Space in the 21st Century - Canadian Forces College · 2005-08-12 · ii he Canadian Forces College second annual Air Symposium, conducted on 5 and 6 April 2000, focused on the Canadian

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A I R S Y M P O S I U M 2 0 0 0

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S p a c e i n t h e 2 1 s t C e n t u r y

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L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l D e n n i s M a r g u e r a t t

D e p u t y D i r e c t o r A e r o s p a c e S t u d i e s

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D r A l l a n E n g l i s h

Canadian Forces College College des Forces Canadiennes

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Foreword……………………………………………………………………........... ii

Thinking the Unthinkable: On Revolution, Outer Space and Canadian Policy.... 1Dr. James Fergusson

Aerospace and Cyberspace: The Transformation of Small Air Forces©………... 15Colonel Richard Szafranski, USAF (retired)

Historical Background of Canada in Space……………………………………… 31Command and Staff Course 26, Syndicate 5

Equipping the Canadian Forces for Space………………………………………. 57Command and Staff Course 26, Syndicate 6

Space, the RMA and Equipment Force Structure Issues for theCanadian Forces in the Twenty-First Century…………………..…………….… 85Shane Levesque, MA

A Canadian Forces Personnel Structure for Space…………………………..….. 93Command and Staff Course 26, Syndicate 7

Personnel for Space Operations……………………………………………….…. 109Dr. Allan English

Space and the Canadian Air Force: An Attitudinal Challenge………….....…… 113Lieutenant-Colonel (retired) Richard J. Young

SPACE; A Future Centre of Gravity………………………………….…….……. 119Command and Staff Course 26, Syndicate 8

Some Lessons for Space from the History of Air Power…………………..….… 135Dr. A. Carl Christie

Space and Battlespace………………………………………………………….… 141Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Blank

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

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he Canadian Forces College secondannual Air Symposium, conducted

on 5 and 6 April 2000, focused on theCanadian Force’s use of Space at thebeginning of the 21st Century. As withthe first symposium held in April 1999,this second symposium received theenthusiastic support of the Chief of theAir Staff in funding and promoting thesymposium’s programme.

The Air Symposium provided aunique opportunity for the students ofCommand and Staff Course 26, selectedacademics, and members of theCanadian air force community to gath-er and share their thoughts on howCanada might use space in future con-flicts. The aim of this event was not todetermine definitive answers on issuesrelated to space, but rather to provide

a collegial setting where the air stu-dents of the Command and StaffCourse could both present the findingsof their research and hear the views ofnoted academics and others on thesubject of space.

The Canadian Forces College wish-es to thank the Chief of the Air Staff,Lieutenant-General David Kinsman, forhis continuing support of the sympo-sium process, and Dr Jim Fergusson andColonel Richard Szafranski, USAF(retired) for their scholarly contributionto the symposium’s agenda.

Inquiries about this publicationmay be directed to the Canadian ForcesCollege, Attention: Deputy DirectorAerospace Studies.

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or the moment, little public atten-tion is being paid in Canada to

developments concerning the mili-tary use of outer space. Canadian for-eign policy is focussed on theMinister’s human security agenda.National defence continues to con-centrate on dealing with the fiscalrestraints facing its goal of maintain-ing multi-purpose, combat capableforces, especially with the loomingmajor modernization and new equip-ment programmes. This is not to sug-gest, however, that outer space isbeing entirely ignored. On the com-mercial side, Canadian firms aredeveloping new technologies toexploit outer space, and in conjunc-tion with the Canadian Space Agencyare moving forward with RADARSATII and participation in theInternational Space Station. Canadacontinues to raise the issue of theweaponization of outer space at theConference of Disarmament. Finally,National Defence is proceeding withthe development of the Joint SpaceProject with the US, MILSATCOM,and a contribution to the U.S. SpaceSurveillance Network (SSN).

Nonetheless, the here and nowfocus of Canadian Foreign andDefence policy as a whole raises sig-nificant questions about whetherCanada will be prepared to deal withthe dramatic security and defenceimplications of outer space in the

future. This is most evident in theabsence of any clear understandingof the way in which outer space islikely, if it has not already begun, torevolutionize thinking about war andpeace, and strategy. Central to thislack of understanding is a set ofuncontested assumptions or beliefsthat relegate space to the margins ofinterest and investment. Unless clos-er attention is paid to space in strate-gic and security terms, Canada’s“long-term strategic interests” maynot be met.

On Revolution

Much attention over the past sev-eral years has been paid to the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA). Academics debate what is aRMA, whether a RMA is underway,and what are its implications forarmed forces. Practioners tend to con-centrate upon the direct implicationsof emerging RMA technologies forforce requirements, inter-operability,and military organizational structuresand procedures. Also, both academicsand practioners tend to see the RMAin rather strict, technical terms sur-rounding the terrestrial employmentof military force. However, both alsotend to ignore the true nature of therevolution, and it concerns outerspace. The centrality of outer spaceto the RMA has two key components;the first concerns the dominant

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Thinking the Unthinkable:On Revolution, Outer Space andCanadian Policy

D r. J a m e s F e r g u s s o n , D e p u t y D i r e c t o r , C e n t r e f o r D e f e n c ea n d S e c u r i t y S t u d i e s , U n i v e r s i t y o f M a n i t o b a

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strategic paradigm of deterrence, andthe second concerns outer space asthe necessary condition for under-standing the true nature of the RMAas debated in the literature.

Regardless of the historicaldebate on military revolutions, thereis general agreement that the develop-ment and deployment of nuclearweapons had a revolutionary impacton the conduct of international poli-tics and the relationship betweenarmed force and politics. As noted byBernard Brodie almost immediatelyafter the use of atomic bombs againstJapan, nuclear weapons changed themeaning and purpose of armed force:“Thus far the chief purpose of ourmilitary establishment has been towin wars. From now on its chief pur-pose must be to avert them. It canhave almost no other useful purpose.”1

Nuclear weapons ushered in the eraof deterrence as the dominant strate-gic concept as informed by the politi-cal context of the Cold War, and sub-sequent technological developmentsof which ballistic missiles in general,and long-range Inter-ContinentalBallistic Missiles (ICBMs) in particu-lar were paramount.

In the construction of the whatmay be labelled the Deterrence RMA,the central focus has been nuclearweapons, which, in turn, has alsobeen expanded with reference to theother two legs of the Weapons ofMass Destruction triad, chemical andbiological. Thus, the central drivingfeature of this RMA concerned war-heads. While one cannot ignore theexponential growth in destructivepower brought on by nuclearweapons, whose very nature under-mined their warfighting utility, these

weapons did not produce theDeterrence RMA. It was only with thedevelopment and deployment ofICBMs in the context of theAmerican-Soviet adversarial relation-ship that the full meaning and impli-cations of nuclear weapons, and thusdeterrence resulted. Prior to then,the idea of defence still had somemeaning, given the prospects ofintercepting bombers carryingnuclear payloads, notwithstandingtactical short-range missiles. ICBMscould not be intercepted, and thusnational defence for the twoSuperpowers came to rely strictlyupon the offense, the ability to deliv-er an “assured destruction” secondstrike. The triumph of the offensemarried to nuclear weapons, theDeterrence RMA, was symbolicallysealed politically and strategicallywith the negotiation and signing ofthe Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)Treaty in 1972.

Of course, this did not forecloseresearch and investment in strategicmissile defence on the part of boththe Soviet Union and the UnitedStates, nor into Anti-Satellite (ASAT)programmes. Reagan’s StrategicDefence Initiative (SDI) was clearlydirected at escaping from theDeterrence RMA, and part of the SDIresearch programme was based uponthe earlier ASAT Homing OverlayExperiments. Ostensibly, the critiqueof SDI centred around the de-stabiliz-ing nature of strategic defences inpromoting first strike incentives andarms races, notwithstanding techno-logical feasibility and cost questions.In reality, this critique largely maskeda much deeper phenomenon - thesocial triumph of the DeterrenceRMA, as many, if not all, of the pro-

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ponents of SDI, or some limited formof missile defences, constructed theirarguments around this belief system.

The Deterrence RMA also extend-ed into the conceptualization andunderstanding of outer space. Itbecame embedded in two ways. First,ballistic missiles were conceptuallynot part of outer space, even thoughMedium Range (MR) through longrange ballistic missiles transitedthrough space. The conceptual exclu-sion of ballistic missiles from spacewas legally codified in the 1967 OuterSpace Treaty, in which space wasdefined relative to an object complet-ing a single orbit. Certainly, theUnited States and the Soviet Unionagreed to this definition for practicalstrategic reasons. But underneaththese reasons was the incontestabletriumph of the belief system. Theimplications, of course, have been,and continue to be, a de-linkage ofspace from the core element of thedominant strategic belief system -ballistic missiles.

Second, the way in which spacewas exploited for military purposeswas driven by the same belief system.Notwithstanding the significant costsand technological barriers to the fullexploitation of space, exploitationwas driven by strategic deterrencebeliefs and subsequent requirements.Once again, the decision to prohibitthe deployment of WMD in space inthe Outer Space Treaty was not neces-sarily a function of cost and techno-logical barriers, but more of the pre-sumed dangers such deploymentsposed to strategic stability considera-tions as defined within the belief sys-tem. Moreover, the development anddeployment of satellite early warning,

intelligence, surveillance and commu-nications were also a function of thebelief system. Even though bothSuperpowers invested in ASATresearch and development for fear ofthe other gaining an advantage, bothalso logically realized that any attackon early warning assets in particularwould be interpreted by the other asthe precursor to a strategic attack.Thus, space evolved as a function ofthe Cold War informed DeterrenceRMA, and its non-weaponization andcurrent manifestation as a sanctuaryfrom weapons is as much a function ofthe belief system as cost and technol-ogy. In so doing, space conceptuallywas moved to the background, ormargin of strategic thought.

Even with the collapse of theCold War context that informed thespecific manifestation of the beliefsystem, deterrence has remaineddominant. New strategic planning,capability requirements, and newtechnologies have remained framedwithin the context of the DeterrenceRMA. Any cursory examination ofofficial national security and militarydocuments today reveals the contin-ued strength of the deterrence mindset. For example, the Report of theQuadrennial Defense Review states:“The third aspect of the military’s keyrole in shaping the internationalsecurity environment is deterringaggression and coercion in keyregions of the world on a day-to-daybasis through the peacetime deploy-ment of US military forces abroad.”2

Most interestingly, the requirementsin this document to undertake thisrole are the classic components of thedeterrence belief system: politicalwill; the communication of commit-ments/threat; and the conventional

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and nuclear, including strategic,forces to carry out the threat.

Of course, these components, anda generic notion of deterrence, havebeen in existence throughout history,and long before the Deterrence RMA.Moreover, the use of conventionalmilitary force did not disappear dur-ing the Cold War, even for bothSuperpowers. However, the genericnotion of deterrence is, in effect, ameaningless one because it isdivorced from any specific under-standing of the relationship of war tothe societies that engage in it, andthis relationship has changed histori-cally. Also, the application of conven-tional military force during the ColdWar and under the Deterrence RMAwas significantly constrained by, anddirectly related to, the conditionsemanating from the triumph of thestrategic offence, such as in the caseof the Vietnam War, and Superpowerinvolvement in the October, 1973Arab-Israeli War. Even in Europe,conventional forces were not there forclassical warfighting purposes, butrather as the first rung of the seam-less web of US strategic deterrence.

For most observers, the Gulf Waris the central empirical case sur-rounding the current RMA debate.On the pro-RMA side, the Gulf War isseen as a harbinger of the revolution.On the con-RMA side, the Gulf War isseen as the product of an evolution ofAmerican military capabilities andstrategies, in effect the Americanway-of-war, generally dated back toVietnam. However, this debate, inter-esting in itself, largely misses thepoint. The actual revolution is thenegation of the no-defence conditionof the Deterrence RMA, and this is

occurring not simply through thedevelopment of missile defences,such as the U.S. National MissileDefence (NMD) Programme and thevarious Theatre Missile Defence(TMD) Programmes. It is also occur-ring through key developments con-cerning the military use of outerspace, which amount to a transforma-tion from deterrence to a defencebelief system.

Space-based assets are central tothis transformation. This does notnecessarily imply the deployment ofspace-based interceptor assets, whichmany fear NMD and TMD are the pre-cursors of (the ghost of SDI). Whilesuch assets would likely create a moreeffective missile defence capability,the key is the development anddeployment of new space-based earlywarning, tracking, cueing, and targetdiscrimination capabilities (Space-Based Infrared High and Low) linkedto terrestrial/air/sea-based kinetic-kill interceptors, a new generation ofground-based radars, and sophisticat-ed command and control/battle man-agement (C2/BM) capabilities. Even ifsuch defences are not perfect, as nodefence ever is, their existence willalter the political calculus of nations.During the age of nuclear deterrence,the key revolutionary transformationwas the impact of vulnerability (nodefence) on political action. In thefuture, missile defences married to anew generation of these space-basedassets transform and reverse this rela-tionship, at least for the UnitedStates, and possibly for Russia as wellif cooperative efforts are fully real-ized. Deterrence may remain the“rhetorical concept”, but it will notbe deterrence in the same sense as thepast. At a minimum it will be a one

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way street, that contains a variety ofunique political-strategic conditions.

The transformation underway asa function of ballistic missile defencewithin the broader outer space devel-opment envelope is not simply a func-tion of technology. It also is the prod-uct of the post-Cold War internation-al system of US political-strategicdominance. Central to this is theexplicit American goal to developnew technologies to ensure its politi-cal-strategic superiority. These newtechnologies, centred upon space,promise to eliminate, or at least sig-nificantly undermine, the traditionalset of beliefs that underpinned theDeterrence RMA. In the future, theUnited States, and thus western secu-rity, will no longer exclusively relyupon national and operational vul-nerability and the threat of nuclearretaliation. Instead, the United Stateswill be able to act with a significantdegree of impunity in relation todirect threats to its national territory,and national interests. National vul-nerability as the extant condition ofthe nuclear age is being replaced bynational survival: defence or theDefence RMA.

Nonetheless, the continuinginfluence of deterrence is evident inseveral ways. As ballistic missiles areconceived outside of space, so ballis-tic missile defence is as well. In fact,missile defence discussions, especial-ly among academics, make no refer-ence to its revolutionary implications.On one hand, it is apparently not partof the RMA. On the other hand, it isimplicitly conceptualized as one ofmany components of operational sup-port to the “warfighter”. Missiledefence facilitates the political will to

intervene by providing protection toforces-in-the-field. In enhancingpolitical will, hence credibility, simi-lar to all the space-based systems andtechnology development pro-grammes, missile defence is portrayedas a support for deterrence. In otherwords, missile defence when implicit-ly linked to other space-based capa-bilities is placed on the margins in thesame manner space was during theCold War.

At one level, the marginalizationof missile defence and space may sim-ply reflect the classical conceptualiza-tion of the strategic dominance of ter-ritory. Humans are land creatures, andwar is won or lost on land. Missiledefence and space, like the navy andair force, are strategic enablers for theprosecution of war on land. Missiledefence and outer space as a whole areseen as support for the “warfighter”.Yet more interesting within this con-text has been the emergence of theconcept of “warfighter” in the pastdecade. This concept did not exist inthe public lexicon at least during theCold War, and it turns Brodie’s dictumon its head.

The conjunction of missiledefence, outer space, and support tothe “warfighter” speak to an emerg-ing new belief system about the rela-tionship between armed force andpolitics. This system is not simply areturn to the pre-deterrence systemfor two reasons. Social-political atti-tudes to war and peace, and the utili-ty of armed force remain embedded indeterrence thought. This is mostclearly evident in the assumed sensi-tivity of Western societies to casual-ties. At the same time, it also reflectsthe liberating nature of the end of the

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Cold War for military institutions,whose cultural predispositions weredirectly undermined by deterrence.In other words, the defence-warfight-er image of the military side of theequation must be blended withsocial-political attitudes towards thecosts of engaging in war.

Outer Space and Strategic Thought

As noted above, missile defenceis excluded from space as a product ofthe triumph of the Deterrence RMAas informed by technology (nuclearweapons and ICBMs) and the politicalcontext of the Cold War. At the sametime, space itself, like missiledefence, is conceptualized as simplyan enabler for the “warfighter”, andoutside of the dominant conceptual-ization of the RMA. Yet, new genera-tions of space-based assets, in fact theevolution of these capabilities sincethe 1980s, are the key to the RMAregardless of how one conceptualizesand understands the term.Eliminating the “fog” and “friction”of war, or at least significantly con-straining their effect, is fundamental-ly dependent upon space-basedassets. Full integration of these assetsinto strategic, theatre, and opera-tional command, control, and battlemanagement is the key to its realiza-tion. Real-time situational awarenessof an enemy on the battlefield, com-bined with the ability to undertakeprecision strikes, thus reducing thesize, and re-structuring the nature ofmilitary forces and their logistictrains, set the stage for realizing astrategic-political level transforma-tion of war; however, they only setthe stage, because the dominantbelief system remains unchallenged.This is evident, as argued above in

the failure to conceptualize missiledefence and space outside of thedeterrence belief system. It is, per-haps, most evident in the failure todevelop, or least propose, an inde-pendent body of strategic thoughtfor space.

Understanding strategy in theemerging strategic space era remainsat best embryonic.3 Whereas studentsof strategy and the western way ofwar turn to the classics of Clausewitz(land), Mahan and Corbett (sea), andDouhet (air), there is as of yet noequivalent for outer space. Certainly,the outline of such strategic thoughtis present, not least of all in US SpaceCommand’s Long Range Plan.4 Butwithin these outlines there are sever-al factors that need to be furtherdeveloped, and with them certaintensions that have to be resolved.

Generally, the starting point,usually more implicit than explicit, isthat space should be understood innaval terms. This point stems primari-ly from two considerations. First ofall, the legal status of outer space issimilar to the high seas - open to alland the possession of none. In thissense, the legal differentiationbetween outer space and sovereignair space is analogous to the differen-tiation between the high seas andsovereign territorial waters. Althoughspace is defined with reference to anorbit, rather than point in which theatmosphere transits into the vacuumof outer space, it is an issue that mayemerge in the future, especially as afunction of growing commercialexploitation. Here, one could poten-tially see reference made to “exclu-sive economic zones” as in law of thesea in the context of orbits and con-

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stellations. One can expect furtherdevelopments in international lawgoverning outer-space, and it is possi-ble that the law governing the “highseas” could also become the templatefor legally defining belligerent rightsin space.

Second, this naval analogy is fur-ther reinforced by the references inthe literature to space-faring nations.Popular culture has also tended toportray military force in space as anaval activity and one should notcompletely disregard the impact ofpopular images, because they doserve to frame the way societies thinkand act. Thus, as a strategic navaldomain, it is possible to conceive ofspace in terms of Mahan and Corbett.

However, space is not simply por-trayed in naval terms. It is also con-ceived in air force and army terms. Inthe context of air force thought, outerspace has long been its domain, or atleast it has dominated the domain as anatural extension of its role in the air,and its technology-dominant culture.Although elements of the other serv-ices participate in outer space activi-ties, with their own sub-commands,US Space Command is clearly an airforce command, and thinking aboutthe impact of the air force becominga space and air force, and its effect onair force culture, is clearly underway.5

More importantly, outer spacestrike assets hold the promise ofbringing Douhet’s vision to fruition:a truly independent strategic force.As many observers have recognized,the new air forces of the secondWorld War lacked the capacity for astrategic strike that would bringquick victory independent of a

ground campaign. The ability to doso was acquired with nuclearweapons, but these very weaponsmade war politically meaningless, theaforementioned postulate of thedeterrence era. However, new strikeassets, that could include a range ofnew technologies located in outerspace constellations, hold the promiseof destroying the capacity of a nationto wage war without a ground/navalcampaign, and such an ability wouldtransform the practice of interna-tional politics.

However, the air force strategiccase must be balanced by the armyone as well. Arguably, the army hasbeen the least directly involved inspace activity, and least technologi-cally driven culture. But, this hasbegun to change, even though theidea of taking ground as the sine quanon of war remains. Space for thearmy is the ultimate high ground.Thus, from an army perspective, rein-forced by current RMA related workon army activities, the strategic valueof space is not inconsistent with aland strategic perspective. Evenfuturistic ideas of re-usable spacevehicles may be seen in airborne/airmobile terms; able to appear at anypoint in an operational theatre toexploit the element surprise.

In many ways, all three strategicperspectives are evident in US SpaceCommand’s Long Range Plan. Despitethe recognition of the need to weave aseamless web for the proper exploita-tion of outer space, its analysis moretransfers the unstated strategic logicof each of the services, without inte-grating them into a new body ofstrategic thought. Thus, control ofspace draws on naval and air thought

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on the army’s force enhancement andon the air force’s force applicationconcepts. In addition, the emphasis isprimarily technological.

Perhaps, it is much too early toexpect the development of a body ofnew strategic thought. Until the vari-ous new technologies are actuallydeployed, their strategic implicationswill be difficult to understand andexploit fully. It was only after the ini-tial use of the aeroplane during theFirst World War that a body of strate-gic thought about airpower emerged.Similarly, it took nearly a decadebefore the full strategic implicationsof nuclear weapons came to be under-stood. Until then and despite thework of Brodie and others, nuclearweapons were largely seen as justanother weapon, albeit exponentiallymore destructive.

At the same time, it is also notsurprising that each of the servicesconceptualizes space according to itsdominant culture. Similarly, it is alsonot surprising that the broader polit-ical, academic, and public discourse,when it does engage space, conceptu-alizes it within the deterrence beliefsystem. However, neither the servicesnor the broader discourse have cometo grips in a meaningful way with thestrategic and security implications ofspace in the foreseeable future.Certainly, the Long Range Plan positsthat space will become an economicand military “centre-of-gravity” forthe US. In so doing, the idea of spacecontrol has emerged with its tradi-tional air and naval connotations ( thesurveillance of space, the negation ordenial of adversarial use, and the pro-tection or defence of one’s own use.In addition, doctrinal concerns, large-

ly dominated up to now by passivemeasures, are now starting to transi-tion into the consideration of activemeasures as well.

However, deterrence remains asignificant barrier to a full under-standing of the strategic and securityimplications of space. Several exam-ples are evident. First of all, theexclusion of ballistic missiles fromthe space envelope, and with themballistic missile defence, has lead totwo interesting views. At one level,the belief that missile defences willproduce greater incentives for statesto acquire larger and more sophisti-cated arsenals of ballistic missilesremains intact. Although this view islargely seen today in the context ofRussia and China relative to NMD, itis also enunciated with regard to theproliferation as a whole; witness theregular retort that the non-prolifera-tion regime will collapse if NMD goesahead. Yet, missile defence is a notjust part of a counter-proliferationstrategy, but it is also central to anon-proliferation strategy. It affectsopportunity costs for missile andWMD proliferators, and can beunderstood as creating a disincentive.

More directly relevant to spaceitself is the dominant assumption thatmissile proliferation is an attempt bystates to obtain the ability to practiceCold War type deterrence as a meansto dissuade the US/West from inter-vening. In so doing, the belief thatsuch states are undeterrable rein-forces this very logic by portrayingtheir leadership as irrational and“mad” the ideal posture to createcredibility. However, perhaps missileproliferation is not solely directedtowards replicating deterrence.

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Perhaps it is also directed towardsacquiring an ability to practice spacedenial, and warfighting itself. Byexcluding missiles from space, oneeasily forgets that missiles are themeans to access space. Moreover, theincreasing exploitation of Low EarthOrbit (LEO) for military and commer-cial purposes is an inviting target foreven rudimentary launch and war-head technology. In fact, this technol-ogy may be much less demanding andcostly than that required for deliver-ing warheads to terrestrial targetsthousands of kilometres away.

To illustrate the value of break-ing away from deterrence and re-thinking space in strategic terms, theAugust 1998 North Korean three stagemissile test is useful. The test is seenas a step towards acquiring the capa-bility to threaten the continental US,and thus deter the US. Critics, inkeeping with deterrence thinking, inpart, argue that even North Koreawould not be foolish enough tobelieve that the US would not retali-ate if attacked. North Korea statedthat the purpose of the test was tolaunch a satellite into orbit. From astrategic space perspective, perhapsthe North Korean explanation is clos-er to the truth; the acquisition of aspace-launch capability married to acrude nuclear warhead to interdict USspace-assets in the case of war, and/orthreaten US/Western commercialspace assets.

Thinking about alternativeexplanations for long-range missileproliferation is excluded by deter-rence. It is only possible when onebegins to think in terms of the inde-pendent strategic world of space. Asimilar case is found in the old deter-

rence-based dichotomy betweenoffensive and defensive weapons asenshrined in the ABM, andSALT/START agreements. Even in theMissile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) world, the issue is missilesfor terrestrial purposes. When mis-siles are linked to space, the divisionis between missile defence andASATs. Both have negative connota-tions because defence is “bad” andoffense is “good”. But from a strategicspace perspective, the distinction ismeaningless. In one way, missiledefences are also ASATs in disguise.However, the most effective missiledefence for terrestrial purposes maynot be the most effective ASAT sys-tem for space defence purposes. Ifthreats to space assets are the future,missile defence investments need tobe geared more to space defence, thanterrestrial defence. A strategic spaceperspective leads one to this type ofconclusion. Certainly, the current pro-grammes and NMD are important tobreak the psychological barrier withregard to missile defence. But, thecurrent programmes remain informedby deterrence, rather than an alterna-tive space-centric strategic one.

A final example of the problem indeveloping a strategic vision of spaceas a function of its emergence as amilitary and commercial “centre-of-gravity” is the idea of space as a sanc-tuary. Drawing on the Outer SpaceTreaty and the absence of weapons inspace, as informed by Cold WarDeterrence, political thought todayassumes that space is a sanctuary, andnations concerned with future USdesigns seek to codify it as such.However, space is not a sanctuary andsince the beginnings of the space agehas never been one. It may be illegal

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to deploy and test nuclear weapons inspace, but it is not illegal to use themin space. Thinking that “criminaliz-ing” the deployment of weapons inspace resolves the problem, in actual-ity may undermine Western security.It permits all states to practice spacedenial, but no states to practice spacedefence outside of passive measuresand limited dual-purpose missiledefence. Strategically, it makes nosense, except as a function of deter-rence which has framed the entirestrategic debate, including arms con-trol and disarmament.

In the end, there are many barri-ers to developing a strategic vision ofspace. Notwithstanding cost andtechnology considerations, one of thecore barriers is the deterrence legacyboth in terms of understanding theRMA and the way in which evenadvocates of space construct theirown visions. Space control, as recog-nized by US Space Command amongothers, will be the key doctrinal andpolitical battlefield of the next twodecades. Already the organizationalfight for jurisdiction is appearing.For many, space is a “purple” domainthat includes all of the services, anda new independent Area ofOperations (AOR). Even though it isorganizationally dominated by theair force, notwithstanding naval andarmy participation, its functionalvalue and strategic nature indicatesthat no single service necessarilyshould dominate the domain of outerspace. As the Second World Warwould lead to the creation of theUnited States Air Force as a new,independent service, so outer spacedevelopments may create the pre-conditions for another new service.In fact, the conditions may already

be in place with the growing empha-sis in the last decade on “jointness”and the development of joint doc-trine among the services.

However, thinking of space inindependent, strategic terms is prob-lematic relative to the way in whichspace continues to be conceptualizedby the services as informed by theirdistinct cultures within the contextof deterrence. Indications of a newconceptualization are indeed present,not least of all as a function of thepublic emergence of the concept ofspace control. Perhaps space does nottruly hold the promise of an inde-pendent strategic role. But unless thisidea is explored, opportunities maybe lost. At a minimum, space holdssignificant strategic and securityimplications for all nations, and whilethe US strategic community is begin-ning to become engaged, many othernations are not.

Canada in the Past

Towards the end of the SecondWorld War the conditions were set inplace for a revolutionary transforma-tion in Canada’s approach to the out-side world. Recognizing Canada’scontribution to the war effort, policy-makers began the process of shiftingCanadian policy from isolationist tointernationalist. In so doing, it wasclearly recognized that Canada’s long-term strategic interests resided in afree and stable Europe. This interestwas further extended, particularlysince the end of the Cold War, to aglobal basis. In effect, Canada bene-fited from a peaceful and stable inter-national system. It had, and contin-ues to have, a stake in the interna-tional order. With such an interest

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and stake, it thus followed thatCanada has had an obligation andresponsibility to commit itself to theinternational order as it has evolved.

During the Cold War, this com-mitment primarily manifested itself inEurope through NATO, on the conti-nent through NORAD, and globallythrough the UN and the practice ofpeacekeeping. Over this same periodof time, Canada’s military capabilitiesand investments declined. The com-mitments relative to declining capa-bilities created the conditions for theidentification of the commitment-capability gap critique.6 While onpaper such a gap clearly existed, thecritique failed to recognize one vitalpoint ( from the deterrence stand-point of “no defence”, it was largelyirrelevant. In many ways, Canadianpolicy-makers, sometime consciouslyand many times unconsciously, actedfrom this standpoint in making deci-sions about investments.

It is this very standpoint that hascontinued in Canadian thought sincethe end of the Cold War. It is perhapsmost clearly evident in the currentagenda of Foreign Minister LloydAxworthy, and the overall post-ColdWar governments’ failure to recognizethe revolutionary changes that areunderway. These changes are a com-bination of the new strategic environ-ment and the emerging revolution inthe relationship between armed forceand politics. The former has removedthe structural constraints on the util-ity of armed force for the defence ofthe West’s strategic interests, andthus Canada’s long-term strategicinterests. The latter through thedomain of outer space is resurrectingthe political conditions supporting

the actual employment of armed forcein a socially acceptable manner.

For Canada, this revolution,whether viewed from the deterrenceperspective or the current RMA debatein the literature, has direct implica-tions for Canadian requirements tomeet its fundamental commitment tothe existing international order. Fromthe former perspective, there is a needto recognize a future of deployed bal-listic missile defences with space-basedtracking, cueing, and target discrimi-nation assets for the defence of NorthAmerica against ICBM threats fromstates other than Russia and perhapsChina, for the defence of Europe, andfor deployed Western coalition forcesin the field. All these missile defencecapabilities are essential to ensure thatwestern decision-makers are willing todeploy forces against regional adver-saries, particularly under the socialconstraints left over from by deter-rence and the unwillingness ofWestern societies, perceived or real, toaccept high levels of casualties.7

The deployment of missile defenceswith their vital space-based assets rep-resents the escape from deterrenceunder the new political environment. Inso doing, capabilities to participatemeaningfully in coalition campaignsbecome essential for Canada. Whereasin the Cold War simply being there suf-ficed militarily, in the emerging envi-ronment of defence, being there is notenough. It also demands making ameaningful combat contribution.

However, the nature of a mean-ingful contribution has to be consid-ered. The key requirement forCanadian Forces to be inter-operablewith other coalition forces, primarily

11


American, is changing. While thelogic of combat capable forces remainsin place, the specific requirementsand investments necessary to be com-bat capable is likely to be significant-ly different. These are likely torequire in particular the ability ofCanadian Forces to integrate into thenew battlefield created by emergingspace-based capabilities under devel-opment in the US, as well as militarystructures that are emerging to exploitthese new capabilities.

Both perspectives tend to indi-cate that Canadian elites mustincrease investment in defence capa-bilities. While there is logic to thisneed, current political conditions alsoindicate that the probability of a sig-nificant “true” increase is near zero.The public political agenda is domi-nated by demands to increase invest-ment in social programmes, evenwithin defence as demonstrated bythe Quality of Life report of theStanding Committee on NationalDefence and Veterans Affairs(SCONDVA). Furthermore, the gov-ernment’s foreign policy agendaemphasis on human security with itsdevelopment underpinning andemphasis on intra-state conflictlargely relegates the revolution tothe margins.

Of course, Canada could chooseto ignore the ongoing revolution, andin so doing undertake a limited orspecialized role in the internationalsystem, a role suggested by theCanada 21 Report.8 In many ways, theCanadian Forces are already driftingin this direction. However such a lim-ited role carries potential politicalcosts. It is in effect a posture of limit-

ed liability, and with limited liabilitycomes a limited political role andcommitment to the internationalorder. In other words, it potentiallyimplies a return to a marginalised iso-lationist reality with an international-ist rhetoric of commitment.

More importantly, there is a dan-gerous belief that Canadian policydeveloped for the Cold War under thelabel of internationalism remainsimmune from geo-strategic and tech-nical changes. With regard to missiledefence, for example, concernsexpressed by the Foreign Minister aredeeply embedded in Cold WarDeterrence. Canada had been able toside-step earlier US missile defenceissues, ABM and SDI, largely becauseof the geo-strategic value of Canadianterritory and existing technology.Today, Canadian territory has becomestrategically irrelevant by the con-junction of the end of the Cold Warand emerging space-based surveil-lance technology. In other words,Canada is likely to pay a significantpolitical price if it attempts to side-step US NMD.9

Beyond missile defence in generaland NMD in particular, there are sev-eral more key issues emerging whichcannot be managed by the old ColdWar policy parameters. Paramountamong them is the emerging issue ofspace control. LongstandingCanadian policy opposition to theweaponization of outer space hasbeen politically viable under thedeterrence conditions of the ColdWar. Opposition was cost-free, as nei-ther the US nor Soviet Union pos-sessed the strategic need, or techno-logical capability, to weaponize. In

12


regard to outer space, commercial andmilitary, raise significant implicationsfor Canada and the Canadian Forces.11

Neither outer space nor the RMA isbeing completely neglected or ignoredwithin DND, and concerns about theweaponization of outer space are evi-dent in DFAIT. Nonetheless, the abilityto understand and respond to either orboth are significantly constrained. Atthe highest political levels, it appearsthat no attention is being paid to outerspace whatsoever, especially given theabsence of a cabinet sub-committeedealing with foreign and defence policyissues. More importantly, the here andnow focus of DFAIT and DND under thecurrent political conditions, especiallywith regard to investments, is a signifi-cant barrier to long-term strategic con-siderations. However, the implicationsfor Canada of failing to move beyondthe immediate horizon may be extreme-ly significant. The political-strategicworld of 2020 and beyond, andCanada’s place within it, is likely to bemuch different from today, especially ifthe future, and with it outer space, isrelegated to the margins in Canadianpolitical-strategic thought and invest-ment. The embryonic first stage of thisnew strategic world is the emergingwith missile defence. The next stagewill be space control.

Endnotes

1. Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon:Atomic Power and World Order, (New York:Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 76.

2. Department of Defense. The Report ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review, SectionIII, 1997.

3. A recent attempt is James Oberg, SpacePower Theory, (Washington: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1999).

4. US Space Command, Long Range Plan:Implementing USSPACECOM Vision for2020, (Colorado Springs: US SpaceCommand, 1998).

5. See James M. Smith, USAF Culture andCohesion: Building an Air and Space Forcefor the 21st Century, (Institute for NationalSecurity Studies. Occasional Paper 19.Colorado: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1998).

6. See Rod Byers, Canadian Security andDefence: The Legacy and the Challenges,(Adelphi Paper # 214. London:International Institute for StrategicStudies, 1986).

7. According to Sean Maloney, theCanadian decision not send ground forcesto the Gulf was primarily a function ofcasualty estimates. Sean Maloney,Warwithout Battles: Canada’s NATO Brigade inGermany 1951-1993, (Whitby: McGraw-Ryerson, 1997).

8. Canada 21, Canada and CommonSecurity in the Twenty-First Century,(Toronto: Centre for International Studies,1994).

9. For details, see James Fergusson, DejaVu: Canada, NORAD, and NMD,(Occasional Paper #38. Winnipeg: Centrefor Defence and Security Studies, 1999).

10. This is evident in Department ofNational Defence, Vision 2020, 1999.

11. For a detailed analysis, see Steve Jamesand James Fergusson, Space Appreciation2000 (Ottawa: Directorate of SpaceDevelopment. DND, 2000).

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15

Introduction

f the Air Force understood itselfto be organized, not around the

aging technology of flight but thenascent technology of top sight, itmight be able to play the continuousroles-and-missions debate in a farmore constructive manner. Like anyshrewd firm, it would cast off low-information missions in favor ofhigh-information ones, strengthenits core competence, and positionitself for vigorous institutional lifewell into the next century, all thewhile contributing to fosteringjointness without risking its ownidentity.

“ . . . Or Go Down In Flame?:Toward An Airpower Manifesto

for the Twenty-First Century”

This presentation advances hypothe-ses that are bound to aggravate some.Hence I am delighted to accept theCollege’s promise of non-attribution. Theviews I will express today are my own.They do not represent the views of TofflerAssociates® or of any of our customers.

Several years ago when the outlinesof how information—especially space-derived information and informationoperations—could transform warfarebecame clearer, a renegade band arosewhose mission remains to attempt totransform Airpower in the 21st Century.The target of transformation has been

the United States Air Force (USAF), notonly the world’s largest, but also atpresent the world’s most capable airforce. That transformation in Airpower,when it occurs, pivots on appreciatingthe roots of airpower’s contribution towarfare and returning to those roots inthe 21st century context. Sadly, thiscampaign to enrich thinking in theUSAF has not been successful and themission is unfulfilled. Since I supportthis band, I am here today on a recruit-ing drive.

Why ought you join the merryband of rebels? Because, and perhapsmuch to the chagrin of the USAF, a“revolution in military affairs” actual-ly requires critics, rebels, and revolu-tionaries at some point. The need forrebels is acute, because if Douhet iscorrect that victory smiles on thosewho appreciate the coming changes inwarfare and anticipate them, then it isalso true that victory may frown onand then elude the wrong-headed. Ifthe USAF is wrong-headed, and Ibelieve it may very well be, then aDavid is somewhere in this Goliath’sfuture. To avoid that, would it not befar better for allies and friends to jointhe rebellion, undertake the transfor-mation of their own air forces, andthereby show the USAF the possibili-ties? Failing that, I’m afraid thatsmaller air forces may become whatthey most fear: in the worst casethey’re inexpensive and trivial knock-offs, using second-rate exportable

Aerospace and Cyberspace: The Transformation of Small Air Forces©

C o l o n e l R i c h a r d S z a f r a n s k i , U S A F ( r e t i r e d )T o f f l e r A s s o c i a t e s ®

© Richard Szafranski, Toffler Associates® 2000. All rights reserved. Do not cite without author’s permission.

I


technologies, and utterly dependenton the United States Air Force.

So, at least two things need to beavoided. First, easily allowing today’sstewards of airpower to act in ways thatassure the future irrelevance of airpower.And second, the trivialization of anyfriend’s contribution to the maintenanceof security in the 21st Century. Towardthat end the thesis of this discourse isthat small air forces can transform them-selves and acquire disproportionatepower by capitalizing on the advantagesthat competence in aerospace and cyber-space operations can bring. The revolu-tion in airpower can begin, and mostlikely will begin, in a small air force.Unlike the United States Air Force(described by one of its former Chiefs asa “full service” air force), with itsnumerous legacy systems and massivebureaucracy, smaller air forces may bemore agile in adaptation and hence moreeasily ready for transformation. Tochoose to remain miniature versions ofthe larger United States Air Force willdoom smaller ones to irrelevance. Theywill become not the partners of theUnited States Air Force, but the hewersof its wood and the carriers of its water.The time to begin the transformation isnow. Sometimes looking back is usefulin helping look forward in that it illumi-nates where we have been.

A Simple Tale: From WhenceDid “Airpower” Come?

Airpower’s Roots

If one dismisses the Icarus andDædelus fables as legends, then airpow-er probably began with balloons. The“hot air” balloon was an innovationwhose ability to change the way inwhich battles were fought was clear

from the beginning. So clear, that vonMoltke, who also saw the potential andthe pitfalls of trucks, rail, and telegraphmade these comments:

Observations should be carried onfor several hours. It is absolutelynecessary that the balloon be keptstationary, like a kite on a string.The technical possibilities of thismust be investigated since strongand changing air currents can placethe balloon at an angle that haltsobservation.

If a balloon cannot be made sta-tionary, its entire usefulness disap-pears.2

General Helmuth Karl Bernhardvon Moltke, circa 1859-1868

Von Moltke was a military genius,but his prejudices were those of a sol-dier. Like Wellington, the soldier’s goalwas to see what was occurring on the“other side of the hill” by creating ahigher hill. The balloon was airpower’sfirst artificial hill. Balloons—nascentAirpower—gave advantages to soldiersby providing information about theenemy merely by extending soldiers’lines of sight. Let me repeat that: thegenesis of airpower was in the quest forbetter information about the enemy.Stationary balloons were followed bymoving balloons, von Moltke’s admoni-tion notwithstanding.3 Moving bal-loons went where the information aboutthe enemy was—near the front lines—so they operated at risk. They werevulnerable to gravity, to “strong andchanging air currents,” and to groundfire. They also were vulnerable to tech-nology. The mastery of the scientificprinciples and sciences that make flight inheavier-than-air vehicles possible4 is more

16


complex than those that make lighter-than-air ballooning possible, but not socomplex that someone did not break theheavier-than-air code—Santos Dumont,the Wright Brothers, some Russian, who-ever. Pursuit aviation was born.

Pursuit airplanes were anti-infor-mation systems. The strategic aim, the“meta-logic” of pursuit, was to deny theenemy information by driving off andharassing those airmen who would col-lect it. The quest for air superioritybegan not as the chase for anti-groundattack capabilities, but as the search foreffective anti-information capabilities.Let me repeat that also: the roots of airsuperiority were in the anti-informationmission. They were not in the vonRichthofen or Bong “Hey, let’s all beaces!” mission or in the Harris andLeMay “bomb ‘em back into the StoneAge” mission, as fond as we are of bothof those missions.

Pursuit was the beginning, buttechnology advanced relentlessly (and,by way of warning, continues toadvance). Soon flyers had the bombletsand bombs (and pilots or observers pro-vided the hand-eye coordination) nec-essary to drop explosives on the enemyfrom on high. The notion of aerial bom-bardment initially was not so much anotion of using airpower to “reach”—even the artillery of the First World Warhad an enviable reach—as it was to useairpower to match reach with certainknowledge: to avoid expending ord-nance stupidly. Stupidly, in this case,means dropping bombs or lobbingartillery shells where the enemy isn’t.5

In the Second World War airpowerwas less able to match reach with cer-tain knowledge in the extended theatersspanning the geography of the Pacific

and Europe. And, indeed, there was arelaxation of the need for certainty. Inthat “total war” the only good enemywas a dead enemy and unfortunatelythe enemy was defined by gross geogra-phy more than precise legal status.Witness Coventry. Witness Dresden.Witness Tokyo, Hiroshima, andNagasaki. In fact, airpower killed morecivilians in Germany than all Americanand British (including Commonwealth)wartime casualties, and in “Japan morepeople were killed in six months ofheavy aerial bombardment than in thewhole United States war effort.”6

The exigencies of that Wardemanded that the technologies ofknowing be less important than thetechnologies of production. Superbgeneralship did not “win” the SecondWorld War for the Allies or for its airforces. Mass production and brute forcedid.7 John Ellis notes that “the prosaicarithmetic of natural resources, generat-ing capacity, industrial plant and pro-ductivity was to be incontrovertible.”8

Airpower went down the path of indus-trial production to create enemy attri-tion, a path the institution failed tostray from until Desert Storm. DesertStorm showed the value of knowledge.The technologies glimpsed in DesertStorm will, fueled by commercialprogress, begin their ascent in the nextdecade. There are markets for informa-tion systems. There are fewer buyers forwarplanes.

Consider the proofs, that airpoweralways has been and always will beabout acquiring superior informationfor the Good People and denying infor-mation to the Bad People. Technologiesnow exist that make matching thatsuperior information to the weaponsthat can hurt an enemy, wherever and

17


whenever an enemy needs hurting, a“joint” job, not exclusively an air forcejob. Navies can strike deep with air-craft and missiles—and do. Armies,ground forces, including naval infantry,can strike the enemy’s rear withartillery, missiles, and rotary wing airforces—and do. Hackers can renderobjects in the enemy’s homeland, “deeptargets” if you will, dysfunctional—and do.

Add to this our concern for ourown aviators and the enemy’s non-com-batants and you have what will soon bean intractable set of problems for OldAirpower: the technologies of long-range precision strike are providingsuitable substitutes for strike aircraft;the technologies of unmanned air vehi-cles (UAV) offer weight and other (cube,maneuverability, infrastructure, mobili-ty, and footprint) advantages overmanned aircraft; the numbers of newmanned aircraft decrease in tandemwith their cost increases; air defensesbecome ever more lethal; and no one isstepping up to the responsibility to bemaster of knowledge production. Thus,by what inexorable logic has the USAFconcluded we must have the F-22. Toprotect friendly missiles? To kill badUAVs or protect good UAVs? Forgivemy incredulity, but were I younger Iwould ask “So what?”

