Social Influence, Sex Differences, And Judgments of Beauty- Putting the Interpersonal Back in Interpersonal Attraction

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology1993, Vol. 65, No. 3, 522-531

Copyright! 993 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0022-3514/93/S3.00

Social Influence, Sex Differences, and Judgments of Beauty:Putting the Interpersonal Back in Interpersonal Attraction

William G. Graziano, Lauri A. Jensen-Campbell, Laura J. Shebilske, and Sharon R. Lundgren

Four studies (N = 711) probed processes that underlie sex differences in attraction. In Study 1,women reported expertise at judging men's physical attractiveness, and this expertise was acknowl-edged by men. In Study 2, women evaluated physical attractiveness after seeing ratings supposedlymade by same-sex peers. Women were influenced by other women's ratings, especially negativeratings. Study 3 indicated that women were influenced by female peers in rating both male andfemale stimulus persons. There was no evidence that men were influenced by peers. In Study 4, Ssevaluated physically attractive persons of the other sex after reading a detailed description. Womenwere more influenced by peer evaluations than were men. Results were discussed in terms of sexdifferences and social influence processes in interpersonal attraction.

One important form of social selectivity involves choice ofconjugal and romantic partners (Buss, 1989). Such choices in-fluence the kinds of physical and psychological environmentsthe chooser will experience, and the potential reproductiveconsequences are powerful (Buss, 1989; Kenrick & Keefe,1992). One psychological process related to social selectivity isattraction. Presumably, feelings of attraction induce people toinitiate relationships selectively, to maintain them, and whenattraction disappears, to terminate them (Berscheid & Gra-ziano, 1979).

There is evidence that the dynamics of attraction in mateselection may be different in men and women (Buss, 1989;Garcia, Stinson, Ickes, Bissonnette, & Briggs, 1991; Graziano,Brothen, & Berscheid, 1978; Kenrick & Keefe, 1992). In a seriesof meta-analyses, Feingold (1990,1992) showed that men val-ued physical attractiveness more in a romantic partner than didwomen. On the other hand, women valued socioeconomic sta-tus and ambitiousness more in a partner than did men. Theseresults held for both North American and non-North American

William G. Graziano, Lauri A. Jensen-Campbell, Laura J. She-bilske, and Sharon R. Lundgren, Department of Psychology, TexasA&M University.

Portions of this article were presented at the 99th Annual Conven-tion of the American Psychological Association in San Francisco, Au-gust 1991.

We are grateful to Tina Adkins, Betty Boland, Shaun Campbell,Chris Camperson, Tina Cazarez, Michelle Fecowitz, Daphine Frank-lin, Betty Harris, Peggy Philpot, Tracy Senderling, Mike Todd, andStephanie Watjus for their help in various phases of this project. Wethank Sharon Brehm, Tom Brothen, William Crano, Elaine Hatneld,William Ickes, Diane Jones, Douglas Kenrick, Bibb Latane, JorgeMendoza, James Olson, W Steven Rholes, James Shepperd, and Mi-chele Tomarelli for comments on an earlier version of this article. Weare especially grateful to Michael R. Cunningham for his advice andsupport.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Wil-liam G. Graziano, Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University,College Station, Texas 77843-4235.

research (Buss, 1989) and for research done recently or half acentury ago (Feingold, 1992).

Women may report that physical attractiveness is less impor-tant in romantic partner choice, but it does not follow thatwomen disregard their own perceptions of men's physical attrac-tiveness. Instead, the dynamics of judgments of physical attrac-tiveness may be different in women and men. The judgmentprocess in women may be more complicated, and less direct,than the corresponding process in men, in which objective phys-ical cues like large eyes reliably lead to judgments of physicalattractiveness (e.g., Cunningham, 1986). More specifically,women may be responsive to behavioral characteristics in ro-mantic partners that convey a cooperative, prosocial disposi-tion (Garcia et al., 1991; Jensen-Campbell & Graziano, 1992) ormaximize the survival or reproductive prospects of potentialoffspring (Feingold, 1992; Trivers, 1972). When these cues arepresent, the man may be perceived as physically attractive(Cunningham, Barbee, & Pike, 1990).

There are sociocultural explanations for sex differencesnoted in evolutionary accounts (e.g., Buss, 1989; Trivers, 1972).In cultures in which men control more power and resourcesthan do women, norms may have evolved such that men canafford the luxury of picking partners on the basis of their physi-cal appearance. For women, choices may need a more prag-matic basis (Rosenblatt, 1974). Sociocultural accounts are notnecessarily incompatible with, or even antagonistic to, evolu-tionary accounts (e.g., Kenrick & Trost, 1989; Tooby & Cos-mides, 1992); both accounts acknowledge sex differences inattraction and mate selection processes.

Regardless of the ultimate explanation, if objective physicalcues receive less weight in women's judgments, then men maybe relatively ambiguous stimulus packages to women. Initialjudgments may be tentative or be made with uncertainty. Fes-tinger (1954) hypothesized that persons in uncertain situationsof this sort will be motivated to obtain social comparison infor-mation. Thus, women may be more responsive than men toinformation from peers in making judgments of physical attrac-tiveness. Consistent with this conjecture, Olson, Ellis, andZanna (1983) found that male subjects used relatively little con-

522

SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND BEAUTY 523

sensus information in making judgments of female physicalattractiveness but made greater use of consensus informationwhen they saw beauty as an objective quality. Olson et al. didnot collect data from women, however, leaving open the possi-bility of sex differences in the use of peer consensus in thesekinds of evaluations (cf. Gorenflo & Crano, 1989).

