Russian nuclear forces, 2013

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2013 69: 71Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsHans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris

Russian nuclear forces, 2013

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Bulletinof theAtomicScientists

IT IS 5 MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT

®

Nuclear notebook

Russian nuclear forces, 2013

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris

AbstractRussia is in the middle of modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era ballistic missiles with fewerimproved missiles. In a decade, almost all Soviet-era weapons will be gone, leaving a smaller but still effectiveforce that will be more mobile than what it replaced. As of early 2013, Russia has a stockpile of approximately4,500 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,800 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomberbases. Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage, along with 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. There is someuncertainty in these estimates because Russia does not disclose how many nuclear weapons it has and theUnited States has stopped releasing data supplied by Russia under strategic arms reduction agreements. Theauthors use public statements made by Russian officials, newspaper articles, observations from commercialsatellite images, private conversations with government officials, and analysis of Russian nuclear forces overmany years to provide the best available unclassified estimate of Russian nuclear forces.

KeywordsICBM, nonstrategic weapons, nuclear forces, Russia, SLBM, Strategic Rocket Forces, strategic weapons,warheads

Russia is in the middle of a compre-hensive modernization of its nu-clear forces that began more than

a decade ago. The upgrade, whichinvolves replacing all Soviet-era ballisticmissiles with fewer improved missiles, isnow approaching a point at which thenumber of modern weapons will shortlyexceed the number of old ones. In adecade, virtually all of the Soviet-eraweapons will be gone. This will leave inplace a significantly smaller but effectiveforce that will be more mobile than theone it replaces.

As of March 2013, we estimate thatRussia has a military stockpile of appr-oximately 4,500 nuclear warheads, of

which roughly 1,800 strategic warheadsare deployed on missiles and at bomberbases.1 Another 700 strategic warheadsare in storage, along with 2,000 nonstra-tegic warheads. In addition to the mili-tary stockpile for operational forces, alarge numberÑwe estimate 4,000Ñofretired but still largely intact warheadsawait dismantlement (see Table 1).2

Unlike Britain, France, and the UnitedStates, Russia has not declared howmany warheads it possesses in itsnuclear stockpile. Moreover, althoughtransparency about Russian strategicnuclear forces is increasing for the USgovernment due to data exchanges andon-site inspections, it is decreasing at

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists69(3) 71–81

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Table 1. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES, 2013

72 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69(3)




the public level for the internationalarms control community, becauseRussia does not disclose such informa-tion and the US government has stoppedreleasing aggregate data supplied to it byRussia under strategic arms reductionagreements.3 As a result, there is someuncertainty in the estimates providedin this Nuclear Notebook. Nevertheless,based on public statements made byRussian officials, newspaper articles,observations from commercial satelliteimages, private conversations with gov-ernment officials, and our analysis ofRussian nuclear forces over manyyears, we are confident that this Note-book provides the best unclassified esti-mate of Russian nuclear forces.

ICBMs

Russia deploys an estimated 326 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)with approximately 1,050 warheads.The ICBMs are organized under theStrategic Rocket Forces (SRF) intothree missile armies with a total of 12 div-isions, a structure the SRF commander,Colonel-General Sergei Karakayev, sayswill continue through 2016 and beyond(Interfax-AVN, 2011b).

Over the next decade, RussiaÕs ICBMforce is scheduled to undergo significantchanges. By 2016, according to Kara-kayev, SS-18, SS-19, and SS-25 missileswill constitute only about 40 percent ofthe ICBM force, down from approxi-mately 72 percent in 2011 (Interfax-AVN,2011a). To meet this goal, over the nextfour years Russia will have to retiremore than half of its ICBM force, mainlymobile SS-25s. By 2021, according to theannounced plans, 98 percent of the oldmissiles will be gone (Interfax AVN,2011c).

To compensate for the retirement ofold missiles, Russia is planning to pro-duce significant numbers of SS-27 Mod.2 (RS-24) ICBMs. But the current andexpected production and deploymentrate of new ICBMs is not rapid enoughto offset the retirement of the old mis-siles. Even if Russia manages to deployan average of 15 new missiles peryearÑsomething it has not been able toaccomplish over the past two dec-adesÑby the early 2020s the ICBMforce will likely shrink to around 220 mis-siles, nearly one-third fewer than today.