Okay, but so what?

“So what?” is the most importantquestion we can ask. (However, asking“So what?” outside an academic envi-ronment is often misunderstood andlikely to be dangerous. Speaking truthto those in power is an acquired skilland, unfortunately, few in the militaryacquire it.9) So what do we make ofthese proofs from my rendering of air-

power’s history? I argue that what weought to appreciate from this abbreviat-ed history are five unchanging thingsthat not only characterize the roots ofairpower but also forecast its evolution-ary or revolutionary future. They are:

1) The vantage that Airpower providesis its principal advantage.10 The higherthe elevation, the better the view.“Airpower” is the military power exer-cised in that indivisible medium of aero-space, the vertical dimension from thesurface of the earth to the edge of theuniverse, and in all the cyberspace.Airpower provides the power of knowl-edge.

2) The advantage of vantage is more orbetter information.11 The earth, afterall, is round and its surface is curved.There are terrain and cultural featuresthat obstruct the line of sight of eventall humans. Operating in the full ver-tical dimension offsets some of the hor-izontal disadvantages of the geometry ofthe planet. Technologies improve sens-ing year after year. Computing powerfollows Moore’s law. Given the rightimpetus, vantage will accrue greaterand greater advantages for those air-power serves.

3) Airpower was created to satisfy theneed for information. As much as wewould like to believe that our roots arein “one-v-one” or “bombs on target,”the simple truth is that airpowerbegan by serving and serves still topenetrate secrecy and resolve igno-rance in the terrestrial realm.Airpower (and its included aerospacepower and cyberspace power) areabout having the knowledge necessary forapplying force to the enemy’s nodes,processes, webs, intersections, andunions to impede the production,

18


transportation, and control of enemycombat power.

4) Airpower changes as technology pro-vides the wherewithal to do new things orto substitute means to achieve the sameends. Science and human creativitygave us aircraft. Science and humancreativity also will give us unattendedaircraft like the Unmanned Combat AirVehicle (UCAV), superbly lethalground-based defense against all kindsof air vehicles (including the UCAV),applications of nano-technology whichwill include more sophisticated missilesand other miniature air vehicles, whatthe Secretary of the United States Navydescribes as “non-explosiveweapons,”12 next-generation radio-fre-quency weapons, all kinds of informa-tion warfare capabilities, and bio-tech-nology applications and weapons thatcan and most assuredly will changemuch about warfare. Simply put, weused to employ battering rams andarrows. We still knock down walls andhurl projectiles at the enemy, but thetechnologies for doing this haveimproved.

5) Finally, history shows that investingin the wrong things is not a problemunless others are investing in the rightthings. We see this every quarter inthe private sector. Applied toAirpower and said another way,some one, some group, some nationwill take airpower the next competi-tive step function leap forward. Asmuch as the aircraft looks unlike theballoon and the satellite unlike theaircraft, the next technologies thatreify a revolution in airpower maylook like the means to sluice thezeroes and one’s of precise knowl-edge across the realm of defendedcyberspace.

Taken together what I think all ofthese may mean is that the USAF mayhave taken a wrong turn with its single-minded (for itself) and potentially divi-sive (for its air allies and for its groundand sea partners) pursuit of the F-22. Itis single-minded because apparentlythere is no sacrifice that the USAF isunwilling to make, no element of forcestructure it is unwilling to forgo, noprograms it is reluctant to kill or pushto the right (even including, one mustsuspect, the Joint Strike Fighter), andno amount of money it is unwilling tospend for the ever-more-costly F-22.When one thinks of the larger aerospaceand cyberspace opportunities and therisks of neglecting them13 one cannotbut help think of the climate, the pre-conditions, that caused the dissatisfiedUnited States Army Air Corps to splin-ter from mother Army and become aseparate Air Force.

But even if the F-22 is not largelytechnologically obsolete by the timeit is fielded, it may very well be near-ing irrelevance: airpower’s dread-nought, dreaded by none.14 By thetime the F-22 comes into service, itmay very well be that air superioritycan be assured by surface-to-air mis-siles, inimical lines of code, and elec-tromagnetic energy emanating fromthe land, the sea, and the air. Amongthe more dastardly adversaries, airsuperiority also could be enabled bybiological or chemical substancesthat prevent F-22 ground crews andaircrews from getting airborne. Butthe universe is large: perhaps weshould not lament that for lack ofvision an air force here or there willwither away.

On the other hand, true aficionadosof Airpower fear that an entire air force,

19


at one time the best in the world, isbeing overtaken by its unyielding devo-tion to its phantasmagoric vision of“Those Magnificent Men In TheirFlying Machines”. What’s to fear? Thatthe air force of one country is wrong-headedly pursing this or that phantasmdoes not stop the right-thinkingAirpower advocates of another countryfrom taking a different course. Whatmight that course look like?15

Okay, So Where Should Airpower BeGoing?

To the Infosphere throughCyberspace…

Airpower is about information, soairpower should be moving into spaceand cyberspace. Airpower should com-mand the “infosphere” described byAlvin and Heidi Toffler in Powershift.Information warfare is the great new dis-covery true aficionados of Airpower needto welcome. Military technology gave uscomputing machines, and computingmachines gave us awareness that thingsin the external world could be reduced tocombinations of zeroes and ones. Thisunderstanding launched the InformationAge. These combinations could be trans-mitted electronically as data and recom-bined upon receipt to form the basis ofinformation. According to the work byArquilla and Ronfeldt, “information” ismore than the content or meaning of amessage. Rather, information is “any dif-ference that makes a difference.”16

Awareness that almost everything17 ofmilitary significance in the externalworld could be reduced similarlylaunched the age of information warfare.

Information warfare is troublesomefor the established institutions to “get,”because key facets of it are indirect and

subtle, not direct and brutish.Information warfare is a form of con-flict that attacks information systems—carbon and silicon—as a means toattack adversary knowledge or beliefs.Information warfare can be prosecutedas a component of a larger and morecomprehensive set of hostile activi-ties—what Arquilla and Ronfeldt call a“netwar” or cyberwar—or it can beundertaken as the sole form of hostileactivity. Information warfare can occurin war and it can occur outside of war.

How easy or difficult is engaging ininformation warfare in and for thecyberspace? The basic requirements areeasy according to experts.

Offensive IW, in brief, uses com-puter intrusion techniques andother capabilities against an adver-sary’s information-based infra-structures. The Commission [USPresident’s Commission on CriticalInfrastructure Protection] is awareof little in the way of special equip-ment required to launch IW attackson our computer systems; the basicattack tools—computer, modem,telephone, and software—areessentially the same as those usedby hackers and criminals. Andcompared to the military forces andweapons that in the past threatenedour infrastructures, IW tools arecheap and readily available.18

Others suggest, perhaps unwitting-ly, that many of Airpower’s old targets(power grids, transportation infrastruc-tures, C2 or C3, etc.) are cyberwar’sdomains now. A RAND report notes that

In the future, the possibility existsthat adversaries might exploit thetools and techniques of the

20


21

Information Revolution to hold atrisk (not for destruction, but forlarge-scale or massive disruption)key national strategic assets such aselements of various key nationalinfrastructure sectors, such as ener-gy, telecommunications, trans-portation, and finance.19

This is not to say that the USAFlacks the thinking or the intellectualtools to see cyberwar in their Air Force’sfuture. It has thought about this, devel-oped doctrine about this, but, one mustsuspect that given the resources going tothe F-22, done very little about this.Carefully read what USAF doctrineadvances. This doctrine describesInformation Warfare (IW) as:

…information operations conduct-ed to defend one’s own informationand information systems or attack-ing and affecting an adversary’s in-formation and information systems.The defensive aspect, defensivecounterinformation, much likestrategic air defense, is alwaysoperative. Conversely, the offen-sive aspect, offensive counterinfor-mation, is primarily conductedduring times of crisis or conflict.Information warfare involves suchdiverse activities as psychologicaloperations, military deception,electronic warfare, both physicaland information (“cyber”) attack,and a variety of defensive activitiesand programs. It is important tostress that information warfare is aconstruct that operates across thespectrum, from peace to war, toallow the effective execution of AirForce responsibilities.20

***IW is information operations con-ducted to defend the Air Force’s

own information and informationsystems or conducted to attack andaffect an adversary’s informationand information systems. This war-fare is primarily conducted duringtimes of crisis or conflict. However,the defensive component, much likeair defense, is conducted across thespectrum from peace to war.21

One can forgive the unimaginativeconstructions and the cloned taxono-my. Note however that this relativelyuncomplicated conception, newnonetheless, poorly masks a newadmission—repetition reveals it—thatthis new kind of warfare and warlikeoperation is not restricted to wartime.Offensive information warfare, “offen-sive counter-information” as the USAFcalls it, is “primarily,” but not neces-sarily exclusively conducted “duringtimes of crisis or conflict.”22 This kindof warfare is new, and the new alwayshas been a challenge and vexation tomilitaries.23 Operations in the cyber-space are harder to grapple with andconcretize than F-22s, or missiles, orsatellites.

Thus the future of airpower may beneither air superiority fighters, air-deliv-ered long-range precision weaponry, noreven unmanned aerial vehicles, but a newdiscovery. The new discovery, the potent“new intangibles” of cyberspace opera-tions24 do not eliminate the old “things”of fighting past or fighting present, butthey now allow old things — like airsuperiority fighters — to be augmented,complemented, or in some cases replacedby new things.

If the future of airpower is to com-mand the cyberspace, then the highreaches of the aerospace must be com-manded first.


Puzzlement over or perhaps dissat-isfaction with the way in which theUnited States Air Force superintendsspace has caused the United StatesLegislative branch to begin twoinquiries and appoint two “commis-sions”: the “Commission To AssessUnited States National Security SpaceManagement and Organization” and the“National Commission For The ReviewOf The National ReconnaissanceOffice.26” The “Space Commission” will:

…review the following:

(1) The relationship between theintelligence and nonintelligenceaspects of national security space(so-called ‘white space’ and‘black space’), and the potentialbenefits of a partial or completemerger of the programs, projects,or activities that are differentiatedby the two aspects.

(2) The benefits of establishing anyof the following:

(A) An independent militarydepartment and service dedi-cated to the national securityspace mission.(B) A corps within the AirForce dedicated to the nationalsecurity space mission.(C) A position of AssistantSecretary of Defense for Spacewithin the Office of theSecretary of Defense.(D) Any other change to theexisting organizational struc-ture of the Department ofDefense for national securityspace management and organi-zation.

(3) The benefits of establishing anew major force program, or other

budget mechanism, for managingnational security space fundingwithin the Department of Defense.

The “NRO Commission” will examine

…the current organization, prac-tices, and authorities of the NRO, inparticular with respect to —

(1) roles and mission;(2) organizational structure;(3) technical skills;(4) contractor relationships;(5) use of commercial imagery;(6) acquisition of launch vehicles,launch services, and launch infra-structure, and mission assurance;(7) acquisition authorities; and(8) relationships with other agen-cies and departments of theFederal Government.

Permit a few polite questions. Whytwo parallel, and indeed in some waysoverlapping inquiries? Is it because theUnited States Senate and House ofRepresentatives believe that the USAF27

is doing such a great job of space stew-ardship that they need a statutorymeans to commend it? If so, then is theSpace Commission examining potentialbenefits of “an independent militarydepartment and service” apart from theUSAF or a “corps” within the USAFmerely to banish these bugaboos frompolite discussion for a few years? Orwill the Space Commission surprise us?

I do not know what the Commissionswill find. Does it matter? Not really.Most likely, the United States Air Forcewill “grow” space capability willingly ifits budget is increased. Maybe this isthe gambit? But if not given additionalresources, the priority given the F-22will be higher than the priority USAF

23


can or will give space. The 360-shipUnited States Navy cannot step up tothe responsibility28. The revitalizedUnited States Army cannot.

Thus the conundrum: the USAF isso locked-on to the embellishment ofatmospheric airpower that it cannotembrace a larger vision of airpower, butthere cannot be a larger vision for air-power unless airmen advance it. Whereshall we find those airmen?

Small Air Forces Can Lead theWay

Size does count…

The hope of the future of airpower-writ-large may reside in small air forces.Size counts in a way that is counterintu-itive. One would think that an air forcewith 360,000 people, over 2,600 fighters,and funded at $US 75 billion would havemore options than an air force of 15,000people, about 140 combat aircraft, andfunded at some small fraction of $US 7 bil-lion.29 But such is not the case. Smallerallied air forces may have distinct advan-tages because they are small. In this cat-egory I put the dear friends of the UnitedStates—Canada, Australia, GreatBritain—and to them would add Israel,the Scandinavian air forces, the Dutch,the Belgians, the Italians, and perhapseven the Germans and the Japanese.30

Small air forces do not have to accommo-date to the same levels of bureaucracythat larger air forces do. They are not,and what a blessing, headquartered inWashington DC. Small air forces are freerto innovate. They use “guile and ingenu-ity to solve problems” and their “chain ofcommand is lean, unstructured and goaloriented—typical more of a start-up thana military bureaucracy.”31 Innovatorsand the managers of innovation know

that it is always a messy process. ButHoward Sherman and Ron Schultz offerthis consolation and admonition:

As information-gathering and – uti-lizing systems, we humans need to real-ize that coherent information flows with-in the fluid context of the complex, notin the solid walls of controlled order.The most powerful and innovative loca-tion within that realm is at the edge ofchaos. At this critical juncture, just thisside of the phase transition into chaos,the greatest opportunities for innovationexist. Mining along this outpost on theedge of confusion may seem dangerous,may go against every wall-building, safe-ty-seeking instinct we have, but it ishere that information thrives and thesurprise of innovation is commonplace.Organizations must learn to operatealong this precipice so that they neitherfall into the total disorder of chaos norare inundated by the overburdenedinfrastructure they have built to protectthemselves.32

I believe that the USAF has both a“safety-seeking instinct” and an “over-burdened infrastructure.”33 I havelearned not to be disappointed whenthere is little innovation there.Although any one of the small air forcescould leapfrog ahead,34 should oneexpect Canada to be in the vanguard?Australian airmen assure me it will notbe them. The air forces of Canada andother sovereign states must draw theirown conclusions. Perhaps there are noconclusions to draw save that “the mer-its of joint operations and the mercilessimperatives of economic efficienciesincreasingly determine the agenda” ofsmall air forces. They are not free tochoose. Perhaps small air forces make avirtue of necessity and assert that theywant to remain miniature versions of

24


the larger USAF, even if it means run-ning the risk of irrelevance. Perhapsgoodwill is more important than any-thing else. These are matters aboutwhich only those invited to adviseshould advise.

But taking Canada as an example,and hypothesizing that advice weresought, what would be a path to revo-lution? There are at least five steps.First, do the headwork before begin-ning the footwork. The CanadianForces College, like the AirpowerStudies Centre in Australia, can be theincubator for forward thinking, auda-cious thinking, about revolutionarytransformations of airpower in the 21stcentury context. Build bridges withevery Staff College and War College youcan. Discuss these things openly withfriends and potential adversaries alike.Take a systems approach. Think interms of the metasystem.

Take advantage of your differentia-tion, too. Canada’s armed forces alsohave the experience of what is good andbad about unification and integration—ask any naval officer—and the “happycompromises” actually required tomake jointness work. In close collabo-ration with ground and sea forces, air-power advocates would begin thethinking that lays the foundation forfuture airpower concepts of opera-tions—which must come first—andfuture doctrine. (I am not, by the way,persuaded that you have not begun aversion of that process already.) Thentest the concepts. Be open to criticism. …but brains, cunning, and chutzpahcount more!

Next, second, and only when theinitial thinking is largely done, putyour friends on notice that changes

may be imminent and that negotia-tions will follow. Get shrewd andcanny business advisors to help youcraft the “deals” you will have to make.Inventory what you have to offer thatothers cannot do without.35 Know yourtrade space and the offsets you want,and trade and barter what you have forwhat you need for transformation.36 Ifyou have “spies,” and I only presumethat you do, trade their services forother collection technologies and sys-tems you do not have. Be tough withthe Big Players. Keep in mind that otherair forces may be giant, but they aremerely the instrumentality of anothersovereign State, and States are equallysovereign even when they are notequivalent in size or wealth. Such isthe law that binds us all.

Put the word on the street thatCanada’s air force intends to move awayfrom being an atmospheric air force andmigrate to an infospheric force. I wouldgo directly — as directly as the lawallows — to Boeing’s Phantom Works,Lockheed Martin’s Shunkworks, theHughes Research Center, Silicon Valley’sentrepreneurs, and countless otherswho can help envision an infosphericair force. Aerospace firms in the UnitedStates, for example, are more innovativethan their Government customers.They would be delighted with dealsthat spark innovation and put an out-side-in pressure on their Governmentcustomers. Form coalitions with otherlike-minded small air forces. Create abuying bloc for procurements. Butwhat does one procure?

Third, consider that one mightbegin by procuring a combination ofco-produced37 sensors andunmanned aerial vehicles for theintensive maritime patrol and

25


coastal defense missions.38 This is awonderful beginning. One might thenre-role planned investments in aircraftupgrades and new aircraft acquisitionsto planned procurements of revolution-ary knowledge systems. Simultaneously,work the challenge of networkingknowledge. Work with ground andnaval forces to incorporate engage-ment systems into the knowledge net-work. Work with vendors (and yoursmall air force buying bloc) to get thedeals you need.

Fourth, move into space moredeeply than Canada is already inspace. If the United States has goofyexport restrictions39 that affect, say, aCanadian radar satellite, perhaps anoth-er nation that also has a small air forcedoes not have such restrictions. Betough in negotiations and willing totrade. If Iceland, for example, plans amissile defense system that might causeunexploded ordnance or biologicalweapon warheads to rain down onCanada, then demand that in fair con-sideration Canada have a say in and apiece of the space action. Be obnoxiouswhen Iceland says “no.”

Fifth, and finally, keep the pres-sure up on the United States Air Force.General Kinsman, for example, is arespected friend of General Ryan. AirMarshal McCormick of the RoyalAustralian Air Force is a friend both toGeneral Kinsman and General Ryan. Theyall can talk, air chief to air chief. The F-22is not Canada’s issue nor Australia’s issue,but the future of Airpower most certainlyis. The Chiefs must talk about this.Eventually, like water wearing on rock,we can revolutionize airpower. If not us,then who? God forbid it be theUnrestricted Warfare crowd. God forbidthe revolution be delayed much longer.

Conclusion

If I have not yet worn out my wel-come, I suspect it may be like Wellingtonobserved about Waterloo, “A damn nearrun thing.” I will close. My recruitingdrive does not end here though; it mere-ly goes into a strategic pause. If you andI do not take it upon ourselves to revolu-tionize airpower, we will be like the sol-diers of the 1930s — the ones who spentgood Army money on research into gasmasks for horses. The choice is ours. Dowe have the guts to choose and the wis-dom to choose properly? The time fortransformation is now.

Endnotes

1. The views expressed are those of the author.

2. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., Moltke On the Artof War: Selected Writings (Novato CA:Presidio Press, 1993), p. 258. Hughes noteson page 257 that “The source of this essay isuncertain. It probably is a combination ofpreviously unpublished essays.”

3. Disagreeing with soldiers seems to be inthe DNA of airmen.

4. Aircraft that could hover followed aircraftthat passed at “high speed” through the airby at least three decades.

5. For those who believe “denial and decep-tion” are new, one need only turn to naturefor disputation.

6. R. J. Overy, The Air War: 1939-1945 (NewYork: Stein and Day, 1980), p. 267.

7. We forget that the Red Army broke theback of the Nazi army by destroying 150divisions with only modest support from theAllies. See John Ellis, Brute Force: AlliedStrategy and Tactics in the Second World War(New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), R. J.Overy, The Air War: 1939-1945 (New York:Stein and Day, 1980), and Graham Lyons,ed., The Russian Version of the Second WorldWar: The History of the War as Taught to

26


Soviet Schoolchildren (New York: Facts OnFile, Inc., 1976).

8. Ellis, Brute Force, p. xviii. Ellis records that

…in the last 18 months of the war the Alliesput onto the battlefield 80,000 tanks to theGerman’s 20,000, 1,100,000 trucks and lor-ries to 70,000, and 235,000 combat aircraftto 45,000; in these same months the U-boatssank 630,000 tons of merchant shippingwhilst the Allied shipyards turned outanother 20,000,000 tons; between 1942 and1945 the Japanese built 13 aircraft carriers,the crucial component of modern naval war-fare, but the Americans built 137. TheBattle of Production was virtually awalkover.

9. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, MilitaryMisfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War(New York: The Free Press, 1990). Theauthors advise that

Military organizations should inculcate intheir members a relentless empiricism, a dis-dain for a priori theorizing if they are to suc-ceed. The “learners” in military organiza-tions must cultivate the temperament of thehistorian, the detective, the journalist,rather than the theoretical bent of the socialscientist or philosopher.

10. My friend and colleague, the late CarlBuilder, offered this insight years ago.

11. Frank Strickland, when reviewing anearlier version of these remarksobserved, “The vantage of the heightsgives one an advantage in sensing. Donot equate, however, that advantagewith knowing. As you well know, sens-ing and knowing are two related but dif-ferent things.” He is, of course correct,sensing is a precondition for knowing.But because one cannot “know,” what isunobserved or un-sensed, exceptthrough faith, the vantage of the heightsis the vantage of knowing.

12. My “Have We Not Yet Begun to Fight?: ATalk About War’s Future With Secretary ofthe Navy Richard Danzig,” Civilization,February/March 2000, p. 61.

13. “DOD’s Strategy For CommunicationsImprovements Called Inadequate,” Inside ThePentagon, March 9, 2000, p. 1. If the UnitedStates Air Force is the United StatesDepartment of Defense’s “executive agent”for space, then these deficiencies suggest fail-ures in vision, funding, or execution. Theyat least suggest other priorities.

The [Defense Science Board] task forcefound no established and verified DOD-wide database of Joint InformationExchange Requirements, which made itdifficult to assess DOD needs. However,the task force derived what it termed a“conservative estimate for the peak total[communications] capacity required fortwo major theaters of war,” measured ingigabits per second (Gbps). The taskforce estimated that by 2010, the mili-tary will require 35 Gbps — “almost 20times what was used in the (uncontested)Bosnia operation in 1997.”

This conservative estimate, the reportadds, “far exceeds the total capacities ofcurrent and planned DOD communica-tion systems, even when projected overthe next decade.”

Other factors complicating DOD’s abilityto meet future requirements includespectrum allocation issues, “Title 10arguments about who is in charge,” anda “significant lack of ‘systems’ perspec-tive and independent system engineer-ing organizations within DOD to providethe necessary studies and analyses.”

14. In the last several combat engagementsinvolving the United States and the armedforces of other States, a legitimate responseto Allied Airpower has been to not fly. Weshould seriously consider the possibility thatan asymmetric response to Allied fighters inthe future is to not fly or to rely on surface-to-air missiles as an enemy’s response to ourair superiority. As an aside, I recall a cartoonin the New Yorker magazine during theheight of the Cold War era. It showed twoRed Army marshals seated at a café in Paris,sipping wine, and gazing upward at inter-twined contrails. The caption read, “By theway, who did win the air war?”

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15. In reviewing an earlier version of thispaper, Dr. Alan Stephens of the AirpowerStudies Centre in Australia wrote:

I think that air forces as we know andlove them will continue to serve a use-ful warfighting purpose, but primarilyin a ‘tactical’ setting. Increasingly thepursuit of strategic effect will be pur-sued via long-range precision missiles,space-based weapons, and cyberwar.(Post-Kosovo, I will be astonished if thenext rogue state/organisation whichtakes on the rest of the world doesn’tuse an all-out cyber-attack. They’ll befools if they don’t.) Air forces have nospecial competence or preordainedplace in any of those activities.

Permit me to add an inflection. The goal ofarmed force is to combine with other kindsof force or power to achieve strategic “out-comes,” not strategic “effects.” The distinc-tion between the two notions is significant,especially for airmen who like to think interms of “weapons effects.” For airmen,“strategic weapons effects” often mean “bigand widespread,” as opposed to “tactical,”which, of course, mean “local and little.”Stealing a thought from the Russian lexicon,strategic operations “alter the course or out-come” of a struggle. All force elements,Airpower included, should strive for, bedesigned for, and be employed with theintention of achieving strategic outcomes.The dominant outcome sought is not “rapiddominance” (an idea fashionable in the USDefense Department now), but rapid “reso-lution.” Resolution may or may not requiredominance since dominance may not allowfor resolution.

16. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt,“Cyberwar is Coming!” ComparativeStrategy 2 (April-June 1993), pp 141-65.

17. But not the internal world. There aresome things of military significance—inten-tions and hostile will, for example—thatawait work undone in chemistry and bio-chemistry before they can be decomposedinto the electrochemical impulses that canbe reduced to zeroes and ones. That daywill come. See Robert L. Solso, Mind and

Brain Sciences in the 21st Century (CambridgeMA: The MIT Press, 1997), John Maddox,What Remains to be Discovered: Mapping theSecrets of the Universe, the Origins of Life,and the Future of the Human Race (London:The Free Press, 1998), and Steve Connor,“Science finds key to beating fear,” TheTimes Newspapers Limited, February 221998.

18. The President’s Commission on CriticalInfrastructure Protection, October 1998, p.30. Emphasis added.

19. “Executive Summary,” Strategic InformationWarfare Rising (MR-964-OSD), p. 1.

20. United States Air Force, “Foreword,”Information Operations, Air Force DoctrineDocument 2–5, 5 August 1998, p. ii.

21. Air Force Doctrine Document 2–5, p. 2.

22. We must appreciate that careful wordchoices have been made before doctrine isapproved for publication. The choice of theword “primarily” appears significant to me.

23. Especially in the alliance context. SeeMaria Seminerio, “’Infowarfare’ part ofNATO arsenal?” Ziff Wire, March 26, 1999.

24. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, “Foreword: TheNew Intangibles,” In Athena’s Camp:Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age(Santa Monica CA: RAND MR-880-OSD,1997), p. xiv.None of this is to suggest that tangible,material resources and technologies aregoing to vanish in a puff of dematerializa-tion. Obviously, things matter, andweapons matter more than most things.Software still needs hardware. Soldiers can-not eat data. Nonetheless, the fundamentalrelations between the tangible and whatmight be called the “new intangibles” areincreasingly crucial to military effectiveness,in both waging war and trying to prevent it.

25. Martin Libicki and I asserted that spacewas the gateway to the infosphere and thatcommanding the infosphere required spacecapabilities. We described the problem thisway in “ . . . Or Go Down In Flame?: Toward

28


An Airpower Manifesto for the Twenty-FirstCentury”

The leap from an atmospheric to aninfospheric Air Force is the next logicalstep, as paradoxical as it may seem. Airforces have always capitalized on speed,range, freedom of maneuver, and van-tage that their medium provides. Yet,nothing travels faster than information.Nothing impedes the distances thatknowledge can travel. Nothing makesmovement more intelligent, economi-cal, and fruitful than information. Andnothing would provide the vantagethat a metasystem provides.Atmospheric solutions sufficed untiltechnology permitted multiple solu-tions from any medium. The metasys-tem, however, demands an integrationof exoatmospheric components withthose provided from the air and thesurface. This is not the vision or rolethat the Army, Navy, and Marine Corpsare in a natural position to advanceon—although they may lay claim tobits and pieces, thereby frustrating thelarger aim. This opportunity is the AirForce’s to lose. Done properly, the issuebecomes not so much “What is thefuture of the Air Force?” but “What isthe Air Force of the future?”

26. Emphasis added. See H.R.1555, TitleVII, Section 701, Intelligence AuthorizationAct for Fiscal Year 2000 (Enrolled Bill Sent toPresident) and Subtitle B, Section 911,Commission To Assess United StatesNational Security Space Management andOrganization.

27. The director of the NationalReconnaissance Office also is an AssistantSecretary of the United States Air Force.

28. “30-Year Shipbuilding Plan OutlinesNeed For A 360-Ship Navy,” Defense Daily,March 6, 2000, p. 1. The article states

The 360-ship force level would providefor 15 aircraft carrier battle groups and14 amphibious ready groups. Elementsof that force structure include 134 sur-face combatants, 68 attack submarines,

four SSGN strike variants of the Ohio-class SSBN submarine, four commandships, 14 SSBNs, 40 combat logisticsforce ships, and 16 mine warfare ships.

Senior Navy officials have recently toldCongress that, from a requirements per-spective, the 300-ship Navy endorsedby the 1997 Quadrennial DefenseReview is not adequate to meet the ser-vice’s commitments.

***The annual funding required to sustainthe force level of about 306 ships—asnoted in the 1997 Quadrennial DefenseReview—will require on average $14billion per year. Funding spikes areexpected for full funding of aircraftcarrier procurement in FY ‘01, ‘06, ‘11,‘16 and ‘19. Those spikes reach as highas the $20 billion mark.

29. The comparisons here are, of course,between the air forces of the United Statesand those of Canada. See The MilitaryBalance 1999/2000, The InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies (London:Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-29,49-50 and The Military Balance 1998/99, TheInternational Institute for Strategic Studies(London: Oxford University Press, 1998),pp. 12-27, 47-48. The 1998 issue presentsthe United States Air Force Total ObligationAuthority in Table 5, page 16. The 1999issue does not have a similar Table.

30. I have omitted the French from this listonly because regarding their air force, as inmany other things, they must be consideredas unique and very special. Nations thatforbid using words and phrases like “e-mail” and “start-up” in official communica-tions are very special indeed.

31. An excellent example is provided byIsrael’s armed forces. See “SuccessfulTech Start-Ups Utilize TechniquesLearned In The Army,” Wall StreetJournal, March 6, 2000, p. 1.

That, says Mr. Kalish and many of hisclients, is why Israel’s high-ts Ut lesh and maned [()24.9(h)45 y of 20015Tc 0.480nated by formert ltelligence

2 9

people and fighter jocks. The Israelimilitary, which is as informal as it isformidable, has served as the incubatorfor a generation of hugely successfulstart-ups, many of which use deriva-tives of classified defense technologyand now trade on the Nasdaq StockExchange.

Limited in size and number, the Israeliarmy has survived by tapping everydrop of its resources. It gives enor-mous responsibility to relatively jun-ior officers and encourages them touse their guile and ingenuity to solveproblems. The chain of command islean, unstructured and goal oriented-typical more of a start-up than a mili-tary bureaucracy.

“It’s in the nature of the Israeli mili-tary-that ‘can do’ attitude,” says BennyLevin, a retired intelligence officer whohelped found computer-software giantNice Systems Ltd. “In a way, Israel is astart-up country.”

32. Howard Sherman and Ron Schultz, OpenBoundaries: Creating Business InnovationThrough Complexity (Reading MA: PereusBooks, 1998), p. 69. See also Ralph D. Stacey,Managing the Unknowable: StrategicBoundaries Between Order and Chaos inOrganizations (San Francisco: Jossey-BassPublishers, 1992, John H. Holland, HiddenOrder: How Adaptation Builds Complexity(Amsterdam: Addison-Wesley PublishingCompany, 1995), T. Irene Sanders, StrategicThinking and the New Science: Planning in theMidst of Chaos, Complexity, and Change (NewYork: The Free Press, 1998), Peter F. DruckerInnovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice andPrinciples (New York: Harper and RowPublishers: 1985), Dan Dimancescu and KempDwenger World-Class Product Development:Benchmarking Best Practices of Agile manufac-turers (New York: American ManufacturingAssociation, 1996), David M. Anderson AgileProduct Development for Mass Customization(Chicago: Irwin Professional Publishing,1997), Clayton M. Christensen The Innovator’sDilemma: When Technologies Cause greatFirms to Fail (Boston: Harvard BusinessSchool Press, 1997), Jeremy Hope and Tony

Hope Competing in the Third Wave: The TenKey management Issues of the InformationAge (Boston: Harvard Business SchoolPress, 1997).

33. There are, for example, more peopleassigned to the staffs of subordinate head-quarters of the United States Air Force thanthere are people in Canada’s air force.

34. One reviewer disagrees, noting that issmall air forces “the merits of joint opera-tions and the merciless imperatives of eco-nomic efficiencies increasingly determinethe agenda.” Hence, the “defence forces ofsmaller countries…are ineluctably movingtowards the ‘tactical effects’ component.”See note 15 above.

35. Among these are your friendship and theconsanguinity of shared values, access, awell educated workforce, a commitment tofairness and social equality, vast expanses fortraining and testing, the NORAD agreement,and purchasing power. There are others.

36. The People’s Republic of China, forexample, requires creation of an “institute”or “training facility” for every deal thatallows access to Chinese production capac-ity (and its relaxed environmental andoccupational safety laws) and Chinese mar-kets. China also requires that firms doingbusiness in China provide the exit ormigration plans that eventually lead toChinese control. If China, why not Canada?

37. Nothing precludes “sole source”arrangements with suppliers.

38. Canada, like Australia, has a huge coast-line. Imagine a Canadian-Australian part-nership to procure the suites of sensors andUAVs that watch those coasts.

39. It’s arguable whether the restrictionsproper are goofy or not, but the way inwhich they are managed in the United Stateswould, I opine, have to improve to rise tothe level of “goofy.”

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31

Introduction

anada has had a distinguishedhistory in the realm of space.

Since the beginning of the modern“space era”, Canada has been a “spacefaring” nation.1 Being a northerly coun-try, phenomena such as the AuroraBorealis and magnetic anomalies associ-ated with the Magnetic North Pole,stimulated space-oriented research veryearly in Canada’s history. This initialresearch laid the foundation for studiesconcerning the difficulties of radiocommunication in the north to thedevelopment of the CANADARM forthe US Space Shuttle program.

Canadian achievements in spacehave been marked by exemplary scien-tific research, satellite engineeringexpertise, co-operation not only withthe United States but also with a host ofother countries and collaborationbetween government and industry. Theemphasis has been not only on scientif-ic research but also in commercial appli-cations with Canada being a leader insatellite communication systems.

Canada’s interest in space has pri-marily been related to its use for peace-ful purposes. In accordance with inter-national law, space treaties and agree-ments that Canada has ratified, the pol-icy of the Government of Canada is tooppose placing weapons in space.2

Historically, the Canadian military hashad and continues to have a role to playin Canadian space endeavours, especial-ly as space provides a unique opportu-nity for the Canadian Forces (CF) toexercise control over territory, airspaceand sea approaches.3 Ongoing efforts toexplore the military uses of space willassist the CF in effectively exploitingthis important medium.

Early Research

Communication throughout most ofCanada in the first half of the 20th

Century was reliant upon radio signalsreflected from the ionosphere.Unfortunately, the phenomena of theAurora Borealis or “Northern Lights”and location of the North Magnetic Polein northern Canada, seriously degradesthis form of communication.4 Researchon studying these phenomena wasstarted as early as 18395 in Canada,which set the groundwork for furtherstudies of the ionosphere and radiocommunications.

Throughout the Second WorldWar, research programs were focusedon the military. In Canada, the first sys-tematic measurements of the ionospherewere made to improve naval radio com-munications and surveillance of trans-missions from German U-Boats.6

Additionally, improvements were madein reconnaissance photography for the

Historical Background of Canada inSpace

S y n d i c a t e 5 : M a j o r C l i f f B e a t t i e ( C h a i r ) , M a j o r S a n d r aB a k e r , M a j o r T o m G u t t o r m s e n ,L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l S l a w o m i r K a l u z i n s k i , M a j o r D o n L e b l a n c ,L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l A l a i n P a r e n t , M a j o r P i e r r e R u e l , a n dM a j o r M a r y T u r k i n g t o n

C


national photographic and survey pro-gram – a program for which the RCAFwas responsible since its inception. Inthe field of aviation medicine, therewere other advancements initiallydeveloped to satisfy military require-ments that were later relevant to spaceresearch. In 1939, Sir Frederic Bantingoversaw the formation of the NationalResearch Council (NRC) AssociateCommittee on Aviation MedicalResearch to support research projectsinvolving the protection of pilots andaircrew who were about to wage aerialwarfare. The focus was on the physio-logical effects of acceleration anddecompression, oxygen equipment,motion sickness and the “G-Suit” devel-oped by Dr. Wilbur Franks.7

Satellite Programmes

Most of the military research thatcontinued after the war was conductedat the Laboratories of the DefenceResearch Board (DRB) which wereformed in 1947. It was at these labora-tories that some of the major Canadianspace programs were initiated. Two ofthese laboratories were amalgamated toform the Defence ResearchTelecommunications Establishment(DRTE) and it was scientists from DRTEwho responded to an invitation from theUS for international participation in theirscientific satellite program, not long afterthe launch of Sputnik I by the USSR.The DRTE proposal was to design andbuild a complete satellite, which would,from a high orbit, monitor the iono-sphere from above. This proposal wasacceptable to US National AeronauticalSpace Agency (NASA) which agreed toprovide the launch facilities.

The Canadian team, led by JohnChapman, built a satellite from scratch

with an emphasis on reliability. Theresultant Alouette I was an unquali-fied success both scientifically andfrom an engineering perspective. Thesatellite was launched 29 September1962 and although designed to oper-ate for only one year in space, it “infact operated for 10 years, vastlyexceeding even the most optimisticexpectations.”8 Canada became onlythe third nation to have built its ownsatellite for orbit and Alouette wasthe first spacecraft to be built entire-ly by a country other than the US orthe USSR. The value of the Alouetteprogram was not only the significantamount of scientific data it generatedabout the ionosphere, but also equal-ly important were the technical com-petence, confidence and credibilitythat it gave to Canadian scientists toundertake even ambitious projects inspace.

Following the success of AlouetteI, the US and Canada embarked on ajoint program to launch more satel-lites. The program was known as theInternational Satellites for IonosphericStudies (ISIS) program and was man-aged at DRTE by David Florida, forwhom the David Florida Laboratory inOttawa was later named.9 Individualsatellites, named Alouette II, ISIS Iand ISIS II, were built in Canada andwere launched by NASA from 1965-1971. Several other countries also par-ticipated in this program by buildingground stations.10 Significantly, it wasalso during this program that theGovernment of Canada successfullytransferred technology developed ingovernment laboratories to industrywith the intent of establishing aCanadian space-based industry withthe economic benefits associated witha high-tech industry.

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While activity on building satel-lites was focused at DRTE, anotheraspect of space research was being con-ducted in Churchill, Manitoba. In theearly 1950s, American scientists wereinterested in probing the atmospherenear the auroral zone for comparisonwith data they had been collecting inNew Mexico. Churchill, located in theauroral zone was ideal especially as itwas accessible by rail and sea and theDefence Research Northern Laboratoryand the Fort Churchill Canadian armycamp were already located there. TheDRB supported the US initiative and theUS Army installed launch facilities forrockets. The first rockets, launched in1955, were ground-to-air missiles firedindependently by the Canadian Armyas part of cold weather trials.

The launching of rockets atChurchill was conducted for more than25 years and provided Canadians with ameans of launching their own scientificpayloads into the upper atmosphere.Altogether, the Americans fired 95rockets from Churchill.11 As the rocketprogram grew, the NRC eventually tookover its management from theAmericans and the expertise that hadbeen developed in government labora-tories was slowly transferred toCanadian industry. With the reductionof government budgets in the 1980s, therocket program was gradually reducedand finally terminated in 1984.12 Thecancellation of this program “had a sig-nificant effect on the Space ScienceProgram as it removed the only compo-nent of the program that had a relative-ly short time-frame between project ini-tiation and launch.”13

During the 1960s, it was evidentthat satellites could resolve the commu-nications problems experienced in the

north and provide other commercialservices such as the delivery of televi-sion programs in both official lan-guages. In 1967, the Governmentdecided to refocus the emphasis ofCanada’s space programs from purelyscientific to commercial applications.As a result, the Alouette-ISIS programwas terminated and the scientific studyof space in Canada seriously declined.14

Commercial Focus

With this refocus, Parliamentpassed an act on 1 September 1969 tocreate Telesat Canada, a government-industry corporation which wouldoperate a satellite-based domestic com-munication system across the country.The first satellite of the system was des-ignated Anik A, which was launched inNovember 1972. With that satellite,Canada became the first country in theworld to have a satellite in geostation-ary orbit for domestic communica-tions.15 The system was successful inproviding quality telephone serviceand television to every community inthe country and in 1990, and the AnikE series of satellites became the mostpowerful domestic communicationssatellites ever launched.16

Teleglobe Canada, originally namedthe Canadian Overseas Telecomm-unications Corporation (COTC), isresponsible for providing overseas com-munications. Initially using wirelessradio and then cable, Teleglobe nowrepresents Canada in Intelsat, the com-mercial, international satellite organiza-tion established in 1964, in whichCanada has a 3 percent share.17

Canadian stations are located in MillVillage, Nova Scotia; Weir, Quebec; andLake Cowichan, BC. Teleglobe was alsoone of the founding members of

33


Inmarsat which provides improved mar-itime communications18 and has beenused extensively by the Canadian Forceson deployment and by ships at sea.

In 1967, Department of NationalDefence (DND) and Canadian ResearchCouncil (CRC) engineers collaboratedon a project to evaluate the use of USmilitary satellites for mobile services.The intent was to provide a mobiletelephone service that would operateanywhere in Canada, using small,inexpensive terminals. A military sys-tem was not implemented in Canada;however, plans were made to offer aMobile Communications Satellite(MSAT) on a commercial basis. Thesatellite was launched in April 1996and provides cellular-like telephoneservice across North America includ-ing up to 400 km offshore, to portionsof the Canadian Arctic, and to CentralAmerica and the Caribbean. MSATlinks land mobile, aeronautical andmarine phones with the terrestrialtelephone network.19

The Hermes satellite program (alsoknown as the CommunicationsTechnology Satellite (CTS)) was also ajoint Canada-US program carried outfrom 1970 to 1980. The intent of theprogram was to develop advanced tech-nology in high-powered satellite com-munications and included participationfrom the European Space ResearchOrganisation (ESRO). The infrastruc-ture investment that Canada made wasthe David Florida Laboratory that wasdesigned and constructed specificallyfor the Hermes project.20 Launched in1976, Hermes was the world’s mostpowerful communications satellitewhich led to powerful direct-to-homecommunications satellites in both theUS and Canada.21

Specialized Programmes

Satellites were also perceived to beuseful in the realm of humanitarianassistance. An international programwas established to locate ships and air-craft in distress and in 1975, the feasi-bility of a satellite aided Search andRescue (SAR) system was successfullydemonstrated in Canada. The work wassponsored by DND and carried out atCRC. In a joint program, Canada, Franceand the US created SARSAT in 1979.These SARSAT partners co-operatedwith the USSR by incorporating thecompatible Soviet system known asCOSPAS into SARSAT. Canada pro-vides some of the required SARSATequipment including SAR repeatersdeveloped by Spar Aerospace Ltd andthe Local User Terminals (LUTs) for usein Canada and abroad, supplied byCanadian Aeronautics Ltd.22

Another innovation involvingCanada was the Navstar GlobalPositioning System (GPS). Although aUS developed system for primary navi-gation, Canada, represented by DND,signed agreements with the US to par-ticipate in research and development forthe system. The Canadian Marconi Co.developed the GPS receiver for DND.Agreements were also signed with theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) countries to foster use and stan-dardization of the system.

As early as 1969, the US invitedCanada to participate in the US SpaceTransportation System (STS) program,more commonly known as the SpaceShuttle. Canadians had previouslyearned credibility with NASA withtheir accumulated experience in space-related programs. This facilitated anagreement whereby Canada would pro-

34


vide the Remote Manipulator System(RMS) for the shuttle, more colloquiallyknown as the CANADARM. TheCANADARM was tested at the DavidFlorida Laboratory and was first testedin space on the Shuttle Columbia inNovember 1981. The RMS is used exten-sively by astronauts on the shuttle tolaunch, retrieve and repair satellites andhas proved to be extremely successful.

In 1982, 20 years after the launchof Alouette I, NASA opened the astro-naut program to Canadians.Commander (later Captain) MarcGarneau, a Canadian Forces Officer, wasthe first Canadian to fly in space. Hisshuttle flight of October 1984 was ofbenefit to many Canadian scientists andthe life-science experiments he con-ducted were all related to space adapta-tion syndrome. The Defence and CivilInstitute of Environmental Medicine(DCIEM) and NRC sponsored theseexperiments.