Some forms of information from peers may have special im-pact on women's judgments of men. More specifically, informa-tion about negative qualities may be especially weighty. Giventhe "person positivity bias" in social cognition (Graziano,Brothen, & Berscheid, 1980; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972), nega-tive information is often seen as more diagnostic (Skowronski& Carlston, 1989). Furthermore, from a woman's perspective,negative qualities in male romantic partners may be dispropor-tionately more costly "per unit" than positive qualities are re-warding. One negative quality could be sufficient to overcome asea of positivity in ensuring survival of offspring (Feingold,1992; Trivers, 1972).

Several variables beyond those noted previously may moder-ate social influence processes in judgments of beauty. First,women may be more responsive to social influence than menwhen subjects are told that other members of their group hold abelief different from theirs, and these other members have sur-veillance over the subjects' responses (e.g., Eagly, 1987). Woodand Stagner (in press) noted that no sex differences have beenfound in studies when subjects believed that their opinionswould not be known to the rest of the group. This suggests thatsex differences in social influence are minimal in private judg-ments. Second, sex differences in social influence may begreater when subjects respond to topics associated stereotypi-cally with the other gender, such as women responding to ques-tions about auto mechanics (Eagly & Carli, 1981; Sistrunck &McDavid, 1971; cf. Eagly, 1987, p. 101; Wood & Stagner, inpress). Nonexperts may be easier to influence than experts. Inthe context of the present inquiry, judgments of physical attrac-tiveness in persons of the other sex may not fit comfortablywithin the expertise domains of both men and women (Gra-ziano et al., 1978; cf. Moore, Graziano, & Millar, 1987). Onereason that women assign relatively low weight to physical at-tractiveness (Feingold, 1992) may be that they perceive them-selves as nonexperts in judging the dimension. Thus, there maybe sex differences in influenceability regarding judgments ofattractiveness resulting from differences in subjective expertise.Third, past research shows that individual differences such asintelligence, need for cognition, self-esteem, and self-monitor-ing may moderate social influence processes (Wood & Stagner,in press). These differences may be systematically related to sex(cf. Eagly, 1987, p. 123).

The present research program probed interpersonal in-fluence processes underlying judgments of beauty and socialevaluation. The studies were specifically designed to explorethe operation of social influence when the task allows anony-mous (i.e., private) responses, places limited demand on cogni-tive skills of message reception, and involves something as fa-miliar, personal, and individual as a private evaluation of physi-cal attractiveness in a person of the other sex. Previous researchhas found that messages with high cognitive demands elicit indi-vidual differences in message reception, and we wanted tominimize this prospect to get a clearer picture of possible sex

differences (Rhodes & Wood, 1992). Individual-differencesmeasures were collected, however, to explore potential moder-ating effects.

The first study probed perceived expertise in judging physi-cal attractiveness in men and women. Specifically, Study 1probed sex differences in perceived expertise in rating physicalattractiveness, relative to other gender-role-stereotype domainssuch as auto mechanics. Ratings were collected both for the selfas an individual and for perceived norms for men and womenas separate groups (ipsatized ratings). We anticipated that menwould regard themselves as more expert at rating physical at-tractiveness in women than would women. We also anticipatedthat men would deny expertise in judging male attractiveness,but that women would not rate themselves as having advancedexpertise in this domain either.

Study 1

Method

A total of 138 Texas A&M University students (87 women and 51men) completed self-report ratings on expertise across several do-mains. First, students were asked to rate their own expert knowledgeon 1 (not at all expert) to 10 fyery expert) Likert-type scales. The do-mains were auto mechanics, calculus, visual arts, classical music, com-puters, cook ing, clothing, etiquette, sports, women's physical attractive-ness, men's physical attractiveness, decorating a house or apartment,initiating relationships, maintaining relationships, dealing with chil-dren, psychology, and landscaping. Once these ratings were com-pleted, students then completed an ipsatized version using a subset ofthese same domains. The scale ranged from women are more expert (1)to men are more expert (10).

Results

Discriminant function analyses were performed on the self-ratings and ipsatized ratings separately, with male versus femaleas the categorization variable. Means and standard deviationsare reported in Table 1. For the self-ratings, three students (twomen and one woman) did not complete all ratings and wereexcluded from analyses. One discriminant function capturedrating differences in self-rated expertise in men and women,X2(17, N = 135) = 136.79, p < .0001. The function correctlyclassified 93.33% of students as male or female. Men ratedthemselves as significantly more expert than women onwomen's physical attractiveness (men's M = 8.31; women's M=6.92), auto mechanics, calculus, computers, sports, and land-scaping. Women rated themselves as significantly more experton men's physical attractiveness (men's M= 5.43; women's M=7.70), clothing, etiquette, decorating homes and apartments,dealing with children, cooking, and of course, psychology. Nosignificant difference between men and women was found ininitiating or maintaining relationships, visual arts, or classicalmusic.