SS-27 (Topol-M)

Russia deploys three kinds of SS-27 mis-siles: the SS-27 Mod. 1, a single-warheadmissile that comes in either mobile (RS-12M1) or silo-based (RS-12M2) variants,and the SS-27 Mod. 2 (RS-24), called theYars in Russia, a mobile missileequipped with multiple independentlytargetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).Deployment of the SS-27 Mod. 1 wascompleted in 2012 at a total of 78 missiles:60 silo-based missiles with the 60th Mis-sile Division in Tatishchevo and 18 road-mobile missiles with the 54th GuardsMissile Division at Teykovo.

All new Russian ICBM deploymentsfor the foreseeable future will be ofMIRVed RS-24 ICBMs. Deploymentof the first two regiments with a totalof 18 mobile missiles has been completedat the 54th Guards Missile Division atTeykovo, northeast of Moscow. Pre-parations began in 2012 for three add-itional missile divisions to receive theRS-24: Initially, silo-based RS-24s willbe deployed at the 28th Missile GuardsDivision at Kozelsk to replace the SS-19s,and then mobile RS-24s will replace SS-25s at the 51st Missile Guards Division at

Kristensen and Norris 73




Irkutsk and the 39th Guards MissileDivision at Novosibirsk. Once Irkutskand Novosibirsk are complete, deploy-ment will follow at the 42nd MissileDivision at Nizhniy Tagil, replacing SS-25s currently deployed there. After silo-based RS-24s are installed at Kozelsk,deployment will follow at the 13th Mis-sile Division at Dombarovsky, replacingthe SS-18s currently deployed there(Interfax-AVN, 2012d, 2012e).

Once completed, this transformationwill reduce the Russian ICBM forcestructure from 12 to 7 missile divisions:3 silo divisions (1 SS-27 Mod. 1 and 2 SS-27 Mod. 2, or RS-24), and 4 mobile div-isions (1 SS-27 Mod. 1 and 5 SS-27 Mod. 2,or RS-24). Most significant, replacingmobile, single-warhead SS-25 missileswith mobile, MIRVed RS-24 missilescould increase the portion of mobileICBM warheads from 15 percent todayto approximately 70 percent by 2022.

It is unclear how many warheads eachRS-24 carries. A US defense official toldus last year that the missile can carry upto six warheads, which would be similarto the loading on the sea-based variant,the Bulava. But the head of the SRF is onrecord saying the RS-24 can carry up tofour warheads (Abdullaev, 2010; RussiaToday, 2010), and a Bush administrationofficial stated in 2009 that Russianflight tests had demonstrated the cap-ability to carry three warheads (Gertz,2009). We are therefore revising ourestimate and will count up to four war-heads per RS-24.

SS-18 (RS-20V)

The SS-18 is a silo-based, 10-warheadheavy ICBM first deployed in 1988. App-roximately 55 SS-18s carry roughly halfof RussiaÕs deployed ICBM warheads.

Karakayev stated in 2010 that Russiawould extend the service life of the SS-18 to 2026 (RIA-Novosti, 2010), but latein 2012, he said that the SS-18 wouldremain in service until 2022 (Interfax-AVN, 2012a).

SS-19 (RS-18 or UR-100NUTTH)

The silo-based, six-warhead SS-19entered service in 1980 and is graduallybeing retired. Currently, Russia deploys210 warheads on the 35 SS-19s thatremain in service. Karakayev stated inlate 2012 that the SS-19 would be fullyretired by 2019 (Interfax-AVN, 2012a).

SS-25 (RS-12M or Topol)

Russia has been retiring SS-25 missilesfor several years, each year removingbetween one and three regiments (9 to27 missiles) from service. Karakayevsaid late in 2012 that the SS-25 wouldremain in service until 2019 (Interfax-AVN, 2012a). Russia has approximately140 operational SS-25 missiles in service,but manyÑperhaps mostÑof the 63 mis-siles at Irkutsk and Novosibirsk are beinginactivated to make way for the RS-24.

Russia is developing a new, liquid-fueled, heavy, silo-based ICBM. Themissile is included in RussiaÕs arms pro-curement program through 2020, with agoal of deployment in 2018 (Gorenburg,2011; VPK News, 2011). Russia will firsthave to create a liquid-fuel ICBM pro-duction line, which it does not currentlyhave, so it is likely that delays will occur.Though the new heavy ICBM is widelyassumed to be a replacement for the SS-18, some SS-18s are scheduled to bereplaced by the silo-based RS-24.