RADARSAT, another joint projectwith the US, is used for remote sensingand has an all-weather, day/night imag-ing capability using synthetic apertureradar. The system has a resolution ofbetween 8 to 100m and can providedata, which when combined with digi-tal terrain data, will create a 3-D repre-sentation of any area of interest.23

RADARSAT, in conjunction with theLANDSAT satellite launched by the US,provides Canada with a thrivingremote-sensing industry used for natu-ral resource surveys and studying theearth’s surface.24

The next major project on the hori-zon is the International Space Station,“one of the most complex and ambitioustechnological undertakings ever con-ceived.”25 Canada was invited to par-

ticipate in the project and will con-tribute the Mobile Servicing System(MSS). This system will assist in theconstruction of the space station as wellas have an ongoing role to play in themaintenance of the station structure.Once again, this project will exemplifythe team effort of both Government andindustry.

Canadian Space Programme/Canadian Space Agency

John Chapman, considered the“Father of the Canadian SpaceProgram”, was commissioned by theFederal Government in 1966 to preparea report to establish the basis for a poli-cy on space research. Known as theChapman Report, it recommendedamong other things, the creation of anational space agency. This conceptfinally came to fruition in 1989 with theformation of the Canadian SpaceAgency (CSA), the centre of excellencefor the Canadian Space Program.26

Objectives. The objectives of theCanadian Space Program are “to devel-op and apply space science and technol-ogy to meet Canadian needs and to fos-ter an internationally competitive spaceindustry.”27 To these ends, Canada hasaggressively pursued satellite communi-cations and remote sensing, spacerobotics and additional activities thatwill provide the greatest socio-econom-ic and technological benefits.

Canadian Space Policy. The spacepolicy framework stems from the CSA’slegislated mandate “…to promote thepeaceful use and development of space,to advance the knowledge of spacethrough science, and to ensure thatspace science and technology providesocial and economic benefits for all

35


Canadians.”28 The framework “con-firms the strategic importance of spacein Canada’s transition to a knowledge-based economy and to the social, scien-tific, sovereignty, and foreign policyobjectives of the government.”29

Canada’s space vision is also derivedfrom these objectives: to maintain andexpand Canadian expertise in tradi-tional areas of activity; to derive maxi-mum social and economic benefit fromCanada’s activities in space; to fosterregional development; to develop anduse Canada’s space infrastructure; andto private sector infrastructure.

Canada pursues a number of strate-gies in order to realize its mandate.These strategies, dictated by policyobjectives and resource limitations,include specialization, or a niche strate-gy, industrial commercialization, part-nerships, fostering excellence in sci-ence, and nurturing a science culture.Accordingly, the CSA has forged vitalpartnerships with other agenciesincluding educational institutions,industry, defence, and internationalagencies such as the European SpaceAgency (ESA). The main areas of spe-cialization include space robotics andautomation (CANADARM), radarremote sensing (RADARSAT I and II),advanced satellite communications andspace science.

New Space Program. Canada’s newspace program was approved in 1999and is restructured around the follow-ing five areas of strategic importance toCanada:

a. Earth & Environment(RADARSAT 1 and 2);

b. Space Sciences (Life andMicrogravity);

c. Human Presence in Space(International Space Station);

d. Satellite Communications (tele-education and -medicine); and

e. Generic/Enabling Space Tech-nologies (miniturization of satel-lite payloads).

Testing and Integration. Canada isfortunate to have the world class facili-ty of the David Florida Laboratory fortesting space technologies. This facilityhas supported testing for theCANADARM, RADARSAT I andCanada’s Mobile Servicing System forthe International Space Station.

CSA and European Space Agencyco-operative ventures. The history ofco-operation in space-related activitiesbetween Canada and Europe predatesthe creation of the ESA. The co-opera-tive venture first began in the early1970s when the European SpaceResearch Organization (ESRO) providedthe solar cell panels and other compo-nents for the Canadian HERMESSatellite Program. The convention cre-ating the ESA was signed in 1975 and,shortly afterwards, the first agreementbetween Canada and the ESA was rati-fied. The co-operation agreement,recently renewed for another term,establishes the framework for co-opera-tion in the fields of space research andtechnology and their space applica-tions. Areas of interest include satellitecommunications and remote sensing,particularly the framework for co-oper-ation in space-related activities forexclusively peaceful purposes.

Canada’s objectives for signingthe co-operation agreement with theESA included fostering collaboration

36

37

in science and technology develop-ment, pursuing synergistic benefitsaccrued by participating in largespace projects on a cost sharing basisand fostering the competitiveness ofCanadian industry. Recent studies,one of which was commissioned bythe CSA, have shown that both part-ners have benefited not only from atechnology aspect but also from aneconomical one.

DND and Space

The military had sponsored manyof Canada’s early space projects. “Priorto 1966, Canadian space projects admin-istered by the military represented 41%of total Canadian expenditures onspace.” Subsequently, the program was“demilitarized” and the focus shifted toan emphasis on commercial applica-tions. The CF has recently established a

Figure 1. D Space D Organization Chart

COS DCDSB Gen

ColD Space D

LColCO CF Det CSA

LCdrD/PM JSP

CSA LO(Civ)

CivDSD Coord

(AS 2)

LColD Space D 2

PD JSP

MajD Space D 3

(JSST Member)

CivD Space D 3-2-2

(AS-3)

Maj (USAF)D Space D 3-3

JSST Team Leader

LCdrJSST

Naval Ops

MajJSST

Army Ops

MajD Space D 3-5

PM JSPDS 5

DTSES

CivPE 2

(CS 3)

Capt

PE3

MajD Space D 2-2(JSST Member)

MajD Space D 2-3

CaptD Space D 2-4(JSST Member)

LCdrD Space D 2-5(JSST Member)

CivD Space D 2-6

ENG 4

D Space D 2PD JSPPD SoS

Joint Op ReqrsArchitecture

R&DOps Research

D Space D 3

PolicyDoctrine

JSST LeadEducation

Human Resources

JSST

EX/Op Planning & ExecutionSp to Ops & Exs

Testing/EvaluationModeling/Simulation/Wargaming

Space Awareness

Lt(N)PE 4

MajJSST

Air Ops

MajJSST

Air Ops

The Joint Space Support Team (JSST) concept isunder development. In the interim requirements forJSST support will be met through forming an ad-hocJSST from designated D Space D Staff. Space D 3-3is the designated team leader. The remainder of theteam will be tailored to meet the specific requirement.

CaptJSST

Info Ops(CELE)


joint Directorate of Space Development(D Space D) to coordinate all CF spaceactivities, to develop space policies anddoctrine, and to acquire a CF spacecapability.

The Directorate for SpaceDevelopment is the focal point withinthe department for achieving CF goalsin acquiring space capabilities neces-sary to support operations. This organ-ization is responsible for providinginput to CF space policy, developing aspace education program and providingadvice on space matters. It is currentlyinvolved in a variety of space-relatedprojects and initiatives as well as co-ordinating with other organizations andgovernment departments to ensure thatthe CF is appropriately prepared tomake the best use of space to achievenational objectives. Currently, D SpaceD has a military liaison officer at CSA tofacilitate co-operation between thesetwo organizations. Additionally, CSAhas a liaison position at D Space Dwhich is not filled at present. D SpaceD’s organization can be found at Figure 1.

Canadian Defence Policy

Canadian Defence policy is identifiedwithin the Defence White Paper, the lastone of which was published in 1994, andis interpreted by DND within DefencePlanning Guidance (DPG) 2000 andStrategy 2020. The White Paper, in par-ticular, identifies that space is an increas-ingly important component of the globalsecurity environment and that “with theadvent of missile warfare, the role of spacein protecting the modern state has takenon added significance”.32 Therefore,Canada’s military interest in space con-cerns the ability to use space, in conjunc-tion with the other environments, to con-tribute to the defence mission.

Space and the use of space tech-nologies have emerged as an increasing-ly important elements of Command,Control and Communications (C3) to theextent that “space activities are nowkey in supporting all operations in the[pursuit] of global security environ-ment.”33 The intent of the Space Policydocument promulgated in 1998 was toensure that every aspect of Canadianmilitary doctrine, activities, and pro-grams relating to space accuratelyreflected the Canadian Government’sdirection. Accordingly, DND and theCF have identified three goals: to pro-tect national security and sovereigntyinterests, to protect national interestsfrom threats located in or passingthrough space, and to fulfil Canada’sdefence commitments by supportingmissions and tasks using space technol-ogy wherever appropriate.34 In addi-tion, DND has identified that the CF willfulfil its defence commitments by usingspace technology wherever appropriate.

To pursue these goals, DND and theCF have identified a strategy that will:

a. use space where appropriate toproject sovereignty and security,and the security of Canada’s allies;

b. develop a capability toacquire and access space data ofinterest, and monitor activities inspace in areas of national interest;

c. use space to support combat-capable, multi-purpose CanadianForces and their world-wide devel-opment on joint and combinedoperations;

d. support arms control verificationand security and confidence-build-ing measures in or from space; and

38


e. participate in space-support-ed search-and-rescue systems.35

This strategy will be reliant uponthe acquisition of space-based or space-related capabilities for success.Although limited by funding, DND’sLong-Term Capital Plan (LTCP) hasidentified several projects that will pro-vide the CF with appropriate capabili-ties. These are as follows:

a. Communication (CANMIL-SATCOM and Fleet SATCOM);

b. Navigation (NAVSTAR GPS,Position Determination for LandForces);

c. Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR);

d. Search and Rescue (SARSAT/IOS project);

e. Intelligence Support (projectTROODOS);

f. Weather Monitoring (underJoint Space Project (JSP));

g. Geomatics Support (under JSP);

h. Surveillance of Space (underJSP);

i. Surveillance from Space(under JSP);

j. Warning. Warning consists ofthe monitoring of man-madeobjects in space and the detection,validation, and warning of attackagainst North America whether byaircraft, missiles, or space vehi-cle;36 and

k. Ballistic Missile Defence.37

DND and the CF will address spacecapability deficiencies through full co-operation with Other GovernmentDepartments (OGDs), Agencies andAllies. Priority will be given to theCanadian Military SatelliteCommunication (CMSC) project and theJoint Space Project. In light of the lim-ited resources allocated to space in theCF LTCP, co-operative participation inUS programmes is considered a keycomponent in the development of amodest space capability for the CF. Ourpartnership in NORAD will be lever-aged, where practicable, to provideCanada a conduit into US space pro-grammes and ensures an equitable con-tribution to burden-sharing in thefuture. An important enabling mecha-nism will be a Statement of Intent con-cerning defence space co-operation tobe developed between DND and the USDepartment of Defence.

Though Canada-US defence co-operation continues to serve this coun-try’s fundamental interests extremelywell, certain arrangements requireupdating [in accordance with evolvingchallenges to continental security]:

a. Canada will contribute toaerospace surveillance, missilewarning, and air defence capabili-ties at a significantly reducedlevel;

b. In the negotiations on therenewal of the NORAD agreement,Canada will seek to preserve itsbenefits and examine closelythose areas that may need tochange in accord with evolvingchallenges to continental security;

c. Canada supports ongoing dis-cussions on the possible expan-

39


sion beyond North America ofNORAD’s missile warning func-tion, and is interested in gaining abetter understanding of missiledefence through research and inconsultation with like-mindednations; and

d. The possibility of developinga space-based surveillance systemfor North America in the next cen-tury will be explored, subject to avariety of military, financial andtechnological considerations.38

Although limited, Canada canincrease its contribution, and enhance itscurrent expertise by participating in thedevelopment of spaced-based radar(SBR) capability for NORAD. Its mainrole would be purely in the detectionand identification of incoming threat toNorth America, contributing toCanadian airspace sovereignty, particu-larly in the Arctic. Since space-basedradar is not bounded by ground-basedradar conventions, the development anduse by the CF of space capabilities wouldbe in accordance with DND Space Policy.This in turn would maintain the appear-ance of being fully in accordance withInternational Law, signed Treaties andany other agreements, which Canada hasratified or supports.

In order to plan the way ahead forthe development of space capabilities, athree-step approach was adopted:

a. First, a review of the currentpolicy framework - to align it withthe 1994 Defence White Paper andthe 1996 renewal of the NORADAgreement;

b. Second, acquiring appropri-ate space capabilities - to support

our three elements, both inCanada in a national security andsovereignty sense, and indeployed operations; and

c. Third, enabling activities -supporting activities required toenable the achievement of thespace capabilities. These activi-ties include support to operations,co-operation with ODG andAgencies, collaboration withAllies, research and development,human resources and policy anddoctrine development.

CSA/DND Cooperation

Canada’s space program had beenmanaged by a variety of governmentprograms and committees and, althoughDND was represented by CRAD, themilitary had not been directly involvedin Canada’s efforts in space since themid-1960s. This shortcoming wasaddressed in 1994 when the Canadiangovernment directed that the CSA “pur-sue synergistic opportunities withDND.”39 The requirement to modern-ize the CF for the 21st century, andensure interoperability with the USarmed forces has further compelledCanada’s venture into space to enhancecapabilities in the areas of communica-tions, navigation, intelligence, surveil-lance, warning, and defences.

Consequently, the DND and theCSA signed a Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MOU) concerningspace-related activities, in November1995. This MOU is expected to berenewed this year. DND and CSA coop-erative activities were initiated with theformation of a DND/CSA SpaceCooperation Committee (SCC) to directall cooperative activities between the

40


CSA and DND, the creation of four AdHoc Working Groups (AHWGs), andthe establishment of Liaison Officers atthe CSA and NDHQ. The SCC is co-chaired by representatives from bothDND and CSA. In accordance with itsTerms of Reference, the SCC is requiredto meet twice annually. The four AHWGsmeet twice annually and report to theSCC. These four working groups are :

a. Research & Development.The objectives of this workinggroup are to identify and pursueopportunities for joint researchand development of space tech-nology systems and capabilities,to identify and develop technicaloptions for joint or dual-use spacesystems and capabilities, and toparticipate in strategic programplanning and activity review;

b. Communications. The man-date of this working group is toprovide a forum to identify com-mon strategic goals and objectivesfor satellite communications andto determine how existing pro-grams can be used to achievethese goals;

c. Earth Observation. ThisAHWG, originally called theRADARSAT AHWG, was formedto exploit cooperative activitiesregarding the use of RADARSAT Idata and any follow on projectssuch as RADARSAT II; and

d. Education, Training &Development. The aim of thisworking group is to identify andexploit space related areas of com-mon interest in this field.Activities conducted in thisregard include the coordination of

space awareness and indoctrinationsessions and to identify joint spacetraining and development courses.

INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERA-TIONS

The UN in Outer Space

The launch of the Sputnik I satel-lite in 1957 embarked mankind upon ajourney of technological developmentin the quest to both explore and exploitspace. The United Nations’ (UN) inter-est in the peaceful uses of space alsodates back to the launch of this firstsatellite.40 In 1959, the UN exhibited agreat deal of foresight when it estab-lished the General Assembly’sCommittee on the Peaceful Uses ofOuter Space (COPUOS), along with twosub-committees, one to deal with legalissues and the other to address scientif-ic and technological issues. The COPU-OS currently has 61 members, of whichCanada is one.41 The COPUOS fostersinternational cooperation in those areasapplicable both to the legal and to thescientific and technological aspects ofspace. The work of these committeeshas resulted in the development of fiveinternational treaties and principlesthat serve as the legal framework for UNmember states to observe in their devel-opment and use of space technology.

The UN also established the Officefor Outer Space Affairs (OOSA) whichserves as the secretariat for the COPUOSand the two sub-committees. In addi-tion, the OOSA is responsible for imple-menting the UN’s Space ApplicationsProgramme. Common themes haveemerged from the UN’s interest in outerspace. These themes are: the require-ment for international cooperation toinclude developing states; that all states

41


should benefit from space technology;and that “space is the “province of allhumankind and should therefore beused for peaceful purposes.”42

Conference on the Exploration andPeaceful Uses of Outer Space

The UN has held three Conferenceson the Exploration and Peaceful Uses ofOuter Space. The first conference, con-vened in 1968, reviewed the progress ofspace based initiatives, and reiterated therequirement for international coopera-tion particularly for the benefit of devel-oping countries. The efforts undertakenas a result of the conference eventuallyculminated in the creation of the UNSpace Applications Programme, whichapplied space technology in the fields ofcommunications, environmental moni-toring and remote sensing. The secondconference, convened in 1982, reviewedprogress and focussed on the require-ment for international cooperation.

The third conference, convened in1999, was necessitated by the require-ment to address both the post-Cold Warworld situation and the rapid advancesmade in space exploration and tech-nologies. The main objectives of theconference, apart from enhancing inter-national cooperation, were to identifymethods of using space solutions toaddress significant regional or globalproblems and to enhance the ability ofstates to use the results of spaceresearch for socioeconomic develop-ment. Canada was a participant in thisconference.

During this third conference, mem-ber states developed the framework of astrategy to meet future challenges andidentified specific areas for action in thefollowing categories:43

a. Protecting the earth’s environ-ment and managing its resources;

b. Using space applications forsecurity, development and wel-fare;

c. Advancing scientific knowl-edge of space and protecting thespace environment;

d. Enhancing education/publicawareness;

e. Strengthening & reposition-ing of space activities in UN sys-tem; and

f. Promoting international co-operation.

Future Challenges. In summary,the UN has been active in promotingthe peaceful uses of space. The UN hasapproved five international treaties,legally binding on ratifying states, andfive principles, that serve as guidelinesor standards. Canada has ratified fourof five treaties. One of the main chal-lenges faced by the UN is enhancinginternational co-operation, particularlyfor developing states. Another majorissue that the UN will no doubt face isthe increasing pressure to weaponizespace. The US National Missile DefenceProgram may be just the beginning ofsuch efforts.

Space Law

International Space Law has beenformally established through a series ofdiverse treaties and agreements. Thefirst step towards constructing this legalframework was undertaken in 1961when the UN General AssemblyResolution 1721 (XVI) was adopted.

42


This resolution decreed that the UNCharter and international law applied toouter space.44 The various resolutionsthat followed were subsequently for-malized through the treaty process.

International UN Treaties. Since1966, the UN has adopted five interna-tional treaties concerning the uses ofouter space. These treaties not onlyregulate military activities in space butalso stress the importance of usingspace for peaceful purposes for the bet-terment of all humankind; no state canappropriate any portion of space. Thesetreaties prohibit the placement ofnuclear weapons or other weapons ofmass destruction in orbit around theEarth, on the Moon or on other celestialbodies. The treaties also prohibit theestablishment of military bases, installa-tions and fortifications on the samebodies. However, the use of militarypersonnel in space is permitted. Thetreaties are legally binding upon thosestates that have ratified them. To date,Canada has ratified four of the fivetreaties; the exception is the MoonAgreement, which Canada has yet tosign.45 The five treaties are:

a. Outer Space Treaty (1966). Thistreaty stipulates that the explo-ration of space shall be carried outfor the benefit of all states, regard-less of their degree of develop-ment. It also prohibits states fromplacing weapons of mass destruc-tion, including nuclear weaponsin space, establishing militaryinstallations in space, and/or test-ing weapons in space. Ninety-fivestates have ratified this treaty and27 others have signed it;46

b. Rescue Agreement (1967). Thistreaty stipulates the assistance

due spacecraft crews in the eventof accident or emergency landing.The treaty also delineates the pro-cedures for returning spaceobjects to launching authorities.Eighty-five states have ratifiedthis treaty and 26 others havesigned it;47

c. Liability Convention (1971).This treaty stipulates, in basicterms, that launching states areliable for any damages caused bytheir space objects. Eighty stateshave ratified this treaty and 26others have signed it;48

d. Registration Convention (1974).This treaty stipulates that launch-ing states shall maintain registriesof space objects and provide spe-cific information regarding theseobjects to the United Nations forinclusion in a central registry.Forty states have ratified thistreaty and four others have signedit;49 and

e. Moon Agreement (1979). Thistreaty elaborates on the 1966Outer Space Treaty. The treatybans both the use of force on andthe use of force from the Moonand other celestial bodies. It alsoestablishes the basis for the futureregulation of the exploration andexploitation of natural resourcesfound on the Moon and othercelestial bodies. Nine states haveratified this treaty and 5 othershave signed it.50

Other Treaties. There are a numberof other treaties, primarily bilateralagreements between the US and Russia(former Soviet Union), that supplementthe treaties approved under the aus-

43


pices of the UN. The additional treatiesinclude the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)Treaty, the SALT I and II Treaties, theThreshold Test Ban Treaty, and thePeaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty(PNET) to name but a few. Thesetreaties are important because they seekto clarify the meaning of the “peacefuluses of outer space” dictum for thegreat powers. For example, the USviews peaceful use as “non-aggressive”while Russia views it as “non-military”;distinctions that could create world ten-sion.51 The bilateral agreements permitthe use of military satellites for armscontrol verification purposes. The USand Russia have also ratified agreementsthat permit the use of early-warning,communications, navigation and mete-orological satellites. Another Treatythat can influence Canada is that per-taining to Environmental Modification.

Principles. In addition to the fivetreaties, the UN has adopted a numberof “principles” which serve to furtherdefine the appropriate peaceful use ofspace. These five international princi-ples have the legal status of GeneralAssembly Resolutions, which meansthat the principles are not legally bind-ing per se, as are the treaties. The prin-ciples serve as guidelines or standardsregarding the peaceful use of outerspace particularly for those states thathave not signed the treaties. Theseprinciples established space as theprovince of all humankind, endorsedthe sharing of information obtainedthrough the use of satellites, and pro-vided general standards regulating thesafe use of nuclear power sources inouter space. The five principles are:

a. Principles Governing theActivities of States in theExploration and Uses of Outer

Space (1963). This was a precur-sor to the Outer Space Treaty. Itestablished the basic componentsof international space law, includ-ing that exploration be carried outfor the benefit of all states andthat nuclear weapons be bannedfrom space;

b. Direct Broadcasting Principles(1982). This principle recognizesthe impact that internationaldirect television broadcasting canhave on other states’ political,economic, social and cultural situ-ations. Communication betweenthe broadcasting and the receiv-ing states is essential.Consequently, the principleendorses both consultation andthe establishment of formal agree-ments between the states;

c. Principle Relating to theRemote Sensing of Earth FromSpace(1986). This principle reiter-ates the concept of internationalcooperation and using space forthe benefit of all states. Statesmust also be cognizant of otherstates’ sovereignty and employremote sensing accordingly;

d. Principles on the Use ofNuclear Power Sources (1992).This principle acknowledges thatnuclear power sources are essen-tial for some missions.Accordingly, the principle stipu-lates that these nuclear power sys-tems should be designed so as tominimize public exposure to radi-ation in the event of an accident;and

e. The Declaration on Inter-national Cooperation in the

44


45

Exploration and Use of OuterSpace for the Benefit and in theInterest of All States, Taking intoParticular Account the Needs ofDeveloping Countries (1996). Thisprinciple acknowledges theimportance of international co-operation in the exploration anduse of outer space for the benefitof all humankind.

Space Law and Canadian Policy

Table 1 provides a brief summaryof those treaties primarily responsiblefor establishing International Space Lawand, as such, they impact Canada.

Canada’s position on the develop-ment of the Space Law regime through aseries of treaties has been generally sup-portive. The Canadian policy has been

one of strict adherence to the treatiesand their intentions. This created somecontroversy with her southern neigh-bour during the 1980s. The issues ofAnti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons, theStrategic Defense Initiative (SDI), andtheir relationship with the ABM treatyof 1972 have been the subject of chal-lenging diplomatic and political consid-erations. Canada’s efforts in arms con-trol during the 1980s were not in linewith the present policy of the USGovernment. A Canadian proposal toban high Earth orbit ASAT systems wasnot well received by neither the US norUSSR at the time. An invitation fromthe US to join in the SDI research pro-gram was also turned down by theCanadian Government. Due to theunclear wording of the ABM Treaty,Canadian officials urged the parties toadhere to the intentions behind the

Table 1. International Space Law

YEAR TREATY MAIN PRINCIPLE1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty Bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere,on

outer space, and under water.

1967 Outer Space Treaty Space activities shall be conducted in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter

1968 Rescue and Return Agreement on the rescue and return of astronauts andAgreement the return of objects launched into Outer Space.

1972 ABM Treaty Prohibits development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems or components (between the US & USSR)

1972 Liability Convention A launching site is liable for damage caused by its space object to people or property on The Earth or in the atmosphere.

1974 Registration Convention Requires a party to maintain a registry of objects it launches into Earth orbit or beyond.

1978 Environmental Prohibits military or other hostile use of environmen-Modification tal modification techniques as a means of destruction,

damage, or injury to any other state.

1984 Moon Treaty Agreement governing the activities of states on the Moon and other celestial bodies.


agreement, namely banning all defen-sive systems. This was clearly a policyaimed at urging the US to limit the SDIto basic research, which is permittedwithin the ABM Treaty. AnotherCanadian initiative was taken towardthe subject of verification from space.This included “peace satellites” thatcould be oriented towards space tospace verification, and towards space toground verifications. The initiative waspart of the Canadian efforts to limit thearms race both in space and in general.Although the program never material-ized as proposed, the subject of verifi-cation has been carried forward as aresult of the Canadian initiative.

NATO

The use of space for military purpos-es has grown to the point where it is vir-tually inconceivable for any self-respect-ing force to exclude space-based resourcesfrom its overall military or strategic plan-ning. In the past thirty years, the militaryuse of space has generally been accepted.The next thirty years has the potential forus to witness a dramatic development -the weaponisation of space.52

There is no doubt that the wholequestion of the relationship betweenthe military and space is about to takeon new importance. If the philosophi-cal debate of the 1960-80s was over themilitarisation of space, then its succes-sor in the 21st century will be theweaponisation of space. It is perhapsnaive to think of space as entirelypeaceful and non-military. After all,the use of the aircraft was initially con-ceived for peaceful purposes or at leastnot as weapons platforms; space seemsto be following the same pattern. Wehave already seen the deployment ofsatellites with specific military purpos-

es, whether for communication, naviga-tion, reconnaissance and surveillance.53

This is thought of in the same wayas previous generations contemplatedand developed sea or air power. Indeedsome would argue that the issue of themilitary use of space at the beginningof the 21st century is at a similar stageof development to that of air power inthe early decades of this century. Manyare aware of the importance air powerhas assumed in the past eight years.Take, for example, the current US posi-tion, which was forthrightly andexplicitly stated in a Department ofDefense (DoD) directive on SpacePolicy, issued in June. While it does notrepresent any significant change in pol-icy, it does express very clearlyWashington’s view of the importance ofspace: space power is as important tothe nation as land, sea and air power;and space is a medium like the land, seaand air within which military activitieswill be conducted to achieve USnational security objectives.

Purposeful interference with USspace systems will be viewed as aninfringement on their sovereign rights.The US may take all appropriate self-defence measures, including, if directedby the National Command Authority,the use of force, to respond to such aninfringement on their rights. Spacecapabilities shall be operated andemployed to:

a. assure access to and use of space;

b. deter, and if necessarydefend, against hostile actions;

c. ensure that hostile forces can-not prevent US use of space; and

d. counter, when directed, space

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systems and services used for hos-tile purposes.

Given that this is Washington’spolicy, can other states afford toignore not only the importance ofspace, but also the likelihood of itsemergence as a new theatre of con-flict? All states are increasinglydependent on space in one way oranother. The information age and theapplication the increased use of tech-nology in war fighting - theRevolution in Military Affairs (RMA) -have increased reliance on the spacemedium. The US is beginning toacknowledge this fact, which manyhave failed to recognise. The rest ofthe world is going to have to play apotentially risky game of catch-up.

The first thirty years of military spaceactivity have seen its evolution from theo-ry to practice, from the strategic to thetheatre level. For example, during opera-tions in Kosovo in 1999, satellite links per-mitted the redirection of aircraft to newtargets while they were flying missions.54

In a relatively short time the inte-gration of space and other assets willoffer real-time information to individualcombat units. Such a growth in the mil-itary usefulness of space will inevitablylead to increasing efforts to destroy theopponent’s capability there. The adventof space power will produce demandsfor space superiority. At that point, itwill become almost impossible to resistthe weaponisation of space.56 The US isdeveloping space-based systems forinsuring its military dominance. Ifthese space-based systems became vul-nerable, the vulnerabilities would beexploited and the US would defenditself. This situation could result in anarms race in space.

The Alliance’s Strategic Concept(Washington 23 April 1999)

NATO is committed to a strong anddynamic partnership between Europeand North America in support of thevalues and interests they share. Thesecurity of Europe and that of NorthAmerica are indivisible.57

The security architecture ofWestern Europe stems from the NorthAtlantic Treaty. Reliance on the US is afundamental reason. The transatlanticpartnership, which is at the heart ofNATO, is the bedrock of European secu-rity, and, within the NATO framework,each of the member states contributesto the security of the others. In terms ofmilitary space capability, the US hasundoubtedly, far and away the greatestpanoply of space assets, and the truth isthat the European members of NATOhave seen little reason to duplicate suchassets. With a few exceptions, theEuropean allies have been content toassume that, when necessary, the US mil-itary space capability would suffice.58

NORAD

The North American AerospaceDefence Command (NORAD) has been acentrepiece of Canada-US defence rela-tions for almost 42 years. For a relative-ly low investment, Canada receivesgreat benefits and has a respected voiceon defence matters related to the aero-space defence of the North Americancontinent. NORAD started as anacronym for North American AirDefence Command. But with emergingtechnologies and threats, it has evolvedto handle not only the threat from longrange bombers but also from Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, whichtravel through space. Hence, NORAD

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truly performs aerospace defence ofNorth America, which implies missionswith both an air and a space dimension.

The 1996 NORAD Agreementassigns two missions to NORAD: aero-space warning and aerospace control forNorth America. Aerospace Warningincludes the monitoring of all man-made objects in space and the detec-tion, validation and warning of attackagainst North America by aircraft, mis-siles or space vehicles. Aerospace con-trol deals primarily with the air dimen-sion of the aerospace defence of NorthAmerica. It consists of the surveillanceand control of the airspace of Canadaand the United States.59 Aerospace con-trol is currently limited to the surveil-lance and control of air approaches toNorth America by air breathing vehiclesonly, but could be expanded to includedefence against ballistic missile attacks.

NORAD evolved from an airdefence organisation to an aerospacedefence organisation60 when theCommand was assigned the role of sup-porting the American strategic deterrentand for providing unambiguous warn-ing of a ballistic missile attack.Accordingly, the United States deployedthe Defence Satellite Program (DSP) andthe Ballistic Missile Early WarningSystem (BMEWS) and assigned them toNORAD. “NORAD’s role was to deter-mine if there was a ballistic missileattack against North America in order toensure that the US NCA [NationalCommand Authority] had adequate timeto order, if necessary, the release ofAmerican strategic forces.”61

In 1985, the United States formedthe United States Space Command(USSPACECOM), as the single point offocus for all military space related

issues. Consequently, USSPACECOMoperates, through its various compo-nent commands,62 all military spaceassets. In the case of NORAD’s missionsusing space assets, NORAD is the sup-ported command and USSPACECOM isthe supporting command. For example,in the case of the ballistic missile warn-ing mission, the DSP constellation isoperated under command and controlof USSPACECOM to support NORAD’sIntegrated Tactical Warning and AttackAssessment (ITW/AA) network.USSPACECOM provides informationfrom space tools to NORAD where it isinterpreted, validated, and assessed toascertain whether or not North Americais under attack. This information isthen disseminated to the governmentsof Canada and the United States. Thesame could apply to the SpaceSurveillance Network as it relates toNORAD’s missions.

There is a direct link built, bynecessity, between NORAD andUSSPACECOM. There is also a pseudo-formal link because the Commander-in-Chief of USSPACECOM, who is also theCommander-in Chief of NORAD, andthe Commander of Air Force SpaceCommand. All three commands are co-located at Peterson Air Force Base inColorado Springs. The DeputyCommander-in Chief of NORAD is aCanadian Lieutenant-General; he alsoserves as the Chief of Staff of NORAD.For the purpose of maximum effective-ness, several key staff positions aredual-hatted NORAD/USSPACECOM,with Canadian personnel manning highlevel decision-making positions acrossthe board. The Director of CombatOperations (N/J3) is a Canadian Major-General and, in this position, he isactively involved in the day-to-daydecisions and operations of NORAD.

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Canadians therefore wield considerableinfluence on the decision makingprocess at NORAD and some influencewith USSPACECOM due to the closerelationship between the two com-mands. In fact, there are several MOUsbetween NORAD and SPACECOM thatallow for Canadian personnel to serve inUSSPACECOM, AFSPACECOM andARSPACECOM positions related to theNORAD missions.

NORAD provides Canada and theUnited States with a mutually support-ing aerospace defence for NorthAmerica. The United States coversapproximately ninety percent andCanada, ten percent of the operatingcosts.63 For this relatively minor invest-ment, Canada gains substantial access toseveral United States space assets thatotherwise would be unthinkable toeven consider acquiring due to the cur-rent reality of Canadian defence spend-ing. The following are concrete exam-ples where Canada has access to expen-sive and capable systems because ofCanada’s strategic relationship with theUnited States: the Defence SupportProgram; the Defence SatelliteCommunications System; the DefenceMeteorological Satellite Program; theGlobal Positioning System; and theSpace Surveillance Network and a net-work of intelligence space-based assets.NORAD is the centrepiece of this part-nership, which has fostered trust andrespect between the armed forces ofCanada and the United States for closeto forty-two years.

NORAD’S Vision

To ensure its future relevancy,NORAD has developed its vision for theyear “2010 and beyond: Partners in pro-tecting our homelands: deter, detect

and defend against air and space threatsto North America.”64 In this vision, theemphasis is on space as an enabler forfour capabilities: precision tracking;precision engagement; integrated battlemanagement; and focused logistics.These capabilities are envisioned to beachievable through information superi-ority, where information is beingprocessed more and more through spacesatellites. Therefore, in order to protectinformation, space systems will alsorequire protection.

If one accepts the assumption thatpresent NORAD missions, which are validtoday, will be valid in the future, it shouldalso be assumed that emerging threatswould require new missions for NORADto perform, if the aerospace defence ofNorth America is to remain credible.Arguably, North America presently andfor the near-term is especially vulnerableto information operations, cruise missileand ballistic missile attacks, and thusthese issues need to be addressed.

There is no known disagreementbetween Canada and the United Statesabout the requirement for defenceagainst cyber attacks and cruise mis-siles. Satellites carrying informationwill need to be protected via passivemeans and they will need to be con-trolled and monitored. The solutionagainst cruise missile attack may befound in a space-based wide area sur-veillance system. The paradox forNORAD is that, although it is nearlyimpossible for it to detect the launch ofa cruise missile unless cued by timelyintelligence, there are means to shootdown the missile. In the case of a bal-listic missile attack, NORAD can detectand track the incoming missile butpresently has absolutely no means toprevent an impact.

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Ballistic Missile Defence

Ballistic Missile Defence is poten-tially an issue of contention betweenCanada and the United States. TheUnited States is currently working on aNational Missile Defence (NMD) pro-gram and will make a decision this yearregarding the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system. The main issuefor Canada is the impact of a unilateralUS deployment of the NMD on the 1972ABM Treaty between the former SovietUnion and the United States. As missiledefence is an extension of the missile-warning mission, NORAD finds itself atthe centre of the debate betweenCanada and the United States on ballis-tic missile defence. Additionally, mostof the architecture required for theNMD Program is presently operationalfor the ITW/AA.

The United States governmentwould like to place operational NationalMissile Defence under the command ofNORAD as the supported commandwith USSPACECOM as the supportingcommand. Under this concept of oper-ations, it is assumed that Canada wouldbe a willing participant in the commandand control of the anti-ballistic missilesystem.65 In the event that Canadarefused to take part, USSPACECOMwould assume full command and con-trol and NORAD’s relevancy would beat stake, which would impact Canadianpersonnel currently working inCheyenne Mountain.66 Canada’s refusalto participate in ballistic missile defenceof North America (BMD-NA) could trig-ger the end of the NORAD alliance aswe know it.

To participate in BMD-NA, Canadawould not have to buy interceptorsfrom the United States, put sensors on

Canadian soil, or even have to provideany funding directly into the program.Canada’s contribution could be negoti-ated with the United States and take theform of an asymmetrical contribution.For instance, the United States wouldlike to place the system under NORADcommand and, as such, requiresCanadian support for the system.Additionally, Canadian support couldinclude easing or perhaps even facilitat-ing negotiations with Russia on amend-ments to the 1972 ABM Treaty. Inreturn for the protection given toCanada by the BMD-NA architecture,Canada could offer, in exchange, partic-ipation in a space related venture suchas a contribution to the SpaceSurveillance Network for the surveil-lance of man-made objects in space - aNORAD mission. This could probablybe achieved through the CF Joint SpaceProject.

CF Joint Space Project

The main efforts of the CF JointSpace Project are intelligence collection,environmental observation, surveil-lance of space, surveillance from space,warning, and defence. “The two pillarsfor acquiring a Canadian capability arethe Surveillance of Space and from Spaceelements.”67 Space surveillance accom-plishes the following:

a. Prediction of when and where aspace object with a decaying orbitwill re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere;

b. Prevention of a returningspace object from triggering a falsealarm in missile-attack warning;

c. Charting the present positionand anticipated orbital paths ofobjects;

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d. Detection of new man-madeobjects in space;

e. Determination of whichcountry owns a re-entering spaceobject; and

f. Informing NASA whether ornot objects may interfere with thespace shuttle and the internation-al manned space station orbits.68

An argument can therefore be madethat space surveillance performs anessential role for the BMD-NA missionwithout being designed for that pur-pose. Politically, Canadian participationin space surveillance does not carry thebaggage of the Strategic DefenceInitiative (SDI) debates and has no bear-ing on the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Surveillance from space couldbecome a niche for Canada to contributeto the United State’s space capabilities.The technological potential forRADARSAT II, for surveying groundmoving targets from space, could beused as leverage in negotiations to fur-ther bi-national defence co-operation.“The ultimate technological goal is to beable to detect and track air targets fromspace, asserting air sovereignty fromspace and detecting cruise missiles.”69

This ultimate goal undoubtedly fallswithin NORAD’s mandate.

The Way Ahead - Space Power andthe RMA

Space power essentially is not justabout a revolution in military affairs.The space environment must be recog-nized as a geographical environment forconflicts that is, in a strategic sense, nodifferent from the land, sea, air, andelectromagnetic spectrum. However,

there is a key geographical sense inwhich space is unlike the other bound-ed, terrestrial environments. Space isunique because there are no boundariesin space and although space power is aform of military power analogous toland, sea, and air power, space basedplatforms will definitely be more promi-nent in future conflicts.

Dr. Colin S. Gray, in his article inthe fall 1999 Airpower Journal, suggeststhese key assumptions about spacepower:

a. In all strategic essentials fornow, space power is akin to landpower, sea power, and airpower;

b. The strategic history of spacepower is likely to follow the pat-tern already traced clearly by seapower and airpower;

c. Geographically and geophysi-cally, space is distinctive but thenso is the land, the sea, the air, andeven cyberspace;

d. People have only one naturalenvironment, the land. To func-tion at all in any other environ-ment, people require technologi-cal support;

e. B ecause people live only onthe land and belong to securitycommunities that are organizedpolitically with territory domains,all military behaviour, no materwhat its tactical forms, ultimatelycan have strategic meaning onlyfor the course of events on land;

f. The logic of strategy is bothgeographically universal and tem-porally eternal; and

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g. The unique geography ofspace must find expression inunique technology, operations,and tactics. That unique geogra-phy does not, however, point theway to some unique logic of strat-egy, let alone a unique irrelevanceof strategy.70

Strategic considerations are just asrelevant in the space environment asthey are in the other environments.71

Even though the geographical, geo-physical and therefore technologicaland tactical details of combat areunique to each environment, there is,nonetheless, a pattern common to thedevelopment of military technology inall geographies: vision, experimenta-tion, exploration, and correction. Thetechnical-tactical challenges that limitthe operational and strategic effect of akind of military power (sea power, air-power, space power) can eventuallyovercome. The best approach to over-coming the challenges posed by thespace environment from a military per-spective is to:

a. Approach it as just anothergenerator of strategic effectiveness;

b. View it as the ‘latecomer onour block’ that should be inter-preted and moulded according tothe ideas and systems which arefamiliar; and

c. View space as a whollyunique geographical environmentthat requires total respect on itsown geo-strategic terms.

Space power and space warfare areboth coming. It is only a question ofhow and when. Although space powercould be regarded as an RMA, certainly

as a Military-Technical Revolution(MTR), it is much more than that. Spacepower is an evolving physical reality;RMA and MTR are mere intellectualconcepts that comprise only construct-ed realities.72

For good or ill, the era of spacedependency has arrived. As spacepower becomes a reality, so space war-fare will become an impending realitywhose prospect is endorsed by history,as well as by the logic of strategy. Ifspace power is defined as the ability inpeace, crisis, and war to exert promptand sustained influence in or fromspace, then the key enabler for spacepower has to be space control. This iswell recognized and understood inUSSPACECOM’s Long Range Plan (LRP).

USSPACECOM Long Range Plan

The Long-Range Plan is theUSSPACECOM roadmap for achievingits vision for 2020. The first premise isthat space is an opportunity for the USas well as their potential adversaries.

With the end of the Cold War, theUS now has a “strategic pause” inwhich to explore innovative war-fight-ing concepts and capabilities. Giventhe continuing dynamic nature of thespace environment and the long leadtimes necessary to develop and fieldspace capabilities, there is a sense ofurgency to articulate future require-ments today.

The increasing dependence of theUS upon space capabilities, both mili-tary and economically, produces a relat-ed vulnerability that will not go unno-ticed by adversaries. US interests andinvestments in space must be fully pro-tected to ensure their freedom of action

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in space. The USSPACECOM Vision for2020 identifies four operational con-cepts:73

a. Control of Space- the ability toassure access to space, freedom ofoperations within the space medi-um, and an ability to deny othersthe use of space, if required;

b. Global Engagement- an opera-tional concept developed byUSSPACECOM which advocates anintegrated, focused surveillance ofspace, air, and surface areas desig-nated by combatant commanders,a defensive umbrella against mis-sile attack, and a force applicationcapability for certain high-priori-ty targets;

c. Full Force Integration- theintegration of space forces andspace-derived information withair, land and sea forces and infor-mation; and

d. Global Partnerships- aug-ments military space capabilitiesthrough the leveraging of civil,commercial, and internationalspace systems.

Conclusion

Canada cannot afford by itself toenjoy the security benefits providedby space-based assets. Canada needsits Allies, and most importantly,Canada needs the US as a full partnerto fulfil its defence needs. Therefore,it is in Canada’s best interest and it isCanada’s policy to maintain and devel-op its strategic relationship with theUnited States. This relationship needsnurturing if Canada is to have signifi-cant access to US space assets. The

defence of North America is indivisi-ble and NORAD is a centrepiece of co-operation for aerospace ventures anda natural conduit for Canadian mili-tary space activity. NORAD is stillrelevant today and will be relevant forthe future as long as it is recognisedthat NORAD provides much morethan air defence. NORAD’s vision isspace-centric and it is in Canada’s bestinterest to embrace NORAD’s vision ifCanada wants to enjoy the continuousaccessibility to US Space systems.The Canadian decision on NMD maybe NORAD’s centre of gravity for itslong-term future. Canada could par-ticipate in NMD by having the JSPcontribute to the US SpaceSurveillance Network from a groundsensor initially and perhaps from aspace-based sensor in the future.

Endnotes

1. Doris Jelly, Canada: 25 Years in Space(Montreal: Polyscience Publications Inc,1988), p 1.

2. Department of National Defence (DND),Space Policy, (Ottawa: CDS, 14 Sep 98), p 3/8.

3. Ibid, p 1/8.

4. Jelly, Canada: 25 Years in Space, p 17.

5. Ibid, p 14. (The Meteorological Service ofCanada was set up in 1839 in Toronto undermilitary auspices)

6. Ibid, p 16.

7. Ibid, p 22. (The G-Suit was designed toenable pilots to withstand the effects ofacceleration and was later adapted for use byastronauts. Dr Franks also worked on thedesign and construction of a centrifuge totest the suit’s capability of protecting pilotsduring acceleration.)

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8. Report of the Standing Committee onResearch, Science and Technology on theStudy of Canada’s Space Program, WilliamTupper, chairman. (Ottawa: House ofCommons, 1987), p 2.

