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    1

    Cross Media Rivalry Matrix

    Company News-

    paper

    TV Cable Pub Live Out-

    door

    Radio Online Video

    and

    Ent.

    Music

    Tribune X X X X X X

    New York

    TimesX X X

    Dow Jones X X

    Gannett X X X

    Knight-

    RidderX X

    Clear

    ChannelX X X X

    Viacom X X X X X X X X

    AOL/Time-

    WarnerX X X X X X

    Disney X X X X X X X

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    2

    One of The Problems

    Sources: Scarborough Research 1999 Release 2, Top 50 Market Report Prepared by NAA Research Department

    Note: Radio drive times reflect Mondy-Friday average quarter hour

    1 Average day readership

    2 Average half hour

    3 Average quarter hour

    4 Average half hour

    58.8% 58.7% 58.6%

    57.9%56.9%

    56.2%

    45.3%

    42.4%40.8%

    39.6%38.5%

    37.8%

    25.5% 25.4% 25.7% 25.5%24.5%

    23.4%

    11.0%10.4% 10.3%

    10.5% 11.3%12.0%

    Daily Newspaper1

    Prime Time TV2

    Morning Drive Radio3

    Prime Time Cable4

    1996 1997 1998 Spring 1999 Fall 1999 Spring 2000

    0%

    10%

    20%

    30%

    40%

    50%

    60%

    70%

    Exhibit 1

    Percent of Adults Reached

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    3

    MOTIVATIONS FOR A MERGER AT TIME INC.

    Slow growth in magazine divisionGrowth in cable networksTime Inc.s decision to enter the entertainment industry is being

    driven primarily by deregulationenabling vertical integrationin media.

    Vertical integration in being motivated by Increasing risk of holdup in acquiring programming andoutlets for Times HBO and Cinemax

    Reduced risk of losses from growing film production costsdue to guaranteed runs in self owned outlets

    Multipoint competition

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    TIMES OFFER FOR WARNER

    Time shareholders offer a 59% stake in the merged firm toacquire Warner (through a stock swap)

    MVT= $109.125 * 57M shares = $6,220,125 M MVW = $45.875 * 178.5M shares = $8,188.6875 M Assumes share prices at the data of the

    announcement

    Completion of the acquisition requires shareholderapproval; combined T-W value = $14.4B

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    5

    EVALUATING THE WARNER OFFER

    Is Warner worth giving up 59% of Time Warner?

    Market value of T-W is $14.4BTime pays 0.59 x 14.4B = $8.496B for Warner

    For Time shareholders to be indifferent between holding Timeand holding 41% of T-W must have a value of $15.17B.$6.22B x 100% = Value T-Wx 41%; Value T-W= $15.17B

    Time-Warner must create an additional $771Min synergiesbeyond their cumulative market values.

    This requires about $75M in additional annual cash flows.

    Assuming a perpetui ty wi th a 10% discount rate.

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    EVALUATING THE PARAMOUNT OFFER

    Is Warner worth giving up the Paramount Offer?

    With Paramounts offer, Times value increases to $9.975B$175 x 57M shares = $9.98B

    For Time shareholders to be indifferent between holding Time(cash from Paramount) and 41% of TimeWarner, T-W musthave a value of $24.3 B.$9.98B x 100% = VALUE (T-W) x 41%; VAL UE (T-W) = $24.3B

    Time-Warner must create an additional $9.929Bin synergies forshareholders to justify spurning Paramounts offer.

    This requires almost $1Bin additional annual cash flows.Assuming a perpetui ty wi th a 10% discount rate.

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    ANALYTICAL ISSUES

    Which stakeholder interests should be served?

    Which interests are being served? (agency problems)

    How do we value the options?

    Where do we find the potential synergies?

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    TIMES DECISION

    Time dropped its stock offer for Warner and paid a higher price($13.1B; $72/share) for Warner with cash.This avoided the need for shareholder approv al of the merger that surely would

    have fai led given the Paramount offer.

    Paramount boosted its offer to $200 per share and indicated awillingness to go higher.

    Paramount sued based on the business judgment rule and lost.

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    CORPORATE-LEVEL STRATEGY- How big is the sandbox?

    The Scope of the Firm

    Corporate-Level Strategyis action taken togain a competitive advantage through theselection and management of a mix ofbusinessescompeting in severalindustries or product markets.

    Vertical IntegrationDiversification

    1. Choo se bu siness areas to part icipate

    in

    2. Choo se strategies to enter/exitbu siness areas

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    CRE TING V LUE THROUGH DIVERSIFIC TION

    Diversificationis a strategy attempting to improve long-runprofitability by acquiring and managing new business lines.

    Related diversificationvalue chain commonalitiesUnrelated diversificationtotally new business activities

    Similar Value Chain

    Hardlines Softlines Food

    Travel

    Insurance

    Different Value

    Chains

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    EVALUATING DIVERSIFICATION

    How can diversification create value?Acquiring and restructuring

    Transferring competenciesEconomies of scaleEconomies of scope

    How can diversification dissipate value?Bureaucratic Costs

    Information overload Coordination limitations

    Pooling RiskManagerial Opportunism (Agency Problems)

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    CREATING VALUES THROUGH ECONOMIES OF SCALE

    Eliminate operational redundancies Reduce costs in common activities

    Eliminate a competitor Reduce competition and rivalry; increase prices

    through increased market power

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    CREATING VALUE THROUGH ECONOMIES OF SCOPE

    Operational Economies of Scope Shared activities Core competencies

    Financial Economies of Scope Internal capital allocation Risk reduction Tax advantages

    Anticompetitive Economies of Scope

    Multipoint competition Exploiting market power