The ipsatized ratings evaluated agreement on gender-rolestereotyped expertise. No difference here indicates agreementbetween men and women on the expertise of men and women.One discriminant function captured rating differences in ste-reotyped expertise in men and women, x2(7, 7Y= 138) = 26.80,p < .001. The function correctly classified 68.12% of students as

524 GRAZIANO, JENSEN-CAMPBELL, SHEBILSKE, AND LUNDGREN

Table 1Ratings of Expertise: Study 1

Measure

Men's physical attractivenessMSD

Women's physical attractivenessMSD

Auto mechanicsMSD

CalculusMSD

Visual artMSD

Classical musicMSD

ComputersMSD

CookingMSD

EtiquetteMSD

SportsMSD

Interior decoratingMSD

Initiating relationshipsMSD

Maintaining relationshipsMSD

ChildrenMSD

PsychologyMSD

LandscapingMSD

ClothingMSD

Women

Self-reports

7.70**1.55

6.92**1.87

1.86**1.21

4.05**2.82

4.002.31

3.452.33

3.95**1.98

6.15*2.35

7.80*1.46

5.63**2.16

7.37**1.41

5.952.35

7.021.93

7.65**1.66

6.28**1.68

3.07**2.12

7.62**1.68

Ipsatizedratings

3.072.06

5.41**2.62

2.28**1.21

5.802.22

3.23**1.50

3.451.39

4.321.25

Men

Self-reports

5.432.23

8.311.75

5.142.31

5.472.95

4.122.22

3.672.49

5.922.00

5.242.13

7.201.72

7.612.20

5.552.09

5.312.39

6.652.47

6.162.58

5.222.15

4.122.36

6.272.16

Ipsatizedratings

3.102.57

7.182.75

3.432.29

6.242.30

4.122.04

3.801.89

4.551.75

Note. Self-reports: A'(men) = 49; iV(women) = 86. Ipsatized ratings: Wfmen) = 51; N (women) = 87.* Men and women were significantly different at p < .05. ** Men and women were significantly differentatp<.001.

male or female. Men believed that men are more expert injudging women's physical attractiveness (men's M = 7.17;women's M= 5.41; F= 14.06). In judging men's physical attrac-tiveness, however, men agreed with women that women aremore expert (men's M= 3.10, women's M= 3.07). Overall, men

believed that they are more expert in judging women's physicalattractiveness, but women believed that they are equal to menin judging women's physical attractiveness. In judging men'sphysical attractiveness, men and women agreed that women aremore expert.


Conclusion

Sex differences in social influence may be greater when sub-jects respond to topics associated stereotypically with the othergender (cf. Eagly & Carli, 1981, p. 16). Our data suggest thatphysical attractiveness judgments are not outside women's self-reported expertise. Despite the relatively low weight womenassign to physical attractiveness for initiating relationships(Feingold, 1992), in both self-ratings and relative ratings,women regard themselves as experts in judging men's physicalattractiveness. Their expertise is acknowledged by men. Menregard themselves as experts in judging women's physical attrac-tiveness, but women do not see themselves as inexpert in thisjudgment.

Study 2

Overview

The second, third, and fourth studies were experiments in-volving manipulation of independent variables and shared pro-cedural details. In these studies, participants were shown pho-tographs and were asked to make social evaluations using Li-kert-type rating scales. Minimum sample sizes weredetermined a priori by calculation for statistical power of atleast .70, assuming a medium effect size and a two-tailed alphaset at .05. Once the evaluation task was completed, each partici-pant completed inventories that assessed individual differencesin cognitive style or motivational processes that might be re-lated to social influence. Study 2 probed the hypothesis thatwomen's ratings of men's physical attractiveness would be in-fluenced by their female peers. Given data from Study 1, ifvulnerability to social influence were due largely to limitedexpertise (e.g., Sistrunk & McDavid, 1971), then women shouldnot be influenced by their peers. From an evolutionary per-spective, however, expertise with the general domain of physi-cal attractiveness may be less important than specific reactionsfrom peers that could inform the woman about the man's socialresources and suitability as a mate (Kenrick & Trost, 1989;Trivers, 1972).

Method

Subjects and design. A total of 105 Texas A&M University femaleintroductory psychology students participated in return for partial ful-fillment of their course requirements. The design was a single-factor,three-level, completely within-subjects design (see subsequent section).The dependent variable was the subject's private rating of physicalattractiveness on a not at all attractive (1) to very attractive (10) Likert-type scale.

Stimulus materials. On the basis of pretesting, nine photographswere selected from a larger set used in previous physical attractivenessresearch (Dickey-Bryant, Lautenschlager, Mendoza, & Abrahams,1986). The photographs were head-and-shoulder graduation portraitsof male U.S. Naval Academy cadets. These photographs were used tominimize the influence of extraneous factors (e.g., clothing style andhaircut) on judgments of attractiveness. The nine photographs werereliably rated as average in physical attractiveness.

Procedure. The participants were scheduled in groups of five or sixto meet the conditions in the cover story. The experimenter met withthe group members once they arrived and told them that this study wasabout physical attractiveness. She or he explained that physical attrac-

tiveness was important because it was one of the first things peoplenotice about others and it can strongly influence overall impressions.She or he explained that we were interested in what people found at-tractive in others. Therefore, they would be asked to rate the physicalattractiveness of some photographs of male cadets from another uni-versity.

She or he then told the participants that personality could influencejudgments of attractiveness. Consequently, they would be asked tocomplete some personality inventories. The participants were told thatpast research had shown that the order in which they completed theinventories and ratings could influence their judgments. Therefore,they would be completing the inventories and ratings in differentorders (e.g., "Some people would rate pictures, then do inventories,then rate some more pictures"). They were also told that because of theexperimental design, some participants might get to rate only a fewpictures, whereas others would be fortunate enough to rate all ninephotographs.

