Contents Preface 9

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 11

PART I THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION

Introduction 19

Chapter 1 Russian National Interests: The State of Discussion By Andrey Kortunov 21 Two Approaches to National Interests 21 Domestic Interaction with Foreign Policy 25 “Westernizing” vs. “Slavophile” Understanding of National Interests 38 Foreign Policy Today — Two Agendas 44

Chapter 2 Impacts of Domestic and Regional Factors on Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy By Tatyana Parkhalina 47 Three Schools of Thought 48 Rising Nationalism 50 The Political Paradigm 51 Economic Groups and Foreign Policy 52 The Regional Agenda 54

Chapter 3 The Myth of the “West” in Russian Political Culture and its Impact on Foreign and Security Policy By Tatyana Yevgeneva 59 Historical Background 60 Identity Crisis in the Late Soviet Period 63 “Communists” vs. “Democrats” 65 Political Myths in Modern Russia 67

Concluding Remarks 71 A Country in Transition 71 Between Continuity and Change 73 Towards a Consensus on Russia’s National Interests 80 Foreign Policy at the Crossroads? 84

PART II THE CIS DIMENSION

Introduction 87

Chapter 4 Reluctant Adaptation: Russia’s Security Policy towards New Eastern Europe and the Baltic States By Dmitriy Trenin 89 Discontinuities of the New Strategic Environment 90 Accepting the Finality of Independence 92 Security Alignments 95 A Different Kind of Russia? 96 Whither Russia? 97

Chapter 5 Ukrainian-Russian Relations and the Debate on NATO Enlargement By Leonid Bilousov 101 Inherited Political Systems 102 The Legacy of Soviet Relations 103 A “Triangle” Relationship 105 The NATO Debate in Kiev’s Political Elite 107 Regional Stability and NATO Enlargement 110

Chapter 6 Belarus, Russia, and a New European Security Architecture By Anatoliy Rozanov 113 The OSCE and a Common Security Space 114 NATO Enlargement: A View from Belarus 116 Belarus-Russia: The Military Aspect of Cooperation 123

Concluding Remarks 129 CIS Priority of Russian Foreign Policy 130 Bilateral Relations 132 Relations with the Republic of Belarus 134 Russian-Ukrainian Relations 137 Post-Soviet Integration? 141

PART III THE EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL DIMENSION

Introduction 145

Chapter 7 Soviet Security Concepts in Historical Retrospective By Aleksey Filitov 147 Choosing the Confrontation Paradigm 148 Provoking Militarization 152 The Myth of Khrushchev’s “New Thinking” 155 External Security at Any Cost 160

Chapter 8 Russian Foreign and Security Policy in its Global Dimension By Yevgeniy Bazhanov 163 The Original Strategy and its Failure 163 The Emergence of a Modified Strategy 164 Objectives 167 Strategy 170 Conclusion 174

Chapter 9 Security Relations between Russia and the Western World By Sergey Rogov 177 The Danger of Isolation 178 A Weak Performance in the Early 1990s 180 New Security Relations with the West 183 Economic Interaction 186 Conclusion 188

Chapter 10 Russia’s Concept of a New European Security Architecture By Igor Maximychev 192 A Continental Security System 192 NATO-Russia Relations 196 Cooperation in Europe 201

Chapter 11 East-West Cooperation and International Ecological Security By Vassiliy Sokolov and Andrey Korneev 205 The Environment as a Security Issue 205 Relationship between Environmental and Military Security 210 Military Interests and Global Environment: 213 The Soviet/Russian Case 213 East-West Cooperation in Environmental Security 216

Concluding Remarks 219 Cold War Legacy 219 Russia in a Multi-Polar World 223 Russia within European Security Structures 225 Russia and NATO Enlargement 226 Traditional and Modern Security Agendas 229

CONCLUSIONS 233 Definition of National Interests 235 Russia’s Relationship with CIS Neighbors 236 Russia in Europe and in the Global Setting 237 How Can Russia Meet the Challenge? 238 What Can the West Do? 239

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Published Sources 243 Books and Articles 243

About the Authors 251

Preface This book addresses the role of the Russian Federation within the post-Cold War European security architecture. It provides a forum for relevant Russian foreign and security policy analysts, as well as ex-perts from Ukraine and Belarus, to share their views and to contem-plate official positions on various aspects of this topic. The contribu-tions were presented at an international conference on Russia’s Role within a New European Security Architecture, organized by the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, held in Zurich on 12-13 December 1997.

Contributors and participants from Moscow included Prof. Dr. Ye. P. Bazhanov, Diplomatic Academy at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Prof. Dr. A. M. Filitov, Institute of General History at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. A. V. Korneev, Institute of USA and Canada Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. A. V. Kortunov, Moscow Public Science Foundation; Dr. I. F. Maximychev, Institute of European Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. T. G. Parkhalina, Institute of Scientific Information at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Prof. Dr. S. M. Rogov, Institute of USA and Canada Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dr. V. I. Sokolov, Institute of USA and Canada Studies at the Russian Acad-emy of Sciences; Mrs. Ye. Stepanova, Carnegie Moscow Center; Dr. D. V. Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center; Prof. Dr. T. V. Yevgeneva, Russian State University for the Humanities; Dr. N. V. Yudina, Dip-lomatic Academy at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Participants from Kiev and Minsk included Dr. L. V. Bilousov, Ukrainian Center for International Security Studies; Mr. A. I. Veselovskiy, Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Prof. Dr. A. A. Rozanov, Belorussian State University; and Dr. L. F. Zayko, Center for Strategic Initiatives “East-West.”

Chairpersons and participants from Zurich, Cologne, and Paris included Dr. O. Alexandrowa, German Federal Institute for Eastern European and International Studies, Cologne; Prof. Dr. C. Goehrke, University of Zurich; Dr. D. Müller and Mr. J. Perović, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zurich; Prof. Dr. J. Scherrer, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris; Prof. Dr. K. R. Spillmann and Dr. A. Wenger, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zurich; Dr. G. Wettig, German Federal Institute for Eastern European and International Studies, Cologne.

The conference was organized under the auspices of the International Relations and Security Network (ISN),1 an Internet-based initiative to promote dialogue and cooperation in security matters at the interna-tional level. As part of Switzerland’s participation in NATO’s Part-nership for Peace, ISN is supported by the Swiss government, whose financial assistance in organizing the conference is appreciated.

The editors thank all the conference participants for their contribu-tions. They particularly appreciate the efforts of the speakers in re-vising their papers to include the results of discussions. They ac-knowledge the interest professed by the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belo-russian Embassies in the event. For the organization of the conference, their many thanks go to their staff, particularly to Derek Müller, Jeronim Perović, Daniel Möckli, and Erika Girod.

With regard to the organization and scope of this book, Derek Müller and Jeronim Perović merit special mention and gratitude. The editors would also like to thank Lyn Shepard for his help with the manuscript.

The views expressed in these conference papers and analytical sections are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the institutions and individuals that so generously assisted them.

1 ISN can be found at the web-address http://www.isn.ethz.ch.

General Introduction

11

Wherever Russians gather — may this be in their homes in Moscow or in Zurich with the purpose of analyzing European security problems — their discussion will inevitably reach the philosophical question of Russia’s nature.

With this remark, Sergey Rogov provoked thoughtful amusement among the participants of a December 1997 conference on Russia’s Role within a New European Security Architecture, most of whom seemed to share that experience and to regard the question of Russia’s nature as a relevant, important consideration. Yet Russia’s nature is ambiguous. In many respects, the country seems to be a “normal” European democracy with constitutional protection of basic freedoms, institutions of balanced powers, free elections, more or less independ-ent news media, and other formal characteristics of Western societies. Important social indicators, such as demographic structure, levels of urbanization and education, social and professional mobility, seem to suggest that Russian society resembles Western democracies.

However, Russian authorities are not in a position to promote large-scale political mobilization. A majority of Russians takes more inter-est in questions regarding daily life, such as the increase in prices, collapse of the economy, or growing unemployment, than in politics. Only a few Russians would describe their country in terms of a “democracy” or “welfare state,” “capitalism” or “liberalism.” A large part of the population would call Russian society “oligarchic,” ruled by a few, highly influential individuals, politicians, and masters of financial empires and oil or gas monopolies. The legacy of paternalis-tic, even authoritarian features is an important aspect of Russia’s po-litical system, as the officially promoted search for a new “Russian idea” suggests. The identification of Russia’s national interests based partly on historical mythology is liable to have a considerable impact on the country’s security perceptions.

From a Western point of view, Russian foreign and security policy appears somewhat contradictory, sometimes even inconsistent. Mos-cow’s firm rejection of NATO enlargement, for example, was widely

13

perceived as a mere tactical bargaining position to receive political and material concessions from Western Europe and the USA, or as a powerful patriotic slogan used in domestic politics. Yet a closer look at the process of Russian foreign and security policy making reveals an impressive consensus among members of the political elite and a collective threat perception based on the traumatic historic experience of being surrounded by potentially aggressive neighbors. Notwith-standing this, Russia has adopted a modern security agenda.

Unlike in the recent past, the key threats to national security are per-ceived as non-military, internal challenges caused by economic crises, social problems, or ethnic tensions. Thus the newly adopted National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, recognizing “the absence of large-scale aggression against Russia in the foreseeable future,” calls for concentration on “the fundamentally new opportunities of mobilizing resources to resolve the country’s internal problems.”1 The task of rebuilding Russia on the basis of values, such as civil society, the rule of law, and a free market economy, corresponds in the field of international relations with the professed dedication to equal coop-eration with neighboring countries, the renunciation of “hegemonistic and expansionist goals,”2 and the conduct of a pragmatic, predictable foreign policy in general.

The above-mentioned traditional threat perception in terms of “geo-politics” will continue to influence the process of defining Russia’s national interests. But democratization and decentralization processes have changed the country irreversibly, making a return to an exclu-sively centralist structure highly unlikely. Increasingly important for Russia’s foreign relations is the impact of regionalization, i.e. the shifting of power from the center to the regions. Besides “national” interests, the Russian State has to take into consideration the interests of “sub-national” actors such as economic groups or some regions of the Russian Federation. Russia’s role within a new European and

1 See “Kontseptsiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federacii,” Rossiys-

kaya gazeta, 26 December 1997, 1st section.

2 Ibid., 4th section.

14

global security architecture — the choice between rapprochement or distance to Western Europe, the USA and the international community — will depend largely on the impact of interests pursued by important domestic actors.

This book wants to contribute to a deeper understanding of the current Russian foreign and security policy discourse as well as present Rus-sian foreign and security policy making. Rather than confronting “Western” and “Russian” positions, the conference and the proceed-ings of the conference provide a forum of debate among Russians, reflecting the authentic character of the internal security dialogue. Ukrainian and Belorussian perspectives are included for additional insight into the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) dimen-sion of Russian foreign and security policy. The contributors were free to decide on methodological approaches and scientific guidelines. They expressed their independent private opinion rather than official positions. The result is a colorful and sometimes contradictory picture.

The book assesses three dimensions of Russian foreign and security policy, covering aspects of the historic and “philosophical” back-ground, internal challenges, the changing relationship with the most important neighboring countries, as well as specific security issues. Each part concludes with an analytical assessment presented by the editors, taking into account the lively, sometimes controversial panel discussions among presenters and commentators.

The most obvious starting point for assessing Russian foreign and security policy is the domestic dimension. The first part of the book is thus dedicated to the important discussion on national interests. In addition, it addresses the impact of mythological patterns on Russia’s relation with Western Europe, factors of continuity regarding Russian and Soviet political culture, and the increasingly important regional dimension of Russian foreign and security policy.

The second part explores the CIS dimension, officially referred to as the most important aspect of Russian foreign policy. While the CIS is no longer considered an adequate instrument to implement integration policy, sub-regional structures and bilateral agreements become increasingly important. Of all the former “sister republics,” the coun-

15

tries within the Slavic vicinity, Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus, play an especially important role for Russian security perceptions. This is why, besides two contributions from Moscow, this publication includes an analysis of Russian bilateral relations from the point of view of both Kiev and Minsk.

The third part is dedicated to the European and global dimension of Russia’s security policy. Departing from an assessment of Soviet Cold War security perceptions, it addresses Russian foreign relations within a “multi-polar world,” the role of NATO and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as aspects of economic interaction. In addition to issues of a “classic” security agenda, non-military and transnational security threats, such as eco-logical crises, are discussed.

16

Part I The Domestic Dimension

Introduction Part I of this book is dedicated to Russian discussion on the country’s foreign and security policy goals and its national interests. To a large extent, it reflects the arguments and attitudes of 19th century debates between Slavophiles and Westernizers. In chapter 1, Andrey Kortu-nov, president of the Moscow Public Science Foundation, explores the important, highly emotional, and politicized discourse of Russian national interests. Leaving aside the “philosophical” aspects of a Rus-sian “mission” in history, the author analyzes different periods of Russian transition since 1991 and shows how different “schools” of political thinking and the changing internal situation interact with the regulation of the country’s foreign policy.

Chapter 2, presented by Tatyana Parkhalina, deputy director of the Moscow Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences at the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION), is dedicated to the role of domestic and regional factors influencing the Russian debate on for-eign and security policy. The author holds that most contributions to the present discourse on national interests and foreign policy goals, whether Western oriented or emphasizing a distinctive “Russian way,” contrast with the real needs and interests of various elements of Russian society; the latter has always been preoccupied with the material aspects of everyday life.

Chapter 3, prepared by Tatyana Yevgeneva, lecturer on Political Sci-ence and associated professor of Political Culture and Political Psy-chology at the Russian State University for the Humanities (Moscow), examines cultural and psychological aspects of Russian foreign rela-tions. The myth of “the West” — an “image of the West as a hostile subject and its confrontation with Russian civilization” — is described as a key aspect of historic continuity with high impact on the present Russian discourse on the country’s place in Europe and its relations with the West.

19

Besides the authors, the following conference participants made spe-cific contributions with their comments and interventions, which are referred to in the concluding remarks of this part: Prof. Dr. Carsten Goehrke, head of the Department of Eastern European History at the University of Zurich, and Prof. Dr. Jutta Scherrer, lecturer at the Center for Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris.

20

ANDREY KORTUNOV Chapter 1 Russian National Interests: The State of Discussion The discussion on the essence of national interests has always been at the center of political discourse in post-Soviet Russia. This discussion is characterized by its very intense, highly politicized nature — in most cases turning out to be purely theological and therefore fruitless. It seems that participants in such a discussion fail to agree even on basics; the whole definition of national interests appears vague, am-biguous, and sometimes eclectic. There are very few notions in the contemporary Russian political vocabulary that are misused (or abused) to such an extent. Quite often opponents, while referring to Russian national interests, simply talk about entirely different things.

Two Approaches to National Interests There are at least two approaches to national interests. The first one can be defined as a “holistic” approach. It assumes that every country is special and unique; moreover, every country has a historic mission of its own to accomplish, its own destiny to follow. Destiny and mis-sion cannot be chosen, changed, or rejected since they are rooted in culture, history, and geopolitical positions of particular countries. A country that fails to follow its destiny is doomed to decline and ulti-mately collapse. The goal of the political leadership is to discover the mission, to articulate it, and to impose it on the society. The wisdom of statesmen consists in their ability to shape the concept of national interests in a manner adequate to this long-term vision of the country’s future. Such an approach turns national interests into an issue of

21

values and beliefs. National interests are thus closely connected with notions of “national idea,” “national way,” or “greatness.”

The second approach to defining national interests might be labeled as “positivist.” It is based on a less “sacred,” more rational vision of society and international relations. National interests from this per-spective are nothing more than the lowest common denominator of multiple and sometimes mutually exclusive group interests that exist in every society — political, social, economic, regional, ethnic, and so on. Therefore national interests cannot be discovered or invented by political leaders, they should rather be understood and balanced. Statesmen should not try to impose their personal vision of “national destiny” on the society, even if they have such a vision. On the con-trary, society should use the State to coordinate contradictory group interests. Political leaders are regarded within the “positivist” inter-pretation of national interests as honest brokers, not as priests. The “positivist” approach to national interest is characteristic of mature democracies: societies with well-defined and well-structured political systems where various group interests can be openly stated, defended, and promoted through proper constitutional mechanisms. However, even in mature democracies from the United States to Japan, one can see at least some elements of the “holistic approach” that add their value component to the concept of national interests (in the USA, ideas of “manifest destiny,” or “crusade for democracy”).

Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes as well as emerging states tend to gravitate to the “holistic” interpretation. First, they need this inter-pretation as a vital source of their legitimacy, that cannot be achieved through standard democratic procedures. Second, within non-demo-cratic states, particular group interests can hardly be articulated, and they cannot compete with other group interests. Moreover, there is no decision making process that would take into account particular goals and aspirations of all social and political strata. Authoritarian leaders need national myths. At the same time they have instruments to im-pose them on the society. But here again, it would be an oversimplifi-cation to equate authoritarianism with the “holistic” interpretation of national interests. No dictator can afford to ignore the “positivist” interpretation completely. At the operational level, some elements of

22

the “positivist” approach are introduced in any authoritarian state; group interests are still taken into account though in arbitrary and biased ways.

If these interests were completely ignored and dictators in total isola-tion from reality invented “national destinies,” no authoritarian regime would last long. If we consider the Russian case in this perspective, we will conclude that Russia is somewhere in the middle between mature democracies and authoritarian regimes. This position makes it very difficult to decide on the approach to national interests. Russia is no longer a totalitarian state. Furthermore, it is probably closer to democracy than to authoritarianism. Russia features constitutional procedures, elections, free news media, and other formal characteristics of a democratic state. More importantly, Russian soci-ety is similar to that of Western democracies in many essential aspects, such as demographic structure, levels of urbanization and education, or social and professional mobility. These features of the modern Russian State and society make it nearly impossible for the leadership to impose any “holistic” vision of national interests on Russia. All recent attempts to sell the public an integrated national interest concept — from Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Aleksander Lebed to Gennadiy Zyuganov and Boris Yeltsin — failed miserably. The Russian society demonstrated a remarkably low mobilization potential, which is not unfamiliar to mature democracies.

The overwhelming majority of Russians do not care about foreign policy. Foreign policy has always been an elite sport in Russia, and this is even more the case now, given the enormous domestic prob-lems that the country must face. Foreign policy has very little to do with the everyday life of ordinary people; at least they find it difficult to trace a direct casual relationship between their lives and interna-tional politics. The country is clearly inward oriented, and an average Russian will not list the issue of “national destiny” as a top priority equally important with the burning problems of continuing inflation, unemployment, organized crime, and corruption among state bureau-crats. For the minority of Russians who do care about foreign policy, the “holistic” approach is still mostly irrelevant. Obtaining visas to Baltic States, customs at the Russian-Ukrainian border, shipments of

23

consumer goods from Turkey or China, and accommodating relatives or friends returning from Tajikistan or Armenia are of much more practical and immediate concern than a rather remote and unclear “Russian mission” in world history.

The so-called “new Russians” (the emerging business community of the country) have their own foreign policy agenda. They carefully watch development of the US dollar exchange rate, foreign consumer goods prices, customs duties imposed by Moscow and its trade part-ners in the West, and so on. Their businesses can be directly affected by the next IMF credit to Russia, by decisions of the G-7 group, or even by new interest rates set by the German State Bank. Growth of the European Union is an important matter for them because it con-tinues to have a serious impact on their business practices in Europe. However, the “Russian mission” is rarely on the radar screens of “new Russians.” No matter what politicians or political scientists might have to say on that, Russian society remains — or rather has become — pragmatic, consumer-oriented, and very difficult to mobilize. The record of recent years indicates that a single event, no matter how dramatic it might look, can hardly kick the Russian society off balance. It paid little attention to German unification, stoically sur-vived Soviet disintegration, and stayed mostly indifferent to the war in Chechnya. No empirical sociological data suggest that NATO enlargement caused radical shifts in general Russian public opinion, a psychological trauma leading to the triumph of radical nationalists and militant revanchists.

Still Russia is in no position to claim the status of a mature democracy with clear predisposition to the “positivist” interpretation of national interests. Mature democracy presupposes procedures and institutions, a political culture, and traditions that Russia has had no time to develop. In the field of foreign policy there are many birthmarks in-herited from the old Soviet regime. One should confess that many of the old Soviet deficiencies are not yet overcome. Some of them are even aggravated. After the Soviet disintegration, many hoped that foreign policy decision making would become an open procedure, involving not just top bureaucrats but also the Parliament, leading political parties, the news media, the public, independent experts, and

24

lobbyist groups. Unfortunately, none of that happened. There seems to be neither a clear chain of command, nor established procedures in this sphere. The lack of open discussion, information feedback, and independent opinion are more than evident. Sometimes decisions look impulsive, characterized by pure ignorance of the situation in the out-side world, or reflect lack of coordination among the larger Russian ministries and cabinet members. Under these circumstances, the influence of even relatively minor domestic factors on foreign policy formation can be crucial. In short, the weakness of the state and institutional problems create numerous problems for introducing the “positivist” approach to Russian national interests.

Domestic Interaction with Foreign Policy Nation building and state-building in Russia is a very complex proc-ess. In a short span of six years Russia went through several distinct stages of evolutionary movement, trying to define its new raison d’être. Internal economic and political problems forever overshadowed Rus-sia’s foreign policy agenda. At the same time, depending on peculiar circumstances at each stage of internal Russian evolution, Russian foreign policy and Russian perceptions of national interests went in a specific direction. With the changing composition of Russian deci-sion-making bodies, the style and impact of Russian activities outside state borders changed too. Eventually these policies became associated with particular influential government bodies, interest groups, and individual policy makers, each of them leaving an inimitable imprint on Russian international stature and behavior.

The following distinct periods in Russian evolution can be identified:

• Early post-independence period, associated with a liberal, albeit “romantic” reformism (1992-autumn of 1993).

25

• Intensified internal power struggle and cardinal shift from demo-cratic pluralism to revival of rigid centralized controls (later 1993).

• Establishment of a system of presidential rule leading to sweeping readjustments in the system of state authority, internal and exter-nal policy making (1993-late 1994).

• Exacerbation of internal contradictions and crisis of authoritarian rule, as manifested by the civil war in Chechnya (1995-1996), and intense power struggles accompanying national elections.

• Attempts at political consolidation and bureaucratic power clashes during Yeltsin’s second presidential term (1996 until now).

Taking account of specifics of the internal Russian situation at each stage is important in understanding institutional competitiveness, interaction between groups, and individual interaction affecting con-duct of Russian foreign policy and, more generally, interpretation of the country’s national interests. In August 1991 the ill-fated attempt by Mikhail Gorbachev’s closest associates to prevent a collapse of the communist regime allowed its sworn enemies, headed by Boris Yelt-sin, to come to the fore and snatch political power away from the communists.

The actual mechanism chosen to bring about fundamental political change in the USSR was the Minsk agreement concluded between leaders of three Slavic Republics, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, declaring their respective independence, thereby voiding the Federate Agreement founding the Soviet state. All other former Soviet repub-lics followed suit, thus completing the de facto and de jure disinte-gration of the former superpower. Naturally, from then on, respective foreign ministry bureaucracies were put in charge of day-to-day con-duct of the new states’ foreign policy, while the ultimate powers of decision making on matters pertaining to their external relations went to the political elites.

A very serious complicating factor in forging the Russian foreign strategy was the ambiguous and unclear decision-making process in this sphere as well as in general. The Soviet Foreign Ministry was

26

traditionally one of the most conservative and rigid governmental agencies, with very strict rules and procedures. Personnel changes at the top were rare, diplomatic carriers were slow and predictable. Even Shevardnadze’s relatively modest innovations were interpreted by many Foreign Ministry bureaucrats as a “revolution” and a “collapse of foundations” on which the Ministry used to operate.

However, the real revolution came when the Soviet Foreign Ministry was transformed into that of the Russian Federation. Many senior diplomats had to resign or were forced into early retirement because of their alleged support of the August coup leaders. Some of the “best and the brightest” from younger generations also left the Ministry, looking for opportunities in the private sector. Newcomers with no diplomatic records and no diplomatic experience at all made fantastic careers almost overnight — both in the Ministry itself and in the Rus-sian Embassies abroad.

The same processes — though less visible from the outside — were reshaping the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, Foreign Intelli-gence, and other agencies involved in foreign policy decision making. As for academic research institutes that very actively advised Gor-bachev on foreign policy matters during his first years, their role diminished because of inadequate funding and defection of gifted scholars from academia into business and politics. Needless to say, personnel and expertise problems were most grave in areas related to the “near abroad” because work had to start from scratch. Besides, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental agencies, at least at the beginning, working on the “near abroad” implied little in the way of prestige and career opportunities. In fact, the “near abroad” divisions were often perceived as second-rate in comparison with the “far abroad.” They were staffed with pre-retirement officers or those who failed in other foreign policy fields.

At the same time, a number of new powerful foreign policy institu-tions emerged that had no analogues in the Soviet Union. Of course, the most spectacular case was the rise of the Russian Supreme Soviet and, in particular, its Committee on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Eco-nomic Relations. On many occasions the committee acted as a rival to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, challenging key decisions and basic

27

approaches of the latter. Parliamentary involvement in foreign policy issues widened the circle of participants to international affairs dis-cussions in the Russian Federation. Another new key foreign policy institution was the Inter-Agency Foreign Policy Commission of the Security Council, established by President Yeltsin in December 1992, and the Presidential Council, founded in February of 1993. From the very beginning, the foreign policy of the independent Russian Fed-eration came under an overwhelming influence of the democratic ideal. This is not surprising since what may be identified as the first Russian Republic began in early 1992 with an upsurge of liberal pub-lic and political activity.

In a short time, Russian civil society took a big step towards democ-racy, assisted in this process by executive and legislative activities intended to dismantle former rigid authoritarian norms and structures. In an unprecedented move that seems above all to have reflected Boris Yeltsin’s personal vengeance against former Politburo colleagues who had made him a pariah, the Communist Party was banned in Russia. However, other limitations on political activity as well as on freedom of the press or personal liberties were lifted altogether, and independ-ent parties and public organizations were created.

With the disappearance of communist ideology and the traditionally conservative system of managing internal and foreign affairs, new Russian leaders obtained a seemingly unlimited freedom in charting and pursuing new goals internationally. It was with the strong impact of Andrey Kozyrev that Russia began to orient its foreign policy towards the West in a strong belief that the country’s fortune was inextricably connected to introducing “civilized” market relations and integration within the community of advanced capitalist societies.1 At

1 Originally, Andrey Kozyrev was supported by President Boris Yeltsin and a narrow group of his associates (G. Burbulis, Ye. Gaydar, M. Poltoranin). At the Foreign Ministry Kozyrev’s view were shared primarily by his former colleagues from the “old” Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation that used to exist while the USSR was still around (G. Kunadze, F. Shelov-Kovedyaev, V. Churkin). Proponents of Kozyrev’s liberal and pro-Western views were to be found in a pacifist faction at the Supreme Soviet (V. Sheinis, S. Yushenkov, G.

28

the same time, Russian “Atlantists,” as they were identified by many for their preference of Russia’s unity with the Atlantic alliance, were to a significant degree indifferent to Russia’s problems east and south of its borders, and particularly towards other New Independent States (NIS).

Initially the Kozyrev group was supported by Russian “realists” in foreign policy matters, those in government institutions who, even though positively inclined towards developing cooperation with the West, called for a balanced approach to the world at large. In the opinion of the “realists,” the pitiful condition in which the Russian Federation found itself after dissolution of the Soviet Union, did not permit the country to enter into close relationships with developed nations. However, given Russia’s close traditional ties with other Newly Independent States (NIS) countries of the former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, as well as some former Soviet clients in the Third World, the “realists” proposed to emphasize expanded political and economic relations with these “natural partners.” They also called for establishing closer cooperative ties with advanced Asian nations such as Japan, South Korea, China, South-East Asian, and Pacific nations. These potentially important partners had been all but ignored by the former communist regime, primarily for ideological reasons. How-ever, under current conditions, they emerged as recognized leaders in the world economy and politics.2

Interestingly, as time went by and Andrey Kozyrev and his group pursued a progressively more pronounced pro-Western course, the

Starovoytova), in some academic institutions (S. Blagovolin, K. Sarkisov, Yu. Davydov), among well-known journalists (A. Nuykin, O. Latsis, V. Nadeyn, Yu. Karyakin), and within a segment of liberal mass media (A. Pumpiansky, V. Loshak, S. Kiselev).

2 The group of “realists” was represented by Kozyrev’s Deputy Minister A. Adamishin, Yu. Mamedov, G. Berdennikov, Russia’s ambassador to the USA, Vladimir Lukin, members of the Supreme Soviet, E. Kozhokhin, A. Tsarev, A. Peskunov, and others. Some leading Russian intellectuals from the academy, S. Shatalin, G. Arbatov, R. Sagdeev, O. Bogomolov, N. Petrakov, G. Yavlinskiy, and others shared their views.

29

“realists” gravitated towards the anti-Kozyrev opposition on foreign policy matters. Of crucial importance was the virtual abandonment by Kozyrev of any active policy towards the “near abroad,” i.e. the for-mer Soviet republics and closest Russian neighbors. This, in their opinion, was particularly short-sighted, since some situations and tendencies developing in the “near abroad” context presented growing direct threats to Russia’s security, e.g. local conflicts, discrimination against Russian and Russian-speaking Diaspora communities. As far as the anti-Kozyrev opposition is concerned, it included different groups that may be subdivided into “moderates” and “extremists.” “Moderates” included those in the foreign policy community who could not resign themselves completely to dissolution of the USSR. Even though they did not call for restitution of the former superpower, realizing the futility and even inherent danger of such an exercise, they tended to look at world affairs and Russia’s foreign policy through the prism of Russian “great power omnipotence” (veliko-derzhavie), demanding that Russia’s “special status” be recognized by others, particularly by countries of the “near abroad.” While not rejecting Russia’s overtures towards the West entirely, the “moder-ates” insisted that their country’s “complete parity” in relations with the US and its allies be recognized.3

Still another distinct group in the anti-Kozyrev (i.e. anti-government) opposition followed extreme positions: its members could never rec-oncile themselves to the “loss” of the Soviet Union and spoke reso-lutely in favor of reviving the “good old” Communist Empire. The main power base of the “extremists” was the Russian Supreme Soviet, for example the multi-party coalition Russian Unity, supported by the

3 Prominent figures among the “moderates” included Vice-President Aleksander

Rutskoy, Head of the Security Council (later retired) Yuriy Skokov, Speaker of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khazbulatov, influential parliamentarians Ye. Am-bartsumov, N. Travkin, O. Rumyantsev, A. Volskiy, and others. Importantly, many of these individuals were at that time (1992-1993) actively involved in cre-ating independent political parties which instantly fell under the influence of their particular views on foreign policy matters.

30

National Salvation Front, and the All-Army Officers Assembly.4 The main aim of the “extremists” was to restore Soviet imperial “power and glory,” “reuniting the Russian lands,” i.e. all former Soviet republics, as well as resuming close alliances with radical anti-West-ern and particularly anti-American regimes: Cuba, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, etc.

As a result of the considerable multi-polarity of perspectives on Rus-sian goals and the internal divisiveness within the “First Russian Republic,” the country was unable to “speak with a single voice” on foreign policy issues until at least mid-1994. While Andrey Kozyrev pushed forward a pro-Western agenda, other government officials made conflicting statements in their foreign contacts, undermining the foreign minister’s effort and creating considerable confusion interna-tionally. Besides various officials of the Supreme Soviet, attempts at shaping up Russia’s foreign policy were made by representatives of the presidential “apparatus,” such as Gennadiy Burbulis and his suc-cessors as well as members of the cabinet. On several occasions, Kozyrev would find himself in a particularly embarrassing situation in connection with pronouncements by Minister of Defense Pavel Gra-chev on matters related to military-political relations with Western and developing countries. In Kozyrev’s own Foreign Ministry, the “old Guard” of functionaries left over from the Soviet Foreign Ministry occasionally created serious difficulties in implementing policy initiatives by their reformist superiors.

At the same time, compared to internal politics, foreign policy issues remained only secondary, if not tertiary in importance. Debates over foreign policy, even on such “hot” and controversial problems as NATO expansion, resolution of the Yugoslav conflict, or arms control mostly represented an “extension” of internal battles between the executive and the legislative branches, among political movements of

4 The majority of the leaders of the “extremists” (V. Zhirinovskiy, S. Baburin, A.

Sterligov, G. Zyuganov, A. Makashov) were expounding anti-Western and nationalistic views. Boris Yeltsin and Andrey Kozyrev were nothing more than “traitors, undermining Russian national interests” to them.

31

opposite orientation. The two major political players — the president and his team of radical reformers on the one hand and the Supreme Soviet opposing President Yeltsin starting in December 1992 on the other — tried to use the economic crisis in their struggle against each other. The president accused the legislature of sabotaging reforms, undermining his efforts to curb inflation and accelerate the privatiza-tion process; the Supreme Soviet spokesmen claimed that economic programs of the executive branch were amateurish, one-sided, and even suicidal for Russia.

It was natural to predict that Yeltsin’s popularity would fall in the face of the ongoing socioeconomic and political crisis, that egalitarian, social-democratic, and even communist ideas would regain influence in Russia, and that the only thing the opposition really had to do was to challenge the president with the voice of the people. That was the goal of the referendum of April 1993 on economic and political performance of both the executive and legislature imposed on Yeltsin by the Supreme Soviet. Once defeated, the president would have been turned into a permanent “lame duck,” and the Russian Federation would have moved from a presidential republic to a parliamentary one. However, the opposition suffered a dramatic defeat. The high turnout demonstrated that Russia had a national political agenda, that people in the periphery still cared about who might have the upper hand in Moscow. It came as a surprise to most experts that a majority of voters supported not only Yeltsin personally but also the perform-ance of his economic reforms.

The immediate impact of the referendum on Russian foreign policy was rather limited. The referendum questions did not address interna-tional politics directly, and though both the president and his opposi-tion tried to make use of perceived triumphs or failures of the Yeltsin-Kozyrev policy abroad during preparation for the referendum, this whole area was clearly overshadowed by much more important domestic issues. However, it does not mean that the referendum was irrelevant in terms of Moscow’s future foreign policy. In fact, some of its consequences already became visible in the summer of 1993. Before the referendum, Yeltsin had to make sure that his foreign pol-icy decisions would not lead to yet another conflict between the

32

executive and legislative branches of government or within the executive branch itself. Faced with the choice of where to make con-cessions to the Supreme Soviet and to the Rutskoy group —on domestic or international issues — he often preferred to compromise on the latter. It is sufficient to mention his abrupt and clumsy cancel-lation of the state visit to Japan in September of 1992.

Now the president’s hands were no longer tied. His final break with Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksander Rutskoy allowed Yeltsin to forge and implement his own foreign policy regardless of how the opposi-tion might react to it. There were at least two signs that possible changes in Russian foreign policy could be more than shifts in rheto-ric. First, after the referendum, Yeltsin took a clearly less ambiguous and more pro-Western position on former Yugoslavia and Bosnia in particular. Second, he announced that he would go to Tokyo prior to the G-7 summit meeting in July, evidently ready to make additional steps to accommodate Japan on the territorial problem. Both changes would have been unthinkable if Yeltsin had still wanted to appease his domestic critics. The reaction of the Supreme Soviet was easy to predict. On Bosnia it took an even more open pro-Serbian position — Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties, called for sus-pension of economic sanctions against Serbia. On Japan, it watched all of Yeltsin’s moves closely, ready to declare any attempt to com-promise on the territorial issue “unconstitutional” and “illegitimate.” The Supreme Soviet also retaliated by blocking ratification of the Russian-American Treaty on Strategic Nuclear Forces (START) II treaty.

The president tried to widen his power base and consolidate his posi-tion by pushing the constitutional process forward. Political develop-ments in Russia in May/July 1993 centered to a major degree around constitutional debates and the possibility of early parliamentary and presidential elections. The executive and legislative assemblies engaged in a fierce power struggle on the issue of drafting a new con-stitution leading to dissolution of both the Supreme Soviet and its parent organization, the Congress of People’s Deputies.

33

The violent events of October 1993 and the constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections brought about a fundamental shift — emergence of the entire complex of “near abroad” issues as the single most important component of Russian foreign policy thinking and activities. Another major new element was a totally different approach to how Russian national goals could and should be achieved within the context of the “near abroad.” An almost total departure took place from abstract “universal values” (i.e. peaceful resolution of conflicts, non-use of military power in pursuit of foreign policy) to assertive if not aggressive modes of behavior and fairly “liberal” interpretation of such matters as state sovereignty and inviolability of borders.

A main reason for these changes was the success of Vladimir Zhiri-novskiy’s ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) during the 1993 Duma elections, and, in a broader sense, the ideology of nation-alism in Russian. Russian liberals of all shadings (“Atlantists,” “mod-erates,” etc.) were ideologically and politically defeated by ultra-nationalist champions of velikoderzhavie. In a startling about-face a few days after the elections, Andrey Kozyrev suddenly changed his rhetoric and started talking about the need to “defend Russian national interests at all cost.” Interestingly, he also became quite tough with regard to Russia’s dealing with the West. This admitted defeat of the government’s foreign policy agenda amounted to an ill-concealed attempt at jumping on the bandwagon of Russian velikoderzhavie.

Introducing the presidential system of government in Russia had both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it had become obvi-ous early in the course of implementing Russian reforms that impera-tive tasks of rebuilding the country economically, giving it a sense of direction, and reestablishing its national cohesion could only be accomplished with the extreme concentration of national resources and willpower. In theory, presidential rule could be an instrument to achieve this aim. On the other hand, acquisition of uncontrolled authority by a single individual is always ripe with dangers for any society. In the Russian context, given its past and recent history of authoritarianism, that danger was particularly high.

After the December 1993 elections and referendum, the Yeltsin regime could move to the indubitable “center stage” of the Russian

34

political system. The new Russian parliament, especially the repre-sentative State Duma, turned out to be much more conciliatory than its Supreme Soviet predecessor. It prepared to play a secondary role to the presidency. At the same time, after the dramatic events of late 1993, the process of ideological and political stratification acquired new impetus. Both on internal and foreign policy matters the many “intermediary shades” that distinguished various political groups and “schools of thought” were disappearing, leaving only a few basic “camps” to continue opposing and fighting each other. In effect, two most important among them were the “presidential camp” and the “nationalist camp.” Despite the attempts mentioned above by some government liberals to develop their own “civilized” nationalistic agenda, they essentially failed to undermine the influence of the intensely anti-government message put forward by the “real” nation-alists of the Zhirinovskiy type who progressively sided with neo-Communists.

At the same time, the foreign policy elite, who previously followed a wide spectrum of platforms, also became divided into an anti-gov-ernment or pro-government group. Many “realists,” “moderates,” etc. were forced to take sides according to this main “dividing line.” In a significant new development, many of those who had previously claimed an “independent” view on foreign policy matters, rushed to join forces with the government camp, gaining lucrative official posi-tions.5

Another important phenomenon leading to substantial changes in foreign policy decision making was the emergence of new centers of power within the government system. To a certain extent, this process, resulting in increased competition between various institutions and individuals for monopoly rights in formulating Russian foreign policy, was similar to the chaotic situation of the “First Russian Republic.” However, a new and peculiar feature was an active and ambitious role played not by elected officials, parliamentarians, or even independent

5 For example A. Migranyan, S. Blagovolin, S. Karaganov, N. Travkin, E. Am-

bartsumov, and others.

35

politicians of national standing but by obscure apparatchiks (bureaucrats) without a formal mandate for state affairs or even foreign policy. The activities of Aleksander Korzhakov, the former head of the Presidential Security Force, were a glaring example. As a close confidant of Boris Yeltsin before removed from power in 1996, Korzhakov began to involve himself quite seriously in decision making on central issues of internal and foreign policy. After the events of October 1993, the Ministries of Defense (Pavel Grachev), Interior (Victor Yerin), and Security (Sergey Stepashin), whose sup-port for President Yeltsin proved to be crucial in defeating the Supreme Soviet “rebels,” had also begun to expand their national influence, progressively involving themselves in conducting Russia’s foreign policy. It was this newly acquired potential of the “power ministries” to make their own decisions on matters of internal and external policies that led to a major tragedy for Russia, the war in Chechnya.

As the result of warfare in Chechnya, Russia lost not only internally but also internationally. Serious complications began to appear in its relations with neighboring New Independent States, particularly in the Caucasian and Central Asian regions. Even the West, remaining “neu-tral” towards events in Chechnya, occasionally criticized Moscow for human rights violations and the arbitrary nature of its policies. How-ever, the regime was very slow to admit its mistakes. It tried to change the situation by combining modest attempts at negotiations (occasion-ally involving international mediators) with renewed military opera-tions in various parts of the Chechen Republic. At the same time, mindful of approaching parliamentary and presidential elections, President Yeltsin and his closest aides in the administration gradually arrived at a decision to discard those members of the presidential team who were involved in particularly bitter public controversies over the conduct of the war. That included both “hawks” and “doves,” even though some of them, i.e. Pavel Grachev and Andrey Kozyrev, belonged to the venerable “Old Guard” with whom Boris Yeltsin originally came to power.

By late 1995, the Yeltsin regime was clearly on the defensive against ambitious and progressively successful attempts by the opposition

36

(particularly neo-Communists and rabid nationalists) to win over the national electorate. The chance of winning the forthcoming parlia-mentary and presidential elections, scheduled for late 1995 and mid-1996, appeared slim. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to ignore two phenomena — affecting voters in a particularly significant way — nostalgia for the Communist past and dissatisfaction with the way national relations were being handled.

With the majority of the population living below the official poverty line and suffering from serious social inequities created by the “shock therapy” of hasty and often misguided economic reforms, it was not surprising that government moves in the socioeconomic, military, domestic, and foreign policy areas were usually received with bias if not animosity. The Chechen affair seemed particularly unpopular, not only because it was creating a situation of virtual civil war in the country, but also because the authorities demonstrated a unique inability to resolve it in an appropriate way. Public opinion, reared for generations in the spirit of velikoderzhavie, could not tolerate that ethnic Russians and the Russian state at large suffered constant humiliating defeats from “a bunch of rebels” bitterly opposed to the very notion of a unified Russian state. Warfare in and around Grozny brought back memories of bloody Caucasian wars of previous centu-ries and raised painful questions about the ability of the Russian Fed-eration to withstand disintegration tendencies that had previously led to the demise of the Soviet Union.

