for the Judgment-Creditor, that

the Garnishee's application instant is incompetent in

that it was brought under wrong Rules; and that the

applicable Rules, that is the provisions of Order VIII

Rules 1 - 12, of the Judgment Enforcement Rules, made

pursuant to the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, do not

envisage applications for extension of time to apply to

set aside Order nisi.

It had been settled by the apex Court in a plethora of

cases that where an Applicant in an application refers

to the wrong law in support of a motion, it should not

necessarily bar the Court from considering the merits of

the application once there is a specific relief and

procedure covered by the law or by equity. See Falobi

Vs. Falobi [1979] 1 NMLR 169; Asims (Nigeria) Limted Vs.

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L.B.R.B. Development Authority [2002] 8 NWLR (Pt. 769)

349.

Furthermore, since the issue raised touches on the

jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the Garnishee

proceedings, I consider it even needless for both the

Garnishee and the Judgment-Debtor (on record), to

have prayed for extension of time, for the simple reason

that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage

of the proceedings in a suit. It is never too early or too

late to raise it. See Kotoye Vs. Saraki [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt.

296) 710; Chacharos Vs. Ekimpex Limited [1988] 1 NWLR

(Pt. 68) 88; Elabanjo Vs. Dawodu [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt.

1001) 76.

On the strength of the foregoing therefore, I hereby

hold that the instant applications are competent to be

entertained by this Court.

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ISSUE ONE

This issue deals with whether or not it is proper in law for

the Judgment-Creditor to bring these Garnishee

proceedings against the NDIC as the Judgment-

Debtor, being the Liquidator of and in place of the

defunct Liberty Bank Plc., the original Judgment-

Debtor, without first obtaining the leave of Court.

Learned counsel for the Garnishee had submitted that

one of the conditions that must be present in order for

a Court to be competent to entertain an action, that is,

competence of parties before the Court, is absent in

the instant case. Mr. Eke submitted, relying on the

decision of Akindele Vs. Abiodun [2009] 11 NWLR (Pt.

1152) 380, that a party is one by or against whom a

lawsuit is brought; and that the competence of parties,

whether as plaintiff or as defendant, is very vital and

important as it goes to the foundation of a suit and

consequently touches on the jurisdiction of the Court.

Learned counsel further submitted that an action can

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succeed if the parties to it are shown to be the proper

parties to whom rights and obligations arising from the

cause of action attach; therefore that for a Court to be

competent and have jurisdiction over a matter, it is

necessary that the condition that the proper parties

must be identified is fulfilled.

Learned counsel further contended that the party

against whom judgment is sought to be enforced

through the Garnishee in the present proceedings is not

a proper party, since it was not a party to the suit from

which the judgment sought to be enforced arose.

Learned counsel further submitted that the NDIC was

not a defendant in the suit that resulted in the

judgment now sought to be enforced, and that it is

erroneous for the Judgment-Creditor to equate the

defunct Liberty Bank Plc. with the NDIC, her Liquidator,

since the Liquidator is distinct and separate from the

company in liquidation; and that the Judgment-

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Creditor cannot by fiat confer the status of Judgment-

Debtor upon the NDIC.

This brings me to the contentions also of Mr. Ojeh, of

counsel for the Judgment-Debtor (on record). It is not in

dispute that by the Orders of the Federal High Court of

30/10/2007, Liberty Bank Plc., was wound up and the

NDIC was appointed as Liquidator. A copy of the Order

of the Federal High Court was attached to the

Garnishee's present application. It is also not in

contention that the judgment-debt, subject of the

present Garnishee proceedings was awarded against

Liberty Bank Plc., in 2005, before it was liquidated; and

a substantial part thereof had remained unsatisfied

ever since.

Now the question posed by Mr. Ojeh, is whether the

Judgment-Creditor can unilaterally substitute the name

of the defunct Judgment-Debtor with the name of the

Judgment-Debtor (on record), the NDIC?

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Before I proceed to resolve this question, let me quickly

resolve in passing, the question of competence of a

Judgment-Debtor to intervene in a Garnishee

proceedings, as raised by the learned counsel for the

Judgment-Creditor, in his address.

The general principle is that a Judgment-Debtor is

merely a nominal party in Garnishee proceedings and

that in all ramifications, it is only the Garnishee that is

expected to react if the law was not properly followed

or observed with respect to the conduct of the

proceedings. See UBN Plc. Vs. Boney Marcus Industries

Limited [2005] 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 656; P.P.M.C Vs. Delphi

Petroleum Incorporated [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 458.

