SAMPLE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS P TEMPLATE · 2.0 Location of Copies of the Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention Plan 2.1 A copy of the Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention

APPENDIX E

SAMPLE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN TEMPLATE

g GE Energy, Power Generation Projects and Services

_______________________________________________________________________________________

Revision 1 Element 11 Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention

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Document No.: HS11

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Health & Safety Procedure

Emergency Preparedness and

Fire Prevention

GE Energy, Power Generation

Projects and Services

Environment, Health, & Safety

Prepared by: Services EHS HQ Approved by: Jim Heenan Released by: D. Olson

GE Company Proprietary

Revision History

Revision Date Author Reason For Change

1 9/5/2006 D. Olson Updated as a Global procedure for Power Generation Projects and Services group.

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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND FIRE PREVENTION 1.0 Purpose and Scope

1.1 The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to the site in establishing an Emergency

Preparedness Plan. This procedure outlines the course of action associated with emergencies, evacuations, and fire prevention. The site must assess each type of potential incident in order to thoroughly identify equipment requirements, on-site response needs, and outside emergency resources. The attachments provided with this plan are intended to assist site management in documenting these procedures. This instruction applies to all personnel doing business at any GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services sites or customer locations.

1.2 The procedure includes activities at the service center as well as work carried out on the Projects

and Services site.

1.3 The EHS Manager conducts a review of the overall emergency response plan on an annual basis. Site-specific plan elements are reviewed during site audits. The Site EHS Representative shall conduct a periodic (quarterly drill) assessment of the plan at the site level to ensure that changes in the site are accounted for in the plan.

2.0 Definitions

2.1 Emergency Coordinator-The Area Manager or designated alternate who will be the GE Energy, Power Generations, Projects and Services person in charge during any site emergencies.

2.2 Emergency Escape Equipment (EEE) – The bag containing the rope and braking system used in

case of an emergency escape from the top of the WTG tower.

2.3 Evacuation Meeting Location- A designated area where all employees will assemble during a site evacuation emergency.

2.4 Fire Detection System – An outside firm or a site monitoring system that detects and sends out a

warning in the event of a fire. 2.5 Fuel/Ignition Sources – Any material, chemical, etc. that has the potential to increase the size, or

possibly start, a fire (i.e. boxes, skids, rags, oil, fuel, paint, etc.). 2.6 Hazardous Materials– Any chemical meeting the hazardous criteria of being toxic, flammable, or

corrosive defined by country regulations. 2.7 Highly Combustible Materials – Any material or chemical that will readily catch fire (i.e. fuel, oily

rags, etc.). 2.8 Reportable Quantity (RQ) – A designated quantity of a chemical that is reportable to a regulatory

agency.

2.9 Small Spill – A spill of less than 20L (5 gallons), which can be completely cleaned and contained using a Spill Kit.

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2.10 Tornado Shelter Location – Any area/location specifically designed or identified for protection from severe weather/tornadoes. An interior room without windows that is designated as a safe haven during tornadoes is considered a tornado shelter.

2.11 Tornado Warning - A tornado has been sighted, take cover immediately. 2.12 Tornado Watch - Conditions are favorable for a tornado.

3.0 Procedure

3.1 Develop a Site Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention Plan for all sites and field operations utilizing the Site-Specific Template and instructions located in Appendix A.

3.1.1 This plan is required to be reviewed any time changes are made to the facility/site,

when there are personnel changes that affect the plan or at a minimum, on an annual basis.

3.2 Develop a Emergency Contact Information Rooster using the Site-Specific Template in Appendix

B.

3.2.1 Post the Emergency Contact Information near all site telephones and communicate its location to all site personnel.

3.3 Complete the Site-Specific Service Area/Center Specific Information in Appendix C and develop

a site emergency equipment, evacuation and rally point map.

3.3.1 Post the Site Map in prominent areas of the Service Center as well as on evacuation routes.

3.4 Each site must communicate the Site Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention Plan to all

affected personnel upon initial work date and upon each change to the plan or procedure.

3.4.1 A copy of the plan must also be shared with the local Fire Department and local Emergency Response Committee (and any other emergency response agency that is expected to respond) if required. This should be documented on who and when the plan was shared.

3.4.2 All visitors and contractors must be informed of the emergency alarms, evacuation

routes and rally points, and who to contact in case of an emergency using information located in Appendix B and C of this Plan.

3.5 Each site must evaluate their need for emergency equipment, i.e., fire extinguishers, 1st aid kits,

emergency lighting, etc. and assure that the proper resources are available at the site. 4.0 Training

4.1 All GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services employees must be trained in the site’s Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention Procedure. (EHS Procedure No. HS7: EHS Training).

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4.2 Designated GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services employees shall be trained on Oil Spill Prevention and the site-specific spill plans, and/or portable fire extinguishers (where applicable).

4.3 GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services personnel involved with climbing and working

in the wind turbine towers must receive training in the emergency escape equipment (EEE) and procedures to escape from the towers, including how to prevent fires while working inside the towers.

5.0 Recordkeeping

5.1 All associated paper files and documentation shall be kept in the GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services EHS Filing System. Additional non-paper type files will be located on the EHS Web Measurements Reporting Website, Training Tracker, GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services EHS Homepage, EHS Services, Support Central, local site server and/or the Web Compliance Center or data base.

6.0 Auditing

6.1 This procedure will be reviewed annually by completing the CEP Health and Safety Framework element 11 “Emergency preparedness” and updating the procedure accordingly.

7.0 Responsibilities

7.1 Service Site/Region/Area Managers shall:

7.1.1 Ensure overall procedure implementation and coordination, 7.1.2 Ensure GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services EHS Headquarters is

contacted in the event of an injury, fire, chemical spill, or major emergency, 7.1.3 Determine when an evacuation should take place, and

7.1.4 Account for every employee during an evacuation.

7.1.5 Ensure adequate emergency response/escape equipment is available at the

site/towers.

7.2 EHS Manager/Coordinator shall:

7.2.1 Be responsible for assisting the Site/Region/Area Manager with coordination of response activities, as necessary, and assisting with follow up activities including incident investigation and corrective actions.

7.2.2 Identify the proper emergency escape equipment to be used by Services personnel and

visitors. 7.2.3 Determine if a reportable quantity has been spilled and contact the applicable

regulatory agencies, as necessary.

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7.2.4 Determine if an emergency spill response team should be deployed.

7.2.5 Complete, and update annually, the site specific information listed in Appendices B and

C and track via EHS Compliance Calendar,

7.2.6 Review this procedure annually, 7.2.7 Ensure all inspections and associated recordkeeping are completed,

7.2.8 Ensure all fire drills and associated recordkeeping are completed,

7.2.9 Ensure all evacuation drills and associated recordkeeping are completed,

7.2.10 Ensure all training and associated recordkeeping is completed, and

7.2.11 Enter all events/incidents into the EHS Measurements Reporting Website.

7.2.12 Develop business specific procedures, which address all types of emergencies possible

at the site and operation level. Include these procedures as attachments to this document and review with all site personnel.

7.3 GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services Employees shall:

7.3.1 Follow the emergency procedures listed in Appendix A,

7.3.2 Notify the Site/Region/Area Manager immediately of any possible emergency,

7.3.3 Control fuel and ignition sources,

7.3.4 Contact the appropriate response personnel in the event of an emergency (ambulance,

fire department, police department, etc.). 8.0 References - None 9.0 Appendices

9.1 Appendix A Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention Plan

9.2 Appendix B Site Contacts

9.3 Appendix C Site Specific Information

9.4 Appendix D On-Site Emergency Response Personnel

9.5 Appendix E Bloodborne Pathogen Program

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APPENDIX A

GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services

Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention Plan In accordance with the provisions of the General Electric Corporate Policy 20.3 and in support of the Company-wide emphasis on full environmental compliance and minimizing risks to employee health and safety, the GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services Site/Service Center, located in ________________________________ has adopted this Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention Plan. This plan has been completed, reviewed, and approved for implementation by the following individuals:

Title, Name and Signature Site Location Date

Region / Area Manager:

EHS Manager / EHS Coordinator:

Other1:

Other 2:

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1.0 Site Description

1.1 See Site Description in Appendix C. 2.0 Location of Copies of the Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention Plan

2.1 A copy of the Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention Plan will be located at each GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services service site, in the office of the Region/Site Manager, EHS Manager/Coordinator, and in a common area so each employee has access to it.

2.2 Additionally, a copy of the plan will be sent to the local Fire Department and local Emergency

Response Committee (and any other emergency response agency that is expected to respond) if required.

3.0 Chemical Use & Storage

3.1 The following chemicals may typically be expected to be found at this service site:

(Enter a list of chemicals typically used at specific sites.)

3.2 The storage locations of these materials can be found on the Site Map located in Appendix C. All containers will be marked or labeled to identify the contents of the container.

4.0 Chemical/Hazardous Waste Storage

4.1 Typical chemical wastes that are generated at this site are:

(Enter a list of chemical wastes generated at specific sites.)

4.2 Wastes may be accumulated in small quantities at the point of generation. If designated waste accumulation areas (or satellite storage areas) have been established, they can be found on the Site Map in Appendix C.

4.3 Wastes are typically accumulated in 200 L (55-gallon) drums that are stored within a secondary

containment. As these containers are filled, they are moved to the designated hazardous waste storage area as identified in the Site Map.

4.4 The chemical and hazardous waste storage areas are inspected weekly to prevent releases,

explosions, and fires. (EHS Procedure HS16, Chemical Management/HAZCOM). 5.0 Potential Emergencies

5.1 The Service Region/Area Manager will be designated as the Emergency Coordinator unless otherwise specified in Appendix B. The Service Region/Area Manager will be notified immediately in the event of an emergency. If the emergency is within the capabilities of site personnel, the Emergency Coordinator will coordinate response activities. If the emergency is beyond the capabilities of site personnel, appropriate outside agencies and emergency responders will be notified. These agencies and their corresponding phone numbers are listed in Appendix B.

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5.1.1 Post the Emergency Contact Information, Appendix B, near all site telephones and

communicate its location and content to all site personnel.

5.2 Every effort should be made to identify the most suitable ambulance and medical facilities location near the site. These resources, and the services they may provide, include:

5.2.1 Medical Services

5.2.1.1 Hospital: Multiple or severe injury treatments.

5.2.1.2 Ambulance Service/Medical Technicians: Medical response and transport.

5.2.2 Emergency Services

5.2.2.1 Fire Department: Fire response, pre-fire planning, confined space rescue.

5.2.2.2 Hazardous Material Response/Cleanup Groups: Spill response.

5.2.2.3 Local Emergency Planning Commission (where applicable): Community warning/evacuation.

5.2.2.4 Police Department: Strikes, bomb threats, community evacuation, traffic

diversion.

5.2.2.5 Neighboring Facilities: Capabilities available through written agreements, fire brigade, hazardous material response team.

5.2.2.6 Other Emergency Services: Severe weather (e.g., hurricane, tornado, severe

storm warnings).

5.2.2.7 Local Media: Radio and television stations, coordination with local emergency response agencies on emergency broadcast capability.

5.2.2.8 Local emergency response authorities - authorization of community

evacuations and traffic diversion.

5.2.2.9 Information gathered on each outside medical and emergency service providers used should include: address, contact person, telephone number, means of contact, response time and capabilities of the emergency resource. The need for backup or secondary resources should be identified as part of the assessment. Gathering and verifying this information is essential to the proper preplanning and coordination for an emergency. The name, address, and phone number of these agencies must be included on the Emergency Contact List (Appendix B: Emergency Contacts List). This list must be posted at the site.

5.2.2.10 Once the emergency resources are identified, the Site EHS Representative

and/or Site Manager should coordinate with these resources to effectively prepare for potential emergency situations. Coordination should include, as necessary:

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5.2.2.10.1 Providing documentation of plans, procedures and/or maps of

the site to the fire department or other responders; 5.2.2.10.2 Site tours for fire and medical response emergency resources; 5.2.2.10.3 Training sessions, emergency drills or simulations with fire,

medical, and confined space rescue providers.

5.2.2.11 If external emergency response capabilities are not available to the degree needed by the site, then the site must develop internal resources and internal response capability, i.e., fire, medical and spill response capabilities.

5.2.3 Training

5.2.3.1 All site employees must be trained on site-specific emergency procedures.

This training should be done as part of site orientation training and shall include the following areas:

5.2.3.1.1 Alarms and other emergency communications used both at the

site and at the customer/host facility as applicable. 5.2.3.1.2 Evacuation procedures including routes and assembly areas to

be used. 5.2.3.1.3 Accident reporting procedures. 5.2.3.1.4 Location of first-aid kits and identification of first-aid providers. 5.2.3.1.5 Chemical spill on-site reporting procedures.

5.2.3.2 The site should review each of its emergency response procedures to

determine which response actions on-site personnel will perform. Because of the intensive training requirements for certain emergency response functions development and use of on-site responders should only be considered if outside emergency response capabilities are not available. The On-Site Emergency Response Personnel (Appendix D On-Site Emergency Response Personnel) list provided shall be completed for all on-site first aid trained personnel; spill responders, and members of a confined space rescue team or fire brigade as applicable. Personnel who will be performing emergency response activities require additional training. Training requirements for emergency response personnel include:

5.2.3.2.1 Chemical Spill Responders 40 hours of HAZMAT Response

Training plus 8 hours of annual refresher training. 5.2.3.2.2 Fire Brigades Training equivalent to that received at Fire Fighting

Training Schools, refresher training must be on a quarterly basis. 5.2.3.2.3 Use of Fire Extinguishers. Annual refresher training on the use

fire extinguishers. 5.2.3.2.4 Confined Space Rescue Training in CPR and First Aid, use of

personnel protective equipment including SCBAs, use of rescue equipment, and practice confined space rescue on an annual basis.

5.2.3.2.5 The EHS Manager/Coordinator must approve all On-Site Emergency Response Personnel.

5.2.4 Emergency Equipment

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5.2.4.1 The site must have readily available the correct equipment to effectively respond to emergency situations. Emergency equipment must be maintained through preventive maintenance procedures (inspection and testing) in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendation to ensure that equipment is in ready condition for use. The location of Emergency Equipment is provided as (Appendix C - Service Area/Center Specific Information – Site Map). The type of emergency equipment available on site should be reviewed periodically to reflect changing site conditions.

5.2.4.2 Equipment inspections should be tracked using the Compliance Calendar.

5.2.5 Alarm and Communication Systems

5.2.5.1 An alarm or other system (e.g., public address, sirens, lights) is needed at the site to notify site personnel in the event of an emergency or that an evacuation is required. The evacuation notification system should be recognizable by all personnel and distinguishable from signals, warnings, buzzers, bells or lights used at the site for other purposes. Communication systems (e.g., telephone, radio and PA systems) are often used as part of the emergency response procedures. An inexpensive air horn is a practical alternative to installing permanent alarm systems at the site. All alarms and communication equipment should be periodically inspected and tested as applicable to ensure proper functioning.

5.2.5.2 Field Technicians are required to always have a form of communication with the service center.

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ATTACHMENT 1

Fire and Explosion 1.0 Potential for Fire & Safe Operating Procedures

1.1 Potential ignition sources at this GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services service site are:

(Insert potential ignition sources at your site here)

1.2 It is required that all fuel and ignition sources (flammable materials) be removed from the site or reduced as much as practically possible.

1.3 Smoking is only allowed in designated areas as identified in Appendix C.

2.0 Control of Fuel Sources

2.1 All trash must be placed in designated containers. 2.2 Flammable liquids must be stored in approved containers and placed in flammable liquid storage

cabinets when not in use.

2.3 Accumulations of paper, cardboard, or other highly combustible materials should be kept to a minimum.

2.4 Areas around fire extinguishers, exits, and electrical panels must be kept clear and unobstructed.

2.5 Combustible material should always be stored away from any ignition sources.

2.6 When transferring flammable liquids from one container to another, always ground and bond the

containers to prevent a static electricity spark. 3.0 Control of Ignition Sources

3.1 Do not use equipment that has exposed wiring, cracked or damaged switch plates. 3.2 Use only approved extension cords for temporary wiring.

3.3 Never use extension cords in place of permanent wiring.

3.4 Do not use cords that are damaged or frayed.

3.5 Do not load motors beyond their capacity.

3.6 Smoking is allowed in designated areas only and all butts must be disposed of in designated containers.

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3.7 If smoke or smoldering is detected, disconnect the power supply.

3.8 When performing welding, cutting or open flame operations outside a designated weld area, a special hot work permit is required (see GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services EHS Procedure No. HS13.4 – Hotwork).

4.0 Fire Fighting Equipment

4.1 Fire extinguishers are portable extinguishing equipment for persons to respond to small-scale fires

(incipient stage). Where fire extinguishers will be used, appropriate provision should be in place for the proper selection, placement and maintenance (inspection and testing) of these units. The following provisions should be used to satisfy these requirements:

4.1.1 Selection - Fire extinguishers should be selected according to the class of workplace

hazards and their severity. The fire classes include: Class A - Ordinary Combustibles; Class B - Flammable Liquids; Class C - Electrical Equipment; and Class D - Combustible Metals. Fire extinguisher size and capacity should be representative of the hazard severity.

4.1.2 Placement - Fire extinguishers should be identifiable (e.g., readily recognizable) in an accessible location to personnel. In general extinguishers should be placed at the entrances to areas where fire risks are present, but should not be placed immediately adjacent to the fire source, where they would be inaccessible in a fire. Within large areas where fire risks are present, fire extinguishers should be located within 16.6 meters (50 feet) of fire sources to facilitate prompt response. The location of the extinguishers should be marked with clearly visible signs, and parked vehicles or stored materials must not obstruct access to the extinguishers.

4.1.3 Maintenance (Inspection and Testing) - Portable fire extinguishers should be visually inspected on a monthly basis for pressure, physical condition of activation pin and handles, and clear access to verify their use status. Fire extinguishers should receive a maintenance check and hydrostatic testing on a defined schedule according to the type of extinguisher.

4.1.4 Training – All site personnel who are expected to use Fire Extinguishers should be trained to use them.

5.0 Inspections

5.1 The following inspections of Fire Protection Equipment must be completed. All inspections are to be tracked via the region's Compliance Calendar.

5.1.1 Automatic Sprinkler System requires annual inspections by a qualified person.

5.1.2 Emergency Lighting requires semi annual inspections – verify that the emergency

lighting will engage during an emergency situation.

5.1.3 Fire Detection Systems require annual inspections – verify that the detection systems will engage in the event of a real emergency. This inspection is usually completed by a detection company.

5.1.4 Fixed Extinguishing Systems require annual inspections – these include standpipes, etc.

Ensure all systems are in complete working order.

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5.1.5 Portable Fire Extinguishers in the service centers require monthly inspections– verify all extinguishers have the required charge, are in the correct locations and properly marked.

5.1.6 Portable Fire Extinguishers also require an periodic maintenance inspection based on

the country specific regulations by a qualified person, as well as periodic hydrostatic testing depending on the type of extinguisher.

5.1.7 Fire extinguishers in the WTG will be inspected each time the turbines are

maintenanced according to country specific regulations 6.0 Response to A Fire

6.1 Response to a Fire in the Service Center

6.1.1 The first employee discovering a fire shall pull the nearest fire alarm and/or dial the site emergency number as listed in Appendix B. If the employee has the appropriate fire extinguisher training, and the fire is incipient, the employee can try to fight the fire.

6.1.2 Evacuate the immediate area.

6.1.3 Notify the Region/Area Manager, who will direct the fire department to the proper

location.

6.1.4 The Region/Area Manager and designated personnel will ensure the evacuation of personnel has been successfully completed and that all personnel are accounted for.

6.1.5 People should assemble at the designated Evacuation Meeting Location as described in

Appendix C.

6.1.6 The Service Region/Area Manager will also ensure that equipment is shutdown as necessary.

6.1.7 The local fire department and the Site Manager will determine when normal operations

can be resumed.

6.2 Response to a Fire at Substation / Transformer:

6.2.1 Call the site emergency number immediately. Fire department must be called immediately to contain this type of fire.

6.2.2 Do not try to extinguish the fire due to high voltage hazards. Cannot use conventional

fire extinguishers.

6.2.3 Site to report the fire to Customer representative and appropriate utility company.

6.3 Respond to fire which is out of control

6.3.1 Barricade hazardous area.

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6.3.2 Fires which cannot be extinguished by an employee using a fire extinguisher must be

fought by an external fire department. As a general rule, if there is not a fire department, which can reach the site within 20 minutes, the site should have a fire brigade, or access to a fire brigade through mutual aid agreements.

7.0 Emergency Drills

7.1 The service center will conduct at least one emergency drill per quarter. This also enables the local fire department to get a chance to become familiar with our site and be more prepared in the event of an actual emergency. Most fire departments are more than willing to help out with emergency drills. The following four types of drills must be conducted during the year;

7.1.1 Rescue 7.1.2 Emergency Services – Medical

7.1.3 Severe Weather

7.1.4 Fire Drill –Site Grounds or Service Center

7.2 Each drill above must be performed at least once during the calendar year with a drill being

conducted each quarter. Multiple drills may be conducted at one time but a drill must be conducted each quarter.

