Surprise and Terrorism a Conceptual Framework

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Surprise and Terrorism: A Conceptual FrameworkDaniel R. Morris aa Department of War Studies, King's College London, UK

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To cite this Article Morris, Daniel R.(2009)'Surprise and Terrorism: A Conceptual Framework',Journal of Strategic Studies,32:1,1 27To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01402390802407392URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390802407392

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AMOS PERLMUTTER PRIZE ESSAY

Surprise and Terrorism:A Conceptual Framework

DANIEL R. MORRISDepartment of War Studies, Kings College London, UK

ABSTRACT While terrorist attacks are, by their very nature, surprise attacks,they are rarely studied as such. There have been few attempts to integrateknowledge and insight from the extensive bodies of literature on military surpriseattack and terrorism. This article proposes a framework for understanding therelationship between the mechanism of surprise and the method of terrorism. Itseeks to situate the principle of surprise within the tactical and strategic logic ofterrorism in order to illuminate the role of surprise as the terrorists tactical

mechanism of necessity and his strategic weapon of choice. Applying thisframework to the 9/11 case will further illustrate the central role of surprise interrorism.

KEY WORDS: Surprise, Terrorism, 9/11

The surprise is, therefore, not only the means to the attainment ofnumerical superiority; but it is also to be regarded as a substantiveprinciple in itself, on account of its moral effect. When it is

successful in a high degree, confusion and broken courage in theenemys ranks are the consequences; and of the degree to whichthese multiply a success, there are examples enough, great andsmall.1

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 1832

Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, itis the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponents

heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the

1Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books 1982), 269.

The Journal of Strategic StudiesVol. 32, No. 1, 127, February 2009

ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/09/010001-27 2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/01402390802407392

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point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is nota means of imposing decision upon the enemy; it is the decision wewish to impose upon him.2

S. K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, 1979

In the domain of war, adversaries have sought to capitalise on theenemys surprise and fear since time immemorial. From simple ambushat the tactical level to sudden war initiation at the strategic level, theeffects of successful surprise can bestow a significant advantage to anattacking force. However, few actors in the history of warfare havebeen as dependent on the mutually reinforcing effects of surprise andfear as the modern practitioners of terrorism a reliance born out of

both tactical necessity and strategic choice.Surprise has always been an inseparable feature of terrorism.

Terrorism operates on the presumption that the victim will beaccessible and vulnerable precisely because the attack is unexpectedat a particular point in time and space. In other words, for an attack tobe successful the victim must be taken by surprise. Without the elementof surprise, not only is the terrorist unlikely to succeed in his missionbut, once exposed, his freedom and very survival will be in gravejeopardy. This point is not controversial. However, the relationship

between surprise and terrorism goes beyond the mere tactical.Terrorism is first and foremost a form of psychological warfare. Assuch, the primary weapons of the terrorist operate not on the body ofthe adversary but rather on his mind. Surprise is one such weapon.

Unlike in the conventional military context, where surprise is usuallyemployed to maximise operational effectiveness by deceiving the enemyas to ones true intentions and capabilities, in terrorism surpriseassumes a much more central place in the tactical and strategicrepertoire of the terrorist. In this context, surprise is not merely a

vehicle to deliver the effects of a weapon upon the enemy. Instead, wepropose to look at it from the other way around terrorists use the gunand the bomb as delivery systems for the real coercive instruments intheir arsenal: surprise and shock. Used in this way, surprise itselfbecomes a potent weapon. It has enabled relatively small groups of sub-state actors to compel entire governments to action and ultimatelychange the course of history. Whether terrorists have been strategicallysuccessful in this regard is debatable, especially if we define successnarrowly as the full realisation of professed political aims. However,their ability to alter the landscape of our security environment andchange the way people think and behave is undeniable.

2S.K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War (Lahore, Pakistan: Wajidalis 1979), 59.

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This article explores the conceptual relationship between surpriseand terrorism.3 It seeks to demonstrate that terrorism cannot properlybe understood without an appreciation for the centrality of surprise inthe logic of the method. Applying this framework to the case of the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC in2001 (9/11) will further illustrate the central role of surprise interrorism.

