S12h tokyo 29 august nistep

seminar given at National Institute of Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP), Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT),

Tokyo, 29th August 2012

Andy StirlingSPRU & STEPS Centre

Ambiguous Evidence:

implications of uncertainty for science policy

- The Economist

`

“we'll restore science to its rightful place”… - President Obama

“Our hope … relies on scientific and technological progress” - Premier Wen Jiabao

PROGRESS

“you can’t stop progress” …

“One can not impede scientific progress.” - President Ahmadinejad

Conventional Technology Policy

all innovation is progress…

Lisbon Strategy for: “pro-innovation action”

- EU Council of Ministers

“we need more pro-innovation policies” - PM Gordon

Brown

“… the Government’s strategy is … pro-innovation” - PM David Cameron

TECHNOLOGY

Lord Alec Broers, President, RAEng

…“history is a race to advance technology”

Technology:

“will determine the future of the human race’”

The challenge of government:

“to strive to stay in the race”…

The role of the public:

“to give technology the status it deserves”…

PROGRESS

TECHNOLOGY


PROGRESS

TECHNOLOGY


Treats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives… no politics … no choice !

PROGRESS

TECHNOLOGY


Treats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives … no politics … no choice !

Scope for debate restricted to: yes or no? … how much? how fast? … who leads?

PROGRESS

TECHNOLOGY


TECHNOLOGY

Treats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives … no politics … no choice !

Scope for debate restricted to: yes or no? … how much? how fast?’ … who leads?

Seriously neglects questions over: which way? …what alternatives? says who? …why?

PROGRESS


For instance... “sustainable energy”

Technological Progress is Evolutionary

Not all that is conceivable, feasible, viable – will be fully realisable

Intended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathways

social shaping (Bijker, 85) co-construction (Misa, 03) studies: expectations (Brown, 03) imaginations (Jasanoff, 05)

Technological Progress


history: contingency (Mokyr, 92) momentum (Hughes 83)path-dependence (David, 85) path creation

(Karnoe, 01)



philosophy: autonomy (Winner, 77) closure (Feenberg, 91)/politics entrapment (Walker, 01) alignment (Geels, 02)



economics: homeostasis (Sahal, 85) lock-in (Arthur, 89) regimes (Nelson & Winter, 77) trajectories (Dosi,

82)


‘Sound Science’ in Policy and Regulation

on chemicals:“ …sound science will be the basis of the Commission's legislative proposal…” - EC RTD Commissioner, Philippe Busquin

on genetic modification:

“… this government's approach is to make decisions … on the basis of sound science”

- former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair

on energy:

“[n]ow is the right time for a cool-headed, evidence based assessment … I want to sweep away historic prejudice and put in its place evidence and science”

former UK Energy Minister Malcolm Wicks

Justification: from political ‘problems’ to technical ‘puzzles’

on public health:

“… sound science … science-based decisions” - UN WHO DG Margaret Chan

Ambiguity in Evidence

Energy technologies: mature, sophisticated comparative analysis…

0.001 0.1 10 1000externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)low RISK high

coal

oil

gas

nuclear

hydro

wind

solar

biomass



0.001 0.1 10 1000

coal

oil

gas

nuclear

hydro

21

wind

solar

biomass

n =

‘externality’: cUS/kWh (after Sundqvist et al, 2005)

minimum maximum25% 75%

low RISK high



coal

oil

gas

nuclear

hydro

36

20

wind 18

solar 11

biomass 22

31

21

16

n =



Knowing Knowledge

` Conventional ‘risk practices’ suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’

` Conventional expert practices suppress our ‘knowledge about knowledge’

` marginalises, elides, ignores, (often) denies radical openness of ‘incertitude’:

` - insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action . Aristotle, Kant, Habermas know-how is less important than know-why

– eg: how to apply neuroscience?

Knowing Knowledge

` - insufficiency: knowledge efficacy is not normative basis for action

` - incompleteness: knowledge enabling utility is limited on wider effects . Lao Tzu, Socrates, Keynes ‘unknowns’ as important as ‘knowns’

– eg: unexpected

mechanisms

in nanohealth

technologies

` marginalises, elides, ignores and (often) denies realities of knowledge:

Knowing Knowledge


- indeterminacy: effective knowledge does not preclude surprise . Gödel, Dosi, Collingridge ”known knowns” foster hubris

– eg: dangers of thinking we know

halogenated hydrocarbons,

CFCs and the ozone hole

endocrine disruptors

methyl tertbutyl ether

- incompleteness: knowledge enabling utility is limited on wider effects



Knowing Knowledge


- incompleteness: knowledge is always limited as a basis for action

- ‘inversity’: increased knowledge can increase ignorance . Einstein, Ravetz, Beck… area / perimeter of known

– nonlinear

dynamics

of climate

and oceans

` - indeterminacy: effective knowledge does not preclude surprise



Knowing Knowledge


- ‘inversity’: increased knowledge can increase ignorance

- intractability: knowledge-commitments compound vulnerability . Ellul, Wynne, Tenner not existence but exposure to unknown

eg: nuclear

dependency


` - indeterminacy : effective knowledge does not preclude surprise



Knowing Knowledge


- intractability: knowledge-commitments compound vulnerability

- incommensurability: knowledges are plural and often conflicting . Kuhn, Arrow, Jasanoff… knowledge often not linear / additive

- eg: agronomy, ecology, soil science, molecular biology on GM



` - indeterminacy : effective knowledge does not preclude surprise



Knowing Knowledge


- incommensurability: knowledges are plural and often conflicting

representing incomplete knowledge as expert ‘risk’ is deeply problematic


- intractability: knowledge-commitments compound vulnerability


` - indeterminacy: effective knowledge does not preclude surprise



Knowing Knowledge


unproblematic

problematic

knowledge about likelihoods

- Socrates, Lao Tzu, Knight, Keynes, Shackle, Collingridge, Smithson, Ravetz, Wynne ...