However, in exceptional circumstances, the Judgment-

Debtor is permitted to intervene in the proceedings,

especially in the peculiar circumstances considered by

the Court of Appeal in Purification Technique (Nigeria)

Limited Vs. Attorney General, Lagos State [2004] 9

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NWLR (Pt. 879) 665, where it was held, per Galadima,

JCA, as follows:

"I am of the opinion that the only possible ground

upon which the lower court could have

entertained the application of the judgment

debtor, and set aside the garnishee order nisi was

that there had been some procedural irregularity in

the proceedings of such serious nature that the

order ought to be treated as a nullity. The

complaint about the breach of provisions of

section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap.

407, Laws of the Federation, 1990 can only be

addressed by way of appeal."

In the circumstances therefore, I consider as

misconceived, the contention of the Judgment-

Creditor's learned counsel that the Judgment-Debtor

(on record), is an outsider to these Garnishee

proceedings; and I have also been satisfied that the

instant application of the Judgment-Debtor (on record)

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has raised very fundamental issues touching on the

jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the Garnishee

proceedings. I therefore agree with the submissions of

Mr. Ojeh, that the Judgment-Debtor (on record), in the

circumstances here, is competent in law, to intervene

and be given a hearing in these proceedings. I so hold.

Now, as to the poser raised by Mr. Ojeh, learned

counsel had contended that the Judgment-Creditor

ought to have sought and obtained the leave of Court,

substituting the NDIC with Liberty Bank Plc., before

commencing the Garnishee proceedings; that failure

to do so amounted to abuse of Court process and self

help; and for which reason the Order nisi made by the

Court, is liable to be set aside.

Learned counsel submitted that before a Liquidator

can become a party to a suit with respect to the affairs

of the company being wound up, the leave of Court

must first be sought and obtained, relying on the

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provision of section 425 (1) (a) of the Companies and

Allied Matters Act (CAMA), which provides as follows:

"The Liquidator in a winding up by the Court shall

have power, with the sanction either of the Court

or the Committee of Inspection to bring or defend

any action or other legal proceeding in the name

and on behalf of the company."

Learned counsel submitted that a Liquidator does not

bring or defend an action in its own name on behalf of

a company in winding up; and where it does, it must

add the capacity in which it is so doing, as Liquidator to

the company.

Without having to necessarily delve into the issues as to

the orders of ranking in settling the liabilities of a

company in winding up and issue of subrogation raised

and touched upon by Mr. Ojeh, one point that leaves

no one in doubt, at least not this Court, is that in

appropriate circumstances, the present Judgment-

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Debtor (on record), is entitled to settle the instant

judgment-debt. But the crucial issue that the Court has

been confronted with here is whether it is proper for the

Judgment-Creditor to commence these Garnishee

proceedings against the NDIC without first obtaining

the leave of Court to so join her; and whether the Order

nisi made by this Court on 27/03/2013, is not thereby

rendered a nullity and liable to be set aside in the

circumstances.

Of crucial relevance to the resolution of this issue is the

provision of section 417 of CAMA. It provides as follows:

"If a winding up order is made or a provisional Liquidator is

appointed no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or

commenced against the company except by leave of the court

given on such terms as the Court may impose."

This provision has been given judicial interpretation in a

number of decided cases. The Court of Appeal, in Ini

Okon Utuk Vs. The Official Liquidator (Utuks Construction

and Marketing Company Limited) [2008] LPELR 4323,

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considered the issue as to whether the learned trial

Judge was right in holding that the Applicant, in that

case, should have obtained leave of the Federal High

Court before bringing the application against the

Liquidator in view of the provision of section 417 of

CAMA, and the Court held, per Omokri, JCA, as follows:

"This issue readily brings to mind the provisions of

section 417 of the CAMA. . .

The wordings of section 417 of the CAMA are so

clear, unambiguous and plain, therefore the court

must give it its literal, plain and ordinary meaning.

Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and

unambiguous, the courts are precluded from

resorting to any aid or any other cannon of

interpretation. See Ibori Vs. Ogboru [2005] 6 NWLR

(Pt. 920) 102; Ibi Vs. INEC [2007] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046)

565; Elobanjo Vs. Dawodu [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001)

76 and F. R. N. Vs. O. Shon [2006] 5 NWLR (Pt. 973)

361. . . .