On the eve of the parliamentary elections of December 1995, the Yeltsin government undertook several policy and personnel changes intended to improve its standing with the electorate. Most noteworthy among these was the replacement of Andrey Kozyrev by Yevgeniy Primakov. Primakov, a seasoned politician who had begun his career several decades ago under the Communists, was well known for his moderate if not conservative views. His background, including a pre-vious assignment as head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, made it clear that he would not follow his predecessor down the enthusiastically pro-Western path. At the same time, Primakov was always highly regarded as a leading Soviet and Russian expert on the Third World, particularly on problems relating to Islam. A man with

37

such special expertise could be indispensable in conducting Russian foreign policy, including complicated relations with Muslim states and regimes.

It is not surprising that some early Primakov policy statements in his capacity as the new Russian foreign minister were very different from those of Kozyrev, even dating back to the time when the outgoing minister decided to become “tough.” First, Primakov came across as extremely critical of Western moves perceived hostile to Russian interests, such as expansion of NATO towards Eastern Europe and pressure applied against Serbs in Bosnia. Second, he proclaimed that he would try to “reorient” the entire Russian foreign policy towards the Orient, particularly Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian members of the Community of Independent States. However, Primakov’s appointment failed to disarm opponents of the regime in continuing their criticism of government foreign policy.

The post-presidential election period after June 1996 saw greater con-centration of power in the area of domestic and foreign policy making. This process may be illustrated by the emergence of another “super-agency” within the presidential administration, the so-called Defense Council. Originally created to offset General Lebed’s Security Council,6 the new body became even more important after the General’s ouster in areas of national defense, foreign relations and security. A gradual return to the situation under the Communist sys-tem took place when the “apparatus” (i.e. the Presidential Admini-stration performing functions of the former central party committee) moved to center stage in domestic and foreign policy making.

“Westernizing” vs. “Slavophile” Understanding of National Interests

6 In a way reminiscent of what was happening under former Soviet rulers, during

the elected president’s illness presidential powers were effectively captured by some key apparatchiks belonging to his administration. One accomplishment of the de facto rulers of Russia during that period was firing General Lebed from his position as the National Security Adviser only a few months after he had entered that position.

38

The issue of Russian national interests is currently discussed in both the “holistic” and “positivist” framework. Within the first context, the discussion boils down to the centuries-old dispute between Wester-nizers and Slavophiles — in the contemporary discourse the argument between Atlantists and Eurasianists. What is Russia? Is it a European state such as Poland or Romania? Should we consider its isolation from Europe, its Orthodox Christianity, and its communist adventure of the 20th century to be mere aberrations of history? Or does Russia belong to a class of its own? Is it fair to say that its geographical position, its ethnic composition, its cultural values and traditions place Russia somewhere between Europe and Asia? Depending on answers to these questions — and these are value matters, not empirical questions — one can come to very different perceptions of Russian national interests.

The Westernizers’ position is based on the assumption that Russia, after all, is a European state, though a very special one. True, Russians acquired their culture and religion from the Byzantine, not from the Roman Empire. True, for centuries the country was isolated from the rest of Europe as a result of the Mongol yoke and xenophobia of Russian tsars. And seventy years of communist rule could not but widen the gap between Russia and the West. Westernizers, however, held that the whole of Russian history is a record of desperate attempts — sometimes inventive and successful but mostly clumsy and abortive — to rejoin the West. The prodigal daughter of Europe is still on her long way home. Now that Russia has finally liberated itself from its empire, it is in the best position to get back to its true European family. There is simply no other feasible choice for Russia, since it will never be accepted in Asia as a real Asian country; cul-tural, ethnic, and psychological incompatibilities between Russia and her Eastern neighbors are much greater than any shades of difference between Russians and other Europeans.

The Slavophiles’ vision of Russia is quite different. For them, Russia is not and has never been a fully European country but rather a sepa-rate civilization squeezed between Europe and Asia. It cannot be compared to Poland or Romania. Its geographic position, ethnic com-

39

position, culture, and traditions put Russia in a very special category of nations with split identities. “Scratch a Russian, and you’ll see a Tatar,” as Napoleon put it. Since the reign of Peter the Great, Russian society was led by an European elite, but the country preserved a mostly Asiatic population.

Slavophiles interpret Russian history as a constant search for a stable balance in dealing with the West and the East, Europe and Asia, Christianity and Islam. For Slavophiles, the Soviet disintegration has not resolved the fundamental dilemma of Russian identity. The disin-tegration cut off a large share of the “Asiatic” heritage. After having withdrawn from Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia looks more European than the former Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet disintegration cut off Russia from the rest of the European continent by creating a chain of new states from Estonia to Moldova, which are not always friendly toward Moscow. What is even more important, even in its reduced form, Russia is still an ethnically and culturally unique country spanning Europe and Asia, a Eurasian country in the true sense of the word. The very ethnic and cultural diversity of Rus-sia was a vital source of her integrity and viability in the past and should remain so in the future.

The Slavophile perception of Russian history draws a line between the Russian Empire and West European colonial structures. Though there were some attempts by the imperial administration to “russify” the non-Russian population, they never reached a point of starting to threaten preservation of different national identities. That is why the system was acceptable to most ethnic groups and why tsars were rea-sonably successful in containing nationalism. Today, with the Soviet Union gone, there is a new basis for a symbiotic, complementary relationship between different ethnic groups and cultures within Rus-sia. The revival of a Russia shorn of its imperial legacy may give a major boost to developing a new and a very diverse federation. This new political entity should remain a Great Eurasian power, but it will not any longer be perceived as a major threat by its neighbors, because this much more loosely organized federation will have neither the intention nor capability for imperial adventures.

40

If Atlantists are right, the only “real” national interest of Russia is to get back to the European family of nations from which it has been separated due to an unfortunate chain of historic accidents. Everything else should be subordinated to this interest; everything that prevents Russia from achieving this goal should be sacrificed. For example, Russia should reassess its relations with other CIS countries if these relations distract its attention and resources from getting into Europe. Similarly, Moscow has to be extremely cautious in developing ties with China, and under no circumstances should it regard China (or Japan, or South Korea, or India) as an alternative to Western Europe and the United States. Russia has to cut short its economic and military ties with radical Third World regimes that it inherited from the imperialist Soviet Union. Likewise, Russia must distance itself from the remnants of the Communist world, i.e. countries like North Korea or Cuba. Moscow should take a strong pro-Western position in the United Nations and other international organizations, giving its full support to Western efforts to curb nuclear and ballistic proliferation or limit the export of arms. The reward for these mani-festations of self-restraint will be a fast and irreversible integration into Western political, economic, and security structures.

If the Eurasianists’ vision were closer to reality, it would be counter-productive for Russia to concentrate its efforts in getting to Europe. Europe would never accept Russians as equal and legitimate partners, simply because Russia is not a European country and does not com-pletely belong to European civilization. No matter how smart and far-sighted Russian politicians might be, they will end with a unilateral dependency of their country on the good will of its Western partners. In the community of prosperous Western democracies, Russia will always be like a white crow in a flock with a permanent complex of inferiority. Instead, Russia’s national interests lie in making the most of its unique transcontinental position. Moscow cannot afford to sub-ordinate southern or eastern dimensions of its foreign policy to its Western direction. Since the coming century will be marked by a deep conflict between developed and developing worlds, Russia should keep its options open to act as an “honest broker” in this foreseeable conflict.

41

The discussions at the “holistic” level can hardly lead to any decisive conclusions since they concern values and beliefs. No factual evidence will be powerful enough to serve as ultimate proof of either side being right or wrong. Today “Atlanticism” seems to be on the decline (because of NATO enlargement, lack of Western investments in Russia, and overall disillusions in borrowing Western modernization models), while “Euroasianism” seems to be on the rise.

The future of the “holistic” discussion on Russian national interests will depend upon a number of factors. In particular, a lot can be defined by how fast and how successful the Russian transition to the market economy will be. Today, six years after the “shock therapy” was introduced, the country still seems at the beginning of the transi-tion process. Rapid development of small and medium-size busi-nesses, active and aggressive entrance on to international markets, further deregulation of the Russian economy, a major inflow of West-ern investments — will all push Russia toward Europe and distance it from the Third World, including parts of the former Soviet periphery as well as countries like China and India. On the other hand, if reforms slow down under the mounting pressure of egalitarian-oriented populists or profit-greedy financial oligarchs, and all attempts to join Western economic structures turn out to be futile, Russia will herself gradually turn into a Third World country with many problems and perceptions similar to those of the developing South.

It seems more productive to analyze the problem of Russian national interests through the “positivist” prism. True, there are considerable uncertainties in foreign policy decision making in Moscow, and quite a lot depends on particular personalities or small kingships around Yeltsin. But still, one can try to identify the main actors who make their voices heard and their positions considered by the state. The state itself is not an entirely unified body. Foreign policy decision making is becoming increasingly compartmentalized, divided between main power centers. The Foreign Ministry is in charge of formal diplomacy, the Ministry of Defense plays the key role in arms control negotiations, and the Ministry of Finance keeps its monopoly over relations with the IMF and the World Bank. Such “feudalism” of for-

42

eign policy creates many problems, since each agency tries to enlarge its “sphere of influence” at the expense of all the others.

Theoretically, the State Duma could exercise some control over executive power in foreign policy through three mechanisms: nomi-nations of key foreign policy officials, ratification of international treaties, and budget approvals. But in reality all three control mecha-nisms are severely limited. The State Duma is important, but more a reflection of Russian public opinion fluctuations than a key player in foreign-policy decision-making. Some economic centers of power are more visible in foreign policy. Quite often their institutional or sector interests are directly converted into Russian foreign policy. In par-ticular, four such centers deserve attention:

• The military-industrial complex, which still comprises the core of the country’s economy.

• The energy sector, which is the main source of hard currency for Russia.

• The agrarian sector and food processing industries.

• New commercial enterprises, above all, private financial institu-tions (banks, insurance companies, investment funds).

Each of these groups has its own set of interests, and each is trying to promote them through influencing related governmental institutions and lobbying in the Federation Council. A most interesting feature of contemporary Russian politics is an emerging alliance between private banks and large oil companies. These alliances might become the main participants in both domestic and foreign-policy decision-mak-ing.

Yet another often underestimated dimension of Russian foreign policy making is the growing role of regions in this process. The political map of Russia is getting more and more diverse, and the impact of regional leaders on foreign policy matters (through the upper chamber of the Federation Council, contacts in the government, and direct interactions with neighboring states) is becoming more and more visi-ble. Running the risk of simplifying, I would argue that regions that have marketable natural resources (oil, gas, gold, diamonds, and so

43

on), sit on main transportation routes, or border affluent and dynamic countries tend to be more integrationist, liberal, and reform-oriented. On the other hand land-locked regions with a poor resource base and heavily militarized, or regions bordering areas of conflicts and poverty tend to be more nationalistic, xenophobic, and conservative.

Foreign Policy Today — Two Agendas One can clearly distinguish between two different agendas of Russian foreign policy represented by various institutions and interest groups. The first agenda can be called “traditional” and is dedicated to damage limitation. The “traditional” foreign-policy agenda aims at limiting the perceived damage caused by NATO enlargement, at preserving the existing arms control regime with the United States, at securing Russian Southern and Eastern borders, at preventing potentially hostile anti-Russian alliances from emerging on the territory of the former USSR and beyond, at keeping the Russian position as a per-manent member of the UN Security Council, at restoring some old Soviet ties with important countries in the Third World, and so on.

The second agenda is “modernist,” committed less to damage limita-tion than to integration. In the view of modernists, Russia should not try to capitalize on the old Soviet heritage, but it has to make full use of opportunities that the new openness of the world might offer Rus-sians. Modernists emphasize such goals as gaining access to Western financial markets, joining global and regional economic institutions, becoming an equal participant in the G-7 group, and promoting hori-zontal ties with new businesses in other CIS countries.

Given the current status of foreign policy debates and, more impor-tantly, the current state of foreign policy decision making, one might speculate about probable dimensions of Russian foreign policy in the nearest future. First, it seems clear that foreign policy decisions will be guided mostly by particular group interests, not by any broad public consensus on what Russian national interests really are. Groups with

44

more financial resources will enjoy better connections in the Kremlin and will have more impact on the decision-making process. That means, for example, that commercial banks and oil companies will have more influence on Russian foreign policy than the defense industry or the agrarian lobby.

Second, Russian foreign policy is likely to be opportunistic rather than strategic. Political leaders in Moscow have understandably narrow time horizons. Hardly any person reflects on foreign policy options for Russia after Yeltsin’s incumbency. The Russian business community is not engaged in long-term planning; the economic situation in the country is too volatile and unpredictable. Hence, future Russian foreign policy will be reactive, not proactive. The country lacks resources, mobilization mechanisms, or consensus building pro-cedures for any “grand designs” on the international arena. A rational diplomacy of a relatively weak state is trying to make the most of opportunities that emerge in the world, adjusting its goals to that of more powerful nations. An opportunistic foreign policy assumes a certain degree of cynicism, mitigated by sober risk assessments.

Finally, it seems almost certain that Russian foreign policy will be characterized by a wide gap between its declaratory and operational levels. Such a gap is clearly not a unique feature of Russia — any political leadership in any country will distinguish between word and deed. However, in Russia, this gap might be wider than in a “normal” country. Statesmen in the Kremlin may choose to use flamboyant nationalist rhetoric as a sort of compensation for the actual weakness of the country. This compensatory function of pronounced nationalism and velikoderzhavie will not be dissimilar from the nationalist rhetoric of Gaullist France in the 1960s.

45

TATYANA PARKHALINA

Chapter 2 Impacts of Domestic and Regional Factors on Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy To a large extent, Russia’s foreign and security policy is influenced by Russian cultural tradition. For many Russians, especially those of the older generation, interaction with the West is above all a psycho-logical problem. In past centuries, social and political tensions were always connected with the country’s lagging behind the West tech-nologically. The recognition of this gap was seen as proof of the need to draw on the West’s achievements to modernize the Russian econ-omy. At the same time, however, Russia has always feared the nega-tive influence of Western values on society and culture, an attitude that limited the scope for cooperation.

In the mid-1990s, the problem of formulating foreign and security policy and of participating, first of all, in the future European security architecture seemed to become a most relevant issue for Russian soci-ety. A closer look at recent Russian and Soviet history explains this development. Since the end of the Soviet period, Russia has been challenged by the problem of its identity and its place in Europe and the world. The loss of its former international status and territories meant national humiliation leading to political disorientation for many Russians. The debate on foreign and security policy focused on the range and manner of relations with the West, preservation of Russia’s special status, and balance between European and Asian orientation.

The way Russian society reacted to the reformist attempts by Gor-bachev and Yeltsin was similar to that of the 19th century. Russia’s special role in world history, the country’s function as a bridge between the East and West, was and still is an important issue.

47

Doubts are voiced as to whether Russia should imitate Western models and rely on Western aid, and fears are expressed about the corrupting influence of Western culture.

Three Schools of Thought Now, as then, there are three schools of thought in society on Russia’s place in the world and its foreign policy. One advocates moving closer to the West and Europe, the second urges renouncing strong links with the West in favor of the so-called Eastern alternative, the third supports a balance between East and West in order to take advantage of links with both, while preserving a distinctive Russian identity. In political terms, these positions can be attributed respectively to the views of liberal reformers, national conservatives, and moderate nationalist centrists.

Pro-Westerners are convinced that the successful development of relations with the West is inseparable from the process of liberal reform in domestic politics and economics. They call for the country’s integration into Western economic and political institutions such as G-7, the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), or NATO.

Anti-Westerners pursue the goal of reviving Russia’s grandeur by renouncing Western models of development and asserting Russia’s special mission in the world. They regard the signing of the Founding Act between Russia and NATO and Russia’s involvement in the Part-nership for Peace Program (PfP) program as a betrayal of its national interests. And they blame NATO’s opening to the East to be a result of intrigues by anti-Russian forces in the West. They fear that foreign policy aimed at integrating Russia into Western institutions will rele-gate the country to a second-rate power and will insult Russia’s national dignity. The economic might of the West is seen as a means of controlling Russia, and security cooperation as an instrument of interference in her internal affairs.

48

For anti-Westerners, forging a stronger relationship with NATO and other Western institutions in the field of security is not an issue, as such an option would allegedly be a capitulation.

As opposed to this extreme trend, moderate nationalist positions hold that Russia, owing to its geographic position and cultural heritage, has to strike a balance between the East and West. Russia’s natural task is seen as assuming the role of a bridge in the Eurasian region, repre-senting, among other things, the interests of Russians living in the countries of the CIS and in the Baltic States. This trend is not anti-Western, but seeks to draw attention to the problem of securing Rus-sian national interests in the East. Its adherents believe that coopera-tion with Western institutions in the field of security represents a deal, a concession to the West in exchange for cooperation with the EU, which they welcome and support.

Although the latter trend is gaining ground in the debate on the direc-tion of Russian foreign and security policy, its adherents (just like the liberal democrats until recently) do not dare speak out openly on the position regarding cooperation with Western institutions in the field of security, especially regarding the problem of NATO enlargement.

According to a survey conducted by the Russian Independent Center for Social and National Problems in June 1997, 12 percent of the respondents favored a close relationship with the West in order to achieve success in market reforms, 22 percent expressed their belief in a renaissance of Russia as a great power and called for a specific Russian way of development, 18 percent believe in the return of socialism, and 15 percent consider themselves centrists and pragmat-ics and favor contacts with the West and at the same time with Asian and Islamic countries.1

As for the Westernizers and the radical national conservatives, they are losing public support. The former because of the plight of the Russian economy popularly associated with commitment to the

1 The June 1997 survey covered 13 regions and more than 2,200 respondents. See

Obshchaya gazeta, no. 30, 1997.

49

Western development model. The latter because the younger generation does not want to see itself cut off from the West on ideological grounds.

Rising Nationalism The fact that moderate foreign policy options seem to be most popular without playing an important role in official policy making is a para-dox of Russian domestic politics. The most likely explanation of this paradox is the nature of nationalism in post-communist countries. The groundswell of nationalism is the result of an inability of political institutions to develop and implement measures that would meet the society’s real security interests in the economic, political, military, and cultural spheres. Manipulating such nationalistic tendencies (rather civic than ethnic) is the most effective way of gaining political power and preserving control over the population.

The former communist leaders-turned-nationalists exploit the popula-tion’s fears and tend toward chauvinism in order to pursue their own agendas. The power they gain in this way is essentially authoritarian. In the struggle for power, the use of nationalism leaves no place for true pluralism or for a multiparty system. Many parties opposing the nationalists are forced to rely on nationalist slogans. Parties and groups refraining from nationalism are branded as unpatriotic and traitors, finding themselves on the sidelines of political life.

In the period of transition from planned to market economy, national-ism seems to increase almost as fast as the political institutions lose control of that process. Nationalism in Russia is a consequence of rapid introduction of market forces in a non-market economy, i.e. a consequence of economic challenges to which political leaders cannot respond adequately. Under these circumstances, nationalism plays several political roles. Entrepreneurs use it to create and protect a national market and at the same time to expand into international markets. Representatives of the old elite use it to justify their desire to

50

revive a surrogate of the old system. For the masses hurt by the results of economic shock therapy and lack of state protectionism or social security, nationalist propaganda provides an answer as to whom to blame.

Extremist nationalists exploit their policies favoring price control, ending ethnic conflicts by force, restoring the military might of the former USSR, support for the military-industrial complex, strength-ening the executive branch of government, and strengthening the nation-state in order to shield the Russian people from alleged harmful foreign influences, especially from the West. Adherents of moderate nationalist positions urge that Russia maintains its independence from Western assistance, insist on its special rights and interests, and keep up its military posture in order to repel a latent threat allegedly coming from Western countries. At the same time, they call for an alliance with the West to counterbalance perceived threats from Japan and Asia.

Meanwhile, reform-minded democrats refrain from raising the issue of nationalism, hoping that liberal ideas will prevail among the masses. This digression concerning the nature of nationalism in Russia partially explains the attitude of different political forces towards formulating foreign and security policy as a whole and towards inter-acting with Western institutions in the field of security.

The Political Paradigm The Russian debate on foreign and security policy, future European security architecture, the role of NATO, and the logic of European integration processes reveals the inability of political institutions to meet adequately the challenges to security in a general sense of the word. It also manifests a certain type of strategic culture shaped under the influence of some philosophical and cultural factors, such as the messianic role of Orthodoxy, as well as important economic and geo-political factors, i.e. lack of clear borders in the East and West, an

51

abundance of natural resources but the inability to make effective use of them, or the position between Europe and Asia.

As a result of these factors, the real or imagined existence of a com-mon enemy justifies increased military spending, and the mentality of a beleaguered fortress allows a national consensus to emerge without addressing the real domestic problems in the political and economic fields. This explains the behavior of Russian politicians at present. There are hardly any realistic assessments of Russia’s real interests in a changed world where use of military force, geopolitical expansion-ism, and imperial attitudes are counterproductive, outdated forms of international behavior.

The disintegration process within the Russian Federation is likely to be accelerated by the shortsighted policy of applying military force to solve social and economic problems (as has been done in Chechnya) and exerting military-political pressure in the post-Soviet area (Abkhazia, Moldova, and Tajikistan). It is a dangerous simplification to brand NATO a “common enemy” of the former Soviet republics, because it opens its doors to countries of Central and Eastern Europe which strive for protection against a formerly aggressive “great power.” Great power attitudes will also consolidate anti-Russian forces in all the former Soviet republics, harm the country’s economic development, and jeopardize reform in all areas. Russia’s interests are best served by cooperative approaches to security matters, including close cooperation with relevant international institutions, i.e. NATO, the OSCE, EU, and the Council of Europe, to overcome the Cold War stereotypes and come up with valid answers to the new challenges to security, in the broadest sense, which already confront the interna-tional community.

Economic Groups and Foreign Policy Increasingly, Russian monopolists, mainly in the field of oil and gas, influence the process of formulating foreign and security policy. Some

52

of them, such as Gazprom and Lukoil, have already determined the directions of their expansion abroad and the directions and forms of foreign policy which can serve these interests. For instance, the so-called Union Treaty with Belarus primarily serves the interests of Gazprom, which is interested in a regular functioning of the pipeline crossing the country and going into Europe. Gazprom wants good relations with Ukraine and Moldova as well.

At the same time, Gazprom is interested in preserving a civilized image of Russia in the West. As long as close business relations with Islamic countries do not undermine the company’s reputation in the West, Gazprom is interested in maintaining good neighborly relations with Southern and Islamic countries. Yet the company has little chance to extend its activities to transport gas from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan via Iran and Turkey. As long as the company can rely on its intimate relationship with high Kremlin representatives, it will not allow foreign investments beyond its control, especially on the crucial Tyumen’ market.

As far as petroleum companies are concerned, they are not as influen-tial as Gazprom, since they lack leverage on the former Soviet repub-lics. During the first years of its existence as an independent state, Russia could not manage without oil pipelines, ports, and oil-refining factories located in CIS and Baltic countries. To a certain extent, this explains why Russia has not officially accepted economic sanctions against Latvia during the so-called political crisis in the spring of 1998.

Lukoil is interested in external expansion towards the West and South. The company already controls 40 percent of oil products sold in the Baltic States and more than 30 percent of imported oil products in Moldova. Lukoil has constructed auto-refueling stations along the line from Western Siberia to Western Europe.

In Azerbaijan, the company participates in three out of five of adopted Caspian projects. There is an agreement with Iraq concerning exploitation of Western Kurna, one of the biggest crude oil deposits. Work can start only after the end of the UN sanctions against Iraq, this being one of the reasons why Russia calls for the lifting of those

53

sanctions. Thus relations with the Baltic States, Islamic states, as well as CIS countries are very important to Lukoil. In comparison with Gazprom, the relationship with the West is less significant, as it does not have projects that depend on Western investments. The Rosneft’ and Slavneft’ oil-companies have the same orientation.

The Regional Agenda The debate on foreign and security policy initiated among members of Moscow’s political elite does not worry the Russian provinces very much. Regional leaders hardly ever comment on the subject, as they are concerned with resolving more tangible problems: how to get money from the federal budget to pay wages to their electorates, how to establish viable trade relations with foreign firms, how to stop the growth of criminality, and so forth.

The issue of foreign and security policy ranks only as the eighth pri-ority for the Russian regional elite. Of much greater concern are the following issues:

• Increase in prices.

• The collapse of the economy.

• Increasing unemployment.

• Anarchy in central power institutions.

• Escalation of a civil war.

• Militarizing of society and involvement in military conflict.

• Disintegration of Russia.2

At the same time, regional leaders and entrepreneurs become actors in the process of decision making in the above-mentioned field by for- 2 Composed on VtsIOM-data, Moscow, 1996-1997

54

mulating economic and political interests. On the one hand, they would like to be more independent from the central power and to cre-ate their own political and ideological centers. On the other hand, they begin to carry out the concept of regionalism, based on the principle of subsidiary, well known in many European countries. Growing regionalism leads to specific types of political and geopolitical behavior. In different regions, new geopolitical orientations are estab-lished. The Far East of Russia and Primorie lean to China, Japan, and Southern Korea; Tuva and Buryatiya are oriented towards Moldova and China; Kareliya is attracted to Scandinavia.

Often, regional leaders combine pragmatic goals with ambitious dec-larations such as advantages in developing direct and close economic relations with foreign companies. Regions exporting power resources and raw materials seek to become economically self-sufficient. The social and cultural gap between regions more flexible to Western-type modernization, such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, and traditional agrarian regions is becoming more and more evident.

At present, there seem to be at least five groups of Russian regions with sufficiently expressed political interests. The first group includes regions with developed export-oriented extraction industries. These include the Republics of Komi, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Yakutiya, and Tyumen’, Sakhalinskaya Oblast’ and Magadanskaya Oblast’, as well as Khabarovskiy Kray. The presence of mineral resources, budget independence, active foreign trade contacts, and other factors influence the choice of the development model. Doing well, thanks to their exports, these regions are interested in economic liberalization, preserving the international prestige of Russia, and friendly relations with potential partners. The local elite would prefer to develop foreign trade activities on an independent basis without state control. As previously described, oil and gas regions have great influence. Their leaders already have sufficiently wide powers and are in charge of financial resources, going into regional budgets and non-budget funds. Mostly the interests of oil and gas monopolists determine their foreign policy orientations.

The second group consists of Russia’s trade-industrial regions, i.e. the giant cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, some seaside territories

55

with big ports such as the Oblasti Kaliningradskaya, Murmanskaya, Kamchatskaya and Arkhangelskaya, or Primorskiy Kray. Considering their influence on the process of formulating Russian foreign policy, they contribute to defending and advocating the interests of national capital and contribute to diversification of foreign policy orientations.

The third group is composed of industrially developed regions, such as the Republic of Udmurtiya, the Oblasti Sverdlovskaya, Nizhniy-Novgorodskaya, Samarskaya, Permskaya, Chelyabinskaya, Novosibir-skaya, Tulskaya, and Tomskaya, as well as Krasnodarskiy Kray. In its economic structure, the military-industrial complex predominates. Regions of this group are experiencing a serious crisis, but they have different visions of how to resolve it. Some of them, such as Sverd-lovskaya Oblast’, call for modernization with an active role of the state. In other regions, for example in the Nizhniy-Novgorodskaya Oblast’, local authorities have worked out their own model, relying on market instruments. In the first case, regional leaders are against for-eign instruments, application of liberal models, and Russia’s partici-pation in international economic and political institutions. The second case yields opposite preferences: those regions not only call for coop-eration but Russian integration within some Western institutions in order to attract foreign investment.

The fourth group is formed by agrarian and agro-industrial regions, for example the Central Chernozem economic region, Krasnodarskiy Kray, and Stavropolskiy Kray. These regions exist almost totally on their own resources. In the foreign policy dimension, their positions are rather weak; they are oriented toward development of their own markets. That is why regional leaders defend interests of Russian producers and favor limitation of imports. Self-sufficiency determines their strategic interests; they are drawn towards self-isolation and administrative methods of management. As a result, in the process of formulating foreign policy orientations of Russia, they consistently defend a so-called “Russian way” and reject participation in interna-tional institutions.

The fifth group consists of so-called depressed regions, i.e. the repub-lics of the Northern Caucasus as well as the Republics of Altay, Bur-yatiya, Tuva, and Kalmykiya. In spite of similar economic indexes,

56

the regional elite elaborate and formulate their strategy in a different way. Some are attracted by liberal models of development, but this is a rather specific form of liberalism based on the absence of any strat-egy whatsoever. Others defend “Soviet type” models of strict state regulation. As to their foreign policy predilections, republics of the Northern Caucasus are usually oriented towards the Islamic world.

Attempts by regional leaders to influence the process of formulating foreign policy, just as any regional lobbying, are carried out in the corridors of legislative power. The interests of the oil and gas regions are defended in the most consistent way. This is realized through the process of legislative initiatives as well as with the help of individual deputies, parties, and committees of the State Duma. Through the Federation Council, regional leaders can block any decision of the State Duma threatening their interests.

57

TATYANA YEVGENEVA

Chapter 3 The Myth of the “West” in Russian Political Culture and its Impact on Foreign and Security Policy The aim of this chapter is to outline the cultural and psychological background of Russian foreign and security policy. These aspects, together with economic and geopolitical ones, determine the main principles and decisions in the field of international relations. Social crises add to the relevance of these background aspects as many cul-tural and political myths, earlier hidden under the rational elements of political culture, are revived and begin to play an important role in the political process, either in decision making, or in mass reaction to these decisions. The following remarks draw upon research carried out by the Center of Civilization Studies at the Russian Academy of Science.1

Social and cultural crises not only destroy the system of rational val-ues but traditional symbols and stereotypes as well. At the same time, neo-archaic elements of culture become more active. The revival of neo-archaic patterns of consciousness and behavior can determine the process of disintegrating cultural space into “closed” and aggressive sub-cultural communities. They also form the background of future

1 According to this research, a vast number of indicators of change occurring in

the cultural and psychological environment of Russia and post-Soviet Eurasia in general were reduced to some generalized categories which could be pre-sented as empirical and operational correlates of reality. With this purpose, an analytical concept of Russia and the post-Soviet region has been developed to describe a system of sociopolitical orientations which could be reduced to three predominant indicators: “rational,” “traditionalist,” and “neo-archaic.”

59

cultural and political mythology. Mythological aspects of political culture are not a specific feature of Russian history but an objective reaction of any political culture under conditions of crises. As a result, fundamentalist values and attitudes opposed to the process of trans-formation are developed, totalitarian tendencies and the activity of radical political parties increase, and authoritarian charismatic leader-ship emerges. The specific character of Russian political culture is determined by the content of mythology based on a newly revived neo-archaic model of orientation which includes a set of concrete images of “us” and “them,” the “hero” and the “enemy,” and others. The image of the West, as opposed to the Eastern or Eurasian char-acter of the Russian population again plays an important role in this system.

Historical Background The image of the West as a hostile subject and its confrontation to Russian civilization has always been present in the history of Russian statehood. Its appearance coincided with the development of the Northwestern Russian province around Moscow. The myth of con-frontation between the Catholic West and Orthodox Russia became an important factor of identification for Russian culture and determined the isolationist foreign policy of its state. Russia’s self-identification as an entity opposed to the West was based on the antagonism of “we” vs. “they,” rooted in archaic levels of human culture. In his work Social Psychology and History, the Russian historian and psychologist Boris Porshnev analyzed the role of this opposition in human history as the model for cognition of natural and social reality, emphasizing that an image of “them” is crucial for the process of social and cultural identification of “us.”2 Throughout the history of human society, the “we” vs. “they” dichotomy has continued to exist latently in group

2 Porshnev, Boris F. Sotsial'naya psikhologiya i istoriya. Moscow: Nauka, 1979.

60

and individual consciousness and is immediately revived in situations of social and cultural crisis which force out its rational elements.

The impact of an enemy image for community identification was analyzed and described by some representatives of psychoanalysis. In his classic work the One Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse describes the function of the enemy image in a political identification of the state as a form of compensation for an identity crisis.3 During different stages of Russian history the image of a hostile West took concrete forms as Poles, Lithuanians, Swedes, Germans, or French-men. Those concrete forms reflected major interests of Russian for-eign policy.

Interpretation of the world based on the “we” vs. “they” conflict formed an image of “our own” territory as sacred space. All events taking place in “our” territory acquired an additional symbolic sense. Life outside “our” territory seemed impossible. “They,” who lived on “alien” territory, were perceived as enemies, provoking negative feelings, aggression, and fear of an unknown danger liable to destroy the unity of “our” world. Mircea Eliade analyzed this model of reality in detail in his works Cosmos and History and The Saint and the Profane.4

In mass perception, foreigners were often dehumanized and seen as fierce creatures, a vision that continued to influence mass culture until the end of the 19th century. An interesting variety is the image of medical doctors as vicious “poisoners” — the first representatives of this profession actually were foreigners, often Germans, or people of Jewish background. The last time this image reappeared was as late as 1953 when Stalinist propaganda announced discovery of an alleged “doctors’ plot.” This lead to the arrest of the most qualified Kremlin doctors, who were pressed to confess that they had poisoned and

3 Marcuse, Herbert. One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced

Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.

4 Eliade, Mircea. Cosmos and History. New York: Harper, 1959; id., Le Sacré et le Profane: The Bear de William Faulkner. Université de Paris VIII, Vincennes, Departement anglo-américain, 1971.

61

murdered high party and Red Army representatives, including Polit-buro member Andrey Zhdanov, obeying orders received from foreign secret services and “Zionist organizations.” In the early glasnost period, defenders of hard-line communism accused Gorbachev and his followers of being “agents of foreign powers.”

Outbursts of hatred towards the West and foreigners residing on Rus-sian territory often occurred during periods of socioeconomic and political change, usually referred to by mass consciousness as “West-ernization.” This happened, for example, in the 18th century after the reforms of Peter the Great. Unable to understand the objective causes of social and political development, mass consciousness focused on its negative results, which were explained by applying the enemy image on foreigners and Westerners. Hence most of Russia’s attempts to “enter” Europe by means of transformation had an opposite effect. They strengthened negative attitudes towards the West and perpetu-ated isolationist tendencies in the political sphere.

In the mid-19th century, reform attempts again produced negative reaction within the cultural elite of Russia, based on a distinctive dis-appointment about an alleged “betrayal” by the West. Western Europe was expected — but failed — to recognize Russia as a genuine Euro-pean country for its efforts to save the continent from a dangerous Napoleon. To compensate for that disappointment, the mythology of Russian superiority was supplemented with the messianic idea. To compensate for feelings of inferiority, the image of Russia as a “select” state — chosen by God — was developed. In the 19th century, the “we” vs. “they” dichotomy was actualized by Russian historiogra-phy. At that time, Russian historic science and popular thinking began to feature the idea that Russia had also saved Europe from another, even more dangerous enemy — the Tartar-Mongols invading Russia during the 14th and 15th centuries. European “progress” was seen as being paid for with “Russian blood.”

Later, the image of Russia “saving Europe” from enemies — from the Tatars to Napoleon and German fascism — and the West “betraying Russia” became one of the main images describing Russian history in Soviet school books. This is important because these manuals formed the system of values and attitudes of the generations, which play the

62

most active role in today's social, cultural, and political process. Dur-ing the Soviet period, manipulation with the myth of the West was not only a main mechanism to justify foreign and domestic policy, but a basic element of Soviet identity (cultural, social, and political). Soviet identity manifested itself primarily in the form of self-identification as a “Soviet man” and citizen of the great, multinational state. Other aspects of identification — ethnic, religious, social, even gender and age — were recognized as secondary ones.

For Soviet mythology, the “we” vs. “they” dichotomy first appeared as antagonism between “reds” and “whites,” “working people” and “exploiters,” as well as “Soviet people” and “traitors.” A revived enemy image contributed to the strengthening of the state. Since the 1930s, the image of “world capitalism” occupied a most important place in Soviet mythology. A hostile “world capitalism” justified the need for social, political, and psychological unity of the Soviet people against the enemy.

Following the end of World War II and installation of the socialist system in Eastern Europe, the conflict between Russia and the West entered its final form in the mythology of inevitable confrontation between the socialist world and Western imperialism. The United States and NATO were two main symbols of Western imperialism in both propaganda and the system of mass attitudes. Even the concept of a Third World could not destroy the conflict between “socialist” and “capitalist” orientations. The confrontation between Russia and the West included both isolationist and messianic elements. Manipulation with this mythology was one major mechanism for justifying Soviet foreign and domestic policy. This manipulation was intensified in the 1970s to compensate for the first signs of an identity crisis.

Identity Crisis in the Late Soviet Period In the 1980s, the Soviet identity was already in a state of a profound cultural, psychological, and ideological crisis. Its manifestation was

63

the disintegration of the traditional Soviet system of images and beliefs, values and myths, as well as a chaotic penetration of new values and stereotypes. The crisis not only destroyed the structure of values regarded as rational and dominating standards but also large parts of the Soviet psycho-semantic system. The process of activating neo-archaic elements affected the collective consciousness of a society deprived of definite social structure. These elements are composing new historical, cultural, and political myths. An aggravation of the crisis led to a specific psychological attitude and disintegration of the habitual world outlook, which includes understanding the social and cultural environment as well as the place occupied by the individual. In his book The Age of the Crowds, Serge Moskovici referred to this process as “the irrationality of the masses.”5

The dominating feelings in Russian society of the early 1980s can be described as “frontier psychology.” It is not yet an identity crisis but something like a presentment of future crisis. The identity crisis, tak-ing off in the second half of the 1980s, destroyed the dominating sys-tem of values and beliefs without providing for a replacement. Irra-tionality became a symbol of existence, and mystical cults reappeared. At the socio-psychological level, the person perceived the situation as the disintegration of the role structure of a habitual social environ-ment, leading to the destruction of the basis for self-identification and, to a certain extent, to loss of the ego.

The identity crisis also manifested a peculiar feeling of “narrowing” space and an eschatological presentment. Various “doomsday” theo-ries — not refraining from predicting definite dates of the Last Day — became more and more popular. This feeling of the “end of time” seems to be intensified by the approach of the turn of the century. In his remarkable 1925 Studies on Collective Psychology, the Russian scientist L. Voytolovskiy, comparing crisis psychology in different European countries of the 19th century with the crisis in 20th century Russia, revealed overwhelming parallels between the cases analyzed.6

5 Moskovici, Serge. L'âge des foules. Paris: Fayard, 1981.

6 Voytolovskiy, L. Ocherki kollektivnoy psikhologii. Moscow: n.p., 1925.

64

Such an eschatological presentment is not stable; it requires compul-sory compensation to avoid psychological disintegration and degra-dation. Activation of neo-archaic structures of consciousness is the most accessible shape of compensation, substituting rational as well as traditional elements of consciousness. In the present Russian system of cultural and political beliefs and symbols, most of the archetypal features analyzed by C. G. Jung, transformed and reproduced by Russian culture, can be discerned.7

As far as the “we” vs. “they” dichotomy is concerned, disintegration of the Soviet Union allowed new forms of group identification to emerge. “We” identification is enriched by different forms of sub-cultural and regional aspects. The region becomes a specially identi-fied subject, a kind of mystical unity of population and territory, thus an analogy to the Russian rural community (mir). Many authors ana-lyzed the role of the community in Russian political culture.

Most recently, Svetlana Lur’e, in her work on Metamorphosis of Traditional Consciousness, examined the influence of community ideas on mass perception and the political process in the Russian state.8

“Communists” vs. “Democrats” Another model proposing a new identity in the sphere of political culture is the dichotomy of “democrats” vs. “communists.” In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Russian cultural elite interpreted the struggle against the totalitarian Soviet system as a confrontation be-tween “democrats” and “communists.” At that period, “democrats”

7 Jung, Carl Gustav. The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious. Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.

8 Lur’e, Svetlana. Metamorfozy traditsionnogo soznaniya. St. Petersburg: Tip. im. Kotlyakova, 1994.

65

were considered to be a special form of community, a mythological unity of all intellectual and political groups opposing “communists.” Russia’s association with Western democracy was an important ele-ment of its identification. In mass interpretation, the process of democratization meant building post-Soviet Russia based on Western socioeconomic and political models. The presidential elections of 1996 seemed to be the last case of instrumentalizing the “democrats” vs. “communists” dichotomy, when the model, which had almost lost its influence, was artificially revived.

In the sphere of international relations, the perceived position of “Russia against the West,” which served as a background for Russian foreign policy for centuries, was replaced by the formula “Russian democrats together with the democratic West against totalitarian communists.” But the new opposition, popular among representatives of the cultural and political elite, was never fully accepted at the mass level. The association of Russian “democrats” with the West failed to contribute to changing the image of the West from negative to posi-tive; it produced the opposite result. The first political figure whose image suffered from this tendency was Mikhail Gorbachev. His for-eign policy was interpreted by some as a “betrayal” of Russia’s national interests. Bearing in mind Gorbachev’s experience, modern political leaders tend to avoid programs and decisions with that dan-gerous “Western” notion.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Russian elite interpreted the strug-gle against “communists” in Russia as a worldwide task. In such a perception, Russian domestic and foreign policy served not only the national interests of Russia but of all “civilized humanity.” Their ear-nest commitment to save the world from the communist totalitarian threat allowed the Russian “democrats” to reject and suppress any penitence regarding their own contribution to the Soviet past. Instead, expectations arose for compensation from the Western “allies,” including economic and financial assistance. The “democratic” mythology reinforced mass interest in foreign policy, though the con-crete expression of this interest was limited to “Western aid.” Nega-tive mass attitudes towards the West did not disappear. They were

66

simply supplemented by the confidence that it was the “duty” of the West to support Russian reforms.

This attitude again caused feelings of disappointment about an alleged “betrayal by the West” in the mid-1990s. Again the West was accused of failure to recognize Russia for having “saved the world” — this time from the communist danger. Connected with the Russian histori-cal mythology, these feelings served as a background for revival of the mid-19th century cultural and psychological situation. In the mythological interpretation of reality, events of the past form an important element of perceiving the present. In the 19th century, the elite psychologically compensated for its disappointment with the idea of Russia being a “select” country. Today, after NATO expansion, disappointment over “loss of confidence” is again intensive. Importantly, the notion of “loss of confidence” is found in declara-tions of quite “democratically” orientated scholars and politicians. At the mass level expectations, which were not realized accelerated dis-appointment in “democratic” mythology, thus strengthening the iden-tity crisis in Russia.