9. Jelly, Canada: 25 Years in Space, pp 110-111.

10. Ibid, p 111. (These included the UnitedKingdom, France, India, Japan, Australiaand Norway.)

11. Ibid, p 98.

12. Ibid, pp 103-106.

13. Report of the Standing Committee onResearch, Science and Technology on theStudy of Canada’s Space Program, p 4.

14. Ibid, p 2.

15. Department of National Defence (DND),Space Indoctrination Handbook (Winnipeg:CFSAS, 1996), p 4-1.

16. Report of the Standing Committee onResearch, Science and Technology on theStudy of Canada’s Space Program, p 3.

17. Jelly, Canada: 25 Years in Space, p 57.

18. Space Indoctrination Handbook, p 5-4.

19. Ibid, p 4-4.

20. Ibid, p 4-2. (The laboratory, located inOttawa, is used for the assembly, integrationand environmental testing of fully assembledsatellites and ocmponents).21. Report of the Standing Committee onResearch, Science and Technology on theStudy of Canada’s Space Program, p 3.



24. Report of the Standing Committee on

Research, Science and Technology on theStudy of Canada’s Space Program, pp 3-4.

25. Ibid, p 7.


27. Canadian Space Agency, National Paper:The Canadian Space Program, (Montreal:Canadian Space Agency, July 19, 1999), p 4.

28. Ibid, p 10.

29. Ibid, p 10.


31. DND, D Space D Level 3 Business Plan,(Ottawa: DND Canada, Nov 1999), p 3.

32. Department of National Defence, 1994Defence White Paper, (Ottawa: DND Canada,1994), p 24.

33. Department of National Defence, “SpacePolicy,” (Ottawa: DND Canada, September 14,1998), p1.

34. Ibid, p 2.

35. Ibid, pp 2-3.

36. Ibid, p 7.

37. Deputy Chief of the defence Staff, “ACanadian Military Space Strategy: The WayAhead for DND and the Canadian Forces,” 14April 1998.

38. 1994 Defence White Paper on Defence, p 21.

39. MOU Between DND and CSA ConcerningCo-operation in Space Related Activities, 17November 1995, p1.

40. The Historical Perspective: The Unitednations and Outer Space. [http://www.u n . o r g / e v e n t s / u n i s p a c e 3 /

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bginfo/historic.htm], Feb 99, p 1.

41. The United Nations Office for OuterSpace Affairs and the Committee on thePeaceful Uses of Outer Space,[http://www.un.org/events/unispace3/bgin-fo/oosa.htm], March 2000, p 2.

42. Report of the Third United NationsConference on the Peaceful Uses of OuterSpace, Vienna, 19-30 July 1999,[http:/www.un.org/events/unispace3],March 2000, p 15.

43. Ibid, March 2000, pp 1-4.

44. Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, ADiplomacy of Hope: Canada andDisarmament, 1945-1988 (Montreal &Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press,1992), p 380.

45. Status of International AgreementsRelating to Activities in Outer Space: UnitedNations Treaties[http://www.un.org/events/unispace3],March 2000 p 4/10.

46. Space Law: Frequently Asked Questions,[http://www.un.or.at/OOSA/faq/splaw.html], March 2000, p 1/4.47. Ibid, p 2/4.

48. Ibid, p 2/4.

49. Ibid, p 2/4.

50. Ibid, p 2/4.

51. Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy ofHope: Canada and Disarmament, 1945-1988,p 383.

52. Alasdair McLean, “Battle for Space,” TheWorld Today, Vol 55 No. 11, (November1999), p 8.

53. Alasdair McLean, “EuropeanExploitation of Space: when rather than if,”

RUSI Journal, Vol 144, No. 5, (October1999), p 48.

54. McLean, Battle for Space, p 8.

55. McLean, Battle for Space, p 8.

56. Jan Petersen, NATO’s Next StrategicConcept, NATO Review, (Summer 1998), p18.

57. Supplement, “The Alliance’s StrategicConcept” Approved by Heads of State andGovernment participating in the meeting of theNATO council in Washington DC on 23/24 Apr99, NATO Review, Vol 47, No. 2, (Summer1999), p D9.

58. Ibid, p D9.

59. 1996 NORAD Agreement and Terms ofReference, (Ottawa/Washington:Governments of Canada and the UnitedStates, 1996), p.3.

60. The NORAD name changed from NorthAmerican Air Defence Command to NorthAmerican Aerospace Defence Command in 1981

61. James Fergusson, Déjà Vu: Canada,NORAD, and Ballistic Missile Defence,University of Manitoba, Centre for Defenceand Security Studies, Occasional Paper # 39,1999, pp.11-12.

62. USSAPCECOM components are US ArmySpace Command (USARSPACE), Air ForceSpace Command (AFSAPCE) and Navy SpaceCommand (NAVSPACE).

63. Fergusson, Déjà Vu: Canada, NORAD,and Ballistic Missile Defence, p 11 (note 22).

64. US HQ NORAD, NORAD Vision 2010and Beyond. (US: Peterson AFB, 1997).

65. Command and Control by third partywere not addressed in the 1972 ABM Treaty.The provisions of third party involvement in

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an ABM system addressed the fact that nothird party can gain access to blueprints andtechnological data that would permit thedevelopment of a third party’s system.

66. LGen Macdonald, DCINCNORAD testi-fied to SCONDVA to that effect 29 Feb 00.

67. Maj (USAF) John Donovan, Space Supportto Military Operations: Seizing the HighGround, NDHQ/D Space D Briefing to theJoint-Warfare Course, Briefing notes, 10June 1999, p.22.

68. USSPACECOM, http://www.peter-son.af.mil/usspace/space.htm, Space sur-veillance.

69. Donovan, Space Support to MilitaryOperations: Seizing the High Ground, p.25.

70. Dr. Colin S. Gray and John B. Sheldon,“Space Power and the Revolution in Militaryaffairs”, Airpower Journal, Vol XIII No.3, (Fall1999), p 26.

71. Ibid, p 27.

72. Ibid, p 31.

73. US Space Command, Long Range Plan –Executive Summary (US: Space Command,March 1998), p 4.

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57

pace forces are fundamental toour modern military operations.

They are playing a central role in theongoing revolution in warfarebecause of their unique capabilitiesfor gathering, processing, and dissem-inating information.”

Dr Paul Kaminski, US DoD UnderSecretary of Defense for Acquisition

and Technology

“Over all of these operations, I amreminded that our space forces pro-vide a constant umbrella …Altogether, our space-based assetsprovide critical global situationalawareness, communications, weath-er, and navigation support to allwarfighters.”

Hon. Sheila Widnall, US Secretaryof the Air Force

Introduction

Throughout history, armies haveattempted to seize control of the highground to gain advantage in battle.Command of the high ground expand-ed visibility over the battlefield, reduc-ing what Clausewitz termed the “fog ofwar” as space represents the “ultimatehigh ground.”1 Satellites have thepotential to afford a commander almostunlimited visibility of the battlespace.For this reason, the Revolution inMilitary Affairs (RMA), described inthe US Joint Vision 2020, is definingand expanding on space capabilities as

a force multiplier. The Gulf War wasthe first conflict in which space assetswere heavily employed in support ofcampaign planning and execution.2

However, it was the air war in Kosovothat made it clear that the ability tocontribute in an alliance with the US inthe future will be contingent upon theability to receive, process and sharespace-furnished battlespace informa-tion. Thus, if Canada plans to continueto contribute to future coalition and, inparticular, US-led operations, it shouldreview its space policy to identifythose space capabilities in which itshould invest.

NORAD is also exploring the use ofspace-based assets to enhance thedefence of North America. Canadagains great benefit from its participa-tion in the NORAD agreement – in fact,it affords a gateway for Canada’s accessto space. With the US poised on thethreshold of Ballistic Missile Defence,the extent to which Canada participatesmay affect her continued partnershipwith the US in space ventures throughNORAD.

Canadian defence policy directs theCanadian Forces (CF) to provide multi-purpose, combat capable forces on land,sea and in the air to meet the require-ments of national security and interna-tional peace missions. In an era ofreduced defence spending, the CF musttake advantage of new technologies thatcan act as force multipliers. However,given the CF’s current defence commit-

Equipping the Canadian Forces for Space

Syndicate 6: Major Cather ine Cowan (Chair), Major Faisal Al Kaabi,L ieutenant -Colonel Mivi l Deschênes , Major Marc Desjardins ,Squadron Leader Richard Lennon, Major Daniel Mitchel l ,Major Thomas Sand, Major Pierre St -Amand

“S


ments and the deficient state of existingconventional equipment, space capabil-ity should initially be acquired as acomplement to, rather than at theexpense of, more traditional equipment.Space should be seen as the means ofmaking current assets more efficientand cost effective in the performance oftheir missions, thereby permittingadjustment to the acquisition ratio ofspace to traditional equipment as effi-ciencies are realized. For the CF, the keyis to define a cohesive procurement pro-gramme that prioritizes the require-ments for space-related equipment asintegral capabilities within the replace-ment and upgrade needs of traditionalmilitary platforms.

In considering the CF’s future par-ticipation in space, two core questionsarise. The first deals with the spacecapabilities that the CF requires. Thesecond concerns the portion of thedefence effort that should be devoted tospace capabilities. This essay outlinesthe key space capabilities and associat-ed equipment that the CF needs toacquire to remain an effective combatcapable force in domestic and foreigncoalition operations now and in thefuture. It begins with an overview ofCanada’s military involvement in spaceand her intent to obtain space capabili-ty through partnership arrangementswith industry and allied nations. Next,a review of current US and Canadianmilitary space policies and the CF spacestrategy are presented to identify thespace capabilities that the CF requires toremain a capable military force in thefuture. Key national factors that couldconstrain Canadian participation inspace will then be discussed. Followingthis, each of the roles and associatedequipment requirements will be dis-cussed. Next, the employment of space

equipment will be examined in terms ofits feasibility, affordability and applica-bility to the CF mission. Finally, thispaper will make recommendations forthe acquisition of space capabilitydesigned to improve the efficiency andinteroperability of CF assets in meetingits current and future tasks.

Background

Canada has played an important andleading role in space since the beginningof the space era. Canada’s successesinclude the physiological research of Dr.Wilbur Franks; research on the iono-sphere during the Second World War toimprove naval communications and sur-veillance of transmissions from GermanU-boats; and the launch of the Canadiansatellite, Alouette I, in 1962. Theseimpressive successes were focussed pre-dominantly on research for militaryapplications. In fact, at the time that thespace programme was “demilitarised” forpolitical and commercial reasons in1966,4 41 percent of Canadian spaceexpenditure was for military projects.The first Government initiative follow-ing demilitarisation of the space pro-gramme led to the creation of TelesatCanada in 1969 to develop a “domesticcommunications satellite system”.

Government policy allowed theCanadian space industry to become suc-cessful in the development of space;however, the same did not apply to theDepartment of National Defence (DND).A Senate Committee hearing on airdefence in 1985 recommended theestablishment of a military space pro-gramme to protect national security,and its recommendations were finallyincluded in the form of a space policystatement in the 1987 White Paper onDefence. To support this policy, the

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Space Development Working Group(SDWG) was finally established in 1991to co-ordinate all space related issuesfor DND. In issuing a DND Space Policyin 1992, the SDWG sought to develop acomprehensive strategic space apprecia-tion, to review current governmentspace policy and to develop an exe-cutable space plan. Recently, theSDWG produced its Space Appreciation2000, a study of today’s global spacedevelopment trends and the relatedsecurity implications for Canada.

Strategy 2020 clearly indicatesDND’s intent to focus on its ability tooperate in a global battlespace. In thisenvironment, reliance on informationand information management willrequire the CF to modernization in theareas of space, telecommunications andsurveillance.5 Limited defence spend-ing and the expensive nature of spaceprogrammes make it clear that Canadacannot on its own afford to develop thecomplete realm of space capability nec-essary for the future battlefield. Onlythrough alliances and industry partner-ships will DND be able to acquire orgain access to those key assets necessaryto remain an effective fighting force infuture operations. While commercialsystems are capable of meeting a num-ber of the support requirements, thereare critical gaps in their ability to meetspecific national security and reliabilityrequirements. The key to obtaining thesecapabilities is our alliance with the US.

DND currently acquires much of itssatellite communications bandwidthfrom commercial companies. In addi-tion, DND has several joint ventureswith industry on projects such asRADARSAT II, a terrain analysis satel-lite system. Multi-national understand-ings are also in place that enable

Canadian participation in joint pro-grammes such as the SARSAT searchand rescue system. Furthermore, anagreement between the Canadian SpaceAgency (CSA) and the European SpaceAgency (ESA) gains Canada access totechnological information on Europeanspace initiatives. However, by far thegreatest cooperation on space relatedissues has been with the United Statesthrough the NORAD agreement. As theUS and Canada define their militaryspace programmes and their future mil-itary structures, cooperation on spaceissues has increased. Discussions haveincluded the renewal of NORAD, themutual defence of North America, andthe use of space in combating the emerg-ing asymmetric threats to continentalsecurity. As indicated in Strategy 2020,these initiatives demonstrate that Canadaanticipates sharing the burden for spacecapabilities in the areas of early warning,global sensing and telecommunications.

On the other hand, differences inCanadian and US policies on BallisticMissile Defence (BMD) may prove a stum-bling block to Canada’s capability toexploit space initiatives through NORAD.The US intends to assign the BMD role toNORAD, but this requires the approval ofboth countries. While the US sees BMDas critical to defence “against nuclearattacks by so-called ‘rogue’ states,”6 theCanadian Government’s “opposition isrooted in its fears for the non-prolifera-tion treaty.”7 Resolution of this issue maybe key to Canada’s continued participa-tion in US space projects. However, forthe purpose of this paper continuedCanadian-US cooperation on space initia-tives is assumed.

Before addressing specific areaswhere Canada envisions participation inthe space arena, it is first necessary to

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review and compare the space policiesof the US and Canada. While doctrinewould give greater insight into the mil-itary application of space assets, neithercountry has developed joint or singleservice space doctrine to a level thatwould be useful to this discussion. Thefollowing section will thus review rele-vant policies to identify key areas forCanadian space participation.

Space Policy

The US views space power as a vitalcomponent of operations. Joint Vision2010 provides “the conceptual frame-work for how America’s Armed Forceswill channel the vitality and innovationof [their] people and leverage technologi-cal opportunities to achieve new levels ofeffectiveness in joint warfighting.”8

Joint Vision 2010 specifies that “Globalpositioning, ballistic missile defense,multispectral sensing, electromagnetictechnology, telecommunications andfusion of all-source intelligence”9 willprovide an integrated picture for “domi-nant battlespace awareness and [an] orderof magnitude improvement in lethali-ty.”10 The key operational conceptsemerging from this document are domi-nant manoeuvre, precision engagement,focused logistics, information dominanceand full-dimension protection – all partsof “full spectrum dominance”.11

In his Vision 2020, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Space Command(USSPACECOM) describes how spacepower will be used to support the oper-ational concepts identified in JointVision 2010. It is based upon the dom-ination of space for military operationsand includes four tenets: “control ofspace, global engagement, full forceintegration, and global partnerships.”12

This recognizes that space, just like air,

sea and land, is becoming another medi-um of warfare in the 21st century andforms the basis for current joint spacepolicy and doctrine development.

In the US, the development ofspace capabilities is derived from theNational Space Policy, which identifiesfour broad sets of guidelines: Civil,National Security, Commercial, andIntersector. The US Department ofDefense (DoD) space policy, a subset ofthe National Security Space Guidelines,states that the primary goal of DoD inspace is to “provide operational capabil-ities to ensure the US can meet nationalsecurity objectives”. It goes on to detailgeneral, space support, force enhance-ment and force application policies.

The missions attributed to DoDinclude:

a. provision of support for theUS’ inherent right of self-defenceand US defence commitments toallies and friends;

b. deterring, warning, and ifnecessary, defending againstenemy attack;

c. ensuring that hostile forces can-not prevent US own use of space;

d. countering, if necessary,space systems and services usedfor hostile purposes;

e. enhancing operations of USand allied forces;

f. ensuring the US ability toconduct military and intelligencespace-related activities;

g. satisfying military and intelli-

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gence requirements during peaceand crisis as well as through alllevels of conflict; and

h. supporting the activities ofnational policy makers, the intelli-gence community, NationalCommand authorities, combatantcommanders and military servic-es, federal officials and continuityof Government operations.13

Canadian military space policy isembodied in the Department ofNational Defence Space Policy docu-ment, dated 14 Sep 1998. The statedgoals of the policy are to use space tech-nology wherever appropriate in:

a. protecting national securityand sovereignty interests;

b. protecting national interestsfrom threats located in or passingthrough space; and

c. fulfilling Canada’s defencecommitments (treaty and UN obli-gations) by supporting existingmissions and tasks.

DND is further tasked to develop acapability to:

a. acquire and assess space data;

b. monitor activities in space;

c. use space to support theCanadian Forces globally;

d. support arms control verification,and security and confidence buildingmeasures in or from space; and

e. participate in space-support-ed search-and-rescue systems.

While expressed in a less focusedmanner, the Canadian policy incorpo-rates all aspects of the US military spacepolicy except active (offensive) ballisticmissile defence. Much of Canadian pol-icy focuses on aerospace warning andcontrol, as specified in the NORADagreement.14 Whilst Canadian policyconcentrates on acquiring access to andusing available space information, USpolicy promotes building a nationalcapability.

Canadian Space Strategy andCapability Requirements

The policy framework describedabove provides the basis for theCanadian military space strategy, whichdefines the CF capability requirementsand resultant equipment programmes.Current CF military space strategy iden-tifies key capability requirements as:

a. Communications. Satellite com-munications are an integral part ofmilitary operations. “Intelligencegathering and dissemination; con-ferencing; information query andexchange; force and resource statusand replenishment needs; deploy-ment; mission planning, taskingand rehearsal; employment; andmission assessment are all enabledthrough satellite connectivity… .”15

Satellites provide the flexibility,security (anti-jam, low probabilityof intercept and detection) and sur-vivability that are essential to rapidmanoeuvre warfare.16 The CFrequirements for satellite communi-cations can be met through a com-bination of dedicated militarysatellites (where security and relia-bility are of concern) and leasedchannels on commercial satellites.As Canada does not possess its own

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military communications satellite,acquisition of guaranteed band-width on US military satellites isplanned to meet Canada’s specificsecurity requirements. However, inorder to take full advantage of thesefacilities, the CF, as part of a coali-tion, will require small tactical ter-minals (in weapons platforms) andboth small (e.g., INMARSAT) andlarge (e.g., MSAT) satellite groundterminals to link deployed CF unitsto these overhead networks.

b. Navigation. Accurate geospa-tial positioning and timing are crit-ical to today’s military operationalenvironment where precisionweapons delivery and zero casualtytolerance are a reality. Systemssuch as the US Global PositioningSystem (GPS) and the RussianGLOSNASS afford continuous,weather-independent, positionalaccuracies on a global scale, whichgreatly increases the effectivenessof both weapon delivery and navi-gation.17 It is critical to CF opera-tions that Canada maintains andenhances its capability to use GPS.It is inevitable that the US will con-tinue to develop and improve itsability to deny the use of, ordegrade the accuracy of, the GPSsignal to reduce an adversary’spotential use of this high accuracysystem. In this light, Canada, incooperation with the US, will haveto consider the effects of navigationwarfare in order to ensure that theCF has the means for continuedGPS access during operations whenaccess is denied to non-alliedforces.18

c. Search and Rescue. Special-ized SAR payloads on satellites

have become a key part of theSearch and Rescue Satellite(SARSAT) search and rescue sys-tem. From a political and publicsupport perspective, it is essentialthat DND continues to participatein the SARSAT system, where ourcurrent contribution is the provi-sion of transponders which “piggy-back” on other satellites.

d. Intelligence Support. Remotesensing19 data from a number ofvaried satellite systems are vital tostaffs for intelligence preparationof the battlefield. An accurate pic-ture of the terrain and weather inan area of operations is critical tomission success. By combining thedata from a number of differentsensors, a fairly detailed depictionof the operational environment canbe provided for the operationalplanning process.20 For Canada toobtain and make use of criticalintelligence support information, itis vital that DND intelligence agen-cies have the ability to receivespace-derived intelligence data at auseful reception rate. Alliedsources of this information areswitching to digital, soft-copytransmission of these products. It isessential that our intelligence agen-cies be supplied with the necessaryequipment to enable reception andanalysis of the information and toallow for the integration of thespace intelligence product into thenormal military command and con-trol system.

e. Weather Monitoring. Comm-anders in modern warfare requireaccurate, timely weather informa-tion for operational planning andfor accurate weapons employment.

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Military and civilian geostationaryweather satellites provide anoverview of the regional weatherpicture every 30 minutes. Bytracking weather patterns andmonitoring trends, planning staffsare able to make accurate forecasts.Satellites in polar orbit providemore detailed weather information(wind, temperature and moisturecontent data) on a 12-hour cycle.This information is critical for theaccurate employment of weaponsystems.21 Therefore, it is essentialthat Canada acquire the capabilityto receive and process near real-time access to global weather data.

f. Geomatics Support. Commer-cial environmental observationsatellites provide a fairly detailedterrain picture. Systems such asCanada’s RADARSAT, France’sSPOT and the US LANDSAT pro-vide the information needed todevelop current maps of almost anyregion of the world to a degree pre-viously unobtainable. By fusingthe data from systems using differ-ing sensor types, a more accurateand informative picture can be pro-duced for operational planners.Recent experience has revealed dif-ficulties in obtaining maps contain-ing required information for shortnotice operations in regions wherethe CF does not traditionally oper-ate. To redress this shortfall, the CFrequires a capability to produceand update maps, at short notice, tomeet the planning needs of newoperations.

g. Surveillance of Space. Surveill-ance of space enables detection,tracking and identification ofspace-based objects, and is the first

step in assuring space control. Aglobal network of sensors providesrapid detection and characteriza-tion of any threats in space. Inaddition to ballistic missile warn-ing, continuous surveillance ofspace can produce intelligenceinformation on the orbits, coverageand overhead timings of hostilesatellite systems. In times of hostil-ities, this information could beused to protect allied use of spacewhile denying similar uses to theenemy.22 As a sovereign nation, itis important that Canada is aware ofthose space systems capable of sur-veying her land mass, seaapproaches and airspace, as well asthreats to Canadian and allied spaceassets. Canadian space policy andthe NORAD agreement identifysurveillance of space as a capabilitypriority. Traditionally, Canada hasparticipated in this role under theNORAD umbrella. The importanceof this capability to Canadian sov-ereignty protection makes it essen-tial for Canada to continue herNORAD participation with the USSpace surveillance Network (SSN).

h. Surveillance from Space. Comm-anders today require near real-timesurveillance to provide informationon enemy force disposition,strength, troop movements and theenvironment where combat willtake place. Satellites equippedwith a variety of sensors are capa-ble of providing rapid surveillanceand reconnaissance information,with image resolutions in the orderof 1 to 3 metres. However, the GulfWar showed that for this informa-tion to be of use, the military musthave deployable equipment capableof receiving and manipulating the

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collected imagery. Experimentationwith the SENTRY Ground stationby Canadian naval forces in Halifaxhas been successful and futureacquisition of systems for both theEast and West Coasts is under con-sideration. Next generation sys-tems may also be capable of provid-ing tracking of moving targets onland, sea and in the air, greatlyenhancing sovereignty protectionand battlespace awareness.23

Canadian policy and the NORADagreement identify surveillance fromspace as a capability priority.Therefore, the CF needs to acquiresufficient surveillance and imageryprocessing capability to meet itsrequirements for sovereignty protec-tion, joint defence of North America,and support to deployed forces.

i. Warning. Space-based ballisticmissile warning sensors, operated byour allies, provide timely detection,identification, tracking and assess-ment of missile attack. The Gulf Warpointed to a deficiency in the capabil-ity of coalition forces to provide tacti-cal warning against modern, shortburn-time, theatre ballistic missiles.The political necessity for minimumcasualties places a burden on the CFto protect deployed forces. Therefore,the CF must investigate options thatwould rectify this deficiency.

j. Defence. Defence against bal-listic missiles, both strategic andtactical, is currently a highly con-tentious issue. The threat to UStroops deployed in theatres abroad,and the potential nuclear threatfrom ‘rogue nations’ has promptedthe US to push strongly for a spaceand ground-based Ballistic MissileDefence (BMD) capability.

However, Canada, along with anumber of other nations, believesthat the existing nuclear non-pro-liferation and anti-ballistic missiletreaties specifically ban this tech-nology. Fearing another nucleararms race, Canada has thus farrefused to endorse the US conceptof BMD. However, as part of theNORAD agreement, DND is cur-rently reviewing the US BMD pro-gramme to gain a better under-standing of its capabilities andimplications to support a futureCanadian Government responseonce the US deployment decision ismade.24 Recent news articles havehinted at the political manoeuvringon this issue. However, given thatthe future of the NORAD arrange-ment may be tied to Canada’s deci-sion on BMD, Canada will soon haveto make decisions on our futureneeds in this area.25

The Deputy Chief of the DefenceStaff is responsible for generatingCanadian military space strategy. Fromthe identified capability requirementsfall the priorities and the specific equip-ment programmes to be pursued inDefence Planning Guidance (DPG),along with the identification of anyenabling activities.26 The limiting fac-tor is the amount of funding allocatedto space capabilities in the CF LongTerm Capital Plan.27 With this factor inmind, DPG 98 identifies “cooperativeparticipation in US programs … [as] akey component in the development of amodest space capability for the CF.”28

Less than two percent of theCanadian military budget, or some$1.72 billion over the next 15 years, isearmarked for major space equipmentacquisition projects to meet key capabil-

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ity requirements of the CF militaryspace strategy. The most notable ofthese projects include military satellitecommunications ($646 Million), globalpositioning systems for select aircraft($152 Million), and enhancements tothe SARSAT search and rescue capabili-ty ($64 Million).29 These projects bare-ly scratch the surface of the requiredcapabilities. As a result, the SpaceProject, which will be discussed later,has been raised to address a few of theshortcomings. The point to be takenhere is that funding for space projectsrepresents an extremely small portion ofthe Major Equipment AcquisitionProgramme at a time when spaceexploitation is the key force multiplierfor the future.

Having reviewed the military spacepolicies of the US and Canada, and hav-ing identified the key capability require-ments from the Canadian military spacestrategy, it is clear that Canada wants tomirror US capabilities but on a smallerscale and currently, without the inclu-sion of active BMD. However, from thecurrent fiscal allocations it is evidentthat the current policy and strategy arehighly ambitious, with little chance ofcoming to fruition without significantUS and commercial input. Therefore,the essential and more immediate capa-bilities need to be identified in order tofocus CF equipment acquisition effortstowards more plausible short- and long-term goals. To this end, the next sectionwill look at factors that shape a nation’sability to equip for space.

National Factors Affecting Canada’sSpace Role

Equipping Canada for space isproblematic. There is far more to theequipment equation than the high cost

of obtaining a basic space capability.Geography, national wealth, technolo-gy, industry, intellect and politics allplay important roles.30 Many of thesefactors determine what a country canand cannot do in a space programmeand a number of them will shape thedirection that Canada should take.

Geography. Geography is importantwhen considering launch facilities.There is an advantage to launch siteslocated on or near the equator as theEarth’s rotational velocity is greatest,giving rockets launched to the East thebiggest boost into orbit. But, mostimportantly for objects launched intogeostationary orbit, the available pay-load on a rocket is greatest because thefuel required to obtain orbit is least. Forexample, a rocket launched fromMontreal could carry only half the pay-load of one launched from the Equator.Canada is not well situated for developinglaunch facilities, therefore, Canada shouldnot invest in this area of a space program.

National Wealth. Countries with greatwealth are more likely to get involved inan expensive space program. WhileCanadians are considered wealthy byworld standards (Canada has one of thehighest GDPs per capita), the relativelysmall population base means Canada’sabsolute wealth is not great. Any size-able investment by Canada in a spaceprogram would thus represent a signifi-cant proportion of Canada’s wealth.Consequently, while the governmentmay wish to have a space program, costwill be a limitation.

Technology. Space technology is rapid-ly changing and represents the cuttingedge of research and development pro-grammes. Canada, with a history ofinnovation and creativity in research

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and development, has great potential toparticipate in the development of tech-nology. To ensure maximum participa-tion, the government should encourageand facilitate co-operation betweengovernment laboratories, private labora-tories and universities.31 Governmentinvolvement with industry on pastspace initiatives has been the key toCanada’s successes. This is particularlytrue in the satellite communicationsarena. As such, technological innova-tion through government partnershipswith the private sector is viewed as aneffective means of achieving Canadianspace goals.

Industry. The most successful manufac-turers in the space industry have beensmaller companies dealing in specificcomponents.32 These companies are ableto quickly restructure their operationsas technology develops and equipmentrequirements change. The Canadianspace industry is not large. With theworld’s largest space customer to thesouth of the border, the CanadianGovernment should, through govern-ment contracts or financial incentives,encourage substantial growth of aCanadian space industry sector thatwould be competitive in the US market.A larger space industry would not onlycontribute export dollars to the econo-my, but would also increase the tech-nology base for space applications.

Intellect. Canada already possesses asignificant high-technology knowledgebase in the communications, computerand robotics fields. This knowledgebase lends itself well to specific nicheswithin the space environment. Canadashould ensure that there are sufficienteducational institutions generating thenecessary knowledge and expertise tosupport a Canadian space capability and

industry. The population’s attitudetoward a space industry must be posi-tive. And, there must be incentives tocurtail the oft-quoted Canadian ‘braindrain’ to the US. Canada has a worldclass educational system. If the govern-ment wants growth in Canada’s spacecapability, it must undertake to win thesupport of the business community andthe population, and must in turn sup-port the institutions that are developingthe required intellectual power base.

Political Will. Space is still primarily inthe realm of nation states, although par-ticipation by non-state (commercial)operators is increasing, so any capabili-ty in space requires Government com-mitment. Because of their nationalsecurity concerns, countries such asIsrael, Russia and China have overcomedeficiencies in national wealth, geogra-phy and other attributes to become sig-nificant players in space - all becausethe political will to have a presence inspace was overriding. If Canada wantsmore than a token presence in space, itmust commit resources. To accomplishthis, the support of the Canadian peopleis very important.

From this overview of Canada’snational factors, it can be seen that,while not suited geographically forsatellite launch facilities, Canada doespossess the necessary technological,industrial and intellectual capacity toplay an active role in the space arena.For a country with a small population,funding will always be a limitation.However, as with all government initia-tives, political will and public supportare key. Current government policy ishighly supportive of a Canadian spaceprogramme; all that remains to be seenis the level of financial commitment thegovernment is prepared to commit.

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Equipping the CF for Space

Given that Canada has the capacityto play a role in space, and havingreviewed the CF’s space capabilityrequirements, the questions of which arethe essential and more immediate require-ments and what would be the bestmethod to meet them need to beanswered. This section will begin toaddress these questions by discussingeach of the capabilities and their associat-ed equipment within the broad categoriesof command, control and communica-tions, data acquisition and exploitation,and surveillance of space and defence.33

Command, Control and Commun-ications

Command, control and communica-tions (C3) is one of the most importantareas where the CF can be supportedand enhanced by space-based assets. C3

satellite systems provide secure, world-wide voice and data communications insupport of command and control net-works.34 Interoperability with our alliesand the capability to receive and transmitkey operational and tactical data dependon a robust communications system.

Communications

As space and command and controltechnologies evolve, connectivity todeployed forces, information fusion,and information management mustreceive increased focus.35 The develop-ment of a high speed, mobile communi-cations capability that can support largevolumes of fused data is key to the inte-gration of all space capabilities intofuture theatre operations.36 From thesestatements it can be inferred that themost important space capabilityrequirement is space communications

and the associated ground and weaponsplatform equipment.

Geography and population distri-butions in Canada make satellite com-munications a highly attractive and costeffective alternative to HF radio,microwave and landline telecommunica-tions. For the CF, commercial communi-cation satellites provide key links toinstallations and deployed forces world-wide. Recognizing this requirement,the CF Space Policy emphasized theimportance of satellite communicationsin terms of providing global strategicand tactical secure communications forthe command and control of air, landand naval forces.37

Unlike many of our NATO allies,Canada does not possess dedicated mili-tary communication satellites. The CFrelies instead on a combination of leasedcapacity from commercial satellites andaccess to other nations’ military systemsto provide global communications.38

Systems currently being used by the CFinclude the following:

a. Telesat Canada. Telesat Canadaoperates all of Canada’s commer-cial ANIK and the upcomingmobile satellite (MSAT) communi-cation satellites. The CF uses theAnik satellites extensively toeffect communications with Alertand the North Warning Systemradar stations. These systemsoffer limited far north coverageand communications security. Asa result, the CF funded a secureteletype and communicationscapability on the Anik E satellites.To utilise these systems, the CFoperates two fixed ground sta-tions and seven transportable ter-minals (MMs). These trans-

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portable terminals deploy with CFcontingents to provide multiplesecure voice, data or video confer-encing channels. However, thebandwidths that can be support-ed, their lift requirements, andsatellite footprints limit the use-fulness of these terminals. TheMSAT, consisting of one Canadianand one US satellite, providescontinental Canada/U.S coverage(with the exception of the farnorth) for mobile communica-tions. Although more expensivethan cellular communications, it isanticipated that MSAT will pro-vide communications to small,light-weight, mobile platforms,such as vehicles, ships and air-craft, at much higher data ratesthan those currently available.39

b. INTELSAT. The InternationalTelecommunications Satellite(INTELSAT) organization providesnear global satellite communica-tions between its 123 plus membernations through the use of INTEL-SAT V, VI and VII satellites posi-tioned over the Atlantic, Indianand Pacific Oceans. Most com-monly used for high volume com-munications, such as TV signals,this system is restricted to peace-ful uses, limiting military usage todomestic operations, peacekeepingand UN sanctioned actions;40

c. INMARSAT. The InternationalMaritime Satellite (INMARSAT)system is a commercial systemdesigned to support a mobile com-munications interface betweenships at sea and land-basedtelecommunications networks forthe 74 member nations.Consisting of satellites over the

Atlantic, Pacific and IndianOceans, it is capable of providingnear-global coverage to smallportable/mobile terminals andfixed ground stations. First intro-duced in 1979, its initial imple-mentation was so successful thatthe system was expanded toinclude both land- and air-basedapplications. Although the CF hasheavily used this system at seaand on deployments both withinand outside of Canada, as a com-mercial system INMARSAT usageis also limited to peaceful traffic.For military users, the INMARSATsystem poses two additional prob-lems: high cost ($7-$10 perminute); and the lack of a guaran-teed channel (channel can be seizedon demand if it is available).41

d. FLTSATCOM. The Fleet SatelliteCommunications (FLTSATCOM)system, owned by the US Navy,provides global communicationsfor US strategic and nuclear mili-tary forces. The initial system con-sisted of three US DoD geostation-ary satellites, supplemented byLEASAT satellites leased fromHughes. Operating primarily inthe UHF range, it ensures securecommunications with ships andaircraft. As part of its UHF Follow-on (UFO) project, the US launched10 satellites between 1992 and 1996as an EMP protected replacementfor the initial system. AMemorandum of Understandingaffords access to CF Naval forces;however, this access is restricted toperiods of joint naval operations.

e. SKYNET. SKYNET is GreatBritain’s military communicationssatellite.

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f. NATO III and IV. NATO III andIV are communication satellitesdedicated for use by NATO forces.

Because of the lack of a Canadianmilitary communications satellite, the CFhas relied on a combination of HF radiosand commercial satellites to provide forlong-range communications. With theunreliability of HF communications andthe limitation of peaceful usage onlyapplied to many of the commercial satel-lite systems now in use, the CF needs toacquire a guaranteed capability for mili-tary communications via satellite. TheCanadian Military SatelliteCommunications (CANMILSATCOM)Project was raised to address this capa-bility shortfall by obtaining guaranteedaccess to the US military globalAdvanced EHF MILSATCOM System.Highly protected, this system will pro-vide the CF with the capability to over-come satellite communications signaljamming, interference and detection. Inaddition, it will provide the CF with thefollowing capabilities: global satellite-based broadcast; mobile and interopera-ble satellite UHF; required UHF MIL-SATCOM terminals for long-range patrolaircraft, submarines, and ships; anddirect interoperability with US NavyUHF communications. Strategic rear-link communications for National com-mand and control to deployed forces willbe supported through a combination ofCanadian-purchased man-portable,transportable, mobile and fixed termi-nals. In short, the CANMILSATCOMproject will ensure reliable, protected,and interoperable global communica-tions to deployed CF elements.42

Communication shortfalls remain-ing after completion of the CANMIL-SATCOM project will be ground based.While the Army’s Tactical Command,

Control and Communications Systems(TCCCS) project addressed some of thetransportable terminal replacementrequirements, the DND CIO organiza-tion is addressing piecemeal fixes tobring these systems up-to-date in orderto ensure transportable rear-link com-munications capability for the future.The recent policy decision by the CF topermit contractors into theatre meansthat transportable ground stationequipment could be leased and operat-ed by contractors to provide all but themost secure rear-link military communi-cations capabilities to deployed forces.However, the CF needs to review thisapproach to determine the best andmost economical means of meeting thisstrategic communications requirement.In addition, while TCCCS addressed themobile and man-portable radio require-ments for the Army, satellite communi-cations terminals would be required tooperate over the MILSATCOM system.For the tactical forces to be interopera-ble and capable of sending and receiv-ing military satellite communications, theCF will have to acquire terminals to sup-port land-based mobile communications.

Canada, as a world leader in thecommunications field is also ideally sit-uated to provide ground control sta-tions as part of its space contribution toits allies. While not a key capabilityrequirement within the CF, develop-ment of Canadian-based ground stationswould help alleviate the world-wideshortage of ground control stations.43 Aground station contribution could beused by the CF as an offset to gain accessto other satellite system capabilities.

Navigation

Space technology has provided mil-itary commanders in the field with

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enhanced movement and control offorces through satellite navigation sys-tems. The Gulf War and the air war inKosovo amply demonstrated the advan-tages of, and the requirement for, accu-rate global positioning and timing syn-chronization for manoeuvre coordina-tion and precise weapons delivery.Only two systems provide continuousglobal coverage today – the US GlobalPositioning System (GPS) and theRussian GLONASS global positioningsystem. Since the Gulf War, Canada hasused the US GPS for all-weather land,sea and air navigation in addition toGPS weapons delivery enhancement.However, while commercial systemsoften provide the requisite accuracies,the spectre of Navigation Warfare(NAVWAR),44 along with GPS integra-tion with numerous military systems,make it essential for Canada to acquirethe capability to utilize the allied mili-tary GPS signal in all conflict conditions.

The Position Determination andLocation Finding (PDALF) Project wasraised by the CF to address the shortfallin military GPS receivers on select mili-tary aircraft, ships and in support of landforces. The decommissioning of manyradio-based navigation aids make GPSreceivers essential. In addition, the abil-ity of the CF to operate in contingencyoperations with the US and other alliednations depends on precise navigationand timing. Therefore, the procurementof GPS receivers across CF elementsunder the PDALF project must continue.

Canada does not possess any GPSsatellites or control segment facilities.To ensure continued access and to gaina better understanding of the NAVWARenvironment, Canada could make avaluable contribution in the area ofresearch and further development of

GPS security with the US as part of itsshare of space capability financing.

Command, Control and CommunicationsPriorities

Both satellite communications andGPS navigation capabilities are vital toCF operations. When looking at themyriad of access and equipmentrequirements that these capabilitiesgenerate, acquisition priority should begiven to obtaining secure satellite com-munications through the CANMILSAT-COM project, followed by GPS receiveracquisition for select platforms, acquisi-tion of strategic rear-link and tacticalsatellite user terminals, and leasing ofcommercial satellite facilities. Oncethese requirements have beenaddressed, the CF should look at mak-ing contributions to the space pro-gramme through investment in commu-nications ground stations and naviga-tion warfare (i.e., GPS security) researchand development.

Data Acquisition and Exploitation

Data acquisition and exploitation“involves the development and deploy-ment of space-based systems for suchfunctions as remote sensing, spatialpositioning, and surveillance andreconnaissance in support of tradition-al military operations.”45 While notusually considered in this category, theCF has international obligations andfinancial commitments to the upgradeof the SARSAT Search and Rescue sys-tem. As activities in this regard mustcontinue, search and rescue will becovered first. Canadian sovereigntyprotection and our ability to gainknowledge of the battlespace environ-ment are contingent upon the CF gain-ing space capabilities in the areas of sur-

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veillance from space, intelligence sup-port, geomatics support and weathermonitoring. Each of these capabilitiesand the equipment necessary to acquirethem are discussed below.

Search and Rescue

While not strictly a military activi-ty, the Canadian public highly supportsthe CF’s leading role in Search andRescue (SAR). Because of the size andgeography of Canada, space detection ofemergency beacons is one of the fewmeasures available to reduce the searcharea, thereby making better use of thelimited SAR assets. As such, Canadahas been committed to the internationalSARSAT program with Canada’s contri-bution coming primarily from the pro-vision of transponders and ground con-trol facilities. The Canadian developed“piggyback” transponders have provento be a cost-effective way of deployingspace segments. The SARSAT system iscurrently being upgraded to providebetter location information. The CF, aspart of its commitment to the SARSATupgrade project, is developing moresensitive and powerful transponders forbetter signal detection and rebroadcastcapability. Even though there may behigher priority needs for space capabil-ities within the CF, international obliga-tions and existing project investmentmake it necessary to continue with theSARSAT update project.

Surveillance from Space

The key to surveillance from spaceis the capability “… to sense the earth’ssurface and air without regard toboundary, sunlight, weather and, insome cases, foliage or soil … .”46

Surveillance and reconnaissance satel-lites, equipped with a variety of sen-

sors, can provide rapid coverage ofareas, installations and troop move-ments to aid commanders in forming anaccurate picture of the battlespace.Comparison of repetitive images from acombination of optical, thermal andradar sensors enables planners andintelligence staffs to highlight forth-coming problems and to make accurateoperations and damage success determi-nations. Future advances in sensortechnology are expected to enablespace-borne tracking of individual tar-gets on land, sea and in the air, greatlyfacilitating sovereignty protection andtactical targeting. With resolutions inthe order of 1 to 3 metres, accurateintelligence information can be easilygained, especially when multiple sen-sors are used to cover the same area.47

A large number of commercialimagery satellites, such as Canada’sRADARSAT, France’s SPOT, and the US’sLANDSAT, are currently deployed, withanother 45 new systems expected to belaunched before 2010. These satellites arecapable of providing users with near-realtime information at resolutions greaterthan 15 meters. Access to these commer-cial satellites can provide a large portionof the information required by the CF forgeneral surveillance, reconnaissance andintelligence gathering purposes. Accessto specialized systems, for more accurate,sensitive and timely information, can beobtained through shared Canadian andallied sources. One possible avenue to aidaccess to the required systems could bethrough Canadian involvement in thedevelopment of the US space-based radarprogramme through the NORAD arrange-ment. Projected efficiencies of space-based radar assets opens possibilities forthe future downsizing and long-termdecommissioning of parts of the NorthWarning System.

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Canada’s major contribution to sur-veillance from space comes through theRADARSAT programme. RADARSAT isa joint government and commercialsatellite that provides a detailed pictureof the earth’s terrain along its orbitingroute. Continuing research and devel-opment aims to achieve the ability totrack ground targets and, eventually, airtargets with RADARSAT II, which isdue for launch shortly. The CF must bepositioned to take advantage of theseevolving capabilities, ensuring con-trolled access to these satellites asrequired.

Intelligence Support

In addition to national surveillancefor sovereignty and environmental pur-poses, the CF needs to be able to quick-ly acquire, process, manipulate and dis-seminate imagery information in sup-port of deployed operations. Theimportance of this capability was clear-ly demonstrated during the air war inKosovo, during which aircraft werereassigned to new targets in-flight andimagery was transmitted to the pilotsfor target familiarization. With theexception of limited systems, such asthe RADARSAT programme, the CF can-not afford to develop a nationallyowned and operated global remotesensing capability that employs thecomplete spectrum of sensor types.However, the CF is well situated to aug-ment its RADARSAT contribution withan imagery processing facility for alliedimagery development, manipulationand dissemination.

Although space systems can pro-vide enormous quantities of raw data,existing CF systems are only capable ofreceiving and processing small amountsof the information made available

through US and allied sources. Giventhe data communications and computerexpertise in Canada, the CF couldbecome an integral and key link in theintelligence chain by developing auto-matic processes and capacity to receive,analyze and distribute timely intelli-gence data to fielded forces in a readilyuseable format. The development ofthis capability would allow continuedaccess to other nation’s space assets inexchange for sharing the processing bur-den. This is an area where Canada’s well-established research and developmentcapability could play a leading role.