Russia is adjusting the operations ofits mobile ICBMs, with each battalion





spending longer periods deployed awayfrom its garrison. A Russian televisioncrew accompanying the 54th GuardsMissile Division at Teykovo on acombat patrol in July 2012, for example,reported that Òthe time the missiletroops remain on combat patrol routeshas gone up considerably. From now on,the military have to remain in position atsecret locations in the woods for 20 daysin a rowÓ (Center TV, 2012). The mobilemissile units are also being equippedwith a new Òmodernized engineeringsupport and camouflaging vehicle(MIOM-M)Ó designed to improve theability of the missile launchers toremain undetected during alert deploy-ments. This includes providing Òcon-cealment and imitation of a missilesystem in field positions, distortion oftracks of system units immediatelyafter they have been taken [sic], includ-ing the rolling on of tracks leading tofalse positions and objectsÓ (Interfax-AVN, 2013b).

Five ICBMs were test-launched in2012, and an SRF spokesperson said 11ICBM launches were scheduled for 2013(Interfax-AVN, 2013a).

SSBNs and SLBMs

After more than 15 years of design, devel-opment, and production, the first of thenew Borei-class (or Borey) ballistic mis-sile submarines (SSBNs) entered intoservice on January 13, 2013. Twenty-fiveyears have passed since the last SSBNwas commissioned in Russia. The newSSBN begins the transition fromSoviet-era missile submarine designs toa new SSBN class of eight planned boatsscheduled to replace the current DeltaIII and Delta IV models by the early2020s; the first boat is named Yuri

Dolgoruki. The current SSBN fleet con-sists of 10 boats: one Borei, six Delta IVs,and three Delta IIIs. Combined theycarry 160 submarine-launched ballisticmissiles (SLBMs) with up to 624warheads.

The Russian navy plans to build up toeight Borei-class (officially known asProject 955) SSBNs, each equipped with16 SS-N-32 (Bulava) SLBMs that cancarry up to six warheads apiece. Initiallyit appeared that the first Borei SSBNwould transit to the Pacific Fleet on theKamchatka Peninsula to begin thereplacement of the Delta IIIs (Itar-Tass, 2008), but the Russian governmentannounced in 2012 that the Yuri Dolgor-uki would be based in the NorthernFleet. The second boat, the AlexanderNevsky, will be based with the PacificFleet (rusnavy.com, 2012a).

The Alexander Nevsky was launchedin 2010 and is undergoing sea trials. It hasto conduct a series of missile test-launches before it can be declared oper-ational, possibly by late 2013 or early2014. The third boat, the Vladimir Mono-makh, was launched in late 2012 and isexpected to become operational aftertwo or three years.

The fourth and subsequent Borei-class SSBNs will be of an improveddesign known as Borei-II (Project955A). The first improved Borei, pos-sibly to be named the Knyaz Vladimiror Svyatitel Nikolai, began constructionin July 2012 and is expected to enterservice in 2015 to 2017. The keels for thefifth and sixth boats, the AlexanderSuvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov, respect-ively, will be laid in 2013, and those sub-marines will probably enter service latein this decade.

There is considerable uncertaintyabout how the improved Borei SSBN





will be armed. Numerous articles overthe past several years have reportedthat each Borei-II will be equippedwith 20 missile tubes, four more thaneach of the first three boats (Interfax-AVN, 2013a). But in February 2013, asenior defense industry source toldRIA-Novosti that the number of tubeswould not be increased. ÒThe Project955A differs significantly from the ori-ginal Borei (Project 955) but not in thenumber of missiles carriedÑthere willstill be 16 on boardÓ (RIA-Novosti, 2013).

For the next several years, the main-stay of RussiaÕs SSBN force will continueto be the six third-generation Delta IVSSBNs built between 1985 and 1992,each equipped with 16 SLBMs. All DeltaIVs are part of the Northern Fleet and arebased at Yagelnaya Bay on the Kola Pen-insula. Since 2007, Russia has beenupgrading the Delta IVs to carry a mod-ified SS-N-23 SLBM known as the Sineva.Each missile carries up to four warheads.All six boats have now completed anoverhaul and conversion to Sineva, butVerkhoturye will not be ready untilApril 2013. The Yekaterinburg wasdamaged by a fire in December 2011 andwill not return to service until 2014 at theearliest. As a result, only four of the sixDelta IVs are currently operational.