Political Myths in Modern Russia The impact of myths on political culture not only depends on their foundation within the history of ideas (as shown above) but also on the commitment and activities of political groups. These groups tend to refer to themselves as a kind of mysterious “unity of people,” which is again an obvious continuity of Russian political culture. Myths developed within definite communities are taken over by political forces, publicized by the mass media, and thus become means to manipulate political orientations and mass political behavior. The political myth gets its final shape after forming a special system of symbols and ritual, which includes the process of individually identifying the mythological community, symbolization of con-sciousness, and ritualistic behavior. The psychological significance of

67

symbols and rituals to identify the community has been analyzed in detail by most schools of modern psychoanalysis.

A main feature of modern cultural and political development is the active process of myth making in all spheres of culture. This includes political culture, which is an important means of overcoming an iden-tity crisis.9 In modern Russian political mythology, the “we” vs. “they” conflict is often manifested in terms of ethnic-political and ethnic-religious consciousness. As discussed above, identification of a mythological enemy usually serves as a means of “explaining” present hardships and crises. An interesting example — one featuring Rus-sians as enemies — is the myth about the Tatars of ancient Bulgaria and the siege of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible. In Russia, myth making on ethnic and historic grounds is connected with revival of religious consciousness. For example, Islam often functions as a cultural basis for ethnic re-identification in regions traditionally tending towards Moslem civilization. At the same time, mass identification via religion allows political leaders to take advantage of people and orchestrate them.

Another form of the process of political myth making is based on regional identification. This tends to occur in cases where the region functions as an identity subject and the mythological unity of a given territory’s population is directed against the “center.” Regional myths support forming a regional political elite and the power of its leaders. The image of “select territory” develops into the idea of a specific mission of the region to become the territory of stability and “law and order,” as opposed to the “instability and disorder” of the “center.” The regional ideologies presented by the governors of the Kursk and Saratov regions, Aleksander Rutskoy and Dmitriy Ayatskov, offer a good example. They represent themselves as incarnations of the tra-ditional Russian “hero-savior” type.10

9 For a recent, very critical assessment of aggressive behavior under conditions of crises, see Akhiezer, Aleksandr. Rossiya: kritika istoricheskogo opyta. Moscow, 1993.

10 A vivid example is governor Aleksander Rutskoy’s promise to turn the Oblast’ of

68

To a certain extent, a political culture based on regional myths tends to counterbalance the impact of other traditional enemy perceptions. Thus the image of the West does not play an important role in foreign policy making, either in mass values and attitudes or in political mythology. The issue of NATO expansion so intensively discussed by the political elite and mass media hardly provokes any reaction in the provinces. At the same time, the negative image of NATO as the con-crete expression of the West remains to form the latent consciousness of most Russians, whose value system was formed under the influence of Soviet mythology.

This process of myth making in modern Russia is closely connected with themes and images of former Russian and Soviet history. Some-times the past seems more vivid and attractive than the present. Cul-tural heroes of the past continue to live in the present, and the events of the past are reproduced in the present with the help of special ritu-als. The past functions as a compensation for today’s disappointments. In an identity crisis situation, history becomes a virtual yet existential reality in which the individual finds a new identity, a sense of existence, and a base for identification with the community. Real historical events, which positively or negatively influence develop-ment of the community, form foundations for new cultural and politi-cal myths. In the words of Vamik Volkan, an American ethnic psy-chologist, these phenomena can be referred to as “selected common trauma” and “selected common glory.”11 Another constructive myth is the idea of the “Golden Age,” featuring the image of an independent, strong, and stable Russian empire.

In conclusion, Russia can be described as a country suffering from a profound identity crisis, which leads to a political culture based on mythology and ethnic or regional identification, possibly aggravating geopolitical instability. Under these conditions, feelings of disap-pointment and “loss of confidence” are liable to strengthen hostile

Kursk into “a second Kuwait.”

11 See Volkan, Vamik D. The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relations. Northvale, NJ: J. Aronson, 1994.

69

attitudes and direct the process of identification toward new confron-tation against the West. A backward-looking orientation towards the “glorious past” provides models for this confrontation. A most vivid testimonial for this attitude is presented by Aleksander Dugin’s work Foundations of Geopolitics, combining crudely simple theories with patriotic, messianic thoughts. Although books of this kind are not very popular at present, they could be called for in the future.12

12 See Dugin, Aleksandr. Osnovy geopolitiki. Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997. The

author argues that world history represents a constant struggle between the “civi-lization of the Sea” (the West) and the “civilization of the land” (Russia/Eurasia).

70

Concluding Remarks A Country in Transition Russian foreign and security policy reflects and is affected by the fact that Russia is experiencing a complex and demanding process of po-litical, economic, social, and psychological transformation. Previous values, belief systems, and behavioral patterns as well as political and economic structures are discredited or destroyed. New ones are only emerging. The collapse of the Soviet central state and unitary ideology left parts of Russian society with an identity crisis and an increasing desire to return to the stable and quiet conditions which allegedly existed in the past.

Contrary to the far-reaching changes experienced by Russian society in the years since the beginning of reforms, the field of foreign and security policy seems least affected by these developments. Histori-cally evolved attitudes and patterns of the Soviet era, geopolitical concepts in terms of border areas, strategic lines of communication, and spheres of interest continue to play an important role.1

The discourse concerning Russia’s national interests most evidently reflects the impact of Soviet or even tsarist traditions. In this context, Russia’s relationship to “Europe” — the object of a controversial dispute within the Russian intelligentsia since the times of Peter the Great — still is one of the most intensively debated topics among

1 For an overview on Russian foreign and security policy after the Cold War, see

Buszynski, Leszek. Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996; Malcolm, Neil et al., eds. Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996; Ra’anan, Uri and Kate Mar-tin, eds. Russia: A Return to Imperialism? New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996; Wallander, Celeste A., ed. The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

71

members of the political elite: Is Russia an integral part of Europe? Or is its geopolitical and cultural center of gravity located in Asia? Or is Russia simply a category of its own?

Against this background, Andrey Kortunov’s distinction between a “holistic” and a “positivist” approach in identifying Russian national interests is particularly helpful. In the field of political theory, holism describes subordination of the individual to the interests of the state or national community.2 Positivism is a philosophy declining any metaphysical approach and confining its research to what can be con-sidered real and free of doubt by empirical experience.3 As far as Russia’s national interests are concerned, Kortunov uses the distinc-tion between these two approaches to emphasize the specific nature of interests that constitute foreign and security policy attitudes and ori-entations of various domestic actors, thus avoiding “holistic,” meta-physical considerations about Russia’s “true nature” or its “historic mission.”

With regard to today’s debate on national security interests, Kortunov concludes that it contains elements of both approaches. Foreign policy decision making is still not an entirely open and democratic process. Only gradually, it began to involve Parliament, leading political par-ties, regional elite, the news media, and independent political and economic groups. Russian foreign policy is less guided by a “great idea” than by institutional and opportunistic interests of a relatively

2 Holism (from Greek holos, “entire”) is a theoretic approach claiming that all

phenomena observed derive from a single higher principle. See Gellner, Ernest. “Holism versus Individualism in History and Sociology.” In Theories of History, ed. Patrick Gardiner, 488-503. New York: The Free Press, 1959.

3 As a philosophical school, the French utopian socialists introduced positivism. Auguste Comte (1798-1857) is recognized as its founder. (Works: Cours de phi-losophie positive,1830-46; Système de politique positive,1851-54). On the con-cept of holism and positivism for the study on Soviet foreign policy, see Snyder, Jack. “Science and Sovietology: Bridging the Methods Gap in Soviet Foreign Policy Studies.” In Soviet Foreign Policy: Classic and Contemporary Issues, ed. Frederic J. Fleron Jr., Erik P. Hoffmann, and Robbin F. Laird, 132-153. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991.

72

small group of key officials. Long-term strategies seem to matter less than the influence of those close to the “ear of the president.” As the debate on NATO enlargement has shown, rhetoric does not necessar-ily make policies, which also tend to be reactive rather than to take active measures independently.

Between Continuity and Change In almost all spheres of life, traditional thinking contrasts with ele-ments of change. The political mentality of Russian society and its elite — norms and rules which members of society recognize and generally observe and which constitute the framework for their politi-cal orientation and behavior — is divided.4

Looking back into modern Russian and Soviet history, three elements of continuity seem to dominate the internal debate on Russia’s national interests and foreign and security policy goals: firstly, the concept of Russia’s missionary idea, and, as a variation, the former communist ideology; secondly, the country’s particular geopolitical situation, and finally, its ambivalent relationship with the West. These three factors have always played an important role in moulding Rus-sia’s perceptions of security in the past and continue to do so today.

4 A detailed analysis of the literature on Soviet political culture is offered by Petro,

Nicolai N. The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1995; Raeff, Marc. Poli-tique et culture en Russie: 18e-20e siècles. Paris: Éditions de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1996; Tismaneanu, Vladimir, ed. Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1995; Welch, Stephen. The Concept of Political Culture. London: Macmillan, 1993; White, Stephen. Political Culture and Soviet Politics. London: Macmillan, 1979.

73

Russia’s missionary idea The so-called “Russian idea” was closely linked to the idea of Mos-cow being the “third Rome.” Introduced by an influential cleric in the early 16th century, this term expressed the powerful sense of mission professed by an expansive principality of Moscow as the result of a successful coalition between the autocracy and Orthodox clergy.5

Essentially, Lenin did not break with that tradition. The fundamental ideological character of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy was expan-sionist, a direct continuation of the tsarist imperial tradition. Under the Soviet system, ideology was the framework for a specific view of the world and served as justification for foreign policy behavior aimed at maximizing the sphere of influence. Especially after World War II, however, expansionism no longer meant only the spread of communist ideology but also an increase in Soviet global presence.6

Today, strong forces among Russia’s political elite call for a common philosophy focusing on Russia’s restoration as a great power. The streamline of acknowledged thinking among modern Russian political scientists, philosophers, writers, and historians connects the “Russian

5 The myth of Moscow as the “third Rome” was picked up in the 19th century, in

the period of the so-called “Russian enlightenment,” and was a subject of the dispute between “Westernizers” and “Slavophiles.” A wide, sometimes contro-versial literature exists on the concept of Moscow as the “third Rome.” For an overview see Cherniavsky, Michael, ed. The Structure of Russian History: Inter-pretive Essays. New York: Random House, 1970; Medlin, William K. Moscow and East Rome: A Political Study of the Relations of Church and State in Mus-covite Russia. Geneva: Droz, 1952; Neubauer, Helmut. Car und Selbstherrscher: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Autokratie in Russland. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1964; Rühl, Lothar. Aufstieg und Niedergang des Russischen Reiches: Der Weg eines tausendjährigen Staates. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1992, 78-97, 605-608; Stökl, Günther. Russische Geschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Ge-genwart. 5th rev. ed. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1990, 212-229.

6 Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics. New York: Praeger, 1967; Lüders, Carl H. Ideologie und Machtdenken in der Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Sowjetunion. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1981; White, Stephen and Alex Pravda. Ideology and Soviet Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988.

74

idea” with imperial ambitions and beliefs in a centralist state.7 In her contribution, Tatyana Yevgeneva critically refers to this “messianic” tradition as the “mythology of Russian superiority.”

Geopolitical situation Another significant element of Russian security perception reflects the country’s particular geopolitical situation. A fear of being encircled and threatened externally is an important characteristic of the national self-image. Since the traumatic experience of Mongol rule during the early Middle Ages, Russia has been aware of threats to its remote and hard-to-defend frontiers. As explained by Carsten Goehrke in his intervention, enemy armies have crossed the Russian or Soviet borders almost ten times in the last four hundred years.8 The experience of destruction and foreign rule resulted in a perceived need for buffer zones.9 Tsars and Soviet leaders alike saw the extension of the country’s borders as an act of self-defense, not aggression.

However, Carsten Goehrke also made the point that periods of expan-sion and defense depended not only on Russia’s internal national strength but on the situation inside neighboring countries as well.

7 For a good example of this interpretation, see Kortunov, Sergei. “View from

Russia: The Fate of Russia.” Comparative Strategy 15, no. 2, (1996): 183-191, here 187: “The Russian idea has always been a mission. Since the times of Vla-dimir and Ivan Kalita, Russia has believed itself to be the leading custodian of Christian values of Orthodox statehood. (...) Russian statehood is the instrument of self-preservation and perfection of the Russian super-nation, and also the ideological foothold that forces Russia, as the blessed historical nation and the mouthpiece of God to ‘suffer for others’.” For further reading on the subject, see McDaniel, Tim. The Agony of the Russian Idea. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1996.

8 Once each in the 16th and the 17th centuries, twice in the 19th century and four times in the 20th century, not counting the Tatar and Turkish wars of the 16th and 18th centuries.

9 See Tibor, Szamuely. The Russian Tradition. New York: McGraw Hill, 1974, 10-12; Dibb, Paul. The Incomplete Superpower. Basingstoke: Macmillan 1986, 7-8.

75

Russia and the Soviet Union tended to expand in case of power vac-uums in neighboring states or when they felt threatened by other countries. In this respect, Russian and Soviet foreign policy didn’t follow a “grand strategy” but rather seized opportunities whenever they arose.10

In the present period of economic, political, and social weakness, arguing in terms of “geopolitics” has become very popular. Expres-sions such as “national interests” or “geopolitics” are novelties in Russia’s foreign policy vocabulary.11 A commonly shared perception considers Russia’s huge territorial dimension to be the most important attribute of the country’s “greatness.” Geographical determinants guarantee Russia’s weight and influence in the world and are believed to be neither subject to historical changes nor dependent on the eco-nomic or military situation.12

10 For an interpretation, see Goehrke, Carsten. “Zwischen Expansionsgelüsten und

Invasionsängsten: Russland im europäischen Mächtesystem der Neuzeit.” Paper presented at the public panel discussion on European Security and Russia, organized by Colloquium Sicherheitspolitik und Medien, Berne, October 1997.

11 The concept of geopolitics, an expression introduced by German general and professor of geography Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), largely influenced Nazi ideology and has since played a considerable role in the strategic discourse. While its relevance has sharply decreased in Western thinking recently, geopoli-tics have become extremely popular in the post-Soviet region, serving, to a cer-tain extent, as a theory substitute. An important variety is the conception of “Eurasianism,” put forward by Russian nationalists, including many communists, to justify supremacy of ethnic Russians in a persistently multiracial Russian Fed-eration. See Buszynski, Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, 6-12; and Thom, Françoise. “Eurasianism: A New Russian Foreign Policy?” Uncaptive Minds: A Journal of Information and Opinion on Eastern Europe, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 65-77. Also, see Agnew, John. Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics. New York: Routledge, 1998.

12 For details, see Simon, Gerhard. “Die Krise der politischen Identität in Russland.” In Der Osten im Prozess der Differenzierung: Fortschritte und Misserfolge der Transformation, Jahrbuch 1996/97 des Bundesinstituts für ost-wissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 25-49. Cologne: Carl Hanser Ver-lag, 1997.

76

Yet a geopolitical self-assessment based on purely geopolitical con-siderations ignores the fact that small countries without extensive natural resources such as Japan can achieve a worldwide economic reputation. Moreover, a strict understanding of geopolitics does not sufficiently consider that manufacturing competition, global markets, and information technology are the most important challenges in times of “globalization.”13 Global transformation processes are changing the structures of societies irreversibly and, in the long run, they will also affect the nation-state, particularly in regard to its social functions related to promotion of economic activities.14 At the same time, other groups, mostly economic ones, become increasingly relevant players at the international level.

While Russia’s political elite claims “greatness” for its country, mainly relying on a geopolitical concept, the state is in fact losing control of its territory and is somewhat confined to a merely virtual existence.

Relations with the West Russia’s relationship with Western Europe has always been an important, yet disputed issue.15 As is well known, the early 19th cen-tury contenders of social progress and enlightenment within the Rus-sian intelligentsia were referred to as Westernizers, while their oppo-nents — defenders of conservative, even reactionary, allegedly genu-ine Russian values, largely sympathetic to the tsarist establishment —

13 Jones, Barry, R. J. Globalisation and Interdependence in the International

Political Economy. London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1995; Mittelmann, James H., ed. Globalization: Critical Reflections. Boulder and London: Rienner, 1996.

14 Camilleri, Joseph A., Anthony P. Jarvis, and Albert J. Paolini, eds. The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Space. Boulder: Rienner, 1995; Cerny, Philip G. “What Next for the State?” In Globalization; Theory and Practice, ed. Eleonore Kofman and Youngs Gillian, 123-137. London: Pinter Publisher, 1996.

15 For an overview, see Geier, Wolfgang. Russland und Europa: Skizzen zu einem schwierigen Verhältnis. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996.

77

were called Slavophiles. At the end of the last century, the so-called Pan-Slavists became advocates of a union of all Slavic peoples and the entire Orthodox Christian community under Russian leadership.16 After World War II, while the Slavic-Russian character of the USSR was emphasized, Communist power caught up with the Western stan-dard of technology, the achievements of which were described as attributes of the Soviet Union’s own power and greatness.

Today there seems to be a tendency to hold the West responsible for Russia’s economic decline. Conspiracy theories have a certain tradi-tion in Russia and are a part of society’s long-term memory. Tatyana Yevgeneva’s contribution identifies that “feeling of betrayal” as a reaction to an alleged Western reluctance to fully recognize Russia’s great deeds and sacrifice, such as the merit of saving Europe from Napoleon or, more important, the contribution to fight Hitler’s fas-cism. In contrast to the short period of Russia’s Western orientation after 1991, the myth of the West is presently used to express a differ-ence or to assume a distance from Western Europe and the USA. Ac-cording to Yevgeneva, today’s situation, marked by a weak state and society, provides an effective breeding ground for the emergence and manipulation of new enemy images.17

However, the country’s relationship to the West remains highly ambiguous. A nationwide survey conducted in April 1996 by the US Information Agency (USIA) showed that most Russians mistrust the West and sense hostility toward Russia. The USIA study indicated

16 On the debate, Westernizers versus Slavophiles in the framework of the so-called

“Russian enlightenment” of the 19th century, see Walicki, Andrzej. The Sla-vophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975; For an illustration of the debate between the different school of thought from Peter I. onwards, see Institut Otkrytoe Obshchestvo. V poiskakh svoego puti: Rossiya mezhdu Evropoy i Aziey. Moscow: Institut Otkrytoe Obshchestvo, 1997.

17 As an example, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation claims that the breakdown of the Soviet Union was directed by “geopolitical interests of gentlemen from across the Ocean” and executed by corrupt Russian “democrats.” See Zyuganov, Gennadiy. Derzhava. Moscow: Informpechat, 1994.

78

that 61 percent of all Russians believed that the USA had attempted to exploit Russia’s present weakness in order to degrade the country to a second-rate power and a raw materials producer.18 But Russians show a more liberal attitude towards Western powers when their personal welfare is concerned. The USIA study revealed that 75 percent of the population — and a resounding 92 percent of the social elite — are in favor of Russian cooperation with the West.19

A summer 1996 survey conducted jointly by the Institute of Sociology in Moscow and Michigan State University revealed that only 20 per-cent of those polled regard “the Americanization of Russian life” as disturbing.20 In this context, Jutta Scherrer stressed in her intervention that the “West” — or rather specific single countries like Germany, France, Britain, or the United States — have always primarily meant capitalism for Russia as well as education, transfer of technology, and industrialization. Hence, the West is not only a topic of foreign policy, but rather one of modernization and progress, as was the case for centuries.

This general picture corresponds to what has been shown by the above mentioned surveys. When people were asked about Russia’s role and importance in world affairs, most of those polled resorted to traditional ideas of great-power status and ideologically slanted pic-tures of their country’s enemies. However, as soon as questions touched on private life, the responses became more pragmatic. The West appeared in a different light, and cooperation with it was seen as essentially desirable.

18 Dobson, Richard. Is Russia Turning the Corner? Changing Russian Public

Opinion 1991-96. Washington, DC: United States Information Agency, 1996, 69-71.

19 Ibid.

20 Shlapenthokh, Wladimir. “How Russians See Themselves Now: In the Aftermath of the Defeat in Chechnya.” Working paper, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, December 1996.

79

Towards a Consensus on Russia’s National Interests All these elements are integral parts of the debate on the country’s national interests, a dispute that touches upon questions of national identity and the destiny of Russia in a broad sense. The expression “national interests” entered the official foreign policy terminology of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.21 The reform-minded leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev intended to liberate foreign policy from some parts of the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary. Besides, the introduction of this “Western” terminology was a symbol of the country’s new for-eign and security policy orientation. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the expression became a slogan for conservative nationalists who saw their country’s national interests threatened by liberal Western ideas and introduction of the capitalist system.22

The discussion of Russia’s national interests departs from the coun-try’s historic self-image. The national idea of tsarist Russia was impe-rial and monarchist. Religion was playing an important role in justi-fying the structure and the expansionist drive of the centralist Russian government. The Bolshevist Revolution set even more ambitious goals — the inner order of the USSR should serve as a model for the entire future socialist world. The national idea combined the concepts of “world revolution” and “developed socialism.” Just as in tsarist times,

21 The expression “national security” was first mentioned in 1989, on the occasion

of a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Supreme Soviet authorized then a group of academicians to draw up a new concept of national security. See Litovkin, Valeriy, “National Security Concept Criticized by Experts but Lauded by the President,” Izvestiya, 8 May 1997, quoted in an English translation in Johnson's Russia List, 8 May 1997.

22 See Sestanovich, Stephen, ed. Rethinking Russia’s National Interests. Washing-ton, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994; Kortunov, Andrei and Andrei Volodin. Contemporary Russia: National Interests and Emerging Foreign Policy Perceptions. Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftli-che und internationale Studien, no. 33. Cologne: BIOst, 1996.

80

the character of the Soviet government was expansive, imperial, and authoritarian.23

What is the national idea of Russia today? As follows from both Andrey Kortunov’s and Tatyana Parkhalina’s contributions, a strong desire for normality is an important feature of the present Russian state of mind. In this respect, Russia seems to be inwardly oriented, as are most “mature” democracies. Considerations of national destiny are not a very high priority. Kortunov points out that the Russian gov-ernment disposes of only a low mobilizing potential and is hardly capable of implementing “holistic” visions and national ideas. Russian society today is pluralistic and allows different actors with various interests to participate in public life.

In this context, one of the most distinctive symptoms of the transition period is the phenomenon of regionalization.24 As shown by Tatyana Parkhalina’s contribution, regional elite are taking an increasingly active role in the policy making process of the central government, advancing interests in a field which used to be strictly and exclusively handled by the small ruling elite in Moscow. Consequently, as Tat-yana Yevgeneva stressed in a comment, Russia’s “national idea” can be identified as the idea of its regions and different elements of soci-

23 Simon, Gerhard. “Auf der Suche nach der ‘Idee für Russland’.” Osteuropa 47,

no. 12 (1997): 1169-1190, here 1169-1170.

24 In this context, regionalization is understood as the transformation of the territo-rial state structure, the shifting of the power from the center to the regions. A comprehensive theory on “regionalization” (on “region” or “regionalism”) does not exist. Scientific dealing with this topic falls back on different theoretical ele-ments from social sciences. From the various approaches to definition of regions and the sources of regionalism, social science literature emphasizes geographic proximity, international interaction, common bonds (ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical) and a sense of regional identity. See Cantori, Luis J. and Steven L. Spiegel, eds. The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970; Russet, Bruce M. “Delineating International Regions.” In Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, ed. David J. Singer, 317-352. New York: Free Press, 1968.

81

ety.25 The adoption of this modern “Western” approach focuses on interests of individual or social groups and restricts the central state’s function to executing the will of its members.

Conversely, an important element of traditional Russian political culture is the idea of the state representing an end in itself rather than strictly serving the needs of society. The authoritarian Russian gov-ernment has always taken a strong interest in itself.26 According to the newly adopted National Security Concept, the lack of a unifying national idea is not only a shortcoming, but also a serious threat to the interests of Russia, its integrity, and sovereignty. In summer 1996, a nation-wide campaign was launched to catalyze debate on the coun-try’s national interests. Russian president Yeltsin called for an official competition to define The Idea for Russia. The liveliest public response is an obvious indicator of the high importance attributed to this matter by a broad political public.27

25 The issue of regionalism in Russia and the international dimension is addressed

in Sergounin, Alexander A. Russia’s Regionalization: The International Dimen-sion. Working Papers, no. 20. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Insti-tute, 1997; Spiegeleire, Stephan De. “Gullivers Fäden: Die russischen Regionen und die Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Russischen Föderation.” In Russland und der Westen: Von der “strategischen Partnerschaft” zur “Strategie der Part-nerschaft,” ed. Hans-Joachim Spanger, 150-176. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Ver-lag, 1998. For a general view on regional processes in Russia, Kappeler, Andreas, ed. Regionalismus und Nationalismus in Russland. Baden-Baden: No-mos, 1996; Stavrakis, Peter J., Joan DeBardeleben, and Larry Black, eds. Beyond the Monolith: The Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997.

26 A prominent example is the newly adopted National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, arguing that “Russia’s national interests are determined by the aggregate of the basic interests of the individual, the society and the state.” See “Kontseptsiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” Rossiys-kaya gazeta, 26 December 1997.

27 See “Ideya dlya Rossii,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, 30 June 1996. For comments and samples, see “Russland: Eine nationale Idee per Preisausschreiben.” Osteuropa-Archiv 47, no. 12 (1997): A483-A498.

82

The above illustrates the high degree by which the political elite is united in the firm belief that Russian foreign and security policy must aim at regaining and consolidating “great power” status. In addition, both its “moderate” leadership and conservative opposition forces stress the uniqueness, distinctiveness, and independence of Russian power and culture. Thus the “Russian way” is seen as a special way including a unique function as a bridge between Europe and Asia and the role of a “leading Eurasian great power.” So far, however, there is no common understanding of what a “great power” is and where the “Russian way” will lead. Communist and nationalist groups profess the idea of restoring a Russian “great power” that would again include at least the European part of the old Soviet Union. On the other hand, the ruling elite has adopted the goals of rebuilding the country on the basis of such values as democracy, the rule of law, a civil society, and a free market economy.

President Yeltsin’s June 1996 address to the two houses of Parliament outlined Russian security policy for the period of 1996 to 2000. He claimed that the “Russian way” would not lead into isolation, but envisages an active participation in global affairs and the development of international cooperation on the basis of equality and partnership with other world centers. The president’s report emphasizes that, due to a friendly international environment, conditions for resolving inter-nal problems are very favorable.28

Likewise, the newly adopted National Security Concept recognizes the main threats to national security — “now and in the foreseeable future” — as being neither external nor military in nature but “con-centrated in the domestic political, economic, social, environmental, information, and religious spheres.” Particular attention is paid to the threat posed by “the critical state of the economy.” At its core, the new security guidelines identify maintenance and strengthening of internal

28 “Poslanie po natsional’noy bezopasnosti Presidenta Rossiyskoy Federacii Fede-

ral’nomu Sobraniyu,” Nezavissimaya gazeta, 14 June 1996.

83

security and stability as the primary tasks and challenges facing the Russian government.29

Foreign Policy at the Crossroads? This new understanding of the country’s national security interests only gradually permeates Russia’s conduct of foreign affairs. Moscow continues to combine dedication to pragmatic cooperation with a par-tially “holistic” definition of Russia’s international position. Despite the country’s weakness, its foreign policy is oriented towards a “great power” status, the basis of which is being undermined in some respects. As the NATO enlargement debate shows, Russia still tends to place its own interests above security considerations of former Soviet republics and, to a lesser extent, of its former Eastern European satellites.

Russia’s ideas and performance in the field of foreign affairs and security policy contrast with its present military potential and its dif-ficult social and economic position. Current Russian foreign policy reflects the internal crisis of the country. A brusque and changing foreign policy rhetoric expresses a high degree of uncertainty. In the long run, this attitude endangers Russia’s reliability as a partner in European and global affairs and probably inhibits a positive internal dialogue on the country’s position in Europe and the world.

Again, Russia is at a turning point in its history. The challenging question is whether the country will define its national interests ac-cording to a “positivist” pattern or based on a “holistic” approach. Will it give priority to the various interests of different elements of its society? Or will a new centralist state rely upon a new missionary idea based on enemy images to strengthen national cohesion?

29 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 26 December 1997.

84

Part II The CIS Dimension

Introduction Part II explores Russian foreign and security policy aimed at reinte-grating the post-Soviet area. According to most relevant official documents, including very recent ones, this is the most important foreign policy goal of today’s Russia.

Chapter 4, prepared by Dmitriy Trenin, deputy director of Carnegie Moscow Center, assesses the “reluctant adaptation” of Russia’s for-eign policy towards its close neighbors to a changing international security environment. The process of coping with and internalizing the irreversible independence of neighboring countries is described as a decisive challenge for Russia’s future security alignment.

While the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is no longer considered to be an adequate instrument to implement integration policy, sub-regional structures and bilateral agreements become increasingly important. Of the former Soviet republics, Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus play most important roles for Russian foreign and security policy. In 1997, Russia concluded high-ranking bilateral agreements with both countries.

In chapters 5 and 6, prepared by Leonid Bilousov, president of the Ukrainian Center for International Security Studies (Kiev), and Ana-toliy Rozanov, head of the Faculty of International Relations at the Belorussian State University (Minsk), non-Russian perspectives are introduced which are not necessarily incompatible with a Russian point of view. The two authors from Ukraine and Belarus explore important aspects of their countries’ bilateral relations with Russia as well as “triangle” relations with Western international and security organizations such as the OSCE and NATO.

Besides these authors, the following conference participants have contributed to this publication with comments and interventions, which are referred to in the concluding remarks to this part: Dr. Olga Alexandrowa, senior researcher at the German Federal Institute for

87

Russian, East European and International Studies (Cologne); Mrs. Katya Stepanova, researcher at the Carnegie Moscow Center; Mr. Andriy Veselovskiy, head of the Department of Political Analysis and Planning at the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Dr. Leonid Zayko, president of the National Center for Strategic Initiatives “East-West” (Minsk).

88

DMITRIY TRENIN Chapter 4 Reluctant Adaptation: Russia’s Security Policy towards New Eastern Europe and the Baltic States While many in and outside Russia still prefer to think in terms of the CIS, or the former Soviet Union, this is becoming increasingly prob-lematic. Like the USSR before it, the “former Soviet Union” is defi-nitely on the way out. In its place, new regions emerge, giving a new structure to a Eurasia which still has Russia in the middle, but no longer at its center.

What is sometimes referred to as the Western CIS states — Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova — can perhaps be more appropriately denoted as a new Eastern Europe. The three Baltic states, which lie immedi-ately to the north, are in many ways an extension of Northern Europe.

It is true, of course, that Russia’s policies toward the six nations west of its new borders differ enormously and are thus difficult to analyze jointly in any coherent way. However, as this paper will attempt to show, in all the six cases Russia is basically dealing with one complex process — an expansion of the West. It is this expansion, rather than the ill-fated models of a “common European home” that appear to lead the way to making Europe “whole.” The factor of Western expansion defines Russia’s new immediate environment and has far-reaching implications for its new international identity and its choice of policies, offering the alternative of adaptation or revisionism. It is the aim of this chapter to analyze these implications and the options available to Moscow.

89

Discontinuities of the New Strategic Environment The expansion of the West should not be confused with NATO enlargement. The process has been under way since 1989, with its each successive wave eroding still further the foundation of the old system of international relations in Europe’s east. Within less than ten years, this process has produced a landscape strikingly different to anything which had existed there for the three centuries during which Russia acted as a European power. Traditionally, Russia’s participa-tion in the affairs of Europe has been a function of where its bounda-ries ran. From the 14th to the 17th centuries it was effectively cut off from Europe by Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, which blocked all access to seas and controlled overland communications. Russia fought wars with these powerful neighbors precisely to get closer to Europe, to be seen as European. The climax came after World War II when Soviet Russian power spread to the very heart of Europe. This tradi-tion became part of the Russian political mind-set. Physical control of the territory was believed to be indispensable for a voice in the affairs of Europe.

The most obvious change since the political earthquake of 1989-1991 is, of course, the huge loss of territory by Russia. This caused a major psychological trauma. Almost unanimously, Russian politicians and commentators point to Russia being pushed back from the center of the European continent. For a state which, since the 14th century, has been in the business of “gathering lands,” the loss of territory is par-ticularly painful. The fact that the current borders of the Russian Fed-eration in Europe roughly follow the lines existing in the early 17th century, soon after the end of the “Troubled Times,” is sometimes transformed into the fiction of Russia being pushed three or four hun-dred years back in its development as a nation, or at least of being pushed back from Europe.

The second change is concerned with power relations. Ever since the Napoleonic Wars, Russia has been one of the principal military pow-ers on the continent. At times it dominated Europe with the number of its soldiers and weapons. Again, this rose to a climax during the Cold War when the Soviet Union became a military superpower and the

90

Moscow-led Warsaw Pact enjoyed conventional superiority in Europe. After the implosion of the “socialist community” and the USSR itself (and the incredible degradation of the Russian Armed Forces), Moscow, for the first time in decades, has to learn to deal from a position of relative military weakness. It is not surprising, then, that NATO enlargement, in the view of some Russian traditionalists, means total military insecurity for Russia.

A third change deals with the status of Russia’s neighbors. Despite many protestations to the contrary, the historic pattern of Russian and later Soviet expansion had little to do with seeking to reach “natural borders,” however defined. Rather, Russian and Soviet power would expand in all directions before it either reached the water’s edge or, much more often, encountered opposition which the Russians were unable to overcome. Thus Russia typically had to deal on its borders either with other powerful empires or states or with buffer states. Of the latter, there were two kinds: those controlled by Russia and thus projecting her political and military influence beyond its borders, and those controlled by Russia’s powerful competitors.

In other words, Russia was surrounded, depending on the epoch and region, by its own satellites or by its adversaries’ cordon sanitaire. This situation became extremely obvious when the Soviet Union gained its superpower status and international relations were practi-cally reduced to a bloc-to-bloc confrontation. Now all this has changed. Clearly, many within the Russian political elite interpret recent developments as Russian-controlled buffer areas being turned initially into no-man’s-lands, and then transformed by the West into buffer areas turned against Russia.

To traditionalist thinkers, these three major changes put Russia into a position of extreme and dangerous weakness. Such thinking would logically lead to Russia first turning inward to protect itself against a hostile outside world and to consolidate its remaining resources for an all-out attempt to alter the new status quo. To a more modern thinker, this doesn’t need to be the case. Indeed, many Russian observers have pointed out that the changes in question offer new opportunities to Russia. Having shed some territory, it has become less imperial and more democratic.

91

The liquidation of its military overhang not only does away with con-frontation, but ultimately leads to a demilitarization of international relations in Europe.

Lastly, the new states need not be seen as pawns in the big powers’ games. As the post-World War II experience of Western Europe sug-gests, they can play a useful role as independent players, enhancing stability and prosperity for all. In actual fact, Russia’s foreign policy has toyed with both notions, but has embraced neither. The guiding light of this foreign policy is not some comprehensive concept built around a particular “national idea,” but simple pragmatism. By being pragmatic, however, Russia has been adapting to the new realities — despite evident dislike for the need to adapt. Its security policy with regard to the Baltic States and the new Eastern Europe provides as good an example as any of the difficulty and reality of this adaptation.

Accepting the Finality of Independence The newly independent states only gradually emerged on Moscow’s radar screen. From the early 1990s, Russia has remained an inward-looking country with little time for an active foreign policy. If any-thing, the ruling elite remained fixated on the United States, and, to a lesser extent, on Western Europe. Central Europe was rediscovered mainly due to NATO enlargement. Immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the CIS served as a psychological and political cushion allowing relatively painless separation of the former repub-lics. From about 1993, in the mind of the Russian political elite, the CIS has stood for a staked-out territory where Russia considered its interests to be of vital importance. The presidential decree of 14 Sep-tember 1995 proclaimed CIS a priority of Russia’s foreign policy. Yet CIS-wide policies have all but failed. Each regional group of coun-tries, and each nation within each group, calls for special treatment.

The problem is not only that Russia has little experience in dealing with smaller neighbors outside of the traditional great-power context.

92

The situation is further complicated by the fact that most of the new states, which have emerged from old Soviet and Russian borderlands, have had virtually no experience in modern statehood. For these new nations, independence, first and foremost, means independence from Russia. Of the six nations, the Baltic States are the only ones with any such experience. Ukraine, despite its claim of being the fifth reincar-nation of Kiev sovereignty since the 9th century, has to build a nation and a state virtually from scratch. Belarus, without a strong sense of national identity, is in a way a failed state, which explains its enthusi-asm for a merger with Russia. Moldova, on the other hand, has at least two strong national identities in conflict with each other, producing first armed confrontation, and then a political stand off.

Except for the Baltic States, there were initially strong doubts in Rus-sia about the viability of each of the post-Soviet creations. Moldova has been divided de facto since 1991; Ukraine was considered likely to split into several states until at least 1993. Belarus and, until 1993, Moldova were believed too weak to survive on their own, given the powerful — and potentially fatal — attraction of their larger neigh-bors. Borders as such have not been much of a problem. It must be granted that official Moscow, which immediately recognized the Soviet administrative boundaries as new international borders, did not attempt to subvert the new states from within so as to dominate them again. Since 1991 the Yeltsin Administration’s unwavering accep-tance of the borders has remained the crucial stabilizing factor in the new Eastern Europe. If anything, Russian energy supplies helped Ukraine weather the most difficult times after gaining independence.

Russian opinion has gradually accepted Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea and is in the process of internalizing the “loss” of Sevastopol. In the case of the Baltic States, the issue has been their territorial claims to Russia, not the other way around. With time, however, both Estonia and Latvia grew more willing to drop their historical but wholly unrealistic claims to adjacent Russian areas. Despite the fact that most ethnic Russians to be found outside of the Russian Federa-tion live in Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, and Moldova, no “Russian question” has emerged so far. Belarus is virtually unprob-lematic. In Ukraine, the local Russians are well integrated. Even in

93

Crimea, secessionism is losing support. Moldova’s conflict is of regional, not ethnic nature, and in Lithuania Russians were granted citizenship rights. This leaves Estonia and Latvia, but the trends there go in the direction of producing a distinct community of Baltic Rus-sians, looking to Europe rather than Russia.

Since 1994/95, when the Chechen conflict came to a head in the Cau-casus, Russia reaffirmed its support for territorial integrity of the new states, which effectively put an end to all hopes of Crimean independ-ence and compelled “Trans-Dniestria” to seek agreement with Chisi-nau. Since 1996, Moscow has intensified diplomatic efforts to bring about a solution of the conflict in Moldova. Still, it took the Russian political elite some time to realize that the newly independent states will neither disintegrate, nor gravitate back toward Russia.

Of all its immediate western neighbors, none is more important than Ukraine. Despite all the friction and rhetoric, since 1992 Moscow’s policies toward that country have significantly contributed to its stability and eventual survival. In 1997, President Yeltsin made the crucial step by signing a treaty with Ukraine, recognizing its sovereignty within the present borders. This may be the strongest indication yet of Russia’s willingness to accept the post-Soviet status quo.

Almost as important and symbolic is Russia’s refusal in 1997 to absorb Belarus, which could have been had almost for the asking. Moscow for the first time consciously and freely abstained from ter-ritorial expansion when after a heated debate within the Russian political elite it vetoed a draft treaty with Belarus providing for a de facto merger of the two states. It is important that financial constraints played a decisive role in foregoing the merger and that the nature of the Belorussian political regime, arguably less liberal than Russia’s own, was cited as an obstacle. Moscow has also moved to define its foreign policy goals with respect to the Baltic States.

In February 1997, the presidential press service made public a document spelling out Russia’s priorities in political, economic, humanitarian, and security spheres. In October 1997 Russia signed a border treaty with Lithuania. President Yeltsin even offered security

94

guarantees to the three nations, which predictably rejected them soon afterward. The influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy came up with a report urging the Russian government to pay more attention to the Baltic States, and to use economic incentives to secure better relations with them.

Security Alignments From Moscow’s perspective, the main issue in the new Eastern Europe and the Baltic States is the security alignment of the countries concerned. It is an open secret that Russia strongly opposed Central European accession to NATO in part to forestall the Alliance move into the former Soviet territory. To Moscow’s intense dislike, the North-Atlantic alliance has emerged as the sole pole of attraction for Moscow’s former allies in Central Europe and even for most of the newly independent states. Russia lost its battle to keep NATO at six-teen. There were dire warnings of a new confrontation, at least estrangement, in case the West proceeded regardless.

They have not come true yet. The security landscape, emerging after the Paris and Madrid summits of 1997, does not resemble any other historical model. There is no overarching arrangement or a firm and established “order.” A great deal remains in flux, but military security is low on most nations’ agendas. One center clearly dominates, but Russia is not excluded. What is emerging is a web of very special partnerships and relationships, tailored to particular circumstances.

Russia has taken calmly Ukraine’s partnership charter with NATO, signed in July 1997 in Madrid. It does not appear concerned over a US-Baltic charter. It reiterates, however, its negative attitudes toward Baltic or Ukrainian membership in the Alliance and threatens to revise its new relations with NATO in case it moves to invite those states. The military factor as such has played only a minor role in post-Soviet developments in the new Eastern Europe. Except for the 1992 armed conflict in Moldova, the region has been spared large-scale violence.

95

No nation has seriously considered using military power against its neighbors. In the wake of the Soviet break-up, Moscow accepted Ukraine’s and Belarus’ takeover of the forces and weapons on their territory.

The issue of nuclear weapons was satisfactorily resolved in coopera-tion with the United States. Russia withdrew its troops from the Baltic States, and negotiated a transit accord with Lithuania in order to maintain contact with its isolated Kaliningrad garrison. In 1997, Mos-cow agreed to drop its long-standing claim to have the whole city of Sevastopol as its sovereign naval base, and accepted joint basing ar-rangements under a twenty year lease for its own Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy.

Russia agreed in 1994 to withdraw its forces from Moldova’s Dniester region. Its proposal of a military base in Tiraspol having been rejected, Russia is reducing its presence in the area, yet remaining careful not to destabilize the still precarious cease-fire along the Dniester. Military presence in the form of military bases, transit, and other activities has remained an issue, which is being handled.