After the general orientation, the participants were told that theywould be moved to separate rooms to make ratings individually. Thiswould allow them more privacy while making their ratings and fillingout their inventories. After the participants were separated and alonein their individual rooms, they were told that they were assigned to thecondition in which they would be filling out the inventories first andthen rating photographs. All participants then received the personal-ity inventories first. This was done to create the illusion that all theother participants could have time to see and rate the pictures and puttheir responses on the rating form while they were filling out invento-ries. These inventories were the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1987),the Shipley-Hartford Intelligence Scales (both verbal and analyticalsections), and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965).

Once the inventories were completed, each participant saw all ninephotographs, one at a time. Participants were told that they were thelast person to see the photographs and would be seeing all nine pic-tures. The experimenter then gave them a "group" rating sheet onwhich to write their ratings. She or he told them that we wanted theirratings to be as honest and candid as possible. She or he then told themthat we created a form that would ensure that their ratings were anony-mous so they could be as honest as possible. The experimenter toldthem that each of the other participants covertly chose a rater numberfrom 1 to 5 on the rating form so we would not know who they were.She or he then told them that because they were the last rater theywould have to choose whatever was left (which was Rater 3). This pro-cedure allowed us to manipulate the participant's perception that theywere the last one to see the pictures and were able to see all of the otherparticipant's ratings before making their own private ratings.

They were then handed each picture, one at a time, and told to turnthe picture face down when they were done rating it. The experimentertold them that we would know when they were done with that pictureonly when they turned it over, because we were not watching to seewhat their ratings were, so they could be totally honest. The experi-menter also told them that we were giving them one picture at a timebecause we did not want them to compare the pictures with each other.Instead, we wanted them to rate each one individually.

In actuality, we had fabricated all of the ratings on the rating form tomanipulate social influence. A rating form was created to manipulatethe positivity of the ratings given to each picture. Of the nine pictures,three pictures were given highly positive ratings (i.e., an average of 8on a physically unattractive [1 ] to physically attractive [10] Likert-typescale). Three pictures were then given very negative ratings (i.e., anaverage of 3 on the same 10-point scale). The final three pictures re-ceived no ratings and served as our neutral no-information condition.With no ratings present, it would be expected that the photographswould receive neutral or average ratings. Ratings, order of presenta-tion, and photographs were completely counterbalanced across re-


search participants to avoid confounding specific pictures with rat-ings.

Once all ratings were completed, the experimenter reconvened eachset of five research participants. Using the funnel debriefing format(Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968), we probed participants for suspicious-ness, debriefed them, and pledged them to secrecy.

Results

We computed mean scores for each of the three social influ-ence conditions (negative, no evaluation, and positive). That is,each participant produced a single mean score for the threestimuli receiving a negative peer rating, a single mean for thethree stimuli receiving no peer evaluation, and a single meanfor the three stimuli receiving a positive peer evaluation. Thesethree composite scores were treated as three levels in a single-factor, completely within-subjects analysis of variance. Therewas a significant main effect for social influence, F(2, 208) =7.83, p < .001. Simple effects analyses indicated that womengave ratings consistent with the direction of negative social in-fluence, F(l, 104) = 13.19, p < .001. There was no evidence thatpositive information influenced women's judgments of malephysical attractiveness, F(\, 104) = .71, ns. Means for the nega-tive, no-information, and positive peer-rating conditions were4.88, 5.43, and 5.33, respectively. Standard deviations were1.29,1.31, and 1.31, respectively.

To investigate personality moderators of the influence effectfor male and female participants, we computed for each partici-pant a P-correlation (see Cattell, 1952, 1963; Nunnally, 1978)and then correlated it with that participant's scores on personal-ity measures. There was no evidence that the social influenceeffect in this study was moderated reliably by any of the fourindividual-differences variables (cf. Rhodes & Wood, 1992).

Study 3

Overview

Study 2 showed that women are responsive to peer evalua-tions, especially negative evaluations, in judging male physicalattractiveness. Study 2 is mute, however, on men's responsive-ness to the same kind of information, and thus, on possible sexdifferences. Furthermore, effects based on reactions to U.S. Na-val Academy cadets may not be generalizable. In Study 3, bothmale and female participants privately evaluated the physicalattractiveness of stimulus persons taken from nonmilitary uni-versity yearbooks. As in Study 2, ratings were completed afterseeing ratings supposedly made by same-sex peers. The individ-uals in the photos were carefully selected through pretesting tobe intermediate in physical attractiveness.

Method

Subjects and design. A total of 265 Texas A&M University intro-ductory psychology students participated in return for partial fulfill-ment of their course requirements. Both men (iV= 103) and women (N= 162) participated in this study. The male and female research partici-pants were assigned to the cells of a 2 (sex of research participant) X 2(sex of stimulus pictures) X 3 (positivity of peer ratings) stratified, ran-dom-block factorial design. The third factor was a within-subjects vari-able. The dependent variable was the subject's private rating of physical

attractiveness on a not at all attractive (1) to very attractive (10) Likert-type scale.

