When the Bolsheviks seized power in the Soviet Union during 1917, they weresuffering from a substantial political legitimacy deficit. Uneasy political foundationsmeant that they were always on the defensive and cinema became a key part ofthe strategy to protect the existence of the USSR. This welcome book showshow one of film’s central functions was as an important means of convincing the masses that the regime was legitimate and a bearer of historical truth.

Based on extensive research in archives and primary sources, the book examines the interaction between politics and the Soviet cinema industry duringthe period between Stalin’s rise to power and the beginning of the Great PatrioticWar. This was the era when the Bolsheviks were trying to develop a ‘cinema for the millions’, which sought to engage Soviet citizens politically by carefullyblending entertainment with the communist message.

Jamie Miller investigates how political and administrative decision-making,censorship, thematic planning and purges were shaped by the Bolsheviks’defensive outlook, which in turn had a largely negative impact on the productionprocess. He examines the role of film unions and societies, compares thedevelopment of two different studios and looks at the education system forcinema personnel. He also analyses key films of the period, including the classicmusical Circus, the class enemy drama The Party Card and the political epic The Great Citizen.

‘Superbly researched and well written, this fascinating book is the first full-length political history of Soviet cinema during a tumultuous period, the “long thirties”, 1929–41. Miller provides a vivid depiction of theprocesses by which increasing state efforts to control the film industry ledto chaos and failure. As such, this work is indispensable reading not onlyfor specialists in Soviet film and culture, but also for anyone interested inthe dynamics of cultural production in an authoritarian society.’– Denise Youngblood, University of Vermont

JAMIE MILLER is Lecturer in Russian at Queen Mary, University of London.

Cover image: Poster for The Man with the Gun (Sergei I. Yutkevich, 1938) © Lenfilm, 2003

Cover design: www.paulsmithdesign.com

Jam

ie M

iller

Sovie

t Cine

ma

SovietCinema

Polit ics and Persuasion under Stalin

Jamie Miller

Soviet CinemaPolitics and Persuasion under Stalin

Jamie Miller

Published in 2010 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010www.ibtauris.com

Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010

Copyright © 2010 Jamie Miller

The right of Jamie Miller to be identified as the author of this work has been assertedby him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof,may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted,in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording orotherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

ISBN: 978 1 84885 008 8 (HB)978 1 84885 009 5 (PB)

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British LibraryA full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available

Set in 12pt Baskerville by Joe Murray in Glasgow, Scotland.

Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenhamfrom camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

CONTENTS

xi List of Illustrations

xiii Acknowledgements

xv Note on Transliteration

1 Introduction

15 Chapter 1 Film Administration and IndustryDevelopment

53 Chapter 2 Censorship

71 Chapter 3 The Purges

91 Chapter 4 Thematic Planning

105 Chapter 5 Representation and Reach:Cinema Unions and Societies

121 Chapter 6 A Tale of Two Studios:Mezhrabpomfilm and Mosfilm

139 Chapter 7 Film Education and Training

154 Chapter 8 Film-makers and Film-making

179 Conclusion

185 Notes

203 Bibliography

211 Filmography

215 Index

INTRODUCTIONExisting Research, Aims, Objectives and Methodology

The basic shape of the established Western approach to Soviet cinema, which emerged in the 1930s, and still exists in a traditional, ‘totalitarian’ form of analysis, suggests that, under Stalinism, the

Soviet film industry was brought under the firm grip of an all-embracing, centralised state and administrative system. This systemcrushed the creative spirit of the 1920s and obliged film-makers tobecome complicit in the creation of pro-regime film propaganda andthe imposition of an artistically weak socialist realist approach.1 Suchaccounts were challenged by ‘revisionists’ who emerged in the 1970sand 1980s. Richard Taylor began looking at Soviet cinema in the 1920sfrom a political point of view, contending that the Party only beganto gain control of the medium at the end of the decade.2 Taylor soonturned to the 1930s, arguing against the traditional film historyinterpretation of the decline into socialist realism. He contended that,while the aim of creating a ‘cinema for the millions’ was subject tocomplex political and economic constraints, the film industry and inparticular its leader, Boris Shumiatsky, managed to lay the foundationsof a genuine mass form of politicised entertainment by the late 1930s.3

Taylor and Ian Christie have also provided researchers with invaluableresources on Soviet cinema in the 1920s and 1930s, through thetranslation and publication of newspaper/journal articles and otherdocuments, in the collection The Film Factory.4 Taylor later co-edited avery important contribution to understanding the cinema of the Stalinera and its legacy, Stalinism and Soviet Cinema, featuring a range of articlesfrom scholars of different disciplinary backgrounds, includingacademics from the former Soviet Union. The collection dealt with

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the origins, development and legacy of Stalinism in cinema and offeredcontributions from both the ‘totalitarian’ and ‘revisionist’ schools ofthought.5 Denise Youngblood has also challenged received historicalideas about cinema, but from the broader perspective of revisionistSoviet history. In her Soviet Cinema in the Silent Era, Youngblood arguedthat Stalinism constituted a revolution from below in cinema, but lateramended this theory, arguing that there was no mass support for thechanges. Instead a ‘revolution from the middle’ was said to have takenplace within the film industry itself.6

The approaches of Western revisionists stood in stark contrast to thework of their Soviet counterparts. In the USSR academics, at leastformally, saw the Party as the careful guiding hand for the film industry,ensuring that it moved in the correct political direction. For example,Alentina Rubailo examined the process of growing Party control during1928–37, contending that the Bolsheviks gradually increased theirinfluence in terms of administration, planning and the ideological sideof film production. Given that the book was written in the Brezhnev era,it is unsurprising that the author presented a wholly positive account ofParty influence and the politicisation of the film industry. Since the collapseof the Soviet system, study of the 1930s has ironically adopted thetraditional, ‘totalitarian’ arguments of the West, concentrating on thesupposedly overwhelming influence of Stalin, comparing Soviet films ofthe 1930s with those of Nazi Germany, and focusing on the negativeaspects of the cinema industry. Nonetheless, Russian scholars have recentlypublished a wealth of archival materials which promise the emergenceof more nuanced accounts of the interaction between politics and cinemain the 1930s.7

Interest in the 1930s has grown and moved in new directions overrecent years. The French scholar Natacha Laurent has dedicated an entirebook, based on archival sources, to censorship during the Stalinist era(although the particular focus is on the 1940s). Laurent pays specialattention to aspects of the decision-making process, providing us with abetter understanding of the mechanics of censorship. Among otherarguments, she points out that censorship was not only imposed fromabove, but also involved the film-makers themselves who formed part ofa complex web.8 Eberhard Nembach provides a useful narrative on thereorganisation of the film industry in the 1930s which favours the bridgingof historical divides and provides some new factual information also basedon archival research.9 Other recent work has tackled new areas, such as