Terrorism and the Principle of Surprise

Tactical Necessity: Surprise as Operational Enabler

There are few operational principles of the terrorist attack so

overlooked and taken for granted as the element of surprise. It is oftendisregarded as an issue worthy of mention perhaps because the functionof surprise in terrorism seems self-evident; indeed, terrorist attacks aresurprise attacks almost by definition. However, it is not entirely clearprecisely how surprise is used by design in the terrorist operation, nordo we fully understand how it works on that level. To answer thesequestions it is helpful to examine the logic of special operations warfarein order to understand how the few can attack the many and gain arelative superiority over the adversary.

The logic of special operations warfare. While terrorism considerablypredates the emergence of modern special operations warfare, there isoverlap between the two with respect to the basic principles employedto overcome the enemys superiority of force. A distinguishing featureof both types of warfare is that they allow the adopter to overcome hisrelative weakness and defeat a stronger adversary who is practising adifferent art of war. Surprise constitutes but one of several principles ofthe special operation and the terrorist attack but it is nonetheless an

essential one. In both types of warfare, surprise is a key operationalenabler.4

The logic of special operations is based on the notion that a small,highly trained force can achieve a relative superiority over the enemy by

3An earlier version of this framework was presented by the author in GregoryB. OHayon and Daniel R. Morris, Warning in the Age of WMD Terrorism, in PeterKatona, Michael D. Intriligator, and John P. Sullivan (eds.), Countering Terrorism andWMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorist Network (London: Routledge 2006),

5168.4 James J. Wirtz, Theory of Surprise, in Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken(eds.), Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel(London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass 2003), 104.

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controlling the key conditions of the engagement or by bypassingdirect engagement entirely.5 Rear Admiral William H. McRaven,commander of the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)and a former Navy SEAL, identifies six essential principles of thesuccessful special operation: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise,speed, and purpose. McRavens theory of special operations explainshow relative superiority is achieved through the correct application ofthese six principles. According to McRaven, relative superiority can begained despite inferiority in numbers and firepower because the sixprinciples act together to reduce war to its most basic level, therebylimiting the adverse effects of friction, chance, and the enemys willto resist.6

The function of surprise in overcoming the latter characteristic of

war a resisting opposition is central to James Wirtzs understandingof surprise. For Wirtz, the enabling mechanism of surprise is a functionof its capacity to remove an active opponent from the battlefield,thereby altering wars nature as a duel. Surprise affords its adopter theinitiative, enabling him to commence the attack at a time and place ofhis choosing and strike before the defender realises that he is engaged incombat. In its ideal form, then, surprise essentially allows the attackingforce to administer damaging blows upon an inactive adversary.7

This is, of course, a theoretical ideal. The suspension of wars

dialectic is temporary, and rarely is it absolute in practice.8

This is onereason why strategic military surprise attacks are often initiallysuccessful but usually fail to deliver decisive victory to the surpriser.Surprise tends to throw the afflicted off-balance only temporarily, andunless this momentary advantage is capitalised on to the fullest, it isunlikely that the surpriser will be able to defeat the inherently strongeropponent. On the tactical level, however, the distance between theoryand practice narrows considerably, and the ideal type becomesconceivable in reality. As Clausewitz put it, In tactics the surprise is

much more at home, for the very natural reason that all times andspaces are on a smaller scale.9 Given that the principles of specialoperations warfare coalesce to reduce war to its simplest form, it is

5McRaven defines relative superiority as a condition that exists when an attackingforce, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defendedenemy. William H. McRaven, SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special OperationsWarfare: Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio 1995), 4.6Ibid., 89.7

Wirtz, Theory of Surprise, 103.8Colin S. Gray, Transformation and Strategic Surprise (Carlisle Barracks, PA: StrategicStudies Institute, US Army War College 2005), 910.9Clausewitz, On War, 270.