7.3 Conducting a emergency drill involves the following steps:

7.3.1 Plan the drill. 7.3.2 Coordinate with the local fire department and fire detection company if conducting a

fire drill.

7.3.3 Conduct the drill.

7.3.4 Ensure the appropriate evacuation takes place.

7.3.5 Time the evacuation.

7.3.6 Check the site for people who did not leave, areas where the alarm can’t be heard, or other potential problems.

7.3.7 Give employees the OK to come back inside.

7.3.8 Critique the drill with the local fire department if they are present.

7.3.9 Write up a brief report of how the drill went and keep it in your site EHS files.

8.0 Emergency Evacuation

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8.1 Evacuation from the Site/Service Center:

8.1.1 A site evacuation map must be posted in commonly used locations inside the service center. (lunch rooms, offices, bathrooms, etc).

8.1.2 A designated Evacuation Meeting Location must be identified for each service center. A

Back-Up Evacuation Meeting Location must also be identified in case the primary Evacuation Meeting Location is affected by the emergency (i.e.—wind direction during a fire makes the original Evacuation Meeting Location unusable.)

8.1.3 All service center personnel must receive training of the site’s emergency evacuation

procedures within the first week of employment at the Service Site.

8.2 During an evacuation the designated Emergency Coordinator shall:

8.2.1 Keep exits marked, clear and accessible at all times.

8.2.2 Instruct employees not to try to fight any fire (unless incipient), but simply to report it immediately.

8.2.3 Notify employees of any evacuation and then verify that all employees are safely at the Evacuation Meeting Location.

8.2.4 Comply with any instructions from the Fire Department.

8.2.5 Consult with the Fire Department / EHS as the situation permits and/or warrants.

8.2.6 Consult with the Fire Department to determine the extent of any evacuation necessary.

8.2.7 Supervise any evacuation that is ordered.

8.2.8 Respond to direction from the Fire Department / EHS and maintain communication with others.

8.2.9 Verify that isolated areas are checked for personnel.

8.2.10 Conduct head count to ensure everyone is accounted for. The designated Emergency Coordinator will notify the fire department if any persons are thought to be inside the building.

8.2.11 The local fire department Fire Chief and the designated Emergency Coordinator will determine when normal operations can be resumed.

8.3 During an evacuation Employees shall:

8.3.1 Evacuate the building from the nearest exit.

8.3.2 Report to the designated site Evacuation Meeting Location outside of the building as listed in Appendix C.

8.4 Evacuation from the Site/Service Center:

8.4.1 Drills from the Service Center shall be conducted quarterly

These drills shall be scheduled and entered into the region’s Compliance Calendar.

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ATTACHMENT 2

Medical Emergency 1.0 Emergency Injury or Illness in the Site/Service Center:

1.1 All facilities should have basic first aid supplies available at the site and a person trained to provide first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in the absence of an infirmary, clinic or hospital in the near proximity. It is recommended that all locations, particularly those with unacceptable emergency response times, have at least two persons per shift who are trained to administer basic first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. In areas where accidents resulting in suffocation, severe bleeding, or other life threatening injury or illness can reasonably be expected, a 3 to 4 minute response time, from time of injury to time of administering first aid, is required. In other circumstances, i.e., where a life-threatening injury is an unlikely outcome of an accident, a 15-minute response time is acceptable. If site personnel are trained and expected to provide first aid, the appropriate personal protective equipment and precautions to prevent exposure to blood borne pathogens should be provided as shown in (Appendix E Blood borne Pathogen Program).

1.2 If emergency medical attention is required for an employee, call the local emergency medical

services as listed in Appendix B. 1.3 Notify the Site Manager or EHS Coordinator of the injury/illness.

1.4 An ambulance shall be used to transport the victim to the appropriate hospital emergency room.

1.5 The Site Manager or injured employees Manager shall fill out an accident investigation report and

the employee, if able, shall fill out an Employee First Notice of Injury (GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services EHS Procedure No. HS6: Accident Reporting & Investigation).

1.6 All accident investigation reports will be sent to the service region EHS Manager where the

determination shall be made as to whether or not the accident will be an OSHA Recordable.

1.7 The incident will then be appropriately entered into the EHS Measurements Reporting Website within 24 hours.

2.0 Non-emergency Injury or Illness

2.1.1 If the employee needs attention by a doctor on a non-emergency basis, the Site Manager or EHS Coordinator will ask the employee if he/she wants to see a doctor.

2.1.2 The Site Manager or EHS Coordinator will arrange transportation and designate someone to accompany the employee to the doctor.

2.1.3 If the nature of the injury permits, the Site Manager or EHS Coordinator shall call a designated cab company to transport the employee to the doctor.

2.1.4 GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services EHS Headquarters must be called immediately.

2.1.5 The Site Manager or injured employee’s Manager shall fill out an accident investigation report and the employee, if able, shall fill out an Employee First Notice of Injury (GE

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Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services EHS Procedure No. HS6: Accident Reporting & Investigation).

2.1.6 All accident investigation reports will be sent to the service region EHS Manager where the determination shall be made as to whether or not the accident will be an OSHA Recordable.

2.1.7 Within 24 hours of the non-emergency injury or illness, the incident will be appropriately entered into the EHS Measurements Reporting Website by the site.

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ATTACHMENT 3

Chemical Spill or Leak

1.0 Response to a Chemical Spill at the Site/Service Center:

1.1 The Service Area Manager or EHS Coordinator should be notified immediately. 1.2 Every effort will be made to prevent spills from entering the sewer system and local waterways.

Personnel working with chemicals or responding to a spill shall wear proper personal protective equipment, such as safety goggles, gloves, etc.

1.3 Only trained personnel in spill response shall respond to a chemical spill or leak. All others must

notify the Region / Area Manager immediately or the EHS Manager/Coordinator. 1.4 For larger spills, additional assistance will be obtained from outside emergency responders or spill

cleanup contractors. Spill response materials are kept at the site for small spills. The locations of these spill kits are identified on the Site Map in Appendix C.

2.0 SWIM

2.1 Stop the Spill—Up-righting a container, closing a valve, or shutting down the equipment. 2.2 Warn Others—to stay clear of the area.

2.3 Isolate the spill area—Keep personnel out of the area.

2.4 Minimize exposure and the spread of the spill. Place absorbent materials around the spill to contain its spread. Do not stand in the spilled material while doing this.

3.0 The primary concerns for responding to chemical spill emergencies are:

3.1 Ensure the safety of all employees. 3.2 Notify appropriate emergency organizations to properly respond to the emergency. (i.e., fire

department, ambulance).

3.3 Get emergency assistance to anyone who has been exposed to the hazardous chemicals.

3.4 Prevent any spills from entering the sanitary and storm sewers.

3.5 Minimize site personnel exposure to the hazardous chemicals by only allowing qualified personnel to respond to the emergency.

3.6 Investigate to determine the cause, effect and damage, if any, and take steps to correct.

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3.7 Arrange for timely clean up of the chemical spill to minimize the potential of contaminating the environment or further contamination of the site.

4.0 Notifications

4.1 The Region/Area Manager must:

4.1.1 Immediately notify the service region EHS manager to provide all necessary information to establish the extent of the emergency, including:

4.1.2 Amount spilled/leaked,

4.1.3 Chemical(s) involved,

4.1.4 Time spill/leak occurred, and

4.1.5 Where spill/leak occurred.

4.1.6 If a spill impacted soil, water, etc.

4.1.7 Person responding to spill/leak.

4.1.8 The Fire Department shall be notified should a spill occur that is not controllable by the employees in the immediate area and requires the evacuation of the building.

4.1.9 Should the spill occur in the site and evacuation is necessary, all employees shall immediately evacuate the building to the designated Evacuation Meeting Location.

4.2 Reportable Quantities

4.2.1 If a reportable quantity has been released, GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and

Services region EHS Manager or Customer will notify the appropriate regulatory agencies, as applicable:

4.2.1.1 U.S. • The National Response Center

• The State Emergency Response Commission

• The Local Emergency Planning Committee

5.2.1.2 Europe/Asia

• Follow country specific regulations

4.2.2 Once the extent of the chemical spill has been determined, GE Energy, Power

Generation, Projects and Services service region EHS Manager, the Site Manager and Customer will make the decision as to the appropriate emergency spill response team.

4.3 Spills that reach the sewer system

4.3.1 The Customer representative shall contact the applicable Sewer District. This

notification must be followed by a detailed written statement describing the causes of the discharge and the measures being taken to prevent future occurrence.

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ATTACHMENT 4

Hurricane (US only)

1.0 Hurricanes involve high winds and heavy rains which often result in power failures, inaccessible roads and structural damage to buildings. Hurricanes generally occur from August through October.

2.0 To prepare for a hurricane, the following must be completed:

2.1 Cover all large windows with shutters or plywood. 2.2 Clear out important paperwork from desk drawers, wrap them in plastic, and store on a high shelf.

2.3 Cover affected equipment, such as

2.3.1 Computers and related Equipment (Printers, Monitors, etc.) 2.3.2 Fax Machines 2.3.3 Photocopiers 2.3.4 Electrical devices (Strip Plugs, Power or Extension Cords, etc.)

2.4 Unplug all affected equipment from wall.

2.5 Move the affected equipment away from any unprotected windows or doors.

2.6 Cover affected equipment with Vizqueen or Plastic Bags.

2.7 Move the affected equipment that is on the ground to the top of desks if possible.

2.8 Backup all data from your Computer and take backup media off site, the data you save on the network drives will be protected.

3.0 In the event of a possible Hurricane in the US, connect to the FEMA Website at

http://www.fema.gov/fema/trop.htm. This site will be active during the Hurricane season and will have up-to-the-minute hurricane information. The GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services Site Manager will determine if evacuation is necessary.

3.1 The National Weather Service will issue a hurricane watch when there is a threat to coastal areas of

hurricane conditions within 24-36 hours. To assure the safety of all GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services service site personnel the Site Manager may call for the immediate evacuate or closure of the site when a hurricane watch has been issued or the site is positioned within the greatest potential path of the storm.

3.1.1 Site Evacuation

3.1.1.1 When calling for the evacuation of the site the site manager must assure that all personnel on site are accounted for and all off site personnel are made aware of the site evacuation/closure.

3.1.1.2 A list of contact information for all site personnel shall be collected by the site

manager for the purpose of recall once the danger has passed.

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ATTACHMENT 5

Tornado (US Only)

1.0 Tornadoes involve highly localized, extremely destructive high winds. Tornadoes generally travel from southwest to northeast. Tornado warnings and watches may only be forecast within hours of a tornado actually occurring. However, tornadoes may touch down with little warning, and therefore, preparation time may be minimal.

1.1 Each site must have a radio and a designated person who is responsible for monitoring the

radio during inclement weather for tornado announcements, where geographically applicable. 1.2 The bulletin will then be identified as a tornado “watch” or a tornado “warning” (severe

thunderstorms and other weather conditions are also announced).

1.2.1 Watch: Continue to monitor the radio closely.

1.2.2 Warning: In the event of a tornado warning proceed immediately to the site specific gathering location. Take the weather alert radio to the tornado shelter area, and continue to monitor it until the warning is over.

2.0 During a Tornado Warning, all Employees shall:

2.1 Clear off important paperwork and remove from the top of desks and store in a secure spot.

2.2 Turn off equipment and machines.

2.3 Move affected equipment away from any unprotected windows or doors.

2.3.1 Computers and related Equipment (Printers, Monitors, etc.) 2.3.2 Fax Machines 2.3.3 Photocopiers 2.3.4 Electrical Devices (Strip Plugs, Power or Extension Cords, etc.)

2.4 Avoid elevators and extinguish open flames. If you are at a location that has an elevator, do not use it during an emergency.

2.5 Meet at the Tornado Shelter Location.

2.6 Monitor the weather radio that should be located in each site.

2.7 Crouch down and cover yourself from falling debris. Use either a jacket or cushion.

2.8 Take a look around for equipment that may fall or tip over in the area and stay clear.

2.9 Do not evacuate the building until told to do so.

2.10 Once building is evacuated, don’t smoke anywhere near the premises.

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When designating a Tornado Shelter Location please consider the following:

− Interior rooms and halls on the lowest floor are the safest,

− Stay away from glass enclosed places or areas with wide-span roofs such as auditoriums, theaters, and

warehouses,

− A corner would be safer than the middle of the wall, and

− A bathroom, closet, office, or maintenance room with short walls would be the safest area, especially if it

was on the north or east side of the building.

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ATTACHMENT 6

Earthquake 1.0 In the event of an earthquake the following shall occur:

1.1 Take cover to protect yourself from injury. 1.2 If there is overhead glass in the area, cover yourself from falling debris.

1.3 Take a look around for equipment that may fall or tip over in the area and stay clear.

1.4 Do not run from buildings during an earthquake. Most injuries occur outside from flying debris,

falling objects or from downed high-voltage wires.

1.5 Avoid elevators and extinguish open flames. If you are at a location that has an elevator, do not use it during an emergency.

1.6 DO NOT smoke or light a match/lighter, as there may be ruptured gas lines.

1.7 Once the initial shock is over, calmly walk out of the building to the site's Evacuation Meeting

Location. Do not reenter the building until the structural damage has been assessed.

When designating an Earthquake Shelter Location please consider the following:

− Safe areas include: doorways, under doorsills, or beside heavy upright beams

− Try to get under the nearest heavy table, desk, bench or machine.

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ATTACHMENT 7

Flood 1.0 Flooding can occur as a result of either long-term, sustained precipitation or short-term intense weather

events. Monitoring of emergency broadcasts are important to ensure proper preparation for such events. 2.0 Prepare for a flood by:

2.1 Secure work area and turn off equipment and machines. 2.2 Cover all large window with shutters or plywood.

2.3 Clear out important paperwork from desk drawers wrap them in plastic and store on a high shelf.

Affected equipment during a flood are:

2.3.1 Computers and related Equipment (Printers, Monitors, etc.) 2.3.2 Fax Machines 2.3.3 Photocopiers 2.3.4 Electrical Devices (Strip Plugs, Power or Extension Cords, etc.)

2.4 Unplug all affected equipment from wall. 2.5 Cover affected equipment with Vizqueen or Plastic Bags.

2.6 Backup all data from your Computer and take backup media off site, the data you save on the

network drives will be protected.

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ATTACHMENT 8

Bomb Threat

Note:

All bomb threats must be taken seriously!!!

0.0 The person receiving the call shall:

0.1 Notify the Service Region/Area Manager immediately. 0.2 Listen very carefully, assisted, if possible, by another person who will take careful notes to ensure

getting the exact language of the message. Pay special attention to if the caller is a man or a woman, any distinguishing accents, and any background noises that might be heard (children, traffic, etc.).

0.3 See if another person can get the call traced, by contacting the police department, while the caller is

kept on the phone.

0.4 Attempt to get the caller to repeat the message several times to elicit further information as to:

0.4.1 Who the caller is 0.4.2 Location of the calling party

0.4.3 Where the device may be hidden

0.4.4 When it is scheduled to detonate

0.4.5 Why GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services is being bombed

The following phone script can also assist in information gathering and should be available to personnel answering the site phone.

1.0 The Area / Site Manager shall:

1.1 Evacuate the site immediately.

1.2 Contact the Police Department listed in Appendix B.

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ATTACHMENT 9

SECURITY

These guidelines are designed to provide a handy reference on security procedures that might be implemented to protect property, personnel, material, and sites against terrorist and illegal or criminal acts. Security is not a one size fits all discipline. The appropriate level of security should be determined based on the prevailing threat level where a particular site is located. For additional guidance on developing site-specific security procedures please reference the GE Energy Security Guidelines web site.

9.1 SUSPICIOUS MAIL PACKAGES (HANDLING OF)

All employees who handle mail have a responsibility to consistently follow the established safety procedures. One of these procedures is to maintain caution and follow directives when dealing with suspicious mail in terms of explosives and biochemical threats. The goal of this procedure is to provide the steps that you must follow in order to protect yourself and all other personnel in the site. We must be ready to act in the event any of us come across a piece of suspicious mail. Be aware that explosive or biohazard material can be enclosed in either a package or an envelope.

1.1 What makes a piece of mail or parcel suspicious?

1.1.1 Has protruding wires, strange odors or stains

1.1.2 Lopsided, oddly shaped

1.1.3 Has an unusual weight, given its size

1.1.4 Shows a city or state in the postmark that doesn't match the return address

1.1.5 No return address or an addressed that cannot be verified

1.1.6 Addressed to someone no longer at your location or is outdated in any way

1.1.7 Marked with restrictive statements, such as "Personal" or "Confidential”

1.1.8 Mail may have distorted handwriting or the name and address may be prepared with homemade labels or cut and pasted lettering

1.1.9 Mail bombs may have excessive postage. Letter bombs may feel rigid or appear uneven or lopsided

1.1.10 Package may be unprofessionally wrapped, several combinations of tape used to secure the package

1.1.11 Package may be endorsed “ Fragile - Handle With Care” or “Rush - Do Not Delay”

1.1.12 Package bombs may make a sloshing sound, but generally do not tick or buzz

THE SITE WILL NOT DELIVER ANY MAIL AND/OR PACKAGE IF DETERMINED SUSPICIOUS

1.2 Use of Gloves for Handling of Mail

1.2.1 As a general rule, gloves are not required to handle mail. However, if a person desires to use gloves it is recommended that N-dex nitrile type (not latex) gloves be used since these are less likely to cause an allergic reaction. Employees are recommended to use gloves if he/she has

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open cuts or sores until these injuries heal. Mailrooms are expected to maintain a supply of gloves for employee use.

1.2.2 Employees who wear gloves to handle and deliver mail are to discard the gloves by traditional means (garbage) upon completion of a shift or a work period. For instance, if an employee handles mail in the morning and leaves the work area for lunch, the gloves would be discarded and a new pair would be made available to the employee for the afternoon work period.

Plastic sealing or Zip Lock bags will be available in each site for containment of any suspicious substances.

1.3 What should I do if I receive a suspicious package in the mail?

1.3.1 Do not try to open the package or envelope.

1.3.2 Isolate the parcel or letter, place it is a plastic bag or other container, and do not move it further.

1.3.3 Evacuate the immediate area.

1.3.4 Wash hands with soap and warm water

1.3.5 Make a list of all the people who had contact with the package or envelope, include contact information, and provide the list to the emergency responders.

1.3.6 Emergency response personnel will take the parcel away, assess the situation and coordinate with officials, and report back to you with information.

1.3.7 Contact the following personnel immediately:

o Site manager, site EHS coordinator, and site medical personnel (if present)

o Energy HQ Security, EHS, Medical and Facilities, as applicable

o Local police

1.4 What should I do if I am exposed to a substance that I suspect may be a dangerous substance?

1.4.1 DO NOT try to CLEAN UP the powder. COVER the spilled contents immediately with anything (e.g., clothing, paper, trash can, etc.) and do not remove this cover!

1.4.2 Then LEAVE the room and CLOSE the door, or section off the area to prevent others from entering (i.e., keep others away).

1.4.3 Report the incident to your supervisor immediately who should notify the above PS personnel, building security and police.

1.4.4 Ensure everyone who had contact with the piece of mail washes his or her hands with soap and water.

1.4.5 Make a list of all the people who had contact with the package or envelope, include contact information, and provide the list to the emergency responders.

1.4.6 Place all items worn in contact with the suspicious mail in plastic bags or other container and present them to emergency response personnel.

1.4.7 Emergency response personnel will take the parcel away, assess the situation and coordinate with officials, and report back to you with information.

1.4.8 SHOWER with soap and water as soon as possible.

1.4.9 The Supervisor or Site Manager is to ensure that the following take place:

1.4.9.1 Notify PS security, EHS, Medical and Facilities.

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1.4.9.2 Notify the local police and the Postal Inspector.

1.4.9.3 Notify local, county, and state health departments.

1.4.9.4 Ensure that all persons who have touched the letter wash their hands with soap and water.

1.4.9.5 List all persons who have touched the letter and/or envelope. Include contact information. Provide the list to the emergency responders.

1.4.9.6 Place all items worn when in contact with the suspected mail piece in plastic bags and keep them wherever you change your clothes and have them available for law enforcement agents.

1.4.9.7 If prescribed medication by medical personnel, take it until otherwise instructed or it runs out.

1.5 POSSIBLE ROOM CONTAMINATION BY AEROSOLIZATION:

1.5.1 Turn off local fans or ventilation units in the area.

1.5.2 LEAVE area immediately.

1.5.3 CLOSE the door, or section off the area to prevent others from entering (i.e., keep others away).

1.5.4 Report the incident to your supervisor immediately who should notify the police & building security

1.5.5 SHUT down air handling system in the building, if possible.

1.5.6 List all people who were in the room or area. Give this list to both the local public health authorities so that proper instructions can be given for medical follow-up and to law enforcement officials for further investigation.

A copy of these guidelines can be found on the EHS Support Central for posting. Additionally, a Suspicious Package/Letter/Materials Emergency Procedures will help with information gathering in case of such an event.