A Different Kind of Russia? The situation in Europe’s east today is very different from anything that existed there in the past. The main difference appears to be Russia itself. Obviously the country is very weak, politically (both in domestic and international terms), economically (with a GDP roughly equal to that of Spain), and militarily. Yet the Russian Federation is not only weaker but also strikingly different from its immediate and more distant predecessors. For psychologically weary Russians, impe-rialism has become unattractive, while nationalism continues to be uninspiring. Early pro-Westernism has been given a setback, but no new “Russian idea” or clear identity has emerged so far. The Russian elite is still torn between a desire to be an independent power center in a multi-polar world and a longing to become part of a Greater Europe.

96

For the first time ever, Russian leaders are contemplating integration into something larger than Russia, which Russia cannot dominate. What distinguishes present-day Russia more than anything else is the rise of non-state actors such as Gazprom, Lukoil, and financial groups. Their interests are already better defined than those of the Russian State. In some important areas, such as the Caspian oil, Russian pri-vate capital claims a leading role on behalf of the nation as a whole. For the first time in modern Russian history, this is leading ultimately to dominance of economic factors rather than strategic or ideological ones in Russian decision making — at least as far as Russia’s western neighbors are concerned.

As a consequence of both domestic and environmental change, Rus-sia’s security agenda is being drastically revamped. The Western strategic facade is losing its age-old primacy through gradual and steady demilitarization. Conversely the unstable south, from the Cau-casus to Central Asia, is becoming more of a headache as time goes by; and in the east a formidable challenge may rise within the next 15-20 years. After half a millennium of expansion to the azimuths, Russia is now feeling pressure on all sides. The implications of this apparent geopolitical reversal, however, can be very different. The loss of an empire and of the sense of mission in the world can lead either to attempts at revisionism, or alternatively to total revision of the whole pattern of Russian foreign and security policy making.

Whither Russia? Internally, Russia at the end of 1997 appears to be on the way to bot-toming out. The start of economic growth cannot be very far away. A series of reforms have been proclaimed and even started, as in the defense establishment. Still the risks are substantial. Although there is absolutely no chance of actually restoring Soviet conditions domesti-cally or in the “near abroad,” a reversal of the current benign set of policies cannot be ruled out completely.

97

A revisionist foreign policy, should it prevail, would mean Russia’s self-imposed semi-isolation from the West. Its point of departure would be a clear rejection of the status quo, and at least covert attempts to undermine it. Using historical analogies as proof, advo-cates of such a policy course would argue that the current state of affairs is “temporary,” akin to the situation that existed during the Civil War of 1918-1921. Russia, in the thinking of these revisionists, is “doomed” to be an empire; otherwise it cannot survive and will have to go under.

Restoration of the Slavic core of the old state would be proclaimed as the first major political goal. Belarus would be absorbed quickly, increasing the pressure on Ukraine. The Crimean situation might be re-ignited, and Dniestrian separatism encouraged. Within the Russian communities in the Baltic States, extremist groups and individuals would be relied upon to raise the profile of “the Russian question.” Formation of something like an anti-NATO bloc could be attempted, even if initially composed of Russia and Belarus alone.

Although this policy may allow some venting to pent-up frustration among the most traditional and nostalgic Russian elite, absolutely irreconcilable to the Soviet collapse, it appears unfeasible. Russia will remain relatively weak for a very long time. Interestingly, the new states are also weak, but their elite is generally better consolidated when dealing with Russia. Of course, the West is committed to play-ing an increasingly prominent role in all the post-Soviet regions, and the new Eastern Europe usually comes at the top of the list. A revi-sionist policy seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. It may become possible only if the reforms utterly fail and nationalism emerges as the principle slogan in the struggle for power.

Continuing an adaptive approach is a more credible option. Internali-zation of the new states’ independence is under way. As former hopes of CIS-wide integration fade away, there is less and less reason to distinguish between the near and far abroad. Western expansion is de facto opening the way to a Greater Europe, which would include Rus-sia in the form of institutionalized association with the European Union and a formal partnership with NATO. European Union (EU) enlargement all the way to Russia’s borders, already seen as non-con-

98

troversial in Moscow, may indeed bring accompanying stability and economic opportunities to be used for Russia’s rehabilitation.

Adaptation, of course, means de facto recognition of the Soviet Union’s historic failure. All those accepting this may have to bear the stigma of defeatism and be seen as promoters of a kind of Erfuel-lungspolitik. Kowtowing to the West has never been popular in Rus-sia. A more practical concern may be that renunciation of imperialism would usher in Russia’s own disintegration. If the CIS can’t stand, how can the Russian Federation? These problems are real. Yet prag-matism means accepting the reality — at least de facto — and seizing the emerging opportunities. Despite all the discourse in the Russian media, geopolitics in the European context is more and more revealed as inadequate and obsolete. Increasingly it has to give way to geo-economics. In a way, Russia offers an interesting parallel to both post-World War I and post-World War II Germany. Russia’s travail is not too dissimilar to that of post-imperial France and even the UK when it had lost the empire. Russia is the last major European Empire to come home and search painfully for a role to play.

One final remark. Russia’s adaptation has been reluctant, but this is an encouraging sign. Reluctance means that it does things despite its leaders preferences, because these leaders (and the bulk of the political class behind them) are left with no other credible option. This permits the hope that adaptation may ultimately succeed.

99

LEONID BILOUSOV

Chapter 5 Ukrainian-Russian Relations and the Debate on NATO Enlargement After the collapse of the former USSR and communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the world entered a new era that can be defined as post-communism. In terms of further development of inter-national relations the USA, the European democratic states, and the international organizations in charge of defending peace and democ-racy are challenged with reconsidering their main goals and priorities — and in particular with defining a new role for NATO to secure peace in the crucial region of Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the main interests of post-communist European states are concentrated in the field of strengthening their international security. This is particularly urgent for those states, which — as the most reliable political and military partners — are chosen to partici-pate in the process of creating a new European security system and to develop closer relations with NATO. Ukraine, as stated in its Military Doctrine, proposes the establishment of an all-embracing system of universal and all-European security and considers its participation in it the most important aspect of its national security.

To ensure regional stability and to avoid the creation of new dividing lines in Europe, the NATO enlargement process should not only par-allel the economic integration process promoted by EU enlargement. It should also bring about a significant widening and deepening of security cooperation between the Alliance and all interested parties in the region. This would decrease possible security competition among more or less successful applicants and non-applicant countries, which

101

would be counterproductive in terms of all-European security.1 Oth-erwise NATO’s arithmetical enlargement, based on collective defense without special assurances, will inevitably lead to new misunder-standings. This is not an enlargement problem but one owing to the nature of the Alliance. The formula is simple: the more countries join the collective defense system, the wider the internal sphere of stability and security. In addition, the fewer countries left outside, the more unpleasant the isolation that these states will experience. Ukraine, neither included in any Western defense system nor willing to join the Tashkent treaty, would feel especially uncomfortable.

Inherited Political Systems To understand the present problems related to the question of ap-proaching or opposing NATO faced by Ukraine, Russia and a major-ity of other post-communist states, the essential characteristics of post-communist political systems must be analyzed. After the collapse of the former USSR, the major issue for all the post-communist states was the problem of self-identification, i.e. of choosing an appropriate model of political, economic, social, and cultural development. On this basis, a definition of the countries’ places and roles in the inter-national community would be stated and translated into policies. Both in Ukraine and Russia, the ruling elite considered this issue to be resolved automatically. In neither country was society included in the process of drafting foreign policy. Official foreign policy doctrines and concepts reflect the countries’ “true” national interests only to a minor extent. Thus neither Ukraine nor Russia managed to find their appropriate places in the European community, and both remain incomprehensible to their neighbors. Their foreign policies are largely unpredictable.

1 Udovenko, Hennadiy. “Ukraine’s View on European Security.” Politics and the

Time, no. 2 (1996): 15-16.

102

During the last ten years, a self-sufficient and mutated power system evolved in many post-communist states. In these systems, totalitarian in essence, the decision-makers tend to be alienated from society at large. These characteristics are typical in Ukraine and Russia. The neo-totalitarian nature of Ukraine and Russia strongly influences the countries’ foreign policies and their approach to international security issues. It is also a major obstacle to improvement of mutual relations, despite the declarations of the presidents.

Both societies are divided into two camps. On one side, there is a small group of newly rich people, on the other side the large group of the very poor. Both societies have practically no middle class that could support social and economic stability. In terms of geopolitics, independence was connected by the ruling Ukrainian elite with com-plete denial of its “Soviet heritage,” moving away from Russia and joining the European community. The Russian elite not only inherited the “Soviet past” but also became the successor of Soviet imperialist foreign policy. Russian politicians are unwilling to accept the fact that Russia has become “smaller.”

The Legacy of Soviet Relations At present, imperial and chauvinistic ambitions of Russian leaders and a potential aggravation of the situation inside Russia represent the major external threat to Ukraine as certain Russian political circles are still determined to play the “Crimean card.” The issue of NATO enlargement and the artificial problem of Sevastopol contribute to uniting even antagonist political forces in Russia.2 The vision of an alleged common enemy could even provide a pretext for interference

2 In a recent interview, Konstantin Borovoy, the head of the Russian Party of

Economic Freedom, hinted that Ukraine was considered a target for a Russian intervention in 1995 instead of Chechnya. See Vseukrainskiye vedomosti, 26 November 1997.

103

within Ukraine, although Ukrainian military analysts consider such a scenario doubtful.

One must also take into account some other differences between Rus-sian and Ukrainian society. In Russia, a certain consensus seems to have emerged in the negative stand to NATO and its enlargement. The situation is different in Ukraine. A March 1997 survey conducted by the Ukrainian International Institute of Sociology estimates that 11 to 22 percent of Ukrainians support the idea of joining NATO, while 28 to 37 percent prefer a military union with CIS countries. The latter position is supported primarily in the Crimea and in the East.3 The data shows that most Ukrainians have not yet made up their minds. One reason might be the fact that people in Ukraine know very little about NATO. According to the data collected by the Crimean Center for Humanitarian Studies, only 26 percent of the Ukrainian population know “much” or “very much” about the activities of the Alliance.4 Yet in Western Ukraine a considerable part of the population views NATO as the guarantor of Ukraine’s independence.

In Crimea and eastern and southern Ukraine, a significant part of the population is against closer relations with NATO. According to the above-mentioned survey prepared by the Ukrainian International Institute of Sociology, some 30 percent of the respondents opted for the unification of Russia and Ukraine, while 53 percent would like to see Ukraine and Russia as independent friendly states with open bor-ders and without customs’ control. Only 13 percent prefer closed bor-ders, a visa regime, and customs’ control.5

Thus most of the population stands for an independent Ukrainian state and has not yet defined its position toward NATO or Russia. At the same time, two significant groups have assumed differing positions on these issues. The political elite is clearly divided in its opinion on 3 The poll was conducted in different parts of the country, however, the Western

regions seem to be better represented. See Den’, 6 December 1997.

4 Pereguda, Ye. “On Ukraine’s Place in Security System.” Okno v Ukrainu: kommentariy, 14 July 1997.

5 Den’, 6 December 1997.

104

Eastern or Western orientation. Unlike in Russia, where Yeltsin and the communist opposition can still come to terms on such issues, any compromise between the Ukrainian president and the speaker of the Supreme Council is impossible.

An important characteristic of Ukrainian-Russian relations is the fact that bilateral relations between the states are completely new, while relations between the peoples are very close and have lasted for cen-turies. Present Russian-Ukrainian relations result from the fact that both Russians and Ukrainians depend heavily on the ruling elite and are debarred from forming their states’ foreign policies. Authorities of both states take advantage of their power to deform their mutual rela-tions, which leads for example, to Russian patriots being anti-Ukrainian and vice versa. Fortunately, democrats in Ukraine and Rus-sia understand that international relations cannot be a monopoly of state authorities. Especially after signing the friendship treaty between our countries, there is hope that mutual relations will improve. But a precondition is a successful system transformation that brings about democratic political systems and civil societies in both countries.

A “Triangle” Relationship The signing of agreements between Russia and NATO and Ukraine and NATO marked the year 1997.6 Together with the friendship treaty between Ukraine and Russia, these agreements comprise the founda-tion of a geopolitical triangle consisting of NATO, Russia and Ukraine.

Harmonious interaction between the triangle parties is a key issue for a new European security system. In terms of political geometry, this 6 The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between

NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in Paris on May 27, 1997. The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine was signed in Madrid on July 9, 1997.

105

triangle is turned upside down, making Ukraine its very fragile “foun-dation.” The success of collaboration within this triangle depends to a great extent on stability within Ukraine. Though Russian-Ukrainian relations are crucial to both countries, there is no guarantee that the friendship treaty will be ratified by the Russian legislative. In this context, statements by some influential Russian politicians such as Sergey Baburin, head of the Duma’s anti-NATO Group, or Vladimir Zhirinovskiy are of serious concern. Like other nationally minded Russian demagogues, the former has stated that a treaty that explicitly recognizes Ukraine’s sovereignty and dismisses old claims about Sev-astopol is an agreement between the presidents, not between the peo-ples.

For Ukraine, preserving its national interests means observing bal-anced relation with both NATO and Russia in order to avoid becom-ing an isolated buffer zone between these parties. Irina Pogorelova, a journalist of the influential Ukrainian weekly Zerkalo nedeli has expressed her concern about the possible consequences of this trian-gle. In her article Moving Towards the Gap, she describes how NATO-Russia negotiations have led to a Western appeasement policy towards Russia in order to prevent a “Versailles”-type situation from occurring.7 Moscow has indeed managed to create concern about Rus-sia becoming analogous to the defeated, humiliated post-World War I Germany. Unfortunately, only a few are committed to take Ukraine so seriously. Debate on the partnership agreement between NATO and Ukraine in the Supreme Council has revealed an overwhelming con-sensus among non-Communist deputies that a treaty with Russia alone cannot guarantee Ukrainian external security. Only in combination with an agreement with NATO can Ukraine be sure of maintaining its independence.

Although the recent period was marked by important achievements regarding Ukraine’s international situation — besides the above-men-tioned friendship treaty with Russia and the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO, Ukraine has signed bilateral treaties with all

7 Zerkalo nedeli, 14 June 1997.

106

its neighbors — the country’s security problems are far from being solved. This is due to the slow pace of internal development. To a great extent, foreign and domestic policies remain a mere collection of slogans and intentions. No effective measures of Ukrainian post-Communist transformation have been implemented yet; in fact, they have not even been agreed upon. Thus one of Ukraine’s major goals, i.e. membership in the European Union as well as other Western and European structures, cannot be achieved until Ukrainian society matches EU standards and is compatible with European democracies.8

Despite considerable success of Ukraine’s step-by-step tactics of approaching European institutions (Council of Europe, WEU) and NATO, it seems unlikely that we shall witness any qualitative break-through in the internal and international situation of Ukraine in the near future. Presently all Ukrainian politics lie hostage to the “parade of elections,” making all major issues of internal and foreign policy subject to political speculation.9 As far as the international situation is concerned, Ukrainian relations with NATO and Russia, as well as the NATO enlargement debate will be the hottest battlefields for presi-dential candidates.

The NATO Debate in Kiev’s Political Elite According to Serhiy Teleshun, a foreign policy adviser to the presi-dent, NATO enlargement and Ukrainian-NATO relations are likely to become a big issue in the presidential elections. Leftist candidates will be strictly negative towards Ukraine’s collaboration with NATO and

8 The Western orientation of Ukrainian international relations is described in the

Parliamentary resolution on the Basic Principles of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy, adopted in mid-1993.

9 The expression “parade of elections” refers to the fact that after the parliamentary elections of March 1998, presidential elections will be held in October 1999.

107

enlargement of the Alliance.10 While domestic issues are difficult to discuss due to widespread voter skepticism towards any party pro-gram, the NATO theme seems to be suitable for attracting certain groups of voters. The main arena of political clashes on this issue is the Supreme Council, which enjoys a Constitutional prerogative to define the main directions of internal and foreign policy.11 In June 1997, the Ukrainian parliament extensively discussed the issue of collaboration with the Alliance. The debate was so hot that Foreign Minister Udovenko was forced to intrude. “Believe me,” he told the deputies, “NATO does not deserve to become a reason of such a split in our society.”12

There is no consensus within reach. The debate between the Ver-khovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) deputies continues in the mass media. Two articles appeared recently in the parliamentary daily newspaper Holos Ukrainy. In his article Threats to Ukraine’s Secu-rity: Myth and Reality,13 Communist MP Yevhen Todorov argues that Ukraine’s orientation to the West and inclination to join NATO is a major threat to Ukraine’s security. However, no Ukrainian official has ever officially declared that Ukraine planned to join the Alliance. He holds that such a policy leads to loss of independence in domestic and foreign policy. He also states that there are no geopolitical threats to Ukraine’s security at present. The only reasonable course in foreign policy, he argues, is to collaborate in all spheres as closely as possible with Russia, dismissing speculation about an alleged Russian military threat as “paranoiac hallucinations.”

In his response to Todorov entitled Real Threat to Security, Duma deputy Petro Osadchuk argues that the major military threat to Ukraine comes from Russia.14 He quotes a book recently written by a 10 See “NATO Does not Review Ukraine as a Buffer,” Zakon i biznes, 29 October

1997.

11 Constitution of Ukraine, Article 85 paragraph 5.

12 Den’, 14 June 1997.

13 Holos Ukraini, 14 October 1997.

14 Ibid.

108

Russian nationalist that provoked great concern, even among pro-Rus-sian members of Kiev’s political elite. That author argues that Ukrainian independence is an “absolute anomaly” and that the coun-try’s sovereignty represents a “negative phenomenon for Russia in terms of geo-politics,” liable to “lead to a military conflict.”15 In addi-tion, Osadchuk makes it plausible that Gennadiy Zyuganov, the leader of the Russian Communists, shares these views. He suggests that Ukraine should conduct a balanced internal and foreign policy based on the principles of preserving the country’s national interests and not expect any “saviors,” from either the West or the East.

As a result of the above-mentioned Constitutional prerogative for foreign policy guidelines, there will not be any legitimate official positions on NATO issues until Parliament adopts its resolutions. On his recent visit to Moscow, Duma Chairman Oleksandr Moros, while sharing his personal opinions on NATO (which “coincides with the position of many deputies,” as he explained), described NATO enlargement as a “serious destabilizing factor,” which changes the balance of power, preserves the interests of individual countries, and infringes upon the economic, political, and military interests of many countries in Europe and in the world.16

But President Kuchma is a proponent of closer collaboration with major European structures including NATO. Recently, Volodimir Horbulin, head of the Ukrainian Security and Defense Council, pre-sented his own vision of developing relations within the NATO-Ukraine-Russia triangle.17 He argues that Ukraine’s international secu-rity policy must respond, on the one hand, to the fact that Russia has still not completely overcome its imperialistic ambitions and, on the other hand, to the fact that Ukraine is separated from Western Europe by a belt of as yet weak post-Communist countries.

15 See Dugin, Aleksandr. Osnovy geopolitiki. Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997, 348.

16 Holos Ukrainy, 3 December 1997.

17 Gorbulin, V. “National Security in the Transformed Triangle.” Den’, 2 December 1997.

109

The latter strive to unite with NATO, hoping to ensure democratic market reforms and spare themselves from possible consequences of instability in Russia.

To a great extent, stability within the European security system depends on the relationship between NATO and Russia, which can now be described as “soft competition.” NATO strives to broaden its political functions, and one of the most important steps in this direc-tion is enlargement by including Central and East European countries. Misunderstanding between NATO and Russia concerning the scope and speed of enlargement, as well as differences between Russia and Ukraine regarding these issues are liable to threaten the security of all countries concerned.

Regional Stability and NATO Enlargement The quality of relations within the NATO-Russia-Ukraine triangle depends on the manner and range of NATO enlargement. Russia will have to cope with the “expansion” of its former enemy alliance if this process halts at the borders of the former USSR. This scenario will be more or less acceptable for Russia, provided upper limits of troops, weaponry, and restrictions to modernizing new members’ military infrastructure are established. At present, the situation seems to be developing in this direction. Neither the first nor the second group of new NATO members will include the former Soviet republics. The third group could probably embrace them. But in case realization of this scenario could slow down and the former Soviet states would become compatible with Western countries in military and economic spheres by the beginning of the next century, the issue of their joining NATO would be formally raised.

A second scenario, reflecting NATO’s intention to leave the doors open to all countries interested and compatible with certain standards of inner development, leads to step-by-step enlargement. At each step, borders would have to be established, and the Conventional Forces in

110

Europe (CFE) Treaty would have to be renegotiated, possibly driving Russia into a confrontational policy. A “cold peace” could result in a new and dangerous Russian atomic strategy and attempts to create a new military bloc with the participation of some other influential states. Presently, however, it is unlikely that Russia will confront NATO. Rather, it will put forward the issue of NATO transformation and do its best to mitigate the consequences of enlargement, strength-ening its collaboration with non-member states.

The further transformation of the Alliance — its possible conversion into an all-European collective-security organization — and Russia’s place in the European structures will greatly influence Ukraine’s external security situation. Relations between Russia and Ukraine will deteriorate only if the latter is integrated into the European structures. They will improve if Ukraine and Russia move to the West together and Russia comes closer to NATO (for example, by being admitted to the political structures of the Alliance).

The “worst case scenario,” for Ukraine, is an “avalanche” enlargement of NATO, driving the country between NATO and Russia. Ukraine’s decision on which side to choose would be unpredictable. Only to a minor extent would Ukraine be in a position to reach an independent decision at all. The status quo of its economic or military integration with either Western Europe or a Russian-dominated system would force Ukraine to one side or the other, regardless of the country’s complex internal situation and real national interests.

111

ANATOLIY ROZANOV

Chapter 6 Belarus, Russia, and a New European Security Architecture The international image of Belarus is inseparably connected to the Russian factor. Perhaps the least independent minded of the former Soviet republics, Belarus still today sees its future as very closely tied to that of Russia. Minsk remains sensitive and responsive to Russian concerns.

Belarus occupies a special place in Russian strategic thinking. In the words of Robert Legvold, “for Russia, Belarus represents a crucial strategic salient, either as a forward wedge of Russian influence in Europe or as a pathway by which others can threaten its peace of mind.”1 The country’s pro-Moscow orientation is beneficial to Russia in view of its concern about the NATO extension towards Central and Eastern Europe. To the West, Belarus matters because of its location. Western strategists would prefer an independent, democratic, stable state on NATO’s future new eastern frontier. Because of its close liaison with Russia, Belarus is not treated in the West as a truly inde-pendent actor in the evolving European security diplomacy. As a rule, Minsk’s approach to European security is not taken seriously and is considered a mirror of Russian ideas. Indeed, special ties with the Russian Federation form the mainstream of Belarus’ foreign and secu-rity policy. Minsk appears to rely heavily on Moscow and to be unwilling to take its own distinctive view on matters of European

1 Legvold, Robert. “Belarus in U.S. Foreign Policy.” A Paper for the Workshop on

Belarus and the International Environment, Minsk, 16-17 October 1997.

113

concern. So far, Belarus has not been able to make an impact on the ongoing development of a viable security structure for Europe.

The OSCE and a Common Security Space According to Belorussian authorities, Europe will enter the 21st cen-tury as a peaceful and stable continent only if its security system meets the following criteria. First, it should be able to withstand effectively both old and new threats to security, especially regional conflicts, terrorism, or organized crime. Second, the system of Euro-pean security should be indivisible and take into account the interests of all European states. All European countries should have equal rights in making decisions concerning the continent’s future security architecture. Third, it is necessary to choose a security model that would unite nations and not create a threat of new divisions on the European continent. According to President Aleksander Lukashenka, the Oganization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could become the basis of a system that would meet these criteria.2

In this perspective, within the OSCE framework existing institutions including NATO could have an adequate place. But Belarus is opposed to efforts to make NATO a cornerstone of the new European security architecture. The Belorussian leadership believes that the OSCE should take a coordinating role among European and transat-lantic institutions in securing peace and stability in Europe. In general, Belarus shares the Russian view that the OSCE should become a leading organization among European security institutions, but this is unacceptable to NATO members.

2 “Statement by the president of the Republic of Belarus Aleksander Lukashenka

at the OSCE Lisbon Summit Meeting, 2 December 1996,” Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannych Del, Minsk 1997, 61.

114

Undoubtedly the OSCE is a useful and valuable component of the European security architecture. It is the only regional forum bringing together all countries of Europe as well as Canada and the United States. It represents a common framework with respect to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law. Although the OSCE lacks both the authority and the infrastructure to do more than provide another opportunity for political consultation and support for diplomatic initiatives, this role is not unimportant. Here broad membership is a real asset. In fact, the organization’s major role is the same as it has been since its predecessor, the Confer-ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was founded in 1975: formulating and refining norms for the appropriate behavior of governments in Europe.3

The OSCE has a unique role to play in addressing the concerns of all states with a stake in European security. The final document of the OSCE Lisbon Summit (December 1996) articulated a vision of Europe as a common security space of equal partners, free of dividing lines. This concept was elaborated upon in the Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century. The model, in the words of the OSCE Secretary General, “is designed to put a strategic perspective on security and stability-building efforts based on OSCE principles and commitments.”4 Nevertheless, OSCE capacities at present and for the foreseeable future are quite rigidly restricted both at the institutional and operational level.

The organization is not in a position to provide much military-political force. In the West, the OSCE is viewed largely as a toothless talking-shop.5 There is too much disparity among its members to institutionalize military resources and structures needed for significant military operations. It is noteworthy that NATO, while avoiding a

3 Zelikow, Philip. “The Masque of Institutions.” Survival 38, no. 1 (1996): 11.

4 Aragona, Giancarlo. “Lisbon and Beyond: The OSCE Role in an Emerging European Security Structure.” NATO Review 45, no. 2 (1997): 7.

5 Hillen, John. Getting NATO Back to Basics. Backgrounder, no. 1067, 7 February 1996. Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1996.

115

sharply delineated division of labor and any institutional hierarchy, expects the OSCE Lisbon security model to complement the NATO and EU enlargement process by reaffirming OSCE principles and establishing norms of behavior for states and institutions within the OSCE area.

In its Lisbon Declaration, the OSCE refers to itself as “the inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision making, and cooperation in its region,” playing a “central role” in achieving the goal of a common security space. However, the declaration makes it quite clear that “no state, organization, or grouping can have any superior responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE region, or regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence.”6 This security model is essentially non-hierarchical, and the OSCE complements the mutually reinforcing efforts of other European and transatlantic organizations, which operate in the same geographic area and/or realm of activities.7 Looking into the nearest future, it is hard to imagine a situation in which the OSCE would pro-vide the main pillar of European security and stability. Balance and “universalism” of this inter-state structure, which were necessary to lower the tensions of inter-bloc antagonism, are proving insufficient in the new circumstances for settling even an individual conflict, let alone ensuring security and stability on a pan-European scale. NATO Enlargement: A View from Belarus The official Western stand on NATO enlargement is that expansion of NATO is meant to strengthen European security, but not against a feared Russian aggression and certainly not directed against Russia. Nevertheless, all public discussion in Poland and much of it in the 6 Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for

the 21st Century, Lisbon, 3 December 1996, sections 4, 9, 10.

7 Aragona, Lisbon and Beyond, 8.

116

United States (on the part of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and others) has been conducted in terms of the need to contain a pre-sumed Russian threat and to prevent Russia from exerting influence on its neighbors.8 In the nature of things, the argument goes, given its size and historical ambitions, a resurgent Russia is likely to threaten Central and Eastern Europe again in due course.9 Peter Rodman expressed this kind of logic in these terms: “The only potential great-power security problem in Central Europe is the lengthening shadow of Russian strength, and NATO still has the job of counter-balancing it. Russia is a force of nature; all this is inevitable.”10

The fear of Russian “neo-imperialism” is often exaggerated. Russia today is both weaker and much more cautious than most people in the West realize. A Russian military threat to Poland and Eastern Europe is inconceivable for the foreseeable future. The current state of Rus-sian conventional forces would make it extremely difficult to mount an attack in central Europe, much less launch a surprise attack. Many officials of the US and NATO believe that Russian conventional forces continue to decline.11

As for the Russian concern for the “near abroad” — a concern that is automatically viewed as alarming in the West — even Western observers claim that it is no more or less imperial than the historic US concern for the Caribbean and Central America.12 Russian policy-makers reject accusations that Russian policy is imperialist and por-tray Moscow’s policy as one promoting and leading integration in the post-Soviet space. The Russian intention of playing a leading role in

8 Lieven, Anatol. “A New Iron Curtain.” The Atlantic Monthly 277, no. 1 (1996):

20-25.

9 Garfinkle, Adam. “NATO Enlargement: What’s the Rush?” The National Inter-est, no. 46 (Winter 1996/97): 102.

10 Rodman, Peter. “4 More for NATO.” The Washington Post, 13 December 1994.

11 Gallis, Paul E. NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance. The Library of Congress, CRS Issue Brief, 6 June 1997. Washington DC: Congres-sional Research Service, 1996, 6-7.

12 Garfinkle, NATO Enlargement, 105.

117

developing integration in the CIS region is likely to remain a constant factor in Russian thinking.13 Of course, few would claim that Russia’s journey is set and its destination known. This real uncertainty gener-ates the Western desire to be ready for all possible scenarios. Not surprisingly, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe want to be admitted to NATO because they fear Russia, and given developments in Russia, their fears are not wholly unjustified.

The process of NATO enlargement is taking place at a moment when NATO’s mission is unclear. NATO members have not reached a con-sensus on what NATO’s future mission should be. Some “NATOists” have argued that expanding NATO membership would provide the main answer to the Alliance’s future mission. However, as Stanley Sloan put it, “the enlargement issue has in fact become part of the problem rather than the answer to the question of what NATO’s future purpose should be.”14 The reasons for Russian opposition to NATO enlargement are basically twofold: in the first place, NATO expansion is seen as a betrayal of clear though implicit promises made by the West in 1990/91. Secondly, Russia fears that NATO expansion will ultimately mean inclusion of the Baltic States and Ukraine within NATO’s orbit, if not in NATO itself — and thus the corresponding loss of Russian influence over these states.

The Belorussian government was always opposed to NATO’s plans for eastward expansion, firmly and unconditionally. President Luka-shenka once referred to the Atlantic alliance as a “dreadful monster.” Then, following a relative attenuation of Moscow’s positions on the issue, Lukashenka also began to temper his views somewhat. In early 1997, the Belorussian Foreign Minister Ivan Antanovich told a nationwide television audience that President Lukashenka was “in a zone of deep reflection” over the issue of NATO expansion. The president was said to have determined that Belarus would pursue “a

13 Smith, M. A. Russia and the Near Abroad. Camberley: Conflict Studies

Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, March 1997, 21.

14 Sloan, Stanley R. “Negotiating a New Transatlantic Bargain.” NATO Review 44, no. 2 (1996): 19-23.

118

very balanced policy, and will respond to changes in the international situation sensitively and flexibly.”15

By early April 1997, it became known that Belarus wanted NATO to provide it with “security guarantees.” Minsk would like these to be included in a special “charter,” regulating mutual relations — just as in the case of NATO’s relations with Russia and Ukraine. Ural Laty-pov, a top foreign policy assistant, made the desirability of NATO security guarantees public to the president, during a press conference following the March 1997 session of the Belorussian Security Coun-cil. Latypov was also quoted, as saying that Minsk wanted the West to approve its proposal formally to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. This would preclude stationing nuclear weapons in Belarus, the Baltic States, and Ukraine, but also on the territory of the three future NATO members, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.

NATO soon stated that it neither plans nor intends to station nuclear weapons on the territory of prospective Eastern members, but it refused to make any formal pledge in that regard. Any legally binding promise would be seen as effectively relegating the Central Europeans to a “second class” of NATO members with lesser rights than the rest.16 Viktor Sheiman, state secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus, at the meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in Madrid on July 9, 1997, presented Minsk’s official position.17 In his words, “Belarus has always believed and continues to believe that the creation of new dividing lines in Europe, including by way of mechanical enlargement of military unions, will not resolve the problems of mutual security and could have been counter-productive.”

15 The interview was televised on March 9, 1997.

16 Weydenthal, Jan de. “Belarus: Minsk Demands NATO Security Guarantees.” RFE/RL Research Report, 4 April 1997.

17 Statement by Mr. Viktor Sheiman, official representative of president A. Luka-shenka, State Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus, at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Meeting, Madrid, 9 July 1997.

119

However, perceiving the new situation realistically, Belarus is ready to strengthen the potential of beneficial cooperation with NATO.

In general, Belarus seeks engagement in a constructive dialogue with NATO and to deepen cooperation within the framework of EAPC, which will become an important instrument of strengthening confi-dence and preventing crises in Europe. Minsk indicated its desire to be more actively involved in the Partnership for Peace program, and it has already taken steps to this end. On the eve of the NATO Madrid Summit, the Individual Partnership Program for Belarus was finally approved in the NATO headquarters. Minsk considers that enlarge-ment of the Atlantic alliance should be accompanied by an internal transformation from the military-political to the political-military dimension. It also states that the countries affected most by the organization’s enlargement should get involved in a dialogue with NATO on a broader scale. Belarus regards signing the Founding Act between Russia and NATO a first goodwill step towards the creation of a new European security architecture. Belarus is going to work to ensure that its interests are considered similarly in the context of NATO enlargement, and it counts on constructive cooperation with the Alliance in this matter. The Belorussian government has proposed to use the dual-track approach of developing practical cooperation with NATO and holding simultaneous and parallel talks on elaborating an agreement between Belarus and NATO on partnership and cooperation. Thinking over the current phase of relations between Belarus and NATO, it is appropriate to take into consideration the following points.

First, Belarus will continue to be of strategic interest for NATO and especially in terms of the Alliance’s eastward enlargement. Sherman Garnett of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has good grounds to state that “if Poland becomes a member of NATO, Belarus will increasingly become a matter of alliance interest as well.”18

18 Garnett, Sherman W. Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security

Environment of Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997, 106.

120

Second, the previous straightforward anti-NATO rhetoric and inflexi-ble linkage to the Russian position have led to an utterly unenviable situation for Belarus. The country’s efforts to build up its own con-structive relationship with NATO were met rather skeptically. At the same time, Russia and Ukraine manoeuvered in due course and promptly and pragmatically proceeded to institutionalize their rela-tions with NATO on a fundamentally new basis. Thus Belarus, due to its historical experience, should do its utmost to create a “good neigh-borly belt” on the perimeter of its borders and to avoid becoming a “gray zone” between NATO and Russia. However, it has failed so far to adequately adjust its relations with the only meaningful military and political alliance which will be increasingly influential in constructing a new European security architecture and in the state of affairs in Central and Eastern Europe. Establishing an even, stable, and dynamic relationship with NATO serves the national interests of Belarus.

However, such a relationship is impossible to build while refusing to accept Western values that are actually laid down in the foundation of NATO. Statements about the Belorussian understanding of democracy and human rights may appear reasonable only to the local public. It was no accident that US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns announced on April 4, 1997, that the words “free and democratic” which are quite applicable to Russia can hardly be used with regard to Belarus.19 One may disagree with that opinion, but it is unwise to dis-regard the fact that such judgements dominate in Western political circles.

Third, the prospects for establishing a “special” relationship with NATO, as in the case of Russia and Ukraine, appear less favorable than the Belorussian authorities might expect, at least in the near future. NATO representatives drop hints that such relations cannot start from scratch. They require adequate preparation, including active participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Elaboration of the Individual Partnership Program was virtually neglected in Belarus for a long time. Only in late May 1997 was it presented to

19 “State Department Noon Briefing,” USIS Washington File, 4 April 1997.

121

NATO. Such a slow pace in pursuing the dialogue with NATO, caused by an anti-NATO predisposition coupled with financial con-straints, is hardly impressive.

Fourth, maximum flexibility in foreign policy, genuine pragmatism, and openness for diverse options should be ensured instead of dashing from one extreme position to another. The drafting of the NATO-Rus-sia Founding Act and the manner in which the Belorussian leadership was informed by Russian officials about the course of negotiations with NATO give grounds for reflection. Belarus should not become hostage of decisions made outside this country and without due con-sideration of Belorussian interests.

Fifth, an increase in interaction with NATO can be a gradual and selective process. For instance, it is well known that Belorussian pub-lic opinion is not favorably disposed toward the Alliance because of stereotypes developed during decades of anti-Western and anti-NATO propaganda. A lack of unbiased information on NATO and specifi-cally on its transformation after the end of the Cold War is an obvious factor that hinders developing elements of constructive cooperation with NATO. In this regard, it would be appropriate to establish a NATO Information and Documentation Center in Minsk similar to the one in Kiev.

It is sometimes said that the enhanced cooperation between Belarus and Russia has been prompted by NATO’s plans for eastward expan-sion. This linkage has been emphasized by some Russian politicians (Sergey Shakhray, Oleg Rumyantsev, and others) and has been viewed as plausible by Western observers. However, let it not be for-gotten, as Nicholas Burns pointedly noted, that political leaders of both countries have discussed a Russia-Belarus union for several years now, preceding any Western plans for expanding NATO eastwards.20 Minsk claims that its movement toward closer integration with Russia is its regional contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security. Western analysts suggest that President Lukashenka’s drive to integrate

20 Weydenthal, Belarus: Minsk Demands NATO Security Guarantees.

122

Belarus with Russia isolates the country further from the West.21 They fear that if Russia ever begins to expand its reach again, Belarus would be the first former Soviet republic to rejoin.

Belarus-Russia: The Military Aspect of Cooperation The military aspect of Belorussian-Russian integration is of particular interest for analysts in many countries. This interest is largely deter-mined by the fact that the advanced form of such integration could have a significant impact on the regional balance of forces and entail tangible consequences for Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Poland. If military cooperation between Russia and Belarus is considered in the context of NATO enlargement and interpreted in terms of confronta-tion, then the dynamics of Belorussian-Russian military integration can be perceived with concern and seen as a possible source of future confrontation. However, if one starts from the assumption that military cooperation between Belarus and Russia is a natural process, consistently evolving within the framework of the general integration paradigm, irrespective of NATO enlargement or anticipated “neo-imperialist impulses” of Moscow, then the assessments will be less disturbing.

For understandable reasons, Western experts bear in mind the per-spective of Russian armed forces’ deployment on Belarus territory. As Sherman W. Garnett noted, “for the states of the region and the West, the issue is not so much whether Belarus disappears as a sovereign state — for even the most sweeping forms of integration are unlikely to return Belarus to the formal status of province — but rather whether Belarus retains real control over its security policy on the key questions of deployment and control of military forces on its terri-

21 Goble, Paul. “Between Integration and Disintegration.” Belorussian Review 9,

no. 1 (1997): 12.

123

tory.”22 It is noteworthy that many German experts on East European affairs do not perceive Belorussian-Russian integration and its military component as anything extraordinary. They do not see a threat in it to Germany or Western Europe, although they acknowledge that a union of Belarus and Russia could make Poland “a little nervous.” According to Hermann Clement of the East European Institute in Munich, Moscow has little to gain from this union in military terms. Alexander Rahr of the German Foreign Policy Society also believes that “not very much has changed” since the signing of the Belarus-Russia union.23 Nevertheless, integration of Belarus and Russia in the military sphere is becoming a notable phenomenon affecting the regional situation.

Based on the Union Treaty (April 1997), Article 11 of the Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia (May 1997) describes large-scale tasks in the security area between the two countries.24 The Treaty between Belarus and Russia on Military Cooperation and an agree-ment on joint provision for regional security in the military sphere (December 1997) were signed in Minsk by the defense ministers of the two countries, Marshal Igor Sergeev of the Russian Federation and Colonel-General Aleksander Chumakov of the Republic of Belarus. It appears that these documents will not cause fundamental change in relations between the military structures of the two countries. At a press conference on the results of the visit, Sergeev emphasized that the achieved agreements do not presuppose the creation of joint military structures or formations.25 It was also noted that the question of re-deploying nuclear weapons in Belarus — if such weapons are deployed on the territory of the new NATO members — was not

22 Garnett, Keystone in the Arch, 106.

23 “Belarus-Russia Union No Threat — German Experts,” Reuters, 2 April 1997.

24 The Union Charter envisages, among other things, the following aspects of coop-eration: Sales of armaments and military equipment, coordination of the devel-opment, maintenance and joint use of the military infrastructure; joint defense procurement; coordination of border policies and inter-operability of border troops command. See Sovetskaya Belarussia, 27 May 1997.

25 Belarusskaya delovaya gazeta, 22 December 1997.

124

raised during the negotiations. The Russian defense minister pointed out that development of military cooperation between Russia and Belarus will take place under conditions of downsizing overall strength of their armies and will in no way destabilize the situation in Central Europe.

Belorussian-Russian military integration is one of the most significant areas of cooperation between the two countries. The military-strategic aspect of the relationship with Belarus is of special importance for Russia, and the Russian side purposefully accentuates it. Nevertheless, relations in the military realm cannot be developed separate from other components of the Belorussian-Russian union. Additionally, the area of Belorussian-Russian military cooperation itself is far from being free of problems. Some issues were raised by the Belorussian side, but satisfactory solutions have not been found yet. Major-Gen-eral Yuriy Portnov, for instance, takes Moscow by its word to main-tain certain joint facilities of the military infrastructure in Belarus — command and control centers, communication centers, airfields, transport routes, and so on — under conditions of consolidated allo-cation of required resources, which is vital for strategic interests of the Russian Federation.26

Interestingly, in connection with the prospective enlargement of NATO and the need to adjust the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Russian experts have lately raised the question: To what degree does the military union with Belarus meet Russia’s secu-rity interests? On the one hand, far-reaching military integration can considerably enhance Russia’s position, for example, in terms of air and anti-missile defenses, while providing an opportunity to use air-fields, communications, and other components of the infrastructure. On the other hand, a long line of close military contacts will emerge between Russia and NATO’s forces.

According to Yuriy Fyodorov of the Moscow State Institute for Inter-national Relations, “maintaining Belarus’ guaranteed neutrality can

26 Ibid.

125

become a more meaningful contribution to Russian security than a military union with Belarus.”27 In his view, a vast neutral zone, excepting the Kaliningrad enclave will then separate the Russian armed forces from NATO’s troops. This may contribute to non-deployment of foreign forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Poland. In addition, if the question of equaling NATO’s and Russia’s military potentials in the southern part of the Baltic region is raised, then Belarus’ neutrality can be advantageous for Russia, since the balance in this case will be established between Russia and NATO rather than between the Russian-Belorussian coalition and NATO.