There are also rumors of a modifiedversion of Sineva, called Layner orLiner, that will be deployed on theDelta IVs over the next several years.One unnamed navy general staff officialreportedly said that, Òwhile the Sinevacan carry four warheads, the Laynerwill carry 10Ó (Izvestia, 2012). But anothersource in the Russian General Staff saidthat the Layner is not a new missile but amodified Sineva: ÒIt is in fact a Sineva.Only the warhead is new.Ó The Laynerhas an improved penetration capability

achieved by, among other things, Òagreater number of reentry vehicles (boy-evoy blok) in the warhead [sic]Ó(Interfax-AVN, 2012b). Instead of morethan twice the number of warheads, itseems more likely that the modified pay-load includes modified warheads andadditional penetration aids.

Three Delta III SSBNs remain in ser-vice on the Kamchatka Peninsula as partof RussiaÕs Pacific Fleet. Each boat isequipped with 16 SS-N-18 M1 Stingray(RSM-50) SLBMs with three warheadseach. The Svyatoi Georgii Pobedonosetscollided with a fishing vessel in 2011.Following repairs, it test-launched anSS-N-18 in October 2012.

The Russian navy declared in 2012that continuous SSBN deterrent patrolswould resume by midyear (RIA-Novosti, 2012a). But according to infor-mation obtained from the US Navyunder the Freedom of Information Act,Russian SSBNs only conducted four tosix patrols during all of 2012. The dur-ation of Russian SSBN patrols is notknown but is assumed to be consider-ably shorter than US SSBN patrols,each of which lasts an average of about70 days. With only five to six operationalSSBNs in 2012, the number of Russianpatrols may have been insufficient tomaintain continuous patrols.

Strategic bombers

Russia operates two types of nuclear-capable heavy bombers: the Tu-160Blackjacks and the Tu-95MS Bear H.Both types can carry the nuclear AS-15Kent (Kh-55) air-launched cruise missile(ALCM)4 and possibly gravity bombs;5

the Tu-160 can also carry the nuclearAS-16 Kickback (Kh-15) short-rangeattack missile.6 A new long-range





nuclear cruise missile, designated theKh-102, is under development.

There is growing uncertainty aboutthe number of bombers and their oper-ational status because Russia and theUnited States no longer disclose thenumber of aircraft counted under armscontrol treaties. The final Memorandumof Understanding exchanged under theStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START) listed a total of 76 deployedRussian bombers (13 Tu-160s and 63Tu-95MSs) and 12 additional test bom-bers, for a total of 88 aircraft as of July2009 (US State Department, 2009). FourTu-95MSs reportedly were retired inlate 2009 (Podvig, 2009), leaving 72bombers in service. Since 2009, no offi-cial data has been publicly released. Ourcurrent estimate is based largely oncommercial satellite images, whichshow that 51 to 54 bombers are typicallypresent at the two strategic bomberbases (Engels and Ukrainka). Another23 to 26 bombers are typically presentat the Ryazan training base, the Kazanproduction plant, and the Zhukovskydesign plant, for a total inventory of 74to 80 bombers. This number is probablya little high because some of the visiblebombers may have been retired andbecause the satellite images were notall taken on the same day. Nevertheless,by averaging the numbers visible on allof the images we can arrive at a roughestimate of 72 bombers currently in ser-vice. In addition to the 51 to 54 deployedbombers normally visible at Engels andUkrainka, another half a dozen or so air-craft from the bases might be on trainingflights or temporarily at other bases, foran estimated force of perhaps 60deployed bombers.

The 60 deployed bombers would onlybe counted as 60 weapons under the

New START counting rule, but the air-craft could in fact carry a maximum loadof 676 weapons (all 72 bombers couldcarry an estimated 810 weapons). Theweapons are not loaded on the bombersunder normal circumstances. Most ofthe weapons have been moved from thebases to central storage facilities, but weestimate that a small number of war-heads might be present at Engels andUkrainka. The nuclear weapons storagefacilities at each base appear to be active.Construction has been underway for thepast two years on one of the nuclearweapons igloos at Engels Air Base.