Geomatics Support (Mapping)

Military operational experience hasshown that updated mapping of an areaof responsibility will often be requiredat little notice. Accurate and timelymapping requires access to remote sens-ing and cartography satellite systemsemploying land-use applications. Toaid in this process, satellites are beinglaunched into service as part of theGeographical Information Systems(GIS). These systems are designed tostore and manipulate surface data in theform of cadastral maps, satellite photos,and contour, road and soil maps48. Infact Canada, as a pioneer in GIS devel-opment, holds the world’s largest landresource data bank. The primary advan-tage of the GIS is the ready ability tooverlay maps, greatly reducing thenumber of man-hours traditionallyspent in manually preparing maps withacetate overlays. In addition, three-dimensional representations of an areacould be produced for fly-through orwalk-through imaging using satellitepictures from different systems. Theadvantage that this technology couldafford tactical and operational operatorsand planners is astonishing, especially

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when considering its value in combina-tion with other intelligence data.49

The key satellite systems used for geo-matic support are:

a. LANDSAT. The US LANDSATsystems were designed for map-ping applications. Orbiting theEarth in near-polar orbits at eleva-tions of approximately 680 km, thesix satellites in the system use acombination of multi-spectralscanning and thematic mappingsensors to provide resolutions inthe order of 30 metres. However,with only six satellites in orbit,coverage of an area can occurs onlyevery 16 days, limiting the capabil-ity to fewer than six useful imagesof a particular region per year. Forsupport to short notice military oremergency operations, 16 daysmay be too long to wait to obtainneeded mapping information.50

g. SPOT. France’s Satellite Pourl’Observation de la Terre (SPOT)uses two High-Resolution Visiblesensors (HRVs) on three operationalsatellites to produce images with 10x 10 metre resolutions over a 117km wide area. The advantage ofthis system is the provision ofimages in stereographic format forthree-dimensional topographicalanalysis. As with the LANDSATsystem, the SPOT satellites are innear-polar orbits that permit sec-ond passes over a particular regionon a 26 day cycle.51

h. RADARSAT. RADARSAT is aCanadian-lead, joint US and pri-vate sector satellite system thatprovides “global information onice conditions, crops, forests,

oceans, and geological forma-tions.”52 Using SyntheticAperture Radar, the system offersa variety of viewing angles, areasof coverage and resolutions. Onwide area coverage, the satelliteprovides routine surveillance ofthe Arctic region on a daily basisand scanning of Canada over a 72-hour period. Using this system,processed information on itemssuch as ice in shipping lanes canbe provided on demand withinfour hours of the satellite pass.For the CF, this system providesimportant information on Canada’snorthern regions, forestry, geolog-ical resources, oceans and floatingice, coastal zones, and Arctic sov-ereignty. In addition, it enablesimproved marine weather and seastate forecasts.53

While the RADARSAT system maymeet many of the CF’s requirements insupporting Canadian sovereignty pro-tection, access to systems using differ-ent sensor types and varied areas ofcoverage are essential to give the CF aglobal mapping capability. The numberof commercially available systems isexpected to increase rapidly over thenext 10 years. Canada, with itsRADARSAT experience, is well posi-tioned to become more involved in thecommercial applications of this technol-ogy, particularly in the overlay and pro-cessing technologies. Canadian spacecontributions in this area could be a keyto future access to other allied and USsystems.

Weather Monitoring

Timely and accurate weather infor-mation is crucial in planning militaryoperations. The US Military Defense

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Meteorological Satellite Program(DMSP) uses two satellites in polar orbitto provide high-resolution weatherdata, in the form of cloud cover, cloudmoisture, wind vectors, soil moisture,ocean current, and sea state data, to mil-itary operations. Data is transmitteddirectly to in-theatre ground terminalsto support current military operationsand to air force tracking stations foronward transmission and processing.To achieve cost savings, convergence ofthe DMSP with the US National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administration(NOAA) weather satellite system is inprogress. Once completed, the com-bined system will provide weatherinformation to both military and civil-ian users. Incorporation of theEuropean meteorological systems tocomplete a single world-wide networkis currently being negotiated.54

For the CF, access to this weatherinformation is essential for accurateoperational planning and weapons tar-geting. Investment in space-basedweather systems is not in Canada’simmediate interest owing to the highcosts involved; however, acquisition oftransportable ground terminals for in-theatre support and dedicated process-ing stations in Canada is required.

Data Acquisition and ExploitationPriorities

The CF needs to acquire spacecapabilities in the areas of surveillancefrom space, intelligence support, geo-matics support and weather monitoring.While not entirely a military require-ment, the CF is committed to participatein the SARSAT upgrade project.Development of more sensitivetransponders will facilitate SAR activi-ties in Canada, enabling more efficient

use of CF SAR assets. Therefore, theSARSAT upgrade project is a top prior-ity within the data acquisition andexploitation area. The Directorate ofSpace Development (D Space D) listssurveillance of space and surveillancefrom space as the key pillars of the JointSpace project. Within the surveillancefrom space capability, initial priorityshould be given to developing the capa-bility quickly to acquire, process,manipulate and disseminate imageryinformation. By offering the capabilityto disseminate processed intelligenceand geomatic imagery to allies oversecure military satellite links, the CFwould provide a valuable service thatcould facilitate access to other spacesystems. Next, the CF should pursueaccess to US and European weathersatellite systems and processing termi-nals for rapid access to weather infor-mation. Participation in the US space-based radar programme throughNORAD and continued research anddevelopment on the CanadianRADARSAT programme should be thenext in line, followed by access to addi-tional commercial imaging systems.

Surveillance of Space and Defence

This area of space capabilitiesincludes the “surveillance of space andthe establishment of defensive systemsto safeguard against threats to nationalinterests in, from or through space.”55

While Canada has actively participatedin the surveillance of space throughthe NORAD arrangement, theGovernment has thus far opposedCanadian participation in BallisticMissile Defence (BMD) in forms otherthan missile warning, research andconsultation roles. As space capabili-ties continue to expand, control ofspace over Canadian territory is

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becoming more important to Canadiansovereignty. Outside the BMD arena,the keys to space surveillance anddefence are:

a. protection of Canadian accessto space-based systems;

b. knowledge of the use of spaceassets over Canadian territory bypotential adversaries; and

c. research into passive denial ofspace system usage by adversariesagainst Canada and its allies.

As the importance of space andspace-based assets increases, therequirement to attain and maintaindominance in space becomes morepressing. Surveillance of space anddefence are the two capabilities thatcombine to assure space superiority.These capabilities and the equipmentnecessary to acquire them are discussedbelow.

Surveillance of Space

Surveillance of space, a key ele-ment in space control, provides Canadawith an awareness of foreign satelliteactivity over Canadian territory. Inpartnership with the US under theNORAD agreement, Canada is deter-mined to take an active part in thedevelopment of a Space SurveillanceNetwork in order to guarantee contin-ued access to aerospace warning infor-mation. As part of its NORAD burdensharing, Canada plans to contribute tospace surveillance through researchsupport in the US Lincoln Lab andthrough the delivery of a space-basedsensor system designed to survey spacefrom space by the year 2004.Preliminary Departmental approval to

commit up to $80 million to thisendeavour was obtained in June 1999.56

The situational awareness that aspace surveillance network will affordcould, in combination with other sys-tems, aid Canada in protecting its ownand allied space systems while monitor-ing the capabilities of other nations. Inaddition, Canada is well placed geo-graphically to detect future air and sea-launched space systems launched fromthe Arctic region, which might other-wise reach orbit undetected.57 This is ofgreat value in establishing an effectiveballistic missile warning capability. Totake advantage of our geography andmake a valuable yet passive contributionto BMD, Canada could install groundbased radar systems, in conjunctionwith the US, capable of monitoring spaceactivity over Canada and the Arctic.This would complement the NorthWarning System, providing a total aero-space picture over Canada and the north-ern approaches to North America.

Space Defences

Defence against ballistic missilesthat use the space medium is an area ofspecial concern to Canada and her allies.Canada’s involvement in this arena iscurrently limited to research and con-sultation.58 Once the CanadianGovernment reaches a decision on thelevel of Canadian participation in spacedefence, Canada could expand itsinvolvement to include research anddevelopment into technologies for pas-sive space denial mechanisms such assignal interception, disruption ordeception. Canada has not yet demon-strated the political will to engage in thephysical attack of space systems or byspace systems. However, the continuedexpediency of the NORAD arrange-

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ment, and Canada’s access to space-afforded information, may depend onCanada’s support to the US NationalMissile Defence (NMD) programme.

The importance of the NORADagreement to Canada cannot be under-stated. The surveillance of space andmissile warning are both importantaspects of DND’s space requirementsthat are provided to Canada throughNORAD. With the agreement almostdue for renegotiation, Canada must beprepared to make an effective contri-bution towards the continued successof NORAD. This may require a shift inpolitical intent toward support of theUS NMD program. Alternatively,Canada could aid in renegotiating theAnti-Ballistic Missile Treaty betweenRussia and the US to permit ballisticmissile defense without reinitiating

upgrade to the SARSAT system(SARSAT Upgrade Project), the acquisi-tion of GPS Receivers (PDALF Project),and a project to secure guaranteed com-munications bandwidth on US militarycommunication satellites (CANMILSAT-COM) have already been discussed inthis paper. All other space capabilityshortfalls have been incorporated intoan umbrella project called the JointSpace Project, which is aimed at devel-oping a comprehensive space capabilityin support of CF operations. Its mainobjectives are to satisfy the CF’s spacerequirements in the following areas:

a. intelligence collection;

b. environmental observation,including weather and geomatics;

c. surveillance of space;

d. surveillance from space;

e. warning; and

f. defence.59

By funding specific developmentsand partnerships within each of theidentified capability categories, the CFis making a valuable and determinedcontribution to space. These efforts areexpected to secure access to systemsthat cannot be developed nationallywhile at the same time opening technol-ogy avenues for the Canadian spaceindustry. The Joint Space Project, incombination with the other three capi-tal space projects, should pave the wayfor meeting Canada’s initial space capa-bility requirements. However, it mustbe remembered that CF expenditures onspace through these projects comprisesonly two percent of the defence budgetover their 15-year implementation.

Equipping Canada for Space -Summary

From the discussion above, it isclear that an extensive amount of space-based, ground station and user terminalequipment is required to meet the 10space capabilities that the CF requires.The CF has attempted to address a fewof these requirements through capitalspace projects; however, these effortsmerely scratch the surface of long-termspace capability acquisition. Much ofthe technology is in its infancy, requir-ing significant research and develop-ment activities. A few of the morerobust technologies, such as communi-cations and remote sensing, have seenrapid commercial involvement andavailability. Due to the fiscal realities ofthe current defence budget, Canada isnot in a position to be able to developand acquire national systems across therange of capabilities. Space capabilitymust therefore be acquired through acombination of Canadian development,commercial leasing, industrial partner-ships and secured access to systemsowned and operated by our allies.

Recognizing fiscal constraints, thisreview of the CF’s space equipmentrequirements highlights priorities forfuture space efforts. Effective partici-pation in coalition operations and jointallied exercises demands that the CFaddress space-based command, controland communications requirements asthe first space priority. The CANMIL-SATCOM and PDALF projects will pro-vide the immediate navigation andstrategic and tactical communicationneeds. However, priority should alsobe given to meeting the CF’s additionalsatellite communications terminal andnavigation warfare protection require-ments. Because of the high level of

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public support and visibility of the CF’ssearch and rescue role, upgrading theexisting SARSAT network is high onthe space prioritization list, and this isbeing met through the SARSATUpgrade project. To gain capability inthe data acquisition and exploitationarena, the CF should concentrate ondeveloping a robust capability toreceive, process, manipulate and dis-seminate imagery information. In addi-tion to the Joint Space Project, the CFshould participate in the US space-based radar programme under theNORAD arrangement to acquire a con-tinuous surveillance capability fromspace. Continued NORAD participationis the key to maintaining a space sur-veillance capability. From a defenceperspective, protection of forces in the-atre from short-range missile attacks isimportant. Therefore, prioritizationshould be given to participation in theUS theatre ALERT system. A govern-ment decision on the extent of Canada’sparticipation in space-based missiledefence must be taken prior to expan-sion of the CF’s efforts beyond the pres-ent levels of research and consultation.

Having looked at the space equip-ment requirements and priorities, andhaving identified key areas whereCanada can make a valuable contribu-tion to space development, the follow-ing section will address the feasibility,affordability and applicability of spacecapabilities and equipment to the over-all CF mission.

Addressing the CF’s Space Requirements

D Space D initiated space projectswill give the CF a basic proficiencyacross the spectrum of space capabili-ties. They should also position Canadawell in terms of gaining access to addi-

tional allied systems. At a price tag ofapproximately $1.8 billion over 15years, this capability does not comecheaply. While representing only twopercent60 of the Defence budget overthis period, it still represents a signifi-cant investment at a time when majorinvestments are required to replacemost of the CF’s aging conventional air-craft fleets and to acquire equipmentessential to sustaining Canada’s combatcapability across the three environ-ments. Therefore, without an increasein defence spending, any increasedspace capability acquisition would haveto come at the expense of conventionalequipment requirements – a situationwhich would probably be untenablegiven the CF’s current missions andoperational tempo. Therefore, unlessspace-capabilities are included as inte-gral components of conventionalweapons platforms and support ele-ments, the CF must carefully weigh thedecision to acquire stand-alone spacecapability against the potential fundingloss for more traditional requirements.

Space Equipment - Feasibility and Afford-ability

To ensure the best use of limiteddefence dollars, the first step in mak-ing an acquisition decision is toaddress the question of how a capabili-ty can best be delivered. Prior to mak-ing any decision to acquire space-based assets, each equipment proposalmust be reviewed against effectivenessand affordability criteria, keeping inmind that space-based capabilities arenot an end unto themselves. Wherethe purchase of user equipment andaccess to existing systems can meet theCF requirement, the project is morefeasible and affordable, and, therefore,more likely to be funded.

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Satellites are expensive. Because ofweight restrictions, the hostile operat-ing environment and reliability require-ments, satellites tend to be technologyintensive. Their high cost61 makes itnecessary to place as much capabilityand redundancy on the payload as pos-sible to maximize cost effectiveness.“Piggy-backing” sensors and transpon-ders on commercial or government-owned satellites is a practice that isoften used to reduce costs. Launchfacilities are limited and availability is ata premium. Orbital positioning is thekey to ensuring a usable satellite foot-print, but room to accommodate satel-lites in geostationary orbit is limited.Where satellites are placed in non-geo-stationary orbits, multiple satellites ormultiple satellite passes may berequired to gain full benefit from thespace capability. Therefore, when con-sidering the development and launch ofspace segment equipment, the CF musttake these factors into account. In addi-tion, the control station and assuredaccess requirements must be considered.

With the exception of Canadianniche contributions to allied spaceefforts, such as RADARSAT, and capa-bilities requiring unique Canadian-owned space assets, the CF should avoidentering into high cost projects forsatellite development. Where Canadarequires specific capabilities that are nototherwise available, “piggy-backing” ofspace-born components on commercialor other satellites represents a more costeffective alternative. However, CF capa-bility requirements are best servedwhere access to existing commercial andallied systems can be assured.

Satellite information processingfacilities are also an important consider-ation. Imagery, intelligence and com-

mand and control information are usu-ally time sensitive, requiring rapidreceipt, processing, manipulation anddissemination. The already high vol-ume of data available from satellites isgrowing at an alarming rate, requiringthe installation of ever more capableonboard processing power. This in turnenables direct transmission to locationswhere the information is required.Alternatively, transmission to selectground stations would permit addition-al processing and fusion with other mil-itarily significant information prior todissemination.

Raw data and imagery, despiteonboard processing, may not provideall of the information required by com-manders at the tactical and operationallevels. Once robust military satellitecommunications are available and theappropriate user terminals are acquired,centralized processing and dissemina-tion facilities would be of greater bene-fit to the CF. Centralized processingwould enable selected views, super-imposed information from multiple sen-sors, and intelligence assessments to beadded to imagery prior to transmissionto operational units, thereby bettermeeting the commander’s requirementsand permitting broader distribution. Inaddition, centralized processing wouldreduce the amount of user equipmentrequired, making the overall space solu-tion more affordable. However, it mustbe noted that while centralized process-ing offers information benefits, thesecome at the expense of timeliness.

The feasibility and affordability ofuser equipment depends on the capabil-ity provided and on the operationalenvironment. For example, a full suiteof satellite communications user equip-ment, from man-portable terminals to

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satellite ground terminal installations, iscommercially available to meet a myriadof operational requirements. In manycases, space user equipment, such asGPS receivers, is an integral componentof existing weapons and support plat-forms. Where this is not the case, ded-icated, sole-purpose space equipmentmay be required. The user equipmentconfiguration and the level of integra-tion with conventional equipment alsoimpact on the equipment feasibility andaffordability.

From this discussion it is evidentthat feasibility, effectiveness and afford-ability are important criterion in theacquisition decision process. Once theproposed space equipment passes thiscriterion, the next consideration iswhether space, conventional or a combi-nation of the two equipment types canbest provide the required capability.This question will now be considered.

Space Capability – Applicability to CFMissions

Space capability is a major forceenhancer in fulfilling the CF missions ofsovereignty protection, North Americandefence, alliance participation and sup-port to CF missions abroad. As dis-cussed previously, space assets facilitateglobal communications, surveillance,navigation, weather monitoring, map-ping, intelligence and reconnaissance.However, once a threat is identified,present space assets are unable to prose-cute that threat. Existing laws andinternational agreements prohibit thedeployment of weapons in space. Asconventional weapons platforms arerequired to act upon the informationthat satellites provide, space capabilityshould be seen as an augmentation toexisting capabilities, not a replacement.

Below, the applicability of space assetsand conventional equipment to CF mis-sions is reviewed by looking at threecapability requirements.

A major task in sovereignty protec-tion and the defence of North Americais surveillance. Traditionally, surveil-lance has been accomplished through acombination of ground-based radar sys-tems and air and sea patrols. Space-based resources, while not capable oftotally replacing the existing surveil-lance assets, are highly effective in asurveying role, particularly in thedetection of missile launches and unau-thorized air and sea entry into Canadianterritory. However, Canadian geogra-phy does not permit full territorial cov-erage by satellites in geostationaryorbit. Therefore, for satellite surveil-lance to be effective, sufficient satellitesmust be placed in orbit to provide con-tinuous or near-continuous coverage.Use of satellites in this manner shouldpermit some Operation andMaintenance (O&M) savings by curtail-ing the number of air and sea patrols,enabling efficiencies to be applied toother tasks. Air and sea assets wouldstill be required to react to threats oremergency (i.e., SAR) situations thatwere identified by overhead satellites.

Battlefield awareness, a major taskin supporting CF missions abroad.Satellites offer a level of flexibility,responsiveness, timeliness, reliabilityand survivability that conventionalassets cannot provide. Satellites havethe advantage of being able to passquickly over a designated area utilizinga mix of sensors and resolutions to com-pile a complete picture of the groundsituation. Multiple flights by recon-naissance aircraft or unmanned vehiclesmay be able to provide the same level of

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information; however, the timelineswould be much longer and the lives ofthe aircrew would have to be put atrisk. For some mission types, satelliteshave look-angle, weather, light sensitiv-ity and resolution limitations that pre-vent them from being entirely effective.While superimposing images from mul-tiple satellites and varied sensors canimprove the quality of images in mostcases, there is no replacement for thevisual acuity of the human eye.Therefore, conventional assets capableof providing a battlespace awarenesscapability cannot be replaced entirelyby satellite assets; however, the taskinglevels of conventional forces in theseroles will be greatly curtailed.

Satellites are highly effective atsome forms of intelligence gathering.The range of sensors available and thelevel of continuous coverage over a spe-cific area impact on the effectiveness ofsatellites in this role; however, satellitesdo not require permission to cross anadversaries border prior to making anactive pass over a region. Little can bedone to prevent satellites from obtain-ing radar and imagery information onalmost every aspect of geography, pop-ulation distributions, industries andmilitary installations. While otherforms of intelligence gathering will notdisappear, satellites greatly facilitatemany facets of intelligence collection.

This brief examination has shownthat space assets, either alone or in com-bination with conventional equipment,provide a capability that enhances theability of the CF to perform its assignedmissions. Acquiring a space capabilitywill not remove the requirement for con-ventional forces; however, space assetusage will enable efficiencies in conven-tional equipment employment to be real-

ized, thus reducing taskings on overbur-dened resources or facilitating reassign-ment of resources to other CF roles.

Summary

Since the Gulf War, space has beenrecognized as a fundamental element insupport of military operations. Thecapability of space-based assets to deliv-er integrated terrain, weather, intelli-gence and navigation information overhigh speed satellite links to deployedforces is providing a level of battlespaceawareness that is changing the face ofconflict. Command and control andinteroperability requirements in futurecoalition or US-led operations mandatesthe capability to access, receive, manip-ulate, process and disseminate space-acquired information. Therefore, for theCF to remain an active player in militaryoperations and alliances in the future, itis essential that the CF acquire key spacetechnologies.

Through an examination of the keyspace capabilities, this essay has identi-fied the equipment that the CF needs toacquire to remain an effective combatcapable force in the future. While theCF intends to acquire capabilities acrossthe spectrum of space technology, limit-ed defence spending and the high costof space programmes make it clear thatthese capabilities can only be acquiredthrough alliances and industry partner-ships. Canada possesses the intellectualand industrial capacity to play an activerole in space, and these attributes lendthemselves well to Canada providing“niche” space capabilities to allies inreturn for guaranteed access to spacesystems and information.

Prioritization of CF space require-ments puts command, control, commu-

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nications and precision navigation atthe forefront. Canada’s present interna-tional commitments combined withhigh levels of public support for searchand rescue make the SARSAT upgradeproject a CF space priority. Identifiedcapital projects will go a long waytowards meeting these requirements.The remaining space capabilitiesrequirements are encompassed in theJoint Space Project, an umbrella projectwhich initiates activities designed toaddress the CF’s surveillance from spaceand space surveillance and defencerequirements. Key amongst theserequirements is the capability to quick-ly acquire, process, manipulate and dis-seminate imagery information, bothfrom the standpoint of using the infor-mation internally and of providing aprocessing and dissemination service toour allies. Access to weather satellitesystems, and participation with the USspace-based radar programme throughNORAD is another important surveil-lance requirements. Continued partici-pation in NORAD is the key to a spacesurveillance and defence capability;however, a Government decision onCanada’s participation with BMD isrequired before CF involvement extendsbeyond present research, consultationand sensor development activities.

A crucial caveat to the acquisition ofspace equipment is that these capabilitiesshould not be acquired at the expense ofconvention equipment replacement pro-grammes. While space-borne and spacesupported equipment can improve theefficiencies of conventional weapons andsupport platforms, they cannot entirelyreplace them. Space capabilities areforce multipliers that enable efficienciesto be realized in conventional forceemployment - savings that are crucial inan era of limited defence spending.

Canada has been privileged, thusfar, with easy access to the benefits ofspace provided because of her strongalliance with the US and NATO. Theimportance of these alliances, especiallythe NORAD agreement, will remain cru-cial to ensuring Canada’s future spacecapabilities. Given the limited defencedollars allocated to space, the CF shouldcontinue to concentrate on communica-tions and interoperability equipmentacquisitions while pursuing surveil-lance capabilities through joint alliedand commercial ventures.

Endnotes

1. Colonel T.J. Grant, Space Policy, (Toronto:Canadian Forces College AMSC1, 1999). p. 1.

2. Donald J. Kutyna, “Indispensable: SpaceSystems in the Persian Gulf War” AirpowerHistory (Spring 1999) reproduced in CSCC/MS/ACP/A/AS/PLN/L-3 Annex A: p. A-2/15.

3. Doris Jelly, Canada: 25 Years in Space.(Montreal: Polyscience Publications Inc,1988) p. 1.

4. D.J. McCoubrey et al., Space IndoctrinationHandbook. (Winnipeg: Canadian ForcesSchool of Aerospace Studies, 1996) p. 3-3.

5. Department of National Defence, Strategy2020. http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/cds/strate-gy2K/s2k04_e.asp (Ottawa, September 1999).

6. Campbell, Murray. “Canada-US spar onanti-missile shield,” South China MorningPost, 21 Mar 00.

7. Ibid.

8. Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2010,(Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), p. 1.

9. Grant, Space Policy, p. 2.

10. Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2010,p. 13.

11. Ibid, 26 (and Grant, Space Policy, p. 2).

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12. U.S. Space Command defines control ofspace as ensuring that the US and her allieswill be able to operate freely in space whiledenying that capability to adversaries.Global engagement is defined as the combi-nation of real time global surveillance andballistic and cruise missile defensive sys-tems. Full force integration is the critical roleof ensuring all forces have access to, and canmake use of, all available information.Global partnerships are the way ahead asopportunities, costs and risks are sharedbetween business, industry, governmentsand the military. US Space Command, LongRange Plan pp. 7-10.

13. Fact Sheet, National Space Policy,[http://sun00781.dn.net/spp/military/docops/national/nstc-8.htm], 19 Jan 00.

14. Captain Don Nicks, Corporal JohnBradley, and Chris Charland, Air Defence ofCanada 1948-1997 (Ottawa: GilmorePrinting, 1997) p. 201. (and Grant, SpacePolicy, p. 3).

15. Jones, Major General W.E., “Air Power inthe Space Age,” Perspectives on Air Powered. Stuart Peach (London: The StationaryOffice, Defence Studies (Royal Air Force),Joint Services Command Staff CollegeBracknell, 1998), p. 202.

16. Ibid, p. 202.

17. Ibid, p. 205.

18. Donovan, “Space Support to MilitaryOperations, Seizing the High Ground” – ABriefing to the Joint Warfare Course by theDirectorate of Space Development, slide 10.

19. “Remote sensing from space is theexploitation of the electromagnetic spectrumto reflect, radiate, refract or scatter to deter-mine the state of the terrestrial domain.Basically it is a means to sense the earth’s sur-face and air below without regard to bound-ary, sunlight, weather and, in some cases,foliage or soil characterises this portion ofspace operations. National security, science,agriculture, forestry, real estate, geology,environmental, and law enforcement areamong the interests involved. A broader

view of this area embodies the ability to sur-vey and determine the status and operationalprofile of satellites or other objects in or tran-siting space.” Jones, “Air Power in the SpaceAge”, Perspectives on Air Power, p. 202.

20. Donovan,”Space Support to MilitaryOperations, Seizing the High Ground – ABriefing to the Joint Warfare Course by theDirectorate of Space Development, slide 6.





25. Department of National Defence, ACanadian Military Space Strategy: The WayAhead for DND and the Canadian Forces(Ottawa: NDHQ, 6 May 1998) p. 4-6/11.


27. Department of National Defence, DefencePlanning Guidance 1998 (Ottawa: DND, 1998)Art 207.2 (and Grant, Space Policy, p. 3).

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid, p. 8-10/11. (and Grant, Space Policypp. 3-4).

30. Oberg James E. Space Power Theory. USSpace Command, 1999, pp. 44-47 and p. 131.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid. p. 22.

33. Ibid, p. 3-C-3.

34. Ibid, p. 3-C-3.

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35. Peach, Stuart ed., Perspectives on AirPower – Air Power in Its Wider Context,(London: The Stationary Office, 1998), p.211.

36. Ibid, p. 211.

37. McCoubrey, “Space IndoctrinationHandbook”, p. 9-1.

38. Ibid, p. 9-6.

39. Ibid, p. 9-7.

40. Ibid, p. 9-7.

41. Ibid, p. 9-8.

42. Donovan, “Space Support to MilitaryOperations, Seizing the High Ground – ABriefing to the Joint Warfare Course by theDirectorate of Space Development, slide 21.

43. Oberg, p. 67.

44. Navigation warfare involves the denial ofaccess or tampering with a hostile nation’sability to use GPS while, at the same time,protecting allied access and use of these sys-tems.

45. McCoubrey, “Space IndoctrinationHandbook”, p. 9-1.

46. Peach, Perspectives on Air Power – AirPower in Its Wider Context, p. 202.

47. McCoubrey, “Space IndoctrinationHandbook, p. 11-1.

48. Ibid, I

34. Ibid, . 21-1.

45. Ibid, . 21-13

45. Ibid, . 21-14

452Ibid, . 21-15

453Ibid, . 21-15

,4.8 U..2(S24.8(.)0( 2Deprt )14.78ent,of tDe)19.6(aense )]TJ /F5 1 Tf 815100510 TD 0 Tc 0 Tw (“)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.4582 0 TD 0.2048 Tc 0Space Tj -17555828-1.1111 TD 0.0183 Tc 0.6498 Tw [(4Sysems) Acquisiion wState g19.8(ey– A29.7(W)hit)]TJ T9.8(89 058.8462TD -0.02954Tc 0 Tw (“P)Tj 0.393790 TD 0.01432 /F4 1r)2j /F5 1 Tf 41.38680 TD 0 Tc (”)Tj /F2 1 Tf 01.39630 TD 0.0143 Tc 0.637 Tw [(4W)69.7(arshng ton: USDonD)4.8(e, 1996),]TJ 03.0721-1.1111 TD -0.00498Tc 0.0259 Tc [(4[www)7.9(,.LAAFB24.8(,.AF)8.8(,.MIL] p)24.8(.)0(1( 5)]TJ 0 -2.2222 TD 0.0143 Tc 0.6393 Tw [(45. McCoubr)19.8(e)29.89y)104.9(, )]TJ /F5 1 Tf 8.0993 0 TD 0 Tc 0 Tw (“)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.458890 TD 0.0143 Tc 0.6393 Tw (Space Indoctrination)Tj -8.5582 -1.1111 TD -0.0049 Tc 0 Tw (Handbook)Tj /F5 1 Tf 4.212 0 TD 0 Tc (”)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.4388 0 TD -0.0049 Tc 0.025 Tw [(, )24.8(.)0( 23-C13)]TJ 03.6508 -2.2222 TD 0.1133 Tw [(456 Dono)24.87v)19.7(an, )]TJ /F5 1 Tf 6.1795 0 TD 0 Tc 0 Tw (“)Tj /F2 1 Tf 0.4389 0 TD -0.0048 Tc 0.3132 Tw [(Space Su)34.9(pport to Military)]TJ -6.6183 -1.1111 TD 0.2302 Tw [(Operations)19.7(, Seizing the High Gr)19.67ound – A)]TJ T* 0.1005 Tw [(Briefing to the J)19.6(oi-0.1( nt )29.7(W)69.7(arf)19.67ar)19.6(e Cour)19.6(se b)14.7(y)0( the)]TJ T* 0.025 Tw [(Dir)19.6(ectorate of Space Dev)34.7(elopm)14.7(ent, slide 213)]TJ 0 -2.2222 TD 0.0193 Tw [(45. MDeprt )14.77ent,of tNtionsl oDeaenc,

85

he issue of space as it pertains tofuture force structure issues for the

Canadian Forces (CF) is one that relatesvery closely to that of the so-called rev-olution in military affairs (RMA). Thisderives from the fact that the drivingforce behind what has come to beknown as the RMA is the rapid develop-ment and deployment of satellite tech-nology in the areas of communications,navigation and surveillance. In consid-ering this relationship four questionsemerge. The first question is, “Whatwill be the role of Canada and the CF inmanaging armed conflict in the twenty-first century?” The second question is,“What will armed conflict in the twen-ty-first century come to look like?” Thethird question is, “What role will spaceand space-based systems play in the res-olution of conflict issues?” Finally, thefourth question is, “How ought spacesystems be integrated into the existingforce structure of the CF?”

With respect to the question ofCanada’s involvement in future conflictsituations, it seems clear that Canadaand Canadians are intent on maintain-ing an active role within the interna-tional system. Canada’s continued com-mitment to various NATO and UN oper-ations is based not just on nationalpride and altruistic tendencies, but onthe need to be assertive in claiming aseat at the table within the internation-al system. Canada’s active participationin these operations is an important out-let for Canadian efforts to influence the

international agenda and to secure ournational interests abroad. Given theextent to which Canadian economicinterests have been absorbed by theprocess of globalization, it is imperativethat we continue to demand a voicewithin the international community byprojecting our influence to as great anextent as is possible.

The question of what twenty-firstcentury armed conflict will look likerests squarely on our understanding ofthe RMA. General Maurice Baril, Chiefof Defence Staff, has defined the RMAas “a combination of technological,organizational and doctrinal changes(that have the effect of) reshaping mili-tary operations.”1 This represents afairly standard institutional explanationof what the RMA is. It is, however,inadequate. The weakness of the defi-nition offered by General Baril and oth-ers derives from the fact that it onlyaccounts for those factors which occurwithin the context of war, or in moregeneral terms, within the context ofarmed conflict. In order to understandfully what an RMA is, one must gobeyond the purely operational consid-erations of technology, doctrine, organ-ization and tactics. One must also con-sider the broader international politicalcontext in which conflicts occur.

Much of the incentive for trying toidentify a new RMA stems from theneed to account for the changes thatoccurred within the international sys-

Space, the RMA and Equipment ForceStructure Issues for the CanadianForces in the Twenty-First Century

S h a n e L e v e s q u e , M A

T


tem as a result of the end of the ColdWar. The notion of the decline of therole of the state within the internation-al system has become very popular as aresult of the intensification of theprocess of economic globalization thataccompanied the end of the Cold Warand the collapse of Soviet and American“spheres of influence”.

Changes have also occurred in theareas of armed force and internationalsecurity. Indeed, the 1991 Gulf War wasoften sited as a signal of the changes tocome in the area of conflict managementin the post-Cold War era. Since then,however, the Gulf War has generallycome to be acknowledged as somethingof an anomaly in terms of how it may beseen to characterize armed conflict.

Perhaps, it would be most instruc-tive to begin by acknowledging that thechanges associated with the end of theCold War may have altered the characterof war, or at least our perception of whatit should be, but have had no affect onits fundamental nature as a politicalinstrument. This fact underlines thepoint that the question of whether ornot the RMA should be associated withthe decline of the state in the interna-tional system is based entirely on thedual failure to understand the nature ofthose changes as well as the nature ofthe RMA itself. The RMA does not com-promise the Clausewitzian definition ofwar as the pursuit of policy by othermeans. Clausewitz himself acknowl-edges that the character of war maychange from one historical period to thenext, but that the nature of war as apolitical instrument of the state remainsconstant.2

One of the most significant ques-tions that seems to emerge consistently

in the consideration of the RMA is thatof the decline of the importance of thenation-state in the international politi-cal system. The question derives inlarge part from the misconception thatthe RMA somehow restricts the abilityof states to employ force in pursuit oftheir national interests. This miscon-ception is itself based on two intellectu-al failings. The first is a failure tounderstand that the process of global-ization does not limit the utility of forcein the international system. In fact, onecould argue that the repetitive occur-rence of conflict in areas such as centraland western Africa, Algeria, Sudan,parts of the Middle East, the Balkans,the Caucasus, Indonesia, and India-Pakistan, to name only the most promi-nent hot-spots, suggests that somestates have found that the utility offorce has actually increased in the post-Cold War era. The persistence of Iraq inflouting established norms of interna-tional behaviour and the rather con-frontational positions occasionallyadopted by states such as Russia, Chinaand North Korea also support the thesisthat not all states perceive a decline inthe utility of force.

The reality of the situation is thatglobalization has not limited the valueof force. However, it has forced devel-oped states sharing a multitude ofmutual interests, including access tonatural resources and shared markets,to work in concert with each other inorder to achieve their political objec-tives. This, of course, implies the build-ing of consensus, which can beextremely difficult even under the bestof circumstances. The difficulty is onlycompounded by the fact that matters ofmilitary engagement are among themost politically sensitive of governmentpolicy issues. Furthermore, it is also

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important to consider the fact that theneed for developed states to deploy mil-itary forces tends to be in response to athreat posed by so-called rogue states.These states often have less invested inthe stability of the international systemthan other, more developed, states andso can afford to commit to a course ofaction that might disrupt that stability.Consequently, the aggressor has theopportunity to seize the initiative andinfluence the political, economic, social,and strategic context of the confronta-tion. The end result of this phenome-non has been that developed states fre-quently find themselves drawn intoconflicts not entirely of their choosing.

The second failure contributing tothe misconception that the RMA acts torestrict the utility of force relates to afundamental misunderstanding of whatthe RMA is. The origins of the RMA aretypically traced to the writings of theSoviet strategist Marshal Ogarkov in the1970s and 1980s.3 Ogarkov noticed atthat time that a growing technologicaldisparity was emerging betweenAmerican and Soviet military forces.He coined the term Military TechnicalRevolution (MTR) to describe thisemerging disparity. The more recentconcept of the RMA is popularly under-stood as a broadening of the scope ofthe MTR. Rather than simply account-ing for the effects of technologicaldevelopments, which by themselvestend to be evolutionary in nature ratherthan revolutionary, the RMA is seen tointegrate these effects with doctrinaland organizational changes, which havea significant impact on the character ofwarfare.4

One aspect of the popular under-standing of the RMA relates to a grow-ing capability in the area of Dominant

Battlespace Awareness (DBA), and theway in which this capability is affectinghow militaries prepare for war by influ-encing organizational and doctrinaldecisions. This capability speaksdirectly to the question of the role ofspace and space-based systems in themanagement of future conflict. It isgenerally accepted that the growingprevalence of space-based earth obser-vation technology, as well as satellitecommunications and navigation tech-nology is enhancing the capacity of themilitary commander to form a clearer,more concise picture of the battlespace.According to this understanding of theRMA, by slicing through the fog of warthe same technology also enables thecommander both to apply force withgreater efficiency and to maximize thedefendability of his or her own forces.However, upon closer scrutiny thesetechnological advancements continue tobe more evolutionary than revolution-ary. While they do have an effect on theway wars may be fought, technologiesthat facilitate DBA are simply the nextstep in a logical progression of the inte-gration of military intelligence andcommunications capabilities that havealways been a part of organized mili-taries in one form or another.

It is necessary for the CF and othermilitary institutions to acknowledgethat this is, in fact, an evolutionaryprocess, which has its roots in the ColdWar security context. By continuing todevelop and deploy successive genera-tions of high tech kit and to alter forcestructures to accommodate these emerg-ing technologies the CF and its alliesrun the risk of preparing for a type ofwarfare that may no longer exist in theinternational system. The implicationsof the continuation of such a trend arethat the CF and its allies will be

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equipped and trained to fight digitalwars in a virtual world, but not able tomeet the challenges they will face in thereal world of the post-Cold War world.The high probability of prolonging con-flict situations unnecessarily and theincreased risk involved for our men andwomen in the field are unacceptableconsequences of such folly.

This is to say nothing of the astro-nomical development and procurementcosts associated with digital technolo-gies. To inflict such an expense onshrunken defence budgets is one thingif the expense is justified. However, toincur great expenses in pursuit of aforce structure geared towards an out-moded form of warfare is not justifi-able.It is not the intention of this paper toargue or suggest that there is no role fordigital technology in modern forcestructures. To be certain, satellite com-munications, navigation and surveil-lance applications do bestow a valuableforce multiplication attribute to mod-ern militaries. There exists a need how-ever, to strike a balance between devel-oping a force structure that is topheavy on stand-off technology and dig-ital weaponry, and one that does nottake advantage of the potential benefitsthat digital technology has to offer.

It is necessary to constantly bear inmind that the doctrinal and organiza-tional changes currently faced by allmodern militaries are largely a functionof the political changes that occurred inthe international system between 1989and 1991. The collapse of SovietCommunism, the re-drawing of bordersthroughout eastern Europe and parts ofcentral Asia, and the spread of theprocess of democratization made it nec-essary to re-evaluate the role of strate-

gic concepts such as nuclear deterrence,strategic balance, and arms control. Italso meant that the operational require-ments and deployment levels of militaryforces needed to be re-evaluated.

Both the rapidity and magnitude ofthe changes, along with the overallsense of relief at the “end of the ColdWar”, made an objective analysis ofthese requirements extremely difficultto achieve. As a result, some of thedecisions made regarding the disposi-tion of forces were not reflective of thenew international security context as itbegan to emerge. The net effect is thatover the last decade or so, the militariesof most developed states, includingCanada, have been preparing to fightthe war they want to more than the warthat they may need to.

The recent trend has been towardsdeveloping and deploying more com-plex weapon systems, but in fewernumbers. The aim of this approach is toget the most out of a declining defencedollar by reducing the density of thetwenty-first century battlefield. Fromthe infantry soldier to stealth bombersand battle ships, the technologicalemphasis of defence institutions andthe defence industry has been on devel-oping more sophisticated technology toenhance passive defences such as speed,stealth, and stand-off capability, and tomaximize the combat lethality of offen-sive weapon systems, primarily throughthe development of Precision GuidedMunitions (PGMs) and other so-called“smart weapon” technology. Anotherperceived benefit of this trend is thefacilitation of interoperability amongnations through advances in communi-cations technology, ostensibly leadingto a more even contribution of forcesamong coalition members.

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The theory behind this trend isthat by simultaneously enhancing thedefendability and lethality of weaponsystems, states will be able to reducethe number of combatants that theymust deploy to a theatre of combat,thereby lowering casualty rates. This,of course, is intended to generate net-savings in both political and economiccapitol. The reality is that developedstates have repeatedly found themselvesconfronted by potential conflict situa-tions where, due to the inherently com-plicated nature of the globalized inter-national system, a clear national interestexists but is sufficiently opaque as tomake it difficult to rationalize the decla-ration of a precise military objective,and even more difficult to commit ade-quate military resources for the attain-ment of that objective.

Indeed, it is quite ironic that while,in principle, advanced military technol-ogy is intended to save both lives andmoney, the thought of risking multi-million and billion dollar weapon sys-tems, in a conflict where national inter-ests exist but seem diluted by the com-plexity of the relationships created byglobal interdependence, acts as a limit-ing factor in the willingness of govern-ments to commit those forces. Theirony is punctuated by the fact that,quite often, there is a significanthumanitarian element to these conflictsituations, in which the lives or generalwell being of large numbers of non-combatants may be at stake.

Upon considering these facts it isincreasingly clear that one could con-clude that the real RMA, such as it maybe, has not yet occurred. In fact, theRMA is not a product of the integrationof technological advancements with thedoctrinal and organizational changes

that occurred in response to a shift inthe structure of the international sys-tem at the end of the Cold War. Instead,the actual RMA will manifest itself inthe realization that those organizationaland doctrinal changes did not reflect acomplete understanding of the implica-tions of the shift in the internationalsystem that occurred in the early 1990s.One could further conclude that until amore complete understanding of thecharacter of conflict and the role ofarmed force in the post-Cold Ware eraare achieved, it is futile at best and dan-gerous at worst to speculate on futureprocurement strategies for military spacesystems. A better approach, as part ofthe broader effort to understand the cur-rent and near future international securi-ty environment, is to examine the way inwhich space and space-based systemscan be integrated into existing forcestructures and organizational schemes.

As Ogarkov began to notice in the1970s, many western militaries had setout on a path towards developing high-tech weapons systems in preparationfor a potential war with the SovietUnion. The current trend in developingand deploying high-tech military sys-tems is merely a continuation of the ear-lier one identified by Ogarkov. What issignificant is that the trend continuedin spite of the fact that the Cold Warended in 1991. After the collapse of theSoviet Union the West continued to pre-pare for conflict against a single, identi-fiable, and somewhat predictable mono-lithic adversary. Moreover, the objec-tive of military and strategic readinessduring the Cold War was in contribut-ing to the condition of strategic stabili-ty between the superpowers. In thenewly emerging international securitycontext of the immediate post-Cold Warera the “enemy” became an obscure set

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of poorly defined “enemies”, whoseactions could upset the stability of theinternational system. Consequently,the issue of strategic stability is nolonger as prominent as it once was.

The prevalence of global interde-pendence has created an environmentin which members of the internationalcommunity with like interests now haveto coordinate their policies for dealingwith such threats. Thus it may beinstructive to reflect on the concept ofthe “Anarchical Society”, postulated bythe international relations theorist,Hedley Bull.5 Indeed, there can be littledoubt that the need for states with com-mon, yet sometimes conflicting, inter-ests to interact with each other in ahighly interdependent internationalsystem necessitates that certain societalcharacteristics must be introduced tointernational relations.

The Napoleonic Revolution ush-ered in a new era in military affairs byintegrating technological, social, andpolitical changes that together influ-enced a newly emerging internationalsystem. Perhaps we still remain tooclose to the heart of the changesbrought about by the end of the ColdWar in order to allow us to achieve anobjective understanding of how theyhave influenced the character of mili-tary affairs in the post-Cold War era. Itmay be that a few more years time willbe required before it will be possible todetermine conclusively whether or notan RMA has occurred, or whether wecurrently find ourselves at the begin-ning of an RMA of a different characterthan the one that has recently becomethe focus of attention.