3

gender and masculinity and the importance of time and space in thefilms of this era. Yevgeni Dobrenko has devoted a book to the explorationof how Stalinist cinema produced history (as opposed to this work whichlooks at the history of the film industry itself) with film playing the role ofa museum that artificially manipulated the past to legitimise the Sovietpresent. This new work has emerged in a context of increasing interest inthe broad domain of Russian and Soviet cinema from academics workingin a whole range of disciplinary areas. Such interest is exemplified by thecreation of a new journal, Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema.10

On the one hand, the current work acknowledges the importanceand validity of elements of historical interpretations that lean towardtraditional or ‘totalitarian’ approaches. It will be argued throughout thatcentralised and administrative political control had a fundamental impacton Soviet cinema during the 1930s. Excessive bureaucracy played a largerole in undermining the film industry and minimising the potential impactof the envisaged ‘cinema for the millions’. Moreover, political violencehad a significant impact on cinema especially during the late 1930s. Atthe same time, however, the analysis argues against certain aspects of thetraditional view, especially those that regard Stalin as wielding completecontrol over the industry and the suggestion that any creativity wascompletely wiped out during this period. This book also endorses aspectsof revisionist accounts. In addition to the fact that cinema was subjectedto extreme centralisation and bureaucracy, the film industry was alsocharacterised by organisational chaos and inefficiency. But while thesearguments are important to this book, the aim here is to develop a freshapproach to Soviet cinema in the 1930s. If we want to understand whySoviet cinema adopted certain political, economic and organisationalforms and why the aims set out for the film industry led to particularoutcomes, we must begin by examining the ways of thinking thatunderpinned its development.

This work not only differs methodologically from previousinterpretations of cinema in the 1930s, but it also deals with a broaderpolitical subject matter than has traditionally been the case. Areas thathave received the particular attention of scholars, such as Peter Kenez,Taylor and Youngblood, include government and Party policy, cinemaadministration and administrators, censorship, the relationship betweenpolitics and socialist realism, questions of genre, the role of popular cinemaand close examinations of directors, individual films or groups of films.This book also deals with some of these matters, but aims to use the

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aforementioned method to gain a new perspective. So, for example, theanalysis agrees, to some extent, with Kenez’s view that censorship had aprofound impact on film production, but the intention here is to establishwhy censorship increased in the 1930s and why certain decisions on filmsor potential films were made. It is a certain mentality that lies behind theelaborate control mechanisms and it is essential that we understand thesemodes of thought if we are to comprehend what happened to Sovietcinema in the 1930s.

Certain aspects of cinema have received some attention for the periodcovering the 1930s, but not as much as the 1920s. This is particularlyrelevant to the economic facets of Soviet cinema.11 I will address this andtry to develop a closer examination of the central role of the industryand its infrastructure in reaching the people. I will also address the areaof film education and training which has received negligible treatmentdespite its fundamental importance.12 Political violence was also of greatsignificance in determining the future direction of the industry in the late1930s. Again, this is an area which has been discussed, but requires furtherexploration.13 Other areas have been almost completely neglected by filmhistorians, namely thematic planning, one of the key driving (or hindering)forces behind Soviet cinema during these years. The establishment ofthe first cinema trade union is also important for a better understandingof how representation of varying interests changed in the 1930s and howfilm-makers and other workers interacted with the authorities and thecinema administration. Although this work seeks to explore new territory,it is not all encompassing. For instance, the author has decided to focusmainly on the feature film aspects of Soviet cinema as documentary film-making in this period deserves more comprehensive treatment than thisbook could allow.

If we are to apply the aforementioned method successfully, we mustalso understand the way in which the Bolsheviks attempted to justify andlegitimise the basis of their power and see how their defensive ways ofthinking, to a large extent, arose from the application of (an alreadydemanding) Marxist theory to an impoverished Russia. ParticularBolshevik attitudes and ways of thinking were crucial in both shaping theSoviet system and almost every aspect of film industry development fromthe late 1920s onwards. The historical methodology of examining thementalities of human beings has long-established foundations. It is usuallyassociated with the French Annales school of historiography who establishedthe approach through a series of studies which examined the attitudes

5

and values of various social groups over the long term, but with a particularinterest in medieval themes.14 Moreover, a concern with distinctivementalities has also long preoccupied scholars of Russian and Soviethistory. This methodology has proven especially fruitful when examiningthe psychological world of individual Bolsheviks, such as Stalin, and hashelped us to understand why they acted in the ways that they did.15 It hasalso been applied to collective mentalities manifested during theRevolutionary events of 1917, as well as in longer-term overviews ofRussian history.16

Bolshevik Defensive ThinkingThe attempt here to understand the Bolshevik way of thinking, and itsimpact on Soviet cinema in particular, will involve a slightly differentmethodological approach than those normally applied to decipheringattitudes and values in human history. The focus will be on the domainof politics as opposed to the sphere of social history often examined inthe area of mentalities. The main subjects of this work are Bolshevikpoliticians, administrators, film-makers and cinema industry personnelin general. The aim is to show how the Bolsheviks tried to create a cinemathat would serve their goals rather than to examine the reception of filmamong the masses or its role in their everyday lives. Thus the focus will beon the view of political history and cinema ‘from above’, as well as ‘themiddle’, as Denise Youngblood describes it. The analysis does not seek toclaim that there was only one mode of thought in Soviet society, rather, ittries to discover how a dominant mindset had such a huge impact on thefilm industry and its day-to-day functioning. The Annales historians havegenerally argued that attitudes have to be analysed over a long period oftime as changes do not take place instantaneously.17 The argumentpresented here does not deny this point, but suggests that the Bolshevikdefensive way of thinking, while having its roots in pre-Revolutionaryattitudes, had its own distinctive Bolshevik stamp.

One of the central methods employed by the Annales school has beenthe use of figures and statistics as both a means of revealing changes inmentalities, as well as proving the scientific credentials of thehistoriographical enterprise by suggesting that it has the same claims ofaccuracy and objectivity as the social sciences. For example, this mightinvolve trying to prove the decline of the Spanish Empire in theseventeenth century by carefully quantifying imports and exports of moneyand goods and the balance of trading relations with the New World. The

INTRODUCTION

6 SOVIET CINEMA

analysis adopted here does not use numerical methods as a means toconfirm its argument, but it does adopt the concepts of ‘structure’ and‘agency’ from the world of political science as a means of trying to establishhow dominant patterns of Bolshevik thinking emerged. This approach isthe first step in the methodology of this work.