Stimulus materials. On the basis of extensive pretesting, 18 photo-graphs were selected from a larger set taken from various universityyearbooks. The photographs were head-and-shoulder graduation por-traits of college-aged men and women. Nine of the chosen photographswere of men and the remaining nine were of women. The 18 photo-graphs were reliably rated as average in physical attractiveness (M =5.39, SD = .77, on a 10-point scale).

Procedure. Research participants were randomly assigned to sex-of-stimulus-picture conditions: They were asked to rate either ninemale or nine female stimulus pictures. These groupsof research partici-pants were homogeneous with respect to sex. Sex of experimenter wascounterbalanced across all conditions. The remaining procedureswere identical to those in Study 2.

Results

As in Study 2, each participant produced a single mean scorefor the three stimuli receiving a negative peer rating, a singlemean for the three stimuli receiving no peer evaluation, and asingle mean for the three stimuli receiving a positive peer evalua-tion. These three composite scores were treated as repeatedmeasures in an analysis of variance. There was a significantmain effect for social influence, F(2, 522) = 5.12, p< .01. Themain effect for social influence was qualified by a Social Influ-ence X Sex of Participant interaction, F(2,522) = 3.94, p < .02.Simple effects analyses indicated that women gave ratings con-sistent with the direction of social influence, F(2,320) = 10.45,p < .001. Means for the negative, no information, and positivepeer rating conditions were 4.59, 4.82, and 5.12, respectively.

Information about negative qualities may be especiallyweighty for women when they rate men, so we conductedplanned comparisons to probe this possibility. Women weremore responsive to negative information, relative to no infor-mation, when they rated stimulus pictures of men, F(l, 79) =5.94, p < .02. There was no evidence, however, that womenwere influenced by negative information when they rated otherwomen, F(\, 81) = 0.33, ns. There was also no evidence thatwomen were responsive to positive information, relative to noinformation, when they rated men, F(l, 79) = 2.30, ns. Meansand standard deviations are presented in Table 2.

There was no evidence that men were influenced by the rat-ings of their peers for either female or male targets, F(2,198) =.32, ns. The means for male participants for the negative, no-in-formation, and positive peer-rating conditions were 4.81,4.91,and 4.85, respectively. Means and standard deviations are pre-sented in Table 2.

To investigate personality moderators of the influence effectfor male and female participants, we again computed for eachparticipant a /"-correlation (see Cattell, 1952, 1963; Nunnally,1978) and then correlated it with that participant's scores onpersonality measures, separately for men and women. The onlysignificant correlation involved the P-correlation and verbal in-telligence in male participants (r = .23, p < .02), suggesting thatgreater verbal ability in men is associated with more socialinfluence. This correlation did not replicate for female partici-pants (r = —.01, ns). When data were collapsed across sex ofparticipant, there were no significant correlations among per-sonality measures and the P-correlation indicator of social in-


Table 2Physical Attractiveness and Social Influence: Study 3

Picture

FemaleMSD

MaleMSD

OverallMSD

n

82

80

162

Negative

4.84,1.19

4.34,1.18

4.59,1.21

Women

No information

4.92,1.27

4.72b1.31

4.82b1.29

Positive

5.25b1.22

4.99b1.37

5.12,1.30

n

51

52

103

Negative

4.59,0.97

5.01,1.05

4.81,1.03

Men

No information

4.83,1.48

4.99,1.33

4.91,1.40

Positive

4.74,1.20

4.96,1.22

4.85,1.21

Note. Means having the same subscript are not significantly different at p < .05. Comparisons are withinsex of rater and sex of picture. A'(men) = 103. N (women) = 162.

fluence. Thus, there was no evidence that the social influenceeffect in this study was moderated reliably by any of the fourindividual-differences variables.

Study 4

Overview

Study 3 replicated Study 2 in showing that when women eval-uate men, negative peer information carries more weight thanpositive peer information. There was no evidence that menwere influenced by their peers in evaluating either women ormen. There are, however, several potential limitations to Study3. First, the stimulus pictures were selected to be average, andaverage persons may be aesthetically ambiguous to observers. Itis possible that had we used less ambiguous stimulus persons,we would have found much less social influence (cf. Jacobs &Campbell, 1961). Second, the experimental situation in Studies2 and 3 was tightly constrained. The manipulation involvedshowing participants lists of ratings, which may not have en-gaged deep analytic or schematic activity (Petty & Cacioppo,1986; Tesser, 1978). Had participants been given some time forthought, social influence may have dissipated. Furthermore,response options were limited to making a single numeric rat-ing. Had participants been exposed to the kind of verbal evalua-tive information traditionally used in the attraction literature(e.g., Berscheid & Walster, 1978, p. 61; Byrne, 1971) or had par-ticipants been given room for more detailed evaluations, thenwe may have found a more complex pattern of social influenceand attraction, even for the male participants (cf. Eagly et al.,1991).

To address some of these limitations, we conducted Study 4.It was similar to Study 3 but with five changes. First, new stimu-lus photographs were found to portray unambiguously attrac-tive college students instead of average students. Second, tosimplify our design, we had participants rate only other-sexstimulus persons. Third, we manipulated peer social influenceby providing detailed, vivid attraction-relevant personality de-scriptions about the stimulus persons, rather than a single nu-meric rating (e.g., Berscheid & Walster, 1978; Byrne, 1971). Thepersonality description was supposedly provided by a person

who knew each stimulus person well. Fourth, participants ratedstimulus persons not only for physical beauty, but also for desir-ability as a date and overall social desirability of traits. Finally,participants either were randomly assigned to a condition inwhich they were instructed to think about the personality de-scriptions (and given time to do so) or were distracted fromthinking about the personality descriptions (e.g., Tesser, 1978).