RISK

UNCERTAINTY

engineered components closed deterministic systems high frequency incidents familiar contexts

open dynamic systems low frequency events human factors changing contexts

INCERTITUDE

Beyond Risk contrasting aspects of ‘incertitude’

unproblematic

problematic

unproblematic problematic


knowledge about possibilities

- Socrates, Lao Tzu, Knight, Keynes, Shackle, Collingridge, Smithson, Ravetz, Wynne ...

RISK

UNCERTAINTY

AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE

engineered components closed deterministic systems high frequency incidents familiar contexts

open dynamic systems low frequency events human factors changing contexts

defining pros & cons contrasting impacts

diverse perspectives alternative options

novel agents or vectors surprising conditions new alternatives

wilful blinkers

INCERTITUDE

Beyond Risk contrasting aspects of ‘incertitude’

unproblematic

problematic




RISK

UNCERTAINTY

AMBIGUITY aggregative analysis patronage, pressure political closure

insurance limitsreductive modelsstochastic reasoning

` science-based policy

institutional remits

political cultureliability protection

harm definitions indicators / metrics IGNORANCE

risk focus is shaped by power – Beck’s “organised irresponsibility”

Pressures for Closure institutional drivers of risk assessment

unproblematic

problematic




RISK

UNCERTAINTY

AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE

aggregated probabilities optimisation algorithms synthetic decision trees Delphi / Foresight predictive modelling

Methods for ‘Opening Up’

precautionary methods ‘open up’ appreciation of incertitude

precaution and participation are about rigour

unproblematic

problematic



AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE

RISK

UNCERTAINTY


burden of evidence onus of persuasion uncertainty factors decision heuristics interval analysis sensitivity testing





scenarios / backcasting interactive modelling

mapping / Q-methods participatory deliberation

democratic procedures

unproblematic

problematic



AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE

RISK

UNCERTAINTY







unproblematic



AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE

RISK



responsive civic research curiosity monitoring,

evidentiary presumptions flexibility, reversibility

diversity, resilience, agility, adaptability

scenarios / backcasting interactive modelling

mapping / Q-methods participatory deliberation

democratic procedures

problematic UNCERTAINTY





unproblematic

problematic



precautionary appraisal

participatory deliberation

definitive prescription

RISK

UNCERTAINTY

AMBIGUITY

IGNORANCE


Op

tion

s

Op

tion

s

humility reflexivity

adaptive learning

sustainability

safety

‘opening up’: options, issues, approaches, possibilities, perspectives

‘Opening Up’ Incertitude precaution and participation are about rigour

Risks of different agricultural strategiesunder assumptions of selection of UK expert policy advisers

organic

environmental

intensive

GM + labelling

GM + monitoring

GM + voluntary controls

Plural Conditional Advice


organic

environmental

intensive

GM + labelling

GM + monitoring


high risk low



organic

environmental

intensive

GM + labelling

GM + monitoring


GOVERNMENT

organic

environmental

intensive

GM + labelling

GM + monitoring


high risk low



organic

environmental

intensive

GM + labelling

GM + monitoring


GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY

organic

environmental

intensive

GM + labelling

GM + monitoring


high risk low



organic

environmental

intensive

GM + labelling

GM + monitoring


GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY

organic

environmental

intensive

GM + labelling

GM + monitoring


PUBLIC INTEREST

high risk low


technological ‘lock-in’

institutionalised technical risk assessment

multiple feasible

Innovation trajectories

restricted appreciation

innovation union knowledge economy

‘closed down’ ‘sound scientific advice’ ‘evidence based’ policy

POSSIBLE PATHWAYS

pressures for justification force unitary ‘‘expert’

prescriptions

presumed benefits case-by-case focus narrow remits aggregated attention regulatory capture technocratic procedures

risk

narrow scope ‘independent’ research ‘pro-innovation’ culture

Op

tion

s$IIIIII

privileged visions

‘Opening Up’ Technology Governance

single ‘best’ / ‘optimal’ / most ‘legitimate’

decisions

€

IIIIII

$IIIIII

$IIIIIIIIIIII

$

POSSIBLE PATHWAYS

diverse pathways

knowledge democracy

broad-based evidence as choice

‘opening up’ politics of innovation

‘best option’ depends on: contexts, perspectives,

sensitivities, scenarios,

- ‘plural conditional’ public policy advice Sustainability

O

ptio

ns

choice discourse

help catalyse: democratic accountability context sensitivity

social robustness

extended participation

transdisciplinary deliberation

explicit priorities uncertainties

multiple options

diversity in technology portfolios

‘Opening Up’ Technology Governance

Documents

S12h tokyo 29 august nistep