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ATTACHMENT 10

OTHER EMERGENCIES

1.0 Power Outage

1.1 Employees should notify the Site Manager, if the outage is not immediately apparent. 1.2 The employees involved should take immediate steps to:

1.2.1 Ensure the safety of personnel. 1.2.2 Restore service. 1.2.3 Investigate to determine cause, effect and damage, if any, and take steps to correct. 1.2.4 If required, call the local utility company. The site-specific utility company is listed in

Appendix A. 2.0 Demonstrations or Civil Disturbances (Including Picketing)

2.1 Any employee seeing evidence of a demonstration within the immediate area of the site shall inform the Site Manager who will in turn notify the co-located business’ GE Manager (if applicable).

2.2 In the event of an act of civil disturbance or other security threat such as assaults, the local police department shall be notified immediately. Attempts to handle potentially violent employees shall not be made by on-site personnel including security with out the support of the police.

3.0 Media Requests

3.1 In the event of an EHS incident that gains media attention, NO ONE at the site shall have any contact with the media before contacting the Customer and GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services service region EHS Manager.

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APPENDIX B

Emergency Contact Information

Site Emergency Number

Phone Number/Business

Emergency Number(at site):

Site Specific Contacts

Title Contact Phone Number

Area / Site Manager Work:

Mobile:

EHS Coordinator Work:

Mobile:

Site Emergency Coordinator Work:

Mobile:

Service region EHS Manager Work:

Mobile:

Customer Representative Work:

Mobile:

Emergency Contacts

Agency Contact Phone Number

Fire Department

Police Department

Ambulance Service

Hospital

Electric Utility Company

Spill Response Team

Sewer District

State Emergency Response Com. (US only)

Local Emergency Planning Com. (US only)

National Response Center (US only) NA 1-800-424-8802

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APPENDIX C Service Area/Center Specific Information

The GE Energy, Power Generation, Projects and Services area/center is located at (name and location of service area/center). The service area/center employees approximately (insert number) people working in (insert number) shifts. The site, a drawing of which is included, encompasses (insert number) square meters. Work at the service area/center includes:

(Provide a description of the type of work performed at the site)

The site is co-located with ____________________________________. The co-located site performs the following type of work (if applicable):

Site/Service Center Evacuation Meeting Location: (list)

Alternate Evacuation Meeting Location: (list)

Tornado Shelter Location: (list)

Earthquake Shelter Location: (list)

Fire Protection Equipment Site/Service Center Specific Fire Detection System(s):

� Pull Box to Fire Department � Automatic to Site Alarm

� None

Site/Service Center Specific Fire Alarm System(s): � Manual Activation � Automatic Activation � None

Site/Service Center Specific Fire Suppression System(s): � Portable A,B,C Fire Extinguishers � Sprinkler System – Office � Sprinkler System – Shop � Sprinkler System – Other � Emergency Lighting – Office � Emergency Lighting – Shop � Illuminated Exit Signs � None

Portable fire extinguishers, emergency eyewashes, safety showers, emergency first aid kits, and emergency spill response kits are located throughout the site. The location of this equipment is identified on the service center map.

Information Completed By: Date:

Insert Site Map as next page and indicate the following:

Hazardous Waste Storage Areas Spill Kit Locations AED

Chemical Storage Locations Emergency Eyewashes Safety Showers

Portable Fire Extinguishers First Aid Kits Fire Alarms

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APPENDIX C (cont)

Service Area/Center Specific Information

Attach Site Map

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Appendix D

On-Site Emergency Response Personnel

On-Site 1st Aid/CPR Personnel

Contractor Individuals Name Training Up-to-Date (yes/no)

On-Site HAZMAT Personnel


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Appendix D (cont)

On-Site Emergency Response Personnel

On-Site Confined Space Rescue


On-Site Fire Brigade


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Appendix E

Bloodborne Pathogen Program

1.0 Purpose

1.1 An infection control plan must be prepared for all persons who handle, store, use, process, or

disposes of infectious medical wastes. The plan includes requirements for personal protective equipment, housekeeping, training, and a procedure for reporting exposures.

2.0 Responsibilities

2.1 The EHS Manager will conduct the Bloodborne Pathogen Program and maintain records of training

and inspections for this program. 2.2 Management will ensure proper conduct of the program though inspections, record keeping and

periodic audit. 3.0 Definitions

3.1 Biological Hazard. The term biological hazard or biohazard is taken to mean any viable infectious agent that presents a risk, or a potential risk, to the well being of humans.

3.2 Medical Wastes/Infectious Wastes. All waste emanating from human or animal tissues, blood or blood products or fluids. This includes used first aid bandages, syringes, needles, sharps, material used in spill cleanup and contaminated PPE or clothing.

3.3 Universal Precautions. Refers to a system of infectious disease control that assumes that every direct contact with body fluids is infectious and requires every employee exposed to be protected as though such body fluids were infected with blood-borne pathogens. All infectious/medical material must be handled according to Universal Precautions.

4.0 Hazards

4.1 Unprotected exposure to body fluids presents the possible risk of infection from a number of

bloodborne pathogens notably Hepatitis and HIV. 5.0 Hazard Control

5.1 Engineering Controls - prevention of exposure to bloodborne pathogens engineering controls include proper storage facilities and containers, syringes designed to prevent accidental needle sticks, autoclaves and disinfectant equipment.

5.2 Administrative Controls - prevention of exposure to bloodborne pathogen administrative controls include universal precautions, assignment of PPE, employee training, use of spill Kits specifically designed for blood and body fluids, restricted access to waste collection points and waste disposal procedures.

6.0 Reporting and Record Keeping

6.1 Any reports required by OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT will be maintained by the

Occupational Health Department. All reports (Training Certificates, Notice of HBV Vaccinations, exposure reports) will be maintained for 30 years.

7.0 Training

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7.1 All personnel assigned duties as First Aid Station Staff, HAZMAT responders, Custodial Employees

(those that clean rest rooms, etc.) will receive initial and annual training by a qualified person on the Bloodborne Pathogen Program. Additionally, personnel trained in First Aid shall be offered this annual training.

7.2 All new and current affected Employees will be trained initially and annually thereafter as part of the first aid/CPR training. The content of the training program will include:

7.2.1 Types and transmission of Blood-Borne Pathogens 7.2.2 General Safety Rules 7.2.3 Universal Precautions 7.2.4 Use of Personal Protective Equipment 7.2.5 Medical Waste Disposal Procedures 7.2.6 Post Exposure Treatment and Procedures 7.2.7 HBV Vaccinations

7.3 Documentation of training will be by Training Certificate 7.4 All Employees not affected by this Program will receive an overview of the program requirements

during scheduled Safety Meetings with documentation by Safety Meeting Minutes Form. 8.0 Hepatitis-B Virus (HBV) Vaccinations

8.1 Those required to provide first aid or emergency response duties on a routine basis will be offered

Hepatitis-B Virus (HBV) Vaccinations at Company expense. 8.2 The choice for HBV vaccination is not mandatory. If an affected Employee chooses not to have the

vaccination at the initial offering, they will have the opportunity to be vaccinated when they are ready. The Company will document the offer, acceptance or declination, and vaccination dates with the Notice of HBV Vaccinations Form.

9.0 Post Exposure Treatment

9.1 Should an affected Employee or an Employee acting as a "Good Samaritan" be occupationally

exposed to HIV/HAV/HBV the affected Employee will report the exposure to the Schenectady Medical Center. The Company will provide for the Employee to be tested for HIV/HAV/HBV at Company expense. Following the initial blood test at time of exposure, employees will be retested at 6 weeks, 12 weeks and 6 months to determine if transmission has occurred. During this period, the Employee will follow the recommendations provided by the Physician.

9.2 An "occupational exposure" is defined as blood or body fluid contact from an injured or ill Employee to the affected Employee or injury by a contaminated sharp object.

9.3 Following the report of exposure, the Company Doctor will contact the exposure source and request that person be tested for HIV/HAV/HBV at Company expense. The request is not mandatory and if refused will not effect that Employee's future employment.

9.4 The source individual's blood is tested as soon as possible and after consent is obtained to determine HBV and HIV infectivity. (Hepatitis B surface Antigen, Hepatitis C Antibody and HIV Screen).

9.5 The exposed employee's blood shall be collected as soon as feasible and tested for HBV (Hepatitis Bs Antibody, Hepatitis C Antibody) and HIV serological status after consent is obtained (Employee Consent for HIV Antibody Testing).

9.6 During all phases of Post Exposure, the confidentiality of the affected Employee and exposure source will be maintained on a "need to know basis". The Blood-Borne Pathogens Exposure and Treatment form is used to document the exposure and offer of medical assistance to the affected Employee and use the Medical Consent for Blood-Borne Pathogens Testing form for the exposure source. The results of any HIV/HAV/HBV tests conducted will be provided to the exposed and source

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Employees within 5 business days of receipt. 10.0 General Procedures

10.1 Personnel when faced with a potential exposure must follow the following procedures. 10.1.1 Pocket masks must be provided to eliminate the need for direct mouth-to-mouth

contact in groups where resuscitation is a part of their responsibilities. 10.1.2 Gloves must be made of appropriate disposable material, usually intact latex or vinyl.

They must be used in the following circumstances: 10.1.2.1 When the employee has cuts, abraded skin, chapped hands, dermatitis, or

similar conditions. 10.1.2.2 When examining abraded or non-intact skin of a patient with active bleeding.

10.1.3 Employees must wash their hands immediately, or as soon as possible, after removal of gloves or other personal protective equipment and after hand contact with blood or other potentially infectious materials.

10.1.4 All personal protective equipment must be removed immediately upon leaving the work area, and if this equipment is overtly contaminated, it must be placed in an appropriate area or container for storage, washing, decontamination, or disposal.

10.1.5 All procedures involving blood or other potentially infectious agents must be performed in a manner that will minimize splashing, spraying, and aerosolization.

11.0 Medical Waste

11.1 Medical/infectious waste must be segregated from other waste at the point of origin. 11.2 Medical/infectious waste, except for sharps (i.e., razor blades, broken glass, needles, etc.) capable of

puncturing or cutting, must be contained in double disposable red bags conspicuously labeled with the words "INFECTIOUS WASTE" and "BIOHAZARD."

11.3 Used needles or other sharps (razor blades, broken glass, scalpels, etc.) must not be sheared, bent, or broken.

11.4 Infectious sharps must be contained for disposal in leak-proof, rigid puncture-resistant containers. Infectious waste contained as described above must be placed in reusable or disposable leak-proof bins or barrels that are conspicuously labeled with the words "INFECTIOUS WASTE" and "BIOHAZARD".

11.5 All employees exposed to human blood and blood products must report to the Company Medical Center for information and possible inclusion in the Hepatitis B Immunization Program.

12.0 Infection Control Plan

12.1 The purpose of the Infection Control Plan is to protect the health and safety of the persons directly involved in handling the materials, Company personnel and the general public by ensuring the safe handling, storage, use, processing, and disposal of infectious medical waste.

12.2 Universal precautions: Refers to a system of infectious disease control, which assumes that every direct contact with body fluids is infectious and requires every employee exposed to be protected as though such body fluids were infected with blood-borne pathogens. All infectious/medical material must be handled according to Universal Precautions

12.2.1 The following universal precautions must be taken: 12.2.1.1 Gloves must be made of appropriate disposable material, usually intact latex

or vinyl. They must be used: 12.2.1.1.1 when the employee has cuts, abraded skin, chapped hands,

dermatitis, or the like. 12.2.1.1.2 when examining abraded or non-intact skin of a patient with

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active bleeding. 12.2.1.2 Mask and eye protection are required when contact of mucosal membranes

(eyes, mouth or nose) with body fluids is likely to occur (e.g. splashes or aerosolization).

12.2.1.3 Resuscitation equipment, pocket masks, or other ventilation equipment must be provided to eliminate the need for direct mouth-to-mouth contact.

13.0 Waste Disposal Plan

13.1 Medical/Infectious waste must be segregated from other waste at the point of origin. 13.2 Medical/Infectious waste, except for sharps (e.g. razor blades, broken glass, needles, etc.) capable of

puncturing or cutting must be contained in double disposable red bags conspicuously labeled with the words, "INFECTIOUS WASTE -- BIOHAZARD."

13.3 Infectious sharps must be contained for disposal in leak-proof, rigid puncture resistant containers. 13.4 Infectious waste thus contained as described in procedures 2 and 3 above must be placed in

reusable or disposable leak-proof bins or barrels which must be conspicuously labeled with the words, "INFECTIOUS WASTE – BIOHAZARD.”

13.5 Spills/Disinfectants: a solution of sodium hypo chlorite (household bleach) diluted 1:9 with water must be used to disinfect, following initial cleanup of a spill with a chemical germicide approved as a hospital disinfectant. Spills must be cleaned up immediately.

13.6 After removing gloves, and/or after contact with body fluids, hands and other skin surfaces must be washed thoroughly and immediately with soap or other disinfectant in hot water.

Personal Protective Equipment for Worker Protection

Against HIV and HBV Transmission

TASK GLOVES APRON MASK EYEWEAR

Control of Bleeding w/ spurting blood X X X X

Bleeding control with minimal bleeding X

Cleaning Bio Spills (blood, vomit, etc…) X

The examples provided in this table are based on application of universal precautions. Universal precautions are intended to supplement rather than replace recommendation for routine infection control, such as hand washing and using gloves to prevent gross microbial contamination of hands (e.g., contact with urine or feces) .

APPENDIX F

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS MONITORING PLAN

GUNN’S HILL WIND FARM

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS MONITORING PLAN

June 2012

Gunn’s Hill Windfarm Inc. 226 ½ James Street North, Unit A Hamilton, Ontario L8R 2L3 Tel: 905-528-1747 Fax: 866-203-6516 Email: [email protected]

January 8, 2014 Sarah Raetsen, Senior Program Support Coordinator

Reference: Notice of Project Design Change – Gunn’s Hill Wind Farm

PLEASE NOTE: The Renewable Energy Approval (REA) Application for the Gunn’s Hill wind Farm was submitted to the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (MOE) in June, 2013.

The tap line connecting the project substation to Woodstock Transformer Station will no longer be required, as connection will be at or near the substation itself.

The tapline has been removed from Project mapping, but there are no changes to the Draft REA Reports provided to the MOE for review.

Please note there are no new environmental effects due to removal of the tap line from the Project description.

Gunn’s Hill Wind Farm Environmental Effects Monitoring Plan

June 2013 i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................1 2. PRE-CONSTRUCTION SURVEYS ..............................................................................................2

2.1. Amphibian Wetland Breeding Survey .............................................................................2 2.2. Bat Maternity Colony Survey ...........................................................................................2

3. POST-CONSTRUCTION SURVEYS ............................................................................................4 4. REFERENCES ...........................................................................................................................4

LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – PROJECT LAYOUT MAP

APPENDIX B - POST-CONSTRUCTION ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS MONITORING PLAN: BIRDS AND BATS


June 2013 1

1. INTRODUCTION

Prowind Inc. (Prowind) is a Canadian wind energy developer based in Hamilton, Ontario. It is affiliated with its parent company, Prowind GmbH, based in Osnabrück, Germany. Prowind’s mandate is to create small-‐scale, renewable and zero-‐emission power generation. Prowind believes in distributed generation that has a minimum impact on the surrounding environment and landscape.

The Applicant for this project is Gunn’s Hill Windfarm Inc., a special purpose vehicle created to hold assets of the Gunn’s Hill Wind Farm.

The Gunn’s Hill Wind Farm is a wind energy generation facility with a nameplate capacity of 25 MW. This project is classified as a “Class 4” wind facility in O. Reg. 359/09, which is defined as an on-‐shore wind facility with a nameplate capacity greater than 50 kW and a sound power level greater than 102 dB(A).

The project will employ the use of ten (10) Siemens SWT 3.0 -‐ 113 wind turbine generators. The 3.0 MW turbines will be rated at a nameplate capacity of 2.5 MW. Other basic components include step-‐up transformers located adjacent to the base of each turbine (step up voltage from approximately 0.69 kV to 27.6 kV), a 27.6 kV underground collector system, fibre optic data lines, a distribution substation, overhead dedicated feeder line, access roads and an Operations and Maintenance building. Temporary infrastructure will include, laydown areas, concrete wash ponds, storage shed, parking area and contractor trailers.

The project is located within the Township of Norwich and the City of Woodstock, both within Oxford County. The majority of the project is proposed on privately-‐owned, agricultural land near the villages of Curries and Oxford Centre, within the Township of Norwich. An overhead cable that connects the project to the Woodstock Transformer Station (TS) is located along Municipal and County Road Right-‐of-‐Ways (ROWs) and is located within the Township of Norwich and City of Woodstock. The primary land base is bounded by Firehall Road to the north, Oriel Line to the east, Gunn’s Hill Road to the south and Oxford Road 59 to the west. The overhead electrical cable to the Woodstock TS will run from the project area north along County Road 59, Pattullo Avenue, Athlone Avenue, Juliana Drive, Cedar Creek Golf Club or Norwich Ave/Parkinson Ave and South Street.

The proposed project layout can be found in Appendix A.


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2. PRE-CONSTRUCTION SURVEYS

2.1. AMPHIBIAN WETLAND BREEDING SURVEY

Surveys for Amphibian Breeding Wetland Habitat will be conducted at one Candidate Significant Habitat site that was not surveyed in the previous round of Amphibian surveys.

The survey methodology will follow that outlined in:

• Bird Studies Canada. 2009. Marsh Monitoring Program Participant’s Handbook For Surveying Amphibians

This methodology recommends listening for frog calls at each survey location for three minutes and documenting type of frog call, abundance of frog calls, direction of call and distance of call. Date, time, weather conditions and location of survey should also be documented. This should be completed three times during the breeding season (Apr to June). The survey should begin 30 minutes prior to dusk.

This methodology consists of anuran call surveys in the spring. Amphibian call surveys will be conducted in each of April, May, and June 2013. Monitoring stations will be established a minimum of 500 m apart and 3 minute surveys were performed at each station, listening for all amphibian calls within a semi-‐circular sampling area.

Additional information to be recorded on the appropriate data forms includes:

• Weather conditions (temperature, wind speed (on a Beaufort scale), % cloud cover, and presence of any precipitation should be recorded).

• Date and time of day.

• Description of habitats or areas scanned during the surveys

• GPS transects of the area searches.

• Name of the observer(s) doing field work.

Threshold for significance are take from the Significant Wildlife Habitat Ecoregion Criteria Schedules (Working Draft Jan 2009). Significance of site can be identified if:

• Presence of breeding population of 2 or more of the listed species with at least 20 breeding individuals (adults, juveniles, eggs/larval masses) or;

• Any wetland with confirmed breeding by American Bull Frogs is to be considered Significant.

Results of these studies will be submitted to the MNR upon completion.

2.2. BAT MATERNITY COLONY SURVEY

Surveys for Bat Maternity Colonies will be conducted at two Candidate Significant Wildlife Habitat that are woodlands located within 120 m of a turbine (including blade swept area).


June 2013 3

The survey methodology will follow that outlined in:

• Ministry of Natural Resources. (July 2011). Bats and Bat Habitats: Guidelines for Wind Power Projects

Survey methodology is outlined below:

Because each woodlot is less than 10 ha in size, 10 candidate maternity roost trees will be monitored in each habitat. This monitoring will be conducted during the month of June. The best examples of candidate bat maternity roost trees will be selected for exit surveys, therefore not all cavity trees identified within the 12.6 m (0.05 ha) radius plots will be surveyed during site investigation. During exit surveys, observers will chose a viewing station with a clear aspect of the cavity opening or crevice.

• The best candidate snag trees are selected according to the following criteria (in order of importance):

o tallest snag/ cavity tree;

o exhibits cavities or crevices most often originating as cracks, scars, knot holes or woodpecker cavities;

o has the largest diameter breast height;

o is within the highest density of snags/ cavity trees (e.g. clusters of snags);

o has a large amount of loose, peeling bark;

o cavity or crevice is high in snag/ cavity tree (>10m);

o tree species that provide good cavity habitat (e.g. white pine, maple, aspen, ash, oak);

o canopy is more open (to determine canopy cover, determine the percentage of the ground covered by a vertical projection of the outermost perimeter of the natural spread of the foliage of trees); and

o exhibits early stages of decay (decay Class 1-‐3; refer to Watt and Caceres 1999 ).

o surveys as follows:

The cavity opening or crevice will be monitored from 30 minutes before dusk until 60 minutes after dusk for evidence of bats exiting. Broad band acoustic monitors will be used at each candidate tree to identify the species of any bats observed. Night vision cameras may be used in conjunction with a broad band acoustic monitor to observe cavities, with the camera footage being reviewed by bat observers the following day.

Observers will record the following information:

• Weather conditions (temperature, wind speed (on a Beaufort scale), % cloud cover, and presence of any precipitation should be recorded).

• Date and time of day.

• Duration of survey.


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• Description of candidate maternity roost tree being surveyed, including tree species, height, canopy cover, description of cavity(ies), peeling bark.

• GPS point of the tree.

• Name of the observer(s) doing field work.

• Type of monitoring equipment used.

• Number and description of behaviour of any bats observed.