Our intent was to use the thought manipulation to increasedepth of processing. It is possible, however, to make more spe-cific, if speculative, predictions by extending Tesser's theory.More specifically, in extending Tesser's (1978) theory to thephysical attractiveness domain, we anticipated that peer de-scriptions would provide a positive or negative schema for thestimulus person. We speculated that when participants wereinduced to think about the stimulus person within a positive ornegative schema, their subsequent evaluations would becomepolarized positive or negative, respectively. In the absence of avectored peer description, thought will not induce polariza-tion. That is, when positive peer description is combined withan opportunity to think about the stimulus person, the stimulusperson should be rated as more attractive; negative peer de-scription combined with an opportunity for thought shouldlead to lower attraction.

Method

Subjects and design. A total of 203 Texas A&M University intro-ductory psychology students participated for partial fulfillment oftheir course requirements. Both men (N = 104) and women (TV = 99)participated in this study. The research participants looked at six pho-tographs of individuals of the other sex accompanied with personalityinterview reports. The participants were assigned to conditions in a 2(thought or no thought) X 3 (valence of social influence) stratified,random-block factorial design.

Stimulus materials. Based on extensive pretesting, 12 new photo-graphs were selected from a larger set taken from various universityyearbooks. The photographs were head-and-shoulder graduation por-traits of college-aged men and women. The 12 photographs (6 men and6 women) were reliably rated as physically attractive (M = 7.12), on a 1(not at all physically attractive) to 10 (very physically attractive) Likert-type scale. Six handwritten prose interviews were also developed tocreate two positive, two neutral, and two negative personality profiles.


The interviews had embedded within them traits scaled by Anderson(1968). For example, positive peer descriptions included "sincere" and"understanding"; negative peer descriptions included "selfish" and"narrow-minded." The profiles were pretested for their positivity. Thesix interview profiles were identical for both sets of pictures, with theexception of the gender of the person. The interviews were pretestedfor their appropriateness for both male and female stimulus persons.The six interviews and six pictures were then completely counter-balanced to eliminate order effects.

Procedure. Research participants initially met in groups of five.Participants were told that they were participating in an impression-formation study. We told them that we wanted their impression ofother men and women on the basis of what others said about them. Wetold them that we would show them photographs of people from an-other university. If the participants were men, we then told them thatthey would learn about the women's personalities through interviewswith men who knew the women well. If the participants were women,we told them that they would learn about the men's personalities fromwomen who knew the men well. We told them the interviews we con-ducted were strictly confidential to allow them to be as honest andcandid in describing the men's and women's personalities. In sum, wetold them we wanted them to see the photographs of the men andwomen and the interview reports from others who knew them well.

We then told them that in everyday life, it is common to form animpression of someone with little time. We said that sometimes theymay even be distracted by some task and then return to forming theimpression. We told them that we were also interested in the effects ofpossible distractions. Therefore, we might ask some of them to engagein a task while they were forming their impressions.

We then passed out blank interview forms and told the participantsthat we would like them to think of an opposite-sex friend whom theyknew well. We told them that the person should be approximately thesame age as them and that the person could have both positive andnegative traits. We then asked them to complete an inventory form andthat these forms were identical to the forms that the other people usedto describe the people they would be seeing. We told them we wantedthem to do this task to familiarize them with the form. We also toldthem not to put their name on the form so their answers would becompletely confidential. We then randomly assigned participants tothe thought and no-thought conditions and placed them in two sepa-rate rooms.

Thought manipulation. In the thought condition, subjects weregiven a packet of photographs and descriptions. They were told to lookat the photograph first, turn it over, and then read the interview form.Participants were not allowed to look at the photograph or rating formagain once they turned it face down. Blank sheets of paper were placedbetween each photo-description pair so the participant would be con-centrating on only one stimulus person at a time. Participants weregiven 2 min to think actively about the person they just saw. They werethen encouraged to think about the person. They were given a 1-minwarning and told to stop at 2 min. After each picture, the subjectscompleted an impression of the participant. This impression included5-point Likert-type ratings of physical attractiveness, dating desirabil-ity, and so forth. The research participants completed the same proce-dures for each of the six stimulus persons.

No-thought manipulation. These subjects followed proceduresidentical to the those followed by the thought subjects, with one excep-tion. After the participants had a chance to look at the photograph andinterview, they were then asked to work on absorbing cognitive tasks(e.g., Shipley-Hartford verbal and analytic reasoning tasks) for 2 min.As in the thought condition, subjects were given a 1-min warning andtold to stop at 2 min. Participants were made to think that we wereinterested in how many items they could complete in the 2 min. Afterthe 2-min cognitive task, the subjects evaluated the stimulus person.

When all the participants finished the impression-formation rat-ings, they completed scales for need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty,1982) and self-monitoring (Snyder, 1987). Then they all gathered in theoriginal room for a complete group debriefing.

Results

Results are reported separately for each of the dependentmeasures and are presented in Tables 3 and 4.