Russia has begun design studies of anew strategic bomber that may emergeas a prototype by the early 2020s. Thenew aircraft, currently referred to asPAK-DA, would replace Tu-160 andTu-95MS heavy bombers as well as theTu-22M3 nuclear-capable medium-range bomber (Itar-Tass, 2010; RIA-Novosti, 2009). Although the newbomber would eventually replace allthree bombers, Russia is still upgradingthe older aircraft (RIA-Novosti, 2012b).

Nonstrategic (tactical) weapons

We estimate that Russia has approxi-mately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear war-heads assigned for delivery by air, navy,and various defensive forces. Russia hasstated that it has reduced its number ofnonstrategic nuclear warheads by 75percent since 1991 and that all are in cen-tral storage (Russian Federation, 2010),but the statements have not beenupdated since 2005.7

We estimate that RussiaÕs tacticalair forces are assigned approximately730 AS-4 air-to-surface missiles andbombs; Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) intermedi-ate-range bombers can deliver both the





missiles and bombs, whereas Su-24M(Fencer-D) and Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers deliver bombs only. Russia ismodernizing some of its Fencers, but theaircraft will be replaced by Su-34 (Full-back) fighter-bombers; deployment ofthe Fullback has started at bases in west-ern Russia. It is possible that other typesof fighter-bombersalsohavenuclearcap-ability, but we have not found reliableinformation to that effect. Although indi-vidual weapons and aircraft vary consid-erably, air-delivered weapons representthe only category of nonstrategic nuclearweapons in which Russia and the UnitedStates have comparable numbers andtypes of armaments; unlike Russia, theUnited States has eliminated all types ofnonstrategic naval nuclear weapons.

The approximately 700 warheadsassigned to RussiaÕs naval nonstrategicdelivery platforms arm cruise missiles,antisubmarine weapons, anti-air mis-siles, torpedoes, and depth bombs.RussiaÕs first new Severodvinsk-class(Yasen-class) nuclear-powered attacksubmarine is conducting sea trials priorto entering operations with the Russiannavy, perhaps later this year. The sub-marine is equipped for nonstrategicnuclear weapons, including antisubmar-ine rockets, and has eight vertical launchtubes for cruise missiles. In November2012, the Severodvinsk conducted a test-launch of what appeared to be the Cali-ber (SS-N-30) land-attack cruise missile(rusnavy.com, 2012b). It is possible(but uncertain) that the Caliber isnuclear-capable. RussiaÕs arms-procure-ment program for 2011 to 2020 indicatesthat it will build a total of 10 Yasen-classsubs (Lenta.ru, 2011).

There are indications that Russia ispreparing for the conversion of someprimary naval platforms from nuclear

to non-nuclear capability. One exampleincludes plans to convert the Oscar-class guided-missile submarines andKirov-class guided-missile cruisersfrom carrying nuclear SS-N-19 cruisemissiles to non-nuclear SS-N-26 andSS-N-27 cruise missiles (RIA-Novosti,2011a, 2012b, 2012c; World MaritimeNews, 2011). According to one report,the Oscar II submarine Orel (K-226)will undergo modernization in 2013 toreplace the obsolete Granit (SS-N-19)anti-ship cruise missile with the newsupersonic Onyx (SS-N-26) (rusna-vy.com, 2012c). While the SS-N-19 isnuclear-capable, the SS-N-26 is not.

We estimate that Russia maintainsaround 430 warheads for air defense,ballistic missile defense, and coastaldefense forces. The warheads are usedin Gazelle ballistic missile defense inter-ceptors at five sites around Moscow, inparts of the S-300 air defense system,and in the SSC-1B Sepal coastal defensesystem. The ballistic missile defensesystem (A-135) is being upgraded, andRussia has begun introducing S-400 airdefense regiments (with about eightlaunchers and 32 missiles each) aroundMoscow and plans to gradually replacethe S-300 system. There is considerableuncertainty about which of the S-300air defense interceptors (SA-10, SA-12,SA-20) are nuclear-capable, whetherthe new S-400 also has a nuclear capabil-ity, and how many warheads areassigned to each unit.

Despite RussiaÕs declaration in 1991and 1992 that it would eliminate allground-launched nonstrategic nuclearwarheads, it has not done so (Aften-posten, 2011). We estimate that approxi-mately 170 warheads are assigned toSS-21 Scarab (Tochka) and SS-26 Stone(Iskander) short-range ballistic missiles.





