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Russell Ackoff

Russell Ac koff is a multi-fac eted academ ic a nd business thinker. Born in Philide lphia in

1919, he has be en c harac terised as an architec t, a philosop her, a c ity planner, an op era -

tions resea rc her and a p rob lem solver. He is perhaps best know n for ma king systems think-ing understandab le a nd ac c essible. But his stud ies beg an uneventfully

Russell Ackoff: I sta rted c olleg e in a rc hitec ture a nd e nga ge d in that field fo r five yea rsand rec eived a deg ree in it.At the end of those five yea rs I wa s permitted to take som eelec tives for the first time and I c hose the elec tives in the philosop hy of sc ienc e, and tha t

bec ame a ma jor interest to m e.When I grad ua ted in architec ture I had a fe llow ship tocontinue grad ua te work in the field, but the p hilosop hy department surp rised me by

offering me an instructorship in the department.

Then World War II intervened very early in my g radua te w ork, and when I returned I wa s

in a hurry to g et finished with my de gree , so I spent full time in the p hilosop hy of sc ience,and I wa s hoo ked . My first full time tea c hing job wa s a t Wayne University in Detroit, where

I spent four yea rs, and then mo ved to Ca se Institute o f Tec hnolog y whe re I spent thirteen.

And then the University o f Pennsylvania, Wharton Sc hoo l whe re I spent a lmo st 25 until Iret ired from there in 1986. I still teac h there, but p rimarily in the Co ntinuing Educ a tion p ro-

grammes.

The sec ond wo rld wa r had a b ig effec t on Ac koff s ea rly ca reer.

Russell Ackoff: I did not c oin the term op erational resea rc h as a matte r of fac t it was

c oined here in Brita in during the war. But I was a partner with West Churchman in esta b-lishing the first academ ic p rog ramm e in operat ions resea rc h, a t Ca se Institute o fTec hnolog y, where we g ave a d eg ree in the topic a nd c onducte d resea rc h for private

and p ublic o rganisa tions. We w ere trying to d evelop the field so tha t it wa s tea c hab le a sa g radua te d eg ree p rog ram a nd it led , within a few yea rs to our p rod uc ing our first text-

book on the subjec t, c a lled An Introd uc tion to Op erations Resea rc h .And tha t sta rted a

flow of p ublica tions tha t enla rge d on the field throug h the la te forties, the fifties into theea rly sixties and then som e fundame nta l c hang es beg an to occ ur.

The field o f Op erat ions Resea rc h, or Op erat iona l Resea rc h a s it w as c a lled in Eng land

was develop ed in c onnec tion w ith efforts to m anag e WW2 mo re e ffic iently. In fac t therewas a book written in whic h the succ ess of the a llies wa s a ttributed to three tec hnologi-c al de velop ments. One w as Rada r, one wa s Sona r and the o ther was Op erational

Resea rch. So a t the e nd of the wa r for the first time it began to b e emp loyed o utside themilita ry, and tha t s whe re we p layed a ma jor role.

Op erational resea rc h attempts to p rovide a n ob jec tive a nd quantita tive b asis for thesolution of m anag eria l and administra tive p rob lem s. It w as one of the key too ls used b y

a llied forces in the wa r.

We c ame to the conc lusion tha t Operat ions Resea rc h was limited for several rea sons.Wefound first tha t the p rob lem s tha t we we re solving te nded to g enera te a dd itiona l p rob -lems, they we re b ette r p rob lems, and usually more p rob lems we re c rea ted by our solu-

tions than the p rob lems tha t we solved . We a lso found the solution to o ne p rob lemdep ended very c ritic ally on how other prob lems we re b eing treated at the sam e time.

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We g ot to foc us mo re on the w ay prob lems interac ted and their solutions interac ted ,than we d id on the p rob lems taken sep ara tely. The na tura l mod el of inquiry is to c ut

things dow n to size but we w ere disc overing g radually that you have to increase the irsize to make them trac tab le, whe n you're d ea ling w ith system s tha t c onta in pe op le.

We beg an to ident ify this c hange and suggest a d iversion in Op erat ions Resea rc h, thec rea tion of a nothe r pa th fo r development. But Op erational Resea rc h p rofessiona lly

rejec ted tha t p rop osa l.And so in the la te 60s we left operat ions resea rch p rofe ssiona llyto sta rt Soc ial Systems Sc ienc es.