If a maternity roost is found, the entire ELC stand is considered bat SWH for the maternity colony roost.

3. POST-CONSTRUCTION SURVEYS

For wildlife habitats determined to be significant based on the results of the surveys described above, post-‐construction monitoring will also be conducted.

For significant amphibian breeding habitat, one year of post-‐construction monitoring will be conducted following the pre-‐construction methods described above. A monitoring report will be provided to the MNR within 3 months of the completion of surveys. The number of species and the number of individual breeding amphibians will be monitored and compared to pre-‐construction conditions. For significant bat maternity roost habitat, three years of post-‐construction monitoring will be conducted following the pre-‐construction methods described above. A monitoring report will be provided annually to the MNR within 3 months of the completion of surveys each year. The number of species and the number of roosting bats will be monitored and compared to pre-‐construction conditions. Results of post-‐construction wildlife habitat monitoring will be reviewed collectively by the proponent, MNR and other relevant agencies to determine if and when additional monitoring and/or mitigation is required. The best available science and information should be considered when determining appropriate mitigation. For post-‐construction mortality monitoring for birds and bats, please refer to Appendix B “Post-Construction Environmental Effects Monitoring Plan: Birds and Bats”.

4. REFERENCES

Bird Studies Canada. (2009). Marsh Monitoring Program Participant’s Handbook For Surveying Amphibians

Ministry of Natural Resources. (July 2011). Bats and Bat Habitats: Guidelines for Wind Power Projects.

Ministry of Natural Resources. (1998). Wildlife Monitoring Programs and Techniques.


APPENDIX A

PROJECT LAYOUT MAP

>

>

>

>

>

>>

>

>

>

CURRIES ROAD

OLD STAGE ROAD

PATTULLO AVENUE

HIGHWAY 59

GUNNS HILL ROAD

FIREHALL ROAD

HIGHWAY 401

OXFORD 14

HIGHWAY 403

CEDAR LINE

OXFORD CENTRE ROAD

ORIEL LINE

PARKINSON ROAD

JULIANA DRIVE

MIDDLETOWN LINE

SWEA

BURG

ROA

D

OLD 14 LINE

COMMERCE WAY

FINKLE STREET

SUBSTATION ROADRIVERS ROAD

HORN ROAD

ATHL

ONE A

VENU

E

DODGE LINE

BEARDS LANE

RIDGEWAY ROAD

DOVER STREET KEYES DRIVEPAVEY STREET

GREENLY LINE

MIDDLETOWN LINE

HIGHWAY 403

MIDDLETOWN LINE

MIDDLETOWN LINE

4

3

8

2 7

1

6

9

5

10

Gunn's Hill Wind Farm Proposed Project Layout

May 29, 2013Prowind Canada Inc.NAD 83 Zone 171:40,000

!(^̂

0 250 500 750 1,000Meters

^ Gunn's HillOttawa

!( TorontoOntario

Key Map to Project Area´

LegendZone of Investigation (50 m)

Zone of Investigation (120 m)

> Turbine

Blade Swept Area

Access Roads (5 m)

Overhead Cable

Buried Cables

Substation/O&M Building/Parking

Laydown Area

OHN Waterbody (LIO)

OHN Watercourse (LIO)

Wooded Area (LIO)

Existing Roads

Existing Transmission Line

Municipal Boundaries

Participating PropertiesNoise Receptors

! Participating

" Non-Participating (Occupied)

X Non-Participating (Vacant)


APPENDIX B

POST-CONSTRUCTION ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS MONITORING PLAN: BIRDS AND BATS

GUNN’S HILL WIND FARM

POST-CONSTRUCTION ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS MONITORING PLAN: BIRDS AND BATS

June 2013

Gunn’s Hill Windfarm Inc. 226 ½ James Street North, Unit A Hamilton, Ontario L8R 2L3 Tel: 905-528-1747 Fax: 866-203-6516 Email: [email protected]

Gunn’s Hill Wind Farm Post-Construction Environmental Effects Monitoring Plan: Birds and Bats

June 2013 i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................1 2. METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................................3

2.1. Carcass Searching Protocol ............................................................................................3 2.2. Species At Risk.................................................................................................................4 2.3. Carcass Removal Trials ...................................................................................................4 2.4. Searcher Efficiency Trials ................................................................................................6

3. MORTALITY ESTIMATE CORRECTIONS ...................................................................................6 3.1. Scavenger Correction Factor...........................................................................................7 3.2. Searcher Efficiency ..........................................................................................................7 3.3. Percent Area Searched....................................................................................................8 3.4. Corrected Mortality Estimates.........................................................................................8

4. POST-CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONAL MITIGATION ...............................................................8 4.1. Bats...................................................................................................................................8 4.2. Birds..................................................................................................................................9

5. CONTINGENCY PLANS .............................................................................................................9 6. REPORTING ........................................................................................................................... 10 7. REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................ 10

L IST OF TABLES TABLE 1 VEGETATION VISIBILITY CLASS CRITERIA ....................................................................3

LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 GUNN'S HILL WIND FARM PROJECT AREA .................................................................2


June 2013 1

1. INTRODUCTION

Prowind Inc. (Prowind) is a Canadian wind energy developer based in Hamilton, Ontario. It is affiliated with its parent company, Prowind GmbH, based in Osnabrück, Germany. Prowind’s mandate is to create small-‐scale, renewable and zero-‐emission power generation. Prowind believes in distributed generation that has a minimum impact on the surrounding environment and landscape.

The Applicant for this project is Gunn’s Hill Windfarm Inc., a special purpose vehicle created to hold assets of the Gunn’s Hill Wind Farm.

The Gunn’s Hill Wind Farm is a wind energy generation facility with a nameplate capacity of 25 MW. This project is classified as a “Class 4” wind facility in O. Reg. 359/09, which is defined as an on-‐shore wind facility with a nameplate capacity greater than 50 kW and a sound power level greater than 102 dB(A).

The project will employ the use of ten (10) Siemens SWT 3.0 -‐ 113 wind turbine generators. The 3.0 MW turbines will be rated to a nameplate capacity of 2.5 MW. Other basic components include step-‐up transformers located adjacent to the base of each turbine (step up voltage from approximately 0.69 kV to 27.6 kV), a 27.6 kV underground collector system, fibre optic data lines, a distribution substation, overhead dedicated feeder line, access roads and an Operations and Maintenance building. Temporary infrastructure will include, laydown areas, concrete wash ponds, storage shed, parking area and contractor trailers.

The project is located within the Township of Norwich and the City of Woodstock, both within Oxford County. The majority of the project is proposed on privately-‐owned, agricultural land near the villages of Curries and Oxford Centre, within the Township of Norwich. An overhead cable that connects the project to the Woodstock Transformer Station (TS) is located along Municipal and County Road Right-‐of-‐Ways (ROWs) and is located within the Township of Norwich and City of Woodstock. The primary land base is bounded by Firehall Road to the north, Oriel Line to the east, Gunn’s Hill Road to the south and Oxford Road 59 to the west. The overhead electrical cable to the Woodstock TS will run from the project area north along County Road 59, Pattullo Avenue, Athlone Avenue, Juliana Drive, Cedar Creek Golf Club or Norwich Ave/Parkinson Ave and South Street.

The project location with Ontario (Fig. 1) and proposed project layout (Fig 2) can be seen below.

This document provides a proposed environmental effects monitoring plan for the Gunn’s Hill Wind Farm as required under Ontario’s Green Energy Act. The project is being developed to meet the expanding demand for clean and renewable sources of energy in the province. The monitoring plan is designed to meet the standards outlined under the Ontario Ministry of Environment’s (MOE) Renewable Energy Approval Regulation (O. Reg. 359/09), the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) Approval and Permitting Requirements Document, and the requirements of the Bird and Bird Habitats: Guidelines for Wind Power Projects (December 2011) and Bats and Bat Habitats: Guidelines for Wind Power Projects (July 2011).

Prowind recognizes the importance of protecting significant natural features while achieving the objectives of renewable energy developments. Pre-‐construction monitoring


June 2013 2

for both birds and bats was carried out with plans that were vetted through MNR and Environment Canada (EC). Reports detailing the methods, results and risk assessment for birds are presented in Appendix F of the Natural Heritage Assessment Report.

Special attention was paid to the pre-‐construction study of bats. A comprehensive regional bat study was designed to provide both details at seven potential wind farm locations in southwestern and eastern Ontario as well as to provide MNR a comprehensive view of bat species and movement patterns that expanded upon the existing knowledge base. EchoTrack is an independent bat research and monitoring company, headquartered in Ontario. EchoTrack carried out the pre-‐construction bat study on behalf of Prowind. Reports on these completed studies have been submitted to MNR and are also presented in Appendix G of the Natural Heritage Assessment Report

Figure 1 illustrates the location and details of the project.

FIGURE 1 GUNN’S HILL WIND FARM PROJECT AREA


June 2013 3

2. METHODOLOGY

The proposed methodology for the post-‐construction environmental effects monitoring is taken primarily from the MNR Guidelines for Wind Power Projects, Bats and Bat Habitat (MNR 2011) MNR Guidelines for Wind Power Projects, Birds and Bird Habitat (MNR, Dec 2011) and is to consist of carcass searching complete with associated scavenger and searcher efficiency trials.

The proposed sampling follows the same sampling procedures, but extends the study the season both before and after the bat season to monitor birds, which begin spring migration earlier and end fall migration later than bats.

2.1. CARCASS SEARCHING PROTOCOL

This section presents the protocols and requirements for carcass searching surveys.

• All carcass-‐searching field personnel are to be trained by an experienced biologist who is familiar with the MNR and EC guidance documents, with bat and bird species expected to occur within the project area and with carcass searching methodology. Field personnel will be familiar especially with Species at Risk expected to occur within the project area.

• All searchers will have updated rabies pre-‐exposure vaccinations.

• Carcass searching is to occur at all 10 turbines.

• Each turbine search area will be mapped into the MNR-‐recommended visibility classes based on the criteria presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1 VEGETATION VISIBILITY CLASS CRITERIA

• Searching will be carried out to a distance of 50 m radius from each turbine tower, systematically covering the entire area using transects 5.0 – 6.0 m apart allowing for a visual search of 2.5 – 3.0 m on each side.

• Searching will be carried out twice per week from May 1 to October 31 and 1 per week from November 1 to November 30.

• Sampling is to consist of three years of searching for bat carcasses and bird carcasses.

• Name of field personnel.

• For all carcasses found, the following data are to be recorded:

o The date and time of the find. o The state of decomposition, to help estimate the number of days since

death. This state will recorded as: fresh

% Vegetation Cover Vegetation Height Visibi l i ty Class ≥90% bare ground ≤ 15cm tall Class 1 (Easy) ≥ 25% bare ground ≤ 15cm tall Class 2 (Moderate) ≤ 25% bare ground ≤ 25% > 30cm tall Class 3 (Difficult)

Little or no bare ground ≥ 25% > 30cm tall Class 4 (Very difficult)


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early decomposition

moderate decomposition

advanced decomposition

complete decomposition

scavenged o The extent and type of injury sustained (if identifiable). o The species (or the best estimate of species, if it is in too poor condition

to identify completely). o Sex of the species (where possible to identify). o The distance and direction from the nearest turbine as well as UTM

coordinates of the carcass (to serve as a verification check). o The substrate on which the victim was found. o Weather conditions including wind speed and direction and

precipitation.

• All carcasses found will be photographed and recorded and labeled with species, sex, date, time, location (UTM coordinate), carcass condition, searcher, injuries, distance to nearest turbine, ground cover and distance to plot centre; a data sheet sample will be provided in a mortality report.

• Sampling is to be carried out for three years, beginning the first full sampling month following operational start-‐up of the wind farm.

• Bird carcasses found during mortality monitoring will be collected and stored in a freezer and used in carcass removal or searcher efficiency trials, assuming they are in reasonable condition.

• Injured birds or bats will be taken to a wildlife rehabilitator – field personnel will have information on-‐hand about the closest local rehabilitators.

2.2. SPECIES AT RISK

The Species at Risk in Ontario List (O. Reg. 230/08) will be consulted to determine species listed as Endangered and Threatened in Ontario. Mortality or injury of an endangered or threatened species will be reported to Ministry of Natural Resources (Alymer) within 24 hours of detection or next business day.

2.3. CARCASS REMOVAL TRIALS

This section presents the protocols and requirements for carcass removal trials.

• Carcass removal trials are to be conducted once a month between May and September during the same period as the bat mortality surveys.

• A minimum of 10 carcasses will be used for each trial.

• Carcasses removal trials will be conducted in a variety of weather conditions; weather conditions will be recorded.

• Trial carcasses will be monitored every 3-‐4 days during the carcass searches


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• Trial carcasses will be left for 2 weeks or until they are fully scavenged

• Only a maximum of 5 trial carcasses will be placed at one time to avoid flooding the area

• At least one raptor will be used for the carcass removal trials.

• Carcasses will be distributed across the range of different substrates/habitats and turbines being searched.

• Carcasses will be placed before daylight using gloves and boots to avoid imparting human smell that might bias trial results.

• Trials will continue until all the carcasses are removed or have substantially decomposed.

• Trial carcasses will be discreetly marked (e.g. clipping of ear, wing leg, fur; hole-‐punching ear; etc.) with a unique identification, so they can be identified as a study carcass.

• Intact carcasses of the following species found during bat mortality searches will be stored and used in carcass removal or searcher efficiency trials:

o silver-‐haired bat (Lasionycteris noctivagans) o hoary bat (Lasiurus cinereus) o red bat (Lasiurus borealis)

• Carcasses of the following species will not be used in carcass removal trials

because of risk of contamination of White-‐nose Syndrome (carcasses will be buried). Carcasses of these species may be sent to the Canadian Cooperative Wildlife Health Centre for analysis of white-‐nose syndrome:

o northern long-‐eared bat (Myotis septentrionalis) o little brown bat (Myotis lucifugus) o eastern small-‐footed bat (Myotis leibii) o eastern pipistrelle (Perimyotis subflavus) o big brown bat (Eptesicus fuscus)

Northern long-‐eared bat and little brown bat are also considered Species at Risk in Ontario and collection of these species will follow the procedures for Species at Risk (see Section 2.2).

Carcasses used for trials will be fresh, if available, but are likely to be mostly of frozen specimens; if frozen carcasses must be used they will be completely thawed before placement.

If sufficient carcasses are available through turbine strikes or the Royal Ontario Museum (ROM), at least one third of the specimens used for carcass removal trials will be bats. In the absence of sufficient bat carcass availability, small brown animals such as mice, wild birds or day-‐old chicks will be used. At least one third of the specimens used will be of a variety of wild bird species, if available from either turbine strikes or the ROM, otherwise specimens will be of day-‐old brown chicks


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2.4. SEARCHER EFFICIENCY TRIALS

Searcher efficiency is an important factor in creating an estimate of total bat and bird mortality. Searcher efficiency may vary for each searcher and among potentially variable substrates and habitats. Therefore, searcher efficiency trials will be conducted as part of post-‐construction monitoring at the site. All turbines are to be located within fields planted with crops. Protocols for these trials are listed below.

• A searcher efficiency trial will be conducted throughout the period of sampling, beginning during the first month of carcass searching and extending until the end of the searching period. This is to ensure that all vegetation growth stages are included in the trials.

• Every searcher involved in the program will be subjected to each searcher efficiency trial; the searcher will not be notified when they are participating in an efficiency trial.

• Tests will occur once per season or once per month

• A tester (i.e. not a searcher for this project) will discreetly place the trial carcasses

• Only a maximum of 3 trials carcasses will be placed during any one testing event

• A minimum of 10 carcasses per searcher per season, per visibility class, per searcher (see table above) represented at the project will be included in the trials.

• The trial carcasses will be spread out over the trial period and conducted with the regular bat mortality surveys.

• The average per searcher rate of finding across all visibility classes will be used for calculations, as outlined in the MNR draft guidance document.

• Raw data for all searchers will be reported with the annual report.

• Trial carcasses will be discreetly marked (e.g. clipping of ear, wing leg, fur; hole-‐punching ear; etc.) with a unique identification so that they can be identified as a study carcass.

• Trial carcasses will be randomly placed by a tester within the search area and location recorded so that they can be retrieved if they are not found during the trial.

• Bat carcasses, if available, will be used for at least one third of the searcher efficiency trials; otherwise other small brown mammals, wild birds or day-‐old chick carcasses will be used.

• If frozen carcasses are used, they will be thawed prior to beginning searcher efficiency trials

3. MORTALITY ESTIMATE CORRECTIONS

As per the MNR guidance document, estimates of total bat mortality will be corrected using the calculations presented below. The same formulae will be applied separately to calculate and correct for the rate of bird mortality.


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3.1. SCAVENGER CORRECTION FACTOR

Proportions of carcasses remaining after each search interval are pooled to calculate the overall scavenger correction (Sc) factors:

Sc = nvisit-1 + nvisit-2 + … + nvisit-m nvisit-0 + nvisit-1 + … + nvisit-m-1 Sc proportion of carcasses not removed by scavengers over the search period

nvisit-0 total number of carcasses placed at the outset of the trial

nvisit-i are the number of carcasses remaining on the i-th visit (1 ≤ i ≤ m)

m total number of visits until all carcasses have been scavenged

3.2. SEARCHER EFFICIENCY

Searcher efficiency (Se) will be calculated for each searcher as follows:

Se = number of test carcasses found number of test carcasses placed – number of carcasses scavenged

Se = nfound n0 - nscav n0 total number of carcasses placed at the outset of the trial

nfound total number of carcasses found by the searcher

nscav the number of carcasses scavenged

The number of turbines that each individual searches will vary so it will be necessary to calculate a weighted average that reflects the proportion of turbines each searcher searched. The weighted average or overall searcher efficiency will be calculated as follows:

Seo = Se1(n1/T) + Se2(n2/T) + Se3(n3/T)…

Seo overall searcher efficiency

Se1, Se2, … individual searcher efficiency ratings

n1, n2, … are number of turbines searched by each searcher

T total number of turbines searched by all searchers


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3.3. PERCENT AREA SEARCHED

Percent area searched (Ps) is calculated as follows:

Ps = actual area searched πr2

r intended search radius from the turbine base, in this case 50 m

3.4. CORRECTED MORTALITY ESTIMATES

The minimum estimated bat mortality (C) is calculated as follows:

C = c / (Se x Sc x Ps)

C corrected number of bat or bird fatalities c number of carcasses found Se searcher efficiency, or proportion of carcasses expected to be found by

searchers Sc proportion of carcasses not removed by scavengers over the search period Ps percent of the area searched The search area will be delineated using a GPS. A map of the actual search area for each turbine searched, and a description of areas deemed to be unsearchable (e.g. vegetation height, type, slope, etc.) will be recorded and provided in the mortality report.

The above calculations will be presented in corrected number of bats or birds per turbine per year. Bat and bird carcasses that are discovered incidental to formal searches will be processed (i.e. collected, recorded, etc.), and fatality data included with the calculation of fatality rates. If the incidentally discovered carcass is found outside a formal search plot, the data will be reported separately.

4. POST-CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONAL MITIGATION

4.1. BATS

Post-‐construction mitigation will be required where post-‐construction monitoring identifies disturbance effects associated with bat SWH. Operational mitigation is required if post-‐construction monitoring shows that a wind power project is causing significant bat mortality. Bat mortality is considered significant when mortality levels at a project location exceed 10 bats / turbine / year.

Operational mitigation refers to adjustments made to the operation of wind turbines to help mitigate potential negative environmental effects on bats (i.e. significant bat mortality). Operational mitigation for bat mortality consists of changing the wind turbine cut-‐in speed to 5.5 m/s (measured at hub height), or feathering of wind turbine blades when wind speeds are below 5.5 m/s.


June 2013 9

The majority of bat mortalities from wind turbine operations occur during fall migration. Across North America, it is estimated that 90% of bat fatalities occur from mid-‐July through September. Where a post-‐construction monitoring annual report indicates the annual bat mortality threshold of 10 bats/turbine/year has been exceeded, operational monitoring will be implemented across the wind power project (i.e. at all turbines) from sunset to sunrise, from July 15 to September 30. This mitigation will continue for the duration of the project. Should site-‐specific monitoring indicate a shifted peak mortality period, operational mitigation may be shifted to match the peak mortality, with mitigation maintained for a minimum 10 weeks. Any shift in the operational mitigation period to match peak mortality should be determined in coordination with and confirmed by MNR.

Where post-‐construction monitoring is applied, an additional 3 years of effectiveness monitoring is required. Monitoring the effectiveness of any post-‐construction mitigation techniques will help to evaluate the success of this mitigation.

4.2. BIRDS

Post-‐construction mitigation or additional scoped monitoring will be required at individual turbines or groups of turbines where post-‐construction monitoring identifies significant annual bird mortality, disturbance effects associated with bird SWH, or significant bird mortality events.

For turbines located outside 120m of bird SWH, 2 years of subsequent scoped mortality and cause and effects monitoring is required where a significant annual mortality threshold has been exceeded. Following scoped monitoring, post-‐construction monitoring (e.g. operational mitigation) and effectiveness monitoring may be required at individual turbines where a mortality effect has been identified or significant annual mortality persists.