Accordingly, Russia would be in a position to retain more troops in this region than in the case of a military union with Belarus. Indeed, there seems to be good reason for Russia to find Belorussian neutrality more attractive than a military union with its neighboring country. As a reliable strategic ally of the Russian Federation but politically independent and loyal toward Russia’s foreign policy and its military-political interests in the Western direction, Belarus could play a more significant role than as Russia’s close military associate. Belorussian neutrality would make NATO membership a less pressing issue for the Baltic States and Ukraine.

In general, the recent pace of integration has slowed down somewhat. The Russian leadership appears reluctant to undertake large-scale integration endeavors at a time when Russia must concentrate limited resources to solve domestic problems. On the whole, Belorussian-Russian military cooperation does not seem to have achieved a level perceived as provocative by Central European and Western countries. There are no grounds to consider this cooperation as confrontational in nature, dictated by intent to build up a threatening “military fist.”

In the foreseeable future, Belorussian-Russian military integration is unlikely to bring about the deployment of Russian forces on the terri-tory of the Republic of Belarus, even if a regional grouping of troops is established. Neither Belarus nor Russia is interested in restoring 27 Fyodorov, Juriy. “Rasshireniye NATO i modernizatsiya dogovora OVSE.”

Yaderny control, no. 28 (1997): 8.

126

military confrontation with the West, and they will avoid any steps that compromise their position. Concerns about a military bloc jeop-ardizing neighboring states fail to reflect reality. Russian foreign and defense policy is not inclined to speed up establishing joint Russian-Belorussian military structures or formations. Increasingly Moscow’s establishment understands that too close a military integration with Belarus will fuel arguments of those States that are eager to enter NATO.

127

Concluding Remarks To a large extent, pre-revolution Russian diplomacy as well as Soviet foreign and security policy in Europe was bluntly “geopolitical,” i.e. a means of protecting strategic security interests, enhancing access to relevant resources and installing buffer zones against Northern and Western European states.1 Due to the absence of clearly defined natu-ral borders, Eastern Europe — from the Ural Mountains to the Black Sea, from the Carpathian Mountains to the Baltic Sea — was a highly unstable region in terms of territorial demarcations. Belarus and Ukraine have been subject to Russian hegemony through most of their history since the Middle Ages, and the Baltic States were repeatedly incorporated by their German, Nordic, and Slavic neighbor states. Soviet security policy, as expressed by the so-called “Brezhnev doc-trine,” regarded states east of the “Iron curtain” as a legitimate sphere of influence and sharply curtailed their sovereignty.

Since dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign and security policy has aimed at reintegrating that region. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), comprising all former Soviet republics except for the Baltic states, is recommended officially as a key insti-tution for post-Soviet integration. But de facto Russian foreign policy increasingly relies on strengthening bilateral relations and sub-regional agreements to protect its national security and foreign trade relations.

As shown above, there is firm belief among members of Russia’s political elite that Russia is a “Eurasian” great power. A widespread popular myth regards Russia as a country “doomed” to be an empire, while more pragmatic interpretations — as professed by Dmitriy Trenin — compare the mightiest of the former Soviet republics with 1 About “geopolitics” and their impact on the Russian security discourse, see

above, p. 76, footnote 11.

129

other historic empires which have painfully experienced disintegration and dissolution. In this respect, Russia faces a major challenge in terms of reassessing and coping with its imperialistic past. Russia, going through a most serious revision of its Stalinist past, both at the scholarly level and in the field of public consciousness, has not yet attempted to investigate critically and objectively its role as an impe-rialist power. Yet a self-critical historical consciousness is an impor-tant precondition for deeper understanding of neighbors’ concerns and security interests. In the long run it will contribute to enhancing con-fidence among Eastern European and Central Eastern European countries.2

CIS Priority of Russian Foreign Policy Newly independent states covering the territory of the former Soviet Union, precisely the eleven countries that have joined with Russia, the CIS, are officially considered the most important partners in Russian foreign policy.3 This priority was set in the winter of 1992/1993, bringing about a shift in focus for Russia’s international relations, which had been mainly Western-oriented in the two years of foreign policy directed by Andrey Kozyrev. Thus the January 1993 Foreign Policy Concept Draft was the first important official document to call for reintegrating the post-Soviet region as Russia’s priority foreign

2 This point has been raised by Carsten Goehrke in his intervention. For a compre-

hensive assessment, see Goehrke, Carsten. “Zwischen Expansionsgelüsten und Invasionsängsten: Russland im europäischen Mächtesystem der Neuzeit.” Paper presented at the public panel discussion on European Security and Russia, organized by Colloquium Sicherheitspolitik und Medien, Berne, October 1997.

3 Ukraine is counted as a CIS member, despite the fact that it has not ratified the treaty. For an excellent summary of Russian CIS policies, including all relevant sources, see Zagorski, Andrej. “Die Politik Russlands gegenüber der GUS — zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit.” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politik 26, no. 3 (1997): 319-327.

130

policy goal.4 With decree No. 940, dated 14 September 1995, Presi-dent Yeltsin delivered a comprehensive description of Russian poli-cies towards the CIS countries.5 Ever since, official documents and statements by key foreign policy representatives have stressed this priority objective. Accordingly, the newly adopted National Security Concept of the Russian Federation again calls the post-Soviet region the most important direction of the country’s foreign policy.6

At the same time, the CIS, created to serve as a “cushion” against negative effects of Soviet disintegration (Trenin), is no longer per-ceived as an adequate instrument to implement reintegration of the post-Soviet region. This became evident with Yeltsin’s critical per-formance analysis at the heads-of-state summits in Moscow and Chisinau (March and October 1997), and the recent dismissal of the Minister for CIS integration, Valeriy Serov, whose aim and method of strengthening CIS supranational powers had been described as resem-bling “the old centralized planning model.”7

Interestingly, the above-mentioned Moscow summit was described in rather positive terms by most of its participants with the exception of President Yeltsin, who was almost enthusiastically referred to as an “entirely different Boris Nikolaevich” by his Ukrainian colleague Kuchma. In fact, the 20th CIS summit, held just after conclusion of a diluted Union treaty between Russia and Belarus, seems to mark the beginning of a new period of Russian relations with former Soviet republics. As integration of the entire CIS region fails, the slogan of “different paces,” introduced by Foreign Minister Primakov in 1996, allowed Russia to form a Community of Integrated States with

4 Diplomaticheskiy vestnik, special edition, January 1993.

5 See “Strategic Policy toward CIS members,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 September 1995.

6 The new security concept, drafted by the Security Council of the Russian Fed-eration, was put into force by Presidential decree no. 1300 of 17 December 1997 (see “Kontseptsiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” Rossiys-kaya gazeta, 26 December 1997).

7 Brzezinski/Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 154.

131

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgystan on the basis of a customs union. Similar sub-regional “unions,” “communities,” and “partnerships” have been formed since then within the post-Soviet region.8

Bilateral Relations While post-Soviet integration remains an officially professed objec-tive, Russia’s commitment to finance this venture has recently decreased significantly. A symptom is the refusal to absorb Belarus, a decision obviously also motivated by considerations of political opportunity. Rather than strengthening CIS institutions, which top politicians have repeatedly described as inefficient and bureaucratic, Russian foreign policy seeks concrete solutions of the most pressing issues affecting neighborly relations on a bilateral basis, considering Russian national interests first. The important comment that develop-ment of CIS integration should not “inflict any damage on Russia’s own interests” had already been pronounced in Yeltsin’s 1995 decree on Strategic Policy toward CIS members.9

However, Russian interests are often claimed and defined by sub-government actors such as some of the large, partly state-owned companies of the so-called military-industrial complex, the influential “financial-industrial groups,” or representatives of the increasingly dominant energy sector.10 Especially the latter, profiting from close ties to top government representatives, play a significant role in shaping Russian relations with the Caucasian states, thus making

8 See Alexandrowa, Olga and Heinz Timmermann. “Integration und

Desintegration in den Beziehungen Russland-Belarus-GUS.” Osteuropa 47, no. 10/11 (1997): 1022-1037, especially 1034.

9 See footnote 5 above.

10 For details, see “Russia’s Financial Empires,” RFE/RL Special Report, January 1998 (http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/rufinance).

132

issues such as Caspian oil or pipeline logistics a considerable factor of foreign policy.

Another aspect of Russian reluctance toward complex multilateral solutions concerns the Tashkent treaty, concluded in May 1992. Although officially referred to as a system of collective security, from Moscow’s point of view, it is not meant to be more than a collective defense system. This became evident when Russia refused to apply the treaty provisions to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as requested by Azerbaijan upon joining the treaty in late 1993. Moscow argued that the Tashkent treaty was designed to deal with threats from outside the CIS only11 and insisted on sending a peace-building mission formally mandated by the CIS but controlled de facto largely by Russia.12 Regarding the “uncontrolled disintegration of the post-Soviet region” as a major threat to its own national interests, Russia attaches great importance to the various hot spots on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

This is partly due to direct or indirect involvement of the “Russian factor” in each of the sometimes very complex conflict backgrounds.13

11 According to Zagorskiy, the Tashkent treaty even lacks important criteria to

qualify as a system of collective defense: A set of common values and a common perception of an enemy. See Zagorski, Andrei. Regionale Strukturen der Sicher-heitspolitik in der GUS. Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, no. 28. Cologne: BIOst, 1996.

12 As known, Russia sought approval and financial support for the CIS troops by OSCE but failed due to a Turkish veto (see Kreikemeyer, Anna and Andrej Za-gorskij. Russlands Politik in bewaffneten Konflikten in der GUS. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997, 102). Previously, Foreign Minister Kozyrev had declared that Russian peacekeeping activities in the CIS region were to be considered a contri-bution to global stability (see Kozyrev, Andrey. “Demokratiya i mirotvorchestvo — dve storony odnoy medali.” Nezavissimaya gazeta, 13 October 1997).

13 The Russian word mirotvorchestvo (literally “peace creating”) means peace-enforcing rather than peacekeeping. Russia, often being party rather than inter-mediary, prefers to actively bring about peace than to neutrally guard and moni-tor post-conflict situations.

133

By distinguishing between outer international demarcations and inner CIS borderlines, Russia seems to imply that the latter are of different, “softer,” “transparent” quality. Nevertheless, Russian authorities, rendering the “Russian question” in its proper sense an essentially declaratory issue with little impact on politics, have never officially questioned the sovereignty and integrity of former Soviet republics by. Vice versa, Russia has always insisted that interethnic tensions and crises within the Federation’s vast territory be strictly treated as internal affairs.

This became most evident in Chechnya, where a long-lasting crisis escalated into real war.14 An estimated 25 million ethnic Russians or native Russian speakers live in the countries earlier referred to as the “near abroad” — an expression recently abandoned by official word-ing15 — some 40 percent of them in Ukraine, accounting for almost a fifth of that country’s population.16

While Russian minorities in the Baltic states are recommended, on Moscow’s request, for international human rights monitoring, the Russian speaking population within the Slavic vicinity is an important political asset and an effective bargaining token in bilateral relations.

Relations with the Republic of Belarus The limits of Russia’s determination to assume responsibility in inte-grating the CIS region became visible when Moscow decided not to

14 Ironically, the invasion of the Chechen Republic by Russian troops began just a

few days after the adoption of the CSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, whose spirit is refraining from using armed forces.

15 The expression seems to have been introduced by Kozyrev in early 1992. Being hardly used officially in recent years, the expression was explicitly abolished by Deputy Prime Minister Serov for reasons of political correctness in January 1998.

16 See “Russians in the ‘Near Abroad’,” RFE/RL Research Report, 19 August 1994.

134

go for an ambitious union with the Republic of Belarus but to sign a moderate, mostly symbolic treaty with this important neighbor. The Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia, signed in April 1997, originally intended to be a far-reaching integration agreement with considerable supranational provisions, was lowered shortly before adoption to a merely renamed version of the April 1996 treaty on the Community of Belarus and Russia.17 It seems reasonable to assume that the emergence of the “young reformers” Nemtsov and Chubays, as deputy prime ministers, prevented Russia from assuming the responsibilities originally envisaged.18 According to an earlier draft of the treaty, the Union would have become a fully integrated new sub-ject of international law, a single political system, with Russia absorbing Belarus’ troubled economy. Soon after the glorious cere-mony in Moscow’s Kremlin to celebrate the foundation of the Union, a vexed Belorussian president stated that he would never allow the synchronization of laws and economic mechanisms as described in the Charter of Union and that he would strictly oppose privatization which, in his opinion, “has destroyed the economy and country” of Russia.19

Moscow’s pressure on Belarus to reactivate its “perestroyka” and to set off a process of transformation is certainly an important contribu-tion to enhancing democracy and free market principles in Eastern Europe. But Russia’s vital interests in this neighboring country cannot be ignored. Strategically, the importance of Belarus will even grow considerably once NATO reaches Poland and, in a possible later stage, the Baltic States, one reason being the remoteness of the Kaliningrad

17 See Diplomaticheskiy vestnik, May 1996 (Community treaty); Rossiyskaya

gazeta, 3 April 1997 (Union treaty) and Rossiyskaya gazeta, 24 May 1997 (Charter of Union, i.e. the executive agreement to the Union treaty, signed like-wise on 2 April 1997).

18 For details, see Alexandrowa/Timmermann, Integration und Desintegration in den Beziehungen Russland-Belarus-GUS.

19 President Lukashenka in a Sovetskaya Rossiya interview of 13 May 1997. 67 percent of all Belorussian enterprises are state-owned; 85 percent of the GNP is produced by the state sector.

135

enclave. Though hardly perceived as an independent actor, or rather, because it does not feel itself truly independent, Belarus has a profound interest in not falling between the frontlines of new confronting blocs. Despite the fact that the country’s official position in the European security discourse very much resembles Moscow’s view — rejection of NATO enlargement and calling for an international umbrella organization reflecting the multi-polarity of post-Cold War relations — Belarus objectively has national interests of its own. An intriguing perspective is the neutrality option that, as Anatoliy Rozanov shows, would suit Russian interests in the long run too.20

The most important factor is certainly the inner development of Belarus.21 However, no important, future-oriented decision can be expected from the present backward-minded, authoritarian regime that seems to enjoy broad popular support. Belarus — having paid the highest blood toll of all countries involved in World War II, being the only European country to have more pensioners than workers — largely shares President Lukashenka’s paranoiac visions of evil impe-rialist enemies and his peculiar utopia of a Beijing-Moscow-Minsk axis.22 Hence significant Western investments or engagements cannot be expected under present conditions, nor would they be appreciated. If Russia, to a certain extent, can be considered the beneficiary of Belarus’ present isolation (Moscow is getting for free what it would otherwise have to pay for, as blunt Macchiavellists point out), it can be expected to play a more active role in the future, aiming at a

20 The neutrality scenario is competently assessed by a former Belorussian MFA

representative, Latypov, Ural. Neutrality as a Factor in Belorussian Security Policy. Occasional Paper from the Conflict Studies Research Center. Camberley: Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 1994.

21 For an overview, see Lindner, Rainer. “Präsidialdiktatur in Weissrussland. Wirtschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft unter Lukaschenka.” Osteuropa 47, no. 10/11 (1997): 1038-1052.

22 According to independent polls, some 70-80 percent of the Belorussian popula-tion supports Lukashenka’s integration scenario (estimate delivered by Leonid Zayko on the occasion of his conference intervention).

136

broader and more intensive interaction with this important neighbor. Partnership provisions under the Union Treaty include both rights and responsibilities for Russia, while present interaction is restricted to asymmetrical military cooperation.

Russian-Ukrainian Relations The histories of Russia and Ukraine are inseparably interwoven. Ever since the foundation of the Russian Empire, Kiev, origin and center of the first Slavic State in the early Middle Ages, has been considered an inalienable part of Russian culture. While the pre-revolution Ukraine essentially served as the Russian Empire’s granary, the Ukrainian SSR was to become the most important “partner” of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics (RSFSR) in the Soviet period. Ukrainian land was the object of fiercest fighting in the civil war following the October Revolution — only in the summer of 1920 was Kiev decisively “liberated” by the Red Army.

While Stalin’s forced collectivization caused millions of starvation victims in Ukraine’s vast agrarian belt, the relatively developed and industrialized southern and eastern parts of Ukraine were completely devastated by German occupation during World War II.

Following Stalin’s death, Ukraine became Moscow’s “junior partner” in an increasingly Russified Soviet Union. In 1954, Khrushchev, who had developed an intimate relationship with the country during his assignment as first secretary and chief executive after the war, decreed that the Crimean peninsula be transferred from Russian to Ukrainian administration, leaving only the Sevastopol district under Moscow’s direct subordination.23 The fact that the Sevastopol district was 23 The administrative act was announced at the official celebration of Russian-

Ukrainian brotherhood in commemoration of the Pereyaslav Treaty (1654), which is seen by Russian nationalists as the historic union between the Russian state and the formerly independent Ukrainian Kosak territories.

137

excluded from administrative transfer is the “strongest” argument of present Russian nationalists in Sevastopol to deny that the city belongs to Ukraine. However, due to the logic of centralized planning, economic interaction between the two Soviet republics remained highly asymmetrical.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the internationally recognized independence of the former “sister republics” created new problems, leaving some of the most important aspects of mutual dependence untouched. Ukraine’s new political elite was committed to build an irreversible Ukrainian national state, relying on a specific Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian language as integrating factors. Yet both had to be reinvented and reactivated after decades of merely folkloristic functioning. Especially in the first period of Ukrainian independence, the anti-Soviet impetus of this identity-building process was directed against Russia, which was then perceived as a chauvinist, colonialist power.

Accordingly, efforts to strengthen Ukrainian as the preferred teaching language in primary school were widely seen as a means of “forced Ukrainization” and in turn caused Russia’s diplomatic intervention to install a long-term OSCE mission to observe human rights protection in Ukraine. On the other hand, a solid communist and anti-reform oriented majority in Parliament, a 20 percent Russian minority con-centrated in the industrialized eastern part of the country, the absence of a significant group of modern entrepreneurs striving for integration into Western economic structures, and the lack of energy resources have largely preserved Ukrainian dependence on Russia in both po-litical and economic terms. Ironically, given the relative backwardness of Ukrainian social and economic transformation,24 following the Russian example has been recognized as a means of converging into Western structures.

Following a short period of independence romanticism, Ukraine adopted a foreign and security policy usually described as “multi- 24 For statistics, see United Nations Development Program. Ukraine 1997: Human

Development Report. Kiev, 1997.

138

vectored,” aiming at promoting the country’s status as a leading Cen-tral Eastern European state.25 Since the election of Leonid Kuchma as Ukrainian president, foreign policy has followed the slogan “cooperation within the CIS — integration with the West.”26 Having renounced every ambition to be a nuclear power and declared a non-alignment doctrine, Ukraine successfully sought recognition by West-ern European structures. A member of the CSCE/OSCE since 1992, it was invited to become a member of the European Council in 1995. The first former Soviet republic to commit itself to the NATO Part-nership for Peace program, Ukraine participated in the IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping missions and was offered a “distinctive partnership” by NATO in July 1997.27 According to Leonid Bilousov, the NATO-Rus-sia-Ukraine “triangle” is a crucial instrument to prevent the country from falling between the frontlines of future confronting blocs. By 1996, Ukraine concluded bilateral treaties with all neighbor countries except for the Russian Federation, thus settling demarcation problems and providing for prevention of crises related to mutual ethnic minorities.

In May 1997, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine held a long-awaited summit meeting that had been announced and postponed many times before. While the heads of state signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, the prime ministers con-cluded a bundle of significant executive agreements dedicated to the

25 See “The Concept (Foundations of State Policies) of the National Security of

Ukraine,” Zerkalo nedeli, 17 January 1997. For a comprehensive description of Ukrainian foreign policy, see the assessment by the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Horbulin, Volodimir. “Natsional’naya bezopasnost’ Ukrainy i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost’.” Politichna dumka/ Political Thought, no. 1 (1997): 82-95. For relations with other Eastern European countries see Pavlyuk, Oleksandr. “Ukraine and Regional Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe.” Security Dialogue 28, no. 3 (1997): 347-361.

26 According to Olga Alexandrowa, this formula was first used in the summer of 1996. See Alexandrowa, Olga. “The NATO-Ukraine Charter: Kiev’s Euro-Atlantic Integration.” Aussenpolitik: German Foreign Affairs Review 48, no. 4 (1997): 2 (online edition).

27 For details, see ibid.

139

future of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and some important aspects of the countries’ economic relations. These documents affirm the “immuta-bility” of existing borders, thus rendering the status of Sevastopol a non-issue28 and contributing to normalized relations between Russian and Ukrainian BSF units.

The result is to stabilize a potentially dangerous inner-Ukrainian situation. In addition, trade barriers to Ukraine’s disadvantage are removed. However, in exchange, the treaties envisage an orientation of the country’s substantial defense industry towards the Russian market and provide for a long-time presence of Russian troops in Crimea — the latter can be regarded a contradiction to the Ukrainian constitution, which explicitly forbids stationing foreign troops; in the long-term the former can jeopardize the integration of the country’s industry into the Western economy or, if it is ever to be considered seriously, Ukraine’s admission to Euro-Atlantic security structures.

Thus the recent period of Russian-Ukrainian relations has brought a rapprochement of the countries’ political establishments, both of which will face elections in the near future.29 Although it seems most reasonable to adjust to political and economic realities and to lower tensions between the two neighbors, it is evident that the real chal-lenge to Ukrainian-Russian relations is the development of Ukraine’s systemic transformation. Only a mature democracy, a stable, diversi-fied economy, and a transparent legal background will allow Ukraine to assume the desired status of a leading Central Eastern European country to attract foreign investments, maintain its independence

28 In contrast to the official foreign policy by the president’s team, national patriots

such as Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, who is a likely candidate for the 2000 presidential elections, still claim that Sevastopol is “a Russian city.” For details regarding the May 1997 treaties, especially the Black Sea Fleet issue, see Sherr, James. “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement? The Black Sea Fleet Accords.” Survival 39, no. 3 (1997): 33-50

29 A connection between rapprochement and the upcoming elections in Ukraine, suspected by many ever since the signing of the 1997 treaties, was confirmed by President Yeltsin’s public “endorsement” of his Ukrainian colleague as his favorite presidential candidate for the 1999 elections.

140

towards a mighty neighbor, and face the challenges of direct neigh-borhood to the expanding European economic and security struc-tures.30

Post-Soviet Integration? Maintaining a “self-imposed semi-isolation”31 towards Europe and striving for recognition as a “Eurasian” great power by the interna-tional community, Russia still relies on its close neighbors and former “sister republics.” On the other hand, the legacy of Soviet centralist hierarchies, the sheer weight of Russia’s national economy and the relatively advanced stage of transformation account for the Slavic vicinity’s persisting dependence on Russia.

Politically, Russian foreign and security policy vis-à-vis its close neighbors can be described as being dominated by remaining hegemonic attitudes, but increasingly pragmatic and aware of the neighbors’ right of self-determination. A realistic assessment of eco-nomic capacities and political opportunities has led the Russian political elite to distance itself generally from chauvinist claims and dreams of a Slavic union. The process of the Soviet Union’s orderly dissolution, referred to as a “peaceful divorce” by Ukrainian President Kuchma, is under way but will take many years to come to an end. Enhancing reintegration of the post-Soviet region continues to be a declared top priority goal of Russian foreign and security policy, but it is hardly pursued and implemented in reality. Hence the CIS is less and less perceived as a meaningful institution.

30 See Kempe, Iris. “Direkte Nachbarschaft: Erweiterte Europäische Union und

Russische Föderation.” Europäische Rundschau 26, no. 4 (1997): 43-55.

31 Expression by Trenin — see above, p. 98.

141

Though it is difficult to distinguish between cause and effect, it can not be ignored that the decrease in Russian engagement parallels an increase in centrifugal tendencies and a growing number of “dissident” countries within the CIS.32

32 While Ukraine, Moldova, and Turkmenistan are not members of the Tashkent

Treaty, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia are commonly referred to as “dissident” states. Ukraine, having failed to sign the 1993 charter, is a mere associate member of the CIS.

142

Part III The European and Global Dimension

Introduction Part III of this publication explores Russian security policy vis-à-vis Western Europe and the USA. In chapter 7, Aleksey Filitov, chief researcher of the Institute of General History at the Russian Academy of Sciences, looks back to the origin of Soviet Cold War security policy, assesses important continuities of Russian-European security relations and perceptions, and offers interesting comments on the present Russian attitude towards NATO enlargement.

In chapter 8, Yevgeniy Bazhanov, deputy director of the Diplomatic Academy at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, extends the range of Russian foreign and security policy to its global dimension, assuming and interpreting a view close to official Russian positions on foreign policy objectives and strategies. His remarks thus prepare the ground for the third part of this publication in which Russia’s participation in international organizations is explored.

Chapter 9, contributed by Sergey Rogov, director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences and an advisor to the Russian Security Council, and chapter 10, prepared by Igor Maximychev, chief researcher in the Institute of European Stud-ies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, are dedicated to the title topic of this book, Russia’s role within a new European security architecture. Both authors express fundamental criticism of NATO enlargement, which is perceived and referred to as “expansion.” While Sergey Rogov raises the important issue of future economic and political cooperation between Russia and various Western institutions, Igor Maximychev examines Russia’s dedication to promote a comprehensive all-European security organization reflecting the post-Cold War system of international relations described in terms of “multi-polarity.”

The final chapter (11) has been prepared by Vassiliy Sokolov and Andrey Korneev, senior researchers at the Institute of USA and Can-

145

ada Studies in the Russian Academy of Sciences. It addresses an important aspect of non-military threats to Russian security, i.e. eco-logical challenges and crises that require transnational cooperation and, above all, a new consciousness of global responsibility, as well as internalization of interdependency and limitation of natural resources.

Besides these authors, Dr. Gerhard Wettig, head of the Department for Foreign and Security Policy of Eastern European Countries at the German Federal Institute for Russian, East European, and Interna-tional Studies (Cologne), and Dr. Natalya Yudina, deputy director of the Diplomatic Academy at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Moscow), contributed to this publication by participating in the December conference. Their comments and interventions are referred to in the concluding remarks to this part.

146

ALEKSEY FILITOV Chapter 7 Soviet Security Concepts in Historical Retrospective Many myths are still attached to the history of Soviet foreign relations and security policy, myths of either an apologetic or accusatory nature. Some of them will be dismissed with the help of new archival findings that became available recently. At the same time, new myths are being created. An interesting case is the construction of a conflict between Litvinov, who is referred to as “internationalist,” and an “isolationist” Stalin-Molotov group in drafting the blueprint of the Soviet post-World War II security concept.1

Newly opened archival files on three special post-war politics com-missions, created in late 1943 and headed by Voroshilov, Mayskiy, and Litvinov, reveal a different picture. The Voroshilov Commission, comprising mainly military experts presented the most cooperative approach. Litvinov’s counterpart seemed to favor a traditional bal-ance-of-powers approach to international relations, i.e. “territorial security” for one’s own country and “organization of rivalries” in the outside world.2

However, Litvinov’s approach was not that of bipolar confrontation,

1 On Maksim Litvinov, Molotov’s predecessor as Soviet Commissioner for For-

eign Affairs, see Mastny, Vojtech. “The Cassandra in the Foreign Commissariat: Maksim Litvinov and the Cold War.” Foreign Affairs 54, no. 2 (1975): 366-376.

Also, see Pons, Silvio. “The Impact of World War Two on Soviet Security Policy.” Abstract of a paper presented at the International Colloquium “La Russia nell’ età delle guerre (1941-1945) verso un nuovo paradigma,” held in Cortona, 24-25 October 1997, 2; 5-6.

147

later to become known as “Cold War,” either. Litvinov, and even more Mayskiy, hoped to use England as a counterweight to the USA, envisioning something like a revival of the 19th century’s multi-polar power game. As for Stalin himself, he wanted to keep all options open, with the least cooperative one, advocated by both Litvinov and Mayskiy, as a worst case scenario.3 However, the question is why the reality after 1945 differed from all that was planned and considered.

This chapter intends to examine this issue, independently from any mythological bias. The question to start from is: was there a compre-hensive concept for international relations after World War II, and which views and threat perceptions contributed to it?

Choosing the Confrontation Paradigm One should not overestimate differences in streamlining and coordi-nating perceptions and policies of the great powers on the “democra-tization” issue as the main cause of post-war confrontation and inse-curity. The Soviet-British “percentage talk” in October 1944 and its aftermath seemed to show their compatibility.4 This phenomenon was 3 For similar treatment of the Soviet foreign policy’s dualism in the post-war pe-

riod see Benz, Wolfgang. Die Gründung der Bundesrepublik: Von der Bizone zum souveränen Staat. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989, 46-47.

For details on the commissions’ activities, see my contributions in: Gori, Fran-cesca and Silvio Pons, eds. The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-1953. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, 3-22; Timmermann, Heiner, ed. Potsdam 1945: Konzept, Taktik, Irrtum? Dokumente und Schriften der Europäi-schen Akademie Otzenhausen, Band 81. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997, 15-27; and Pechatnov, Vladimir O. The Big Three after World War II: New Doku-ments on Soviet Thinking about Post War Realtions with the United States and Great Britain. Cold War International History Project, Working Paper, no. 13. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 1995.

4 The informal deal resulted in Soviet non-intervention during the Greek crisis in December 1944 and a similar policy assumed by England and the USA towards the events in Romania in February-March 1945.

148

not a par excellence expression of a great power “conspiracy” against Europe and the world. Among the Europeans themselves, the idea that classical 19th century standards of Western-type liberal democracy might not be reasonably applied in the situation of post-war social and emotional upheavals, especially in pre-industrial societies of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, found wide circulation and partial accep-tance.5

At the grass-roots level, developments were by far more confusing. Even in countries with strong traditions of rule of law, popular rage against collaborationists and pro-Nazi elements sometimes swept aside legal constraints. On the other hand, the declared strategy and, at least initially, the demonstrable practice by the Soviet side in defeated countries like Finland, Austria, and, what was of special importance, Germany, were a far cry from ideological sectarianism and political intolerance.6

Where Soviet policies took a more ominous look, Western reaction often featured a peculiar tacit connivance, if not of direct encourage-ment of Soviet leaders to take an even more repressive course, if only a veiled one. Some new archival evidence shows this, for example. On September 16, 1945, during the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, US Secretary of State James Byrnes met his Soviet counterpart, Vyacheslav Molotov, to discuss privately the situation in Romania and Bulgaria. Judged by the Soviet transcript of the meeting, Byrnes was displeased in the first place by the fact that the Soviets did not act in Romania as they had in Poland.7

5 As an example, the remarks by the well-known historian and Neue Zürcher Zei-

tung journalist J. R. von Salis may be cited. See Salis, J. R. von. Weltchronik 1939-1945. Zurich: Orell Füssli, 1966, 551-552.

6 I tried to show this complex phenomenon in an essay on “The Soviet Adminis-trators and their German ‘Friends’.” In The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, ed. Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii, 111-122. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

7 Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (AFP RF), 06/7/43/678, ll. 54-58.

149

Such behavior makes it difficult to explain the choice of confrontation paradigm by both sides. What then prompted the “worst case” to be perceived by Soviet decision makers and led them to abandon the “cooperative” option in favor of a confrontation course, far in excess of what was envisioned by even those Soviet war-time planners who adhered to the non-cooperative approach? The most obvious yet para-doxical answer is the A-bomb. The “buffer zone” along the Soviet western borders — the cornerstone of “territorial security” — was no protection against atomic air strikes from bases around the whole perimeter of the Soviet landmass. (This was the standard, if exagger-ated, image of Western strategy in the post-war era.) The “organiza-tion of rivalries” could be nothing but an empty phrase for a situation in which the American atomic monopoly and economic preponder-ance ruled out any challenge to the USA from any “capitalist com-petitor.” The idea of Soviet-British collaboration against American “dynamic imperialism,” as suggested by Litvinov,8 turned out to be a chimera.

Paradoxically, the solution to this double task was found in the most rigid application of the very concept of “territorial security,” which turned obsolete with the advent of the nuclear age. Still, the construc-tion devised had its own cold and crude logic. The American atomic airspace sword aimed at Soviet territory was thought to be sufficiently neutralized by the Soviet armor-infantry counterpart targeted on Western Europe and stationed in countries within the “buffer zone.”

In addition, some of those countries (i.e. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Soviet zone of Germany), were to become suppliers of uranium ore for the Soviet atomic project. Converting the “buffer” into a “bridgehead” and the “reparation area” into a partially “inte-grated economy” (even in the narrow defense-oriented sense) would lead unavoidably to hardening the internal regimes in the corre-sponding countries, to hermetically closing them from Western “spies and saboteurs.” The net result was a sharp division of the continent —

8 See, again, my remarks in Gori/Pons, The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold

War.

150

something which Litvinov never advocated and may explain his ulti-mate discomfiture and demise. Still, it is hard to deny that the new security concept was a specific outgrowth of the school of thought prevailing in his wartime planning agency. Somewhat simplifying, one may say that Litvinov planned a “cold peace,” but the product in the nuclear age turned out to be the Cold War.

Zhdanov’s “theory of the two camps,” formulated in the fall of 1947, was an ideological expression of this premise. Reality, however, proved otherwise. Less than a year later, the rulers of Yugoslavia, having most actively promoted the “two camps” concept earlier, chose the “third path.” It seems that not only an abstract belief in the “contradictions of the capitalist system” but rather real experience with their “friends” led Soviet decision makers to the idea of sowing discord in the enemy camp. The Western feat in the peripheral area of confrontation was reciprocated by a deft gambit at its very central point, in Germany, culminating in Stalin’s famous note of 10 March 1952.

Various and opposing interpretations of this Soviet initiative take a prominent place in the cold war mythology.9 Even lacking Soviet internal documents, the interpretation of the Soviets playing the “German card” or compromising with the West is too contradictory to be convincing. The conservative Germans could not possibly be rec-onciled with the Potsdam border settlement, and in this respect there was a broad consensus in Germany at that time. But the mere hint of a possible change in territorial status in Europe was unthinkable for the Soviet side, as it would have destroyed the very foundations of the “territorial security” system.

On the other hand, the NATO allies obviously took the promise of a Soviet retreat to the Oder-Neisse line as too cheap a price for their own retreat well beyond the Rhine and for creating a military vacuum

9 This view is accentuated in the latest research papers by Gerhard Wettig. See his

article in: Bodensieck, Heinrich et al., eds. Die Deutschlandfrage von der staatli-chen Teilung Deutschlands bis zum Tode Stalins. Studien zur Deutschlandfrage, Band 13. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994, 83-111.

151

in the middle of the continent. Appeals to German nationalist feelings within this context could only intensify Western suspicions by reacti-vating the Rapallo complex. All these considerations were obvious during the1952 “war of notes.” Their disregard by the Soviet side and the resulting totally predetermined failure of its German gamble can only be understood by presuming total incompetence within the Sta-linist foreign policy institutions.10

New archival evidence may shed some new light on the motives, pur-poses, and results of Soviet planning on Germany at the zenith of the Cold War. The most curious feature of the analysis provided by Ger-many experts in the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1951-1952 is the almost complete neglect of the important question how to prevent Western rearmament. Considerations within the Soviet Foreign Min-istry centered on how to use this fact in propaganda. And even in this field, there was a great deal of a rather formal, nonchalant attitude, sometimes bordering on neglect.

Provoking Militarization Was Stalin really interested in the West adopting the Soviet draft peace treaty of 1952? Or would a negative Western reaction have suited him more? Did he wish to resolve the German question or just to keep it open? Did he really perceive West German rearmament as a threat to be resisted or as a good propaganda issue to be used and even indiscreetly promoted as a means of muddying the waters in the opponents’ camp while disciplining his own detractors, real or sup-posed? Crucial evidence is still lacking to give definite answers. In retrospect, it may still be argued that Stalin and his heirs could only congratulate themselves on the “victory” of the Western security con-cept in the Europe of the 1950s. Apart from the contested alibi for

10 See Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years.

Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 1996, 134-140.

152

cementing the German division, they obtained the maximum in “organization of rivalries” within the Atlantic Union as well as within the West European community.11

The European Defense Community project arguably distorted and retarded the integration process, which constituted the most formida-ble challenge to “socialist” patterns of international relations. More than that: keeping open the German question proved an efficient tool to curb any “Titoist” trends among the elite in the satellite states, first of all in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). As long as a sword of Damocles — i.e. the possibility of Soviet accommodation with the West on reunifying Germany — hung over their heads, they were bound to remain quite controllable.12

A curious parallel with the current situation comes to mind. The awkward campaign against present plans to enlarge NATO again looks more like propaganda for it, as was the case in the 1950s at the first stage of its enlargement. Certainly we are even less entitled to speak of a secret design to undermine enemy cohesion and to bolster the sagging morale in our own ranks today than may be attributed during the Stalin period. After all, NATO and Russia are no longer enemies, and Russian foreign policy does not seem to be guided by any clear master plan. And even Stalin’s designs leave room for sec-ond-guessing. Still, the story of Stalin’s “struggle” against (or for?) Western Germany’s remilitarization is a good reminder of largely neglected problems affecting motives that were sometimes concealed and consequences that were often unforeseen.

11 Even the French walk-out of the Western military structure in 1966 is sometimes

described as the distant aftermath of the Federal Republic’s admission to NATO. This interesting point was presented by F. Sirjacques-Manfrass as an opinion expressed once in a private talk with her by a Gaullist military theorist, General Poirier. The idea of the French independent nuclear deterrent was said to be also codetermined by the fear of West Germany’s use of NATO for its own purposes. See Timmermann, Potsdam, 211.

12 I elaborated on this point in my paper presented at a seminar on Stalin and the Cold War held in Moscow on September 22-23, 1997.

153

Of the two phenomena just mentioned (that is subjective motives of political actors on the one hand and objective consequences of their actions on the other), the latter is surely of more historical relevance. This is why the notion of a “missed opportunity” is still referred to, even acknowledging the fact that the Soviet initiative on the Germany in1952 truly lacked goodwill. Stalin’s ploy was a calculated risk, but the calculations soon became irrelevant in the GDR’s (and other client states’) acute economic and political crisis and the fierce succession struggle in the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death in March 1953. Con-trol was weakened and all but lost by June 1953, as events in the GDR clearly demonstrated. The West did not use this favorable constella-tion to bring about a decisive turn in German and world development. It only recouped this failure by bold and efficient actions in 1989-1990.

Thus 1953 did not start a new era in international relations. Yet it marked the beginning of a new Cold War security concept which was to become a shared property of both sides known as the pax atomica americano-sovetica or, in other words, the system of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). And 8 August 1953 can be called its point of departure. On that date, Georgiy Malenkov, the first post-Stalin prime minister, made public “that the United States no longer had a monop-oly on production of the hydrogen bomb.” In March 1954 Soviet For-eign Minister Molotov, in his tedious report to the Central Committee of the CPSU (TsK) Plenary Meeting on the Berlin Conference of the Four Powers (21 January to 18 February), revealed a sensation:

I had two talks with [US] Secretary of State, Dulles, on the atomic issue. (...) The exchange of views concerned the procedure [for a discussion] of the atomic issue. In accordance with a proposal by the US government, it has been agreed that for some period this discussion would be held in Washing-ton between the representatives of two states — the USA and the USSR — with Dulles having laid special emphasis [on the point] that this period of bilateral negotiations should be as long as possible. (...) The US and USSR governments agreed that these negotiations should be confidential.13

13 See Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent

History (RTsKhIDNI, i.e. the former Party Archive), 2/1/77, ll. 69; 71; 74.

154

The message was clear. An exclusive Soviet-American club of super-powers would determine the future world order. Paradoxically, this deal was struck between two most improbable partners, each tradi-tionally considered as the archetype of the dogmatic and antagonistic approach to the international problems. Interestingly, while the mythology on Dulles has been eroding for some time, the cliché image of “iron Vyacheslav,” who allegedly outdid even Stalin in fanatical hostility and mistrust of the outside world, still largely persists.14 But there is strong evidence for a picture with more nuances. It was Molotov who, in the process of planning the initiative on Germany in 1951-1952, tried to give it a more diplomatic, less propagandistic form. Molotov opposed the alarmist line by some over-zealous intelligence analysts after Stalin’s death. He also added a draft treaty on European security to the Berlin conference agenda, an item to be dealt with in the last years of Stalin’s reign and in the first months after his death, then referred to as a trick invented by the “right-wing Social-Democrats” to lure the masses away from combating “Ameri-can imperialism.”15

The Myth of Khrushchev’s “New Thinking” The very positive general opinion about Nikita Khrushchev is based on a persistent political myth. The truth about Khrushchev’s contri-bution to Soviet foreign relations becomes evident by investigating the background of his famous Account Report to the 20th Party Congress. The comparison of an early draft version of this speech and the altered version finally delivered reveal a foreign policy conception of mixed,

14 See, e.g., highly acclaimed recent book by two Russian scholars: Zubok, Vladi-

mir and Konstantin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, 78-109.

15 Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), 5/28/65, ll. 63-76.

155

eclectic quality.

The initial draft, compiled in the TsK apparatus, i.e. in Khrushchev’s personal fiefdom, repudiated indirectly the Dulles-Molotov “deal” on pax atomica. The corresponding lines, after a somewhat fatalistic assertion of the war as an “unavoidable finale of the arms race,” read as follows:

Nowadays it became a fad to speak, as if the nuclear weapon brought about the essential revision of this truth. Since the atomic and hydrogen bombs possess huge destruction capacity, nobody would allegedly take the risk of using them due to a fear of retaliation. Thus, one of the most dangerous myths was born and is being maintained in every possible way: as if nuclear weapons serve to strengthen peace. The race in the production of nuclear weapons does not reduce, but rather raise the danger of a new war. As for a fear of retaliation, will the aggressors refrain from sacrificing millions of victims, if the profits are at stake?16

An anonymous TsK secretary deleted this piece of rhetoric at a rela-tively early stage of speech-writing. However, in his report delivered to the Congress audience on 14 February 1956, Khrushchev dedicated extensive comments to the perverse notion of “policy of strength,” “equilibrium of forces,” and “arms race,” but without any mention of the nuclear dimension.