The d ifferenc e b etween a Systems approa c h and Op erat ions Resea rc h is very funda -menta l and multi-d ime nsiona l. So it s d iffic ult to e xp la in simp ly, but let m e tr y.

Op erat ions Resea rc h, like typ ic a l sc ientific resea rc h p roc eeds ana lytica lly. Now ana lysis is

a simp le p roc ess, a p roc ess you c an ob serve with any c hild when a c hild is given som e-

thing that they ve never seen b efore a nd they w ant to unde rstand it.The first thing youdo is to ta ke it apart, and you try to unde rstand the parts taken sep ara tely and the n you

try to a ssem ble the understand ing of the pa rts to an understanding o f the w hole. So for

example if you try understanding a business you have to first break it apart into produc-tion, ma rketing, financ e a nd p ersonnel. Unde rstand ea c h of them and assemble them to

an und ersta nd ing o f the whole.All sc ient ific resea rc h is essent ia lly ana lytic, and it was ac rusad e in sea rc h o f the ultima te pa rt, the element. Bec ause it wa s be lieved that when

you understoo d the ultima te p arts of things, you c ould then rea c h ultima te und erstand-ing o f the whole of whic h they were a pa rt.

What w e d isc overed in the 1940s and 50s is tha t a na lysis c annot p rod uc e und ersta nd-ing of systems. A system is a whole w hose c ha rac teristics derive out of the interac tions of

its parts. Not the ac tions of its parts ta ken sep ara te ly, its the way the p arts interac t.And

therefo re when a system is ta ken apart, like an automo b ile, if its d isassem bled , it s nolong er an automo b ile. It s not the sum o f its parts, it s a p rod uc t of the interac tion o f its

parts. So the automo b ile loses its c ha rac teristics when it s d isassem bled , and so d o itspa rts. An automobile c an t move w ithout a mo tor. But if you take the m otor out of the

autom ob ile it ca n t move anything. Now we d isc overed when you tried to exp la in a sys-tem using ana lysis, the first step is, you take it apa rt, and of c ourse it loses a ll of its c ha rac -

teristics.You c annot examine a system by loo king a t its parts, you must look at it a s a part

of a la rge r who le. So a na lysis, we d iscovered , yields informat ion about the struc ture ofsom ething, and how it wo rks, tha t s know led ge , know how. Exp lana tions lie outside,that s

synthet ic thinking . Synthesis yields understa nd ing, ana lysis yields knowled ge, and it was

tha t d istinct ion tha t was c ritica l for the eme rgenc e o f the systems sc iences. It uses both,but to understa nd systems, particu la rly those tha t involve peop le, synthetic thinking is

required.

The way this point of view d evelop ed was not a result of w ha t the psycholog ist c a lls an ah ha expe rienc e, where you sudd enly have a n insight, there s the thing a nd you see

the b ig d ifferenc e. It evolves, in m y c ase it evolved out of p rac tic e. I wa s c ontinuously

confronting problems in social systems that I found that traditional methods of OperationsResea rc h c ouldn t d ea l with. For example: Operations Resea rc h is la rge ly the app lic a tion

of m a thematic s to the solution of m anage ria l prob lems. Most o f the p rob lems in large sys-tem s, stra teg ic p rob lems, organisa tiona l prob lems, do not involve q uant ities, they involve

qua lities. So increa sing ly I had to w orry ab out ho w to ha nd le q ua lita tive fac tors in systemsas opposed to quantitative.And that raises questions about the effectiveness of thema them atic a l/ ana lytica l tec hnique.The m od el in Op erations Resea rc h had originally

been to use the m ethods of Physic s in the study of m anage ria l prob lem s.Tha t bec ame

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increasingly dysfunctional and we had to develop something to replace it.And thatoc c urred over time , it wa s an evolution, not a solution.

The rec ep tion of Systems Thinking w as very mixed . Ma ny who a re opposed to a ny type o f

c hange g ave the typica l respo nses it s all old hat there s nothing new and they con-

tinued to do wha t they had be en d oing w ithout pa ying a ny attention to it.As long a s w ewe re d ea ling with simp le th ings, the o ld system is fine. If we re t rying to understa nd the

pheno mena of a transformation o f a soc ial system suc h as the Soviet Union wentthrough, the mathem atica l eq uations wont give you the a nswers.