For turbines located within 120m of bird SWH, immediate post-‐construction mitigation (including operational mitigation), as identified in the Environmental Impact Study, and 3 years of effectiveness monitoring will be required where monitoring identifies significant annual bird mortality or disturbance effects associated with bird SWH.

Operational mitigation techniques may include periodic shut-‐down of select turbines and/or blade feathering at specific times of the year when mortality risks to the affected bird species is particularly high (e.g. migration). Emerging and new technologies will be considered that may reduce bird fatalities.

5. CONTINGENCY PLANS

As stated in the guidelines, a contingency plan is required to be identified in the Environmental Effects Monitoring Plan. Contingency plans are required for significant mortality events or if mitigation actions are not effective, whereas the thresholds outlined in bullets below are thresholds requiring Operational Mitigation (see Section 4.0). A contingency plan may be required in the event a significant mortality event or events, or if mitigation actions fail. Significant mortality will be considered as a threshold of:

• 10 bats/turbine/year (averaged across the site)

• 14 birds/turbine/year (at individual turbine or turbine group)


June 2013 10

• 33 birds (including raptors) at multiple turbines

• 0.2 raptors/turbine/year (all raptors) (averaged across the site)

• 0.1 raptors/turbine/year (provincially tracked raptors) (averaged across the site)

The MNR will be notified and mitigation measures will be determined to address the mortality event if a threshold is exceeded. Contingency plans for bird and bat species will be designed in consultation with the MNR.

The contingency plan mitigation outlined above would occur starting as soon as the threshold(s) is (are) exceeded for a period of three years post-‐construction environmental effects monitoring.

6. REPORTING

Annual reports will be prepared following conclusion of fall monitoring and submitted to the MNR, MOE, and EC within 3 months of completion of fall sampling. All raw data will be tabulated and included in the reports. A final report, following conclusion of the 3-‐year program, will be submitted to MNR, MOE, and EC within three months of completing the project. If additional monitoring is necessary due to significant mortality or surpassed bird or bat mortality thresholds and the implementation of mitigation measures, a yearly report will be prepared at the culmination of each year of monitoring and the culmination of the monitoring program in its entirety. Three years of additional effectiveness monitoring, including annual reporting, is required if operational mitigation is required.

All bat and bird monitoring data and associated reports will be submitted to the Ministry of the Environment and MNR, consistent with MNR’s procedures and protocols, and satisfy the data standards and requirements of the Wind Energy Bird and Bat Monitoring Database. Bat survey data submitted will be entered into the database, analyzed, reported and used to address knowledge gaps and create public data summaries. Standardized templates available online through the Wind Energy Bird and Bat Monitoring Database found at http://www.bsc-‐eoc.org/birdmon/wind/wind_templates.jsp will be used to record and report all field data.

7. REFERENCES

Environment Canada. 2007a. Wind Turbines and Birds: A Guidance Document for Environmental Assessment. April 2007. Environment Canada, Canadian Wildlife Service.

Environment Canada. 2007b. Recommended Protocols for Monitoring Impacts of Wind Turbines on Birds. April 2007. Environment Canada, Canadian Wildlife Service.

Bats and Bat Habitats; Guidelines for Wind Power Projects. July 2011. Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources.

Birds and Bird Habitats; Guidelines for Wind Power Projects. December 2011. Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources.

APPENDIX G

PRELIMINARY IMPACT STUDY

IDENTIFICATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

DEPLOYMENT OF THE GUNN’S HILL PROJECT

WIND FARM

In the region of OXFORD COUNTY, ONTARIO


IDENTIFICATION OF TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Prepared for

Prowind Canada Inc. 226 1/2 James Street N, Unit A

Hamilton, Ontario L8R 2L3

Gunns Hill Project Telecom impact study.doc Project: P-2012265

Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc Page 2 Version 1 December 2012

DEPLOYMENT OF THE GUNN’S HILL PROJECT

WIND FARM


PRELIMINARY IMPACT STUDY IDENTIFICATION OF TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Team members in charge of the preparation of this document

Etienne Leroux, Eng.

Régis d’Astous, Senior Specialist

Maurice Beauséjour, P.Eng. December 21st, 2012

Note: This document is written according to a mandate given to Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc. by Prowind Canada Inc. This document is based on data obtained mainly from the database of Industry Canada and third parties, for which no field validation was made by YRH. Consequently, the information and conclusions presented in this document are strictly informative. Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc. as well as the people acting on their account cannot be held responsible for any direct or indirect damage connected to the contents of this document.



TABLE OF CONTENT

1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 4

2 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................ 5

3 SYSTEMS IDENTIFICATION ....................................................................................................... 6

3.1 BROADCAST SYSTEMS .............................................................................................................. 6 3.1.1 Television Broadcast Station .......................................................................................... 6 3.1.2 FM Broadcast Station ..................................................................................................... 8 3.1.3 AM Broadcast Station ..................................................................................................... 9

3.2 NAVIGATIONAL AID SYSTEMS .................................................................................................... 9 3.2.1 VOR /Localizer Systems ................................................................................................. 9

3.3 MOBILE SYSTEMS ................................................................................................................... 10 3.4 POINT-TO-POINT SYSTEMS ..................................................................................................... 11 3.5 POINT-TO-MULTIPOINT SYSTEMS ............................................................................................ 13 3.6 RADAR SYSTEMS .................................................................................................................... 13 3.7 SEISMOLOGICAL SYSTEMS ...................................................................................................... 15

4 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 17



DEPLOYMENT OF THE GUNN’S HILL PROJECT WIND FARM



IDENTIFICATION OF TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

1 Introduction

Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc., broadcast and telecommunication consultants have been

mandated by Prowind Canada Inc. to verify the impact of the deployment of the Gunn’s Hill

project wind farm on the telecommunication systems operating in the region of Oxford

County, Ontario.

This preliminary study report presents the results of the first phase of the study, identifying

the telecommunication systems in the wind farm area that might be affected by the

deployment of the Gunn’s Hill wind farm project. This study aims, among other things, to

identify point-to-point microwave telecommunication links that intersect the proposed wind

farm project and to define the consultation zones associated with these links and with the

mobile base station located in the region. The study also aims to identify radar and navigation

systems with the potential to be affected by wind turbines and to assess the potential for

impact on radio and television broadcast signals in the region.

All consultation zones are in accordance with the proposed consultation distances of the

RABC/CANWEA guidelines and are shown on the map in Annex 1. Most of these

consultation zones are not designated areas where the placement of wind turbines is

forbidden, as it is the case for an exclusion zone like the corridor linking two microwave

stations. The placement of wind turbines within most of these consultation zones is possible.

However, each case may require further detailed analysis before proceeding.

The results of this study will determine the extent of the detailed study, which could be

required and would aim to evaluate the magnitude of the potential interference to specific

systems and to recommend alternative solutions where required.



2 Discussion Previous studies from different sources indicate that almost every telecommunication

systems could be affected by the operation of a wind turbine in cases of extreme proximity. In

more representative cases, interference is unlikely when a spacing of only a few rotor

diameters exists between the telecommunication system and the wind turbine.

Generally speaking, the potential for interference issues from wind turbines come from two

different sources; the obstruction of the radio wave caused by the wind turbine and the

reflections of the radio wave from the wind turbine’s surfaces. Both types of interference will

degrade the received signal and affect the performance and reliability of the communications

system.

Many different parameters, related to the wind turbine itself, influence the magnitude of the

potential interfering signals. The type of wind turbine, the rotor diameter, the number and

shape of the blades, the material in the blades, the shape and size of the supporting tower

and the shape and size of the nacelle, all have an impact on the potential obstruction or

reflection of the signal. Similarly, the parameters of the telecommunication system such as

the type of modulation, the frequency and the signal polarisation, the relative position of the

transmitter, wind turbine and receiver as well as terrain topography, antenna radiation pattern

and propagation conditions, also have an impact on the potential for interference with radio

telecommunication systems.

The main factor to consider in evaluating the potential for wind turbine interference is the

conductive nature of the material used for the turbine blades. The rotation plane of the blades

and the support tower appear as a significant conductive surface causing potential

obstruction or reflection of a signal. Fiberglass-epoxy blades offer some improvement but do

not solve the potential problem entirely as the presence of wires connecting lightning

receptors at the tips of the blades to the grounding system is often sufficient to make the

blades appear as a significant metallic element.

The following system categories are considered to be potentially impacted by wind turbine

interference under certain conditions and will be discussed in more details in the following

section.



- Broadcast systems, TV, FM radio and AM radio;

- Navigational aids systems, VOR;

- Mobile systems, VHF and UHF mobile, cellular and PCS;

- Point to Point radio systems, UHF, microwave and satellite links;

- Point to Multipoint systems, FWA, MMDS, LMCS;

- Navigational and meteorological radar systems.

- Canadian National Seismograph Network

3 Systems Identification

3.1 Broadcast Systems

3.1.1 Television Broadcast Station Historically, analog television signal reception has been very sensitive to signal reflection

from wind turbines. Analog television signal impairments from wind turbines generally occurs

as video distortion taking the form of a flicker of the picture synchronized with the blade’s

passage frequency. The impact on the aural channel is generally not perceptible as it is a

frequency modulated (FM) sub-channel. As most of the analog TV stations have now been

dismantled or converted to modern digital technology, television signal reception impairment

by wind farm becomes less of an issue. However, exceptional cases of conflicting situation

are theoretically still possible.

There is no simple rule to determine the minimum separation between wind turbines and a

digital TV transmitter or receiver to ensure impairment-free operation. The topographic

information and the relative positions of the sites are important parameters. With digital

television technology, at least one case of reception impairment has been reported in the

USA at proximity of wind turbines, in an area where the TV station’s coverage was already

marginal before wind farm implementation. While with analog TV technology, unacceptable

impairment has been experienced at distances as far as 10 km from the wind farms, with

digital TV, the geographical extent of quality degradation should be limited to the proximity of

the wind turbines, especially in areas located on the fringe of the TV station coverage. Under

extreme conditions, image and sound quality impairments have been noticed within proximity

of wind turbines, however a typical setback distance from residences minimize the risk of

impact. Each case needs to be evaluated separately to consider the actual field conditions.



The operation of television transmitters is regulated and each television station has an

associated protected service contour, within which interference from other stations affecting

the quality of signal reception should be kept to a minimum. The deployment of wind turbines

in close proximity to a television transmitter could be problematic as it may degrade a

significant portion of the service contour area of the station and special care should be taken

as the distance between the wind turbine and the transmitter decreases within the prescribed

2 km consultation radius. The deployment of wind turbines at the limit of the service contour

of a digital TV station may have an impact on the quality of reception in the vicinity of the wind

farm and the risk of degradation may need to be evaluated.

With the ATSC (Advanced Television Systems Committee) digital TV technology (DTV), the

issue associated with the static ghosting is solved, since the digital TV receivers have the

ability to deal with the different signals reflected by fixed obstacles and arriving

simultaneously at the receivers. As mentioned previously, when the wind turbines are in

operation, the rapidly changing signal level reflected or blocked by the wind turbines could

exceed the ability of the receivers to compensate for such variation, especially in locations

where reception was already marginal.

The old analog NTSC TV technology may still be used for a few years in some region of

Canada, however with the recent CRTC decisions 2012-384, 2012-413 and 2012-414

authorizing the CBC and TVO to shut-down their remaining analog re-transmitter as of July

31st 2012, the number of analog stations still in operation in Canada has been reduced to

very few, which are planned to be shut-down or converted very shortly.

In the case of the Gunn’s Hill project, there is no more analog TV station remaining and

covering, even partially, the wind farm project study area.

Most TV broadcast operators already converted their old analog NTSC TV stations to the

new ATSC North American digital standard, providing a much higher quality picture and a

better resilience to the changes in the environment. According to the Industry Canada

database, there are ten DTV stations covering at least partially the wind farm study area and

they are listed in Table 1.



Table 1- List of DTV stations whose service contours overlap the wind farm study area.

The performance of an ATSC receiver has not yet been tested in detail in presence of wind

turbines. Consequently, it is not possible to positively state that no impact will ever occur.

However, it is clear that the potentially impacted area near a wind turbine will be significantly

reduced with ATSC reception compared to the impact zone affecting the obsolete NTSC

system reception, which would reduce the risk of degradation in reception quality for the

neighboring residences by a similar ratio.

For the proposed wind farm project, the study area is located in a mainly rural region.

According to the 2011 census data, there are approximately 106 permanent residences and

a total population of about 318 peoples living within the study area. However, there are

approximately 18 254 permanent residences and a total population of about 45 198 peoples

living within the 10 km extended study area which represents the TV signal reception study

area as stated by the RABC-CANWEA guidelines.

3.1.2 FM Broadcast Station Previous studies and simulations in laboratories have shown that FM broadcast reception is

generally not affected by the wind turbine operation, as long as a minimum distance of a few

hundred meters from the wind turbine is maintained. Potential FM reception degradation

would be perceived as a background “hissing noise” synchronised with the rotation of the

blades. Potential degradation would typically only happen on the fringe of the coverage area

of a station, as the signal to noise ratio is already marginal (<12dB) and at close proximity to

STATION NETWORK TRANSMITTER LOCATION CICO-DT-28 TVO Paris/Kitchner

CITY-DT-2 Independent - English Woodstock

CKCO-DT CTV Kitchener

CFPL-DT CTV London

CIII-DT GTN Paris

CFTO-DT CTV Toronto

CICO-DT-18 TVO London

CFMT-DT-1 Independent - English London

CHCH-DT Independent - English Hamilton

CBLT-DT CBC Toronto



the wind turbine. These conditions occur mainly outside the protected service contours of the

stations.

There is no FM broadcast transmitter station located within or at proximity of the proposed

wind farm project area.

3.1.3 AM Broadcast Station Just like television signals, AM broadcast signals are amplitude modulated and as such could

experience interference from wind turbine operation. However, the AM broadcast systems

operate at very low frequency with wavelengths much longer than TV signals and thus are

not reflected by wind turbine components. The reception of AM broadcast signals will not be

affected, unless the receiver is very close to the wind turbine itself (less than a few meters).

One should note that the construction of any metallic vertical structure near an AM antenna

system could modify the radiation pattern of the antenna system, as the new structure will

react as a secondary radiator. In some instances, particularly with stations having a

directional radiation pattern, the cumulative impact of a large number of wind turbines could

be an issue, even at relatively large distance.

There is no AM broadcast transmitter station located within or at proximity of the proposed

wind farm project area.

3.2 Navigational Aid Systems

3.2.1 VOR /Localizer Systems The VOR (VHF Omnidirectional Range) use frequencies in the 108-118 MHz band and a

combination of amplitude and frequency modulation to facilitate aircraft short-range

navigation. The VOR ground stations are generally located within the boundaries of airports

but are sometimes located along main navigation corridors for en route navigation. A clear

area of approximately five hundred meters around ground stations should be maintained for

proper operation and precision of the airborne receiver. Depending on the local condition and

topography, tall buildings or structures should be avoided at much larger distance from the

station to avoid distortion of the variable azimuth signal. Nav Canada, who is in charge of the

operation of the VOR stations, would like to be notified as soon as possible of any proposed

wind farm project within 15 km of these stations. Their initial analysis could help to provide



assistance to wind farm promoters during the process of turbines positioning, in order to

minimize the impact on the operation of the station.

There is no VOR station located within 15 km of the project area. A consultation with Nav

Canada through the mandatory Land Use Proposal process has been initiated with the final

surveyed layout and we are still waiting for their formal response.

3.3 Mobile Systems All mobile systems operating in the VHF and UHF bands as well as the Cellular or PCS

systems in the 800, 1900 MHz and AWS bands use some form of frequency or phase

modulation which, similarly to the FM broadcast systems, are not considered susceptible to

wind turbine interference. These systems are designed to operate with mobile units moving at

vehicular speeds up to a few hundred kilometers per hour, which produced much stronger

multipath and faster and deeper fades than what could be produced by reflections from wind

turbines. Even if interference is theoretically possible at very close distances from the wind

turbine under weak signal conditions, there is no reference in the literature describing any

encountered real case. We do not expect any significant interference with that type of

systems.

There is one mobile telecommunication system site identified within the proposed wind farm

project study area. A 1 km radius consultation zone is showed on the map in annex 1. Four

wind turbines (#7, #8, #9 and #10) are located within the 1 km radius consultation zone of the

mobile site consultation zone. None of those wind turbines are expected to cause any

interference due to wind turbine distance to the identified mobile site, respectively about

870 m for wind turbine #7, 630 m for wind turbine #8, 677 m for wind turbine #9 and 979 m

for wind turbine #10. These distances are largely sufficient to insure the physical protection of

the site.

The public safety agencies, DND, RCMP, GMCB and other agencies like NRCan,

Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and Environment Canada (EC) were contacted

by Prowind Canada Inc. to identify any communication systems they may have in the area.

These agencies confirmed they have no objection with the Gunn’s Hill wind farm project.



3.4 Point-to-Point Systems The point-to-point telecommunication systems are used to link broadcast stations to their

associated studio as well as for a multitude of applications associated with different utilities.

The telephony and data networks use microwave point-to-point links and especially with the

expansion of the cellular systems, microwave links are used to link every base station to their

associated switching centre. At UHF and microwave frequencies, point-to-point links require

clear line of sight between communicating stations. The presence of structures on each side

along the path may cause signal reflection partially cancelling the direct signal to the point

where the communication may be disrupted.

The installation of wind turbines at close proximity to a point-to-point path can result in

stronger impact than a static structure, considering the amplitude modulation effect and the

Doppler Effect introduced by the rotation of the blades. Many references in the literature have

evaluated the required clearance between the path optical line of sight and any wind turbine

along the path and most conclude that the minimum distance to be maintained to ensure an

interference free operation is 3 times the first Fresnel zone radius. The first Fresnel zone

radius depends on the frequency of operation of the link, the path length and the position

along the path.

An additional lateral distance equivalent to the wind turbine rotor radius is also included to

ensure that the rotor blades clear entirely the path exclusion corridor.

In the case of the Gunn’s Hill project, four point-to-point links crossing or terminating in the

study area have been identified. The associated consultation corridors appear on the map

included in annex 1. It should be noted that these corridors were computed using the

coordinates provided in the Industry Canada database, which are known to be occasionally

inaccurate. The analysis considered an error allowance of 100 m, which increases the width

of the consultation corridors by 200 m. Based on the analyzed layout, no wind turbine are

planned to be built within these microwave links consultation corridors. The following Table 2

lists the point-to-point sites terminating the identified links.



Table 2 - List of point-to-point sites with their published coordinates.

The following table 3 presents the locations of the wind turbines as per the proposed layout

which was analyzed.

Table 3- Coordinates of the proposed Gunn’s Hill wind farm layout

Turbine Number

Easting UTM NAD83

Zone 17 (m)

Northing UTM NAD83

Zone 17 (m)

1 523280.001 4769977.972 2 523797.627 4770215.703 3 523881.008 4769897.553 4 525534.012 4768601.985 5 525919 4768537 6 526655.989 4770340.023 7 526979.966 4770300.263 8 527114.966 4768860.058 9 527438.033 4768938.011

10 528153.146 4769205.415

Two wind turbines (#6 and #7) are located within the 1 km radius consultation zone of the

Oxford Center microwave site and none of them are within the microwave links consultation

zones. Both wind turbines are not expected to cause any interference to the identified

microwave links due to wind turbine distance to the Oxford Center microwave site,

respectively about 420 m for wind turbine #6 and 705 m for wind turbine #7. These distances

are largely sufficient to insure the physical protection of the site.

Location

Easting UTM NAD83

Zone 17 (m)

Northing UTM NAD83

Zone 17 (m)

Elevation (m)

WOODSTOCK (1327 DUNDAS ST) 525 323 4 776 471 312 OXFORD CENTRE (714420 MIDDLETOWN) 526 296 4 770 120 321 WOODSTOCK (564960 BOWER HILL RD) 518 603 4 772 099 376 WOODSTOCK (ON0076) 518 490 4 772 253 374 WOODSTOCK (564965 KARN RD) 518 104 4 772 808 371 NORWICH (ON1962) 534 451 4 762 783 276



The same clearance criteria also apply to the satellite communication earth stations operating

in the microwave bands between 4 GHz and 14 GHz. Once the azimuth and elevation angle

of an earth station pointing at a specific satellite are known, the minimum distance to the

closest wind turbine in a given direction can be evaluated. There is no licensed earth station

identified within or near the proposed wind farm project area.

The Direct to Home (DTH) satellite TV services are very popular in these rural areas where

cable networks are often non-existent. A validation of potential satellite line of sight blockage

may have to be done as part of a detailed study, once the final wind farm layout is known. In

a relatively flat land region like in this case, a normal setback of 500 m from residences is

largely sufficient to maintain a clear line of sight to the satellites used by the Canadian service

providers.