This seems to be the compromise formula agreed on within the Soviet leadership. It did not prevent Khrushchev from going pretty close to the brink of declaring thinkable the victorious nuclear war. The corresponding excerpt from his text may be cited here:

No doubt, the working class and the broad masses of the toilers in the capi-talist countries, in case the ruling circles of these countries dare to unleash this war, will not fail to make the decisive conclusions in respect to the re-gimes which periodically used to throw the nations into the bloody wars. It is not fortuitous that one may hear the confessions by authoritative persons in the bourgeois countries: there will be “no winners” in a war that uses atomic weapons. These persons still hesitate to declare that capitalism will

16 TsKhSD, 1/2/3, ll. 222-223

156

find a grave in the new war, if it unleashes it; they are compelled to admit openly, however, that the Socialist camp is not to be defeated.17

It is easy to see the obvious contempt for common sense in both deleted and delivered propagandistic statements. The former deliber-ately blurred the crucial distinction between the “nuclear equilibrium” and “nuclear arms race” and left unanswered the logical question of how the profiteers themselves could possibly escape the devastation caused by the nuclear war. The latter failed to answer the question why the capitalists would wish to unleash the war in the first place. Of course, some allowance might be made for the Soviet leader’s real predicament. In reality, the “equilibrium of forces” did not exist, either in the nuclear arsenal or in the delivery capacity. And the “no winners” stance was represented only by a small fraction of the “most authoritative persons” in the West. The emotional outbursts were expressions of an inferiority and insecurity complex and of the auda-cious idea to conceal it by bragging and bluffing — after all, even Malenkov’s declaration of the Soviet nuclear breakthrough was a bluff, as the actual tests took place some days later.

Interestingly, a quite different approach was recommended by a “think tank” affiliated with Molotov’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In an internal December 1955 memorandum prepared by the “Committee of Information,” foreign policy dimensions in US politics were explored. Aggressive and extremist trends were attributed to an influential milieu of provincially minded “monopolists of the Midwest and West,” while the leading “Wall Street group,” adhering to European interests, was seen as advocating a “cautious” line.18 In many respects, this memo leaves a more balanced and less adventurous impression than the concepts professed by Khrushchev.

17 The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 14-25,

1956: Stenographic Transcript. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1956, 23 (in Russian).

18 TsKhSD, 5/28/285, ll. 76-83.

157

One is led to ask seriously whether the Berlin and Cuban crises would have occurred with the foreign policy command left in Molotov’s hands.

The Berlin crisis resulted in the deployment of “euro-strategic mis-siles” directed against Soviet territory and capable of reaching it. The rise in revanchist and neo-Nazi activities was another disquieting phenomenon caused by the disappointment of many West Germans on the lack of a strong Western answer to construction of the Berlin wall in the summer of 1961.19 The sowing of discord in the NATO camp turned out to be a dubious “achievement.” Even more dangerous was Khrushchev’s gambit of deploying missiles in Cuba the following year.

The positive aspect of this affair is sometimes seen in the American pledge to withdraw missiles from Turkey as part of a deal to defuse the crisis. Yet it is forgotten that this supposed deal did not extend to some ninety missiles of an analogous type stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany and withdrawn only in 1969.20 The “tit-for-tat” diplomacy failed to meet Soviet security’s needs. It was a more cau-tious line leading to détente that brought about a turn in this trend — another good lesson in history for today’s NATO expansion oppo-nents.

The Cuban adventure was conceptually codetermined by new interest of the post-Stalin leadership in problems of the “Third World.” The idea of a “peace zone,” comprising both the “socialist” camp and some developing countries like India or Egypt, was more an innovation of Khrushchev’s Report to the 20th Congress than a vision of peaceful coexistence or the belief that war could be avoided, as had already been propagandized in Stalin’s time. Judged by the extent of changes

19 For more on the adverse consequences of Khrushchev’s crisis diplomacy, see

Filitov, Aleksey M. Germanskiy vopros: ot raskola k ob"edineniyu: novoe prochtenie. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1993.

20 See Nerlich, Uwe. “Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe: Is NATO Running Out of Options?” In NATO, the Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic, and Military Setting, ed. Kenneth A. Myers, 87. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980.

158

in the initial draft Report to the 20th Congress before the final version, the political implications do not seem outstanding, even in theory. In particular, the polemical phrases were deleted about the USA as the “biggest and most aggressive colonial power,” the “hatred of imperialism” among the “broad masses” of colonial countries, or the “creation of the united anti-imperialist front.”21

At the following Party Congress (February 1959), the notion of “capitalist encirclement” was abandoned, recognizing the fact that the “territorial security” concept had become obsolete. But the militant remarks on “who encircles whom” came to be interpreted as a claim to extend the Soviet presence to every place on the globe. It was a violation of the tacit Soviet-American understanding on the terms of pax atomica, calling for mutual restraint in the disputed areas.

In principle, these terms would have made obsolete the quest for allies and satellites, redundant and irrelevant for the superpowers from the point of view of their own security.22 Paradoxically, it was just during this period (May 1955) that the military-political Warsaw Pact was created. While the Western Europeans drew the right conclusions from the EDC’s failure and concentrated on the economic aspects of integration (Treaty of Rome in 1957), Soviet leaders chose to repeat Western mistakes and to ignore what was basically a Marxist approach — political unity could only be firm if buttressed by a sound economic base. It was perhaps here that the opportunity to construct mutually advantageous relations between the USSR and its neighbors in Eastern and Southeastern Europe was missed. In addition, the pax americano-sovetica concept left no room for the “great friendship” security concept uniting Soviet military technology with Chinese combat forces, as had been tried unsuccessfully in Korea. Again analysis of Khrushchev’s 1956 draft report shows how assessment of

21 Another interesting detail, the suggested elevation of India to a status of the sixth

great power was also conspicuously absent in the final text. See TsKhSD, 1/2/3, ll. 230; 234; 236.

22 See on this point: Joffe, Josef. “What Just Happened: A Lite History.” The New Republic, 13 August 1990.

159

the Chinese factor had changed. The tendency to treat the Chinese ally less enthusiastically is apparent.23

The crucial role of nuclear deterrence led to reconsideration of the role of conventional forces and European strategy. Neither a “buffer zone” nor a “bridgehead” was needed any longer. Khrushchev’s massive reduction in military personnel was a response to this new situation. A confidential memorandum to his TsK colleagues gives evidence of his thinking on the subject. A militia-type army was envisaged. Officers would be trained without leaving their civilian jobs, and airborne divisions would be mobilized at short notice.24 This proj??ect was utopian if not of a destabilizing nature — the vision of an airborne force as the backbone of a strategic doctrine combining both sins. The party elite’s astonishment and uneasiness over projects of this kind may have stimulated the ultimate fall of the inventive “Nikita.”

External Security at Any Cost Very little may be added to cover the period from Brezhnev to peres-troyka. This is not only due to lack of archival evidence. The so-called “stagnation” period is hardly attractive, because trends of the Molotov and Khrushchev period simply continued, and hardly any new ones emerged.

A curious aspect was the formula “allies for the sake of security” being juxtaposed into “security for the sake of allies.” Maintenance of largely hollow structures such as the Warsaw Treaty Organization or Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) became a top

23 See The 20th Congress, 24.

24 TsKhSD, 2/1/416, ll. 1-11. For a commented English translation of the docu-ment, see Zubok, Vladislav. “Khrushchev’s 1960 Troop Cut: New Russian Evi-dence.” In Cold War International History Project Bulletin, issues no. 8-9, 416-420. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1996/1997.

160

priority, while more relevant state interests and needs were pushed aside. This development had already begun during Stalin’s last year. The 1952 initiative on Germany seems to have marked the beginning of what became known as the “Brezhnev doctrine.” The soft-pedaling in relations with China took a dangerous turn toward open confronta-tion in which no rules were devised or complied with. Policies in the “Third World” degenerated into what could be termed a “wild hunt” for clients without any geopolitical or even ideological justification. As for the military dimensions of security, Brezhnev’s adage re-minded one of an answer once given by AFL-CIO chief George Meany to a question about his union’s program: “more.” More of everything, more nuclear warheads, missiles, tanks, officers, and sol-diers. The result was predictable. External security devoured the internal security of both the system and the country.

Instead of a conclusion, the most fitting word for a historian would be a warning about wrong lessons from the past. There is a certain trend in Russia towards historical masochism, professed by statements such as “We have lost the Cold War,” “We’ve lost allies,” “We’ve lost security.” Meanwhile, talk of “defeat” or “victory” in the Cold War is an empty phrase,25 and termination of the Warsaw Treaty Organiza-tion or COMECON has hardly harmed Russia’s real security interests. After all, its military dimension is still based on Mutual Assured Destruction and always will be — even if all the other states on the globe join NATO. As for the more palpable threats in the political economics field, they are caused mainly by failure to work out and implement new security concepts owing to the persistence of concepts formed by the Cold War.

25 For detailed information, see Filitov, Aleksei. “The End of the Cold War: A

Symposium.” Diplomatic History 16, no. 4 (1992): 54-60, and id. “Victory in the Postwar Era: Despite the Cold War or Because of It?” In The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implication, ed. Michael Hogan, 77-86. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

161

Eastward expansion of NATO too is proof of a surviving Cold War mentality. While Russia is entitled to its critical attitude towards this process, there is no reason for it to react in panic.26

26 I tried to make this point in a broader context in a paper delivered at a conference

on Europe in the 21st Century: Look from Russia, NATO and Countries of Cen-tral and Eastern Europe, held in Moscow on May 12-13, 1997.

162

YEVGENIY BAZHANOV Chapter 8 Russian Foreign and Security Policy in its Global Dimension This chapter examines the evolution of democratic Russia’s foreign policy from its original format to its current one. The main objectives and basic strategy of today’s Russia in the international arena are explained. Suggestions are offered concerning the future course of Moscow’s foreign relations.

The Original Strategy and its Failure Russian democrats came to power at the end of 1991 with a firm desire to overcome the rift with the West and, as the first foreign minister, Kozyrev, put it, “to achieve the historical task of transform-ing Russia from the dangerous sick giant of Eurasia into a member of the Western zone of co-prosperity.”1 The West was perceived as the principle ideological and political ally, the main source of aid, urgently needed for successful reforms, and finally as a model of development.2 In the framework of this policy, Moscow not only stopped all competition with the West in world affairs but also in fact went out of its way to approve the actions of the Western govern-

1 Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, no. 3-4 (1992): 8.

2 For details see Bazhanov, Yevgeni. Russia’s Changing Foreign Policy. Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, no. 30. Cologne: BIOst, 1996.

163

ments. It followed a similar if not identical line on all major issues. Accordingly, ideological, geopolitical, and economic ties with Soviet partners in the Third World were suspended in most cases or toned down.

Yet this policy did not last long. Internally the failure of “shock ther-apy” delivered a powerful blow to the camp of the radical reformers. Nationalist and communist forces won the parliamentary elections in 1993 and began to exert a strong pressure on liberal foreign policy. Even more important was the fact that representatives of the conser-vative hawkish school of thought were included in the government and came close to dominating it in 1994-1996.

Among those external factors that produced changes in Russian for-eign policy, the behavior of the West should be singled out. It became a common belief among Russians that the West failed to be a reliable ally; instead it treated Moscow as a potential adversary who should be checked and isolated by expanding NATO to the East and other methods.3 Other complaints were that the West was turning Russia into an economic colony and gave advice on reforms aimed at ruining the local society. It was also becoming clearer with every passing day that the Kremlin was losing ground in the CIS zone and other parts of the world.

The Emergence of a Modified Strategy The Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy became the target of strong inter-nal criticism that gradually grew into a full-scale national debate. The debaters belonged to four major camps (or schools of thought).

The first camp of Westernizers, which dominated political life during 1991-1992, continued to insist that Russia should concentrate all its efforts on rejoining “the family of civilized Western nations.” The 3 See Izvestiya, 20 April 1994; Segodnya, 15 October 1994.

164

Westernizers explained unfavorable changes in the behavior of America and its allies by the reemergence of conservative tendencies in Russian politics and foreign policy, by chaos in the country’s econ-omy and social life. Admitting differences between Russia and the West, the Westernizers argued for coping with them within the framework of an overall strategy of alliance with developed nations.4

The second camp positioned itself directly opposite the first one. It pointed out that the West had tried for centuries to undermine Russia’s strength and influence. Finally, in the last decade of the 20th century, the West almost succeeded in eliminating Russia as a superpower with the help of traitors. Those who shared fears about the Western threat suggested various ways on how to counter it. Some sought alliances with the former Soviet republics, others with China, Iran, or radical Arab regimes.5

The third school of thought in the national foreign policy debate united those who spotted enemies everywhere. Among adversaries they listed in addition to the West, Turkey, Zionists, Islamists, China, Japan, and “forces of aggressive nationalism” in the former USSR. The third camp called upon compatriots to close the country to the outside and maintain a tight defense system.6

The fourth opinion voiced in national debates called for a balanced strategy in the world. Its essence was that Russia has no enemies; it can and should cooperate with most countries of the world, especially neighboring ones; Moscow should not “tilt” to any side. Because of its geographical position, size, power, and history it must maintain balanced relations with the West, the East, and the South without

4 The author of this paper examined views of the Westernizers in, for instance, the

following articles: Bazhanov, Yevgeniy. “Diplomata vsyakiy mozhet obidet.” Segodnya, 23 June 1995; id. “Kogda rodina ne v opasnosti.” Novoe vremya, no. 31 (1995).

5 See, for example, Bogomolov, Yuriy. “Ya sprosil Gitlera.” Izvestiya, 26 March 1996; Commersant-Daily, 10 November 1995; Izvestiya, 12 December 1995.

6 See Dementyev, V. and A. Surikov. Armiya, reforma, bezopasnost. Moscow: Institut Oboronnykh Issledovaniy, 1996, 12-16.

165

trying to ally itself with one or the other (possible exceptions being the CIS members). This philosophy can be found in platforms of the pro-government’s political union Our Home Russia and Yabloko, a democratic opposition party.

Foreign Minister Kozyrev in 1993-1995 increasingly advanced such views. They are found in pronouncements of his heir, Yevgeniy Pri-makov, who says, for instance:

Russia must conduct a diversified, active policy in all directions, where Rus-sian interests are involved, (...) this is a vital necessity in order to create the optimal conditions for internal development — more dynamic, more effec-tive — in our changing world.7

There are quite a few other politicians — such as former State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin or the 1996 presidential candidates Svyatoslav Fedorov and Mikhail Gorbachev — who subscribe to the foreign pol-icy philosophy discussed above.

It can be argued that the balanced open approach has lately been gaining momentum in Russian foreign policy. There are a number of reasons for such a tendency. First of all, it is connected with internal developments in Russia, and the activation of reform processes there. After a victory in the 1996 presidential elections, Yeltsin substantially reshuffled the Russian government, once again having included in it a large number of young liberal reformers. These reformers have stopped some of the conservative trends in Moscow’s diplomacy, which were on the rise back in 1993-1996.

The crucial role of leading financial circles in reelecting Yeltsin has dramatically increased their influence on the Kremlin’s internal and external policies. These circles push for a pragmatic, economy-ori-ented strategy in the world. Another important reason is further trans-formation of the Russian society after Yeltsin’s victory in the 1996 presidential elections. Even for numerous dissatisfied groups and

7 Primakov, Yevgeniy. “Rossiya ishchet novoe mesto v mire.” Izvestiya, 6 March

1996.

166

individuals, it has become evident that Russia will stay on the tracks of capitalist reforms in the foreseeable future, and it is necessary to adjust one’s views and actions on both domestic and external issues.

As for the organized communist and nationalist opposition in the leg-islature, though strong numerically, its influence on the conduct of foreign policy has been reduced, according to the new Constitution adopted in 1993. The strengthened executive branch manages to push through its own external strategy, especially when the broad strata of the country’s population do not care much about such issues and can-not be mobilized by the opposition. The strong personality of the cur-rent foreign minister helps to solidify the balanced diplomatic line. Finally the West, feeling positive shifts in Russia, including termina-tion of the war in Chechnya, has in turn become more receptive to Moscow’s interests and thus helps Yeltsin to advocate flexible diplo-macy inside Russia. NATO concluded the Founding Act with the Kremlin, a substantial progress has been achieved in economic inter-actions, and Russia has been accepted into the exclusive club of eight leading world democracies.

The situation has changed so much that Yeltsin claims nowadays that there are absolutely no problems between Russia and Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and in fact all other West European na-tions. Successes have been scored on other diplomatic fronts — a substantive rapprochement with China, warming up of relations with Japan, improvement of ties with Ukraine, and certain progress towards the settlement of conflicts in the CIS zone.

Objectives There is reason to believe that Russia will continue to move to an open, flexible, and balanced foreign policy. This conclusion is con-firmed by an analysis of the objectives of Russian strategy abroad. As was mentioned earlier, in 1991/92 the underlining objective was a desire to join as quickly as possible the “family of civilized Western

167

nations.” Later, 1993 until 1995, it seemed that Moscow shifted the focus of its attention to security concerns and the maintenance of its superpower status. Now it looks as though the requirements of internal reforms and development are again starting to dominate the inter-national behavior of the Russian government. The difference with the original attitude of the democrats is that the Russian establishment now wants to collaborate not only with the West but also with many other partners. Besides, it is ready to compete with the West as well as other players in world politics and economics.

China is regarded as a huge market for military hardware and indus-trial equipment as well as a valuable source of consumer goods and labor. Japan and the “little tigers” of Asia are needed to finance mod-ernization of the Russian Far East. In order to have debts repaid by Soviet clients in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, etc.), Moscow has to smoothen relations with them. Good rapport with rich sheiks of the Persian Gulf will help to convince them to buy Russian weapons and to invest in Russian oil and gas projects.

Moscow must also consider the fact that deterioration of the political and economic climate with its immediate neighbors might destabilize the situation back home and deny access to transportation systems, reserves of natural resources, testing facilities, spare parts, etc. For example, a break in relations with Azerbaijan might leave Russia without a large portion of the Caspian oil; problems with Kazakhstan would impede the exploitation of the space center and military testing facilities; a rift with Belarus will make vulnerable Russian railway, air, pipe, and electrical links with Europe.

Security concerns are another motive of Russian foreign policy. The dream that the end of the Cold War would bring universal peace and harmony is over, and Moscow identifies a number of potential sources of threats or challenges to its security. In the West it is NATO expan-sion. In the eyes of the Russians, it will lead to weakening Moscow’s geopolitical position. As Foreign Minister Primakov likes to reiterate, “intentions may change, while the potential will remain.” If Russia’s relations with NATO or with its individual members deteriorate for some reason, it could become subject to manipulation and intimidation by this strongest military block in the history of mankind.

168

Security concerns associated with post-Soviet territory are even more obvious. Conflicts between Russia and former Soviet republics (Moldova, Ukraine), among these republics themselves (Armenia against Azerbaijan), inside new states (Georgia), and pressures by neighboring countries on CIS members (Afghan extremists against Tajikistan) are all perceived as threats or challenges to Russia’s national security. The drifting of CIS countries towards other political and economic poles (Western Europe, Turkey, Arab regimes) is also considered harmful to Russia’s security.

The same applies even more to forces supporting separatists inside Russia, especially in the Caucasus region. There is an increasing apprehension about the growing potential of China and immigration of Chinese to the sparsely populated and economically weak Russian Far East. Fears of a less immediate nature exist: the ever-tense situation in Korea, the drama of the former Yugoslavia, and the Middle Eastern “cauldron.”

In the final analysis, security challenges rather than pushing Russia back to isolation and extremism promote the balanced foreign policy mentioned above, since sources of these challenges are numerous, and challenges come from various directions. Moscow, being relatively weak militarily now, has to meet them by employing a strategy of flexibility and diversity. It cannot be too tough with NATO, because it has the emerging Chinese giant behind its back. At the same time, the Kremlin is interested in a close partnership with the Peoples’ Republic of China in order to restrain NATO expansion and to deter Islamic extremism in the South.

The same logic can be applied to the analysis of Russia’s reemerging great power ambitions. These ambitions are reflected in claims to play the pivotal role throughout the former Soviet Union, to be a leader of Europe, to participate in the exclusive G-7 club, to have its own dis-tinctive say regarding every international issue, to show the Russian flag on all four continents. Since Russia cannot compete on equal terms with the USA for world supremacy as it once did, it promotes multi-polarity in international relations. This policy requires a balanced approach to various blocks and countries, regardless of their ideological orientation.

169

Strategy Helping to move the world to multi-polarity constitutes in fact the essence of the current Russian world strategy. The Russian ruling elite believes that international relations will be much smoother and convenient if a number of power centers call the shots as an alterna-tive to American hegemony.

There are reservations against this notion. Perhaps the United States is not the perfect superpower, but at least it is well examined and a pre-dictable one. We know from history that the United States did not exercise its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the initial period of the Cold War and never tried to conquer other countries. Even when the USA attempted to impose its will on other nations, the rationale was promotion of democracy and human rights as well as fighting Com-munism. In practice, of course, good intentions have not always corre-sponded to prudent action. As for the other potential superpowers (Japan, China, Germany), can we be at ease when thinking of their future behavior? In the past, Japan used its might to subjugate its Asian neighbors ruthlessly, and they would certainly react negatively to the reemergence of Tokyo as a political and military giant. China, during the zenith of its power before the European onslaught of the 19th century, not only treated other nations as “barbarians” but also as “vassals” of the Middle Kingdom, subordinated to China.

On the whole, Moscow realizes that there are pitfalls on the way to establishing a multi-polar world. The old balance-of-power system is gone, but the new system of equal partnership must still be estab-lished. Russia believes that a number of conditions should be observed in the transition to the new world order.

First of all, new division lines in international relations must be avoided. Beyond the NATO issue, attempts are being made to divide the world into civilizations that are presumably doomed to clash against each other. This is especially evident with regard to the Mos-lem world, which is sometimes labeled as a foe of modern civilization owing to the activities of certain extremist Islamic groups. As Moscow sees it, the second condition of moving to a just world order is the

170

rejection of the notion that states can be divided into Cold War winners and losers — and that the winners may dictate rules of behavior to the losers. Russian democracy was certainly not a loser in this war; it feels that it was a winner. The third condition is democra-tization of international economic relations. No one should use eco-nomic leverage to achieve egoistic political gains. The Kremlin opposes American attempts to sanction business partners of Cuba, and to intensify the economic blockade of Iran and Libya. There are also unjustified discriminatory measures by the West against Russian exports.

The Russian government favors as a fourth condition of the transition to a stable multi-polar world a close coordination and cooperation of the international community in resolving at least the following basic issues:

• Settlement of conflicts.

• Further promotion of arms reduction and military confidence-building measures.

• Strengthening of humanitarian and legal aspects of security.

• Aid and support to countries experiencing various difficulties in their development.

Let us examine Moscow’s approach to the issues mentioned above. As viewed by the Kremlin, visible progress has been achieved lately in settling major regional and local conflicts: peace agreements on Bosnia are being implemented, first important steps have been negoti-ated on establishing lasting peace in the Middle East, cease-fires have been achieved in the Trans-Dniester region, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. A slight improvement can be detected within conflict zones in Africa and Latin America.

However, Moscow is concerned with new splashes of confrontation and violence in the Middle East. Being ready to continue joint peacekeeping efforts with the USA, the EC, France, Egypt, and other members of the international community, Russia feels that real success can only be achieved on the basis of the “territories in exchange for peace” principle. In Bosnia and Kosovo, Moscow insists on an

171

impartial, moderate approach to unsolved problems with a stronger emphasis on social and economic restoration, return of refugees, and acceptance of Serbia as an equal participant in international life as well as respect for the territorial integrity of Serbia. Russia would like to see more active involvement of the UN and other international peace-seeking bodies in conflicts within the CIS zone and in Afghani-stan.

In the field of arms reduction and military confidence building meas-ures, Russia advocates and pursues a number of programs and steps. Moscow was one of the first countries to join the treaty on the total ban of nuclear tests. Moscow attaches paramount importance to the signing of this treaty by all states possessing nuclear capabilities. It is felt in the Kremlin that no state should be permitted to test nuclear devices in the period before the treaty becomes effective. Russia is critical of India and Pakistan for their recent nuclear tests. Moscow is prepared to implement existing treaties to reduce nuclear arms and to move ahead with achieving new agreements. However, the Russian government points out that the progress in this sphere will depend on the overall situation in relations between Moscow and the West. The Kremlin advocates modernization of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Among other things, group ceilings and ceilings for national armed forces must be lowered, and limitations on troop deployment upon foreign territories must be introduced.

Calling for observing humanitarian and legal aspects of security, Rus-sia emphasizes the plight of the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic countries. Moscow hopes to see a more active and systematic role of the UN and other international bodies in overcoming remaining discrimination of Russians in the Baltic area. For its part, the Kremlin is ready to fight against ethnic discrimination on a global basis. At the same time this policy will be coordinated with the principle of the territorial integrity of states.

The problem of the transition to a new international order has become especially acute on the European continent in connection with the process of creating a new regional security system. During the Cold War, stability was maintained, albeit without solid guarantees, by the balance of power between the two opposing camps. Finally the oppo-

172

nents came to realize the need to sign the Helsinki Act, which fixed state borders resulting from World War II. Now, as the Russian gov-ernment points out, there is no balance of power in Europe, and the Helsinki agreements are no longer as effective as before.

After the termination of the Cold War, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia disintegrated. Numerous smaller states appeared on the European map with borders neither fixed nor guaranteed by the Helsinki agreements. These circumstances as much as events in Europe in the post-confrontational period calls for a new security mechanism. Earlier threats have been replaced by different ones on the continent. Some of them are even more dangerous. It is enough to mention that for the first time since World War II ethnic and territorial conflicts have erupted in the Southern and Eastern parts of the continent.

Moscow believes that under such conditions the following work must be done to build the framework of a new security system in Europe:

• Identification of current and potential threats.

• Classification of international organizations (regional and global) meant to deal with those threats.

• Determination of a mechanism to coordinate these organizations and thus unite them into a comprehensive system of European security.

• Establishment of the principles and rules of behavior on which threats will be dealt with.

According to the Russian official view, this model of European secu-rity should be based on all organizations dealing with security issues on the continent — the UN, the OSCE, the European Council, NATO, the EC, and the CIS. These organizations must be united into one system, and therefore all aspects of their mutual cooperation should be examined and agreed upon.

Moscow sees the OSCE as the main link in the new model of Euro-pean security. It had rich experience and achievements in promoting a European dialogue during the Cold War and in the period of turbulent

173

changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The fact that the OSCE is the only universal organization of European states adds validity to it. Yet this does not mean that the OSCE will take charge of other Euro-pean organizations or will try to duplicate them. As for the principles of the new security model for Europe, Russia insists on the following:

• Avoidance of elements of unequal security (security of some countries achieved at the expense of others).

• UN functions should not be duplicated or ignored; peacekeeping operations and sanctions can only be executed by an appropriate decision of the UN Security Council.

• The model presupposes fixation of current state borders in Europe; all countries participating in the collective security system must make commitments on this account as well as obligate themselves regarding transparency, control, and military activities.

Russia pays special attention to the issue of NATO and its expansion. It is a fact that NATO was created during the Cold War against the USSR, and since that period it has not fully transformed itself into a new quality. NATO expansion puts Moscow into a precarious geopo-litical situation and creates anxiety about Russia’s security. However, the Kremlin is ready to coexist and even cooperate with NATO on the basis of mutually acceptable rules of behavior. The Founding Act, signed by Russia and NATO members in 1997, provides such a basis. Yet the future of relations between Russia and NATO as well as the future of the whole European security system depends on how the Founding Act is implemented. It will also depend on the transforma-tion of NATO and non-admittance of former Soviet republics to it.

Conclusion On the basis of realities inside and outside Russia as well as prevailing moods of Russian political and economic elite, we may venture to predict that evolution of Russian foreign policy will continue in the framework described above. The “near abroad” will dominate Rus-

174

sia’s diplomatic agenda, thus reflecting internal politics, the vital necessity for integration, and the irresistible urge to restore the tradi-tional sphere of influence.

The road to integration will be a bumpy one, owing to suspicions of the CIS countries’ elite and positions of the West and Southern neighbors of the former Soviet republics. Bilateral and international differences, especially concerning NATO expansion and Russia’s bitterness over the lost great-power status, will mark Moscow’s partnership with the West. However, the partnership will survive.

Firstly, Russia lacks the strength to afford a general confrontation with the major world powers. At the moment, its armed forces are no match for the combined military machinery of its potential foes. Russia’s military system is disorganized and its technology deteriorating. The geo-strategic position of Russia is even less favorable. The front line has moved from the middle of Germany to the Russian-Ukrainian border. No government could dream of confrontational policies under such strategic circumstances.

Secondly, authorities would have to improve the crisis-stricken Rus-sian economy — both to bolster military strength and to meet expec-tations of the tired and disillusioned population. This cannot be done without imported technology, capital, and management know-how. For this reason and also in order to secure necessary income by exporting raw materials, Russia will have to keep the doors to the world open and remain flexible in its relations with the most devel-oped nations on the planet.

Third, there is basically no major ideological issue (under any leader) that could drive a wedge between Russia and the developed countries. Russia has no choice but to strive to build a modern society along the lines of Western Europe or America.

Fourth, the Russian population is fed up with confrontations and wars — even the domestic operation against Chechen separatists has not gathered popular support.

175

Regarding the West, Russia does not pose a strong enough geopoliti-cal challenge to unite the Western powers and make them pool their resources against Moscow.

One can expect a more energetic Russian drive in Asia and the Pacific (especially China), in the Middle East, and in South Asia. In most cases the Kremlin will get a positive response from its prospective partners. The new (or renewed) Russian friendships will create some anxiety in the West and inside the regions mentioned above. For example, Japan might not like further rapprochement between Mos-cow and Beijing, but misunderstandings and tensions will be limited and controllable. Moscow will not sacrifice its relations with the West for its friends in the Third World. All in all, Russia will most probably be one of the power centers in the emerging multi-polar world — no more aggressive or specific in its behavior than other centers.

176

SERGEY ROGOV

Chapter 9 Security Relations between Russia and the Western World 1997 was a crucial year in the post-Cold War settlement process in Europe. The transition from the bi-polarity of the previous period to the new European system entered its final stage. Russia and the West are no longer mortal enemies. But, despite numerous declarations the Russian Federation has not been treated as an equal partner by her former enemies when it comes to building a new European system. From a Russian point of view, the most serious danger is a post-Cold War settlement that would exclude Moscow from the mechanism of decision making on the key issues of international politics. As has been historically proven, the character of the post-war settlement and the new geopolitical map of the world, on the basis of a new balance of power, define the results of any war.

Today “the West” (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD) accounts for about 75 percent of the world’s GDP, while the Russian share dropped to something like 2 percent. This means that the Russian Federation is not the superpower the Soviet Union used to be. The GDP of Russia has been reduced almost 4 times compared to the Soviet GDP. The federal budget of Russia resulting from mismanagement of economic reform has shrunk to less than $80 billion in 1997. The Russian government today is practically bankrupt. It cannot pay its bills. It cannot maintain its social-welfare system. Nor can it provide support for the Soviet-size armed forces. While the Russian Federation is immersed deeply in an economic crisis, the federal budget of Russia depends every month on loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Mean-while, the military power of Russia, lacking an adequate economic

177

base, has been drastically diminishing. This brought about the defeat of the Russian armed forces in Chechnya.

But the Russian Federation possesses a tremendous potential for eco-nomic growth. With its unique natural resources, huge territory, and large population, Russia can be revived at the beginning of the 21st century as a major international player, both in the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific region. This is why the main issue concerning the new European system is building up positive relations between the Russian Federation and the West. If they establish a real partnership, the new European architecture will be stable and balanced. But if the post-Cold War system is created without Russia as a responsible partner, it will be unstable and later result in dangerous scenarios when Russia and the West resume their military-political rivalry.

The Danger of Isolation Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation started major domestic economic and political reforms. Moscow was also interested in joining the international institutions as a full and equal member. But the West was not eager to invite Russia to join the major Western organizations. Despite numerous declarations and assurances of partnership, the West in recent years persistently dic-tated the rules of the game, playing the role of a “leader” whom Mos-cow had to follow. For the past six years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia has been unable to integrate into the Western commu-nity as an equal partner. Until 1997 Moscow was not admitted to the key Western institutions (like the G-7, OECD, NATO, EU, WTO, London and Paris clubs of creditors). Since the collapse of the USSR, Moscow has lost its old clients and allies without acquiring any real new allies and partners in the international arena.

The OSCE, to which Russia belonged as the successor to the Soviet Union, has been overshadowed by institutions created by the West during the Cold War. The West prevented the OSCE from evolving

178

into the centerpiece of a new European system that was supposed to bring the former Cold War rivals together. Instead, the new European architecture is built around Western organizations. The dominant trend in the 1990s has been toward the enlargement of key Western institutions, i.e. the Northern Atlantic alliance and the European Union, which established themselves as the commanding regional institutions in the political, economic, and military field. The Western community began to consolidate its victory over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the Cold War by absorbing the Central and East-ern European countries.

After all, the Cold War was started in Eastern Europe where the West tried to resist Stalin’s efforts to absorb Poland and other Eastern European countries into the Soviet sphere. The defeat of the USSR in the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union are perceived as conditions to achieve the original Western goals of restoring the pre-Cold War status quo of an “undivided Europe” by including Eastern European countries in the victorious Western Community. Both NATO and the European Union are reaching historical decisions on enlargement that will consolidate the evolving European system. These two organizations are creating a new institutional framework that will shape Europe in the next ten to twenty years.

But there are important differences in the approaches of the two main institutions to expansion to the East. These differences are not only related to different functions of the two organizations but also to their membership. NATO, the Euro-Atlantic organization, has brought both the USA and Western Europe under a political and military umbrella, while the European Union represents only one side of the West and until a few years ago was focused solely on economic priorities. The relationship between the two is not only mutually compatible but to some extent also competitive.

NATO’s main achievements include mutual defense guarantees and a unique multinational military infrastructure dominated by the United States. Through NATO, the United States can preserve the cohesion of the victorious Western community, preventing re-nationalization of foreign and defense policies of its Cold War allies. Without the North-

179

Atlantic alliance, it would be much more difficult to maintain claims for American global leadership.

Since the late 1980s NATO has cut its force structure and weaponry by about 25-30 percent. Nevertheless it retained the essence of a col-lective defense organization with the most developed countries in North America and Western Europe accounting for about half the global GDP, approximately 60 percent of world military expenses and 80 percent of international expenditures on defense-related research and development. In conventional weapons, accountable under the CFE Treaty, NATO now enjoys a three-to-one superiority over Rus-sia, while in previous decades the Soviet Union dominated the Euro-pean military balance. The Alliance possesses the only efficient inte-grated defense organization capable of using military coercion if nec-essary. NATO’s defense capability allows “exporting” security and performing power projection tasks. It is NATO’s relative military advantages that explain Russian suspicions about admitting the USSR’s former Warsaw Pact clients into the North-Atlantic alliance. What is even more important — Western superiority will become even stronger as a result of NATO’s enlargement.

Unlike NATO, the European Union does not include the United States and to some extent competes economically with the NAFTA. But the EU lacks military power and thus indirectly depends on NATO and the United States for defense and political “leadership.” The EU is also enlarging, although this most important economic alliance (about 27 percent of the world’s GDP) is first “deepening” by creating monetary union and other important measures before admitting any “poor relatives.” While the EU failed to create “an independent secu-rity identity,” it has become the crucial decision making body for European economic development which in due time will probably have important political implementation.

A Weak Performance in the Early 1990s

180

The very passive and frequently incompetent diplomatic position of Russia in the early 1990's gradually made many in the West believe that Russian interests can be ignored. The conclusion of Russian troop withdrawal from Germany and Eastern European countries in 1994 provided a good opportunity to consolidate results of the Western Cold War victory by absorbing Central and Eastern Europe into the Western community.

Hence, by the mid-1990s, Russia found itself playing only a marginal role in creating a new European system evolving around NATO and EU. In the foreseeable future this system has no intention of admitting Moscow as a full member or an equal participant in the European decision making process in political, military, and economic matters. It is only natural that Moscow cannot agree to NATO being turned into the main European security structure, while Russia, which is not a member, is left outside this system. This is why the problem of NATO’s eastward expansion has dominated Russian-Western nego-tiations during the last two years.

The decision to enlarge NATO created real prospects of Moscow’s international isolation when a weakened Russia, lacking political will, had to accept a third-rate role in the international political and eco-nomic system. NATO expansion, ignoring the Russian Federation’s legitimate interests as a European power, would mean that post-Soviet Russia is treated as a “defeated” country, forced to reconcile with the victors’ dictates and pay the geopolitical price for the Soviet Union’s downfall.

Russia has a unique consensus on the problem of NATO’s eastward expansion. Representatives of the entire political spectrum with rare exceptions are against the bloc’s expansion. Although the country is in the grips of an unprecedented economic crisis and its political situation is very unstable, Russia’s political elite does not want to accept a second-rate status in Europe. The question of NATO enlargement has dominated Russian-Western relations for the last two years, creating fear that it will result in a new division of Europe. For obvious reasons there is a consensus in Russia against NATO’s expansion — the situation when a defense alliance, from which Mos-cow has been excluded, becomes a dominant security structure for all

181

Europeans. This is not acceptable to Russia, which has been a Euro-pean power since the days of Peter the Great.

Russia cannot claim the right of veto in NATO. However, European and other international security issues affecting Russia’s vital interests should not be handled without Russia’s direct participation. It is time for the West to understand that a course towards isolating Moscow can lead to a long-term geopolitical conflict. Under conditions of weakness, Russian diplomacy faced a remarkably complex and diffi-cult task: how to protect Russian national interests despite the wasted time and extremely adverse balance of power? Moscow lacked the carrot and stick approach to support its diplomatic position on the question of NATO expansion.

To threaten the West with a new Cold War by initiating a military response to the expansion of NATO’s military organization, as some Russian nationalists suggest, would be an empty bluff. Resumption of a military-political confrontation, in which there is no chance of vic-tory, would be a criminal adventure. Emotional and sometimes even hysterical reaction would boomerang. Attempts to freeze the status quo would be hopeless. It would be no better to pretend that NATO’s enlargement is unimportant, reversing the previous position to announce that Moscow “will not recognize” the expansion of the North-Atlantic alliance.

But nobody asked Russia to agree to NATO expansion. If Russia had accepted NATO enlargement without getting anything in return, it would have completely undermined Moscow’s prestige and would have meant a humiliating defeat with extremely negative long-term consequences. The real task for Russian diplomacy is to compel the United States and other Western countries to recognize Russia’s legitimate interests and to meet its minimal requirements half way. A meaningful solution demands negotiating a realistic compromise which would allow, on one hand, protecting Russian interests and, on the other, avoiding a senseless confrontation with the Western key military alliance. Taking into account that Moscow’s ideal or maxi-mum goals are unattainable at present, it was indispensable to define an optimum set of Russian priorities.

182

What are the aims of Russian diplomacy in these efforts? First of all, Moscow wanted to keep Russia fully involved in European affairs even if Russia is not a NATO or EU member. This required gaining NATO consent on Russia’s full participation in decision making on the key questions of European security through a special Russia-NATO political mechanism as a key component of the new European security architecture.

Secondly, Moscow needed to maintain the stability of the Russian-Western military despite the lack of parity in economic and other spheres. It was essential to reduce to a minimum the direct military consequences of NATO expansion, preventing an even greater change in the military imbalance from our standpoint. It also requires the necessary arrangements to control the deployment of Western military forces as well as conventional and tactical nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe near the Russian border.

Thirdly, Russia wanted to resolve a number of questions connected to on-going trade discrimination against Russia and to create more favorable conditions to attract Western investments and technologies urgently needed to overcome its unprecedented economic crisis.

Fourthly, it was necessary to gain the full participation of Russia in such international institutions as G-7, the OECD, the World Trade Organization, the Paris and London clubs of creditors, and to define Moscow’s relations with the main economic coalitions — the EU and the APEC.

New Security Relations with the West In the past year, since Yevgeniy Primakov replaced Andrey Kozyrev as Russian foreign minister, Moscow managed to get the West to agree to some very important compromises. The intense diplomatic work enabled the achievement of an important political breakthrough at the Russian-American summit in Helsinki in March 1997. Presi-dents Yeltsin and Clinton signed five very important statements at this

183

meeting, which together give a basis for institutionalizing a more equal relationship between Russia, on the one hand, and the United States and the West as a whole, on the other. Russian diplomacy intensified the process of talks underway so that the Paris, Denver, and Madrid summits could adopt compromise decisions in the form of documents binding on all.

To prevent dangerous confrontation on NATO expansion, Russia and the West agreed to define clearly a new mechanism of relations between Russia and the North-Atlantic alliance. This was done in May 1997 in Paris by concluding the Founding Act, an official and politically binding agreement which confirmed and developed the principles of the 1975 Helsinki declaration, taking into consideration today’s needs and requirements, thereby clearing the way to main-taining stability and peace in Europe in the next century. Of course, Russia did not get the right to veto decisions on NATO’s internal problems related to collective defense. But Moscow was able to negotiate recognition of Russia participating equally as a great power in adopting decisions on key European security problems. Above all, this covers the prevention of conflicts and the use of force for peacekeeping operations.

Leaders of Russia and the West made an important breakthrough in Paris towards ensuring international stability and security. They suc-ceeded in agreeing to the creation of a mechanism for unprecedented military-political cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO. They also succeeded in resolving some problems connected with the prevention of a new arms race in Europe. Western partners had to present convincing proof that enlargement of NATO would not result in the growth of a military threat to Russia.

It is only natural in the 21st century that the conventional arms control regime in Europe should correspond to the new realities rather than the status quo which existed in the second half of the 20th century during the Cold War. The West should consent to fundamental mod-ernization of the CFE Treaty with a view to lifting flank restrictions that endanger Russia’s security. Under the Founding Act, NATO committed itself to avoid creating a military threat to Russia as a result of enlargement. NATO later announced that it does not plan any large-

184

scale deployment of Western forces near the Russian borders. Besides, Russia and the United States reached an understanding at the Helsinki summit on a framework agreement regarding the START III treaty. It provided for the reduction of Russian and American strategic nuclear weapons by one third to one half by the end of the next decade, compared with the level stipulated by the START II Treaty. NATO also announced in Paris that it has no plans, intentions, or reasons to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new alliance members.

A mechanism to coordinate the adoption of decisions and their ful-fillment by Russia and NATO is being created. The form of the part-ners’ interaction is quite unusual: without being a NATO member, the Russian Federation will actually have a voice during the discussion of European security issues. This will preclude “ousting” Russia and help it to maintain its role as a great European power. Although the sides have not managed to iron out all their differences, the most important thing is that the document on Russia-NATO relations is a solid base for practical cooperation under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council.