Whenever we attempt to understand political, social or economicdevelopments, either historical or contemporary, we try to establish theconnection between agency (individuals or groups of individuals) andthe structures in which they find themselves. In the twentieth century,academics working in social sciences and humanities have adopteddiffering views over where the emphasis should lie in this debate.Structuralism emphasises the importance of structure, arguing thatobservable political, social or economic events, processes and outcomesare merely the product of unobservable political, social or economicstructures, of which ‘actors are merely bearers’. An alternative, but equallysimplistic view, can be found in the arguments of intentionalism whichsuggest that structures are the outcome of human agents (often, but notalways individual) acting on rational, strategic intentions that are usuallyunfettered by any structural constraints. Over the past two decades, therehave been various attempts to overcome the artificial separation ofstructure and agency in order to develop more sophisticated explanationsof how humans have interacted with their world. Among the most effectiveof these has been critical realism. Critical realism contends that humanagency must always be understood as a close interaction with existingand pre-constituted structures as these structures either constrain or enableindividual or collective agents by the choices and strategies which theydefine. Human agents can, to some extent, transform structures throughintentional acts which might have either intended or unintendedconsequences. Moreover, by combining their incomplete knowledge ofexisting structures with strategic learning, achieved by observing theconsequences of their actions, agents are able to develop new strategiesfor future action.18 If we apply this basic conceptualisation to the historicalagency of the Bolsheviks and the distinctive structures which defined thecourses of action available to them, then we are able to see why theirfuture approach to the cinema industry (and every other aspect of Sovietlife) revealed less of a flexible strategic learning and more of an almostunchanging way of thinking. A particular defensiveness evolved which,to a large extent, reflected the gap between what the Bolsheviks wantedto achieve and what the structural realities allowed them to achieve.

7

Before we can establish a proper understanding of the relationshipbetween Bolshevik measures and Russian structural realities, we mustfirst look at the origins of their ideas, which can be traced back to KarlMarx. In order to understand the Bolsheviks’ attempts to frame Russianreality within the terms of Marx’s thinking we must briefly examine hisfundamental ideas and the efforts to apply them to specifically Russiancircumstances. Despite the debates on the scientific status of Marx’stheoretical framework, his thought was fundamentally moral. Marxthought that human beings had the potential to be creative, freeindividuals, to realise themselves as fully as possible. Such emancipationhad not been achieved mainly due to scarcity and the inevitable strugglefor resources that were related to primitive levels of material productivity.The advent of capitalism and its mechanisation of labour showed thatthe masses could potentially become free of compulsive labour. Yet thiscould only be achieved if humanity could destroy the class system onwhich capitalism thrived. For Marx the central characteristics of capitalistsociety were class division and class exploitation, reinforced by a statethat enabled the ruling class to maintain the exploitative status quo,through coercion if necessary. He believed that this intolerable situationwould eventually culminate in a social revolution, leading to the end ofcapitalism and the emancipation of humanity.

Following the revolution the proletariat would seize and maintainpolitical control in a transitional period whereby a socialist society wouldgradually replace its capitalist predecessor. The transitional periodconsisted of the replacement of ‘bourgeois’ class dictatorship withproletarian class dictatorship, justified by the fact that the working classconstituted the large majority of the population. The transitional,proletarian class-controlled, socialist state would oversee the dismantlingof the legal and institutional basis of capitalism, foster the developmentof the economic and productive powers of the state and protect therevolution from political enemies.19 In short, it would lay the basis for thefuture communist society. Marx assumed that the working class would bethe agency, not only for the transitional period of social change, but alsofor the eventual emancipation of humanity as a whole from capitalismand its class system. The ultimate goal of communism consisted of aclassless society of individuals freed from exploitation, drudgery and ableto realise their creative capacities in a context free from ‘bourgeois’institutions. This would largely be made possible by abundance and thefinal elimination of scarcity. The Bolsheviks adopted Marx’s basic theory

INTRODUCTION

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as one of the key foundations of Party legitimacy. They claimed that hehad uncovered the objective laws of human development through whichall societies must pass, yet, despite their allegedly inevitable character,the Bolsheviks argued that such laws had to be partly helped along bypolitical activism and this was particularly necessary in the Russian context.

It is well known that Marx’s predictions failed to materialise in theWest as he expected. When the Revolution took place in Russia, it was ina country where capitalism was still in its early stages and the state wasdominated by a huge peasantry engaged in primitive agrarian forms ofproduction, while a relatively small working class existed in the urbancentres. Indeed, the pre-existing structures within which the Bolshevikswould attempt to realise Marx’s vision certainly enabled the Bolsheviksto seize power. They managed, at least for a very brief period, to appealto workers and peasants with promises to transform lives, end exploitationand expropriate land from the wealthy. In this way the Bolsheviks presentedthemselves as a saviour to all. Yet, economic backwardness would alsoprove to be an enormous constraint in the drive to implement Bolshevikpolicies. Lenin, who was acutely aware that Marx’s schema did notcorrespond to Russia, adapted to the country’s particular circumstances.In accordance with his belief that the working class did not have theknowledge and understanding to lead a social revolution, he argued thatthey would have to be led by a so-called vanguard. This vanguard consistedof the Communist Party, an elite organisation of class-conscious,professional revolutionaries who would lead the way from capitalismtowards a classless society. However, in Russia the highly productivematerial basis to be created by advanced capitalism was absent. As Marxhad contended, this well-developed material base was an essentialprerequisite for a successful transition to a communist society wherescarcity would be eliminated. Thus from the very beginning, the Bolshevikswere faced with the need to reconcile the gap between the need for asophisticated material base and their claim that the new Soviet state hadentered the transitional period referred to by Marx.20 In truth the USSRbegan as a dictatorship of communist elites that would have to overseefull industrialisation and the drive for productive powers, before it couldclaim to have even reached the transitional period of socialism.

So from 1917 onwards, the Bolsheviks were presented with a hugeproblem and it was essentially a problem of political legitimacy. In thefirst place, the revolutionaries claimed to embody an ideology that soughtto free the masses from the inhuman exploitation of capitalism. Yet, with

9

regard to its pre-existing economic and social structures, Russia was anundeveloped country and the arduous process of full industrialisationstill lay ahead. The historical record had shown that the transformationof societies from predominantly agrarian economies into industrial giantsusually involved hard toil, poor living standards and a significant level ofexploitation. It seemed evident that Russia would struggle to avoid suchdifficulties and when industrialisation did take place under Stalin, it provedto be far more brutal than anyone could have imagined. So, from thevery beginning, the Bolshevik claim that Party authority, to some extent,emanated from the inevitable developmental march of history was shownto be an unfounded and illegitimate argument. The Party tried to coverthis glaring lack of theoretical legitimacy by still claiming that the USSRwas in a transitional period, which it rather euphemistically described as‘socialist construction’.