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however, the attackers would certainly have been thwarted before theattack could reach the operational stage. In fact, without thepresumption of surprise the London operation could hardly have beenconceived at all. In the end, surprise made the attack possible, butultimately not successful.

In sum, while it is by no means sufficient for operational success,tactical surprise is usually necessary for the avoidance of outrightfailure. Surprise itself cannot deliver victory but it can create theconditions necessary for an operation to be conceived and successfullyexecuted. In terrorism, the stark asymmetry of force capabilitiesbetween the terrorist and the state necessitates the use of tactics thatbypass the dialectical nature of war from which the state derives itsoverwhelming military advantage.11 Surprise enables the terrorist to

overcome this asymmetry by pre-empting the duel that is war, asWirtz puts it.12 Through the element of surprise, the terrorist seeks tonegate the states strengths and create the conditions to exploit itsweaknesses. Surprise is only one tactical principle of the terroristoperation but it is nonetheless an essential one. Without it, terrorismwould not only be foolishly impractical as a method, but virtuallyinconceivable as a strategy.

Strategic Choice: Surprise as Strategic Weapon

That terrorists have the tactical advantage is not significant in itself.Indeed, the capacity to harness the initiative and strike some vestige ofthe state belongs, in theory, to virtually everyone. Nor is the capacity tokill or injure unique or of any special importance. Ordinary murderrates dwarf the number who perish at the hands of terrorists. Ifterrorism was simply about killing, it would likely be classed in theformer category, where the relatively low incidence rate would cause itto all but disappear into obscurity. Terrorism, however, is intuitively

understood as something altogether different. Terrorism commandsattention, captures imaginations, and alters perceptions on a scale thatfew other criminal activities could. Terrorism is able to achieve thisbecause of two critical characteristics: it is politically motivated and itis psychologically directed.

Terrorism is more about propaganda than violence. Terrorists pose athreat to society not simply because they kill people, but moreimportantly because they threaten to kill people. Indeed, the threat of

11Richard K. Betts, The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages ofTerror, Political Science Quarterly 117/1 (2002), 30.12Wirtz, Theory of Surprise, 104.

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terrorism exists more in the public imagination than in reality.However, if an act of terrorism is able to influence perceptions andalter behaviour, then terrorists may be able to reap strategic benefits.To this end, the function of surprise may go well beyond that of a meretactical enabler. When the object is to maximise the psychologicalimpact of a terrorist attack and generate far-reaching effects, surprisecan become the terrorists strategic weapon of choice.

The strategic logic of a tactical principle. To understand how surprisecan be used as a strategic weapon we must first consider the notion thattactics and strategy constitute one another in a nexus of means andends. Tactical principles, though principally at home on the battlefield,can nonetheless have their own strategic logic. Beyond the immediate

objectives against which they are directed, tactics can also serve astrategic imperative that may or may not be functionally connected totactical goals. A terrorist operation to destroy an airplane, for instance,employs some specific tactics to effect that goal. However, the strategicimpact of the attack is not derived from the loss of a single airplane andits passengers. The strategic effects are instead generated from thepsychological impact that the specific tactics induce on an intendedaudience.

The fear that an attack invokes does not merely derive from

the outcome, but more importantly from the nature of the attack,which is defined in large part by the specific tactics employed.Terrorists can conceivably strike anywhere, anytime, and unexpect-edly.13 Terrorism terrifies because the tactics that characterise themethod make the threat appear ubiquitous. It is the unexpectednature of the terrorist attack that perhaps resonates loudest inpeoples minds; the fear the method induces is a function of notknowing where, when, and how the terrorists will strike next. TheGreek Cypriot terrorist leader Colonel (later General) Georgios

Grivas explained how this principle was exploited during the Britishoccupation of Cyprus:

[O]ur strategy consisted in turning the whole island into a singlefield of battle in which there was no distinction between front andrear, so that the enemy should at no time and in no place feelhimself secure. The enemy never knew where and when we mightstrike. . . . This strategy achieved the dispersal, intimidation and

13Brian M. Jenkins, The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony before the Long Commission(Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1984).