The parties agreed that their purpose is the creation of a stable, safe, integrated, and undivided democratic Europe. It is a veiled recognition of the fallacy of preserving and expanding a military-political block of the Cold War period. But in essence it means that Moscow does not deny the right of Eastern European states to chose protection by NATO. Certainly, it admits facts that are not too pleasant for many in Russia, but failure to recognize the reality of today’s situation would have been far worse. The Alliance will expand, and the issues are the conditions and consequences of this expansion.

The parties pointed to the need to realize the potential and strength of the OSCE as the framework for European security. It represents all the continent’s states equally. The parties also stressed the need to enhance the operational capability of the OSCE. This formula is directed against the current transformation of NATO into the back-bone of the all-European system, but there is no reason to overesti-mate the importance of these words: the OSCE will not be permitted by NATO to become a sort of “UN for Europe,” as we hoped a few years back. Alas, its role will remain limited. But preserving the

185

OSCE will limit the claims of the North-Atlantic alliance and other Western institutions to monopolize the sphere of European security.

The Founding Act legally established cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. This document provided a strong political commitment, given at the highest political level, to become the foun-dation of positive and stable relations between Russia and the West in the 21st century. This document defined the mechanism of consulta-tions, coordination, and, to the maximum appropriate extent possible, joint decision-making and action on security issues of common con-cern. The Founding Act also reflected the need for a profound trans-formation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimen-sion.

Economic Interaction Another important issue is the economic agenda of Russian-Western relations. Russia is interested in resolving problems of mutual trade, undertaking steps for increased access to each other’s markets, and having Russia granted “most favored nation” status. As is known, the United States and other Western countries continue to discriminate against Russia. However the end of economic sanctions will hardly give a serious impulse to Russian exports to the West, especially to the United States. While the Russian Federation sells a lot of oil, natural gas, and other raw materials to the Western Europe, very few Russian goods are competitive in today’s American market.

The European Union is a much more important economic partner for Russia than the United States. The EU accounts for almost 40 percent of Russian foreign trade, while the share of the CIS states is only about 23 percent. The Asian-Pacific countries account for 10 percent, the United States for 5 percent. Russia’s future development depends very much on its access to the European markets and Western sources of high technology. Even more important are possible Western in-

186

vestments, without which Russia’s economic recovery is unlikely. Moscow does not have the necessary domestic capital to modernize the Russian economy. This is why the Russian government announced its plans for the adoption and realization of a new legal regime that convincingly demonstrates Russia’s commitment to attract foreign and domestic investment. The new tax regulations are supposed to stimulate legitimate business, including action on a value-added tax, an excise tax, and both corporate and individual income taxes. Thus administrative mechanisms, a penalty system, and a procedure to settle disputes will be precisely determined.

It is no secret that the Russian government depends today on Western loans, which cover about half of its budget deficit. This dependence became even more obvious during the world financial crisis at the end of 1997, when Russia was directly hurt by the collapse of the interna-tional financial market. But it should be mentioned that the efficiency of these loans is by no means indisputable. Moreover, IMF and World Bank requirements began to determine the key economic decisions of the Russian government. Many in Russia express concern that the country will become economically dependent on the West and its financial institutions.

Russia’s economic diplomacy has been aimed at creating better con-ditions for integrating the Russian Federation into the world economy. Moscow was able to negotiate arrangements in 1997 which may allow Russia to move upwards in the global economic hierarchy. Russia participated in the Denver discussions on economic issues in June 1997, so the G-7 meeting finally became the G-8 summit. But it is not yet clear whether it will be really the G-8 or Russia will be restricted again under some far-fetched pretext. If Russia is admitted into this forum as a full participant, the organization may later begin to play a new role. The appearance of Russia can with time open the doors for China, India, and Brazil. The G-7 can evolve from a privileged club of the West into a new global forum of the leading countries of the world in the 21st century.

The Russian Federation was also accepted into the Paris and London clubs of creditors in 1997 and was promised admission to the World Trade Organization in 1998 as well as to the Organization for Eco-

187

nomic Cooperation and Development (without any indication of dates). Russia was also admitted to the APEC in Vancouver during November 1997. At the Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg, Russia, France, and Germany announced that they would regularly have some kind of special consultations on European issues. It may be too early to evaluate the consequences of this decision, but it could become the nucleus of a new “European concert” with Russian par-ticipation. Finally, in December 1997, the Russia-EU agreement signed in 1994 came into force at last. This opens the door for serious Russian trade growth with the European Union, which could lead eventually, within15 to 20 years from now, to admitting Moscow into the EU.

It is also possible to believe that the Russian economic recovery will help build an economic bridge between the EU and APEC, tremen-dously facilitating growth of the truly global market at the beginning of the 21st century. Russia, as a Eurasian power, can play a unique role in this development.

Conclusion Russian diplomacy achieved some major successes in 1997. First of all, it became possible to avoid a new confrontation between Moscow and the West that Russia could not win. Russia’s diplomacy managed despite the odds to avoid a crushing defeat, which would have trans-formed our country into a “defeated nation” and would have strength-ened Russian isolation in the international arena. Secondly, basic consensus guidelines were agreed upon for conditions and institutional arrangements permitting Russia and NATO to interact on European security. It’s possible to conclude that if the Founding Act is implemented, Russia can retain its equal role in the new European system. Thirdly, Moscow and the West agreed upon measures to pre-vent a large increase in the military threat to Russia during NATO expansion, including the non-deployment of Western nuclear weapons

188

and combat forces in Eastern Europe. Fourth, a package of measures came into force aimed at encouraging trade and private investment.

But there is no reason for euphoria. The problem cannot be considered resolved. The Founding Act created only the basis for a long-term compromise, which will define the character of relations between Russia, the United States, and the West as a whole. The Russian Federation faces serious diplomatic challenges at negotiations, concerning the conditions for Russian G-8 participation, the system of European security, conventional arms control, tactical nuclear weapon arrangements, the START III treaty, and the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty. And it’s not at all clear yet that the West really wants to admit Moscow fully into the core Western institutions in Europe — NATO and the EU.

True partnership between Russia and the West is only possible once Russia overcomes its domestic crisis and establishes its new identity. Without the restoration of its economic might and social and political stability, Moscow cannot regain its role as a great power. Only the recovery of the Russian economy and the creation of normal eco-nomical and political conditions for Russian Federation citizens will enable Moscow to play an important role in world affairs. But all this will require many years, if not decades. Then Russia, as a great Eura-sian power, can ensure a more equal partnership with the West and gain full acceptance into the new European system, protect its posi-tions in the South, and achieve integration into the fast-developing Asian-Pacific region.

189

IGOR MAXIMYCHEV Chapter 10 Russia’s Concept of a New European Security Architecture The collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system established after World War II has left open the question of a new European peace order since 1990. The key question is the nature of this order, and the answer to this question depends on whether the end of global confrontation was a victory for one side or a rational arrangement of both sides enfeebled by senseless competition. If we consider a crushing defeat of the Soviet Union as a super power by another super power, the USA, it would be only logical to build the new peace order as a system to coerce the overthrown enemy. In this case, the probability is high that the beaten rival will later seek revenge. Yet the presumption of equal-ity for all participants of the foreseen peace order would guarantee its durability and effectiveness.

A Continental Security System The most effective way to achieve this goal would be to create a genuine continental system of collective security. But the new chapter of European history opened by the end of the East-West confrontation failed to introduce new “tools” for regulating the continent’s affairs. Europeans only have instruments inherited from the Cold War period. These are stigmatized by their origin and capable of reproducing the turbulence in a world changed in its very nature. Attempts to “mod-ernize” them have resulted in no major success to date. Moscow has proposed to build a system founded on an institutionalized Conference

192

on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It would have its own Security Council with the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council acting as its security arm and NATO, the WEU, and the Commonwealth of Independent States as associated bodies. This proposal didn’t receive great support. The OSCE remains helpless. Moreover, NATO enlargement threatens to revive a certain degree of confrontation. It appears that the inability to reflect existing realities in organizational structures is now avenging itself.

While addressing problems of the continent’s unification, Europe now relies on the capacities of NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and a couple of smaller and less important organi-zations of a more or less continental nature. Only the least powerful of all the above organizations — the OSCE — comprises all the European states plus the United States and Canada; the prestigious but hardly more efficient Council of Europe has all the European coun-tries among its membership, but not USA and Canada. The powerful NATO and the European Union fail to include half of Europe — pre-cisely the half that was in confrontation with the rest of the continent until 1990. Therefore, it would seem logical to assume that further developments will be determined by the transformation of the two latter organizations and, most important, by their relations with coun-tries of the amorphous part of Europe that lost all elements of supra-national structure when the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) disintegrated.

This is why we speak today of a new European security architecture combining all partial security elements existing on the continent with-out jeopardizing common security. The success of this extremely important effort depends on implementing the two following basic principles:

• The whole continent must be one integrated security area.

• All European countries must enjoy equal security guarantees.

In fact, it was easier to realize these terms during and after the revo-lutionary events that changed the face of Europe and the entire world. But the leaders of the USSR (Russia) were convinced then that the end of the confrontation would automatically bring about harmony of

193

interests of all the major participants of a new peace order. Therefore the necessary steps were not taken in due time.

Today’s situation in Europe is developing in a totally different direc-tion from the one envisaged by the Europeans at the end of the Cold War in 1989/90. Then, the general direction of the continent’s prog??ress was determined by the Paris charter for a new Europe unanimously adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) heads of state and government meeting in November 1990. This document comprises clearly formulated collective European commitments for the coming decades. It expresses the very essence of the new period of European history: “the era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended.”

When a “new era is dawning in Europe,” the parties to the charter assumed an obligation to “expand and strengthen friendly relations and cooperation among the States of Europe, the United States of America and Canada, and to promote friendship among our peoples.” They further declared: “with the ending of the division of Europe, we will strive for a new quality in our security relations” and “help to overcome the mistrust of decades, to increase stability and to build a united Europe.” They emphasized that “Europe whole and free is calling for a new beginning.”

The Charter pointed out that “the establishment of the national unity of Germany is an important contribution to a just and lasting order of peace for a united, democratic Europe aware of its responsibility for stability, peace and cooperation,” and that “we recognize the essential contribution of our common European culture and our shared values in overcoming the division of the continent.” The July 1992 CSCE follow-up summit meeting in Helsinki on Challenges of the Times of Change stated that “the Charter of Paris for a New Europe outlined the guiding principles of the establishment of a community of free and democratic states from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”1 The same

1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Institute of European Studies,

Russian Academy of Sciences. From Helsinki to Budapest: The History of OSCE/CSCE in Documents. Vol. 3. Moscow, 1996, 304; 306-308; 313, 323.

194

obligations were formulated in the “two plus our” Treaty on German reunification (September 1990)2 and the “Great Treaty” between Bonn and Moscow (November 1990).3 But these stipulations remained mere declarations, not compulsory for the signatories.

The most far-sighted politicians understood very soon that the funda-mental difference between the profound integration of Western Europe and the amorphous state of the rest of the continent could last forever, and they began looking for a solution to it. In 1992, the then president of Poland Lech Walesa put forward the idea of establishing a “NATO-bis” and an “EU-bis” in Eastern Europe which would serve as the second pillar (Russia and the CIS being the third one) of an all-European structure uniting the entire continent without any excep-tions. This constructive idea of Lech Walesa did not find any support in Central and Eastern Europe nor — and this is more important — in Russia, and therefore vanished. The reaction of the West was equally negative. The Walesa plan was replaced by the concept of NATO enlargement.

An alternative to these proceedings was the idea already mentioned, proposed by Germany and Russia in 1992 about a more effective structure of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe by creating a Security Council for the continent. The logical end of such a development would be to establish a Continental System of Collective Security. This idea is now added by Yevgeniy Primakov’s proposal to accelerate the elaboration of a European security charter based on the Helsinki Final Act and decisions of the OSCE summits in Paris, Helsinki, Budapest, and Lisbon which would give Europe a code of principles of conduct oriented to the 21st century.4 The sub- 2 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Die Vereinigung Deutsch-

lands im Jahr 1990: Eine Dokumentation. Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1991, 101-104

3 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Deutsch-Russische Staats-verträge: Eine Dokumentation. Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundes-regierung, 1991, 75-83

4 Speech by Yevgeniy Primakov at the conference “Revolution and Rebirth,” Montreux/Switzerland, 6 June 1997 (see Vestnik MID RF, August 1997).

195

stance of both suggestions is to guarantee regional security, which remains the most important sphere of collaboration of all Europeans. The events in ex-Yugoslavia have confirmed the importance of such precautions.

NATO-Russia Relations The elaboration of a new European order of peace was relegated to the background through the decision to expand NATO. While the European Union is relatively far from starting its enlargement, today we witness the beginning of NATO expansion that reduces the whole European security problem to NATO-Russia relations. NATO en-largement is often advertised as a means of ensuring all-European security that, in turn, should provide the basis for unifying the entire continent.

However, there is no room (and there will never be room) for Russia in NATO. Even though today one hears from time to time comforting assurances that Russia’s membership in NATO is possible “after a certain probation period,” they are vehemently opposed within the block itself. Typically, a German colleague remarked at a recent aca-demic conference in Thessaloniki that before we could speak of letting Russia into NATO, as suggested by some US colleagues, one had to consider making it a state within the United States.

The West often claims that NATO is already an “open community,” and, after it completes its reconstruction, no country belonging to the North-Atlantic region and desiring to join it will be prevented from doing so. This appears to be a willful or unintentional distortion of the facts designed to facilitate the smooth admission into the block of the first three new applicants (further expansion will follow the tested track). As long as Russia remains an independent state, capable and willing to pursue its own interests in Europe and in the rest of the world, even those who claim that there is nothing anti-Russian in the

196

NATO enlargement sincerely exclaim that Russia’s accession to NATO would make the alliance devoid of any sense.

All this shows that no matter what statements and declarations are made by the alliance, NATO’s one and only raison d’être has always been the “deterrence” of the USSR in the past — and now of Russia. If it were not true, the enlargement of the block should have started with a formal or informal proposal to Russia to consider joining it. This would have enabled the alliance to acquire a genuinely all-Euro-pean stature. Many pro-West Russian politicians and parliamentarians have indicated the desirability of such a step from the very first days of the debate on NATO expansion and even at the height of pre-Madrid polemics. But nothing of the sort happened. The alliance leaders just made a couple of nebulous hints about some distant future. At working level, it was made clear that nobody was going to invite the Russians anywhere: “let them submit the application, and we will consider it.” But this is not acceptable for Russia.

Morally and psychologically, submission of an “application” by Rus-sia would amount to public recognition of its “defeat” in the Cold War, although it is clear to everybody that Russia could not lose a war it has never waged. Such an interpretation of European realities would never be acceptable for the Russian public that initiated normalization of relations with the West, but on equal terms, not on conditions of “voluntary capitulation.” The application to join NATO would be viewed as an unconditional surrender, opening the way to the winner’s dictate. And no illusions exist on the character of such a dictate: the double standards of the West are too obvious in its approach to the situation in the states of the former Soviet Union, which incidentally have always jeopardized Russian interests.

Besides, there are forces within the alliance that would never agree to let Russia inside for the same reasons they are expanding NATO now. Russia’s accession to NATO, apart from political problems, would create formidable organizational complications. The membership of such a potentially powerful state as Russia would make NATO man-agers rack their brains over the necessity of accommodating it in the alliance’s commanding structures, without violating the rights and hurting the feelings of former (and not so former) members of the

197

organization — leaving aside the issue of US leadership, which cannot be discussed. This situation has been illustrated by a heated, sometimes extremely heated, debate on redistribution of posts among the founding members that took place in Madrid.

NATO is the only international organization functioning in Europe that is and will always be closed for Russia as an equal partner. Their “peaceful coexistence” was possible as long as NATO limited itself to the role prescribed to it by the military strength of the USSR, that of maintaining stability in Western Europe. NATO’s decision to embark on military integration of the continent without Russia – that is against it – made future antagonism between them inevitable. NATO’s strategy of “deterrence of Russia” necessitates Russia’s response in the form of “deterrence of NATO.” For Russia, which is weaker and much more vulnerable than the USSR, this will be much more difficult. But Russia will be compelled to do so if no reasonable compromise is found to limit NATO expansion. Even President Yeltsin, a known friend of the West and particularly the USA, warned some time ago that such a development was unavoidable if the alli-ance leaders continued to lend a deaf ear to Russia’s apprehensions.

The Russia-NATO Founding Act signed in Paris on 27 May 1997, offers new opportunities for convergence and cooperation of the par-ties, or for their divergence. What will really count is the interpreta-tion of its ambiguous provisions. The only definite thing so far is the beginning of NATO enlargement. All the other provisions are vague, especially if one takes into account the fact that this promise is in no way binding for the West.

The emphasis made by Madeleine Albright on the political character of the commitments (instead of legal commitments demanded by Russia) means that the West may very well forget them if, suppose, the situation in Europe changes or new governments come to power in states which are parties to the Act. In a sense, this situation is balanced by the fact that the other party is free to do the same thing. Ultimately, everything will depend upon the goodwill of the States vis-à-vis the interpretation of the agreements.

198

The truth is that the West evaded commitments it had assumed in 1990-1991 and decided to enlarge the block, thus once again endan-gering the integrity of the continent. There isn’t much in the text of the Founding Act that would indicate its often-advertised role of the “nucleus” of a future all-European system of collective security. In principle, the Permanent Joint Russia-NATO Council could carry out such a function, but its authority is not precise, and Western rhetoric that nobody will have a right to veto NATO decisions only confirms that the West is not prepared to deal with Russia on equal terms in security matters.

A system of collective security can be based only on the principle of consensus that makes the voice of each country of absolute value. Negation of the “right of veto” is in fact a mere camouflage for refusal to deal with Russia on the basis of consensus. This means that the creation of an all-European security system and a new order based on this system, which would replace the Yalta-Potsdam system, still remains a very distant goal. This is confirmed by the unprecedented NATO military activity on territories bordering Russia, thus creating a growing concern among the Russian public5

Signing the Founding Act cannot be viewed unambiguously as either a conclusion or a beginning of some new post-confrontational period of international relations. It will not limit NATO enlargement, which seriously endangers European unity, but at the same time it may pro-vide new opportunities for a constructive dialogue between Russia and all the members of the alliance.

One may only regret that the crisis in Russia-NATO relations is not settled but merely postponed. Russia seeks ways to use the opportuni-ties provided by this respite to avoid the threat of its isolation.

5 On September 26, 1997, the Russian State Duma adopted an appeal on this sub-

ject, stating that “there is no doubt that under the cover of peace-keeping (...) the armed forces of the USA are exploring new theatres in direct proximity to the borders of the Russian Federation. One cannot exclude that (...) the capability of US troops to land on the territory of the Russian Federation itself is being tested.” See Rossiyskaya gazeta, 8 October 1997.

199

200

Cooperation in Europe The urgent policy task of all OSCE members consists in removing the flagrant contradiction between their obligations under the Charter of Paris and an unlimited NATO enlargement which some see as the highest political wisdom. The range of future possibilities is by no means restricted to the only alternative: either an unchecked NATO expansion or an unorganized amorphism of Central and Eastern Europe. One cannot exclude the emergence of other proposals on options to resolve the all-European unity problem through universal security, especially if life itself puts forward this task. Boris Yeltsin’s recent initiatives regarding the security of the North European region suggest this direction. Their importance is that they recognize the significant role of neutral countries in today’s situation in Europe. This is one more reason why one should not hurry in advancing NATO towards Russian borders.

Referring to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is still suffering from obvious impotency, the Founding Act states: “the OSCE, as the only pan-European security organization, has a key role in European peace and stability. In strengthening the OSCE, Russia and NATO will cooperate in preventing any possibility of returning to a Europe of division and confrontation, or the isolation of any state.”6 This solemn formula should find an adequate reflection in the practical deeds of European states and the USA. It is necessary to embark urgently on a process of finding solutions to the problems of collective security on the basis of a structure embracing the entire continent, be it a reformed OSCE, a transformed NATO including all European states, the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council, or something totally new.

Since there are apprehensions in Europe as to possible interference in its affairs from the outside (as alleged by the NATO enlargement protagonists), the Russia-NATO Council could be assigned a very specific mission to elaborate and adopt a universally acceptable defi- 6 See Nezavissimaya gazeta, 28 May 1997.

201

nition of interference and develop a set of preventive measures that will be obligatory for everyone. As one of the motives to join the alli-ance is said to be the fear of a possible unexpected attack, the Council could be asked to implement a pan-European early-warning system. The combination of such concrete measures and others formally inde-pendent of each other would result in the desired all-European effect.

The Permanent Joint Council should accommodate German, French, and British influences in order to prevent the negative effects of the NATO enlargement process for Russia and the rest of Europe. Of key importance will be the position of the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany, the first Western country to demand accelerated eastward expansion of the alliance and one of the most consistent advocates of this process, which country has assumed a huge responsibility for the destiny of the continent. Now the time has come to show that it is worth this responsibility.

Far from being achieved is the aim of satisfying Russia’s strong wish to belong to a formal group of decision-makers, that will be competent in all the major issues of European security, and thus anchor them firmly in Europe. The Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council can be the solution to the problem, provided that both sides try to attain this objective. And the emerging “triangle” Jacques Chirac-Helmut Kohl-Boris Yeltsin could be an excellent support for this mechanism. If the process of rapprochement between Russia and the European Union could be strengthened in parallel to progress in the security field, the emergence of a basis for a Great Europe would become possible.

In the 21st century, the harsh realities of international competition require additional stability and cohesion of existing or emerging cen-ters of strength (the innovation centers). This factor determines the growing tendency of an organic integration (full or partial) of states belonging to particular regions or grouping of countries. Even the United States, an incontestable world leader, is now forming around itself a North American Free Trade Association.

Europe, which has been experiencing a latent internal crisis for a long time, is particularly feeling this urge acutely. The beginning of the post-confrontation period has laid the theoretic and practical

202

foundations for unifying the European Continent in its entirety, thus enabling the creation of a Great Europe “from Reykjavik to Vladivostok.”

It would be a wrong signal for the next millennium if the end of the 20th century would bring only the beginning of NATO expansion. Practical work for the construction of a common European home must be started. And the first step towards this goal would be to resolve the dilemma of the continent’s security problem. The Declaration of the OSCE Summit in Lisbon (December 2-3, 1996) on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century points out the principal dimensions of this work: inadmissibility of attempts to strengthen one’s security at the expense of the security of other states; obligatory consideration of security concerns of all states irre-spective of membership in military structures or arrangements; the principle of international organizations and structures cooperating in the security sphere which presumes unacceptable any claim to domi-nate an organization or a group of states in Europe.7

The non-governmental Commission on Greater Europe (president: Jacques Chirac; Vice-Presidents: Otto Graf Lambsdorf, Alois Mock; Executive Director: Anatoliy Chubays) noted in its report for 1994 “No Great Europe without Russia — No Great Russia without Europe”: “it is particularly dangerous for Europe to provide the world with the image of a divided, disoriented, and stagnating continent. What is needed is a new, dynamic vision of a common European interest and of a common European security not merely within the framework of the European Community, of NATO or of the Western European Union, but within the framework of a Greater Europe.” And further: “if the concept of a Greater Europe is to develop beyond a mere idea, it must be underpinned by an all-European Security Con-vention, which includes the US and Canada. The two prime objectives of such a convention would be: to secure peace in Europe through a non-aggression and comprehensive security pact of all the signatories

7 See Afanas’evskiy, Nikolay. “Lissabonskiy sammit OBSE.” Mezhdunarodnaya

zhizn’, no. 1 (1997).

203

of the convention; or to protect in a non-aggressive manner the com-mon external security interests of Europe, covering not only military threats but the whole range of civilizational challenges that can endanger peace, social stability and freedom in Europe.”8 The move-ment toward this aim has already begun despite varied and powerful resistance.

8 Commission on Greater Europe. Net velikoy Evropy bez Rossii — net velikoy

Rossii bez Evropy. Moscow, 1994, 23-25.

204

VASSILIY SOKOLOV AND ANDREY KORNEEV Chapter 11 East-West Cooperation and International Ecological Security There are many links between environment and security, some of them of historical dimension. Throughout human history, the basic component of armed conflicts was linked with possessing land or other natural resources. In many cases the question was about the survival of a community in a specific natural environment. In this context, humanity had in mind the notion of the environment’s limited carrying capacity from the very first conflicts and battles. Today pol-icy makers in different countries are beginning to delve more deeply into the causes and consequences of conflicts and instability in the post-Cold War world. It is now increasingly clear that non-military risks such as environmental degradation, depletion and scarcity of resources, rapid population growth, and refugee flows begin to play a key role with evident implications of an international and global scale.

The Environment as a Security Issue That is why the definition of “environmental security” is now a sub-ject of increasing interest to governmental leaders, academic circles, and international organizations. It is evident, however, that not all environmental problems are of a security nature. Most attempts to specify links between the environment and security have focused on the environmentally caused scarcities and conflicts, on compelling evidence of relationships between environmental problems, human health concerns, and economic and political instability. In addition to

205

scarcity of such resources as water, land, food, or forest products, environmental threats of an international dimension are becoming dangerous not only for the natural environment but for public health and genetic integrity.

Failure to address the existing environmental conditions, regional or civil conflicts, hastened or exacerbated by environmental stress, could involve the international community or specific countries in costly and hazardous military interventions, peacekeeping, or humanitarian operations. It is evident that some environmental security issues are of immediate concern (the Chernobyl case is an example), while others are mid- or long-term, regional, or global in scope.1

The latter include global environmental challenges with a high poten-tial to disrupt the economic stability and irreversible environmental effects for all mankind. Rapid population growth, large-scale interna-tional migrations, and differential demographic patterns can create challenges to environmental security. The world is projected to have more than 8 billion people by 2025. The majority of them (about 85 percent) are expected to live in non-industrialized countries. Demo-graphic pressure on ecological systems and overuse of resources can create shortages of essential resources such as food, water, and fuel, resulting in possible conflicts of different scale and social degradation.

According to the World Resources Institute’s estimates, around 60 percent of the less industrialized world’s poorest people live in ecol-

1 For example, the drying of the Aral Sea with environmental degradation — loss

of fresh water and arable lands, wind-blown distribution of sea-bed salts, radical changes in public health and life expectancy, and associated economic collapse — total decline of fishery, restricted agriculture, seems to be a potential security challenge for the Central Asia region including a threat to the political stability of the region, the probable generation of refugees, and even the durability of the five independent nations responsible for the Aral Sea environmental disaster. This is also a security issue for Russia that has no more territorial links to the Aral Sea basin but still has historical responsibility for the situation. The regional stability in this sense clearly continues to evolve with the integration of environ-mental resource elements.

206

ogically vulnerable areas.2 Environmental scarcities place limits on economic options in poorer countries, and this can be an example of how environmental scarcities interact with political, economic, social, and cultural factors of instability. Environmental stress generated by the growing needs of the world population now refers to environ-mental damage that has global dimensions. Climate change brought about by the increasing “greenhouse effect” resulting from the grow-ing concentration of industrial gases in the atmosphere, principally carbon dioxide, can be a type of environmental stress with large inter-national implications (such as raising the sea level, changing agricul-tural patterns, and climatic conditions), including potential conflicts, refugees, etc. Global environmental stress is also manifested by chlo-rofluorocarbons (CFCs) which deplete the Earth’s ozone layer and allow a higher level of ultraviolet light to reach the earth’s surface, causing direct damage to people and vegetation.

Deforestation is a growing factor of global environmental instability. Every current second the surface area of world forests is reduced by one half a hectare. Tropical forests covering only 6 percent of the surface not only attract carbon dioxide from the atmosphere but also provide the habitat for an estimated 50-60 percent of all wild species. Another serious global challenge is the loss of bio-diversity. Accord-ing to Worldwatch Institute estimates, the world is losing around 7 percent of all arable land every decade, resulting mainly from erosion and deforestation. Every two years the desert expands on an area comparable to the territory of Greece and now covers almost 30 per-cent of the surface.

The world’s grain harvest area has been reduced from 0.23 hectares per capita in 1950 to 0.12 hectares these days.3 International conflicts can also emerge from environmental stress in neighboring states due to trans-boundary effects, the best known cases involving acid rain erasing vegetation and materials. “Diplomatic wars” on the issue are

2 World Resources, 1996-1997. New York: Oxford University Press, 30.

3 Brown, Lester R. et al. Vital Signs 1997: The Environmental Trends that are Shaping our Future. London: Earthscan, 1997, 41.

207

already known in North America and Europe. The same problems could arise from the use of international waters; there are 217 inter-national rivers, the basins of which cover 47 percent of the surface. Access to fresh water, its resources, and the level of effluent into a body of water traversing different countries are already sources of international tension in many parts of the world.

Current environmental issues demonstrate very visibly global interde-pendence. In the time line, all global concerns are not necessarily national concerns and sometimes even not national interests. The “proliferation” of this concern is a long and contradictory process in which international discussion, cooperation, and probably pressure could play the key role. To illustrate this, we can mention the fact that former Soviet government officials paid no attention to the risks of global warming or ozone depletion until these issues were raised abroad, and only under the influence of international discussions did the debate over global warming and ozone depletion move from the abstract theoretical level to the consideration of practical policy re-sponses. This is very much the same for most countries which began to grapple with global environmental risks only after these issues had been placed on the international agenda.

Starting with the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment of 1972, tremendous efforts were made in establishing international environmental regimes based mainly on conventions and other valid instruments of international law. Hundreds of agreements are in effect in the environmental field at bilateral, regional, and international lev-els. The international Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development had prepared general strategies for environmental devel-opment and numerous specific prescriptions. A serious contribution was made by the Earth Summit on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and by the UN Special General Assembly on the “Rio plus 5” process in June 1997 in New York. On the institu-tional side, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the UN Commission on Sustainable Development are assigned to facilitate national environmental programs and cooperation among nations. Environmental issues became increasingly prominent in activities of other international organizations. Establishment of the

208

Global Environmental Facility (GEF) by the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP created a real financial mechanism for transferring resources from developed to developing countries to address global environ-mental challenges.

This list of achievements by the international community is far from complete. However, there are many unresolved problems on the inter-national agenda, sometimes connected to basic questions such as na-tional sovereignty, national interest, or national security. For instance Prime Minister Carlsson of Sweden outlined:

The old pillars of sovereignty and non-interference in international affairs are slowly giving way to a more flexible system, based as much on concern for the security of people as for the security of states.4

This statement and all arguments mentioned above are supposed to say that the definition of “national security” is evolving more and more towards the term “human security” which reflects existing reali-ties in this world better. This is especially important owing to the fact that the nation-state system (to which the traditional security system is linked genetically) is evolving, giving more power to regional entities on the one hand and delegating some of them to emerging super-national organizations on the other hand, thus losing the capacity to provide protection and security for individuals.5

Most of the major armed conflicts of the last decade were not directly based on the country-against-country principle. This is another signal of the fact that the nation-state system is in the process of gradual evolution. The process is most visible through economic integration and loss of governmental controls on diversified activities within national entities (at least in many developing countries) due to perma-nent budget shortages, growing external debt, and the inability to 4 Quoted in “Congressional Program: The Convergence of US National Security

and the Global Environment.” First Conference, 12-16 November 1996. Wash-ington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 1996, 16.

5 In this context, the authors find some similarities between European integration and Soviet disintegration.

209

control transnational migration. Now they also have environmental stresses. “Environmental strains,” as wrote expert Jessica Mathews from the USA, “that transcend national borders are already beginning to break down the sacred boundaries of national sovereignty, previ-ously rendered porous by the information and communication revolu-tions and the instantaneous global movement of financial capital.”6 The aggravating factor of growing environmental insecurity is that degradation is most evident in areas that have the least economic and technological capacity to cope with change. Facing global challenges, the state-centric views are losing more and more in their capability to resolve current and future problems.

Relationship between Environmental and Military Security Environmental security is directly linked by many ties to military activities and security. The best known and discussed vision consists of the fact that the military sector represents a constant threat to envi-ronmental security. Environmental effects of development, produc-tion, and deployment of military weapons and systems of armed forces maintenance have destructive effects on the state of the environment.

However, the basic part of the risk is associated with warfare or armed conflicts and with the use of weapons of mass destruction; the environment serves as an additional argument to cope with the legacy of war. It is also well known that the military sector consumes a large amount of energy and natural resources, depriving society of the financial resources urgently needed for social and economic develop-ment and environmental protection. After World War II, global mili-tary spending added up to a cumulative $30-35 trillion. For the last decade the world has slowly been moving toward disarmament; the ranks of the world's armed forces have been reduced by 20 percent

6 Mathews, Jessica T. “Redefining Security.” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 2 (1989):

162.

210

from the peak of $28.7 million in 1988 to $23 million in 1995, global stockpiles of weapons hav been reduced from 12 percent in develop-ing countries to an average of 25 percent in industrialized countries.7

Some estimates show that world annual military spending decreased by almost 40 percent. However, a real “peace dividend” from disar-mament, particularly in relation to environmental mobilization, is barely visible in most countries. For the last several years in Russia, the most sensible reductions in military spending go along with drastic and continuous decreases in the “green budget” despite growing public concern about the state of the environment in the Russian Fed-eration. The old Cold War illusion of beating swords into plowshares now seems a long way from reality than a few decades ago.8

Assessing the role of the military sector for environmental security, we cannot avoid the risk imposed on society by outdated military equipment and facilities, which begin to be very visible and inevitable owing to the disarmament process. The Russian case provides the best example in this context. Large deposits of chemical weapons accu-mulated in the country for many decades (almost 40,000 tons of dif-ferent poisons)9 should be destroyed within one decade following international agreement and appropriate commitments, despite real shortages in economic resources and technical capacities. The high environmental risk is attributed to outdated nuclear submarines stored with radioactive fuel. In the Russian arctic zone alone about 70 nuclear submarines have been anchored, 53 of them stored with the fuel. The transportation of fuel to the existing Russian treatment facilities would require 150 special railway trains, each of them at a 7 Renner, Michael. “Budgeting for Disarmament.” In State of the World — 1995:

A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Towards Sustainable Society, 152. New York and London: Norton & Company, 1995; and Brown, Vital Signs 1997, 90; 120.

8 Environmental protection accounts for around 0,5 percent of the annual federal budget which is still the major source of environmental expenditures in Russia; the real spending is even less.

9 Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Ekologicheskaya bezopasnost’ Rossii. Vypusk 1. Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1995, 79.

211

cost of around $500,000 (US),10 not taking into account limited capacities of treatment facilities. This list is far from complete.

While considering the idea of a comprehensive, integrated world security system, we should admit that military security in terms of preventing potential aggression should be a part of this system in the foreseeable future. It is an existing reality in the current world. That is why it seems to be more practical to bridge the interests of environ-mental and military security, particularly by concentrating interna-tional debates on such issues as the optimal size of the military sector including reductions and conversion issues, an evolution to more “environmentally sound” military sectors and to use of army scientific and technological capacities and experiences for the environment’s sake. It is especially important to take into account the fact that the interests of both sides are not always contradictory. There is a growing understanding in the military sector that it is much more difficult to maintain troops and conduct military operations in truly environ-mentally degraded places containing toxins, radioactive isotopes, or having undrinkable water, with no reliable earthquake or flood con-trols.

We would expect that military sectors in different countries would make a larger effort to initiate and expand mutual cooperation by “military-to-military” interactions on environmental matters. A good signal in this direction is the Arctic Military Environmental Coopera-tion (AMEC) based on an official agreement between the USA, Nor-way, and Russia.11 This program covers such important issues as safe storage and transport of spent nuclear fuel, treatment of low and high level radioactive wastes, redemption of contaminated sites, and train-ing for personnel involved in handling radioactive materials. This

10 Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Ekologicheskaya bezopasnost’ Rossii.

Vypusk 1. Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1997, 102; 245.

11 See, for example, Ruff, Nathan, Robert Chamberlain, and Alexandra Cousteau. “Reports On Applying Military and Security Assets to Environmental Problems.” In Environmental Change and Security Project, issue 3, Spring 1997, 87. Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997.

212

might be a starting point for more productive and peaceful cooperation in eliminating environmental risks from military installations and facilities, both those in service and outdated ones, taking into consid-eration the limited Russian economic and technical capacity, defi-ciencies in institutional arrangements to meet the target in the fore-seeable future. Tracing military and environmental linkages, we should say in historical terms that the military did not play an exclu-sively negative role for environmental security. Often on the contrary, it indirectly or intentionally raised public awareness on the environ-ment, contributing directly to social education on environmental risks. The Soviet/Russian case demonstrates this argument.

Military Interests and Global Environment: The Soviet/Russian Case Despite contradictions in the following statement, we should say that in our societies certain education on global environmental risks came from military preparations and activities, or at least that military preparations had a galvanizing effect on the learning process. For example, nuclear arms tests initiated research on long-range trans-portation of dangerous pollutants. A considerable amount of learning about atmospheric risks resulted from developments in the aviation and space industries — important segments of the Soviet economy that were closely linked to the military sector.

The most poignant case was that of ozone depletion. The first Soviet satellite fitted with an ozone measurement device was sent into orbit as early as 1965. At that point, the primary concern was not potential health effects of ozone depletion but potential changes in air currents and atmospheric turbulence that might affect aviation and rocketry as well as possible health risks for crews of high-altitude aircraft. Research on this issue was later expanded to determine the atmospheric effects of the supersonic Tu-144 jet airplane and multiple launches of missiles and rockets.

213

The Soviet military’s interest in the risk of anthropogenic change in climate increased sharply in the early 1970s. In the wake of the US use of military environmental modifications during the war in Viet-nam (for example, use of cloud seeding to slow down enemy offen-sives and use of defoliants to deprive the enemy of food supply and ground cover), increasing reports appeared about military climate research in the USA and debates took place in the US Congress over military use of environmental modification. This resulted in the adop-tion of a Senate resolution in 1973 calling for prohibition of such techniques. Thus both the Soviet military and Soviet government began to pay increasing attention to the prospect of a so-called “geo-physical war.” This was a major turning point in the Soviet debate over these issues, for it was the first time that the prospect of climate manipulation had been cast purely in a negative light. It is interesting to note that the geophysical war debate in the USSR raised the risk of ozone depletion before it became an issue of broad national interest.

This particular concern was reflected in the 1976 edition of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Referring to research in the USA and other Western states, the authors noted that “the possibility of using rockets and other means is being explored for the purpose of changing the physical state of the ozone layer and creating windows above certain adversarial territories in order to provide unlimited penetration of ultraviolet rays and space radiation.”12 Overburdened by the high military expenditures imposed on the national economy by the Cold War, the USSR launched an intensive international effort to secure a global ban on all activities aimed at modifying the environment for military purposes. In August 1974, the Soviet government proposed a United Nations draft treaty to prohibit the military use of environ-mental modification. The United States responded positively to these efforts, and the result, after two years of negotiation, was the signing of the special “Convention on Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile use of Environmental Modification Techniques.”

12 Sovetskaya voennaya entsiklopediya. Vol. 2. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976, 523.

214

Further connection between military issues and global climatic changes emerged in the early 1980s with the debate over a “nuclear winter.” That was a hypothesis that the large quantities of smoke and debris thrust into the atmosphere by a major nuclear exchange could block out solar radiation with disastrous and perhaps terminal conse-quences for all life on Earth. The publication of this hypothesis gen-erated a number of major efforts to model the climatic consequences of nuclear war. This in turn made a major contribution to debate on the prospects for global climate change as a contribution that survived the demise in interest on the nuclear winter issue itself. International efforts to evaluate the nuclear winter scenario were supported enthu-siastically by the Soviet government, although in this case the primary impetus came not from the military but from the top political leader-ship, which sought to use this issue to stimulate popular opposition to the ongoing modernization of nuclear weapons by the USA and NATO.

Although military concerns played a crucial part in stimulating Soviet interest in global environmental risks, the role of the Soviet military cannot be judged as positive on balance. Like any military commu-nity, it used its power to obstruct collection or dissemination of any information that might conceivably be of interest to foreign intelli-gence agencies, including all data concerning emissions from military industrial facilities. This policy and appropriate restrictions were, of course, supported by many industrial departments. They saw no rea-son to provide any more ammunition to internal proponents of more effective environmental policies and to elevate monitoring expenses and heavy pollution control investments.

After the demise of the Soviet Union the Russian military confronted other environmental problems in an international context. The ques-tion was about the environmental legacy of basing Soviet military troops in Eastern Europe, about the preliminary assessment of military impacts on the environment. There were political and economic reasons for environmental claims from Eastern European countries such as property rights to the facilities left behind. However, the Russian military had much to learn on environmental management. Through the military sector, the new leaders of Russia had learned in a

215

practical way that environmental claims can be a very serious subject of international relations.

East-West Cooperation in Environmental Security Environmental issues in Russia had been firmly incorporated in list of national priorities despite the radical changes that had occurred and the continuing, severe economic crisis during the last decade in the country. Russia is not relieved of any international obligation in the field of environment. A new system of East-West international coop-eration that has been developed to deal with the troublesome effects of transition in the former socialist states, is moving now beyond sci-entific contacts and policy discussions to cooperative planning and actions and in some cases to joint implementation strategy.

Yet there is room for improvement of cooperation on international environmental security to reveal the future contribution of the idea of sustainable development to European peace and conflict resolution in particular. It would be important to work out multilateral and multi-dimensional strategies of conflict prevention. The authors would like to suggest the establishment of an international Early Warning System for Environmental Disturbances (EWSED). Paying attention to infractions within the international dimension, the EWSED might be a good practical field to use an existing national and international military infrastructure such as NATO for peaceful purposes. 13

13 Preliminary consultations would be carried out within a multinational Working

Expert Group. To develop effective approaches to these problems, the Expert Group would regularly conduct specific seminars and workshops in different countries. The authors suggest to rely on the ISN maintained by the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research in. The Russian Institute of USA and Canada Studies in Moscow would coordinate these activities within the CIS. Other institutions such as the European Information Network on International Relations and Area Studies would be more than welcome to contribute.

216

The most important problems related to Russia are connected with large deposits of outdated military materials and different equipment that may become dangerous sources of possible trans-boundary con-tamination and should be deactivated. Some international research, technical and economic assistance, as well as multilateral cooperation may be useful and important in this respect.