Clearly, the problem of identifyingand adapting to the RMA is not unique

to Canada or the CF, but is one that isfaced by all modern states. It is a sys-temic problem that stems from a failureto clearly understand the nature andeffect of the social, political, and eco-nomic changes brought about by theend of the Cold War. Having noted thatthere is no certainty in anticipating thelong term effects of systemic change,the thesis of this paper remains firmlyrooted in the statement that the realRMA will be realized when not one, butmany, states begin to acknowledge thatthe strategic concepts, organizationalstructures, doctrinal positions, andforce structuring practices of the post-Cold War have been little more thanwarmed over variants of thoseemployed during the Cold War. TheRMA can only be realized when statesgain an appreciation for the fundamen-tal differences between the currentinternational system and that of theCold War, and then respond by employ-ing new strategic concepts, organiza-tional structures, doctrinal positions,and force structuring practices.

With respect to what the RMA por-tends for Canada and the CF, there seemsto be no easy answer that might lead toa short term solution to the current andfuture challenges posed by questions ofprocurement and force structuring. Onething is clear however, that is the factthat Canada’s status in the internationalsystem is largely a function of the com-mon perception of its close relationshipwith the United States. The greater theextent to which Canadian economic andstrategic interests and values are seen tobe inextricably linked to those of theUnited States, the greater will beCanada’s influence in the internationalsystem. Unfortunately, this placesCanadian strategists and policy makersin an extremely difficult position.

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On the one hand is the need toacquire an objective understanding ofthe changes that have reshaped thepost-Cold War international system andrespond positively to them. The logicalextension of this activity could verywell be something as significant as aswitch away from the emphasis on thedevelopment of increasingly sophisti-cated weapon systems that began dur-ing the Cold War. On the other hand isthe need to retain a very close workingrelationship with the United States,which happens to possess the largestand most technologically advanced mil-itary force in the world. Clearly, as theworld’s foremost leader in what hascome to be referred to as the RMA, theUnited States poses a particularly acutechallenge to the need for Canada, and therest of the world, to respond positivelyto an accurate understanding of the cur-rent international security context.

The only acceptable course ofaction open to Canada at this time is toattempt to pursue both sets of interestsconcurrently. Canada and the CF oughtto play a lead role in promoting discus-sion among its allies about the currentcharacteristics of the international secu-rity environment. Canada should alsoassume responsibility for generating anawareness of the fact that new methodsof engaging the issues presented withinthat environment are required. At thesame time the interoperability of the CFwith its most likely coalition alliesneeds to be ensured. Any failure toensure a high level of joint operationscapability would certainly result in themarginalization of the Canadian contri-bution to an international effort, andthe concomitant degradation ofCanada’s ability to wield influence inthe international system. Such anunfortunate state of affairs would cer-

tainly compromise Canada’s ability tofully pursue its own interests withinthe international system.

This two-sided approach to copingwith the problem of the so-called RMAis not offered as an easy out to a diffi-cult question, but as a means of provid-ing a balanced solution to a challengingproblem for Canadian defence and secu-rity policy. As was mentioned above,by alienating the United States and pre-senting Canadian interests as being dis-tinct or even contrary to those of the USCanada would be undermining its ownability to exert its influence in the inter-national system. However, by simplycontinuing along the current path ofwhat is erroneously referred to as theRMA, Canada would be underminingits longer term ability to protect andpursue its interests by preparing for anenemy it would like to fight rather thanfor one it may need to fight.

By pursuing both avenues at thesame time it is likely that Canada willeventually be able to field a multi-pur-pose combat-capable force of the sortdescribed in the 1994 Defence WhitePaper. Indeed, such a force will berequired to address the broad range ofthreats to the interests of Canada and itsallies that will continue to emerge in thetwenty-first century. This force willneed to be able to demonstrate a highdegree of adaptability to meet a broadrange of threats and mission profiles,and will certainly have to take advan-tage of the benefits provided by modernmilitary technology. However, somebalance must be introduced into theequation. It must be understood thatmodern military technology may notalways mean the most expensive orsophisticated technology, for it wouldbe folly for Canada, or any other state,

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to price itself out of the ability todeploy a force into the field with suffi-cient resources to achieve its objective.

The goal then, is to coordinatemore concerted efforts to conceptualizethe post-Cold War security environ-ment with an analysis of how space andspace-based systems can be used tomanage conflict issues within the con-text of the post-Cold War, rather thanthe Cold War, international securityenvironment. By conducting this paral-lel analysis the CF will better positionitself to meet the challenges of futureforce structure issues as they pertain tospace and space-based systems.

Endnotes

1. Baril, Maurice, General, CDS,www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/may99/27cdsre-port_b_e.htm.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book 8Chapter 3, Howard and Paret, Eds.(Princeton: Princeton University Press,1976), p. 593.

3. In fact, the Soviets identified the conceptof a nuclear RMA as early as the late 1950sto early 1960s, see William Kintner andHarriet Fast Scott (eds.), The NuclearRevolution in Soviet Military Affairs,(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,1968).

4. General Maurice Baril, CDS, excerpt from1998-99 CDS Report found at web sitewww.dnd.ca/eng/archive/may99/27cdsre-port_b_e.htm.

5. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: AStudy of Order in World Politics, (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1977).While Bull’s theoretical concept of theAnarchical Society is based on a rather tra-ditional realist interpretation of interna-tional relations and reflects many of theassumptions associated with the bipolarinternational security context of the ColdWar, it may yet serve as a useful point of

departure for a more detailed study of thesocietal qualities of international relationsin the post-Cold War era.

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93

Introduction

pace-based services pervadeeveryday life in Western society.

The general population, however, ismostly unaware of the extent of these.When gas pump access cards were dis-abled for 24 hours a couple of yearsago, most of the population was proba-bly never aware that a meteor showerhad disabled space communicationslinks.1 Equally, there is little aware-ness within the Canadian Forces ofspace capabilities as they relate tooperational effectiveness because littlespace training and direct work experi-ence is available within its personnelpool. In particular, force structureconsiderations for space operationsboth today and in the future havehardly been considered. This paperwill address the question of what per-sonnel force structure the CF shouldcreate for future exploitation of spacecapabilities.

Facts and Assumptions

The modern warfare environmentextends beyond the conventional lim-its of sea, land, and air. The impor-tance of assured access to space capa-bilities to support the strategic, opera-tional and tactical levels cannot beoverstated. As a preliminary step toexamining personnel issues for spaceutilization, it is therefore helpful to

highlight the following general pointswith respect to space limitations andadvantages:

a. space-based platforms pro-vide the ultimate high ground,offering an unrestricted globalfield of view and greatly increasedline of sight;

b. due to its influence throughinformation dominance in mili-tary operations, space is maturingas a warfare environment;

c. heavy military and civilianreliance on space-based systems,combined with their high cost,make them a centre of gravityand, therefore, a security concern;

d. due to the critical importanceof access to space capabilities,international space partnershipswill heavily influence strategicrelationships;

e. legal aspects of space arebecoming increasingly formal andcodified through treaties andinternational space law detailingrights, obligations, and contractu-al remedies for space related activ-ities and assets;

f. the rate of change in spacetechnologies and capabilities is

A Canadian Forces Personnel Structurefor Space

S y n d i c a t e 7 : L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l C l a u d e R o c h e t t e ( C h a i r ) ,L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l B e n o i t C a r r i e r , L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l J o h nG r a h a m , M a j o r A n d r é D u p u i s , M a j o r D o u g G r i m s h a w, M a j o rA n t o i n e H a u t e c l o c q u e , M a j o r D a v e M u l c a i r , M a j o r C h i o n eR o b i n s o n a n d M a j o r S i m o n S u k s t o r f

S


rapidly accelerating. We havemoved through the First Age ofSpace, a 30-year period duringwhich space assets were national-ly owned and used for strategicpurposes, to the Second Ageencompassing the past ten years,space assets have become commer-cialised and theatre level assetsare used for routine operations.We are currently on the thresholdof the Third Age, during whichspace capabilities will be fullyintegrated into warfighting at thetactical level; and

g. the Canadian Forces leadershipacknowledges and fully under-stands the critical importance ofspace-based capabilities as a forceenhancer and is actively pursuingexploitation of space capabilitiesconsistent with national policy.2

In addition to these general state-ments, this paper is based on a numberof assumptions with respect to theintentions of the Government ofCanada and the Canadian Forces, whichare as follows:

a. the Canadian Forces are commit-ted to the integration and utilisationof evolving space capabilities andtechnical enablers as force enhancers;

b. the Canadian Forces will notpursue an independent space pro-gram but will adopt a space strat-egy dependent upon strategicpartnerships primarily with theUS, as well as with Europeannations and possibly other nationsor agencies;3

c. the Canadian Forces will nothave sufficient funding to invest

heavily in system hardware fordedicated military service;4

d. the majority of the CanadianForces contribution to internation-al space partnerships will be in theareas of personnel and knowledge(software development);

e. interoperability for communi-cations, surveillance, reconnais-sance and targeting data will beheavily dependent upon the abili-ty to use space capabilities; and

f. the Canadian Forces will con-tinue to rely heavily on collectivedefence and interoperability withallies to meet defence commitments.

This paper has been formulated inthe context of the above generalpoints and assumptions. Clearly,appropriate management of CanadianForces personnel possessing expertisein space-based technologies and sys-tems is critical to maximize the mili-tary utility of space. Therefore, theCanadian Forces must put in place anadaptable system to recruit, developand retain a cadre of select individu-als capable of exploiting the militarypotential of space.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to showthat the framework within which theCF can best manage its humanresources in the area of space opera-tions is the Occupation SpecialtySpecification (OSS) and OccupationSpecialty Qualification (OSQ) struc-ture. The paper intends to illustratethat this structure offers that bestchance for joint focus in space opera-tions, flexibility of personnel employ-

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ment and dissemination of spaceknowledge throughout the CF. Thescope will be limited to the examina-tion of potential force structures forthe Canadian Forces and not theDepartment of National Defence. Assuch, it will not include DND civilianoptions nor will it be concerned withthe Canadian astronaut program,which is run by the Canadian SpaceAgency.

Background

Any discussion on the personnelrequirements in the area of space mustbegin with the various roles and mis-sions in which the CF may becomeengaged. This section outlines thoseroles and missions, moving from thegeneral to the specific and beginningwith a brief review of basic space doc-trine, followed by an examination ofDND space policy.

Space Doctrine

Basic space doctrine for the CF iscontained in Chapter 26 of theCanadian Forces Operations Manual.Being general in nature, this doctrine

outlines the full range of militaryroles and missions in space.Realistically, this complete list cannot and should not be taken as aguide to actual requirements for per-sonnel or resources because Canadaneither owns nor operates the rangeof space-based assets needed to carryout the full spectrum of space mis-sions. Nevertheless, given that spaceassets provide the new “highground”, CF members should striveto gain a comprehensive knowledgeand understanding of space doctrine.The basic doctrine provides the fouroperational space roles depicted inFigure 1: enhancing operations forterrestrial forces, space forces sup-port, space control, and force appli-cation. The following paragraphswill explain these roles and theircomponent missions.

Enhancing operations. In this role,space-based assets are used as a forcemultiplier for sea, land, and air forceoperations. Missions are global innature and include: surveillance andreconnaissance, secure and non-securecommunications, environmental obser-vation, precision navigation, and mis-

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Space ForceRoles and Missions

SupportingSpace Forces

LaunchOperations

SatelliteOperations

SpaceControl

Surveillanceof Space

Protection

Negation

ForceApplication

Enhancing Operations

Surveillance &Reconnaissance

Communications

EnvironmentalObservation

Navigation

Missile Warning& Defence

Figure 1. Basic Space Doctrine: Roles and Missions5


sile warning and defence. Of note is thefact that Canada has not yet made anydecision regarding its participation inBallistic Missile Defence (BMD). “Todate, Canada has limited its activitiesconcerning BMD to research and con-sultation with the United States andother like-minded states.”6 A negativeoutcome to this issue could have a pro-portionally negative impact onCanadian participation in space throughNORAD and USSPACECOM space-basedassets.

Supporting space forces. This roleinvolves any activity that results in thedeployment and/or maintenance ofspace-based hardware. It calls for alaunch capability as well as a commandand control capability. Performing thisspace role is highly infrastructureintensive. The requirement for groundstations, telemetry capabilities and avariety of other types of facilities can beconsiderable, depending upon thedegree of support required.7 In co-operation with the US armed forces,Canada plans to obtain “a CanadianMilitary Satellite Communication (CAN-MILSATCOM) capability to acquire reli-able, secure, flexible and survivabledata and voice communications in sup-port of military operations” through theCF CANMILSATCOM project.8

Space control. This role is roughlyequivalent to the air superiority role forair forces or sea control for naval forces.Surveillance of space is usually anation’s first entry into the space con-trol role. To be effective, such surveil-lance must give the ability to constructa highly accurate catalogue to predictthe location of any object in space atany time. The protection mission is asignificant step in a nation’s space pos-ture and is oriented towards guarantee-

ing the use of friendly space-based sys-tems. The negation mission goes onestep further and aims to deny theenemy the use of his own systems.9

Force application. The foundationof the force application mission rests onspace-based systems or platforms thatare capable of applying force to ground,sea, and air targets in support of terres-trial military operations. At this time,no military possesses this capability,but Lockheed-Martin is developing areusable vehicle to carry out such mis-sions, and other such projects may beunderway.10 Although US national pol-icy does not presently support the con-cept, the US Space Command Long-Range Plan includes this mission as apossible area of expansion if directed bythe US government. Any system thatcould deliver a weapon, whether kinet-ic or some other type, such as a laser,would be included under this role.11

For a number of reasons, CanadianForces participation in the above basicdoctrine hierarchy is limited. Nationalpolicy restrictions, cost constraints orboth prevent participation across thefull set of doctrinal roles depicted inFigure 1. Such restrictions and con-straints are accounted for in DND’sspace policy, the capstone document forCF involvement in space.

DND Policy and CF Strategy

DND’s space policy is intended toensure that Canadian government direc-tion is accurately reflected in space pro-grams and activities. First articulated inJuly 1987 and based on the 1987Defence White Paper, the policy wasupdated in September 1992 followingthe publication of the DepartmentalSpace Appreciation document that year.

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This Space Appreciation concluded thatDND, as the primary guarantor ofnational security, ought to develop therequisite capabilities to safeguard anyCanadian interests that could be threat-ened in, from, or through space.12 Twoyears later, the 1994 Defense WhitePaper noted the increasing importanceof space within the global securityenvironment. The 1990 Gulf War pro-vided compelling evidence of theimportance of space surveillance,reconnaissance, and missile warning.DND’s most recent space policy, pub-lished in September 1998, still drawsheavily upon the 1992 SpaceAppreciation document, but reflects theincreased space emphasis from the 1994White Paper. According to this policy,DND and CF space goals are:

a. to protect national securityand sovereignty interests;

b. to protect national interestsfrom threats located in or passingthrough space; and,

c. to fulfill Canada’s defencecommitments by supporting mis-sions and tasks using space tech-nology wherever appropriate”.13

According to the policy, the follow-ing four space capability areas will be“considered” [authors’ italics] for devel-opment by the CF in pursuit of theabove goals:

a. “the capability to acquire andassess space data of interest;

b. the capability to support com-bat-capable forces deployedworld-wide with command, con-trol, communications and naviga-tion tools;

c. the surveillance of land, sea,air and space; and

d. the development of warningsystems.”14

In doctrinal terms, then, DNDseeks to develop capabilities in two ofthe four roles depicted in Figure 1:enhancing operations and space con-trol. For the foreseeable future, the CFhas no intention of developing capabili-ties in either the supporting spaceforces or the force application doctrinalroles.15

The policy acknowledges that theCF cannot develop the above capabili-ties on its own. Effective cooperationwith other government departments,industry, and allies is essential.16 Thepolicy highlights the importance ofCanadian-US space partnership withinNORAD and calls for an “operationallyoriented space research and develop-ment program” as well as an “adequate-ly trained cadre of civilian and militarypersonnel at all rank levels”17 to bringthe CF space effort to life.18 In short,the CF aims to develop its space capabil-ity by three principal means: in coali-tion with other nations, particularly theUS; through Canadian research anddevelopment; and by developing tai-lored expertise among CF personnel.

The details linking DND space pol-icy with specific space-related projectsare contained in the Canadian MilitarySpace Strategy published in April 1998.This document details the capitalequipment projects that will be pursuedthrough the Department’s Long TermCapital Plan. Two of the major projectsare CANMILSATCOM and the JointSpace Project (JSP), a multi-faceted con-glomerate of six smaller projects. The

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strategy also cites a number of enablingactivities in support of the overall spaceeffort.19 One of the main enablers is theSpace Human Resources Working Group(Space HR WG). This group is mandat-ed to develop a plan for the identifica-tion/tracking, training/education,employment and retention of CF space-qualified personnel.20 This subject willbe further discussed below, under theheading of Employment in DND.

CF Space Personnel Force Structure

Personnel Requirements

From the HR perspective, giventhat Canada will clearly not invest heav-ily in an independent space program,the CF will need to nurture a strong liai-son capability to operate withinalliances to meet its space policy goals.The knowledge and expertise require-ment could take different forms; how-ever, based on United States Air Force(USAF) space operations experience, thefollowing HR requirements are likelyfor the CF:21

a. space operations staff person-nel to command, manage andoperate space and ballistic missileand warning systems, space con-trol activities and associated ana-lytical activities;

b. space operations analysts tomanage space system analyticalactivities using computer systems,mathematical tools, and celestialmechanics to generate high accu-racy satellite position predictionsfor space surveillance, trackingand space control;

c. space operations personnel tocommand, manage and operate

electronic and optical space sen-sors, missile warning sensors andoperations centre activities;

d. personnel to fill staff posi-tions in relevant organizations todevelop operational space doc-trine to pursue the optimal use ofspace-based capabilities; and

e. subject matter experts able toidentify potential areas ofexploitation of space assets toenhance operational capabilities.

Despite these implied spacetasks, there is currently no formalforce structure for CF personnelinvolved in space activities. There is,however, an informal structure.About two dozen personnel areemployed in full-time space-relatedactivity, within the Directorate ofSpace Development (D Space D) andelsewhere. Additional personnel areemployed with NORAD and receivespace training before beingemployed. Unfortunately, CF qualifi-cation annotations reflect only cours-es completed not experience. Thus,career managers find it difficult orimpossible to track space expertiseother than via informal means. TheSpace Human Resources WorkingGroup (Space HR WG) has tried toaddress this issue since 1998, but theproblem remains unresolved.According to the 1998 space strategy,the working group undertook an ini-tiative to develop a common OfficerSpecialty Specification based on a“Joint Space Operations Supportcourse,” but no means of trackingexperience was examined. In thiscontext, the solutions proposed inthis paper are aimed at revisiting theentire problem.

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Review of Other Solutions

One possibility for obtaining com-parative information on this issue is toexamine the situation in other coun-tries. Over 50 countries are involved inspace to varying degrees. In the top tierare Russia, the US, France, Japan,China, the UK, India, Israel andUkraine.22 All of these countries havelaunched indigenous satellites and mostof them maintain comprehensive spaceprograms, as well as providing commer-cial space services. At the other end ofthe spectrum of these fifty-some coun-tries are those nations that have ademonstrated interest in space, whetherfor commercial or military applications,but have no significant indigenous pro-grams. Canada is positioned around themidpoint of this spectrum, with coun-tries such as Finland, Portugal, TheNetherlands, and Norway. These coun-tries might offer a basis for future com-parisons of space personnel force struc-tures, but little information was avail-able at the time of this study.

A most useful basis for comparisonlies in the US Navy’s (USN) situation.Like the CF, the USN has an interest inspace applications but does not ownspace assets. It relies on the USAF andother strategic organizations to provideit with space-related products. TheUSN personnel base is larger thanCanada’s, with approximately 340 per-sonnel directly involved in space opera-tions, but it operates along similar lineswith respect to space. Navy personnelrotate in and out of space billets andtheir files are annotated with spacequalifications. These billets, however,are seldom perceived as career enhanc-ing. Thus, interest in them is generallypoor, and turnover rates are high.23

Nevertheless, the US Navy approach,

even with a larger complement thanthat envisioned for the CF, is certainly aviable option.

Solutions for the CF

Before launching into the review ofoptions, a few principles need to beconsidered. First, given our ambitiousspace objectives and very limitedmeans, a CF space personnel force struc-ture should provide for the needs of allthree environments. As an added bene-fit, space resources could serve to fur-ther this integration of the environ-ments into a more effective joint CF.Therefore, a joint approach to personnelforce structure is not only necessary butalso essential. Secondly, as the role ofspace evolves and expands, CF involve-ment could increase or change in scope,thus requiring adjustments to its spacepersonnel force structure. Therefore, itshould be flexible enough to accommo-date such variations easily.

Finally, knowledge of space capa-bilities is at present, confined to a limit-ed body of CF personnel, leaving largesegments of the operational communi-ties ill-suited to exploit space resources.At present, space has not been integrat-ed into the operational structure of theCF, although it is clearly the significantfield of the future.24 A space personnelforce structure that contributes to thedissemination of space knowledgewould indeed enhance CF capabilitiesand effectiveness across the spectrum ofoperations.

Space Personnel Structure Options

In considering how the CF couldmeet its space operations needs asdeveloped above, the following threeoptions emerge: a separate Military

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Occupation (MOC), a Sub-MilitaryOccupation (sub-MOC), and the use ofOccupational Specialty Specifications totrack CF personnel with space-relatedqualifications. This section will exam-ine each of these options. One optionnot considered is the use of DND civil-ians and contractors in manning space-related positions. This is not to suggestthat there is no requirement for civilianparticipation in CF space issues.Civilians could be effectively employedin the scientific and managerialdomains. Space operations, like allother operations within the military,require an innate understanding of themilitary requirement and therefore thenature of the task demands a militaryprofessional. Ergo, the options consid-ered herein involve military personnelonly. In the following paragraphs, abrief description of each option will bepresented, and advantages and disad-vantages will be discussed. Finally, arecommendation will be proposed anddeveloped in the next section.

MOC. This option is the most com-plex. Good parallels for comparison canbe found in the USAF, the United States

Army, and the USN. Until very recent-ly, only the USAF possessed the equiva-lent of a space operations occupation.The United States Army was the next toadopt this approach when it formed aSpace Operations career field in 1999,using officers from other career fields.25

The USN does not have a space careerfield at this time. Instead, it attempts tofill space-related billets with officerswho have specialty training in a space-related area.26

Figure 2 is a comparison betweenthe USAF, US Army, and the USNofficer strength in space-related bil-lets. From these numbers it is obvi-ous that the USAF has by far thelargest space operations organization.These figures reflect the variousservices’ attitudes towards spaceoperations. The Army and the Navyview space operations as a forceenhancer, used to support the fleet atsea, or the soldier in the field.Although the USAF recognizes thisforce enhancement aspect, it goes astep further and views space as anindependent combat element in itsown right.27

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Armed Service Officers in Space OperationsUSAF 3,600

Army 60

Navy 340

According to space policy, theCF views space operations as a forceenhancer. This emphasis parallelsthe USN system. The US Army, onthe other hand, developed a spaceoperations career field essentially tosupport corps level activities.Given the Canadian Forces’ limited

size, it would be difficult to justifya separate MOC based on the needto support any formation. It wouldalso be unwise to build an MOC inwhich most, if not all, of the opera-tional employment is based onaccess to a foreign nation’s capabil-ities.28

Figure 2


In addition, there is a very goodorganizational reason that the CF shouldhave officers from various career fieldscycle through space operations employ-ment. Space operations are relativelynew within the CF. A broad base ofunderstanding of how space operationscan affect the modern battlespace willbecome increasing important across allCF MOCs. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, astudent at National Defence University,specifically addressed this militaryinternal cross-training aspect when dis-cussing the pros and cons of the USArmy (prior to the establishment of acareer field) and USN approachesregarding space personnel:

The biggest pro is the constantcycling of warfighters through thespace operations arena. This aidsthe mission of force enhancement intwo ways. First, it ensures warfight-er influence into the space operationsarena, and secondly, when these offi-cers return to their career fields, itensures some space operations influ-ence into the warfighting arena.29

Given the small numbers of person-nel involved in space, the limited CFoperational space capabilities, and thispreference for the broadest possibleexposure of Canadian Forces personnelto space operations, it is neither feasiblenor recommended that a separate SpaceOperations MOC be created for the fore-seeable future.

Sub-MOC. A sub-MOC could be aviable option for space operations with-in the CF. Under this option, an exist-ing MOC would be chosen from whichpersonnel would be drawn to staff thesub-MOC.30 Once an individual wastrained in the space operations sub-MOC, the person’s career, especially at

the junior officer level, would be almostexclusively within space operations.

As with the previous option, a sub-MOC would provide for continuity andthe building of a core of space expertswith the CF. Management of spaceoperations personnel would be verysimple because all expertise wouldreside in one sub-MOC. The careeropportunities available to members of asub-MOC, although limited in thebroader military context, might makerecruiting of specialists much simplerfor the CF. In addition, this optionwould allow the CF to develop highlyspecialized military personnel. Lastly,this option would also limit the trainingcosts associated with space operations.

On the negative side, as with thefirst option, exposure to space opera-tions would be limited to a select group.The vast majority of the CF would nothave the opportunity to learn about andwork in space operations. This wouldprobably limit the integration of spaceknowledge across the CF and, in partic-ular, across the warfighting communi-ties. Conversely, a dedicated space oper-ations sub-MOC would have a very lim-ited knowledge base of broader CFoperations. Finally, this option impliesthat a parent or feeder MOC31 wouldhave to be chosen. The question thenbecomes - which MOC? If the sub-MOCwere drawn from an operational MOC,space knowledge would tend to remainconcentrated within a specific environ-ment. Choosing an air MOC, for exam-ple, would limit knowledge expansionwithin the army and navy.

This option is not very differentfrom the MOC option. A sub-MOCwould provide a vehicle for career man-agement but would tend to compart-

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mentalize the space knowledge withinthe CF. It carries many of the disadvan-tages of the first option with only mar-ginal additional advantages. It is there-fore not recommended.

Occupation Specialty Specification andQualification. OSS refers to a CF spe-cialty that can be easily documentedand tracked using personnel manage-ment technologies currently used bythe CF. OSQ refers to the database taggiven to personnel in any MOC that isawarded after the completion of a for-mal course recognized by the CF.

The OSQ-granting course wouldnot necessarily have to be one given bythe CF. Personnel posted to space billetsin the US, for instance, must attend for-mal training at a US training facility. Inmost cases this training is sufficient tosatisfy an OSQ. For the few positionsthat do not require a formal course,members could attend, as a minimum,the Basic Space Operations Course givenat the CF School of Aerospace Studies(CFSAS), Winnipeg. This course, cou-pled with on-the-job training, would besufficient to grant an OSS qualification.Given the very small yearly throughputof members going to space billets, a spe-cialized training course would be nei-ther practicable nor economicallyviable.

An OSQ for space would open upspace employment to the broadest pos-sible number of CF personnel. It wouldalso eliminate any problems with careermanagement because personnel couldbe managed within the existing staffstructure. The OSS coding systemwould also let CF identify all personnelwho have space experience, allowing itto build a core of expertise whereappropriate. In short, it encompasses

most of the advantages of the two pre-viously discussed options.

This approach of providing spaceoperations experience to the broadestpossible number of MOCs does havesome disadvantages. Firstly, it does notresult in a centrally managed body ofexpertise. Most officers would spendone, or perhaps two, tours in a spaceposition, then cycle back to theirrespective MOCs to be managed by anyone of the career managers. Only a veryfew selected officers could be groomedto become experts in space operations.The OSS system does provide a mecha-nism to track individuals with spaceexpertise (whether this is a single basiccourse or varied experience and knowl-edge), but careful attention would needto be paid to actually tracking thesepersonnel. Because the OSS methodolo-gy is only designed to track formalcourses, a qualification that is awardedthrough on-the-job training or out-service academic training (such as anMSc in Space Operations) would notappear as an OSQ on a member’s file.An OSQ also bears a training cost, how-ever in this case that is mitigated by abroader personnel knowledge base.Furthermore, we would recommendthat the CF use a single OSQ code asopposed to a variety of codes tailored toevery different type of employment.The goal of a space OSS would be toidentify a small number of specific per-sonnel within the CF who have sometype of space experience for employ-ment some time later in their career.What is important is general spaceknowledge as opposed to specific tech-nical skills.

The use of the OSS system to man-age personnel involved in space opera-tions encompasses most of the advan-

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tages and few of the disadvantages ofthe previous options. It provides amechanism to track personnel with aspace operations background andallows the maximum exposure of across-section of CF personnel to spaceoperations. Therefore, selection of thisoption would provide the most benefitin enhancing the combat capability ofthe CF and in determining appropriaterequirements to manage CF personnelresources.

Human Resource Management

Having recommended the OSS/OSQmethodology as the best means ofdeveloping CF space expertise, thispaper will now examine this approachin terms of the various human resourcemanagement processes. The followingsections discuss resource managementissues, including recruiting, trainingand education, employment, and reten-tion issues.

Recruiting

Recruiting aims to locate and enrolcandidates suitable for employment inmilitary occupations. The recruitingeffort can either focus on people pos-sessing specific skills or search for suit-able individuals capable of receivingeducation and training to the right levelin such skills. While the former pre-vails in the civilian sector, militaryrecruiting has traditionally focused onthe latter out of institutional necessity.The need to progress through a rankstructure and the uniqueness of mostmilitary occupations make enlistingtrained workers directly from societydifficult or impossible.

Given the OSS recommendationabove, personnel needed to man space-

related positions would need to comefrom various MOCs and trades withinthe CF. Upon selection, each personwould be temporarily assigned to aspace-related position just as in anyother staff, shore or ground assignment.Upon completion of a space assignment,the individual would normally returnto serve their former MOC community.Recruiting in this sense would thereforebe a voluntary activity conductedthrough the career management net-work. Indeed, individual could effec-tively pursue two parallel careers, onein their MOC and one in space-relatedpositions.

In support of the career manage-ment effort, one of D Space D’s func-tions should be in thementoring/awareness-raising area. DSpace D should provide a ‘road show’to tour the country informing CF audi-ences about space initiatives andopportunities. Such a program shouldbe aimed at middle and senior leader-ship because they are the most influen-tial in pursuing space issues. The rea-son for this suggestion is that it isessential to secure “buy-in” from thesegroups if the CF space effort is to haveany chance of growing from its currentstatus. The program should aim tokeep a broad-based level of awarenessin space-related issues.32 This wouldrequire personnel with space skills, butpreferably also with recruiting or careermanagement expertise.

Space Training and Education

As mentioned previously, there is aneed for a system that can track spaceknowledge and/or space experienceranging from formal course qualifica-tions to on-the-job training. The sys-tem should give career managers the

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original working group by establishinga Space Human Resources WorkingGroup (Space HR WG). The aim of theSpace HR WG was to develop a compre-hensive plan for the education, train-ing, professional development, andemployment of CF space personnel.37

The Space HR WG recommended thatthree areas be pursued to satisfy thefuture needs of DND:

a. develop a space Post Graduate(PG) program at RMC to providepersonnel with space expertise;38

b. establish joint manning ofNORAD space positions to devel-op personnel in space-relatedemployment; and

c. establish an OSS called “JointSpace Support to Operations” totrack personnel possessing spacequalifications, for further employ-ment.

Unfortunately, improvement is stillrequired in all of these areas. First, thespace PG program at RMC has stalleddue to a lack of funding. Next,International Trade in ArmsRegulations issues and the implicationsfor access to classified information areadversely affecting the combined man-ning of NORAD space positions.Finally, the OSS methodology has beeninitiated, but difficulties were encoun-tered with the CF’s Peoplesoft manningdatabase software.39 About 50 positionswithin Canada have been identified byD Space D as requiring a space OSS, butuntil a tracking system is up and run-ning, matching personnel to positionswill remain an ad hoc career manage-ment activity. Although career man-agers do their best under this arrange-ment, the potential benefit to the CF

that could be derived from foreign andexchange experience is lost when mem-bers return to Canada. Invariably suchmembers are cycled back to normalMOC employment that precludes apply-ing their newly acquired expertise.

Out-of-country employment. Cur-rently DND appears to be able to meetits requirements; however, in order toensure that personnel are employed inareas of strategic interest to Canada, DSpace D is pursuing other opportunitieswithin the US.40 The 1999 version ofthe Defence Planning Guidance calls foraddressing space capability deficienciesthrough full cooperation with othergovernment departments and agenciesand emphasizes the importance of coop-erative participation in US programs.41

Indeed, the key feature of CF strategy isaccess to US systems. Specifically, thestrategy is aimed at such access for all ofthe missions in the “enhancing opera-tions” role (Figure 1) except missiledefence. The CF position in NORAD isregarded as a vital link through whichexpanding access can be pursued, andmust be preserved.42

A review of the complete CF per-sonnel inventory within NORAD isongoing, under the direction of theDeputy Commander in Chief (DCINC).Placing personnel in positions south ofthe border has potential benefits forDND, but within the past year someincumbents have had security restric-tions imposed. This issue has beenraised through the Military CooperationCommittee (MCC) and is being dis-cussed.

D Space D has initiated positivesteps to address employment issueswithin DND. Providing the humanresource management tools required for

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effectively employing personnelthrough OSQ tracking is a very goodinitiative and should be pursued vigor-ously. Seeking opportunities foremployment in space positions withinthe US should be evaluated against thepotential risks in data access imposedby restrictive US policies. Reaching anacceptable agreement through theefforts of the MCC could mitigate thisrisk.

Retention

With the passage of time, it is prob-able that increased pull factors fromcivilian industry could draw ourexpertise away. The space exploitationindustry is projected to grow into as yetunforecast areas and dimensions. Dueto the lack of tracking methods, reliableretention data is difficult to obtain, butat present retention does not appear tobe a concern.43

Conclusion

This review of CF space roles andmissions demonstrates that there is asignificant and growing need for per-sonnel with space expertise. The CFcould fulfil this requirement by creat-ing either a support function sub-servient to the navy, army and air forcesor, less feasibly, a new MOC contribut-ing jointly to the accomplishment ofmilitary objectives. In the short term,the Canadian context favours the firstalternative simply because of Canada’slimited resources, activities, equipmentand personnel involvement in space.Going one step further, these realitieslead one to believe that the establish-ment of independent CF space occupa-tional trades would likely not be viablein the CF. The alternative, therefore,would be to select personnel with rele-

vant knowledge and expertise from allappropriate career streams for trainingand employment in CF space roles andmissions. The CF’s strategy should betwo-pronged: expanding the flow ofpersonnel through the space communi-ty, and expanding the flow of expertisethroughout the CF.

Political and fiscal realities dictatethat CF involvement in space is likely toalways be either within the frameworkof an alliance or a coalition.Furthermore, these realities are likely tolimit or prohibit CF personnel participa-tion in some space roles and missions.Nevertheless, it remains essential forthe CF to cultivate an organic minimumlevel of knowledge and expertise ineach space role and mission to meet andvalidate its military objectives.

Given this need, there are threepossible options that the CF can pur-sue: create an MOC, create a sub-MOC,or apply the Occupation SpecialtySpecification methodology currently inplace. Despite strong parallels with theUSN, the CF does not have sufficientpersonnel strength to create a separateMOC. Creating a sub-MOC would tendto concentrate space knowledge in oneparent occupation. The recommendedoption is to use the OSS methodologiesto assign skill set prerequisites to posi-tions, track space-qualified personneland provide career management withinexisting personnel policies and struc-tures. The preferred concept would beto rotate selected CF personnel throughboth space and non-space positions,allowing them to develop in their occu-pations while providing the CF withthe space expertise it needs. D Space Dcould support this approach by raisingspace awareness across the CF. Alltypes of training and experience,

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including civilian qualifications, wouldbe tracked. As well, a comprehensivedatabase on space employment wouldbe developed, and expanded CF train-ing in space would be initiated. Theadvisor for space would remain theChief of the Air Staff and NORAD willcontinue to be an essential alliance forthe CF in space matters. Retention ofqualified personnel is not currentlyseen as a problem area.

Access to space capabilities is vitalin the modern warfare environment. AsCanada continues to pursue its person-nel and software niche involvement inspace, the CF must ensure that it canprovide a suitably qualified personnelforce for space operations activities.

Endnotes

1. From research and personal knowledge ofLieutenant Colonel John Graham, CanadianForces College Command and Staff Course 26students.

2. Implied by the formation of Directorate ofSpace Development within the DCDS organ-isation and the commissioning and contentof the Space Appreciation 2000.

3. Space Appreciation 2000.

4. The absence of a mention in DPG 2000points to this fact.

5. Department of National Defence,Canadian Forces Operations Manual,Chapter 26, pp. 5/17-11/17.

6. Department of National Defence,[http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/aug99/19BMD_b_e.htm], 19 August 1999.

7. Ibid., Canadian Forces OperationsManual, Chapter 26, p. 6/17.

8. Department of National Defence, Reporton Plans and Priorities, Section III – Plans,Priorities and Strategies [http://-

www.cadets.dnd.ca/vcds/dgsp/rpp/rpp98/sec_e.asp], 25 March 1998.

9. Ibid, p. 8/17.

10. General Estes, CinC NORAD andUSSPACECOM, speech to the Senate ArmedServices Committee, March 11-12 1997[www.spacecom.af.mil/usspacecom/speech2.htm]. See also [www.imco.com:80/michaud/products/vstar.htm].

11. Canadian Forces Operations Manual,Chapter 26, p. 10/17.

12. Department of National Defence, ACanadian Military Space Strategy: The WayAhead for DND and the Canadian Forces(Ottawa, DND, April 1998) p. 1.

13. Department of National Defence, SpacePolicy (Ottawa, DND, 1998) p. 2.

14. Ibid, p. 3.

15. Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-025 Space Operations Doctrine,(Ottawa, DND, 1998) p. 6.

16.Ibid., Space Policy, p. 4.

17. Ibid, p. 5.

18. Ibid, p. 6.

19. Ibid., A Canadian Military SpaceStrategy: The Way Ahead for DND and theCanadian Forces, p. 9.

20. Ibid, p 10.

21. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce M. Roang,Space Operations Force Management – CanWe Meet the Challenge? (Air University:Maxwell AFB, Alabama, May 1990), pp. 4-8.

22. The European Space Agency (ESA) alsohas a significant presence in the space fieldbut not in military applications.

23. Roang, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce M.,Space Operations Force Management – CanWe Meet the Challenge? Air University:Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

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24. Dr Madsen, Canadian Forces College.

25. Telecom Lt Col Fallen, Chief, SpaceOperations Proponent Division, U.S. Spaceand Missile Command, 29 Feb 2000.

26. Telecom Lt Cdr Dave Julian, OfficerProfessional Development Section, OfficerPlans & Policy Branch, Navy PersonnelCommand, 29 Feb 2000.

27. Jones, LtCol Richard, USAF. AComparative Assessment of the Services’Management of Their Space OperationsPersonnel. The Industrial College of theArmed Forces, National Defence University,Washington, D.C., 1992.

28. In a briefing note on Space HR Issues, DSpace D endorsed this position and indicat-ed that a survey of the number of spacerelated personnel showed that this numberwas too small to justify the creation of a sep-arate MOC.

29. Jones, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard, USAF.A Comparative Assessment of the Service’sManagement of their Space OperationsPersonnel. The Industrial College of theArmed Forces, National Defence University,Washington, D.C., 1992, pp. 9-10.

30.The reason a specific MOC would have tobe chosen is that, by definition a sub-MOCis part of a specific MOC. If the same spe-cialised skill set applies to more than oneMOC it becomes an Occupation SpecialitySkill (OSS).

31. As a note of clarification, employment inspace operations need not be devoted to anyspecific MOC or grouping of MOCs, opera-tions for example. The impact of spaceoperations is ubiquitous and any and allMOC could benefit. Also currently are no,or very few prerequisites to fill space opera-tions billets.

32. Air and Space Power Mentoring Guide,Air University Press, Maxwell AFB,Alabama, 1997.

33. CFSAS, Space Indoctrination Handbook,p. iv.

34. Ibid, p. ii.

35. Telecom Maj Mckay, D Space D 3-5, 27February 2000.

36. Ibid.

37. Department of National Defence, 5275-1(D Space D 3-5) 18 Nov 96, “Terms ofReference for the DND Space HumanResources Working Group”, p. 1/3).

38. However, the authors of this paper donot see this as the most effective method ofproviding advanced learning in space mat-ters. A better alternative would be to capi-talise on the space expertise at civilian uni-versities and US military institutions.

39. Maj Mackay, D Space D 3-5, during adiscussion on 28 February 2000, providedinformation regarding the Space HumanResource Working Committee recommenda-tions and actions.

40. E-mail from Colonel Aruja, D Space Ddated 1 March 2000.

41. Department of National Defence, DefencePlanning Guidance 1999, (Ottawa, DND, June1998), pp. 2-4.

42. Syndicate 7’s opinion based on variousdiscussion with D Space D personnel.

43. Telecon Maj Mckay, D Space D 3-5, 27February 2000.

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he question of the effects of theincreasing demands for personnel

employed in space operations in theCanadian Forces (CF) is importantbecause, as most of us have heard before,personnel costs are the largest chunk ofthe CF’s budget, people require a longtime and a heavy investment to preparethem for their duties, and people are theonly asset that can actually appreciateover time. And anyone reading thepapers lately about the case of Canadianspace researcher Judith Lapierre’s expe-riences with the experiment in Moscowto determine the effects of space travelon human behaviour will understandthat people are every bit as important astechnology in the exploitation of space.1The personnel dimension of space is par-ticularly important at the beginning ofthe 21st century because the air force wein Canada have worked with most close-ly since the Second World War, the USAir Force (USAF), is evolving from whatthe USAF has termed an “air and spaceforce” to a “space and air force.” Thistransformation, as Syndicate 7 implied,could have far reaching consequences forthe Canadian air force. Therefore, it isprudent for us to consider the personnelaspects of this metamorphosis nowbecause the young people who are join-ing the air force today will be its leadersin the year 2030 and after, well beyondeven the vision statements of today

I would like to consider future per-sonnel issues in terms of — what, who,how. Assessing what we think CF spaceoperations personnel will be doing 10to 30 years in future can give us someidea of who in the Canadian population

could best do these things. Once weunderstand who we are looking for, wecan debate the how: the development ofpolicies to recruit, select, train, employ,and retain these people

Most attempts in the past to definewhat people might be doing even 10, letalone 30, years in the future have moreoften than not met with failure. Analysesof the work of those who have attemptedto predict the future of society, includingthe noted futurists Alvin and HeidiToffler, have revealed that they are wrongmuch more often than they right.2 Withtoday’s dramatic changes in military doc-trine, and operational and organizationalconcepts that are fundamentally alteringthe character and conduct of militaryoperations, it may be even more futile tohope to accurately predict the future ofspace operations. Consequently, ratherthan try to identify any particular skillset, as our present Military OccupationStructure does, we might be better offlooking for people who, as the draft“Officer Professional Development 2020Statement of Operational Requirement”puts it can “think creatively, reason criti-cally, act decisively in face of ambiguityand uncertainty,...anticipate, welcomeand utilize the wave of technical advancessweeping us forward.”3

If one accepts this definition of“what” we are looking for in our spaceoperations personnel in the future thenthe draft SOR gives us an idea of whowe are looking for, namely “outstand-ing leaders who demonstrate superiorintellectual capacity...[and] greatermental agility...[they are] dynamic and

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PERSONNEL FOR SPACE OPERATIONS

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flexible in thought and action...innova-tive and proactive...They will operateeffortlessly in a technological and infor-mation rich environment and be commit-ted to lifelong learning.” In addition,they should manifest qualities and idealsinherent in the military ethos uponwhich military effectiveness depends.4

Before looking at the “how” ofrecruiting, selecting, training, employing,and retaining these people, I will take abrief look at some of the issues raised bythe “what” and the “who” above. First ofall, if we accept the draft SOR’s appraisalof who we are looking for, and it is verysimilar to those enunciated by our allies,this means we are competing for humanresources with virtually every other insti-tution in Canada (and the world), includ-ing industry and the public service, notto mention the attraction for some towork independent of any formal organi-zation. Compounding this challenge aredemographic trends, according to a dis-cussion paper for Defence ManagementCommittee prepared by Capt (N) AlOkros, that point to an aging Canadianpopulation with a smaller proportion ofthe workforce in the youth cohort thatthe CF has traditionally recruited from.Furthermore, in this youth cohort, thosewho we wish to recruit (high-demandknowledge workers and moderatelyskilled individuals seeking to develophigh-demand competencies) will have dif-ferent career expectations from those whohave traditionally joined the military. Thisnew generation of knowledge workerswill be accustomed to moving rapidlyfrom job to job or following two to fourcareers in a lifetime.5 Large organizationslike the CF, therefore, will have to providerelevant inducements to these prospec-tive recruits if they hope to attract andhold them. A recent survey by a largeToronto-based management consulting

firm found that one of the biggest obsta-cles for major Canadian corporations torecruiting and retaining people on thecutting edge of business these days, thosein “e-commerce,” is the bureaucraticstructure of most large companies com-bined with an organizational culture thatimpedes innovation.6 In a similar vein,according to Okros’s study, the keyinducements for high skill workers to joinand to stay in the CF will increasingly bean attractive organizational culture, fairtreatment, and developmental opportuni-ties rather than on other factors, evenhigh salaries. Organizations will also needto recognize that different individualswill be seeking different inducements -some will look for stability, others forchallenge and change.7

The current CF personnel productioncycle (job analyses-occupation structurerevision-recruiting-training), where ittakes eight or more years to go from anOccupational Analysis which identifies anew skill set that needs to be developedto actually producing the first qualifiedpeople with that skill set, is no longerviable in an environment where therequired skills change before the firstproducts of the system can be usefullyemployed.8 Elliot Cohen has argued thattoday’s armed forces still reflect the indus-trial age military “preoccupied by stan-dardization, specialization, professional-ization, synchronization...[and] central-ization” rather than the flexibilityrequired to nurture the new traits expect-ed to be needed in the future.9 Okros’report contends that the current hierar-chical “stovepipe” CF human resourcesystem based on an internal labour mar-ket and predicated on constraints andassumptions from 30 years ago is nolonger viable, and the report suggests thata complete overhaul of existing rank andMOC structures is necessary.10 What may

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be needed is a flatter organization withfewer ranks (remember Nelson’s navy,where the man o’war was the most com-plex weapons system of its time, reallyonly had two commissioned officer ranks(non-flag)- lieutenant and captain).Would this be a better model for spaceoperations in the future than the CF’s cur-rent seven officer ranks (non-flag)?Christopher Bellamy, a British defencewriter, has gone even further and sug-gested that, given the complexity of mod-ern operations, we should consider an allofficer force.11 In any case, Okros suggeststhat the CF needs to closely manage criti-cal skill sets and high potential personnelwhile reducing the investment in careermanagement, training, and successionplanning for less critical personnel andaverage performers. He suggests that theCF needs to have “an open and agile”human resource system working in part-nership with other governments, indus-try, allied forces and one more concernedwith how people move in and out of theorganization than trying to manage aninternal labour market.