3.5 Point-to-Multipoint Systems Point-to-Multipoint systems are gaining in popularity in rural areas to offer services such as

telephony, internet access and wireless cable TV networks. These systems operate in

different frequency bands from 1.5 GHz up to 40 GHz with many different types of

modulations. In the case of the point-to-multipoint systems oriented toward general public, as

for the Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISP), the position of the users are unknown and

the protection of these systems can be limited only to the base stations of these systems

which are collocated with the microwave sites. A consultation zone of 1.0 km radius is also

associated with these stations as in the case of the mobile systems and the installation of

wind turbines could typically be carried out as close as the limit of the physical protection of

the radio station.

However, in the case of the point-to-multipoint systems whose stations require a licence from

Industry Canada, they are treated as multiple point-to-point systems in our analysis and are

therefore included in the previous section of this study. No such point-to-multipoint systems

have been identified within or at proximity of the wind farm project study area.

3.6 Radar Systems Radar systems generally operate in the microwave frequencies from 1 GHz to 10 GHz or

more, and use the radio wave reflection to locate and identify any eventual target. Military



and civil usage of radar systems is mainly related to air traffic control and meteorology to

name a few applications. Any fixed structure in the radar station line of sight will reflect a part

of the signal transmitted by the radar back to the radar receiver which will process it. The

echo from the structure will be similar to the echo from an aircraft, but will show different

particularities designated as its radar signature and processing can differentiate between a

structure signature and an aircraft signature, even between two different types of aircraft.

When the structure is fixed, filtration and processing can generally eliminate the structure

signature from the radar display, reducing the impact for the radar operator. The navigational

radar, especially the long range radar, typically have a slight positive antenna elevation angle,

such that structures far enough from the radar station are not visible from the radar station

position and generally do not cause any significant radar response. Moving structures like

wind turbine cause important disturbance to radar operation, since the signature is

continuously changing according to rotor speed and wind direction. Especially when many

wind turbines are clustered in relatively large wind farms, the filtration and processing of

these radar echoes become virtually impossible. Attempts to develop filtration and complex

processing to cancel the responses from moving structures like wind turbine have been made

with disappointing results. New processing algorithms are currently being tested to mitigate

the impact on navigational radar. The results of these tests should be available relatively

soon and possible mitigation solutions could be proposed if validation tests are conclusive.

The meteorological radars operate in a similar way and attempt to measure the cloud density

and precipitation as close as possible to the earth surface as well as the air movement. In

order to achieve a larger coverage area, they are usually installed on higher platforms and

their antenna elevation angles are generally close to the horizon and sometime negative,

depending on local topography. The presence of fix structures can be dealt with in the same

way as for the navigational radar, however since the radar beam is grazing the earth surface,

echo from structure even over the horizon are often seen.

Based on the recent discussions within the RABC/CANWEA Joint Working Group, a

consultation zone of 60 km radius is required around Coast Guard radar station, while a

50 km radius consultation zone is required around the meteorological radar stations and an

80 km radius zone is required around the Air Traffic Control (ATC) radar stations. Similarly,



the Department of National Defence requires a 100 km consultation zone around the so

called defence radar stations.

There is no Canadian Coast Guard maritime traffic radar station and no meteorological radar

station within their respective consultation distance of 60 km and 50 km.

However, there are two ATC PSR radar systems operated by Nav Canada at the London

airport and at Mount Hope (Hamilton airport), located respectively 35 km west and 60 km

east of the proposed wind farm area. Nav Canada has been contacted through the

mandatory Land Use Proposal process and a formal letter to proponent has been received

and is presented in Annex 2. It states that they have no objection to the project as initially

proposed. The revised layout dated 2012-12-07 has also been submitted to Nav Canada and

we are still waiting for the revised letter to proponent.

Similarly, this final surveyed layout has been submitted to Transport Canada for obstruction

clearance approval, along with a wind turbine lighting proposal. An analysis is ongoing within

Transport Canada and we expect their response shortly.

Prowind Canada Inc. also transmitted a request to the air navigation department of the

Department of National Defence (DND) to identify their communication systems, navigational

aids, radar or others systems that could be in the area of the wind farm project. The DND has

confirmed that they have no objection with the submitted Gunn’s Hill wind farm area. If the

project is to be modified, a new request should be submitted to the DND. This project is

referenced as WTA-2095 in the DND records and this number should be used as reference

in any future communication with the DND.

3.7 Seismological Systems Even if the seismological stations are not really part of the telecommunication systems,

Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) are providing information related to their seismic

monitoring stations and would like to be notified when wind farm installation are planned at

proximity of these stations.

Seismological sensors are very sensitive equipment capable of measuring earthquake

tremors much lower in amplitude than what can be felt by the population. Many different



national and international seismological networks exist and some stations are also used to

monitor the application of the International Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, sometimes able to

detect a detonation of 100 tons of conventional explosives, more than 5000 km away. Studies

have shown that the vibration of a single wind turbine transmitted to the ground through the

supporting concrete pad can travel on relatively long distance and reduce significantly the

sensitivities of the seismological instruments.

It has been agreed that a consultation distance of 50 km from a seismological monitoring

array and 10 km from a single monitoring station would be required and that the impact of

any wind farm project located within these distances from a seismological station should be

analysed on a case by case basis.

There is no seismological station located within a radius of 10 km of the proposed wind farm

area.



4 CONCLUSION An inventory and preliminary analysis was completed for every telecommunication system

within 100 km of the wind farm project study area which could suffer interference from the

planned Gunn’s Hill wind farm project. Sources of information to identify

telecommunications systems result mainly from the database of Industry Canada and the

correspondence with certain public safety agencies. Consultation zones are produced in

accordance with the guideline issued jointly by the RABC and the CanWEA. Based on the Industry Canada database, there are ten digital TV stations and no analog TV

stations identified as covering the wind farm area. Following the CRTC decision 2012-384,

as of July 31st 2012, the CBC closed 607 analog stations throughout Canada, such that

only one CBC digital station, CBLT-DT, remains in operation in the area. There is no FM or AM broadcast transmitter station located within or near the wind farm

project study area itself. There is no VOR station located within a radius of 15 km of the proposed project area. There is one land mobile base station located within the wind farm project study area. Wind

turbines #7, #8, #9 and #10 are within the 1 km radius consultation zone and are not

expected to cause any interference to the identified mobile station. There are four identified point-to-point links crossing or terminating within the project study

area. Wind turbines #6 and #7 are within the 1 km radius site consultation zone and both

wind turbines are not expected to cause any interference to the identified microwave links. There is no maritime radar system within a 60 km radius and no meteorological radar within

a 50 km radius. However, the London and Mount Hope ATC primary surveillance radar

(PSR) stations are located within their respective consultation radius. Nav Canada

response to the Land Use Proposal process according to the layout dated 2012-05-24

confirm that there is no issue with any of their systems. We are still waiting for their

confirmation with regard to the slightly different layout dated 2012-12-07.

The DND also confirmed having no objection with the submitted Gunn’s Hill wind farm layout

dated 2012-12-07. They requested to be informed of any modification to the wind farm



project area and the submission of a new request as necessary. The new submission, if

required, should refer to the WTA-2095 wind farm project file.

Public safety agencies confirmed having no objection with the submitted Gunn’s Hill wind

farm layout.

There is no seismological station located within a radius of 10 km of the proposed wind farm

area. It is necessary to add that all these evaluations, the resulting consultation and exclusion

zones and the conclusions of this report are primarily based on the information published in

the database of Industry Canada or other sources for which no field validation has been

executed. It should be noted that the Industry Canada database used for this study was

dated 2012-10-09 and that it is not always updated as quickly as the commissioning of new

radio stations and there may be new stations deployed recently that will appear only in few

months in the database. It is impossible to identify these stations before they are added to

the database, as it is impossible to identify the stations using unlicensed frequencies, which

are not listed in any public database.



References

Dipak L. Sengupta, Thomas B. A. Senior, “Electromagnetic Interference from Wind

Turbines” in Wind Turbine Technology : Chapter 9, , David A, Spera (Ed), ASME Press,

1994.

David F. Bacon, “Fixed-link Wind-Turbine exclusion zone method”, D.F. Bacon, 2002.

M. M. Butler, D. A. Johnson, “Effect of wind farm on primary radar”, DTI PUB URN No.

03/976, 2003.

RABC/CANWEA “Coordination Process Between Wind Turbines and Radiocommunication

and Radar Systems” December 2010.

Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Broadcasting Public

Notice CRTC 2007-53, Ottawa, 17 May 2007.

Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, Broadcasting Public

Notice CRTC 2012-384, Ottawa, 17 July 2012.

ATSC Standard, ‘’ ATSC Recommended Practice: Receiver Performance Guidelines’’,

Document A/74, June 2004 with corrigendum July 2007.



Annex 1

Overview of the

Gunn’s Hill wind farm project





Annex 2

Nav Canada’s

Letter to Proponent





Annex 3

Public Safety Agencies Response

(From Prowind Canada Inc. Communication Log)



From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: December-14-12 2:41 PM To: Regis Dastous Cc: [email protected] Subject: Detailed Analysis - No Interference - REVISED LAYOUT- Gunn's Hill - Woodstock, Ont - WTA-2095 Regis, We have completed the detailed analysis of your proposed site revision, Gunn's Hill, located near Woodstock, Ont (WTA-2095). The results of our detailed analysis have shown that there is likely to be no interference with DND radar and flight operations. Therefore, as a result of these findings we have no objections with your project revision as submitted (attached). If however, the layout were to change/move, please re-submit that proposal for another assessment using the assigned WTA number listed above. The concurrence for this site is valid for 24 months from date of this email. If the project should be cancelled or delayed during this timeframe please advise this office accordingly. It should be noted that our office looks at each submission on a case by case basis and as such, concurrence on this submission in no way constitutes a concurrence for similar projects in the same area, nor does it indicate that similar concurrence might be offered in another region. Finally, the concurrence offered in this email extends only to the subject projects and current proponent. Should the project or any part of it be altered, or be sold to another developer, this office must be notified and we reserve the right to reassess the project. Thank you for your patience on this matter and for considering DND radar and airport facilities in your project development process. If you have any questions feel free to contact me. Thank you. <<Gunns Hill Surveyed Layout 2012.12.07 Submission file.xls>> Adin Switzer Capt AEC Liaison Officer CCISF/ESICC ATESS/ESTTMA Défense nationale | National Defence 8 Wing Trenton, Astra, ON K0K 3W0 TEL: 613 392-2811 Ext4834 (CSN: 827-4834) FAX: 613 965-3200



Cathy, I have reviewed this proposal in respect to DND's radiocommunication systems, and I have no objections. Mr. Mario Lavoie



From: Fox, Mark (MGS) [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2012 10:26 AM To: Juan Anderson Cc: 'Rochelle Rumney'; 'Jeff Segal' Subject: RE: Gunns Hill Wind Farm: impact assessment Hi Juan; Based upon prior assessment and confirmation that all turbines listed in the attached May 24, 2012 layout will be within the Gunn’s Hill wind farm project area as provided by Cathy Weston in the attached July 21, 2009 Email, a revised impact assessment is not required as the Gunn’s Hill wind farm project area has previously been determined to unlikely to impact the performance of Ontario’s Public Safety Radio system. Please be advised that a reassessment will be required should the project area change or turbines be located outside the project area as defined in Cathy’s July 21, 2009 Email. If you have any questions, you can contact me at 416-327-0383 or by email at [email protected]. Regards, Mark Fox, P. Eng. Network Radio Engineer Government Mobile Communications Branch Infrastructure Technology Services Ministry of Government Services 155 University Ave, 14th Floor, Toronto, ON M5H 3B7 Email: [email protected] Phone: 416-327-0383 FAX: 416-327-0353 Blackberry: 416-524-6547



From: Weather Radars Contact,National Radar Program [Ontario] [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: December-20-12 11:24 AM To: Regis Dastous; Weather Radars Contact,National Radar Program [Ontario] Subject: RE: Gunns Hill Wind Farm - Impact Assessment - Weather Radars Contact,National Radar Program [Ontario] Dear Mr. Régis d’Astous, Thank you for contacting the Meteorological Service of Canada, a branch of Environment Canada, regarding your wind energy intentions. Our preliminary assessment of the information provided to us via e-mail on December 14, 2012 indicates that any potential interference that may be created by the Gunn’s Hill Wind Farm near Woodstock, Ontario will not be severe. Although we would prefer our radar view to be interference free, this is not always reasonable. As a consequence, we do not have strong objections to the current proposal. If your plans are modified in any manner (e.g. number of turbines, height, placement or materials) this analysis would no longer be valid. An updated analysis must be conducted. Please contact us at: [email protected]. Thank you for your ongoing cooperation and we wish you success. Best Regards and Happy Holidays! Carolyn Rennie ______________________ Carolyn Rennie National Radar Program Meteorological Service of Canada Environment Canada 4905 Dufferin Street Toronto, Ontario M3H 5T4 Office : 3N-WS12 [email protected] Phone : 416-739-4931 ------------------------------------------------------- Carolyn Rennie Le Programme Nationale de Radar Service météorologique du Canada Environnement Canada 4905, rue Dufferin Toronto, Ontario M3H 5T4 Bureau : 3N-WS12 [email protected] Téléphone : 416-739-4931



From: Francine Boucher [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2012 4:20 PM To: Juan Anderson Cc: 'Jeff Segal'; 'Rochelle Rumney'; Alex Beckstead Subject: Re: Gunns Hill Wind Farm - Turbine Coordinates Hello Juan, We do not foresee any issues with the Gunns Hill final layout provided to us. The closest radio site we have is at Woodstock, approximately 5 km away with no links intersecting the area. Please do not hesitate to contact me should there be additional information needed. Thank you, Francine Francine Boucher, ing. Manager - Radio Spectrum Management Section/ Gestionnaire - Section de la Gestion du Spectre Radio Mobile Communications Services/ Services de communications mobiles RCMP/GRC tel.: 613-998-7338 fax: 613-998-7528 [email protected]



Dear Cathy, I have reviewed the proposed location for your Gunn Hill Wind Farm. The Canadian Coast Guard does not have any sites in that location, therefore, we would not anticipate any interference problems. Lee H. Goldberg, P.Eng.

DEPLOYMENT OF A WIND FARM

IN THE AREA OF WOODSTOCK

IMPACT STUDY ON CBC TV BROADCASTING

Prepared for

Prowind Canada Inc. 215 Sander St, Suite 304, Box 1678

Kemptville (Ontario), Canada K0G 1J0

Gunn’s Hill Wind Farm Impact Study On CBC TV Broadcasting Project: P-2009223

Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc Page ii Version: 1.0 December 2009


IN THE AREA OF WOODSTOCK,


Team members in charge of the preparation of this document

Étienne Leroux, Jr. Eng.

Régis d’Astous, Senior Specialist

Maurice Beauséjour, P.Eng. December 2, 2009

Note: This document is written according to a mandate given to Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc. by Prowind Canada Inc. This document is based on data obtained mainly from the database of Industry Canada and third parties, for which no field validation was made. Consequently, the information and conclusions presented in this document are strictly informative. Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc. as well as the people acting on their account cannot be held responsible for any direct or indirect damage connected to the contents of this document.


Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc Page iii Version: 1.0 December 2009

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1

2 DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................................ 2

2.1 QUALITY OF RECEPTION OF ANALOG TELEVISION SIGNALS ....................................................................... 2

3 ANALYSIS OF TELEVISION BROADCAST SYSTEMS ...................................................................... 4

3.1 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................ 4

3.1.1 Operating Parameters of the stations .............................................................................................. 4

3.1.2 Location of the wind turbines analyzed ......................................................................................... 4

3.1.3 Wind turbine specifications ........................................................................................................... 5

3.2 ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 7

3.2.1 Image Quality Evaluation .............................................................................................................. 7

3.2.2 Image Quality Prediction ............................................................................................................... 9

3.2.3 Dynamic Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 10

3.2.4 Static Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 12

3.2.5 Quantitative evaluation of the impact of the wind farm ............................................................... 14

4 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................... 17


Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc Page 1 Version: 1.0 December 2009



IN THE AREA OF WOODSTOCK, ONTARIO

1 Introduction Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc., telecommunications and broadcasting consultants was

mandated by Prowind Canada Inc. to verify the impact of the ten turbines of the Gunn’s Hill

wind farm project in the region of Woodstock, Ontario.

This report addresses the issues of the impact of the wind farm on television broadcast

signals in the region and presents the results of a detailed analysis on the quality of received

signals from the following television stations: CBLFT-8 (CBC French), CBLN-TV (CBC

English), and CBLN-TV-1 (CBC English).

Appendix 1 presents an overview of the wind farms’ area and of the surrounding analysis

zone, extending up to 10 km from the furthest wind turbines. The details of the location of the

individual wind turbines are also included in Table 2.



2 Discussion It is generally agreed that some telecommunication systems may be affected by the

operation of a wind farm in the immediate vicinity and in some cases even when a

considerable distance separates the physical installations, depending on the relative position

of the transmitter, the receiver and the wind turbines. The quality of the received television

signals is among the most frequently impacted by the operation of a wind farm.

2.1 Quality of reception of analog television signals

The reception of television signals is probably the type of system most likely to be affected by

the deployment of a wind farm. Interference due to the presence of wind turbines causes

video distortion that appears as ghosting and flickering of the image synchronized with the

rotation of the blades. There is usually no impact on the quality of the audio portion of the

signal since it is transmitted using frequency modulation (FM).

There is no simple rule to determine the minimum separation, between wind turbines and TV

transmitter or receiver, to ensure interference free operation. The topographic information

and the relative positions of the sites are important parameters. Interference free operation

has been encountered in some cases at relatively close distances, while unacceptable

interference has been experienced at distances exceeding 10 km. Each case needs to be

evaluated separately to consider the actual conditions. This study presents the results of a

detailed analysis concerning the area of the proposed wind farm.

The rules of operation of television broadcast stations allow each station a protected service

contour within which no interference from other stations is allowed. The installation of wind

turbines within the protected service contours may have an impact on the quality of the

received signal in the vicinity of the wind farm area. The goal of this study is therefore to

establish, as precisely as possible, for every station involved, the extent of the realistic

service contours and the location of the inhabited areas within these contours where received

signal degradation is most likely to occur.

This analysis will involve two aspects: the analysis of static ghost signals due mainly to the

presence of the wind turbine support tower and the analysis of the dynamic ghosting or



flicker, due to the rotation of the wind turbine blades. A similar methodology is used for each

analysis; but the parameters used, the interpretation of the results, and the tolerance

threshold of the viewers, are different in the two cases.

It should be noted that as required by a decision of the CRTC (Public Notice CRTC 2007-53),

the Canadian television network is being converted to the ATSC digital standard and this

transition process must be completed prior to or at the latest on the 31st of August 2011. This

decision of the CRTC means that after that date, all NTSC analog stations would not be

allowed to transmit anymore and should be replaced by digital ATSC stations. The impact of

a wind farm on digital television (DTV) reception is not known precisely, but it is well accepted

that DTV is much more robust than the analog NTSC system.

Based on the ATSC technology evaluation and on preliminary information available with

regard to DTV performance under multipath propagation, it is estimated that the wind farm

implementation should not have any significant impact on the quality of DTV signal reception

with regard to the static structures. However the movement of the blades could possibly

cause potential quality of reception degradation within relatively short distances, possibly up

to a few hundred meters from the wind turbines. A detailed analysis of the potential impact of

the wind farm on DTV signal reception would be required, but since the acceptable

degradation thresholds for DTV reception and the operational parameters of the future DTV

stations are not known yet, it is not possible at this stage to evaluate the potential impact on

the quality of the DTV signals reception.

This impact study is limited to the potential impact on existing CBC analog TV stations. It is

estimated that the probability of significant impact on DTV signal reception is relatively low

and limited to short distances from the wind turbines, generally less than the usual back-off

distances from any residence.



3 Analysis of television broadcast systems

3.1 Overview

3.1.1 Operating Parameters of the stations

The analysis aims to evaluate the impact of new wind turbines on the reception of signals

from the following three television stations, whose theoretical service contours cover, at least

in part, the proposed wind farm area. The operating parameters presented in the following

table are obtained from Industry Canada’s database. The radiation patterns were obtained

directly from the operators, in order to get a radiation pattern sufficiently detailed for the

purposes of this study.

Table 1- List of the TV stations analyzed.

Call sign Channel Effective Radiated PowerVisual: MAX / AVERAGE

(W)

Ground elevation

(m)

Antenna height

(m)

Coordinates

NAD 83

CBLFT-8 Kitchener 61 388500 / 204200 403.9 178.4

43° 27’ 00’’ N 80° 36’ 07’’ W

CBLN-TV London 40 1678000 / 1000000 278.9 230.8

42° 57’ 20’’ N 81° 21’ 19’’ W

CBLN-TV-1 Kitchener 56 1041000 / 130170 304.9 234.7

43° 15’ 39’’ N 80° 26’ 38’’ W

In order to determine the real extent of the coverage of each station, the realistic service

contour of each station was generated using the dBPlanner software and the propagation

algorithm CRC-Predict V3.21. The realistic service contours are included in appendix 2 for

each of the three stations covering, partially or entirely, the proposed wind farm area.

3.1.2 Location of the wind turbines analyzed

The analysis of the impact of a wind farm on the quality of reception of television signals

depends on the individual position of the wind turbines that are included in the analysis.