217

Concluding Remarks Cold War Legacy Soviet foreign and security policy has always been described in terms of oscillating between the revolutionary-imperial paradigm and blunt pragmatism, with the former gradually losing ground since the estab-lishment of “collective leadership” under Brezhnev in the early 1960s.1 Until Stalin’s death in 1953, decisions in the field of foreign and security policy were made solely by the Generalissimus who con-sulted a closed circle of Politburo members, especially Foreign Min-ister Molotov.2 In the months following the end of World War II, Stalin professed a non-confrontational attitude towards the West, but he returned to an ideologically motivated foreign and security policy in the final years of his reign, witnessing eruption of the Cold War, the Berlin crisis of 1948, and the Korean war.3

1 See Hoffmann, Erik. “Soviet Foreign Policy Aims and Accomplishments from

Lenin to Brezhnev.” In Soviet Foreign Policy: Classic and Contemporary Issues, ed. Frederic J. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffmann, and Liard Robbin F., 50. New York: De Gruyter, 1984.

2 For a comprehensive assessment of foreign policy decision making in the late Stalin period based on new archival findings see Zubok, Vladislav and Constan-tin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.

3 For a concise evaluation of new findings as well as standard works on the begin-nings of the Cold War, see Tucker, Robert. “The Cold War in Stalin’s Time: What the New Sources Reveal.” Diplomatic History 21, no. 2 (1997): 273-281. See also: Filitov, Aleksey M. “Kak nachinalas’ ‘kholodnaya voyna’.” In Sovet-skaya vneshnaya politika v gody ‘kholodnoy voyny’, 1945-1985: novoe pro-chtenie, ed. L. N. Nezhinskiy, 47-68. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1995.

219

It has often been argued — and recently declassified archive materials seem to support this view — that Stalin’s decision making was less motivated by a Cold War master plan than by the traumatic perception of surrounding hostility.4 The first use of the “total weapon” by the United States against Japan in August 1945 caused deep shock in the Kremlin and led to another “revolution from above” to carry out a massive rearmament program. Eventually it created what was to become the military-industrial complex. The second significant threat perception leading Stalin to choose a confrontational course was the Marshall Plan, directly causing his risky “blockade” gambit in Berlin, announcement of the so-called “two camps” doctrine at the first Cominform meeting in 1947 and, ultimately, leading to the establish-ment of the Warsaw Pact Organization.5

Stalin’s true motivations and aims with regard to Germany — a key issue for understanding the origin and nature of the Cold War — are still disputed and yet an object of historic fascination. This is shown by Aleksey Filitov’s contribution and accordingly became evident at the conference plenary discussion. While new archive findings allow the view that the famous March 1952 note was, in the words of Robert Tucker, “essentially a Cold War manoeuver by means of diplomacy” and that “a positive response by Western governments was never envisaged in Moscow,”6 Filitov goes slightly further, suggesting that, despite officially professed efforts to resolve the “German question,” leaving that question open and readily accepting West Germany’s rearmament suited Soviet interests much better. A surprising analogy can be discerned, according to Filitov, to the present situation, where a

4 See especially: Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin

Years. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

5 See the commented edition of the recently declassified Cominform record: Pro-cacci, Guliano et al., eds. The Cominfom: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1996. Also, see Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy; 1939-1956. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

6 Tucker, The Cold War, 281. See also: Wettig, Gerhard. “Stalin und die deutsche Frage: Die Note vom 10. März 1952.” Osteuropa 47 no. 12 (1997): 1259-1273.

220

harsh campaign against NATO enlargement “is looking again more like propaganda for it.”7

Filitov’s suggestion that Stalin’s actions seem to carry the signature of a hidden grand design that was put at risk by Khrushchev’s Cuban gamble is debatable. Mutual vulnerability and therefore mutual deter-rence did not yet exist in 1954. It was precisely against the back-ground of the Berlin crisis of 1958-1962 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 — crises directly connected to the question of the nuclear balance — that Moscow and Washington developed mutual confi-dence in areas of common interest, notably the German and nuclear questions.8 But Filitov’s line of argument is helpful in so far as it reminds us of the fact that Cold War alliances aimed not only at enemy deterrence but were at the same time used to manage intra-bloc relations. NATO’s raison d’être was never only the “deterrence” of the USSR, as Maximychev suggests. It always performed at least a triple role, i.e. “to keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in.”9 And if one understands alliances in this broader sense, as tools to manage international relations, there seems to be less reason for anxiety in the face of today’s enlargement of NATO.

As for the impact of ideology on decision making, the description of early Cold War Soviet leaders by Zubok and Pleshakov is equally true for the period of “peaceful coexistence” as well as the period of détente:

Not all of the leaders were die-hard dogmatics. (...) Sometimes they even enjoyed more flexibility in their roles than their Western counterparts. Yet the messianic prescriptions of revolutionary-imperial ideology loomed large

7 See above, p. 153.

8 On the evolution of American thinking about the absolute weapon see Wenger, Andreas. Living With Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons. Lan-ham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. On American perception of negotiations with the Soviets in the early 1960s see Wenger, Andreas. “Kennedy, Chruschtschow und das gemeinsame Interesse der Supermächte am Status quo in Europa.” Vier-teljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 46, no. 1 (1998): 69-99.

9 Quotation ascribed to Lord Ismay, NATO Secretary General 1952-1957.

221

in the political environment in which Soviet leaders struggled, rose, and fell. Ideology was neither the servant nor the master of Soviet foreign policy. But it was the delirium tremens of Soviet statesmen, the core of the regime’s self-legitimacy, a terrifying delusion they could never shake off.10

Today, ideology is no longer an issue in foreign and security policy making, although the word, with positive connotation, is publicly and officially being used again in the context of a new “Russian idea.”11 Foreign and security policy is now a means of serving and protecting Russia’s national interests, which, as comprehensively described in the newly adopted security doctrine, are perceived in the field of inner challenges — economic and social development — rather than in the context of a Russian mission civilisatrice. Notwithstanding this, Rus-sia insists on being an “influential Euro-Asian power” and claims international recognition of this status. Great power status is a per se value, attached to high emotions and essentially non-discussible. This is despite the fact that, from a Western point of view, it seems an inversion of logic to presume great power status as a premise without analyzing to what extent the country’s performance as an economic, military, or spiritual actor actually qualifies Russia for this claim.

Many Russian foreign and security policy analysts and decision-mak-ers profess an ambiguous relationship to their own Soviet past. While overcoming the Soviet system in general is proudly perceived as an achievement beneficial to the entire international community, certain accomplishments of the Soviet era have been positively internalized, yielding self-identification and a tendency to speak in terms of “we”

10 Zubok/Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 276.

11 The Constitution of the Russian Federation (Art. 13, part 2) states that “no ideol-ogy may be instituted as a state-sponsored or mandatory ideology.” Interestingly, former Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Ivan Rybkin, referred to the newly adopted security doctrine as “a document representing the ideology of the new State, of a new socioeconomic structure, of new principles of life.” (Press release of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1997, on the occasion of the president’s approving the security doctrine). About the offi-cial contest for contributions to a new “Russian idea,” see above, p. 82, fn. 27.

222

about positive aspects and deeds of the past.12 Legally, this situation is reflected by the fact that Russia, as a successor in interest of the USSR, is expected to answer for the debts of the bankrupt Soviet system and is entitled to take advantage of the remaining assets. Another aspect of psychology is the tendency to think and argue in military terms of “defeat” or “victory,” “surrender” or “humiliation.” Departing from the belief that NATO, the USA, or European govern-ments profess the same thinking, the “West” is often criticized for allegedly harboring views about Russia having “lost” the Cold War.

Russia in a Multi-Polar World No longer being a global superpower but a “leading Euro-Asiatic power” brings Russia closer to the level of other — real or potential — regional powers such as China, India, or Brazil. In other words, the global system of international relations is changing from bi-polarity to multi-polarity. “To strengthen the trends towards forming a multi-polar world” is thus a key objective of Russian foreign and security policy.

12 A good example from the panel discussion is a statement regarding the Russian

performance in the field of human rights protection, where a Russian conference participant argued that “we have signed the Helsinki Act at the very beginning and implemented all the relevant provisions.” The opposite attitude is to deny responsibility for crimes and mistakes committed by the Soviet regime. See, for example, Stankevich, Sergei. “Toward a new ‘Russian Idea’.” In Rethinking Rus-sia’s National Interests, ed. Stephen Sestanovich, 24-32. Washington, DC: Cen-ter for Strategic and International Studies, 1994: “It was neither Russia nor the Russians who sent troops into the Baltics in 1940, into Hungary in 1956, into Czechoslovakia in 1968, and into Afghanistan in 1979. It was the ruling elite of the totalitarian Soviet state that pursued those actions. Attempts to blame Russia or the Russians for the crimes of the Soviet Union are the result of malicious lies and historical blindness.”

223

The fulfillment of this process is expected to take a “lengthy period of time,” as “relapses into attempts to resolve the world’s problems unilaterally, even by military means,” are considered to be characteristic for the present stage.13

Russian foreign and security policy performance in terms of bilateral relations in multiple directions is described by Yevgeniy Bazhanov’s contribution. Besides the Euro-Atlantic aspect and the vital CIS dimension, Russian foreign policy has a strong Southern and Eastern vector, aiming at stability and fruitful trade relations and the founding of “strategic partnerships” with the most important countries in Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific region.

The Peoples’ Republic of China currently attracts the greatest Russian interest. An unprecedented activity in high-level meetings, joint dec-larations, and agreements between the two countries has taken place in recent years. The first important step to this rapprochement was President Yeltsin’s April 1996 visit to Beijing and the signing of an agreement enhancing the former “constructive partnership” to a “strategic partnership,” followed by a joint Declaration on a Multi-polar World by the two heads of state (April 1997). Since then, a number of bilateral cooperation agreements have been signed, aimed at increasing foreign trade and de-militarizing the 4,000-km common border. In addition, Russia fosters confidence building between Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, and China.14

13 The National Security Concept, (“Kontseptsiya natsional’noy besopaznosti

Rossiyskoy Federacii,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, 26 December 1997) part I, 1st para-graph.

14 For a comprehensive assessment of Russian-Chinese relations, see Wacker, Gudrun. China und Russland: Auf dem Weg zur “strategischen Partnerschaft”? Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, no. 41. Cologne: BIOst, 1996.

224

Russia within European Security Structures In the context of a new European security architecture, Russia’s striving towards multi-polarity is discussed in terms of multilateral relations, i.e. of international organizations. Ever since the fall of the Soviet Empire, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, until 1994 CSCE) has been Moscow’s favorite mul-tilateral structure. High hopes were attached to this organization, whose member-states cover the impressive territory “from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” In addition to the fact that it comprises the United States and Canada as well as all European countries (with the excep-tion of the former Yugoslavia, whose membership is still suspended), the internal decision-making process based on consensus truly imple-ments the Russian vision of no country playing an overly influential role. Hence, Russia has always called for a powerful, stronger OSCE, most obviously on the occasion of drafting the Lisbon summit docu-ment titled A Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe of the 21st Century.15

The early 1990s’ OSCE “spirit of Paris” seems to be perceived as a binding commitment made by the governments of Europe and the USA at that “new beginning” period. Its rather quick evaporation, followed by a shift of focus towards NATO as the only functioning security organization, leaving Russia outside, has been perceived as a partial betrayal. Moscow’s abandonment of its “Westernizing” inter-national orientation, as expressed by the dismissal of Foreign Minister Kozyrev, is seen as a result rather than a cause of this process. In his

15 In March 1996, Russia submitted its maximalist draft text of the Common and

Comprehensive Security Model, to be discussed at the Lisbon summit. For details, such as the suggestion to install a “European Security Council” as a per-manent OSCE institution, see Maximychev, above, p. 195. Similar thoughts, at an official level, are presented by Afanas’evskij, Nikolai. “The OSCE Summit in Lisbon.” International Affairs (Moscow) 43, no. 1 (1997): 33-36. For an objec-tive assessment, see Zagorski, Andrey. “Russia and European Institutions.” In Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda, ed. Vladimir Baranovsky, 519-542. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

225

contribution, Igor Maximychev explores the Russian fascination with the OSCE at a broader level, as a claim insisting that the “Yalta-Potsdam system” be succeeded after the end of Cold War confronta-tion by a truly comprehensive — inclusive rather than exclusive — security architecture with NATO as an integrated military structure as opposed to the core body. However, the notion of expanding the OSCE into a continental system of collective security is not acceptable to many in the West. One can point to the conceptual weaknesses of collective security arrangements in general, as Gerhard Wettig did in his comments. Moreover, such skepticism seems to be supported by the events in ex-Yugoslavia, proving the limits of a UN-type security system on a regional level.

Realistically assessing the chances for a further strengthening of the OSCE as dim, Sergey Rogov instead calls for a revision of the CFE Treaty and substantial cooperation within the framework of the NATO-Russia act, especially the Joint Permanent Council established with this agreement. In terms of a broader understanding of European security, Rogov attaches importance to full recognition of Russia as “an equal partner” in international economic relations — not just giving lip service to the idea. Taking note of the European Union’s enlargement plans and its big share of Russian foreign trade, he accuses the United States and European countries of continuously “discriminating against Russia.” He insists that Russia become a full-fledged G-7 partner, “an arrangement which may allow Russia to rise upwards in the global economic hierarchy.” But Rogov also makes clear that overcoming its domestic economic and political crisis remains a central precondition for a true partnership between Russia and the West.

Russia and NATO Enlargement The question of Russia’s role within the post-Cold War European security architecture was long dominated by a single issue — eastward extension or enlargement of the North-Atlantic alliance. Most Russian

226

analysts still refer to this process as “expansion.”16 As well known, Moscow has always objected to an increasing role of NATO in Eastern Europe, which it does not understand as an “export of sta-bility” but as a potential threat to its own security. The official word-ing in this context expresses concerns about “drawing new division lines” in Europe caused by NATO enlargement and expectations that the Alliance will undergo a further process of substantial “transfor-mation.”

Much having been accomplished with the signing of the Founding Act in May 1997,17 Russia is still far from being at ease with three of its former satellites — Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary — joining the Alliance. Many in Moscow regard the expansion as betrayal by the West. A widely held opinion claims that official promise had been given by European governments that NATO would refrain from extending if the Soviet Union did not inhibit German reunification.18 With the first step of enlargement becoming a political reality, the focus has shifted towards preventing a possible second round likely to bring NATO in direct proximity to the Russian Fed-eration.

While several of the conference participants emphasized the unique Russian consensus in opposing NATO “expansion,” the contributions

16 See, for example, the contributions by Kortunov, Filitov, Bazhanov, Rogov, and

Maximychev (p. 31, 162, 168, 181ff., 196ff.).

17 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997. For further relevant documents, see “Major Milestones in NATO-Russia Relations: A Chronology of Important Events” on the NATO World Wide Web site (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ fndact-c.htm).

18 A good example is provided by a press conference of former Defense Minister Rodionov in Brussels, on 18 December 1996: “I remember very well the times when the first president of Russia, Mr. Gorbachev, met with European leaders (...). Verbal assurances were given from many, many leaders that there will never be any talk about NATO enlargement to the East.” See Press Point of Mr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, and Minister Igor Rodionov, Russian Defence Minister, Brussles, 18 December 1996.

227

to this book reflect a wide range of attitudes professed by Russian foreign policy representatives on this topic. A blend of total rejection, general skepticism about constructive cooperation expectations, and even hints at a positive assessment are expressed in the contributions by Filitov, Bazhanov, Rogov, and Maximychev. While Maximychev categorically objects to a security architecture based on NATO enlargement, Filitov seems inclined to acknowledge a potentially sta-bilizing effect of an enlarged alliance, as was the case at NATO’s founding when its goal was to perform a “double containment” role. Given these points of view, Rogov assumes a middle position, explic-itly noting chances of mutual benefit in the important but difficult partnership between Russia and NATO. However, as both Rogov and Bazhanov correctly emphasize, future relations between Russia and NATO, as well as the future stability of the European security system, crucially depend on how the Founding Act is implemented.

Taking Russia’s legitimate security concerns and threat perceptions fully into account, it still seems important to consider the security interests of the neighboring countries concerned. Many Russian for-eign and security analysts and decision makers still tend to ignore the obvious reason for Eastern European states to seek NATO member-ship, relying on the official diplomatic wording that the new mem-bers’ admission is not directed against any specific third country. Rather than taking into account the security concerns of its former allies, Moscow has decided to address Brussels to discuss the matter of NATO enlargement on a “great power-to-great power” basis.

Verbal tension between Russia and the Northern-Atlantic countries has significantly decreased since signing the Founding Act in the spring of 1997. The agreement, a framework for enhanced partnership and potential cooperation to mutual benefit, provides for consultations on a regular basis and increasing practical cooperation. Russia is given no right of veto in inner-NATO decision making, nor does the Alliance gain means of influence in internal Russian policy making. The low level of politically binding power is seen ambiguously by the NATO partners as both a chance to remain independent and to lack commitment, thus performing that inner “transformation” Russia is calling for.

228

Traditional and Modern Security Agendas While non-military threats and challenges to social security and wel-fare are very high on Russia’s present security agenda, “classic” defense and disarmament issues, for many reasons, continue to play an important role in foreign and security policy making. Russia adopted a preliminary new military doctrine in 1993,19 a final version of which is expected to be drafted in parallel to elaboration and implementation of an urgently required army reform within the framework of the 1997 security doctrine.20 With its armed forces facing a serious crisis, Russia relies on its nuclear forces to maintain a minimum level of military power. The only one of the former Soviet republics to have retained atomic power status, Russia considers nuclear deterrence, including a “first use” option, an important strategic means, as described in the 1993 draft military doctrine as well as in the newly adopted security doctrine.21

19 See “Voennaya doktrina Rossii,” Rossiysskie vesti, 18 November 1993.

20 On the occasion of putting in force the new security doctrine by presidential decree, the then Secretary of the Security Council, Ivan Rybkin, explained the hierarchy of doctrines envisaged by the president: “this is a general basic con-ceptual document, on grounds of which a whole complex of other policy and strategy related doctrines and programs will have to be elaborated: the military doctrine, doctrines of economic and financial security, of social security, of food supply security, of information and ecological security, and many others.” (See Release 02/18 Dec. 1997 by the Press Service of the Russian National Security Council.) With the dissolution of the Russian Defense Council, its integration into the Security Council, and appointment of a qualified, high-ranking Defense ministry representative (A. A. Kokoshin) as Security Council Secretary, the president additionally tightened security policy authority.

21 While tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the territories of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to Russia in 1991-1992, strategic nuclear weapons issues were more complicated. Only after having received considerable interna-tional security guarantees, did Ukraine join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and later, in December 1994, ratify START I.

For a general assessment of Russian arms control strategy, see Konovalov, Alex-ander A. “The Changing Role of Military Factors.” In Baranovsky, Russia and Europe, 196-219.

229

The 1993 treaty on strategic nuclear forces (START II) still awaits ratification by the Russian parliament. In addition, there is reason to assume that Moscow might abandon the informal 1991 regime on restricting deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, although the long-term contribution to deterrence and increasing security of these weap-ons is questionable.22 The declaration of the North-Atlantic Council ministerial meeting of December 1996 that NATO will not deploy any tactical nuclear weapons on territories of possible future members has calmed Russian security concerns and provides a basis for the hope that Eastern Europe — including Belarus — will remain a non-nuclear zone. For Russia, the most important issue in the context of arms control is the CFE Treaty, a revised version of which is to be negotiated by late 1998.23 As known — and mentioned in Rogov’s contribution — the Russian Federation reserves the right to strengthen its Western and Southwestern flanks.

As mentioned more than once, non-military challenges play a very important role in Russia’s present security risks perception. A stable international environment and the absence of an immediate military threat create a situation where Russia can direct more of its resources towards internal development. Economic and social challenges — and suggestions on how to cope with them — are described extensively in the 1997 security doctrine, and most conference contributions touched upon those aspects. In addition, there are a number of trans-national security aspects. All of these are closely interwoven with internal Russian factors, but they concern the security interests of the interna-

22 See Sokov, Nikolai. “Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination: Next Step for Arms

Control.” The Nonproliferation Revue 4, no. 2 (1997) (online edition). For an insight into Russian opinions on START II ratification, see Schilling, Walter. “START II und die Rüstungspolitik Russlands.” Osteuropa 46, no. 7 (1996): 657-663.

23 After the MBFR talks (held in Vienna until 1989) were concluded without a result, the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) within the OSCE, 1992, led to a first CFE Treaty. A first modification, summer 1996, pro-vided for some temporary leverage for Russian flanks concerns. The Vienna CFE revision conference has been in effect since 1997.

230

tional community at large and require international cooperation to prevent hazardous situations on a potentially large scale. The most important of these aspects are migration, organized crime, and eco-logical security. In their contribution, Vassiliy Sokolov and Andrey Korneev explore continuities and discontinuities of Soviet and Rus-sian ecology policies.

Key threats to ecological security on the territory of the Russian Fed-eration are described, especially the risks caused by outdated military equipment and poorly maintained weaponry. Raising the issue of the so-called Bellona case,24 the conference panel discussed the impor-tance of free access to relevant information, strengthening of resulting consciousness, and further development of civil society as precondi-tions for a responsible ecological security policy.25

24 In summer 1996, the Oslo-based Bellona Foundation released a shocking report

titled The Russian Northern Fleet. Sources to Radioactive Contamination, which was immediately declared “banned literature” in Russia. A Murmansk-based Bellona employee, co-author of the report, retired Captain A. Nikitin, was arrested and charged with high treason through espionage and divulging of state secrets, on the basis of secret military laws. Besides the fact that principles of legal protection guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights were violated, the Russian Security Service’s action can hardly be described as being in line with the Russian Constitution, which protects the right to reliable information on hazardous environmental issues (Art. 42). To date, Nikitin is held under city arrest in St. Petersburg. For details, see http://www.bellona.no.

25 For a general assessment of Russian ecological problems, see Feshbach, Murray. Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995.

231

Conclusions

Definition of National Interests Russia must still find its place in Europe. The nation faces difficulties in this quest to overcome great domestic political and socioeconomic transformations and, at the same time, to orient itself to the new multi-polar and independent setting abroad. Confronted with this dual challenge, the Russian leadership must cope with the task of lending continuity to foreign and security policy on the basis of a pragmatic definition of the nation’s long-term interests.

In view of the continuing orientation crisis, the danger consisted (and still consists) in the fact that Russia, in establishing its national inter-ests, holds to “holistic” concepts which push traditional missionary thinking and a “statist” design into the foreground. Despite or perhaps because of the current weakness of the country, it orients itself toward Great Power status that is undermined in many ways. The foreign policy rhetoric of the Russian elite — even if not at the same level of importance as foreign policy moves — stands in marked contrast to current military potential and the difficult social and economic situation. Accordingly, the difficulty of Russia’s approach to Western European countries and institutions is in the fact that Moscow links the desire for cooperation with the West with the image of a special status in international relations.

In the everyday foreign policy of past years, national interests were formulated in a largely negative way. In view of domestic policy ten-sions between the various political camps, a consensus developed to reject everything that seemed incompatible with Russian Great Power claims. However, this claim of a “past” status is assumed, as the Soviet Union availed itself of real leverage options. Indeed, the Russia of today continues to refer to the nation’s nuclear potential, to its abundance of resources, and to its geographic position as a Eurasian power. Yet such a “geopolitical” way of looking at things overlooks the fact that in the globalization era factors such as economic power and information technologies increasingly determine a nation’s ability to influence international relations.

A definition of national interest which orients itself to a “holistic”

235

Great Power concept not only leads to foreign policy isolation but also to resulting domestic conflicts, i.e. between the center and eco-nomically developing regions as well as between elements of a plu-ralistic Russian society. Hence an important assumption for shaping Russia’s foreign relations is formed by arranging clear foreign and security policy priorities from any consensus-forming basis which considers the visions and interests of various groups and elements of Russian society.

At least at the conceptual level — within the framework of working on a new security doctrine — a rethinking has been observed for sev-eral years. The realization that threats for Russia do not loom from abroad and are not of a military nature must now be transformed into political practice. Despite “imperialist” tones, the general tendencies of developing the foreign and security policy of years past indicate a positive direction. This applies to shaping relations to states within the CIS as well as in a European and global context.

Russia’s Relationship with CIS Neighbors The “national idea” remains inseparable from the fate of the former Soviet republics for a broad portion of the Russian political public. CIS territory — above all Russia’s relations with the Slavic nations of Belarus and Ukraine — represents one of the most important objec-tives of Russian foreign and security policy for the foreseeable future.

The core of Russian CIS policy is isolationist and strives for economic and strategic advantages in this area. Despite imperial rhetoric, Russia’s policy toward its immediate neighboring states is currently marked by constructive pragmatism. However, Russia could not bear a more intense integration within the CIS sphere due to its financial burden. Typical of developments in the CIS territory is the fact that sub-regional structures (bilateral relations above all) are becoming more important, while the CIS on the other hand is progressively los-ing importance as a multilateral institution.

236

Over the long term, it will be of crucial importance if Russia allows economic or military-strategy considerations to predominate in form-ing its relations with these countries. Linked with this is the question which political powers prevail in Moscow. Russia’s domestic devel-opment will be paramount in deciding if the integration process of this territory will occur naturally or by force.

In regard to the stability of all of Europe, the great challenge consists in preventing Ukraine and Belarus to become “buffer zones” between an enlarging NATO (and EU) and Russia. Thus the West is challenged to support these countries economically and politically while promoting their independence. The increased stability of these countries also fits in with Russian interests. This applies especially to Ukraine. Its potential should develop sharply in its direct neighbor status with the expanded European Union.

Russia in Europe and in the Global Setting Due to domestic policy instability and an extremely difficult economic situation, Russia will remain an unpredictable partner for the West in the foreseeable future. The area of conflict between shrill rhetoric directed toward the heated mood of domestic policy and pragmatic decisions in cooperation with key international partners is nowhere as clear as in the difficult Russian relationship with Europe.

Even if great portions of the Russian elite have found common cause in rejecting NATO’s eastern enlargement, some signs of progress can still be noted in Russia’s security policy cooperation. The joint mili-tary role in the Bosnian war is primarily seen as a milestone in the process of strengthening confidence-building between the North-Atlantic alliance and Russia, where Russian troops under their own supreme commander bore part of the responsibility for promoting peace in this region, serving side by side with troops from NATO member states. This first important joint mission followed the institu-tionalization of bilateral relations in the form of NATO-Russian con-

237

sultation.

This approach permitted Russian isolation anxiety resulting from the first NATO enlargement round to be cushioned politically. The future and debate on a second NATO enlargement round will have to test the feasibility of the Founding Act’s modalities. From an economic standpoint, the integration of Russia into G-7 stands symbolically for a more intensive relationship of the country to the global economy. A greater challenge will consist in finding a healthy balance between necessary protectionism and worthwhile deregulation in foreign trade, and defining relationships with the World Trade Organization.

The numerous bilateral and multilateral economic inter-weavings which exist between individual business groups, financial structures and individual Russian regions, and the outside world are much more important to the country’s development than the “high policy” events. As a consequence of these economic inter-weavings, the Moscow center must consider increased regional and sub-national economic and political interests in formulating its national foreign and security policy.

How Can Russia Meet the Challenge? Looking toward the future, the Kremlin leadership is challenged to give Russian foreign policy a consistent direction that orients itself to the country’s long-term interests and the actual potential. At the same time it should be kept in mind by all sides that the era of the Soviet Empire belongs to the irrevocable past. In view of the continuing economic predicament, the uncertainty of domestic politics involves the danger that foreign policy will be orchestrated by various voices in pursuit of short-term political interests.

A foreign policy marked by shifting rhetoric makes Russia not only an unpredictable partner in European and global affairs. It also blocks off a positive domestic Russian dialog in the long term on the posture of Russia in Europe and the world. Here also lies one of the great chal-

238

lenges to Russian society and its present government: Russia cannot avoid re-appraising its history of the past decades in an unprejudiced manner. This will include the relationship of Soviet power with Cen-tral and Eastern Europe states.

Russia is introspective, and this is good. In this way the continuing social, economic, and political transformation process is accompanied by the pronounced desire of a broad segment of society to return to normality. Hopefully the economic crisis facing Russian society will soon bottom out and begin a rebound. But, parallel to this, it is also important that existing domestic and foreign realities are noted in open Russian debate, for example, the challenge of a pluralist social structure, the fact of decentralization and shifting of central power to the regions, and the new international situation favorable to Russia.

Russia’s foreign and security policy decision making process cannot be called fully open and democratic. It is still influenced too much by institutional interests of the ramified foreign policy apparatus as well as a few economic groups. Nevertheless, in recent years a gradual opening of Russian foreign policy has been observed. Thus within the Russian Foreign Ministry, for example, a department was created to coordinate foreign policy activities in the regions. In the center, rec-ognition seems gradually to be sinking in that a policy, which fails to consider the interests of important elements of the Russian State, can hardly be implemented over the long term.

What Can the West Do? What can the West do to support this process? At first sight relatively little. The direction in which the nation wants to go will be decided in domestic Russian dialog. Despite this it is important that the West gives serious heed to Russian interests, sensitivities and anxiety over threats by seeking to reduce traditional enemy images and fear of contact through open dialog with Russia. At the same time the West must be prepared to present to the Russian side its own values and

239

convictions that form the background to important political decisions such as the eastern enlargement of NATO.

The West is challenged to continue its support for the Russian reform project and to use the historic chance of building a Europe that is no longer divided by lines of ideological demarcation. At the same time, cooperation with Russia should not be confined to the level of eco-nomic relations but must lead into all-embracing cooperation that also includes support for building a civilian society.

Russia is closely linked with Europe in many ways, not least by a common culture and centuries of history. Despite stressing the Rus-sian “special path” and “diversification of foreign policy” (Primakov) the West is the most important point of orientation for Russia, not only in an economic sense but also in terms of ideals. Thus Russia’s quest for its own post-Soviet identity can be seen as an intensive debate with the Western world, its traditions, and values. In contrast to the polemics spread over Russia’s “isolation” in Europe, it must be determined that Western Europe and Russia never stood closer in their common history than since the end of the Cold War. Despite all the differences and inequities, intensive dialogues and exchanges are underway between these two parts of Europe which are worth ex-ploring more profoundly.

240

Selected Bibliography

Published Sources Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Paige Sullivan, eds. Russia and the Com-

monwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data, and Analysis. Armonk, NY: Sharp, 1997.

“Dokumente zu den Entwicklungen in Russland und in der Gemein-schaft Unabhängiger Staaten (GUS).” Internationale Politik 52, no. 1 (1997): 77-118.

“Dokumente zur Aussenpolitik Russlands und der Mitgliedstaaten der GUS.” Internationale Politik 50, no. 11 (1995): 73-120.

“Kontseptsiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federacii,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, 26 December 1997

Books and Articles Afanas’evskij, Nikolai. “The OSCE Summit in Lisbon.” International

Affairs (Moscow) 43, no. 1 (1997): 33-36.

Alexandrowa, Olga. “The NATO-Ukraine Charter: Kiev’s Euro-Atlantic Integration.” Aussenpolitik: German Foreign Affairs Re-view 48, no. 4 (1997) (online edition).

Alexandrowa, Olga and Heinz Timmermann. “Integration und Desin-tegration in den Beziehungen Russland-Belarus-GUS.” Osteuropa 47, no. 10/11 (1997): 1022-1037.

Baranovsky, Vladimir, ed. Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Bazhanov, Yevgeni. Russia’s Changing Foreign Policy. Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, no. 30. Cologne: BIOst, 1996.

243

Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien. Der Osten im Prozess der Differenzierung: Fortschritte und Miss-erfolge der Transformation. Jahrbuch 1996/97 des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien. Cologne: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1997.

Buszynski, Leszek. Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.

Dibb, Paul. The Incomplete Superpower. Basingstock: Macmillan 1986.

Dugin, Aleksandr. Osnovy geopolitiki. Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997.

Feshbach, Murray. Eccological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995.

Filitov, Aleksey M. “Kak nachinalas’ ‘kholodnaya voyna’.” In Sovet-skaya vneshnaya politika v gody ‘kholodnoy voyny’, 1945-1985: novoe prochtenie, ed. L. N. Nezhinskiy, 47-68. Moscow: Mezhdu-narodnye otnosheniya, 1995.

———. Germanskiy vopros: ot raskola k ob"edineniyu: novoe prochtenie. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1993.

Fleron, Frederic J. Jr., Erik P. Hoffmann, and Robbin F. Laird, eds. Soviet Foreign Policy: Classic and Contemporary Issues. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991.

Françoise, Thom. “Eurasianism: A New Russian Foreign Policy?” Uncaptive Minds: A Journal of Information and Opinion on East-ern Europe, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 65-77.

Garnett, Sherman W. Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe. Washing-ton, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997.

Geier, Wolfgang. Russland und Europa: Skizzen zu einem schwierigen Verhältnis. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996.

244

Gori, Francesca and Silvio Pons, eds. The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-1953. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy; 1939-1956. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

Institut Otkrytoe Obshchestvo. V poiskakh svoego puti: Rossiya mezhdu Evropoy i Aziey. Moscow: Institut Otkrytoe Obshchestvo, 1997.

Kappeler, Andreas, ed. Regionalismus und Nationalismus in Russland. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996.

Kempe, Iris. “Direkte Nachbarschaft: Erweiterte Europäische Union und Russische Föderation.” Europäische Rundschau 26, no. 4 (1997): 43-55.

Konovalov, Alexander A. “The Changing Role of Military Factors.” In Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda, ed. Vla-dimir Baranovsky, 196-219. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Kortunov, Andrei and Andrei Volodin. Contemporary Russia: National Interests and Emerging Foreign Policy Perceptions. Be-richte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und interna-tionale Studien, no. 33. Cologne: BIOst, 1996.

Kortunov, Sergei. “View from Russia: The Fate of Russia.” Com-parative Strategy 15, no. 2 (1996): 183-191.

Kreikemeyer, Anna and Andrej Zargorskij. Russlands Politik in bewaffneten Konflikten in der GUS. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997.

Lüders, Carl H. Ideologie und Machtdenken in der Aussen- und Si-cherheitspolitik der Sowjetunion. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1981.

Malcolm, Neil et al., eds. Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press 1996.

245

McAuley, Mary. Russia's Politics of Uncertainty. New York: Cam-bridge University Press, 1997.

McDaniel, Tim. The Agony of the Russian Idea. Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Müller, Derek, Jeronim Perović, and Andreas Wenger. “Die neue russische Sicherheitsdoktrin im Zeichen des Transformationspro-zesses.” Aussenpolitik 49, no. 1 (1998): 32-35.

Naimark, Norman and Leonid Gibianskii, eds. The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

Pavlyuk, Oleksandr. “Ukraine and Regional Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe.” Security Dialoque 28, no. 3 (1997): 347-361.

Petro, Nicolai N. The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpreta-tion of Political Culture. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Procacci, Guliano et al., eds. The Cominfom: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1996.

Ra’anan, Uri and Kate Martin, eds. Russia: A Return to Imperialism? New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

Raeff, Marc. Politique et culture en Russie: 18e-20e siècles. Paris: Éditions de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1996.

Ruff, Nathan, Robert Chamberlain, and Alexandra Cousteau. “Reports On Applying Military and Security Assets to Environmental Problems.” In Environmental Change and Security Project, issue 3, Spring 1997, 82-95. Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997.

Rühl, Lothar. Aufstieg und Niedergang des Russischen Reiches: Der Weg eines tausendjährigen Staates. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1992.

246

Segbers, Klaus and Stephan De Spiegeleire, eds. Post-Soviet Puzzles: Mapping the Political Economy of the Former Soviet Union. 4 vols. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995.

Sergounin, Alexander A. Russia’s Regionalization: The International Dimension. Working Papers, no. 20. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1997.

Sestanovich, Stephen, ed. Rethinking Russia’s National Interests. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994.

Shearman, Peter, ed. Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

Sherr, James. “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement? The Black Sea Fleet Accords.” Survival 39, no. 3 (1997): 33-50.

Schilling, Walter. “START II und die Rüstungspolitik Russlands.” Osteuropa 46, no. 7 (1996): 657-663.

Simon, Gerhard. “Auf der Suche nach der ‚Idee für Russland‘.” Osteuropa 47, no. 12 (1997): 1169-1190.

Sokov, Nikolai. “Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination: Next Step for Arms Control.” The Nonproliferation Revue 4, no. 2 (1997) (online edition).

Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Ekologicheskaya bezo-psnost’ Rossii. Vypusk 1. Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1997.

———. Ekologicheskaya bezopsnost’ Rossii. Vypusk 1. Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1995.

Spanger, Hans-Joachim. Russland und der Westen: Von der “strategischen Partnerschaft” zur “Strategie der Partnerschaft.” Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 1998.

247

Spiegeleire, Stephan De. “Gullivers Fäden: Die russischen Regionen und die Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Russischen Födera-tion.” In Russland und der Westen: Von der “strategischen Part-nerschaft” zur “Strategie der Partnerschaft,” ed. Hans-Joachim Spanger, 150-176. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag, 1998.

Stavrakis, Peter J., Joan DeBardeleben, and Larry Black, eds. Beyond the Monolith: The Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Rus-sia. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997.

Stökl, Günther. Russische Geschichte: Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. 5th rev. ed. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1990.

Tismaneanu, Vladimir, ed. Political Culture and Civil Society in Rus-sia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1995.

Tucker, Robert. “The Cold War in Stalin’s Time: What the New Sources Reveal.” Diplomatic History 21, no. 2 (1997): 273-281.

Wacker, Gudrun. China und Russland: Auf dem Weg zur “strategi-schen Partnerschaft”? Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissen-schaftliche und internationale Studien, no. 41. Cologne: BIOst, 1996.

Wallander, Celeste A., ed. The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

Welch, Stephen. The Concept of Political Culture. London: Macmil-lan, 1993.

Wenger, Andreas. “Kennedy, Chruschtschow und das gemeinsame Interesse der Supermächte am Status quo in Europa.” Vierteljahrs-hefte für Zeitgeschichte 46, no. 1 (1998): 69-99.

Wenger, Andreas and Jeronim Perović. “Russlands Sicherheitspolitik vor der Neubestimmung? Die Herausforderung der NATO-Oster-weiterung.” Osteuropa 48, no. 5 (1998): 451-466.

———. “Russia’s Ambivalent Relation to the West.” Swiss Review of World Affairs, no. 11 (1997).

248

———. Russland und die Osterweiterung der Nato: Herausforderung für die russische Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, no. 43. Zurich: For-schungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse, 1997.

Wettig, Gerhard. “Stalin und die deutsche Frage: Die Note vom 10. März 1952.” Osteuropa 47, no. 12 (1997): 1259-1273.

Zagorski, Andrej. “Die Politik Russlands gegenüber der GUS — zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit.” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politik 26, no. 3 (1997): 319-327.

———. Regionale Strukturen der Sicherheitspolitik in der GUS. Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und inter-nationale Studien, no. 28. Cologne: BIOst, 1996.

Zagorski, Andrey. “Russia and European Institutions.” In Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda, ed. Vladimir Bara-novsky, 519-542. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Zubok, Vladislav and Konstantin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.

249

About the Authors Yevgeniy P. Bazhanov, a former diplomat and foreign policy adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev, is vice-president of the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, and director of the Institute of Contemporary International Studies. His extensive publication record includes: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (1998), Russia’s Changing Foreign Policy (1996), Russia and Asia (1991), China and the World (1990).

Leonid V. Bilousov is president of the Ukrainian Center for Interna-tional Security Studies and deputy editor-in-chief of the journal Political Thought. Among his recent publications are: Political Aspects of Cooperative Security Arrangements beyond Partnership for Peace: A View from Ukraine (1996), Security in Europe: The Central European Component (1994).

Aleksey M. Filitov is leading researcher at the Institute of Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences, and lecturer at various Mos-cow universities. He has extensively published on World War II and Cold War issues. His recent monographs include: The German Ques-tion: From Partition to Unification (1993), The Cold War: The Debate in Western Historiography (1991).

Andrey V. Korneev is head of division at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. Among his publica-tions are: The Economic Development of Russia and Global Economic Trends by the End of the Century (1996, co-author), On Different Sides of the Ocean: The USA and Japan – A Struggle for Natural Resources of the Pacific Ocean (1985).

Andrey V. Kortunov, former deputy director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, is president of the Moscow Public Science Foundation. Among his recent publications are: Russia and UN Reforms (1995), Russia and the West: Models of Institutional Integration (1994), Soviet Disintegration and US Foreign Policy (1993).

251

Igor F. Maximychev, a former diplomat, is chief researcher at the Institute of European Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. His publications include: Threats to Russia’s Security related to the Beginning of NATO Enlargement (1998), Russian-German Relations: Formation, Status, Prospects (1997), United Germany as a Factor of European Security (1997).

Tatyana G. Parkhalina is deputy director of the Institute of Scien-tific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, and director for European security issues of the Moscow NATO Documentation Center. Among her publications are: On the Future European Security Architecture (1997), Of Myths and Illusions: Rus-sian Perceptions of NATO Enlargement (1997), Nationalism in Europe: Realities and Perspectives (1996).

Sergey M. Rogov is director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, and member of the Scientific Council at the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Among his publications are: Arms Control after the End of the Cold War (1997), Security Concerns of the New Russia (1995), Three Years of Trial and Error of Russian Diplomacy (1994), The Debates on the Future Military Doctrine of Russia (1992), The Soviet Union and the USA (1989).

Anatoliy A. Rozanov is professor of International Relations and director of the Center for International Security Studies at the Belo-russian State University in Minsk. His recent publications include: NATO: Problems of Transformation and Enlargement (1996), Secu-rity: Western Approaches (1994), New Thinking and International Security (1991).

Vassiliy I. Sokolov is head of department at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. His recent mono-graphs are: Social Learning in Management of Global Environmental Risks (1998), Global Climate Change and International Relations: A View from Russia (1994).

Dmitriy V. Trenin is deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. His recent work includes: Russia’s China Problem (1998), Russia in World Arms Trade (1997, co-editor), The Baltic Chance (1997).

252

253

Tatyana V. Yevgeneva is head of the chair of General Political Sci-ence and Special Political Disciplines, Russian State University for the Humanities, and associate professor for Political Culture and Political Psychology. Among her recent publications are: Formation and Function of Political Myths in Post-Soviet Societies (1997, editor), Mythology ad Politics (1997, co-author), Contemporary Political Mythology Content and Functioning (1996, co-author).