The SS-21 is gradually being phased outand replaced with the SS-26, whichunder the 2025 State Armament Planreportedly will be deployed with allground troop units (Gavrilov, 2013).

Funding

This research was carried out with a grant from thePloughshares Fund.

Notes

1. New START aggregate data from March 2013attribute 1,480 warheads on 492 deployedlaunchers. The number is lower than ourestimate because it does not count weaponsstored at bomber bases, but instead attri-butes an artificial number of one weaponper bomber. In reality, Russian bomberscan carry six to 16 nuclear weapons each.

2. We estimate that Russia stores its nuclearweapons at 48 permanent storage sitesacross the country, including about 10national-level central storage sites (Norrisand Kristensen, 2009). Other essential refer-ences for following Russian strategicnuclear forces include the general NewSTART aggregate data that the US and Rus-sian governments will release biannually;the Open Source Center (various dates);Pavel PodvigÕs website on Russian strategicnuclear forces (Podvig, 2012); and the Russiaprofile maintained by the James MartinCenter for Nonproliferation Studies for theNuclear Threat Initiative (2012).

3. Under New START, Russia releases onlythree overall aggregate numbers for stra-tegic forces: deployed ballistic missiles andheavy bombers; warheads attributed tothose delivery vehicles; and deployed aswell as non-deployed delivery vehicles.Under the previous agreement, START, theUS State Department made available the full,unclassified breakdown of Russian aggre-gate numbers, including the number ofeach type of missile and bomber and theirlocations. For a copy of the July 2009START Memorandum of Understandingthat includes a specific breakdown of Rus-sian numbers, see Kristensen (2011).

4. The Tu-95MS is equipped with the AS-15Aand the Tu-160 with the AS-15B, which hasa longer range. Depending on aircraft type,Russian bombers can carry up to 16 weap-ons; hence, it would be possible for 72 bom-bers to be loaded with 820 warheads but onlybe attributed 72 warheads under NewSTART.

5. One well-informed source says that there areno nuclear gravity bombs for the Tu-95MSand Tu-160 aircraft (Podvig, 2005).

6. There are rumors that the AS-16 may havebeen retired or placed in storage.

7. A US Embassy cable stated in September2009 that Russia had Ò3,000”5,000 plusÓnonstrategic nuclear weapons (Venik4.com,2010), a number that comes close to our esti-mate at the time (Kristensen, 2009). The USprincipal deputy undersecretary of defensefor policy stated in 2011 that Russia was esti-mated to have 2,000 to 4,000 nonstrategicnuclear weapons (Miller, 2011). We estimatethat the number is at the lower end of thatrange with the rest awaiting dismantlement.For a more in-depth overview of Russian andUS nonstrategic nuclear weapons, see Kris-tensen (2012). Some analysts estimate thatRussia has significantly fewer warheadsassigned to nonstrategic forces. See, forexample, Sutyagin (2012).

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Author biographies

Hans M. Kristensen is the director of theNuclear Information Project with the Federa-tion of American Scientists (FAS) in Washing-ton, DC. His work focuses on researching andwriting about the status of nuclear weaponsand the policies that direct them. Kristensenis a co-author to the world nuclear forces over-view in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford UniversityPress) and a frequent adviser to the news mediaon nuclear weapons policy and operations. Hehas co-authored Nuclear Notebook since 2001.Inquiries should be directed to FAS, 1725DeSales St. NW, Sixth Floor, Washington, DC,20036 USA; þ1 (202) 546-3300.

Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with theFederation of American Scientists in Washing-ton, DC. A former senior research associatewith the Natural Resources Defense Council,his principal areas of expertise include writingand research on all aspects of the nuclear weap-ons programs of the United States, the SovietUnion and Russia, the United Kingdom, France,and China, as well as India, Pakistan, and Israel.He is the author of Racing for the Bomb: GeneralLeslie R. Groves, the Manhattan ProjectÕs Indis-pensable Man (Steerforth, 2002) and co-authorof Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin toYeltsin (Westview, 1995). He co-authored orcontributed to the chapter on nuclear weaponsin the 1985”2000 editions of the SIPRI Year-book (Oxford University Press) and has co-authored Nuclear Notebook since 1987.





Documents

Russian nuclear forces, 2013