Physical attractiveness. There was a significant main effectfor peer social influence, F(2, 398) = 12.83, p < .0001. Thismain effect was qualified by a Social Influence X Sex of Partici-pant interaction, F{2,398) = 2.76, p < .06. Simple effects analy-ses indicated that women were influenced negatively, but notpositively, in evaluating physically attractive male targets, rela-tive to the no-information condition, with overall F(2,194) =7.58, p < .001. Means for the negative, no-information, andpositive peer description conditions were 3.25, 3.49, and 3.55,respectively. Men were influenced positively, but not negatively,in evaluating physically attractive women, relative to the no-in-formation condition, with an overall F(2,204) = 8.06, p < .001.Means for the conditions were 3.73,3.73, and 3.96, respectivelyMeans and standard deviations for all three dependent mea-sures are presented in Table 3. Intercorrelations are presentedin Table 4.

In addition, there was a significant Thought X Sex of Partici-pant interaction, F(\, 199) = 4.99, p < .03. For female partici-pants, thinking about physically attractive men significantlydecreased their judged beauty (M = 3.32), relative to a no-thought condition (M = 3.55). For male participants, thinkingabout physically attractive women had no significant effect (M= 3.87), relative to a no-thought condition (M= 3.67).

Desire to date. There was a significant main effect for socialinfluence, F(2, 389) = 486.17, p< .0001. This was qualified bya Social Influence X Sex interaction, F(2,398) = 7.98, p < .001.Peer influence exerted less impact on male participants' desireto date physically attractive women, F(2,204) = 26.17, p < .001,than it did for female participants' desire to date physicallyattractive men, F(2,194) = 287.20, p < .001. For men, there wasa smaller discrepancy in the desire to date a physically attractiveperson with a negative peer description (M = 2.67) and a posi-tive peer description (M = 4.32) than there was for women(negative M= 2.07, positive M= 4.15).

Positivity of traits. There was a significant main effect forsocial influence, F(2, 398) = 549.49, p < .0001. Participantsgave ratings consistent with the direction of peer descriptions.Means for the negative, no-information, and positive peer de-scription conditions were 3.05, 3.19, and 3.92, respectively. Onthis measure, peer social influence did not interact with eithersex or thought.

^-correlation analysis. As in Study 3, /"-correlations werecomputed for each participant and then correlated with thatparticipant's scores on personality measures, separately for menand women. None of the correlations were significant (cf. Wood& Stagner, in press).

General Discussion

In classical philosophical discussions (e.g., those of Aristotle,Aquinas, and Kant), beauty is an attribute intrinsic to the object


Table 3Social Influence on Three Dependent Measures: Study 4

Dependent measure

Physical attractivenessMSD

Dating desirabilityMSD

Trait ratingsMSD

Negative

3.25,0.86

2.07,0.76

3.04,0.40

Women

No information

3.49b0.72

3.43b0.74

3.21b

0.33

Positive

3.55b0.78

4.15C0.72

3.96C

0.28

Negative

3.73,0.65

2.67a0.74

3.06,0.33

Men

No information

3.73a0.60

3.60b0.70

3.17b

0.32

Positive

3.96b0.58

4.32C0.63

3.88,0.33

Note. Means having the same subscript are not significantly different at p < .05. Comparisons are withinsex of rater and dependent variables. N(men) = 104. iV(women)= 99.

under scrutiny. The recent social psychology literature on at-traction appears to support this premise (e.g., Cunningham,1986). It has been argued that people are responsive to certainintrinsic attributes because these attributes may be associatedwith the evolution of our species (e.g., Kenrick & Keefe, 1992).

The magnitude of the beauty-intrinsic attribute link is anempirical question. Even if a large link were found, however,important questions would remain about social forces that initi-ate and maintain such links (e.g., Campbell, 1988; Deaux &Major, 1987; Garcia et al., 1991; Graziano, 1987; Hatfield &Sprecher, 1986; Jacobs & Campbell, 1961). In particular, thepresent program of research explored the hypothesis that pro-cesses underlying judgments of beauty and attraction may bedifferent in men and women (Buss, 1989; Garcia et al., 1991;Graziano et al., 1978; Kenrick & Keefe, 1992).

In his meta-analyses, Feingold (1990, 1992) showed thatwomen valued physical attractiveness less in a romanticpartner than did men. One possible implication is that womenmay not be sensitive to variation in men's physical attractive-ness, or they may regard themselves as nonexpert judges. Re-sults from our first study, however, suggest that women do con-sider themselves experts in judging physical attractiveness. Fur-thermore, the ipsatized ratings show that both men and womenregard women as expert in judging men's physical attractive-ness. Thus, it is not plausible that sex differences in social influ-ence on judgments of physical attractiveness are a result of feel-ings of limited expertise (e.g., Eagly & Carli, 1981; Sistrunk &McDavid, 1971). Nor is it plausible that the sex differences we

found were a result of public conformity pressure (Wood &Stagner, in press). In our three experimental studies, womenprovided private, anonymous ratings.

The dynamics of judgments of physical attractiveness seemto be different in women and men. Our results suggest thatwomen do evaluate physical attractiveness in men, and theseevaluations are related to men's dating desirability (see Table 4).The link between physical attractiveness and dating desirabilityis virtually identical in men and women. For women, however,important processes appear to be occurring before the subjec-tive judgment of physical attractiveness. The judgment processin women is responsive to peer input and appears to be morecomplicated than the corresponding process in men, in whichobjective physical cues like large eyes reliably lead to judgmentsof physical attractiveness (e.g., Cunningham, 1986). From anevolutionary perspective (Buss, 1989; Feingold, 1992; Kenrick& Keefe, 1992; Trivers, 1972), women may be responsive tocovert characteristics in romantic partners that maximize thesurvival or reproductive prospects of potential offspring. Whenthese characteristics are present, the man may be perceived ofas physically attractive (Cunningham et al., 1990). Otherwomen may be an especially valuable source of supplementalinformation about a potential mate's tendencies.