There s another very fundamenta l c hange tha t Systems Thinking had to take intoacc ount. In 1900 it is estima ted tha t about 95% of the p eop le emp loyed in my country

could no t d o the job as we ll as their bosses c ould. Now its c lea r w hy, if you have a g roupof p eop le o perating d rill presses and the fo reman retires, then som eone w ould look over

the p eop le operating the d rill p resses and p ic k the best one to b e the forem an. So he

c an now do d rill pressing bette r than a ny of his subo rd ina tes. And peop le wo uld rise a slong as they w ere the best in the g roup in whic h they fell.They g ave rise to the fam ous

Pete rs p rinc ip le tha t a ll ma nag ers rise to the level of their ow n incom petenc e. Now

tod ay it s estima ted tha t over 95% of the p eop le em p loyed can do their job s bette r thantheir bosses c an. You c annot manag e them the same w ay. When you re ma naging sub -

ordinates who know how to d o w hat their do ing b etter than you do, you do nt ma nagew hat they d o, you ma nag e the w ay they interac t. That requires a d ifferent type of orga ni-

sation and a different type of ma nage ment. Conventional manag ement a nd c onven-tiona l orga nisa tion c annot d o it.

What Ive just d esc ribed seems to ma ke c om mo n sense and be o bvious and so the mo stob vious question tha t Im c onstantly confronted with is w hy arent mo re o rga nisa tions

doing it?.And tha t s a very funda me nta l question a nd it s very imp ortant to know the

answe r to tha t. Bec ause you c an t ove rc om e the p rob lem unless you understand it, so letme try to explain why this happens.

You ne ver lea rn b y doing som ething right. Ca use you a lrea dy know how you d o it.You

only lea rn b y ma king mistakes and c orrec ting them . Now there a re tw o kinds of m istakes.You c an d o som ething you shouldn t ha ve d one .Tha t s an error of c o-mission, a c orpora -

tion c an buy a c om pany it shouldn t have b oug ht. The sec ond sort of error is tha t you

d idn t do som ething yo u should have d one .Tha t s an error of om ission. You d idn t buy ac om pany you should have boug ht. Now o f these tw o typ es of e rrors one is very muc h

mo re imp ortant than the othe r, errors of om ission. If you look a t c om panies tha t fa il or

have troub le, if you take IBM in the 1980s, it was wha t it didn t d o,it d id not go to thesma ller co mp uters tha t got it in troub le. Not wha t it did.

Now if you look at ac c ounting system s in your country and mine, only one o f these tw o

type s of e rror are rec orded .When you d o som ething you shouldn t have d one , it willeventua lly ap pea r in the b ooks. But when you don t do som ething you should have

done it will ne ver appea r in the books. Now you re in an organisa tion tha t says ma king a

mistake is a ba d thing. But there s only one type o f mistake you c an be c aug ht on. Itsdoing som ething you shouldn t ha ve d one . Therefore if you wa nt to ma ximize p ersona l

sec urity, what s the best stra teg y don t do a nything. Minimise the c hange s tha t youb ring about, tha t will ma ximize p ersona l sec urity. So if we wa nt to cha nge , and tha t s pa rt

of wha t we w ant to do throug h orga nisa tiona l design, we ha ve to sta rt to record mis-ta kes and systema tica lly lea rn from them. That s part o f systemic thinking .

But it a lso explains why mo st o rganisa tions a re relucta nt to c hange , bec ause the y are

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sec urity seekers.

Ac koff s a ttempt to elevate the sub jec t helped to p ut OR on the intellec tual map. But

a fter working in the field for over 20 yea rs, Ac koff felt that he ha d taken it as far as he

c ould. For him System s Thinking was the only way of overcom ing Huma n kind s na tura lresistance to c hange .

Russell Ackoff: I think that the p rinc ipa l p rob lems tha t c onfronted us wa s how to m ake

these idea s more a c c ep tab le to a larger numb er of peo ple who we re in the position ofbe ing ab le to do something ab out them . It s a very diffic ult task, be c ause were a ve ry

c onservative c ulture, we re very sa tisfied , ge nerally spea king about whe re we a re,andour princ iple attitude is lea ve we ll enough alone, do nt rock the bo at, let na ture ta ke

its course , ra ther than rec og nising that we a re a n ae rop lane flying throug h a hurric ane,

and if we d on t c ontinuously ad just our position we won t ge t there.