Relatively minor modifications on the position of a few wind turbines (a few hundred meters)

will not significantly affect the results of this analysis, but the relocation of several wind

turbines in order to create a new grouping in a previously unoccupied area of the wind farm

may require an update of this analysis, especially if the new locations are in the vicinity of



inhabited areas. The positions of the wind turbines included in this analysis are listed in Table

2 and their locations are presented on the map included in Appendix 1.

Table 2- Coordinates of the Wind Turbine analysed, projection in UTM Zone 17 (NAD83).

Wind Turbine Number Turbine Type (UTM NAD83)

Easting (UTM NAD83)

Northing 84 GE 2.5xl 525507 4768702 85 GE 2.5xl 525920 4768537 86 GE 2.5xl 527462 4768743 87 GE 2.5xl 528209 4769203 88 GE 2.5xl 526655 4770349 89 GE 2.5xl 523283 4769965 90 GE 2.5xl 527003 4770313 91 GE 2.5xl 523757 4770367 92 GE 2.5xl 527156 4768772 93 GE 2.5xl 523837 4770044

3.1.3 Wind turbine specifications

The type of wind turbine used and its physical and geometric characteristics are all important

parameters enabling us to determine the risk and the severity of potential interference on the

quality of the received television signal. The wind turbine model used in the present project

are the GE 2.5xl using a support tower placing the hub height at 100 meters. The main

characteristics are listed below.

Rotor Diameter: 100 m Axis tilt: 4° Blades Coning: 0° Number of blades: 3

Blades Material: Fiberglass reinforced Epoxy resin Length: 48.7m Projected area of a blade: 112.0 m² Twist angle (anchor point to blade tip): 15°



Tower Length Bottom Top Section Diameter Diameter 1 12.00m 4.3m 4.3m 2 15.00m 4.3m 4.3m 3 20.62m 4.3m 4.3m 4 23.88m 4.3m 4.3m 5 24.36m 4.3m 3.075m

One of the most important parameters concerning the wind turbines is the reflection efficiency

which allows us to determine how effectively the blades will reflect the incident signal. This

parameter depends on the type of material used in the blades and on the geometry of the

blades. As stated in several publications, this factor can be estimated as follows:

S = A M exp(-2.30 )

Where S is the efficiency coefficient of a wind turbine blade in the horizontal axis; A is the airfoil coefficient of the blade; M is the coefficient of the material; is the twist angle of the blade from the base to the tip (rad). Based on the results of measurements performed by Sengupta and Senior, the following

factors are suggested for the airfoil and material coefficient:

A = 0.80 M = 1.00 for metallic blades 0.41 for non-metallic blades

However, it was observed that non-metallic blades equipped with lightning arresters at the tip

of the blade and connected to the grounding system by conductive cables will present a

higher material factor than non-metallic blades, sometimes approaching the value for metallic

blades. In our case, a material factor of 0.75 was used, representing a compromise between

a non-metallic blade without lightning arrester and a fully metallic blade. Based on this

compromise, an efficiency factor of 0.33 was obtained. This parameter was used in the

analysis to obtain the reflection factor which in turn allowed us to determine the equivalent

power reradiated by the wind turbine rotor.



3.2 Analysis methodology

The two types of analysis performed in this study are a dynamic analysis, focusing on the

reflections caused by the rotating wind turbine blades, and a static analysis, focusing mainly

on the impact of the supporting tower. Both of these approaches seek to establish if, at a

given location, the quality of the received signal reaches the quality threshold recommended

by the regulation.

3.2.1 Image Quality Evaluation

The following Table shows the image quality index gradation, as recommended by Industry

Canada and by International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Industry Canada, in its

Technical Bulletin TB-5, publishes a methodology for assessing the impact of fixed structures

in the vicinity of television transmitters, generally considered to be 1500 m or less. This

method, developed for structures typical for telecommunication towers and short distances,

has not been demonstrated as effective for larger cross-section structures such as wind

turbine support towers, nor for structures located several kilometers away from the

transmitters. The software developed for this method is also limited, as it does not allow the

input of cylindrical or conical structures of the required dimensions to represent wind turbine

towers.

Table 3- Description of the image quality index

Quality Index Degradation (description) 5 Imperceptible (excellent) 4 Perceptible but not annoying (good) 3 Somewhat annoying (average) 2 Very annoying (mediocre) 1 Unusable (bad)

The image quality index, as described in the Table above, can however be used to evaluate

users perception. The following graph shows the variation of that index as a function of the

relation between the Desired to Undesired signal ratio and delay.



Figure 1- Curves of image quality index proposed by Industry Canada for static ghosting.

Industry Canada has yet to publish a technical bulletin concerning the impact of wind farms

on the quality of reception of television signals. The ITU has however published the

recommendation BT-805 that presents a simplified method for analyzing reflections on

moving rotor blades, based largely on the 1980s research done by Sengupta and Senior,

which considered each wind turbine as a retransmitter.

In order to account for the rotation of the blades in the dispersion zone, where the delay is

shorter but causes nevertheless important image flicker, the ITU uses the curve with a

minimum 28 dB offset for delays shorter than 1 microsecond. The following graph illustrates

that curve for image quality index 4 which is the minimum level recommended by Industry

Canada and the ITU.



Figure 2- Curve of image quality of grade 4 proposed by the ITU for the dynamic ghosting.

The ITU method has been compared through simulations with the method proposed by Mr.

Senior in reference 3. The results indicate that the two methods are generally in agreement

within approximately 1 dB. It has also been compared with the Radar Cross Section (RCS)

methodology and it has shown that the proposed methodology would be conservative by a

margin of 5 to 10 dB approximately. A more recent study on the methodology proposed by

the ITU, completed by an Australian team, also concluded that the methodology would be

conservative by a margin of 6 to 10 dB. Therefore we used the Industry Canada curve with a

quality index of 4 for the static analysis and the ITU curve for dynamic analysis, despite this

significant level of conservatism, ensuring to present a worst case scenario approach.

3.2.2 Image Quality Prediction

Through the years, Yves R. Hamel et Associés Inc. (YRH), in collaboration with various

broadcast industry players has developed proprietary simulation software for predicting the

impact of wind farms on the quality of the received television signal within the wind farm area.

This software partially uses the approach developed by Dr. Sengupta and Senior in the 70s

and early 80s, as well as the simplified version of the approach proposed by the ITU in its

recommendation BT- 805.

In the case of static analysis, the simulation software can be used, within the area

surrounding the wind farm, to estimate the number of wind turbine support towers that are



likely to produce ghosting at any given location. Each wind turbine is analyzed separately and

the results are compiled to show the impact of the entire wind farm.

The same process is applied to dynamic analysis but since the ghosting is caused by the

wind turbine rotor blades motion, it then depends on the orientation of the blades, and

therefore on the strength and the direction of the wind. The analysis must then be

complemented by a statistical analysis which includes the speed and direction of the

prevalent wind. The probability of any given location being affected by dynamic ghosting is

the sum of probabilities for each of the individual wind turbines. The result of the analysis is

therefore not the number of wind turbines likely to affect a given location but rather a

percentage of time that a given location is likely to be affected by ghosting due to the rotation

of the wind turbine blades.

3.2.3 Dynamic Analysis The method used for dynamic analysis is to evaluate, at each location, the level of signal

received directly from the TV transmitter, as well as the level of signal received as a result of

reflection on the blades of each wind turbine. The ratio of the two signals and the delay

between the reception of the direct and the reflected signal is used to establish if the signal

quality index at a given location is within the acceptable levels, considering the impact of all

the individual wind turbines.

The evaluation of the equivalent power radiated by the wind turbine is based on the method

proposed by the ITU in BT-805, but the radiation pattern of the wind turbine is based on the

method proposed by Mr. Senior in reference 1. The wind turbine radiation pattern proposed

by Mr. Senior appeared to us as more realistic than the radiation pattern proposed by the

ITU, since it was based on a quantity of field measurements rather than on arbitrary values in

the case of the ITU BT-805 recommendations.

The evaluation of the signal received directly from the transmitter is accomplished using the

published station parameters and antenna radiation pattern on file with Industry Canada. The

dBPlanner version 2.5 propagation software, along with the CRC-Predict version 3.21

algorithm, is used for the prediction. The topographical data is taken from a digital database

with a resolution of 3 arcseconds resampled at 100 m, in order to decrease the calculation

time. The field strength at the TV receiver is predicted with an antenna height of 9.1 m above



ground, as stated by Industry Canada in BPR-4, while the field strength at the wind turbines

is predicted at a height of 100 m above ground, corresponding to the wind turbine axis.

Dynamic analysis is accomplished by using the projected area of the blades and an

equivalent number of blades of two per rotor, as suggested by Mr Sengupta and Senior. The

rotor axis tilt and the coning angle of the rotor blades were not considered in this approach,

making it a conservative evaluation.

Appendix 3 presents the results obtained for the three stations previously identified. Since it

is impossible to precisely define an exclusion zone for the impact on image reception quality,

it is preferable to represent the impact at each potential reception location and estimate if the

resulting impact is acceptable for a typical TV viewer. Yellow and red colored areas represent

locations where a possibility of interference exists, due to one or several wind turbines. For

each 100 m X 100 m section of terrain, the color indicates the total probability that this grid

point will be affected by dynamic ghosting, at a sufficient level to correspond to a signal

quality index lower than 4 and therefore perceivable and potentially annoying.

The analysis was limited to the area within the realistic Grade B contour, obtained from the

CRC-Predict algorithm. Therefore, wherever the terrain background is visible, either the

signal level was below the minimum Grade B level or there was no significant wind turbine

interference in that location.

It is recognized that dynamic interference produced by a wind turbine at a specific point will

not be permanent, but will be present only when a particular geometry is in place, mainly

based on the orientation of the wind turbine, and therefore, depend on the direction of the

wind. As suggested by Sengupta and Senior in reference 11, the ghosting produced in

dynamic mode is mainly caused by reflections on the surface of the blades, similar to a mirror

reflection. This type of reflection is very directional (specular) and would impact only a sector

of a few degrees from the point of reflection on the blade. From a statistical point of view,

Sengupta and Senior suggest considering a wind distribution sector of 5° to estimate the

probability of dynamic interference. As it is not possible without extensive calculation to

determine exactly the location where interference, caused by a reflection on a blade with a

specific angular position of the rotor compounded to the blade pitch angle under certain

precise conditions of wind will occur, it is preferable to consider the phenomenon with a

statistical approach.



The analysis of the wind distribution in the area of Woodstock, according to the database of

Environment Canada, allows us to establish, by interpolation, that the probability of the wind

coming from any sector of 5° varies between 0.25% and 3.00%. Considering that the wind

turbine does not operate when the wind speed is lower than 3 m/s and stops operating for a

wind speed higher than 25 m/s, these minimum and maximum probabilities for any 5° sector

become 0.22% and 2.65% with an average of 1.22%. This average value could be used as

is, but it is proposed to consider the sector of the prevalent winds without necessarily using

the worst possible case. The value of 2.29%, corresponding to the average of all the 5°

sectors within the quadrant of 90° centered around the prevailing wind direction, is

considered as representative of the prevailing wind probability without being excessively

pessimistic.

Based on this probability of 2.29%, when more than 4 wind turbines can cause interference

at a specific point, the probability of interference at this point is considered to exceed the

threshold of 10% of the time. This threshold of 10% of the time is the maximum considered

to be acceptable by Industry Canada, according to the BPR-4, with regard to the interference

from another TV station operating on the same channel. Although no Canadian standard is

defined with regard to the interference caused by the wind turbines, this threshold could also

be used when considering the interference on same channel originating from one or several

wind turbines.

According to the BPR-4, when populated areas are submitted to a risk of interference for

more than 10% of the time, the operator of the TV station causing the interference must take

corrective measures to eliminate or reduce this interference. When this interference is

occurring within unpopulated areas, it can generally be accepted.

3.2.4 Static Analysis The static analysis uses the same approach as the dynamic analysis, generally considering

the whole surface of the support tower. The height above ground used for the calculation of

the received field is 50 meters for a 100 meter tower, corresponding to the center of the

support tower. The curve used for image quality index is the curve published by Industry

Canada in the BT-5. The radiation pattern used for the support tower of wind turbines is the



one proposed by T. Vaughan and H. McClure in reference 12 and corresponds to the

radiation pattern of a cylindrical tower in the case of horizontal polarized signal.

In addition to the curve of quality index used, the main difference between dynamic and static

methodologies is in the vertical pattern of radiation of the tower. As shown in a study

published by the British Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in reference 4, evaluating the

effect of wind turbines on the operation of radars, the measurements and modelings done

demonstrate that the vertical opening of the radar response is very narrow.

Although these models were done at higher frequencies than those used in television, it is

reasonable to claim that the opening angle of the vertical radiation pattern of the tower

represents only a few degrees, which practically matches the opinion of Industry Canada

expressed in the BT-5. The modeling of the tower shows that in the S band (3.0 GHz), a

conical tower of 100 meters with a tapering angle of 0.5° has a vertical opening of

approximately 0.03° centered around the 0.5° elevation plane, while in the L band (1 GHz)

the vertical opening is approximately of 0.09°, also centered at 0.5° elevation. The conicity of

the tower is then an important parameter to consider for the reflectivity of the tower.

At TV frequencies, approximately 500 MHz for the UHF band, 200 MHZ for the H-VHF band

and 60 MHz for the L-VHF band, the vertical pattern opening could be approximately 0.2°,

0.5° and 2° respectively, and because the conicity of a typical tower is approximately 1o or

more, these vertical patterns would be uptilted at least 1° over the horizon. Since the BT-5

suggests openings of a few degrees, up to approximately 10° for telecommunication towers

built with angle irons, it is reasonable to conclude that the values mentioned previously are

realistic for cylindrical or conical towers. To consider the potential reflections on the elements

contained in the nacelle and also on the blades when the wind turbine is not in operation,

openings of 1° for UHF, 2° for H-VHF and 5° for L-VHF and an uptilt angle of 1o could safely

be used for calculations in the case of a typical conical support tower.

This methodology only partially considers the conicity of the tower, since the incidence angle

of the incoming wave from the TV transmitter is considered as normal to the surface of the

tower. Except in certain particular cases, the incident wave actually arrives at the tower closer

to the horizontal plane, which would result in an uptilt angle of radiation practically equal to

twice the conicity of the tower. In the particular case of the support tower used for this



project, the upper section has a taper angle is about 1.4°, while the middle sections are

cylindricals. The angle of the upper section is such that the energy reradiated from that

section will be uptilted approximately 3° and would almost never reach the ground.

On the other hand, the energy reradiated from the middle section would be in the horizontal

plane, thus having a significant contribution to the unwanted signal received at ground level.

In order to consider these particularities of the towers used for the Gunn’s Hill project, the

projected area of the upper section of the tower was not included in the calculations.

However, in order to consider the contribution of the nacelle and blades, the equivalent

center of radiation of the support tower has been kept at 50m and no uptilt has been included

for the static radiation pattern of the tower. We expect this approach of evaluation of the static

interference to be fairly conservative, even if the projected area of the upper section is not

included, since the center of radiation has been maintained at the 50m level, while the actual

centre of the contributing sections of the tower is only at 35.75m. Appendix 4 presents the

results of the static analysis for the three stations covering the area of analysis of the Gunn’s

Hill wind farm.

3.2.5 Quantitative evaluation of the impact of the wind farm The most practical method to evaluate the real impact of the wind farm on the surrounding

population is probably to estimate the number of households which could suffer a potential

degradation of the quality of reception of the analog TV signal. To do so, the number of

dwellings enumerated during the census of 2006 in each census subdivision was used and

the geographical distribution of the households was considered proportional to the distribution

of the buildings found in each of these census subdivisions.

The comparative analysis of the areas where a possible degradation of the quality of

reception is expected and the distribution of the households as previously described are

presented in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 4 presents the approximate number of households

potentially impacted by the dynamic ghosting for each analyzed TV station, while Table 5

presents similar results for the static ghosting.

The total number of dwellings included in the area of analysis is estimated at 17 091 on the

basis of the data from the 2006 census. According to the results shown in the following

Tables, we can conclude that typically 85% or more of the local population (dwellings) are



within the Grade B realistic service contour of each station. The actual ratios are ranging from

93.2% for CBLFT-8 to 78.3% for CBLN-TV-1.

Table 4- Estimated number of dwellings potentially suffering dynamic ghosting.

TV Station

Dwellings Within Grade

B Contour

Dwellings without

dynamic ghosting

Dwellings with ghosting

probability less than 5% of the

time


probability between 5% and 10% of the time


probability more than 10% of the

time CBLFT-8 15921 (93.2%) 15411 244 179 87 CBLN-TV 14988 (87.7%) 14087 204 181 516 CBLN-TV-1 13385 (78.3%) 13179 132 55 19

Table 5- Estimated number of dwellings potentially suffering static ghosting.

TV Station

Dwellings Within Grade

B Contour

Dwellings without static

ghosting

Dwellings potentially

suffering static ghosting from

1 or 2 wind turbines


suffering static ghosting from 3

or 4 wind turbines


suffering static ghosting from 5 or more wind

turbines CBLFT-8 15921 (93.2%) 9854 1503 2797 1767 CBLN-TV 14988 (87.7%) 13491 471 302 724 CBLN-TV-1 13385 (78.3%) 10377 1214 1299 495

These estimates were produced by using the receive antenna masks suggested by Industry

Canada. These masks roughly represent the response of a relatively simple receive

antenna, equivalent to a Yagi aerial with 4 director elements. Most good quality TV reception

antennas are much more directional than the suggested mask, which would reduce the

number of dwellings affected, without eliminating all possibilities however.

Two of these stations (CBLN-TV and CBLN-TV-1) are rebroadcasting the same signal and

some of the dwellings are covered by both stations. For static interference, some

households receiving a potential interference on a channel can switch to the other channel

which is not suffering any interference. For dynamic interference, it can be assumed, due to

the geometrical configuration of the wind farm and the TV stations, that a specific wind

condition causing interference on a station will not simultaneously cause interference on the

other station of the same network. The table 6 presents the estimation of the number of

dwellings which are covered by at least one or both stations of the same network and are

free from interference on at least one of the station of the network.



Table 6- Network based estimation of dwellings wihtout ghosting.

Network

Dwellings in the network

Coverage

Dwellings without static interference

Dwellings without dynamic

interference Dwellings without any

interference CBLN 16409 (96.0%) 15489 16207 15465

Finally, it was not possible to obtain precise figures on the rate of penetration of cable

television in the various agglomerations of the area, but it is generally agreed that a

significant number of these dwellings receive their television signals via a cable TV operator

or some Direct Broadcast Satellite services. It is estimated that less than 25% of these

dwellings receive the television signals in a conventional way, which would reduce by 75% or

more the number of dwellings of Tables 4 and 5 potentially suffering a real impact. If the

statistical analysis also included the market shares of each of these stations, the results

would indicate values of around only 5% to 10% of the values indicated in the preceding

tables, and most of the time less than 5%.

It should be noted that the methodology used is representing a worst case scenario

approach and we strongly believe it represents a conservative approach and the actual

impact will be significantly lower than the presented results. The model used has not been

benchmarked against actual field measurements; however, similar impact predictions on

previous projects resulted in very few users’ complaint, if any.



4 Conclusion The detailed analysis of the possibilities of image ghosting for three CBC television

broadcast stations covering, even partially, the area of the Gunn’s Hill proposed wind farm,

made it possible to determine that a certain number of dwellings would possibly experience

this type of interference in dynamic mode, static mode or even both.

Several of these households already eliminate this risk by using a good quality reception

antenna which will allow them to discriminate between the direct signal from the TV

transmitter and the reflected signals from the wind turbines. All calculations of the study

were done using the antenna mask proposed by Industry Canada. However, the majority of

the antennas on the market are more directional than the proposed mask.

For the stations CBLN-TV and CBLN-TV-1, whose transmitters respectively broadcast the

same CBC signals, the viewers who would suffer ghosting due to the wind turbines when

tuning one of these stations at a given time, will generally be able to tune to the other one

to receive a good quality signal. It is indeed far from probable that a situation of

interference affecting the two transmitters occurs simultaneously.

The methodology used is not considered as an extreme worst case scenario analysis; we

strongly believe it represents a conservative approach and the actual impact will be

significantly lower than the presented results. While the model used has not been

benchmarked against actual field measurements, similar impact predictions at other wind

farms resulted in no complaint.

The results presented are considering that the entire population is receiving their TV signals

in the over the air conventional way, while it is well known that only a small fraction of the

population is still using this type of reception system. Based on a Canadian Media Research

Inc. report prepared for the CRTC in 2006, it is estimated that in Ontario, less than 10% of the

population is still using this type of TV signal reception. However, the same report indicates

that rural residents are approximately 2.5 times more likely to receive their TV signals over

the air. For those households where a significant degradation would be noticeable and a

good quality reception antenna would not solve the difficulties, a subscription to a cable TV



service or to a DBS service would be the best approach. These services are increasingly

popular in these rural regions where the televisual choice is otherwise limited.