This discussion of “who” now leadsus to “how” we might develop policies torecruit, select, train, employ, and retainthe people needed for space operations.There are no easy answers to this ques-tion. But shortfalls in recruiting inWestern armed forces in recent years haveled to a number of proposals from thosestudying the problem.12 One extreme is toadopt an entirely occupational approachto human resources and pay a competitivewage plus benefits (e.g., pension plan) inan attempt to attract and retain thoseneeded by the Armed Forces. The otherextreme is to attempt to return to a voca-tional model of the military by attemptingto recruit, mould and retain those whowish to make the armed services a life-long career and calling. As you know, nei-

ther of these extremes is likely to succeed;therefore, some hybrid will likely be nec-essary. A couple of historical examplesmay help generate some ideas about whatthis hybrid might look like.

In the 17th and 18th centuries theRoyal Navy (RN) was on the leading edgeof the technology of its era and involvedin exploration and scientific research,not unlike some aspects of the space pro-gram today. How did it cope with per-sonnel problems, for example increasingin size from 16,000 in 1792 to 120,000 in1797 (a 7.5 increase)? In peace, most ofthe Royal Navy’s ships were “in ordi-nary”(long term storage) maintained bya cadre of warrant officers who, lookingfor a stable career, stayed with the shipsat all times and supervised their reacti-vation for war when necessary. Most ofthe seaman were engaged in civiliancommerce keeping their seafaring skillssharp aboard merchant vessels. Whenwar was imminent, press gangs broughtthem back into the navy to serve aboardthe newly reactivated fleet. Most of theofficers were on “half pay” in peace andreturned to the fleet when called by theAdmiralty. This system worked reason-ably well and enabled Britain to “rule thewaves” for over 200 years.

A Canadian example of maintain-ing expertise in a high technology mili-tary area can be found in the RoyalCanadian Air Force (RCAF) Auxiliaryafter the Second World War. The RCAFAuxiliary was composed of formedunits of part-time aircrew, mechanics,intelligence analysts, air traffic con-trollers, meteorologists, administrators,medical personnel, etc who practisedtheir wartime roles on weekends and inthe evenings. Organized into 12 flyingsquadrons, and more than 35 otherunits (including four intelligence units),

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they manned everything from sevenfighter squadrons (some equipped withjets) to the ground radars that controlledthe interceptors. Most Auxiliary unitswere located near towns or urban centresto ensure a suitable recruiting base. TheAuxiliary’s wartime role was to augmentand where necessary replace regularRCAF units in Canada so that they couldbe deployed overseas. A modern versionof the RCAF Auxiliary might be a reserveinformation technology (IT) squadron,along the lines of 5001 Intelligence Unitbased in Toronto in the 1950s. It could beformed from some of the many IT spe-cialists who live in the Metro Torontoarea. The motivation for belonging tosuch a squadron would not be financial,but perhaps the chance to work in anarea (like space) that these specialists can-not work in during their normal employ-ment. Other motivators, like the ones thatsustained the RCAF Auxiliary in the1950s and early 1960s, might be thecamaraderie provided by belonging tosuch a squadron, and the chance to be amember of a prestigious “club” with itsown distinctive uniform and mess. Thissystem would have the potential of get-ting highly prized technical expertise forthe air force at a very low cost. Somequestions might arise, such as what ifsome of these experts were in wheelchairs? Would this preclude their servicein static positions near their homes?

The questions I have raised are onlyintended to start the debate over what arebeginning to become increasingly crucialpersonnel questions for all Western armedforces. What I find disturbing is that theCF has invested very little money inresearching these critical issues. A signifi-cant amount of resources remain commit-ted to technical research and technically-oriented post-graduate programs for serv-ing officers, but a relatively small amount

has been invested in studying the equally,if not more, vital personnel issues thatchallenge the CF. I suggest that it is time toget down to some serious, evidence-basedstudy on what the future might look likeand do some rigorous analysis of the issuesbefore making decisions that will havelong term implications for the ability ofthe CF to fulfil its mandate in a worldincreasingly dominated by space.

Endnotes

1. “Canadian Decides to Stay in RussianSpace Study Despite Harassment,” 28 March2000, http://www.canoe.com-/CNEWSSpace0003/28_lapierre.html.2. See for example Lee Patterson, “FutureImperfect,”Forbes (Apr 1998), 20; WilliamA. Sherden, The Fortune Sellers: The BigBusiness of Buying and Selling Predictions(New York: John Wiley, 1998); and Sidney C.Schaer, “Back to the Future . . . Predictionsfrom the past that haven’t come true . . .yet,” Newsday (22 Jan 1999),http://www.elibrary.com/s/edumark/.3. “Canadian Officership in the 21st Century– OPD 2020 Statement of OperationalRequirement,” dated Jan 2000 (draft), i, p. 49.4. “Canadian Officership in the 21st

Century,” p. 1.5. Cdr A. Okros, “Into the 21st Century:Strategic HR Issues,” a Defence ManagementCommittee Discussion Paper,<http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/vcds/dgsp/analysis/hr_e.asp>, p. 4.6. “E-commerce workers in demand,”Kingston Whig Standard (10 Mar 2000), p. 14.7. Okros, p. 9.8. Okros, p. 11.9. Eliot A Cohen, “A Revolution inWarfare,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2(March/April 1996), p. 38.10. Okros, pp. 8, 9, 11, 12, 14.11. Patrick Mileham, “The Future ofMilitary Leadership,” in Ethical Dilemmasof Military Interventions, Patrick Milehamand Lee Willett, eds. (London: RoyalInstitute of International Affairs, 1999), p.55.12. See for example, Robert Suro, “Pay,Morale Problems Still Beset Military,”Washington Post (10 Jan 2000), p. A1.

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Introduction

he importance of space assets to themodern military professional,

whether warrior, peace-keeper or peace-maker, should by now be obvious. The1991 Gulf War has been credited as thefirst in which space assets played a piv-otal role, to the extent that an unexpect-edly lopsided result was achieved by thecoalition. Credit for whatever militarysuccess one can ascribe to the NATO cam-paign in Kosovo, achieved solely throughthe use of airpower, without a singlecombat-related casualty, is widely attrib-uted to the enhancing and enablingnature of space-derived support. Whilespace assets, as yet, play no direct part inthe actual delivery of ordnance, spacesupport in terms of providing the preci-sion navigation and guidance, weather,surveillance, timing, battle-damageassessment, and warning, makes the forcewith space superiority formidable out ofproportion to the normal calculation ofcombat power. Canadian airmen benefit-ed alongside their allies in those theatresand no Canadian field commander needgo into any theatre, regardless of the mis-sion, without the benefit of the battle-field preparation made possible by theview from the ultimate high-ground.

However, the integration of thespace dimension into our thinking aswarriors is still embryonic and we are notanywhere near to pulling our ownweight as a nation toward the capabilitiesupon which we are coming to rely. Moreparticularly, the air force has been slow toseize the opportunity to lead the CF into

the space arena. This paper will proposea number of reasons why the air forceshould be seen as the logical lead servicefor Canadian space capabilities. Once thisis accepted, the task of developing doc-trine, defining operational capabilities,developing force structure, and organiz-ing, training and equipping personnelwill become much easier.

National Security Challenge

The difficulties encountered whiletrying to put some logical structure intothe CF space-related force developmentactivities in the mid-1990s, stemmed froma policy vacuum at the highest levels ofgovernment. The “waterfall” model usedto describe the process of DND force devel-opment has national security/militarystrategy, traditionally described in govern-ment white papers, setting the parametersfrom which DND develops its doctrine,force development models, personnelstructures and operational activities.

The 1987 White Paper on Defence,“Challenge and Commitment”, containeda rather good discussion on the linkbetween space and national security, butwithin months of its publication, thepaper was thoroughly discredited andany statements it contained, regardless ofmerit, were rendered useless in supportof any planned program activity. Sincethat time, government level policy state-ments on space have been far less detailedand contain mostly innocuous generali-ties. Internal to DND, a series of policypronouncements going back almost 15years attempted to define those activities

Space and the Canadian Air Force: AnAttitudinal Challenge

L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l ( r e t ’ d ) R i c h a r d J . Yo u n g

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which were permitted (mainly forceenhancement activities such as surveil-lance, navigation, communications andweather), and to identify some of themore obvious things which were eitherbeyond the pale (weapons in space) orwhich required further governmentdirection (defence against space threats).

In keeping with the recent history ofthe dynamics within government circles,the Minister of National Defence must bevery circumspect in pushing for govern-ment policy at the cabinet level, particu-larly on some of the more sensitive issueswith respect to space. In the absence ofexplicit direction, DND, perhaps morethan other departments, is more apt touse the casting of bones, stirring ofentrails and sniffing of the wind to deter-mine how much rope it can afford to giveitself. Long time inhabitants of NDHQoften refer to this as the art of mind-read-ing. In such a climate, more study andless action is seen as a good thing.Besides, the potential cost of some of thespace capabilities being discussed causedconsiderable concern to the advocates oftraditional terrestrial systems.

But, the growing cooperationbetween DND and the Canadian SpaceAgency (CSA) on such things asRADARSAT, and the potential fielding ofa National Missile Defence (NMD) systemby the US, will soon force the governmentto take a stand on the nature of Canada’ssecurity interests in space (witness therecent verbal sparring between theMinister of National Defence and theForeign Affairs Minister on the topic ofNMD). Perhaps until that landmark deci-sion is made, it is understandable thatDND and the Canadian Forces will notwant to get too far out front of the head-lights. But that mustn’t stop the processof looking ahead and planning prudently.

Space as a Joint Arena

What policy direction there was inthe early 1990s stressed the joint natureof space activities, by which it was meantthat all environments were to be equalbeneficiaries of space products and serv-ices. To those within each of the envi-ronments who keep count of the scarcebeans doled out to DND, jointness alsomeans that whatever is proposed will notcome at a cost to the core capabilities oftheir respective environments and noneof the services yet include space as a corecapability. For example, the Director ofNaval Requirements in the early 1990sopined to a meeting of the SpaceDevelopment Working Group that themoney to be notionally assigned to thetask of the Surveillance of Space wouldbe better spent on “swill barges.” Thearmy was also skeptical, allowing the airforce to demure without having to take astand. In the collegial, consensus-drivennature of NDHQ decision-making, onehold-out is all a joint project needs tobring it to its knees. The knowledge thatstaffing a joint requirements document isa formidable task can usually be reliedupon to forestall plans to spend resourcesalmost indefinitely. A further challenge,even presuming an agreed upon require-ment, is to find a champion for the entryof the proposed project’s cash flow fore-cast into the Long Term Capital Plan.Important projects, today more thanever, need a strong advocate at NDHQ inorder to make any significant progress.Jointness in this context can be a recipefor inaction.

Space Advocacy of Lieutenant-General Al Dequettville

By insisting on jointness, and in theabsence of a lead-service concept, space-related force development could have

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suffered the same fate as other suchorphans to jointness such as ElectronicWarfare (EW) and Nuclear, Biological andChemical Warfare (NBCW). What savedthe situation in the early 1990s was thevision of Gen Al Dequettville who, whilein the VCDS Force Development Division,caused the formation of the Joint SpaceProject, corralled a significant notionalbudget for it in the Long Term CapitalPlan, and single-handedly defended itlong enough to prevent the infant mor-tality that it may have otherwise suffered.Ironically, his overt commitment to spaceseemed to disappear when he movedfrom Ottawa to Winnipeg to assume com-mand of Air Command in the mid-1990s.

While in the VCDS Branch, he knewspace was important and defended it byforce of his position and powers of per-suasion. He did not have a strong policyor doctrinal position upon which to basehis advocacy then anymore than we dotoday. We have the benefit of ten years ofexperience to see what was reasonablyapparent to some back then as being obvi-ous today, but we are not much furtherahead in terms of the hard policy/doctri-nal issues, among them being:

• What role should space play in thesecurity of Canada?• What role should DND/CF play inspace activities?• What activities/operational capa-bilities should we develop?• What part does each of the servic-es play in these?• What personnel policies/activitiesdo these require?

The Air Force as Space Advocate

It is my contention that significantprogress will not be made in addressingthese issues until one of the environ-

ments (services) steps up to the plate andbecomes the DND space advocate. I fur-ther believe that a good case can be madethat this ought to be the air force. Atpresent, the DCDS has been given themantle of DND space advocate, and it isin his branch that the Directorate ofSpace Development (which manages theJoint Space Project) now finds its home.

While this may seem logical giventhe joint emphasis space has been givenand the fact that the DCDS is the chief CFoperator responsible for most joint sup-port activities, the fact is that the DCDS ispoorly positioned to be an agency forforce development. Simply put, theDCDS is a force employer, not a force gen-erator. His clear focus is the planningand management of the myriad opera-tions the CF has been assigned. Issues oflong-range policy/doctrine developmentand their relationship to capital planningand project management are not on theDCDS radarscope. What I am referring tohere are the organize, equip and trainissues, functions which the environmentsare uniquely accustomed to doing andare designed to address.

The review of headquarters struc-tures done by the Management, Commandand Control Review Team in the mid-1990s, briefly considered a central jointforce generation agency operating in par-allel with the environments, but ultimate-ly decided against it. I should add thatamong the most consistent promoters ofspace activities within the departmenthave been the staff of the Policy branch.Their support thus far has been key butthey are even less suitable than the DCDSbranch to carry on any of the needed doc-trine and force development activities.

The CF does not have a capability todo joint force generation (a function

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which includes joint force development),nor, in discussions I have had with manyon this topic, does anyone seem to under-stand the implications of that fact.Despite the intentions of integration andunification, the CF still does all of its forcegeneration activities as though there werestill three separate services. All personnelare recruited and trained as a member ofone of the three services and all equip-ment procurement (with only a few smallprojects excepted) is managed by one ofthe three services. Even though a legalfiction, the DND budget is essentiallymanaged as though it was made up of theindividual budgets of three separate serv-ices. That being the case, therefore, oneof the services must take on this advocacyrole if space capabilities are to be effec-tively integrated into the CF.

Why the Air Force?

Despite the air force insistence on thejointness of space (along with the otherservices), it is time to reconsider that atti-tude. The Canadian air force actually hasa long history of being involved in aspectsof space operations and continues to thisday through membership in NORAD.Many air force personnel have worked inthe United States Air Force Space (USAF)Command, and some now are employed inthe United States Space Command. Untiltheir decommissioning in the late 1980sand early 1990s, the air force operatedspace surveillance sensors on Canadiansoil (Cold Lake, AB and St. Margaret’s, NB)which fed directly into the US SpaceSurveillance Network. Until the early1990s the air force carried on its list of cap-ital programs, a project worth $1.5 billionto be used as Canada’s contribution to theUSAF project for a space-based wide areasurveillance system. Only the demise ofthe project in the US caused the air forceto abandon its plans for their contribu-

tion. The money was turned back (seen inlarge measure as the air force’s contribu-tion to belt-tightening), but the require-ment was handed to the Joint SpaceProject Office then resident in the VCDSbranch. With the money gone, the airforce’s interest in space seemed to suffer asimilar evaporation.

Nevertheless, the nature of spaceoperations arguably can be seen more asan extension of airpower than of anyother military capability. The extensionof airpower doctrine to aerospace power,ultimately to spacepower doctrine is alinear progression that makes sense. TheUSAF felt strongly enough about thisthat one of their recent Chiefs of the AirStaff stated that the USAF was an air andspace force on its way to becoming a spaceand air force. Despite the joint nature ofUS Space Command, the USAF portionrepresents over 90 percent of its total per-sonnel and capital activity. Only USdomestic and inter-service politics pre-vents the USAF from being the sole spaceservice. I refer to the American examplesimply to point out that the idea of theprimacy of air forces in space activity isnot an idea born in a vacuum.

I’m not suggesting that the Canadianair force try to establish itself as the soleproprietor of Canadian military spaceactivity, but that it should consider itselfthe major stakeholder and, as such, shouldoffer to be the principle coordinator ofspace doctrine and force developmentactivity, as in fact it did (unsuccessfully) inthe mid-1980s. The upside to this notionis logic; however, the potential downsideis financial responsibility. This, in myopinion, is one of the prime reasons the airforce has been hesitant to take a moreproactive role in recent years. The otherservices would be happy to see the airforce struggle with juggling space-related

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force development priorities along withthe other balls they already have in the air.

Why would I wittingly thrust the airforce into what appears to be an unten-able position in an already strained capi-tal rationalization process? Because it isthe right thing to do. It is to recognizethat the current arrangements can onlytake things so far and it will not be farenough. This seizing of the ultimate highground would require the Air Force todispel the perception that it spends moretime trying to rationalize and defend thestatus quo rather than looking to theinevitable future. Of course, lead servicedesignation would have to come withassurances that the other services wouldcontribute their fair share of resources.

Space Doctrine Development

Such responsibility would give theair force incentive to finish a processbegun in the early 1990s to develop aspace chapter to the growing volumes onAerospace Doctrine. The project wasassigned to the CF School of AerospaceStudies (CFSAS) in Winnipeg but wasnever completed for a variety of reasons,among them likely being the prevailingview that space was not the preserve ofthe air force. CFSAS is already seen as animportant focal point for space-relatedexpertise and training in the CF, and italready assists the other services byopening courses to their personnel onoccasion. Officially designating the airforce as the lead service for space wouldfacilitate a broader mandate for CFSAS toexpand their activities on behalf of theCF. A comprehensive doctrinal statementfrom the air force would also lead to amore detailed chapter in the JointDoctrine Manual which would expandon what amounts now to a place-holder.Space doctrine needs a proper home.

Operational Focus – Surveillanceof Space

If, as I have argued elsewhere, theSurveillance of Space was to become theniche CF operational contribution to col-lective security, through NORAD, itwould be equally logical for the air forceto resume this activity in Canada, thusincreasing the personnel base involved inthis activity. Many Air WeaponsControllers and Air Defence Technicians(or whatever they are calling each otherthese days), along with a smattering fromother Military Operational Classifications(MOC), spend a good proportion of theircareers engaged in this activity and itseems odd that this should be a careerfield that can only be pursued outside thecountry. Concentrating on Surveillanceof Space would provide a focus for edu-cation and training for those to beinvolved, would give R&D focus tospace-related activities and would nar-row the focus of our force developmentactivities. Not that I would advise aban-doning the other elements of the JointSpace Project, but I would make it clearwhat the flagship of the project ought tobe and who will be in the cockpit (noticeI avoid the term bridge). Here again, noneof this need exclude the opening of somepositions in NORAD and elsewhere topersonnel from the army or navy, aprocess that is already well established.

Supportive Personnel RelatedActivities – Education and Training

The focus of the air force should beon the organizing, equipping and train-ing of those to be employed in the opera-tional activity of the Surveillance ofSpace. There are many other space-relat-ed activities which require space-awarepersonnel from all the environmentsincluding terrestrial intelligence, surveil-

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lance and reconnaissance activities, alongwith command, control and communica-tions activities. These are not principallyair force operations but one which shouldhave strong air force input.

All services require a cadre of space-aware personnel and there are severalvehicles available for this. The SpaceScience syllabus at RMC provides anexcellent undergraduate program andgraduates with Space Science degrees havealready made important contributions intheir short time as commissioned officers.However, RMC has had trouble in attract-ing cadets to take this otherwise popularfield of study because many MOCs do notrecognize it. That needs to change or RMCwill not be able to continue without a crit-ical mass of students enrolled in the pro-gram. The air force needs to lead thecharge by insisting that light-blue MOCsreview their assessment of the SpaceScience program. RMC has also offered toprovide a post-graduate program but hasnot received much support for this pro-posal. This needs to be given serious con-sideration to facilitate the more technical-ly demanding aspects of space operationsand research activity. Presently, the onlypost-graduate opportunities for space-related programs are outside the countryand are prohibitively expensive.

On the other side of the educationand training coin, I have already men-tioned the School of Aerospace Studies inWinnipeg. The Space Squadron atCFSAS has done yeoman work with asmall staff to provide an impressive num-ber of CF personnel, at all rank levels,with a basic awareness of space opera-tions through their Basic SpaceIndoctrination Course, and General andSenior Officer Space IndoctrinationCourse. Recently, there was talk of devel-oping a more advanced course, an initia-

tive that I hope has been supported withthe appropriate mandate and resources.An appropriate mandate in my opinionwould be for CFSAS to be designated asthe CF center of excellence in space-relat-ed training, to accompany and collabo-rate with RMC’s designation as the centerof excellence in space-related education.

A vehicle to force MOCs to be morecognizant of space-related credentialsfrom either RMC or from CFSAS could beto formally adopt space operations as asub-classification specialty. Activitiesrequiring the specialty have alreadybeen catalogued by the Directorate ofSpace Development and the number ofpositions requiring either space-aware orspace-qualified personnel is surprisinglyhigh (in the hundreds). What still needsto be done is the designation of MOCsand the formalization of career paths.

Bottom Line

The purpose of the panel on SpacePersonnel Issues at this year’s AirSymposium was to be more focussed onspecifics than I have been in this paper.However, it was my intention to situatethe discussion of personnel related ques-tions as being at the end of an extensiveprocess of determining national goals andobjectives, defining required operationalcapabilities, and designating environ-mental roles and responsibilities, all final-ly leading to the determination of neces-sary personnel requirements. Many ofthe initiatives I have mentioned havebeen started, while others have only beendiscussed; in any event, there remainsmuch to be done. Finishing the tasksbegun, identifying what yet needs to bedone, and providing the educated andtrained personnel to do all this will bemore effectively achieved if the air forcewere to take the lead role.

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pace, you’re well aware, isincreasingly at the center of our

national and economic security.That fact isn’t lost on the rest of theworld, either. Allies and adversariesalike understand fully our depend-ence on space – it’s their dependencetoo. And they understand that suchdependency also creates substantialvulnerability, if not protected.1

General Richard B. MyersCommander-in-Chief (CINC), US

Space Command

Introduction

“What is it about space power thatmakes it so enigmatic?”2 Despite thefact that modern societies count onspace systems for everyday tasks -including weather forecasts, banktransactions, inventory control records,medical prescriptions, and the ever-expanding use of cellular phones - theyare not space smart. The same could besaid about modern defence forces thatmay have previously failed to under-stand or appreciate the opportunitiesthat space provides in the conduct ofwar. Other equally important changesin the world, such as the Revolution inMilitary Affairs (RMA) and the comingof the Information Age seem to havedominated the military discourse oflate, while space, as a future frontier,has been slower to be noticed and evenslower to be exploited.

“Today, the United States (US) isthe world’s space superpower,” andacknowledged leader in both spaceinvestment and capabilities.3 In explor-ing space, therefore, it is impossible toignore American efforts in this regard.This paper is not intended to extol thevirtues of American dominance, simplybecause their space-based capabilitiescurrently exceed those of all othernations. Instead, this paper exploresspace in terms of its potential impact onmilitary operations. It provides anassessment of current environmentalfactors that will likely shape the futurebattlespace, reviews how space hasbeen used in recent conflicts, describescurrent technological capabilities whichspace enables, identifies vulnerabilitiesof space, and recommends measuresthat must be adopted to protect space-based capabilities. This paper concludesthat space is a future centre of gravityfor military operations, based on itspotential impacts on critical aspects ofwar, by reducing collateral damagethrough improved targeting, enhancedinformation dominance, and increasedair superiority.

Aim

This paper suggests that militaryforces will become increasingly depend-ent on space-based systems, makingthese systems the centre of gravity formilitary forces and creating the necessi-ty for their exploitation and protection.

SPACE: A Future Centre of Gravity

S y n d i c a t e 8 : L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l G i l l e s W. D u f o u r ,W i n g C o m m a n d e r E d w a r d J . S t r i n g e r , R A F,M a j o r S t e p h e n H . R . B a n n i s t e r , M a j o r M i c h a e l J . C o n w a y,M a j o r J o - A n n e E . M a c D o n a l d , M a j o r K i r k J . S h a w,M a j o r T i m o t h y A . S l a u e n w h i t e , U S A F, M a j o r A l e x M . S m i t h ,a n d M a j o r P i e r r e J . A . P. S t - C y r

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Environmental Analysis

Prior to considering space-basedtechnologies specifically, it is necessaryto understand how several environmen-tal factors are expected to impact spaceoperations, and thereby affect futuremilitary operations. These environmen-tal factors include political, military,economic, and informational, whichwill be discussed independently.

Political

Access to space for the conduct of mil-itary operations has created significantlegal challenges and considerable debate;the same could also be said of space usedfor civil and commercial purposes.Because there is little in the way of inter-national law which pertains to the controlof a nation’s use of space, reference must bemade to a few international treaties whichdetail specific restrictions. The most sig-nificant of these legal documents is the1967 Outer Space Treaty which prohibitsthe placement of Weapons of MassDestruction (WMD) in space. A secondtreaty, the 1979 INMARSAT Treaty,allows their satellites to be used only for“peaceful purposes”; however, it acknowl-edges that “military uses” per se are notincompatible with peaceful purposes.4

International restrictions on the useof space may not be as important as state-ments that detail what is actually permit-ted. At the height of the Cold War, theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR) objected to US attempts to takeimagery over their nation. The result ofthis issue was international law whichstated that “countries have no grounds forobjection to being imaged from space.”5

Domestically, many countries seethe proliferation of commercial satellites

and the provision of high-resolutionimagery as a potential sovereigntyissue. As a result, several countrieshave taken steps to minimize the risksto their sovereignty by imposing laws,known as “shutter control”. Forinstance, Canada has “reserved the gov-ernment’s right to review and approveall commercial remote sensing systemsowned, operated, or registered inCanada.”6 The US issued a similar lawin 1994 with Presidential Directive 23;however, this law is currently underconsiderable scrutiny for its potentialunconstitutional nature. Conversely,Israel is considering launching addi-tional imaging satellites and providinggeographic control to commercial cus-tomers.7 While countries strive torespect sovereignty concerns, there is afear that these “shutter control” lawswill have an economic impact on com-mercial satellite companies by drivingpotential customers away.

Another example of domestic con-trol is “selected availability” on the USGlobal Positioning System (GPS) satel-lites. The US government is “committedto the non-military use of GPS on a con-tinuous, world-wide basis, free of direct-user fees.”8 Nevertheless, it retains theability to degrade the accuracy of theGPS signal to ensure that the US militaryand its Allies maintain an advantage.

Recently, the United Nations (UN)Secretary-General Kofi Annan accurate-ly captured the essence of the debate instating that “[w]e cannot view theexpanse of space as another battle-ground for our earthly conflicts.”9

While several nations share this view,many others have already begun toexploit space for military purposes.The legal issue becomes even more com-plicated when consideration is given to

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the growing number of commercial ven-tures and international partnerships.As the only international medium thatborders every nation in the world, it isanticipated that the interest in this issuewill be far-reaching and that a world-wide resolution will not be forthcomingvery quickly.

In response to the demand for time-ly and accurate information, the media,through their enhanced space-basedcommunication systems, plays anincreasing role in shaping public opin-ion. As a result, democratic govern-ments now take greater heed to mes-sages, either implicit or explicit, beingdisseminated by various news mediums.

Military

The importance of the “highground” has dominated military doc-trine for centuries as commanders con-tinually seek a higher vantage point.Throughout history, the high groundhas offered defensive and informationaladvantages over the enemy. In 500 BC,Sun Tzu highlighted the defensive andobservational advantages of mountain-ous terrain,10 while more recently, CarlVon Clausewitz claimed that the “highground offers three strategic assets:greater tactical strength, protectionfrom access, and a wider view.”11 Headded that, “occupation of high groundcan mean genuine domination.”12

Today, space is the medium that offersthe highest vantage over the enemy,and thus is considered the ultimatehigh ground.

Many countries advocate the mili-tary use of space, with the US being theprimary example. Current US Air Forcedoctrine identifies the following spaceforce missions: space control, force

application, force enhancement (for ter-restrial-based forces), and space sup-port. Simply stated, space controlmeans ensuring friendly access tospace, while denying the same of theenemy. Examples of space controlinclude the destruction of ground-based antenna systems, the jamming ofsatellite links, and the surveillance ofspace objects. Force application con-sists of space-based attacks against mil-itary targets. The US Government con-siders the use of Inter-ContinentalBallistic Missiles (ICBM) as an exampleof space-based force application sinceICBMs travel through space to reachtheir targets. Force enhancement oper-ations are the principal focus of theAmerican military space capabilitiesand consist of those space operationsconducted with the objective ofenabling or supporting land, sea or airforces. Navigation, communicationsand remote sensing (including recon-naissance, surveillance, early warningand weather) are examples of forceenhancement operations. Space sup-port is considered in terms of its abilityto sustain, surge, and reconstitute ele-ments of a military space system asneeded. Examples include space launchand ground-based Command andControl (C2) of satellites. The US doc-trine recognizes that space providesglobal coverage, flexibility, economy ofeffort, and proven effectiveness for mil-itary forces.13 In light of these spacecapabilities, it is expected that anincreasing number of nations will bepaying more interest in creating theirown space systems.

Recent trends indicate that mili-taries can no longer afford to developtheir own technologies, and thus willrely more on partnerships with indus-try, allies, and other services, in order

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to meet their demands in a fiscallyresponsible manner. In fact, the USDepartment of Defense has directed thatcivil and commercial capabilities will beused to the maximum extent possible,including the use of allied and friendlycapabilities, ensuring adherence tonational security regulations.

From a military defence perspec-tive, the challenge will be to find theright balance, or trade-off, in invest-ment and capability, to create innova-tive partnerships between military,commercial and civil sectors, and tomeet military requirements in the mostcost-effective manner. One option inreducing costs may be the leveraging ofcommercial systems.

Economic

In keeping with a global economythat is transcending borders, commer-cial use of space is expanding quicklyon a world-wide scale. Over the lastdecade, commercial space has experi-enced a 20 percent annual growthrate,14 and in 1996 commercial spacerevenues, at $77 billion (US), outrankedgovernmental space expenditures.15 Anestimated $500 billion (US) has beeninvested in commercial space systemsover the last four years,16 and this levelof investment shows no signs of decline.In fact, various estimates indicate 1700to 2100 satellites will be launched in thenext decade and the expected marketfor high-resolution imagery is expectedto top $3.5 billion (US) by 2004-2005.17

General Myers, CINC US SpaceCommand, reported that, during theKosovo crisis, commercial carriers satis-fied the majority of the Allies’ satellitecommunication (SATCOM) require-ments. He expects that commercial

imagery providers will continue to sat-isfy a large percentage of militaryrequirements in the future, while anevolving community of privatelyowned space operators will dominate inproviding remote sensing and launchservices, to a steadily growing spectrumof global customers.18 During the nextdecade, rapid growth in commercialspace is expected in the areas of com-munications, launch services, andremote sensing.

Significant private ownership isexpected to dominate the next stage ofdevelopment, with investment originat-ing from all over the world. Increasedaccessibility and affordability areexpected to mark this era. Where prac-tical and feasible, this commercializationactivity will become even more attrac-tive as militaries opt to access a neededcapability with minimal capital invest-ment. As a result, commercializationwill allow militaries to either reducecosts or procure capabilities that theyotherwise would be unable to access.

Informational

Sun Tzu stated that “by perceivingthe enemy and perceiving ourselves,there will be no unforeseen risk in anybattle.”19 The same belief rings truetoday. Whether the pace and extent oftechnological developments are consid-ered revolutionary or evolutionary innature, there is consensus that technol-ogy is transforming the conduct of war-fare, just as the introduction of mecha-nization during the industrial age hadpreviously changed warfare. The impe-tus for the RMA focuses on the applica-tion of information technology to con-ventional manoeuvre warfare; theenemy’s sophisticated arena of com-mand, control, communications, and

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intelligence (C3I) will be targeted inorder to deny communications, inter-fere with data management, and destroyinformation networks. Besides givingcommanders a dominant situationalawareness of the battlespace, informa-tion operations have the potential of“putting an enemy at the mercy of bothconventional attack on the battlefieldand psychological operations aimed atcontrolling his perceptions and deci-sion-making abilities.”20

According to the US Air ForceHistorian, Dr. Richard P. Hallion, one ofthe qualities of aerospace power is its“view” which can lead to “awarenessand the opportunity for informed deci-sion-making leading to decisiveaction.” He adds that, “with the space-flight revolution, view expanded inthis century from battlefield to theatreand now to global dimensions. Spacesystems are now an integral part of how“national leaderships learn about glob-al developments and formulate plans todeal with them.”21

Successful warfare in the informa-tion age requires rapid dissemination ofinformation to combatants. Combatantswho receive, analyse, decide and act onthis information, within the enemy’sdecision and execution cycle, will set anoperational tempo that may lead to vic-tory.

Space progress in the current cen-tury “is likely to be determined more byeconomic and political considerationsthan by the availability of technolo-gy.”22 Although there are still sometechnological hurdles to clear, the lawsof government rather than the laws ofgravity are expected to factor intoadvances made in space.23

Use of Space in Recent Conflicts

Since the Germans launched V2rockets in 1944 and the Soviets launchedSputnik 1 in 1957, the use of space-basedassets has grown considerably. The USmilitary employed satellites inOperations URGENT FURY (Grenada),EL DORADO CANYON (Libya), andJUST CAUSE (Panama).24 Although theiruse was often ad hoc and incomplete,satellites still provided valuable lessonsfor military space operations and led tofurther developments and innovations.This section explores several space-based capabilities that were developed orexploited in the Falklands War, the GulfWar, and the Kosovo conflict.

The Falklands War

Although much has been writtenon the discreet support provided bythe US to the United Kingdom (UK)during this conflict, one of the mostimportant but least heralded areas ofassistance was the provision of satel-lite access. This access allowed com-manders in London to maintain dailyreal-time communications with com-manders in the field and on the ocean.More importantly, the ability to linkpolitical activity with military activi-ty being conducted eight thousandmiles away conferred a great degree offlexibility on the British forces inwhat was a very political battle. Thepost action report to the House ofCommons stated that “the vital impor-tance was shown of satellite communi-cations in operations conducted atgreat distance.”25

The Gulf War

Because the coalition formed tofight the Gulf War was led by the

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Americans, it was supported by the fullcomplement of US space-based systems.Space forces satisfied the followingrequirements during the Gulf War: mete-orological information, navigation sup-port, geomatic services, communications,sensing, and missile launch warning.

American Defence Meteorologicalsatellites provided weather informationin areas where no other sources wereavailable. Weather information wasused in strike package planning andredirection, air refuelling control and inplanning the ground offensive.26

The Gulf War saw widespread andhighly successful use of GPS for naviga-tion through obstacles and minefields,siting of artillery in a featureless desert,and direction-finding accurately acrosslong distances at night. CommercialGPS receivers were purchased by a largenumber of individual soldiers to aug-ment limited government supplies,highlighting the importance placed onGPS navigation.27

During DESERT SHIELD, mappingsatellites permitted terrain to beanalysed to identify areas, such asswamps, that would otherwise beimpassable to tanks. By the commence-ment of DESERT STORM, satellite map-ping had produced accurate maps thatalso charted the position of Iraqi obsta-cles. In addition, these satellites pro-vided terrain following guidance infor-mation for cruise missiles.28

The reliance of coalition forces onsatellite communications was such that“…90% of communications into theatrewere via satellites.” In addition, satel-lites carried most of Central Command’s(CENTCOM) intra-theatre communica-tions, demonstrating the enhanced flex-

ibility of manoeuvre that satellite-basedcommunications offer over land-line orradio communications.29

Space-based sensing provided crit-ical intelligence information on Iraqiforces, which formed the basis of theCoalition’s strategy. The success of theCoalition’s campaign against Iraq high-lights the importance of space-basedsensing to military operations.

Missile warning was also importantin the Gulf War. Iraq used the SCUDmissile threat as a political tool,attempting to draw Israel into the warand hopefully tear apart the coalition.Consequently, the SCUD became muchmore important politically than it wasmilitarily, and hunting it down becamesuch a priority that it altered the aircampaign plan. US Space Commandoperators at Cheyenne Mountain, inColorado, optimized their sensing andreporting of SCUD launches to CENT-COM PATRIOT missile defence crews,such that coalition personnel receivedsufficient warning to don protectiveclothing, as well as arm and pointdefence systems.30

Two significant challenges in theGulf War pertaining to space-based tech-nologies were bandwidth and groundstation security. Communications, intel-ligence, weather reporting, and missilewarning all suffered, not from the prob-lem of a lack of information but of pos-sessing and needing to distribute toomuch information. As a result, it wasnecessary to control bandwidth in orderthat satellite communications would notbecome an operational “choke-point”.Because, space technology is useless if itcannot transmit back through its groundstation, ground stations become a criticalnode, which required protection.31

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The Kosovo Conflict

Since the Gulf War, additionalspace-based capabilities had beendeveloped, with North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) forces relyingextensively on those new capabilitiesduring the Kosovo Air Campaign.

GPS provided navigation to theplatforms, as well as to the munitionscarried by those platforms. The B2bomber was heavily dependent on GPSsupport for its GPS Aided TargetingSystem and GPS Aided Munitions.

The Kosovo Liberation Army usedsatellite telephones to communicatewith NATO forces to provide benefi-cial intelligence. Satellite communica-tions were equally applicable at alllevels of the conflict, from the strate-gic to the tactical level. For example,some aircraft in Kosovo had the capa-bility to be redirected to new targetswhile flying missions using satellitecommunications.32

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)provided all-weather imagery, and anew tactical intelligence managementstructure was put in place to improvethe use of intelligence gleaned.33 Theobjective of this management structurewas to process imagery and return itquickly to the planners and aircrew intheatre. To do so required reliable satel-lite communications, which in Kosovowere provided by a wide variety of US,NATO, British, and French space-basedplatforms. Increased use of space com-munications allowed the US to leavelarge portions of its support infrastruc-ture and personnel at home, reducingboth costs and risks in theatre.34 As aresult, space-based communicationsbecame a critical link.

This brief history highlights theexpanding roles and increasing relianceplaced on space-based assets. Their usehas evolved from an inter-theatre com-munication tool in the Falklands War, tothe provision of more specific capabili-ties in the Gulf War, to a virtual relianceduring the Kosovo Conflict. Enhancedutilization of space during these con-flicts has proven that space is the newhigh ground for military operations. Acloser look at current military space-based capabilities will further empha-size this fact.

Current Space Capabilities

Space has evolved from being aunique asset for national leadership tobeing an essential consideration for mil-itary commanders at all levels of war.In the past, militaries used space exclu-sively as a force multiplier. Today,space-based systems provide capabili-ties that cannot be satisfied by othermeans. With the end of the Cold War,military budgets have been significant-ly reduced with a parallel reduction indefence infrastructure, while militarydeployments have dramaticallyincreased. In order to meet the chal-lenges of reduced resources andincreased global commitments, nationsare attempting to exploit technology,especially space-based systems. Spaceprovides critical capabilities for militaryoperations, including communications,navigation, weather, national defence,remote sensing and surveillance, eachof which will be examined more closely.

Communications

The employment of space-baseddevices is rapidly becoming the pri-mary medium for modern military com-munication systems. Civilian and mili-

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tary satellites already provide criticalsupport to military operations, andmore advanced satellite communicationsystems are being deployed each year.They provide global, voice and datacommunications for military activitiesthat demand timely information to facil-itate mission success.35 Military sys-tems can be specifically designed toprovide secure, jam resistant, and inter-operable world-wide communications.Since their operational genesis in theGulf War, military space-based commu-nications have proven their advantagesover traditional land-based systems,such as VHF, UHF, HF radios, and land-line dependent equipment.

The inherent limitations of radiosystems include VHF and microwaveline-of-sight transmission restrictionsand degradation in transmission qualitydue to long distances, electromagneticinterference and atmospheric condi-tions. An example would includedegradation of long distance communi-cations during periods of high solaractivity. Consequently, long distanceradio transmissions need to be down-linked to the closest landline systems orare systematically passed to numerousground stations, resulting in significanttransmission delays. As a result, real-time communications from the battle-field to the CINC are difficult. Thelandline dependent systems are vulner-able to enemy targeting and are unavail-able in many areas of conflict, particu-larly for operations other than war.Both radio and landline systems arehighly susceptible to damage from anelectromagnetic pulse (EMP); hence,they would be rendered unusable by anuclear blast.

Military space-based communica-tion systems, such as the US Defense

Satellite Communication System and theUK SKYNET 4 constellation, which haveboth been orbiting since the late 1980s,provide significant advantages to mod-ern battlefield operations. With globalcoverage, these systems provide a con-tinuous world-wide communicationscapability that can rapidly respond tounanticipated military transmissionrequirements, anywhere in the world.However, they do remain susceptible toEMP and some forms of electronic war-fare. In addition, they are bandwidthlimited, as previously discussed.

Future US military satellite commu-nication systems are being designed toovercome these weaknesses. The newUS MILSTAR system is a highly secure,jam-proof, radiation-hardened, EMPresistant satellite that is capable of mov-ing to avoid an enemy Anti-Satellite(ASAT) attack.36 The Advanced Extre-mely High Frequency (EHF) communi-cation system is expected to increasemilitary communication transmissionrates by more than a factor of ten.37

Similarly, other countries are pursuingenhancements to military satellite com-munications. An example is the French-led European consortium’s Syracuse IIIsystem, expected to be in-service by2004, which will be purely for militaryoperations and include both X-bandand EHF-band communications.38

The employment of commercialsystems, such as GLOBALSTAR andIRIDIUM, will transform the quality ofcommunications for air power opera-tions by providing real-time sensor toshooter communications.39 This capa-bility has been demonstrated in recentaircraft tests, joint exercises, and opera-tions. It provides a capability for com-manders to better track aircraft andcommunicate with forward-deployed

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units. It also provides aircrews with theability to plan missions en route to tar-gets during long over-water deploy-ments.40 Capitalizing on this potentialcapability, the US Air Force (USAF) isdeveloping an integrated, global C2

network, which will eliminatestovepipe applications and utilize a dis-tributed architecture.41 Space-basedcommunications are providing criticalcapabilities that are unavailablethrough other means.