The Bolsheviks also suffered from a further political legitimacy deficit.Marx had never adequately described the nature of worker control duringthe socialist transition period, but the implication was that it would involvethe participation of the working masses in some form. Although Leninargued for a vanguard party, he recognised that this must be temporaryand that a truly socialist system had to provide democratic mass participationif society was to be successfully transformed. Such a view was enunciatedin his State and Revolution (Gosudarstvo i revoliutsiia, 1917) where he supportedmass participation in the administration of socialism and the abolition ofthe parliamentary system in favour of the true democracy of the commune.He believed that such developments would lead to the gradual witheringaway of the state. The post-Revolutionary reality was quite different. Whenthe Bolsheviks were soundly defeated in the constituent assembly elections,it was clear that they did not have the popular backing they wanted. Theirreaction was the closure of the assembly, the banning of rival parties andthe establishment of repressive police control. From this point on, the masses,in whose name the Bolsheviks claimed to rule, would have no say in therunning of the Soviet state. This was problematic, as the Bolsheviks’ othersource of legitimacy came from the people and, in particular, the workingclass. As soon as it was clear that the Bolsheviks did not have popular support,they tended to lean on the role of the elite vanguard party and, moreimportantly, Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which would always be the ultimatearea of Party legitimacy.

Internal structural constraints were compounded by the regime’suneasy relationship with the rest of the world. Marx’s vision of proletarian

INTRODUCTION

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revolution was a worldwide vision and, for a short period, the Bolsheviksheld out some hope that revolutions might break out in other Europeancountries. When this did not happen the USSR was isolated. Indeed, notonly did the Western powers attempt to prevent the Bolsheviks fromwinning the civil war, there was also a reluctance to recognise thelegitimacy of the Soviet Union as a geo-political entity for several years.Russia traditionally had a difficult relationship with the West. Rulers, suchas Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, had tried to emphasise theneed for European modernisation, while Slavophiles argued about theunique nature of Russia which they believed should follow its own path.This historical tension manifested itself in the Bolshevik desire to seeRussia reach and surpass European levels of development. At the sametime, this development would be guided by Marxist ideology, whichbecame both a way of attacking the capitalism of the West and a way ofshowing how Russia was unique. Throughout the existence of the Sovietstate the Bolsheviks constantly believed they had to defend themselvesfrom what they saw as an immoral, exploitative Western world.

Thus, in terms of the collective agency of the Bolsheviks, once theyhad seized power they could not simply proceed towards thetransformation of the pre-existing structures of tsarist Russia. On an evenmore fundamental level the Bolsheviks had to prove the legitimacy oftheir ideas and their right to hold power. On the one hand, this meantintellectual self-justification which, as we have seen, was achieved byemphasising the importance of revolutionary elites and the role of thevanguard party. However, more importantly their vision had to involve asignificant degree of mass support and participation which, as we havealso seen, was largely absent when the Bolsheviks came to power. Certainhistorians of a purely totalitarian persuasion have sometimes over-emphasised the combination of ideology and terror, implying that theBolsheviks treated the masses with contempt and, therefore, had no interestin whether or not they had their support.21 But such accounts fail torecognise the importance of the mass of ordinary people for the potentialrealisation of Marxist ideals. Coercion was, of course, an option availableto the Bolsheviks and one that was often employed in the 1930s. Yet, purecoercion can rarely be the sole basis for the effective functioning of amodern state. The industrialisation of the Soviet Union required masscooperation to achieve its extremely ambitious goals. But the Bolshevikswanted more than cooperation. They wanted the masses to believe in theideals of the classless society of emancipated human beings and to be

11

part of the transformation towards that society. It was not their intentionto enslave ordinary people.

The Bolsheviks were subject to constraints on various different levels.As we have seen, on a fundamental level they had to contend witheconomic backwardness, which always threatened to undermine theirentire project. But they were also constrained by political and social issues.In particular, their claim to embody the will of the masses was problematicgiven their ideological partiality to the working class. They may havebeen able to offer a brief and superficial appeal to the peasantry, but theBolsheviks believed in collective ownership, while the peasant wasdesperate to maintain a significant degree of private farming.

The Bolsheviks were also constrained and, to some extent, influencedby the political mentalities and traditions of the past. Generally, autocracyand coercive government have been regarded as central to Russian history.While there is a great deal of truth in this, recent research has shown thatthere was a long-standing pre-Revolutionary belief in strong governmentconstrained by religious and national tradition in the interests of themasses. If the Bolsheviks were too repressive, they might be seen as acontinuation of the worst aspects of tsarism, but if they failed to be ruthless,they might be perceived as weak utopians. The Bolsheviks ultimatelyleaned towards the idea of an extremely powerful and unconstrainedgovernment, which was consistent with their monolithic view that anypower ceded to the opposition, or even the slightest element of pluralism,would destroy the entire Revolutionary enterprise. Another aspect of thepre-Revolutionary political mode of thinking was a belief in the centralityof the state not merely as a mechanism for maintaining public order andraising taxes, but also for administering justice, acting as a moral arbitratorin public affairs and playing a substantial role in economic ownershipand regulation. Thus the substantial role of the state was already firmlyrooted before the arrival of the Bolsheviks. Nonetheless, the communistagenda was very specific in that it sought to use the state’s resources togain the support of and mobilise the masses toward a distinctive politicalvision, eliminating private property in favour of a state-led form of publicownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange.22

These factors limited the strategies open to the Bolsheviks. Thedemands they faced from millions of peasants and workers meant theyhad to be decisive, strong-willed and, most importantly, they had toproduce visible results quickly in order to maintain their hold on power.Following years of civil war, the revolutionaries sensibly adopted the course

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of compromise through the NEP (New Economic Policy) which allowedthem to consolidate their position and foster economic recovery. However,the Bolsheviks were never satisfied with compromise. Their revolutionarymodel was preoccupied with the need to fit Russia into the Marxisthistorical schema and to reach the level of economic and socialdevelopment that Marx had seen as a necessary prerequisite for thesocialist transition period. This necessitated rapid economic developmentas well as radical policies that would prove the legitimacy of Bolshevikpower. By the end of the 1920s, the decision to embark on holistictransformation had been made. Certainly, this was partly due to Stalin’spolitical manoeuvring, yet it was also fully consistent with the Bolshevikrevolutionary ‘all or nothing’ model and their impatience to enact radicalprogrammes.