Some forms of information from peers may have special im-pact on women's judgments of men. More specifically, informa-tion about negative qualities may be especially weighty. Resultsfrom Studies 2, 3, and 4 support this contention. Furthermore,in Study 4, women placed more emphasis on negative informa-

Table 4Intercorrelation Among Evaluation Measures: Study 4

Measure

1. Physical attractiveness2. Dating desirability3. Positivity of trait rating

Male rater

2 3

0.66* 0.65*— 0.65*

Female rater

2

0.61*

3

0.49*0.51*

2

0.66*

Overall

3

0.49*0.52*

Note. N (men) = 104. N (women) = 99.*p<.001.


tion when rating dating desirability than did men. It is interest-ing in this regard that negative qualities exerted less influenceon women's judgments of other women. From an evolutionaryperspective, negative qualities in male romantic partners maybe disproportionally more costly than positive qualities are re-warding. One negative quality could be sufficient to overcome asea of positivity in ensuring survival of offspring (Feingold,1992; Trivers, 1972).

One finding that is not easily explained by the evolutionaryaccount (e.g., Trivers, 1972) involves women's judgments ofother women's physical attractiveness. If our extension of theevolutionary-reproductive argument were valid, then why werewomen influenced in their judgment of the attractiveness ofother women? Why were the effects not limited to women'sjudgments of men? These results may be better explained insociocultural terms. To the extent that men control more powerand resources than do women, norms may have evolved suchthat men can afford the luxury of picking partners largely onthe basis of their physical appearance. For women of lowerpower or fewer resources, choices may need a more pragmaticbase (Rosenblatt, 1974). If there were competition amongwomen for the more desirable men, then it might be advan-tageous to women to have a sense of their competition. Admit-tedly, the explanation is ad hoc and speculative. Further re-search may help provide a better explanation for this unantici-pated, but interesting, social influence phenomenon.

An alternative sociocultural interpretation involves sex dif-ferences in motives for engaging in social comparison (Goren-flo & Crano, 1989; Olson et al., 1983). For example, women maybelieve that in an attraction context, attention to peer evalua-tions is simply collecting information that may be useful (con-structive motive), rather than testing the validity of judgments(validation). Alternatively, when making judgments of physicalattractiveness, men may be more likely than women to believethat physical attractiveness is a personal, subjective assessmentthat requires little or no peer input. Our interpretations arespeculative, however, because neither Olson et al. (1983) norGorenflo and Crano (1989) examined beliefs about the relativeobjectivity of the tasks they used. Furthermore, the substantivecontext of tasks commonly used in social comparison research(e.g., Gorenflo & Crano, 1989) does not contain material thatmight elicit different patterns of response from men andwomen, such as judgments of attraction for persons of theother sex.

There are several other unexpected findings that warrant fur-ther research. In Study 4, we manipulated the participants' op-portunity to think about the stimulus persons before they madefinal attractiveness ratings. Our intent was to probe some theo-retical processes (e.g., depth of processing) that might help ex-plain our previous findings. From Tesser's (1978) theory of self-generated attitude change, we expected that the impact ofthought would be moderated by the valence of peer descrip-tions. More specifically, we expected that the valence of theschema (positive or negative) would interact with the opportu-nity to think in polarizing evaluations of physical attractive-ness. Instead, we found a Thought X Sex of Participant interac-tion. When women thought about attractive men, the men be-came less attractive; when men thought about attractivewomen, there was no evidence of changes in attraction. We can

only speculate on processes that might have produced this out-come. It may be that men's judgments of women's physical at-tractiveness is more "automatic," or more perceptuallymanded, than are corresponding processes in women's judg-ments of men (e.g., Cunningham, 1986). Consequently, thoughtabout characteristics of attractive persons has less impact onmen than on women. This does not explain, however, women'sincreased negativity. Another possibility is that women mayhave a stereotype of attractive men that is both negative andstable (cf. Eagly et al, 1991). Even in the face of positive peerdescriptions, the women's stereotype may have operated like aTesserian schema, steering thought toward negative polariza-tion (i.e., judgments of lower attraction). This does not explain,however, the failure of thought to affect men's ratings. What-ever the explanation, thought about attractive people appears tohave different consequences for male and female perceivers,and this warrants further research.

The outcomes of this program of research raise many ques-tions. No single set of theoretical processes—evolutionary, so-ciocultural, or social-cognitive—seems able to explain theoverall pattern of outcomes (cf. Kenrick & Trost, 1989). None-theless, these studies show converging evidence that the dy-namics of attraction are different in men and women. At leastfor women's judgments of men, it may be a mistake to treatbeauty as an exclusively independent, causal variable. Forwomen, male beauty may be better regarded as a dependent,effect variable that is a consequence of interpersonal processes.

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Received November 19,1992Revision received February 17,1993

Accepted February 25,1993 •

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Social Influence, Sex Differences, And Judgments of Beauty- Putting the Interpersonal Back in Interpersonal Attraction