Navigation

Space-based radio navigation sys-tems such as the US GPS and theRussian Global Navigation SatelliteSystem (GLONASS) have revolutionizedglobal navigation, performing both nav-igation and weapons guidance func-tions. Both GPS and GLONASS provideprecise position fixing, velocity, andtiming information to an unlimitednumber of users (civilian and military)on a continuous, world-wide basis. Inaddition, both systems provide 24-hourall-weather coverage.

The new generation of PrecisionGuided Munitions (PGM) relies heavilyon space-based navigation systems.These PGMs provide all-weather capa-bility with significant cost-savings.Such weapons and space-based capabil-ities provide the foundation for theUSAF core competency of “precisionengagement”. For example, duringOperation ALLIED FORCE, the GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitionsachieved great success from altitudesabove cloud cover, and six of the elevenweapons used throughout theOperation were guided by GPS.43

Space-based navigation has become sosuccessful that it is regarded by many asthe “centre-piece of the expected revo-

lution in military affairs … every mili-tary aircraft will navigate using GPS,and almost 100,000 GPS units will be inuse with the US Army. Every majorPGM will target through GPS.”44

The military dependence on, andintegration of, GPS is projected to growimmensely.45 More than 7,000 platformsand 500,000 weapons, using GPS guid-ance, are planned to be in service by2006.46 By all accounts, space-basednavigation provides essential capabili-ties for modern militaries.

Weather

Weather satellites have becomeintegral for planning military opera-tions and PGM targeting, as demon-strated during recent conflicts.Weather observation systems have beenin existence since the 1960s and havesince evolved through many genera-tions. Current systems include finer-resolution cloud cover sensors, auroradetectors, as well as temperature, mois-ture, and infrared sounders.

In order to enhance the manage-ment of systems while reducing costs,there is a trend toward merging civiland military satellite weather programs.An example is the National PolarOrbiting Operational EnvironmentalSatellite System which combines USmilitary, American civil, and theEuropean EUMETSAT systems. Thesewill predict, track, and monitor world-wide meteorological events withextraordinary accuracy, at a much-reduced life-cycle cost.

Military operations are routinelyconducted in less developed regions ofthe world that lack advanced meteoro-logical sensors. Satellite-based weather

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These enhanced ISR capabilitiesincrease the operational commander’schance of success through the provisionof more timely and accurate informa-tion, thereby allowing improved deci-sion-making and execution cycles.

Commercial sectors are providingan incremental ISR capability at a much-reduced cost, particularly attractive tothose nations that could not otherwiseafford it. In addition, this commercialISR capability will supplement theexisting capability for other countries.Potentially, upwards of one hundredcommercial and civil imaging systemscould be launched within the next sev-eral years to provide subscribers withelectro-optical, radar, multi-colour,multi-spectral imagery, with one metreresolution or better.49

The future of ISR is the migrationof airborne to space-based C2 plat-forms. Space-based moving targetindication (MTI) radar applicationswill eventually replace AirborneWarning and Control System (AWACS)and Joint Surveillance, Tracking, andReconnaissance System (JSTARS) air-craft in tracking air, ground, and sea-based enemy assets.50 The futureRADARSAT 2 will provide a prototypeof a high-resolution space-based MTIradar system, the benefits of whichwill be constant world-widecoverage.51 Data management and dis-tribution will, however, remain thecritical issues.

To date, space remains the onlyoperational environment where militarycommanders have the potential to max-imize the use of ISR capabilities withoutlegal restrictions. In periods other thanconflict, space-based ISR provides theonly means to legally monitor foreign

activity, including treaty compliance.As a result, exploitation of these capa-bilities is expected to be vigorouslypursued.

Space-based systems have evolvedtremendously during the past decade,as militaries attempt to exploit the ulti-mate high ground of space, throughincreased exploitation on these criticalcapabilities. Space-based inter andintra-theatre communications are lessvulnerable and easier to deploy thanground-based systems. Global naviga-tion systems provide precision capabili-ties that contribute to reduced collater-al damage. Accurate world-wideweather forecasting is available as aresult of space-based observation sys-tems. Improvements in detecting,tracking, and defending against missileattacks are attributable to enhancedspace-based capabilities. Finally,enhanced situational awareness, as wellas the potential migration of C2 plat-forms, are derived from improvementsto space-based ISR capabilities. It isimportant to recognize the vulnerabili-ties of these systems and the require-ment to implement appropriate securitymeasures.

Security Implications for Space

As militaries become increasinglydependent on space-based systems andthe capabilities derived from them,these capabilities become inherentlymore vulnerable to threats. To that end,appropriate security measures must beinstituted to ensure their protection.“As military operations become relianton space systems, it will become neces-sary to monitor, detect and react tothreats from or through the [space]medium. This leads to the requirementfor capabilities in the space control

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area.”52 Space control, similar to con-trol of the air, must be maintainedthrough military action aimed atexploiting and ensuring the effectiveuse of the space medium while reduc-ing, or preventing, its use by hostileforces. The vulnerability of any space-based system can be examined interms of its confidentiality, integrityand availability.

The confidentiality of data trans-mitted through satellites is maintainedthrough the use of cryptographicequipment to ensure that the “need-to-know” criterion is respected. Theintegrity of information must be pro-tected against any unauthorized “hack-ing” and data manipulation. The avail-ability of space-systems, particularly intimes of crises, must be preserved.Ground, link, and space segments ofspace-based systems can be subjectedto lethal and non-lethal attacks, whichwill have an impact on the availabilityof the space system.

The ground segment can be direct-ly targeted through conventional meansor indirectly attacked by being isolatedfrom its support elements, includingpower and communication sources. Aspace-based system remains less vulner-able to threats when it has redundantground control stations, mobile groundcontrol stations or greater autonomyfrom its control station. Space-basedsystems requiring unique or extensiveground-based infrastructure areextremely vulnerable to this form ofattack. For instance, any system thatrequires significant ground processingsupport will be highly susceptible tothreats and requires an active defence ofthese stations, or built-in redundancy.Miniaturization of the ground segmentwill enhance their survivability by

making them harder to target.Examples include MILSTAR suitcase-sized communication terminals and cel-lular phone links to commercial commu-nication systems.

The link element of space-basedsystems is also susceptible to direct orindirect attacks. Direct attacks are tar-geted against the communication link ofthese systems. An example would bethe elimination of a satellite communi-cations antenna, which isolates thespace-based system or prevents thereceipt of data. Indirect attacks alsoisolate the system but through non-destructive means. These include jam-ming, which is the blocking of a trans-mitted signal by overpowering it withnoise, and spoofing, which is the delib-erate alteration or replacement of a sig-nal with a false one.53 For example, GPSnavigation signals can be blocked witha jammer the size of a hockey puck.54

The space element of space-basedsystems (satellites) can be attacked byanti-satellite weapon systems, such asdirected-or kinetic-energy weapons.The practicality of shooting a satellitewith a kinetic-energy weapon is dimin-ished by the threat of debris to friendlysystems in orbit. In addition, the possi-bility of rendering large satellite con-stellations inoperable is relativelyremote. Directed-energy weapons pro-vide a more likely threat to spacecraft.Spacecraft operators and manufacturersshould install special sensors to quicklydetect and report an interferenceattempt.55 “Without such sensors, it isdifficult to rapidly determine whetheran anomaly was caused by natural phe-nomena, such as radiation, an onboardfailure or an intentional effort to dam-age the satellite or disrupt service.”56

Lightweight, efficient and inexpensive

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micro-sensors are being developed tomitigate these shortcomings; however,commercial operators are unlikely toinstall them on their spacecraft becausethere is no business case to justify a sen-sor’s added weight, space and power con-sumption for protection.57 In the longrun, the lack of satellite manoeuvrabilitywill determine its survivability. Researchinto methods of efficiently and effective-ly manoeuvring needs to be pursued.

Passive countermeasures to preventthe effective use of satellites includedeception to either hide forces or leadthe enemy to false interpretation of theinformation, thereby achieving the ele-ment of surprise. “The operationalcommander can also synchronize terres-trial activity to avoid times when over-head satellites are in the area. Currentsatellite paths and times of observationare regular, predictable and publiclyavailable, allowing operational synchro-nization to avoid detection.”58

Space control is expected tobecome the central issue of the nextdecade as the US and others attempt toaddress the problems associated withthe increasing reliance on space for ter-restrial military activities and for theincreasing role in modern information-based global economies.

The focus for protection activitiesinclude improved hardening of spacesystems both in orbit and those locatedon the ground. The majority of militarysatellite communications now travelover commercial systems; however,these service providers see no threat orbusiness case for protection. Militaryofficials are urging commercial compa-nies to take protective measures such as“hardening” their satellites to radio-fre-quency and laser interference, carrying

interference detectors, hardening pay-loads, adding manoeuvring capabilityor designing in system redundancy –anything that would tend to improvethe reliability of services bought bymilitary customers.

Conclusion

Without question, both modernsocieties and modern militaries havebecome dependant on space systems.In spite of this dependence, many mili-taries have been slow to recognizespace’s potential to influence the mod-ern battlefield. Indeed, space is theultimate high ground, and will becomethe new centre of gravity for opera-tional forces. While the US, perhapsbetter than anyone else, recognizes thisfact and are spending more now on mil-itary space systems than all other play-ers combined, other nations are alsobeginning to recognize the importanceof the high ground of space.

Nations and non-state actors withenough resources will gain access tonew space systems and technologies.They will access integrated space andinformation technologies. The rapidassimilation of information, enabled byspace-based capabilities, will be the keyto successful operations. High-speed,high-volume telecommunications, cou-pled with advances in computers, willenable vast, interactive, informationdatabases on globally networked com-puters. Not only will these space-con-nected systems drive and control mod-ern nation states and the global econo-my, they will enable the effective com-mand and control, and engagement ofmilitary forces. Notwithstanding thesetrends, the use of space for militaryoperations must overcome significantlegal and political considerations.

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Perhaps the most provocative ofthese considerations is the area of spaceweapons, which would include space-based lasers to shoot down hostileICBMs, space weapons to attack othersatellites and space-released weapons todestroy terrestrial targets. Currently,these kinds of weapon systems clearlybreak the thresholds of acceptability.They contravene several current inter-national treaties and cross contempo-rary social and political norms. But the21st century could well see a changedriven by the proliferation of greaterand greater range ballistic missiles. Ifthis threat materializes, space weaponswill likely be fielded because of theircost effectiveness, accuracy, and rela-tive invulnerability.

From the early use of German V2rockets in the Second World Warthrough to most recent use of GPS-guided munitions in Kosovo, the mili-tary uses of space-based assets hasgrown considerably; these uses includ-ed communications, navigation, weath-er, national defence, remote sensing andsurveillance activities. Clearly, space-based inter- and intra-theatre communi-cations are less vulnerable and easier todeploy than ground-based systems.Global navigation systems enable preci-sion capabilities that contribute toreduced collateral damage and increasethe effectivenss of smaller militaryforces. Space-based weather systemsprovide accurate worldwide forecast-ing. Improved space-based capabilitiesenhance the detection, tracking, anddefence against ICBMs. Space-basedISR capabilities provide enhanced situa-tional awareness. These diverse,demonstrated capabilities have created areliance and dependence for modernmilitaries on space-based systems, andthis ever-growing dependence will

make space a future centre of gravityfor military operations.

Although the high ground ofspace will become the new centre ofgravity for modern militaries, thereare numerous associated vulnerabili-ties which must be protected.Communications confidentiality,integrity and availability must beassured through encryption andhardening from various forms ofattack. Additionally, GPS navigationsignals are particularly vulnerable tovarious forms of spoofing and jam-ming and likewise, must be protected.Space control will, therefore, be cru-cial to ensuring successful militaryoperations in the future. Protectionof space-based assets must begin nowto ensure these assets are availablewhen needed. Space will be the “hubof all power and movement”59 ( not tobe ignored.

Endnotes

1. Richard B Myers, “Implementing OurVision For Space Control.” (written tran-script of speech to US Space Foundation inColorado Springs on 7 Apr 99), p. 1.

2. Richard B Myers, “Space Superiority IsFleeting,” Aviation Week & SpaceTechnology. (January 1, 2000), p. 54.

3. Myers, “Space Superiority Is Fleeting,” p. 54.

4. Wolf D. von Noorden, “Inmarsat Use byArmed Forces: A Question of TreatyInterpretation,” Journal of Space Law,(January, 1995), p. 2.

5. Yahya Dehqanzada and Ann M. Florini,“Commercial Satellite Imagery Comes ofAge,” Science and Technology, Vol 16, IssueNo 1 (Fall, 1999), p. 2.

6. Sharon.Hobson, “US Security FearsThreaten Canada Space Project,” Jane’s

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Defence Weekly, Vol 32, Issue No 002 (July14, 1999), p. 23.

7. Vipin Gupta, “New Satellite Images forSale,” International Security, (Summer,1995), p. 104.

8. Thomas S Moorman Jr, “The Explosion ofCommercial Space and the Implications forNational Security,” Airpower Journal, Vol13, Issue No 1 (Spring, 1999), p. 15.

9. Alasdair McLean, “Battle for Space,” TheWorld Today, (November 1999), p. 8.

10. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans by J. H.Huang (New York: Quill William Morrow,1993), pp. 74-79.

11. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans byMichael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) p. 353.12. Ibid, p. 354.

13. Department of the Air Force, Air ForceDoctrine Document 2-2 Space Operations(Washington DC: USAF, 23 Aug 98), pp. 7-17.

14. Headquarters, Air Force SpaceCommand, Command Executive Briefing, 17July 1998, slide 26.

15. Sandra I. Erwin, “In Surging SpaceIndustry, Commercial Markets Have theRight Stuff,” National Defense, Vol 82, IssueNo 536 (Mar, 1998), p. 14.

16. Headquarters, Air Force SpaceCommand, Command Executive Briefing, 17July 1998, slide 26.

17. Michael Mecham, “Commercial Imagingto Enter 1-Meter Era,” Aviation Week &Space Technology, (April 26, 1999), p. 84.

18. Ibid, p. 84.

19. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 52.

20. Andrew Richter, “The Revolution inMilitary Affairs and Its Impact on Canada:The Challenges and Consequences,” Instituteof Internal Relations, (March 1999), p. 1.21. Dr. Richard P. Hallion, “Military Power

And the Revolution In Military Affairs,” AnAddress at the Joint Services Command andStaff College, Bracknell, UK, 9 March 1999.

22. Norman R. Augustine, “The WrightBrothers Meet Adam Smith,” Aviation Week& Space Technology, (January 1, 2000), p. 48.

23. Ibid, P. 48.

24. Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., “Space:A New Strategic Frontier,” Air PowerJournal (Spring 1992) p. 14

25. Falklands (see Edward)

26. Donald J. Kutyna, “Indispensible: SpaceSystems in the Persian Gulf War,” Air PowerHistory, (1999), p. 34

27. Ibid, p. 35.

28. Ibid, p. 36.

29. Ibid, p. 36.

30. Craig Covault, “Military SpaceDominates Air Strikes,” Aviation Week &Space Technology (March 29, 1999), p. 32.

31. Ibid, p. 2.

32. Alastair McLean, “Battle for Space,”pp. 8-10.

33. Craig Covault, “Military SpaceDominates Air Strikes,” p. 32.

34. Ibid, p. 32.

35. Canada, Department of National DefenceB-GG-005-004, Joint Doctrine for CanadianForces Joint and Combined Operations,(Ottawa: DND, Canada 6 April 1995),Chapter 26, p. B-1/4.

36. Horley, “New Space Race,” Jane’sDefense Weekly, (26 August 1998), p. 23.

37. Bryan Bender, “Two Firms Tapped toDevelop MILSATCOM,” Jane’s DefenseWeekly, (1 September 1999), p. 1.

38. “France Launches Search For Next-

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Generation Satellites,” Jane’s InternationalDefense Review, (1 August 1999), p. 7.

39. Robert Ackerman, “Down-to-earthSolutions Offered For British MilitarySatellites,” Signal, (Dec 1999), p. 65.

40. William Scott, “Airborne Ops CenterSmooths Deployments,” Aviation Week &Space Technology, (18 October, 1999), p. 14.

41. Joris Lok, “C2 For The Air Warrior,”Jane’s International Defense Review, (1 Oct1999), p. 53.

42. Shawn P. Rife, “On Space-PowerSeparatism,” Airpower Journal, (Spring,1999), p. 22.

43. Ibid, p. 22.

44. Dr Stanley B. Alterman, “GPSDependence: A Fragile Vision for USBattlefield Dominance,” Journal of ElectronicDefense, Vol 18, Issue No 9 (September,1995), p. 53.

45. Don Heskovitz, “And the Compass SpunRound and Round,” Journal of ElectronicDefense, Vol 20, Issue No 5 (May, 1997), p.57.

46. David Foxwell and Mark Hewish, “GPS:Is It Lulling the Military Into a False Senseof Security ?,” Jane’s International DefenseReview, September, 1998, p. 32.

47. Michael A. Dornheim, “National MissileDefense Focused on June Review,” AviationWeek & Space Technology, (August 16, 1999),p. 66.

48. Canada, Department of NationalDefence, Directorate of Space Development,“Seizing the High Ground,” Presentation 10June 1999.

49. Dee Ann Davis, “Imaging RegulationsStalled,” Geo Info Systems, (July, 1999).

50. Steven R. Shill, John R. Jensen, andDave Cown, “Bridging The Gap BetweenGovernment and Industry,” Geo InfoSystems, (September, 1999).

51. Canada, Department of NationalDefence, Directorate of Space Development,“Seizing the High Ground,” Presentation10 June 1999.

52. Steve Delory, Brad Fournier, Dave Hanakand D.J. McCoubrey, “Space IndoctrinationHandbook,” (Unpublished Canadian ForcesSchool of Aerospace Studies paper,Winnipeg, Manitoba, August 1996), p. 3-B-3.

53. J. Todd Black, “Commercial Satellites:Future Threats or Allies?,” Naval WarCollege Review, Vol 52, Issue No 1 (Winter,1999), p. 105.

54. David Foxwell and Mark Hewish, “GPS:Is It Lulling the Military into a False Senseof Security,” p. 2.

55. William B. Scott, “Space Chief Warns ofThreats to U.S. Commercial Satellites,”Aviation Week & Space Technology, (April 12,1999), p. 51.

56. Ibid, p. 51.

57. Ibid, p. 51.

58. Ann M. Florini, “The Opening Skies:Third -Party Imaging Satellites and U.S.Security,” International Security, (Fall,1998), p. 98.

59. Clausewitz, On War, p. 595.

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hile I am delighted to be here, Imust admit that when I was

invited to participate, I protested mild-ly: “I am a historian; I know nothingabout ‘space’.” “That’s OK,” I wastold, “there will be lots of people therewho know a lot about space. We justwant you to provide some context.” Sothat is what I will try to do, by suggest-ing some ways in which we can put allof what we have been hearing into somekind of historical perspective.

There are many parallels fromwhich we can draw — especially fromearly sea power, as we have heard fromother symposium participants. I partic-ularly liked Al English’s words on thissubject; members of the Air Force, anderstwhile members of a space force, canderive great benefit from the study ofnaval history. However, given the audi-ence, I decided to restrict my commentsto things we should remember aboutthe beginnings of air power and thereactions to the first aircraft. And,hopefully, remind us that we mightlearn from the less than enthusiasticreception earlier technological develop-ments received. In Canada, airmen —in fact all military personnel — havesuffered from hesitant policymakers inthe past. We do not want that to hap-pen again with space issues.

I should note that I was fortunateenough to sit in on the “SpaceApplications” course at the Canadian

Forces School of Aerospace Studies(CFSAS) the week before last. For this Iwould like to thank the CFSAS comman-dant, Lieutenant-Colonel MurrayHaines, and the staff of his “SpaceFlight” - Major Kid Johnson, CaptainKevin Smith (USAF), Steve James, andtheir other presenters, including JoshDore and Captain Joe Churman, who areboth with us this week. (And please donot worry. The instructors protectednational security by asking me to absentmyself from the three classified hours ofthe course.) I found the experience fas-cinating - and commend it to you. Evenso, by no stretch of the imagination canI claim any expertise on space issues. Ido, however, at least now have a nod-ding acquaintance with the kind ofthings that are being done and may bedone with and through space assets. Itis positively mind-boggling.

As I looked at the numerous mis-steps and missed opportunities in theevolution of air power, I was tempted totitle this little contribution, “Neverunderestimate the importance of stu-pidity as a causal factor in history.” Thefact is that we have not always done theright thing. Although it is, admittedly,usually easier to criticize decisions (orthe lack of them) after the fact than tomake them at the time.

Even today, notwithstanding all theimpressive things we have been hearingyesterday and today, some people remain

Some Lessons for Space from theHistory of Air Power

D r. C a r l A . C h r i s t i eS e n i o r R e s e a r c h F e l l o wC e n t r e f o r D e f e n c e a n d S e c u r i t y S t u d i e sU n i v e r s i t y o f M a n i t o b a

W

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skeptical about space and the impact itmight have on military affairs. One of mystudents observed that a satellite is noth-ing more than a balloon on a long tether.1While this sounds a little facile, in someways he may be right — at least for someof its roles. But this new observation bal-loon also has much keener eyesight thandid the First World War observer lookingdown from his basket hanging beneathhis balloon. And, at least to this point, nonation has yet deployed the equivalent ofan earlier generation’s Sopwith Camels toshoot the eyes out of the sky — as far as Iknow. Moreover, today’s observation bal-loons not only do a much better job ofobserving, they do many other things aswell — as we have seen and heard here.

If we had more time, we could lookat earlier periods of history and consid-er the skepticism with which many mil-itary leaders greeted other inventionsthat later had profound influences onwarfare. Simply recall the lack of enthu-siasm some generals and admirals hadfor the tank, for the submarine, for themachine-gun during the First WorldWar. I do not know if General DouglasHaig really said that the machine-gunhad no stopping power when confront-ed by the horse.2 Even if he did not, thesentiment reflects that of a generation ofofficers. Many of us are probably famil-iar with the fear of many cavalry officersbefore, during, and even after the FirstWorld War, that the cursed — and use-less — new flying machines would scarethe horses. It has often taken some timefor the military mind — or anyone elsefor that matter — to come to grips withnew opportunities offered by great newinventions.3 Such as the aeroplane.

Canadian military leaders have notbeen immune to skepticism when itcomes to advances in technology. The

infamous Sam Hughes, then Minister ofMilitia and Defence, is reported to havecautioned our first pilot — indeed thefirst person in the British Empire to flya powered machine — J.A.D. McCurdy,in August 1914:

The aeroplane is an invention ofthe devil and will never play anypart in such a serious business asthe defence of a nation, my boy.4

Not surprisingly, given such astrong expression of opinion, Hugheshad reportedly expressed similar viewsbefore. One of the key figures in the his-tory of Canadian military aviation, MajorG.S. Maunsell, Director of EngineeringServices in Militia Headquarters inOttawa, wrote in December 1912:

The Minister does not wish Aviationtaken up, at any rate, at present.5

Canadians who know our air forcehistory know that Sam Hughes had abrief flirtation with aviation when heunilaterally — and somewhat mysteri-ously — authorized the creation of aCanadian Aviation Corps to accompanythe first contingent of the CanadianExpeditionary Force when it sailed forEngland in the fall of 1914. However,this was only a brief straying from hisanti-aviation stance; he soon lost allinterest in the new toy.

The $5,000 secondhand Burgess-Dunne biplane that accompanied ourmilitia to the Salisbury Plain never flewin support of the troops. LieutenantW.F.N. Sharpe, one of the three mem-bers of the Canadian Aviation Corps,died while learning to fly with theRoyal Flying Corps; his commander,Captain E.L. Janney, except for a briefreappearance as a recruiter with the

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short-lived Royal Canadian Naval AirService in 1918, faded from the pages ofhistory. The most diligent researchercan find even less about the other mem-ber of the corps, Staff Sergeant Harry A.Farr, our first air force mechanic.6

The lack of vision in MilitiaHeadquarters and in the Cabinet pre-vented Canada from having its own airforce during the First World War.Following the Great War it gave us aminiscule force whose members per-formed various civil roles as “bushpilots in uniform.”7 Consequently,when war came again in 1939 Canadahad only a tiny cadre on which to buildwhat eventually became one of the greatair forces of the world. Even then it wasa bit of an illusion because most mem-bers of the Royal Canadian Air Forcewho served overseas during the SecondWorld War scattered through a foreignservice, the British Royal Air Force.8

As we come to a crucial point in theevolution of Canada’s defence policy, letus hope that our leaders show morevision and inspiration. Whatever we callour air force — or indeed the CanadianArmed Forces — we hope Canadians canserve as more than just individual cogsin a foreign service. Indeed, thoughsome commentators have decried ourlimited participation in the Persian GulfWar and in the air war over the formerYugoslavia, at least CF members servedlargely in Canadian units in both con-flicts.9 We trust this can continue.

If, as one suspects, the currentincumbents of National Defence Head-quarters, Parliament Hill, and even theLiberal caucus lack unanimity on spaceand other defence issues of today, wecan take solace from history. If SamHughes, and many others in Ottawa,

had no use for aviation, a few Canadiansexpressed more open views — anapproach we should encourage.

In March 1912, Major-General G.J.Mackenzie, Chief of the General Staff(CGS), offered a caution that bearsrepeating today. Although we wouldprobably take this as a truism, it couldbe chiseled in stone over the entrance tothe “headshed” — or National DefenceHeadquarters — in Ottawa.

A military organization which doesnot keep pace with the latest scien-tific developments must be hope-lessly left behind by organizationswhich are alive to that necessity.10

The Canadian CGS may have been inthe minority, but he was not alone. In1907, in the preface to the first volume ofhis Aerial Flight, the British author F.W.Lanchester wrote about the new scienceof aeronautics in a way that might still beapplicable today - simply by changing afew key words. Commenting on the pro-vision for the scientific study of aerialflight, Lanchester urged:

The importance of this matter enti-tles it to rank almost as a Nationalobligation; for the country inwhich facilities are given for theproper theoretical and experimen-tal study of flight will inevitablyfind itself in the best position totake the lead in its application andpractical development. That thismust be considered a vital questionfrom a National point of view isbeyond dispute; under the condi-tions of the near future the com-mand of the air must become atleast as essential to the safety of theEmpire as will be our continuedsupremacy of the high seas.11

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Lanchester and a few other visionar-ies continued to express such views beforeand during the Great War, influencing asmall number of key people. One wasMajor-General Sir David Henderson, thenDirector General of Military Aeronauticsat the War Office. In 1916, when aircraftwere just starting to demonstrate theirtrue potential, he wrote:

The aeronautical arm is a new forcein war, performing new functions,extending its activities every dayand, at present, recognising butfew limitations to its possibledevelopment.12

Incidentally, Henderson pennedthese words for Lanchester’s book,Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of theFourth Arm.

We may have to take care with howwe tack numerical adjectives on to ournouns - “third dimension,” “fourth arm.”It gets confusing. We already have thingslike “fifth column” and “the fourth” - oris it “the fifth? - estate.” Who came upwith this “third dimension” as the tag forspace anyway? What does it really mean?

I have been told that we should notconsider space as simply an extension ofthe air only at a higher altitude. Funnythings happen to the physics — andtherefore what is possible — when weleave the atmosphere behind. More than a“third dimension,” it becomes a complete-ly new world, where many of the old rulesno longer apply. Or, at least to the unsci-entific mind, they seem to have a differentimpact. (Or maybe our understanding hasbeen too conditioned by popular culture— from Buck Rogers to Star Wars.)

Does this mean that utilization ofspace requires the creation of a new

service, force, or corps? Surely not. Inthe United States, it appears that theUnited States Air Force (USAF) has triedto appropriate this role. Space is takenas simply an extension of the air. We seethis reflected in title changes rangingfrom professional air force publicationsto commands. Even so, as we have seen,the other American services still haveorganizations to deal with space ques-tions, and would find it increasingly dif-ficult (if not impossible) to conduct theirbusiness without utilizing space assets.

It all makes me wonder if, no mat-ter what one thought of unification ofthe Canadian armed forces back inFebruary 1968, maybe we have stum-bled towards the type of military organ-ization required for the next generationof warfare. Back then, of course, therewas little or no thought of space. I amsure it did not enter into the thinking ofPaul Hellyer or any of his advisers whenhe said, or apparently thought, “Damnthe Torpedoes”13 and pushed throughhis Canadian Forces Reorganization Act.Perhaps we may yet take good advan-tage of this one-service approach todefence problems.

However our forces are organized,one can argue that, in many respects,nothing has changed in the formulationof Canadian defence policy. As manyhistorians and other commentators havepointed out, we are essentially anunmilitary people who have risen to thechallenge whenever called upon. Thishas caused us to do some amazingthings. Our fathers and grandfathersand great-grandfathers have maderemarkable contributions to Alliedefforts in two world wars — both athome and abroad. The extent of thetotal mobilization of our nationalhuman and economic resources made

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Canada a key part of the winning strat-egy in both world wars. We have alsomade not insignificant contributions toother coalition campaigns — as many inthis room know far better than I.

If such efforts seem to require moreof a stretch for the government inOttawa and most of the people it repre-sents, we should remind ourselves thatit was ever thus. What, for the lastpost-Cold War decade, has been called a“peace dividend” bedeviled previousmilitary leaders and their political mas-ters following other wars of the twenti-eth century and following those of theeighteenth and nineteenth as well. Itseems that this country always wants todefend itself on the cheap. DouglasBland has commented on this proclivity:

Canadians, whether they admit it ornot, believe in the Monroe Doctrineand they intuitively understandthat “free-riding” on Americandefence capabilities is a rationaldefence policy, although theyworry also about Canada’s ability todefend itself against US help.14

This poses a dilemma for thosemaking and implementing policy: howto protect Canada without spendingmoney and, at the same time, withoutjeopardizing our sovereignty. Previousgenerations have wrestled with the sameproblem. Now that we have questionsof “space” and the related complicationof ballistic missile defence (whethercalled BMD, NMD or some yet-to-be-revealed acronym), the latest incarna-tion of the dilemma is going to be a par-ticularly nettlesome one to resolve.

Finally, whatever our governmentdecides, let us hope that the words of anearly Canadian air force officer are kept

in mind. In 1922, after visiting Baffin,Ellesmere, Bylot, and North DevonIslands in the arctic archipelago,Squadron Leader R.A. Logan advised:

Canada, if it considers itself worthyto be called a nation, should haveenough pride and spirit to take atleast ordinary precautions todefend itself in any emergency.15

More words to chisel in a promi-nent place in Ottawa. Heck, theyshould go on the Langevin Block andthe Centre Block16 of the ParliamentBuildings as well as NDHQ.

Endnotes

1. I am indebted to Capt Steve Maude,CFANS, for this analogy, although he admitsthat he may have got the idea directly fromsomeone else or indirectly from the readinghe has done as a student of air power and anavigation instructor.

2. Haig did write in 1914 that “two machineguns per battalion were more than sufficient.”Quoted in A.J.P Taylor, English History, 1914-1945 (New York and Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1965), 35. Taylor continued:“[Secretary for War, Lord] Kitchener thoughtthat four per battalion might be useful, andanything more a luxury. [Chancellor of theExchequer, David] Lloyd George said: ‘TakeKitchener’s figure. Square it. Multiply bytwo. Then double again for good luck.’ Thearmy began the war with 1,330 machine guns.During the war 240,506 were manufactured -thanks to Lloyd George.”

3. Beyond conventional military histories,one can often get this impression from read-ing works such as Bernard and Fawn Brodie,From Crossbow to H-Bomb (New York: DellPublishing, 1962) and the more recentMartin Van Creveld, Technology and War:From 2000 B.C. to the Present( New York:The Free Press, 1991).

4. Attributed to Hughes and quoted inJ.R.K. Main, Voyageurs of the Air: A History

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of Civil Aviation in Canada, 1858-1967(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967), p. 11. Mainprovides no source for this statement andsome historians doubt its authenticity. It isconsistent, however, with the mercurialHughes’s known views on aviation beforethe war. In addition, Main’s long career inaviation and interest in its historical devel-opment put him in a position to acquireinside information. See also S.F. Wise,Canadian Airmen and the First World War,The Official History of the Royal CanadianAir Force, vol. 1 (Ottawa and Toronto:University of Toronto Press in co-operationwith the Canadian Government PublishingCentre, 1976), pp. 17-18.

5. Quoted in Wise, Canadian Airmen, p. 18.

6. For more on the Canadian Aviation Corps,see Wise, Canadian Airmen, p. 27-9.

7. Used as the title of chapter 3 in the secondvolume of the official history of the RoyalCanadian Air Force by W.A.B. Douglas, TheCreation of a National Air Force (Ottawa andToronto: University of Toronto Press in co-operation with the Canadian GovernmentPublishing Centre, 1986), 91. For more onthis understudied era of Canadian air forcehistory, see W/C F.H. Hitchins, Air Board,Canadian Air Force, and Royal Canadian AirForce, Mercury Series, Canadian WarMuseum Paper No. 2 (Ottawa: NationalMuseums of Canada, 1972).

8. C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: TheWar Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa:Queen’s Printer, 1974), pp. 301 and 305.

9. For the Gulf, see Maj Jean H. Morin andLCdr Richard H. Gimblett, OperationFriction: The Canadian Forces in the PersianGulf, 1990-1991 (Toronto and Oxford:Dundurn Press, 1997) and, for Kosovo, agrowing body of literature including LColDavid L. Bashow, Dr. Steve Harris, and CaptJames Pickett, et al, “Mission Ready:Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,”Canadian Military Journal, vol. 1 no. 1(Spring 2000), 55-61 (also available on theInternet at www.journal.dnd.ca).

10. Quoted in Wise, Canadian Airmen, p. 17.

11. F.W. Lanchester, quoting himself, in the“Author’s Note” to his new book, Aircraft inWarfare: the Dawn of the Fourth Arm(London: Constable, 1916), xii. I amindebted to LCol Mark Matheson for lend-ing me his copy of this valuable work.

12. Ibid., “Introductory Preface,” p. viii.

13. Note the title of Paul Hellyer’s memoirs,Damn the Torpedoes (Toronto: McClellandand Stewart, 1990).

14. Douglas L. Bland, Chiefs of Defence:Government and the Unified Command of theCanadian Armed Forces (Toronto: [CanadianInstitute of Strategic Studies], 1995), p. 21-2.The Monroe Doctrine is the name given tothe declaration made by U.S. PresidentJames Monroe, during his State of the Unionaddress to Congress on 2 December 1823,warning European powers to refrain fromexpanding further into the Americas. In anironic twist for Canadians, who todaydepend on U.S. protection, the youngrepublic was apparently relying on theassumption that the strength of Britain’sRoyal Navy would provide de facto enforce-ment of the new policy.

15. Quoted in Leslie Roberts, There Shall BeWings: A History of the Royal Canadian AirForce (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1959), p. 66;and in F.H. Hitchins, Air Board, CanadianAir Force, and Royal Canadian Air Force,National Museum of Canada, MercurySeries, Canadian War Museum Paper No. 2(Ottawa: National Museums of Canada,August 1972), 80. For the original, and fas-cinating document, see R.A. Logan, “Reportof Investigations on Aviation in the ArcticArchipelago carried out during the Summerof 1922,” Directorate of History andHeritage, Document Collection accessionnumber 74/414. See also Douglas, TheCreation of a National Air Force, p. 105.

16. Home of the PMO, or Prime Minister’sOffice.

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here is widespread agreement thatthe strategic environment today is

full of constantly evolving risks, uncer-tainties and threats to our security. Aswe have witnessed the unprecedentedchanges in the past decade, few woulddisagree that future conflict is likely tobe highly complex, with an increasingprobability of asymmetric strugglesbetween various state and non-stateactors, each attempting to avoid theother’s strength, while at the same timeattempting to exploit the other’s weak-ness. There is also a welcomed trendtowards sensitivity to casualties and thedesire for decisive results that take nei-ther too much time or too much of thenation’s precious resources.

As we know, the fields of commu-nications, computers and informationtransfer are advancing very rapidly,driven by Commercial Off The ShelfTechnology (COTS) and by the adoptionof web technologies. Nevertheless, wemust remember that rates of changeeverywhere are different, and that thischallenge is leading to vastly differentlevels of technical and military capabil-ities among the key actors on the politi-cal and military stage. As a militaryofficer assigned to SACEUR’s AirCommand & Control staff in NATO, Ican assure you that we are grapplingwith this issue daily. We find thatmaintaining strict interoperability andsoftware configuration controls are thekey to ensuring the Joint Force AirComponent Commander (JFACC) has theright tools and the right information inthe right format to meet the time-sensi-tive demands of decision makers.

One of the most impressive, butequally disturbing facts about today’sdynamic military environment, is thesheer volume of data available to theoperator that can rapidly lead to infor-mation overload. The spectacularadvances in information technologyleading to the establishment of a globalinformation dimension are based uponthe ready availability of unambiguousreal-time data compiled from numeroussources and sensors, such as intelli-gence, surface, maritime, air and space.In the NATO Air Command & ControlSystem (ACCS) project, our aim is to cre-ate a single, fused information domainfor the JFACC. A combined productwould also be made available to theCombined Joint Task Force or RegionalAir Commander’s planning staff andcould then be used to form a JointOperating Picture (JOP). This compo-nent level view of the battlespace willhopefully enable JFACC’s to effectivelymanage aerospace assets to achieve thelong-term aim of connectivity from“sensor-to-shooter” through a highlyintelligent command and control net-work. This could also support the longsought after transformation from thecurrent sequential and linear planningof air operations, to simultaneous,interactive planning, thereby signifi-cantly improving the tempo of theoperations cycle.

The principal factor for the timelyacquisition of information and intelli-gence and the completeness of fuseddata is the need to compile a battlespacepicture for our Commander more rapid-ly than the opposing Commander. This

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Space and Battlespace

L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l R o n B l a n k

T


is no different today than it was in thepast, as operators have always needed toprovide all relevant data to every levelof command that requires it forCommand and Control (C2) purposes.

In the next decade, the requirementto effectively co-ordinate the delivery ofmultinational air, maritime, land-based,and possibly, space-based precisionweapon systems, with ranges up tothousands of kilometres, will be a chal-lenge of the highest order. The overalleffect will be to enhance the concentra-tion of force, to expand the continuumof the battlespace, and to blur the divi-sions between the strategic, operationaland tactical levels of warfare.

One of the most important attrib-utes of being a good JFACC is havingfull situational awareness or SA. Wemust enable him or her to detect andlocate an adversary’s forces, to continu-ously monitor their activities, and toprovide targeting and cueing info and aclear overview of operations.Moreover, to be effective, ourIntelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance (ISR) assets must beable to provide comprehensive, 24-hrcoverage over any terrain, in any weath-er and in all electromagnetic environ-ments throughout the battlespace.Technology now offers extremely high-definition imagery at approximately onemetre resolution to anyone. The abilityin joint operations to assimilate nearreal-time cueing of platform sensors byother ISR assets (including those inspace) will be significantly enhanced inthe next few years. In my view, Canadaneeds to pay special attention to thisdevelopment.

NATO recognizes that the informa-tion management challenge of exploit-

ing the operational and technical info ina timely, efficient manner within thebattlespace and of ensuring that themost current sources are used for theJOP represents one of the most signifi-cant challenges facing operational plan-ners today. It has been reported that inOperation Allied Force, US DSP satel-lites were providing near real-time cue-ing of large IR incidents, such asexploding bombs and large fires direct-ly to the CAOC operators. Such capabil-ities were not in their original designspecifications, but history shows thatresourceful and intelligent operatorscan often push the technical envelope oftheir sensors and weapons beyond theirdesigner’s limits.

Let us turn now to the question ofwhether the Canadian Forces (CF) haveadapted their doctrine on how we con-duct operations to incorporate the use ofspace. In fact, the CF has used satellitetechnology since the 1960s. We rely onsatellite communications, we helped topioneer SARSAT for Search and Rescue,we are increasing our use of GPS fornavigation, we continue to participate inRADARSAT for furthering technologydevelopment, and we are also membersof NORAD and several other bodiesinvolved in military operations and sci-entific work that include space-based,or surveillance by space sensors.

Unfortunately, the CF does not ownsurveillance satellites or ground-basedspace sensors. Nor do we have dedicat-ed communication satellites that areEMP-hardened, or that offer instanta-neous access to any point on the globefor high amounts of data. Some mayask: what’s the impact? In my view,there are only a few, but I believe theyare significant concerns. Without dedi-cated surveillance from space, we rely

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on data provided by our allies or thatwhich we may purchase from commer-cial entities such as www.spaceimag-ing.com. Our Commanders must rely onsomeone else’s imagery for target identi-fication, selection and mission plan-ning, as well as bomb damage assess-ment. In a multinational coalition sce-nario, this is probably acceptable, pro-vided that our Air Force agrees dailyparticipation in the CAOC’s JointTargeting Board and using data producedby others is good enough. This does not,however, permit Canada to carry outindependent aerospace operations.

As the second half of the 20th cen-tury has matured the air realm thefirst half of the next century willmature the aerospace realm. For airforce purposes, space and air arenot separate domains. Instead theyare two parts of the same whole, asclosely related as oceans and seas.We should think of the aerospacedomain as a seamless volume fromwhich we provide military capabil-ities in support of national security.Space is a place, not a mission.

General Michael Ryan, 1999

As this quote indicates, there is agrowing awareness that the air andspace above us form one endless contin-uum. Our government has tasked theDepartment and the CF to surveyCanada’s air approaches and the air-space above it. Since the mid-1980s wehave not had ground-based space sen-sors. I believe there are initiativesunderway at NDHQ to address this defi-ciency, but until a replacement capabil-ity is acquired, Canadians have toappreciate that we have no independentknowledge of any objects orbitingabove us, unless someone else is kind

enough to provide us with hard copyimagery, or to share access to their ownsurveillance systems.

Given the limitations imposed byreliance on allied, NATO or commercialcommunication satellites, I would onlydraw your attention to recent statisticsfrom Operation Allied Force which statethat this air campaign used five timesmore bandwidth from satellite commu-nications than was used in OperationDesert Storm. Without assured, surviv-able communications, how do we guar-antee that the CF can pass time-sensitivedata to our senior leadership withoutthis vital process being impacted byother military or commercial usage? I donot have the answer to that question butI raise the issue, because I believe that itis fundamental to our defence policygoal of being prepared to commit expe-ditionary forces anywhere on the globe.

So far, I have just mentioned tech-nical capabilities. However, what aboutthe training, procedures and doctrine ofour air force? Sadly, with few excep-tions, most military organizations onlywrite doctrine to describe capabilitiesthat they possess, and we have alreadyheard from other speakers and in otherseminars about a lack of CF doctrine forthe use of space capabilities. We shouldhave a doctrine that addresses all aero-space capabilities in a fundamental way,whether the CF operates them today orever plans on acquiring them. Absent adetailed appreciation of what aerospacepower is capable of doing, we are indanger of limiting our capabilities andcapacities in this domain, as well as theresourcefulness and initiative of ourservicemen and women.

The NATO Panel on Air DefencePhilosophy recently completed a study

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called “ A Vision for the C2 of NATOAerospace Forces in Joint Operations.”The authors believe that SA needs to beimproved through the amalgamation ofmaritime, land and air pictures, includ-ing ground surveillance and space. Inorder to improve the integrity of C2 andthe means of aerospace forces to main-tain freedom of judgement on the basisof global SA, space-based assets deservespecial and particular attention. Thefinal point is that NATO needs to evalu-ate space assets in more detail as theyare new and are expected to play everincreasing roles in the future. Theseconclusions have immediate transfer-ability to any air force.

As the reliance on commercial satel-lite technology is increasing, the space

dimension, the control of the informa-tion and the data exchange all requireeveryone’s full attention to maintain atechnological edge over potential adver-saries. It will be crucial for the CF toprovide our operators with the tools,doctrine and training they need toachieve these benefits with their equip-ment, if we are going to be able to keeppace with the tempo of future opera-tions in all dimensions. As exhibited bypast visionaries such as Bishop, Barkerand Slemon, the air force has always metchallenges head-on in the past. Let usnot allow the opportunity to be activeplayers in all of the aerospace domainpass us by.

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Documents

Space in the 21st Century - Canadian Forces College · 2005-08-12 · ii he Canadian Forces College second annual Air Symposium, conducted on 5 and 6 April 2000, focused on the Canadian