The structural constraints that the Bolsheviks faced both internallyand externally meant that their choices and strategies were alwaysrestricted. Their choice to go down the path of exclusive, elite dictatorshipmeant that they would always be on the defensive. Their inability toreconcile a grandiose ideological outlook with these structural constraintsled to the evolution of a defensive way of thinking, a sense of constantlybeing under siege. As well as the constant need for self-justification, theBolsheviks knew that the greater mass of the people, including the hugepeasantry, were not with them. This became more obvious during thegrain requisitioning onslaught after the Revolution and the laterindustrialisation and collectivisation programmes. In addition to therealisation that the majority of the people were not sympathetic to theregime, the revolutionaries genuinely believed that there were traitors,enemies, spies and saboteurs throughout society intent on destroying thecommunist dream. This was accompanied by the fear that the capitalistcountries were also attempting to undermine the Soviet system by anymeans necessary. When a regime believes that it is under siege it takesdefensive measures not unlike those adopted during a war. Thus thestrategy of holistic transformation was guided and shaped by therevolutionaries’ defensive outlook. However, the reaction of defendingor closing up, especially when radical measures had unintendedconsequences, meant that the Bolsheviks tended not to learn from theirmistakes. Their strong belief in a rigid revolutionary model meant, as weshall see, that the Soviet government and cinema administration continuedto implement failing policies to the cinema industry, fearing that opennessto new ideas might be seen as an acknowledgement of political failure.

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Implications for CinemaHow does what we have said relate to our central concern, Soviet cinema?In order to answer this question we must examine the formal, intendedfunctions of cinema in Soviet society. Cinema presented the Bolshevikswith a potentially powerful weapon, as it was not only an exciting newtechnology; it was also accessible and appealing to the masses as an artform that they could engage in. From the communist perspective, cinemacould serve many crucial functions. First of all, it could play its role in thestruggle to circumvent the problems implied by illiteracy. Yet, this wasnot merely a practical application. The liquidation of illiteracy would bedone within the terms of reference and ideas of communist ideology.Therefore, cinema would politically educate the masses so that they woulddevelop a conscious understanding of the Revolution, the new socialistreality and their part in that reality. At its most ambitious, such aneducation would contribute to the creation of a ‘New Soviet Man’, ahighly moral, socialist paragon of virtue, dedicated to the final goal ofcommunism. However, the most fundamental task of cinema was neverpublicly spelled out. As we have argued, the Bolsheviks’ defensive way ofthinking was central to their outlook and this had both an impact ontheir idea of cinema’s purpose and how it should be organised. The cinemaindustry became both part of the quest for legitimacy and part of thefrontline of political and ideological defence. It had to legitimise andprotect communist ideology, power and, most importantly, the reality thatthey had given rise to. The communists could not properly explain whytheir hold on power did not correspond to the supposedly scientific Marxisttheoretical framework to a sceptical intelligentsia, although the averageSoviet citizen was almost certainly not interested in such issues.Nonetheless, ordinary people were concerned with the everyday realitythat sprang from Bolshevik thinking. The communists had to reconciletheir rhetoric of human emancipation with the grim Soviet reality ofbreakneck industrialisation and the hardship and low living standardsthat came with such a transformation. Party leaders also knew thatachieving mass cooperation was essential for the realisation of their goals.So they had to convince the masses of the necessity of their effectiveparticipation in socialist construction, by claiming that they were workingtowards a communist paradise. Thus cinema was to play a fundamentalrole, not only in politically educating and moulding the new man, butalso in showing ordinary people that their feats and sacrifices were intheir own interests and the interests of society as a whole. Cinema would

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14 SOVIET CINEMA

play a crucial role in helping to keep the masses on side while they madegood the modernisation gap required to give them the better life thatthey yearned for and to provide an interim legitimacy for the Bolsheviks.Indeed, film’s political function went beyond political education,mobilisation and persuasion. As we shall see in the final chapter, filmwould also play a key role in sharing the Bolsheviks’ burden of politicalresponsibility with ordinary citizens.

The Bolshevik defensive way of thinking that emerged was shaped bya range of past and present structures but, most of all, by the irreconcilablegap between their political aims and the pre-existing structures withinwhich they had to operate. This defensiveness sought to protect thecommunist ideal and Soviet power from being exposed as fraudulent. Itguided policy and administration, which rested on the uneasy foundationsof profound political insecurity and illegitimacy, and was a disaster forSoviet cinema, bringing it to the brink of productive and creative collapse.As we shall observe, this defensiveness manifested itself in many differentways on both an institutional and an individual level. Ultimately, its maineffect was to undermine the very industry that had been intended to serveas a frontline in the ideological defence of the Bolshevik regime.

Note: Where there are several pagenumbers against a heading, those inbold indicate major treatment ofthe topic.

Abramov, Al. 167Abrikosov, Andrei 132, 133actors 87–88, 101, 102, 132, 145administration, film 15–22, 60,

179 (see also Soiuzkino; Sovkino)

administration, studio 121–29Aleinikov, Moisei 75–76, 128, 129,

134Alexander Nevsky 28, 103Alexandrov, Grigori 23, 41, 107,

135background 146, 174, 175 (see also Circus, The; Happy Guys,

The; Volga Volga)All-Union Committee for the Arts

37–40All-Union Party Conference on

Cinema 16America 22–23, 28, 31–32, 33, 35–

36, 116Andrievsky, Alexander 122Andrikanis, Yevgeni 111Andronikashvili, Kira 86Annales school 4–5Annensky, Isidor 147Anninsky, Alexander 131, 132

Anoshchenko, Nikolai 22Antikol, Rafail 85Antipov, Nikolai 62Ardatov, Anatoli 77ARK (The Association of

Revolutionary Cinematography)(see ARRK)

Armand, Pavel 57Armenia 54, 85, 88Arnshtam, Leo 87ARRK (The Association of Workers

of RevolutionaryCinematography) 56–57, 76–78, 105–9, 112

Arsenal 64artistic councils 47, 52, 59, 121,

127, 133–37Arts Committee 37–40Arustanov, Grigori 75–76Ashamed to Say 57Atarbekov, Vadim 83Audio-Cinema, New York 22–23Azerbaijan 85–86, 88

Babel, Isaac 87Babitsky, Boris 49, 85Bakunts, Aksel 88Barnet, Boris 146Barskaia, Margarita 41Battleship Potemkin 172Bear, The 147Bear’s Wedding, The 87, 175Bek-Nazarian, Amo 26

INDEX

216 SOVIET CINEMA

Belgoskino 76, 81, 88Belorussia 54, 86, 88Bezhin Meadow 41, 60, 67, 87, 150–

51Bilinsky, Miron 45Black Consul, The 150Bleiman, Mikhail 128, 163Blium, Karl 86Blue and Pink 45Bluebird 131Bolshakov, Ivan 46–48, 52, 60, 116,

126, 131and artistic councils 47, 134, 137

Bolsheviks 4, 5–12, 56, 179–83Bolshintsov, Manuel 163Boltiansky, Grigori 109Breslavsky, Mikhail 85Brik, Osip 134Brokman, Yevgeni 79Bronshtein, Lev 87Brother Hero 80Bruk, Veniamin 83Bubnov, Andrei 61, 62Bufeev (head of sales, Sovkino) 74

cadres, cinema 16–17, 142–43cameramen 146, 147, 151–52cameras 31career prospects 145–49cells, Party 57–58censorship 2, 40–41, 53–70, 123–