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It is not is dispute that the 1st Respondent was

Appointed Liquidator of Utuks Construction and

Marketing Co. Ltd. on 26/6/95. Therefore with effect

from 26/6/95 no action or proceeding shall be

proceeded with or commenced against the

company except by leave of the court given on

such terms as the court may impose. The Appellant

argued in his brief that leave of the lower court was

not necessary as a condition precedent to bring an

action against the Liquidator for acts done or

omitted to be done by the Liquidator. The

submission of the appellant is misconceived. The

provisions of section 417 of the CAMA are clear

and unambiguous and it provides that such leave

is a condition precedent. See Abheke Vs. NDIC

[1995] 7 NWLR (Pt. 406) 228 @ 242; FMB Limited Vs.

NDIC [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 400) 226 @ 243 and Klifco

Limited Vs. Philip Holzmann A. G. [1996] 3 NWLR (Pt.

436) 276 @ 282."

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In view of the position of the law as encapsulated in the

authorities sighted in the foregoing, I am compelled to

agree with the submissions of learned counsel for both

the Garnishee and the Judgment-Debtor (on record),

that leave of Court is required before any proceedings

can be commenced against the NDIC, as Liquidator to

the defunct Liberty Bank Plc. The provisions of sections

417 and 425 of CAMA are statutory provisions; as such

this Court is incompetent to waive compliance with the

same.

Where a party commences an action which requires

the fulfillment of a condition precedent or pre-

condition for the commencement of the action, that

condition must be fulfilled before the action can be

validly commenced. And where there is non-

compliance with a stipulated pre-condition for setting

the legal process in motion, any suit instituted in

contravention on that condition is incompetent and

that Court is equally incompetent to entertain the suit.

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See Madukolu Vs. Nkemdilim [1962] 1 All NLR 581;

Rossek Vs. A.C.B Plc. [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 20; Nnonye

Vs. Anyichie [2000] 1 NWLR (Pt 639) 66.

In the instant proceedings, there is nothing to show that

the Judgment-Creditor obtained the leave of Court in

order to proceed against the NDIC as Liquidator to the

original Judgment-Debtor, Liberty Bank Plc. This

omission, no doubt, is fatal to the entirety of the steps

already taken in these proceedings, as this Court lacks

the jurisdiction, as it stands, to have entertained the

proceedings. See also Provisional Council, OSU Vs.

Makinde [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 613.

The situation here is akin to what obtains in the regular

civil proceedings, whereby upon the death of a party

in an action, which survives him, leave of Court is

ordinarily sought and obtained before a new party is

substituted for the dead party.

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I must therefore resolve the issue under consideration

against the Judgment-Creditor; and having done so, I

consider that the succeeding two issues have been

rendered academic. It is thus needless to proceed to

determine them, the Court having held the position

that it lacked jurisdiction to have entertained these

proceedings so far.

Before I draw the curtains on this Ruling however, my

last word would be that since it is not in contest that the

there is a judgment-debt in favour of the Judgment-

Creditor, which is ordinarily enforceable against the

NDIC, as Liquidator to the defunct Liberty Bank Plc., if

the proper procedure had been adopted by the

Judgment-Creditor; and since the Appeal lodged

against the judgment awarded in favour of the

Judgment-Creditor has been struck out by the Court of

Appeal, one wonders why the NDIC has consistently

refused to tow the path of honour, assuage the

hardships suffered over the years by the Judgment-

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Creditor and pay the judgment-debt that was validly

owed the poor landlord/Judgment-Creditor since 2001,

when the defunct Liberty Bank Plc., then as tenant, had

refused to pay her outstanding rents; rather than

wielding a technical defence? This is perhaps one of

such instances that technicality seems to have delayed

justice; but then, the law must be applied as it is, not as

the Judge wishes it to be!

In any event, the effect of this decision is not to drive

away the Judgment-Creditor from the seat of justice,

but merely to require him to follow the appropriate

channel in approaching the seat of justice.

In the final analysis, the two applications succeed, on

the consideration of the sole ground that the

Judgment-Debtor so described in the present

proceedings, is not competently joined in these

proceedings, the leave of Court having not been

sought and obtained as required by law. In the

circumstances, the Garnishee order nisi made by this

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Court on 27/03/2013, together with the entire

Garnishee proceedings, shall be and are hereby

accordingly set aside. I make no orders as costs.

OLUKAYODE A. ADENIYI

(Presiding Judge)

07/10/2013

Legal representation:

P. D. Abalaka, Esq. (with Aduojo Abah, Esq.) – for the Judgment-Creditor

D. A. N. Eke, Esq. – for the Garnishee

A. O. Ojeh, Esq. - for the Judgment-Debtor (so described)