Any significant impact on the analog television signal reception from these stations will be

temporary, since it is planned that all these analog NTSC TV transmitters will be switched

off before August 31, 2011, as requested by the CRTC decision 2007-53. The potential

impact on the reception of the digital TV stations, which will replace the analog stations, is

not very well documented at this point in time. However, it is well recognized in the

broadcast industry that the digital transmission will be much more robust than the analog

transmission.



Reference:

1- Dipak L. Sengupta, Thomas B. A. Senior, “Electromagnetic Interference from Wind

Turbines” in Wind Turbine Technology : Chapter 9, David A. Spera (Ed), ASME Press, 1994.

2- David F. Bacon, “Fixed-link Wind-Turbine exclusion zone method”, D.F. Bacon,

2002. 3- Thomas B. A. Senior, Dipak L. Sengupta, “Large wind turbine sitting handbook:

Television interference assessment” Technical report No.4, University of Michigan, 1981.

4- M. M. Butler, D. A. Johnson, “Feasibility of mitigating the effect of wind farm on

primary radar”, DTI PUB URN No. 03/976, 2003. 5- ITU Recommendation BT.805 “Assessment of impairment caused to television

reception by a wind turbine”, ITU-R BT.805, 1992. 6- Thomas B. A. Senior, Dipak L. Sengupta, “Wind turbine generator sitting handbook”

Technical report No.2, University of Michigan, 1979. 7- Industry Canada TB-5 “Report on predicting television ghosting interference and

picture quality”, Issue 2, July 1989 8- Industry Canada BC-9 “Television ghosting interference analysis”, Issue 1, July 1996 9- Industry Canada BPR “Part IV: Application Procedures and Rules for Television

Broadcasting Undertakings”, April 1997 10- Industry Canada BTS-3 “Television Broadcasting”, Issue 2, December 1997 11- Dipak L. Sengupta, Thomas B. A. Senior, “Wind turbine generator interference to

electromagnetic systems” Final report, University of Michigan, 1979. 12- T. Vaughan, H. McClure, “Reflection and ghost in a multitower environment” IEEE

Transactions on broadcasting, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 1989. 13- David A. Spera, Dipak L. Sengupta, “Equations for Estimating the Strength of TV

Signal Scattered by Wind Turbines” Lewis Research Center, May 1994.



APPENDIX 1

Global View and Analysis Zone

Gunn’s Hill

Wind Farm









APPENDIX 2

Realistic Coverage

of TV Stations

Gunn’s Hill

Wind Farm









APPENDIX 3

Dynamic Interference

Analysis Results

Gunn’s Hill

Wind Farm









APPENDIX 4

Static Interference

Analysis Results

Gunn’s Hill

Wind Farm







APPENDIX H

LOCAL AERODROME ASSESSMENT

Local Aerodrome Assessment

Proposed Gunns Hill Wind Farm

Prepared for:

Prowind Canada Inc.226 1/2 James St. N, Unit A

Hamilton, ON L8R 2L3

December 7, 2012

Submitted by:

LPS Aviation Inc.One Antares Drive, Suite 250

Ottawa, OntarioCANADA K2E 8C4

Tel: (613) 226-6050 Fax: (613) 226-5236e-mail: [email protected]

Web site: www.lpsaviation.ca

Aerodrome Assessment - Gunns Hill Wind Farm 1 -

Executive Summary

LPS AVIA Consulting was retained by Prowind Canada, Inc. to assist in the definition and analysisof the interactions of the Curries Aerodrome with the proposed Gunns Hill Wind Farm and to assistwith developing a strategy for addressing any arising issues.

The Curries Aerodrome is located about 1.2Km from the nearest proposed wind turbine location inthe Gunns Hill project. The proposed turbine locations are not aligned with the runways at theaerodrome.

An aerodrome, either registered or non-registered, is not required by Canadian Aviation Regulationsto have enforced Obstacle Limitation Surfaces around the aerodrome.

The aerodrome is assessed as having two runways, both being Code 1A-Non-Instrument runways.If the aerodrome was a certified airport, Transport Canada Aerodrome Standards andRecommended Practices would define a set of required obstacle limitation surfaces. A hypotheticalset of surfaces were developed for the aerodrome and compared to the proposed turbine locations.

Current turbine positions would not penetrate the hypothetical surfaces.

Discussions with the aerodrome owner may proceed on the basis that, although not required byregulation, Prowind has, as a good corporate citizen, located the turbines to minimize impacts on theaerodrome.

Operational changes at the aerodrome, including right hand circuits on two runway directions, maybe usefully employed to maintain safety of operations under the Visual Flight Rules conditions thatwill be the normal operation at the aerodrome.

Night operations require specific aerodrome lighting facilities and safety would be maintained if theturbines closest to the approach paths had obstruction lights.

Aerodrome Assessment - Gunns Hill Wind Farm i -

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

1.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11.2 Project Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11.3 Aviation Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11.3.1 Transport Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11.3.2 NAV CANADA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-21.4 Site Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

2.0 Regulatory Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12.2 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12.3 Airport Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12.4 Marking and Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

3.0 Aerodrome Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13.1 Aerodrome Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13.2 Aerodrome Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13.3 Wind Farm Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

4.0 Mitigation Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Aerodrome Assessment - Gunns Hill Wind Farm ii -

List of Figures

Figure 1- 1 Project and Aerodrome Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3Figure 2- 1 Airport Obstacle Limitation Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Figure 3- 1 Aerodrome Data Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Figure 3- 2 Hypothetical Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

Aerodrome Assessment - Gunns Hill Wind Farm 1-1 -

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Background

Prowind Canada, Inc. is proposing to developa 25-MW wind farm near Woodstock,Ontario.

As part of the planning process, Prowindwished to have a better understanding of therisks to successful completion of the projectgiven the specific interests of the owner of anaerodrome in the vicinity of the proposed windfarm, the Curries Aerodrome.

A significant interest in all wind farmdevelopments in Canada is held by theaviation industry represented by twoorganizations: Transport Canada and NAVCANADA.

LPS AVIA Consulting was retained by ProwindCanada, Inc. to assist in the definition andanalysis of the aerodrome interactions with theproposed wind farm and to assist withdeveloping a strategy for addressing anyarising issues.

1.2 Project Description

The proposed Gunns Hill wind farm project islocated near Curries Ontario. There are to beten 2.5MW wind turbines, each with a totalheight of 151 metres from ground to blade tip.The rotor diameter is 103m and height to hubis 99.5m. The base ground elevations rangefrom 295 to 330 metres above mean sealevel.

Ten turbine locations have been identified andthe outlying turbines are located as follows (inUTM co-ordinates, Zone 17, NAD83):

Ident Northing Easting

East - # 1 4,769,978 523,280

West - #10 4,769,205 528,153

North - #6 4,770,340 526,656

South - #5 4,768,560 525,942

As aviation mapping work is carried out inLatitude/Longitude (WGS84) format, theabove turbine locations are also shown as:

Ident Latitude Longitude

East - # 1 N43.08216/ W80.71400/

West - #10 N43.07504/ W80.65418/

North - #6 N43.08531/ W80.67251/

South - #5 N43.06930/ W80.68136/

Figure 1-1 shows the project location and therelevant aviation facility.

1.3 Aviation Interest

Two organizations have the following interests,responsibilities and authorities with respect towind farm development. While the major goalof each organization is aviation safety, the twohave different roles with respect to aviationregulation. The Curries Aerodrome is subjectto aviation regulations.

1.3.1 Transport Canada

Transport Canada (TC) is the regulatoryauthority for aviation under the AeronauticsAct and provides regulation and inspection toall aspects of the industry including airlines,airports, airspace and air traffic controlorganizations. This includes safety oversight


for NAV CANADA. TC is responsible formaintaining and monitoring compliance with theCanadian Aviation Regulations (CARs)

TC’s main interest is in structures and theirobstruction of air routes and airport vicinityairspace. Significant new structures are to bereported to TC for their review. Any issuesare to be resolved through either lighting andmarking of the structures, relocation ordemolition if necessary. There is a formalsubmittal and review process with specifiedforms to be used.

1.3.2 NAV CANADA

NAV CANADA is a not-for-profit organizationwith the authority for all aspects of air trafficcontrol in Canadian airspace. While under TCregulatory oversight, NAV CANADA isresponsible for electronic systems used forcommunications, navigation and surveillanceof air traffic in Canada. NAV CANADA is alsoresponsible for the distribution of AeronauticalInformation Publications (AIPs) that include allmaps, charts, airport data and operationalrules used for flying in Canada.

NAV CANADA’s major interest is in theimpacts of new structures on the operation ofthe electronic systems used to support theATC responsibilities and in their impacts on

the use of airspace and routes used for airtraffic. Issue resolution is through refusal ofpermission for the development of thestructure or through adjustments to theairspace operation rules in the vicinity of thestructure, or both. Resolution may also involvechanges in operational procedures within theATC organizations in NAV CANADA.

There is a formal application procedure usingprescribed forms that will lead to NAVCANADA analysis of the proposed structureand appropriate approval or refusal. NAVCANADA and Transport Canada work closelytogether and co-ordinate application reviewsto ensure that no structures bypass the reviewprocess.

1.4 Site Location

The figure on the following page identifies thelocation of the proposed wind farm and thenearby Curries Registered Aerodrome.

This review is not intended to be a completeaviation impacts assessment so NAVCANADA aeronautical facilities are notidentified herein nor are they assessed.


Figure 1- 1 Project and Aerodrome Location


2.0 Regulatory Environment

2.1 Definitions

Under the Aeronautics Act and the CanadianAviation Regulations (CARs) any locationused for landing or taking off of aircraft iscalled an aerodrome.

An airport is an aerodrome that has beencertified by Transport Canada under the Act.

The aerodromes in the vicinity of proposedwind turbines are often referred to informallyas "airports", however most of these facilitiesare aerodromes and are not certified airports.The CARs apply in quite different ways to thetwo types of facilities.

The facilities are also often referred to as"airstrips" however this is a lay term that hasno standing under the CARs.

A Registered Aerodrome is one for whichtechnical details are included in CanadianAeronautical Information Publications (AIPs)including navigation charts and the CanadaFlight Supplement (CFS), which is a technicallisting of all airports and registeredaerodromes in Canada.

An aerodrome may be certified as an airportif:

a) it serves regularly scheduledpassenger traffic; and/orb) it is in a built-up area;

orc) it is “in the best public interest asdetermined by the Minister”.

There is no requirement that an aerodromebe registered and, in fact, many “flyingfarmers” operate from private, non-registeredaerodromes.

On the other hand, there are someaerodromes in Canada that are privately

owned, have very high standards of design,construction and operation equivalent to thoseof certified airports but remain aerodromes asthey are not used for scheduled passengertraffic but only charter traffic. Primaryexamples are aerodromes located at resourceextraction centres.

2.2 Operations

All aerodromes, registered or unregistered,must be operated in accordance with theCARs, in particular with CARs Part III subpart1 - Aerodromes.

A certified (licensed) airport must beoperated in accordance with the CARs, inparticular with CARs Part III subpart 2 -Airports.

2.3 Airport Requirements

CAR III, Subpart 2 includes requirements,among others, that an airport be constructedin accordance with Aerodrome Standards andRecommended Practices,TP312 whichdefines the technical standards for airports inCanada.

TP312, Section 1.2, Applicability states: "1.2.2Standard.- The specifications, unlessotherwise indicated in a particular context,shall apply to all land airports certified inaccordance with Air Regulation Part III." Thespecifications in TP312 are thus notrequirements for registered or unregisteredaerodromes.

Section 4 of TP312, Obstacle Restriction andRemoval, defines the areas around anairport, known as Obstacle LimitationSurfaces, that must be kept free of obstaclesto safe operation of aircraft. The size and


configuration of these surfaces is based onthe length of the runways, the type of aircraftusing the airport and the extent of poorweather or night-time operations at the airport.

The figure below (from TP312) illustrates thespecified surfaces for an airport.

Figure 2- 1 Airport Obstacle Limitation Surfaces


A second document, titled “Land Use in theVicinity of Airports, TP1247”, is a guidelinedocument that applies to airports and does notapply to uncertified aerodromes, eitherregistered or unregistered. Part I, ObstacleLimitation Surfaces refers to TP312 as itssource document.

2.4 Marking and Lighting

Most operations at aerodromes such as theCurries Aerodrome are non-instrument, VisualFlight Rules (VFR) and take place only underVisual Meteorological Conditions in which thebasic principle is to "see and be seen". Allflying and communications procedures aredefined in the Aeronautical Information Manual(AIM) whose provisions cover all aspects offlight operations under the constraints definedby Transport Canada and NavCanada.

The proposed turbine locations and height are

to be reviewed by Transport Canada who haslegislative authority for aviation safety underthe Aeronautics Act. CAR 601.24(2) states:

A person who has responsibility for or controlover a building, structure or object thatconstitutes an obstacle to air navigation shall

(a) mark and light the building, structure orobject in accordance with the requirements ofStandard 621

The Standard Obstruction Markings manual isCAR Standard 621 and includes in Section 12specific requirements for wind turbines and insection 1.2 a description of the informationthat is to be provided to Transport Canada assoon as possible, and well before constructionbegins.


3.0 Aerodrome Analysis

Within the Regulatory environment describedin Section 2, the Gunns Hill wind farm proposaland the Curries aerodrome can be assessed.

3.1 Aerodrome Identification

The aerodrome is registered so technicalinformation is included in the current issue ofthe Canada Flight Supplement. The relevantdata page is included as Figure 3-1 below forreference.

From this data, the most significant points are:

ID: CRE3Location: N43 03 59 W 80 42 01Owner: George RandPPR: Prior Permission Required for useRunways: 17/35 1800'x50' turf

09/27 1500'x50' turfNote also the Obstacle Clearance circle onthe aerodrome diagram which will bediscussed further below.

3.2 Aerodrome Assessment

Using the published information, the followingpoints can be derived and are relevant to theCurries Aerodrome.

1) The runway lengths (457m and 549m) at theaerodrome fall within the definition of a Code1, non-instrument (VFR) aerodrome (less than800m in length) in TP312.

2) The runway width (15m) allows for aircraftwith a wingspan up to but not including 15mand are defined as a Code A runways.

3) There are no lights for night-timeoperations.

4) The aerodrome has no associated air

navigation instruments so both runways aredefined as a Non-Instrument runways and arethus used only for Visual Flight Rules(VFR)operations with specific regulatory minimumrequirements to be clear of cloud and with ahorizontal visibility of not less than 2 miles.

5) TP312, Section 4 - Obstacle Restrictionand Removal defines the required ObstacleLimitation Surfaces for a certified Code 1ANon-Instrument Airport runway as complex3-dimensional surfaces around the airport asshown previously in Figure 2-1.

For a certified airport, the take-off/approachsurfaces start at 30m from the runwaythreshold and 30m each side of the runwaycentre line and extend to 280m to each side ofthe centreline at 2,530m from the runwaythreshold. This surface starts at the thresholdelevation (ASL) and rises at a slope of 1:20 toa height of 125m above the thresholdelevation.

For a certified airport, the transitional surfacesstart at the elevation of the runway centre lineand at a point 30m from the centre line andrise laterally at a slope of 1:5 to a height of45m. These slopes therefore extend out to255m from the centre line.

There is no requirement (TP312, paragraph4.2.2) for an Outer Surface as defined inTP312 paragraph 4.1.1 (i.e. at 45 m above theaerodrome elevation) at any non-instrument(VFR) aerodrome, even a certifiednon-instrument (VFR) airport.

It is important to note that these surfaces arenot required for an uncertified aerodrome.They may, however, be used as good practiceguidelines for any Code 1 aerodrome.


Figure 3- 1 Aerodrome Data Page

3.3 Wind Farm Assessment

The proposed wind farm is not located withinthe OLS areas for any certified airport in thevicinity. The nearest certified airports areLondon at about 39 Km from the nearestturbine, Kitchener at about 49 KM, St. Thomasat about 48 Km and Hamilton at about 62 Km.Approach and departure paths for theseairports do not pass over the wind farmlocation. No impacts have been identified.

There are also two registered aerodromes inthe vicinity: Woodstock at 9Km, and Currieswhich is located at about 1.2 Km from thenearest turbine.

Approaches and departures for theWoodstock Aerodrome would not normally

pass over the proposed location.

The Curries Aerodrome requires a moredetailed assessment.

It is important to note that maintenance ofObstacle Limitation Surfaces is not arequirement for aerodromes, eitherregistered or unregistered.

Many wind farm developers do, however,attempt to maintain a clearance near existingaerodromes as far as possible as ‘goodcorporate citizens’. The appropriate clearancein this case is often determined by theapplication of hypothetical OLS to theaerodrome site.

The hypothetical surfaces were developed forthe Curries Aerodrome based on the runwayCode 1A, Non-Instrument standards and


including: take-off/approach surfaces for thethresholds of runways 27 and 17; the relevantportions of the outer extremities of thetransition surfaces; and no outer surface.

The published information on the aerodromestates only one latitude/longitude locationwhich is known as the Aerodrome ReferencePoint (ARP). This point is not the threshold ofany runway but is rather approximately thegeometric centre of the aerodrome.

The surfaces can only be drawn from theaccurately surveyed threshold centre points sothe points used were those from the site visitfield notes dated March 5, 2010. Theaccuracy of the surfaces is directly dependanton the accuracy of the surveyed thresholds.

These surfaces are shown in the overlay onthe location image in Figure 3-2 on thefollowing page. In this figure, the red lines arethe optioned areas from the map from theProwind website dated January 4, 2010. Thegreen lines are the take-off/approach surfacesand the blue lines are the transition surfaceboundary in the vicinity of the proposed turbinelocations.

The turbine locations are from the Gunns HillFinal Layout dated December 7, 2012. Theaerodrome runway co-ordinates, outlines andcentrelines are from the March 5, 2010 fieldnotes.

From the Figure 3-2 below, the followingobservations and comments can bedeveloped:

1) The hypothetical take-off/approachsurfaces for the Curries Aerodrome wouldoverlie several portions of the optioned lands;

2) The transition surface would not overlieoptioned lands;

3) The maximum height above the ARP of thesurfaces would be 125m and as the land isrelatively flat, there would not be sufficient

clearance for the proposed turbines (with aheight of 151m AGL) under any point of thetake-off/approach surfaces;

4) In no case does a currently proposedturbine location lie under a surface;

5) The nearest turbine, #3, lies about 26 moutside the surface and at this point, takinginto consideration the relative groundelevations and the slope of the surface, aturbine of 151 m would penetrate the surfaceby about 58.5 m if it were under the surface.

6) The Obstacle Clearance circle on theaerodrome data page (Fig 3-1) indicates thatin all quadrants around the ARP, the clearancealtitude is 3000' ASL. Because a clearance of1000 feet is required, this indicates thatsomewhere within 5 nautical miles of theaerodrome in all quadrants there currently areobstacles that reach to between 1900' and2000' ASL (limits are rounded upwards to thenext 100' increment). In the proposed windfarm, turbine #4 is the worst case and with abase elevation of 1088' ASL and a turbineheight of 495.3', the top would reach to 1583'ASL. The current obstacle Clearance Circlewould allow for that altitude and no changeswould be required.

7) It is noted that most of the structures on thefarm, silos, barns etc., currently penetrate thehypothetical transition surface.

8) Normally, and by regulation, on take-off thepilot will turn left and will approach by makingleft turns toward the runway. This is known asa left hand circuit. At this aerodrome, a regimeof right hand circuits for runway 09 (goingeast) and runway 17 (going south) should beput in place to ensure that aircraft turn awayfrom the obstacles represented by theturbines. RH circuits are permissible under theregulations in circumstances such as this andhave been used previously.

Figure 3- 2 Hypothetical Surfaces



4.0 Mitigation Measures

The preceding analysis of the relationshipbetween the proposed Gunns Hill wind farmproject and the Curries Aerodrome indicatesthat they are in close proximity and care mustbe exercised in project layout and, later, in theuse of the aerodrome. To allow for continuedoperation of the aerodrome, the followingmitigation measures and negotiation positionsare available to Prowind in discussions withthe owner.

1) The Curries Aerodrome is not a certifiedairport and cannot become certified.

2) Although Obstacle Limitation Surfaces arenot required for aerodromes, either registeredor non-registered, Prowind has takenappropriate approach surfaces intoconsideration in defining turbine locations.

3) Currently proposed turbines and locationsdo not penetrate any hypothetical ObstacleLimitation surfaces.

4) Right hand circuits are available for use withrunways 09 and 17.

5) As all operations at the aerodrome will beundertaken in VFR conditions and daylightconditions, the current clearances areadequate.

Night operations have the same clearancerequirements but require specific aerodromelighting facilities for legal operations.

6) The turbines will be required by TransportCanada to have obstruction warning lights butlikely not all will require lights. There may beroom for discussion with TC and with theaerodrome owner about which turbines shouldhave lights. Presumably, those closest to theapproaches should be lit.

7) Note that some aviation regulations aremodified for objects over 150m in height andbecome more stringent. Constraining turbineheights to 150m or less may marginally reducecosts of the project.

Documents

SAMPLE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS P TEMPLATE · 2.0 Location of Copies of the Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention Plan 2.1 A copy of the Emergency Preparedness and Fire Prevention