29, 176, 180Chameleon 61Chapaev 46, 94, 98, 159Charentz, Yeghishe 88Charot, Mikhas 88Cheliuskin 67Chelli (artist, Uzbekgoskino) 80Chertulov, Mikhail 86Chiaureli, Mikhail 117Chicago 54Christie, Ian 1Chubar, Yeghia 88Chuzhin, Yakov 83cine-city 35–37, 50cinefication 18, 23–33, 42–43, 50,

111

Cinema Committee (1929) 18Cinema Committee (1938) 29, 42–

48, 128, 147–48 (see also GUPKhF)

‘cinema for the millions’ 16, 48–49,61–62, 159–60, 176–77, 183

Cinema Institute 78–79, 86, 116,140–45, 149–53, 182

cinema, role of 13–14, 93–98cinemas 23–30, 40, 63

(see also cinefication)Circus, The 81, 98, 152, 154–59‘class enemy’ films 160–68classic literature, films based on 96Conveyor Belt of Death, The 58critical realism 6‘cultural revolution’ 72, 96, 141–42

Danashevsky, Anatoli 76Dark Reign, The 73decrees 16–19, 33–34, 42–44, 47–

48, 61, 67defensive mentality 5–12, 14, 103,

138, 179–83censorship 53, 54, 69Dukelsky 44Shumiatsky 51

Demutsky, Danylo 89Diky, Alexei 87Dinamov, Sergei 61, 62directors, film 41–42, 45–46, 87,

115–17, 123, 146 (see also individual directors)

directors, studio 129–30, 131Dirin, Nikolai 87discipline, workplace 21, 34–35, 44,

50–51, 114, 132distribution, film 23–29, 42–43Dobrenko, Yevgeni 3Doller, Mikhail 45, 74–75Dorokhin, Nikolai 173Dosvitny, Oles 80Dovzhenko, Alexander 64–65, 89,

115, 151Dubrovsky 96Dubrovsky-Eshke, Boris 136Dubson, Mikhail 41, 66, 87, 88

217

Dukelsky, Semyon 29, 44–46, 51–52, 90, 115, 116

Dunaevsky, Isaac 156Dunaiats (chief accountant,

Vostokfilm) 83Dylo, Osip 81Dzherpetian, Maria 88Dzhulbars 131, 159–60Dzigan, Efim 102, 146, 160

economic accountability (khozraschet)130

educationfilm-makers 139–45, 149–53,

182–83role of cinema 13–14, 93–98

Eggert, Konstantin 87, 88, 175Eisenstein, Sergei 23, 107, 116, 127,

128, 146at Cinema Institute 79, 141, 142,

143, 149–53 (see also Bezhin Meadow; October)

Ekelchik, Yuri 115Ekk, Nikolai 131End of Saint Petersburg, The 74Enei, Yevgeni 88Engels, Viktor 79Engineer Goff 88Envy 102Epik, Grigori 80, 81equipment

film-making 20, 22–23, 31–32,145

projection 23–24, 31, 111Erdman, Nikolai 73–74Ermler, Fridrikh 28, 41, 98, 99,

175, 176The Great Citizen 163–67

executions 77, 79, 80–89exports 32–33

factories 30, 34–35Feast of Saint Jorgen, The 122–23, 124Fedka 46Fifth Ocean, The 160Fighters 89Filippov, Fyodor 124, 136, 146

film education 139–45, 149–53,182–83

film-production 121–29, 131–32film stock 30–31finance 21–22, 40, 45, 48, 101–3,

130Cinema Institute 144–45

First Cavalry, The 102, 103Flyers 87, 160foreign films 25–26, 54foreign influences 22–23, 31–33,

35–36, 116reaction to 71–72, 85, 88–89, 90

Fragment of an Empire 99Frid, Ian 147Friends 57, 87Fyodorov, Vasili 59Fyodorova, Zoia 89

Gabrilovich, Yevgeni 171–73Galka, Mate 111Galperin, Alexander 151Gardin, Vladimir 87Gavronsky, Alexander 73Gay Canary, The 87Georgia 47, 54, 86, 88Gerasimov, Sergei 164German, Emil 73–74Gessen, Daniil 80GIK (State Institute of

Cinematography) (see CinemaInstitute)

Ginsburg, Samuil 85Girl Rushes to a Meeting, A 87, 160Girl with Character, A 160Girl Without a Dowry 60Girniak, Osip 80Glavrepertkom (see GRK)Gold (see Lad from the Taiga, The)Goldin (head of trade, Sovkino) 74Goltsman, Yevgeniia 83Great Citizen, The 28, 89, 98, 163–

67, 168Great Consoler, The 87Great Glow, The 96Great Life, A 137Great Terror 71, 81–89, 148

INDEX

218 SOVIET CINEMA

Grinberg, Mikhail 113Grinfeld, Natan 82, 85GRK (Glavrepertkom) (State

Repertoire Committee) 53–55,56, 62, 122

Groshev (director, Mosfilm) 128,135

GTK (State College ofCinematography) 139–40

Guest, The 103GUK (State Directorate for the Film

Industry) 39–40, 62–63, 83, 85,118

GUKF (State Directorate for theFilm and Photo Industry) 33–34, 37, 38–39, 114, 140

GUPKhF (Main Administration forthe Production of Feature Films)125–26, 127, 130, 136

GURK (Main Administration for theControl of Shows andRepertory) 39, 55

Gusev, Viktor 58Gusman, Boris 87, 89

Happiness 169–71Happy Guys, The 49, 62, 73, 81,

154Hearts of Four, The 68–69, 135Hollywood, Soviet (see cine-city)Holmgren, Beth 155House of the Dead, The (Home and

Community) 58–59houses of cinema 117–18

ideological concerns 19, 21, 35, 38,43–44, 151

(see also censorship; thematicplanning)

If War Comes Tomorrow 97Ignatenko (head of production,

Uzbekgoskino) 80Institute of Cinematography (see

Cinema Institute)intentionalism 6Intorgkino (see Soiuzintorgkino)Iogansen, Mikhailo 88

Iosilevich, Viktor 83Irchan, Miroslav 80Ivanov, Alexander 131Ivanov, Boris 66, 67, 146Ivanov, Viktor 147

job prospects 145–49journalists 78, 80, 86

Kadochnikov, Valentin 124, 136,146

Kadysh, Alexander 85Kagan, M.A. 85Kaliuzhny, Alexei 88Kapler, Alexei 87Karo 167Katsnelson, Leonti 39, 85Kavaleridze, Ivan 40–41, 60, 66Kei-Kheru 86Kenez, Peter 3, 4Kerzhentsev, Platon 38, 39Kheifits, Joseph 64Khersonsky, Khrisanf 78Khomutov, Vasili 85khozraschet (economic accountability)

130Kiev (see Ukraine)Kino 86, 110, 114–15Kirshon, Vladimir 111Kiva, Nikolai 126, 127, 130Klado, Nikolai 80Koffman, Joey 23Komsomolsk 164–65Konsovsky, Dmitri 87–88Korolev, Konstantin 83, 84Kosior, Stanislav 62Koval-Samborsky, Ivan 87Kozinstev, Leonid 41Kremlin cinema 63Kucherovsky, Alexander 85Kudriavsteva, Antonina 77Kuleshov, Lev 41, 61, 79, 87, 149,

176Kulik, Ivan 88Kultpros 62–63Kunin (Uzbekgoskino) 80Kuprashvili, Bachua 88

219

Kurianov, Alexander 126Kurs, Alexander 87, 89Kyrlya, Yvan 87

Lad from the Taiga, The 127Large Wings 66, 87Last Night, The 62–63, 100, 171–74Laurent, Natacha 2Law of Life, The 66, 67Lazurin (Kiev studio) 60League of Militant Godless 122Lebedev-Kumach, Vasili 156Lebedev, Nikolai 46Lebedev, Stepan 79lecturers 141, 143, 149–53Lenfilm (Leningrad studio)

administration 39, 114, 132artistic council 47, 134and censorship 57purges 82, 85

Lenin in 1918 28, 87, 95–96, 98,115, 167

Lenin in October 82, 167Lenin, Vladimir 8, 9Leonidov, Boris 80Lezhnevich, Ales 81Lialina, S.S. 78–79Litovsky, O. 163Lokot, Vasili 87Lopatinsky, Faust 87Lukashevich, Tatiana 146Lukov, Leonid 147

Macheret, Alexander 163Magic Pearl, The 124–26, 127–28Malkin, Boris 134Man with a Gun, The 115Mansfeld, Ernst 89Manukhov, Konstantin 79Maretskaia, Vera 89Mariamov, Grigori 83–84Martirosian, Amasi 88Martov, Zhosef 115Marxism 7–8, 9, 150Mashenka 125, 173–74Mass, Vladimir 73–74Maxim Trilogy 94

Medvedkin, Alexander 47, 175,176, 183

Happiness 169–71mentalities 4–5

(see also defensive mentality)Mezhrabpomfilm

administration 17, 19, 121–23,126, 129, 130, 148

artistic council 133–34and censorship 59purges 74–75

Mikaberidze, Kote 54, 131Mikhailyk, Vasili 85Miners 96Misiano, Francesco 129Molchanov, Alexander 83, 84Molotov, Viacheslav 24Monosson, Lev 86Mordokhovich, Mikhail 86Moscow cinemas 24, 25–26, 29–

30Moscow Society of Cinema

Personnel 105–6Mosfilm (Moscow studio)

administration 101, 114, 124–26,127–28, 130–32

artistic council 47, 134, 136and censorship 57, 58film directors 146purges 85

Mother 74Moulin Rouge 54musicals 156–58, 159My Grandmother 54, 131My Homeland 64, 87

Nazar Stodolia 88Nefedov, Vasili 79Nembach, Eberhard 2Nikanorov, M. 110Nilsen, Vladimir 37, 141, 149, 151–

53arrests and execution 81–82, 83,

86NKVD (People’s Commissariat of

Internal Affairs) 82, 83, 90

INDEX

220 SOVIET CINEMA

October 64, 81, 151Odessa (see Ukraine)ODSK (Society of Friends of Soviet

Cinema) 56–57, 78, 109–12Okulov (building sector deputy) 85Old and the New, The 81, 151Old Fortress 45Old Jockey, The 74Olesha, Yuri 102Orelovich, Solomon 85, 147Orgburo cinema commission 60–

62

Party Card, The 160–63, 168Path of the Enthusiasts, The 99Pazin, Anton 77peasants (see working class)Peasants 28Pechalin-Perez, Grigori 85Penzo, Ida 82Pepo 88personnel management (see

discipline, workplace)Peter the Great 40, 46Petrov (engineer) 85Petrov-Bytov, Pavel 94, 175Petrov, Vladimir 46Piatigorsky, Yuli 85Pilniak, Boris 86Piotrovsky, Adrian 85Pipinashvilli, Konstantin 146Pirogov, Pyotr 87Piscator, Erwin 87Podobed, Porfiri 74Poet and Tsar 87Polishchuk, Valerian 80, 81Politburo, censorship role 66–67political films 93–98, 160–68Polonsky, Konstantin 125–26, 131Portnov, Viktor 87Pravov, Ivan 132, 146Preobrazhenskaia, Olga 132projection equipment 23–24, 31,

111projectionists 111, 112, 114proletarians (see working class)Prometheus 41, 59, 60, 66

Protazanov, Yakov 60, 61, 122–23,122–23, 134, 175

Pudovkin, Vsevolod 77, 108–9, 117,146

films 45, 74, 75Pugachev 94purges 17–18, 71–90, 148Pyrev, Ivan 46–47, 77, 108, 176

background 146, 174, 175films 98, 135, 159, 160–63

Queen of Spades 45Quiet Flows the Don 99

Rabis 107–8, 112Radiant Path, The 98Rafes, Moisei 98Raizman, Yuli 130, 146, 175, 183

films 62–63, 87, 100, 125, 160,171–74

RAPP (Russian Association ofProletarian Writers) 106

Rappoport, Herbert 103Return of Maxim, The 94Return of Nathan Becker 88Revolt of the Fishermen 88Rich Bride, The 98, 159Riutin, Martemian 20, 73Road to Life, The 87Romm, Mikhail 41, 44–45, 46, 48,

58, 115, 117, 137arrest of Slivkin 82background 146

Room, Abram 59, 77, 79, 149RosARRK (Russian Association of

Workers of RevolutionaryCinematography) 109, 118

Rosiner (actress) 108Rossnabfilm 28, 42Rossolovskaia, Vanda 86Rubailo, Alentina 2rural cinemas 24, 26, 43‘Rus’ 75Rutes, M 166–67

Sailors 97Sakharov (alleged terrorist) 83

221

salaries 45–46, 113, 114, 115, 129,176

Salys, Rimgaila 155–56Satel, Yevgeni 85satire 169–71, 183script production 43–44, 46, 57–

59, 61, 102, 122, 123–25, 128scriptwriters 87, 92–93, 100, 115,

146, 147Semyonov, Nikolai 124Shaposhnikov, Adrian 167Sharifzade, Abbas 88Shchors 64–65, 115Sheffer, Lev 56Shklovsky, Viktor 58–59, 78Shkolnik, Matvei 85Shneider, Mikhail 78, 79, 149Shneiderov, Vladimir 131, 159Sholokhov, Mikhail 173Shorin, Alexander 22Shpis, Boris 88Shukailo, Pavel 86Shumiatsky, Boris 15, 20–22, 34–

37, 38–42, 48–51, 179–80arrest and execution 83–84and censorship 60, 61–62, 118and cinefication 29, 31–32

Shutko, Kirill 86Shvedchikov, Konstantin 20, 82,

99Shveitser, Vladimir 74, 123Sibtekhfilm 86Sidorenko, Ivan 79Sidorov, Ivan 83Sidorov, Nikita 79Sillov, Vladimir 77Sinclair, Upton 76, 86Slivkin, Albert 82, 83Smirnov, Yakov 83, 85Soiuzdetfilm 47, 148Soiuzintorgkino 33, 85Soiuzkino 18–21, 22–23, 75–76,

112and censorship 57, 58and Cinema Institute 140, 141,

142–43, 144thematic planning 99

Soiuzkinoprokat 29, 42, 43Sokol, Valentin 83Sokolov, Fyodor 85Sokolov, Ippolit 22, 23, 78Sokolovskaia, Elena 85, 131sound 22–24, 22–24, 28, 30, 31,

145Sovkino 16, 58, 74, 82, 108

thematic planning 98, 101, 102Stalin, Joseph 37, 42, 61–66, 61–

66, 67, 166and Danashevsky 76and Riutin 73

Staritskaia-Cherniakhovskaia,Liudmila 80

State Film Institute (see CinemaInstitute)

Stepan Razin 131, 132, 133Stepanov, Vladimir 85Stetsky, Alexei 61, 62Stolper, Alexander 66, 67, 146Storm, The 96Strange Woman, The 108Strict Youth, A 59–60, 102Stroganov, Stepan 79structuralism 6students 141–44, 150–51studios

administration 121–29artistic councils 47, 52, 59, 121,

127, 133–37and censorship 57–60directors 129–30, 131 (see also individual studios)

Sultanov, Gulam 85–86Suvorov 45Sverdlov, Samuil 83Svetozarov, Boris 78Swineherdess and the Shepherd, The 98,

135, 159

Tager, Pavel 22Tasin, Georgi 88Tauschenbach, Walter 89taxation 18Taylor, Richard 1, 3teachers 141, 143, 149–53

INDEX

222 SOVIET CINEMA

theatres (see cinemas)Theft of Sight 61thematic planning 91–104, 180–81Three Comrades 87ticket prices 30Tikhonov (director, Mosfilm) 132Tisse, Eduard 23, 79, 107, 149, 151Titberidze, Amvrosi 86Tiutiunnik, Yuri 80Tractor Drivers, The 159trade unions 107–8, 112–15, 116–

17, 118, 119–20training (see education, film-makers)Trauberg, Ilia 41, 117, 136Trauberg, Leonid 118Tretiakov, Sergei 87Tulub, Zinaida 88Tur brothers 158Turin, Viktor 131Turksib 131Turovskaya, Maya 167Twelfth Night 147Two Mothers 56–57

Udarnik cinema, Moscow 24Ukraine 47, 54, 59–60, 80–81, 85,

87, 88, 102film education 139–40, 147

Union of Cinema Personnel 112–15unions, trade 107–8, 112–15, 116–

17, 118, 119–20urban cinemas 24, 26, 43Urusova, Yevdokiia 88USA (see America)Usievich, Vladimir 83Uspensky, Viacheslav 79Uzbekistan 79–80

Vainshtok, Vladimir 136Vaks, Boris 169Vaks, Leo 167Vasilchikov, Yuri 80Vasilev, Georgi 46, 94, 159Vasilev, Sergei 46, 94, 159, 166Vasileva, Raisa 87Verner, Mikhail 160Vertov, Dziga 41

Vetrov, Boris 169VGIK (All-Union/Higher State

Institute of Cinematography) (seeCinema Institute)

Virgin Soil Upturned 173Vlysko, Oleks 80Volchek, Boris 115Volga Volga 49, 74, 81, 98, 152Volny, Anatol 88Volpin, Mikhail 74Vorony, Mark 80–81Vorony, Nikolai 88Vostokfilm 77, 83, 148Vovsy, Grigori 86Vyborg Side, The 94Vyshinsky, Andrei 67

wages 45–46, 113, 114, 115, 129,176

We are from Kronstadt 160West, relationship with 10

(see also foreign influences)Widdis, Emma 171Without a Dowry 96working class

audiences 56–57, 109–11, 112cinema personnel 17, 142–43,

148Yalovy, Mikhail 80Yashin, David 80Yegorova, Galina 88Youngblood, Denise 2, 3Youth of Maxim, The 94, 95Yudin, Konstantin 68, 135, 146,

160Yukov, Konstantin 83Yutkevich, Sergei 41, 115, 128–29

Zaitsev, Yakov 87, 89Zarkhi, Alexander 64Zeldovich, Grigori 125Zhdanov, Andrei 62, 67, 68–69, 135Zhilin, Vasili 83Zhzhenov, Georgi 89Zlatogorova, Tatiana 87Zvenigora 80

When the Bolsheviks seized power in the Soviet Union during 1917, they weresuffering from a substantial political legitimacy deficit. Uneasy political foundationsmeant that they were always on the defensive and cinema became a key part ofthe strategy to protect the existence of the USSR. This welcome book showshow one of film’s central functions was as an important means of convincing the masses that the regime was legitimate and a bearer of historical truth.

Based on extensive research in archives and primary sources, the book examines the interaction between politics and the Soviet cinema industry duringthe period between Stalin’s rise to power and the beginning of the Great PatrioticWar. This was the era when the Bolsheviks were trying to develop a ‘cinema for the millions’, which sought to engage Soviet citizens politically by carefullyblending entertainment with the communist message.

Jamie Miller investigates how political and administrative decision-making,censorship, thematic planning and purges were shaped by the Bolsheviks’defensive outlook, which in turn had a largely negative impact on the productionprocess. He examines the role of film unions and societies, compares thedevelopment of two different studios and looks at the education system forcinema personnel. He also analyses key films of the period, including the classicmusical Circus, the class enemy drama The Party Card and the political epic The Great Citizen.

‘Superbly researched and well written, this fascinating book is the first full-length political history of Soviet cinema during a tumultuous period, the “long thirties”, 1929–41. Miller provides a vivid depiction of theprocesses by which increasing state efforts to control the film industry ledto chaos and failure. As such, this work is indispensable reading not onlyfor specialists in Soviet film and culture, but also for anyone interested inthe dynamics of cultural production in an authoritarian society.’– Denise Youngblood, University of Vermont

JAMIE MILLER is Lecturer in Russian at Queen Mary, University of London.

Cover image: Poster for The Man with the Gun (Sergei I. Yutkevich, 1938) © Lenfilm, 2003

Cover design: www.paulsmithdesign.com

Jam

ie M

iller

Sovie

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SovietCinema

Polit ics and Persuasion under Stalin

Jamie Miller