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wearing down of the enemys forces and especially seriousconsequences resulting from our use of surprise.14

Cultivating the perception of a battlefield without bounds is intrinsic tothe logic of terrorism. As we will see later, it is also a central aspect ofAl-Qaedas strategy.

Terrorists have yet to demonstrate the capacity to pose an existentialthreat to a society. However, through the use of surprise tactics theterrorist can create a climate of fear by undermining perceptions ofpersonal security. If the terrorist can strike anyone, anywhere, anytime,then essentially everyone becomes a potential victim, everywhere isdangerous, and every moment is potentially ones last. The principle ofsurprise thus lies at the heart of the terrorists coercive strategy, without

which the terrorist cannot hope to influence a target audience. Indeed,if terrorist attacks were always expected, the impact would bemanageable to the point of mere inconvenience because people wouldonly need to adjust their routines around specific points in time andspace. It is therefore largely the capacity of the terrorist attack tosurprise tactically that generates strategic impact.

The moral effect of surprise attack. The mechanism by whichsurprise operates on the strategic level can be understood by examining

how surprise attack alters what Clausewitz described as the moralelement that is, the commitment of the people, the government, andthe military to resist the enemys will and persevere over him in theconflict. The merits of surprising an adversary in battle have longbeen recognised, not only for the physical effects on the battlefieldbut, equally, for the capacity of surprise attack to deliver damagingblows to enemy morale. Like surprise, terrorism is a method valuedfor its capacity to both physically destroy and psychologicallydislocate.

As a method of warfare that operates almost entirely on thecondition of the mind, terrorism is fundamentally about capitalising onthe psychological effects that result from the experience of a terroristact whether the act is experienced first-hand as a victim or second-hand as a spectator via the media. The extent to which a terrorist attacksurprises and shocks an intended audience is directly related to theviolent and dramatic nature of the act. As a leader of the JapaneseUnited Red Army explained, Violent actions . . . are shocking. We wantto shock people, everywhere. It is our way of communicating with the

14Quoted in Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia UP2006), 55.

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people.15 The desire to surprise and shock is one reason why explosiveshave long been the terrorists weapon of choice. These weapons, theproletariats artillery, cause surprise, confusion, and panic among theranks of the enemy, explained John Most, the late nineteenth centuryGerman-American anarchist.16

The terrorist uses violent and shocking acts to cause what Sir BasilLiddell-Hart described as the psychological dislocation of theenemy.17 The capacity to surprise and shock a significant portion ofsociety through discrete acts of violence is a hallmark of contemporaryterrorism largely afforded by the advent of mass media. In an age ofnear real-time global media reporting, Sun Tzus once hyperbolicmantra, kill one person and frighten ten thousand, has assumed analmost understated literal truth. An unexpected act of indiscriminate

violence can shatter presumptions of personal security for millions ofpeople, fundamentally changing the way people think and operate. Thiseffect is greatest when an attack surprises its audience by the very factof a terrorist threat where none was thought to exist. While terroristattacks often surprise by their method or timing, it is when perceivedreality is suddenly shattered by the very existence of terrorism that themoral effect is greatest. As will be discussed later, this was the type ofsurprise experienced by Americans on 11 September 2001 and thisgreatly contributed to the impact of the event.

Terrorists use fear as a coercive lever against a target population,often as a proxy for influencing that populations political leadershipand its policies. It is not so much the terrorist attack itself that producesthis fear and anxiety. Thomas Schelling reminds us that the art ofcoercion depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than ondamage already done.18 Terrorist attacks that come with no promiseor potential for future strikes would unlikely serve the terroristsstrategic goals. As Clausewitz explained:

If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we mustplace him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than thesacrifice which we demand; but the disadvantages of this positionmust naturally not be of a transitory nature, at least in

15Quoted in Ibid.16 John Most, The Case for Dynamite, in Walter Laqueur (ed.), Voices of Terror:Manifestos, Writings, and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists from

around the World and Throughout the Ages (New York: Reed Press 2004), 341.17See B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (Norwalk, CT.: The Easton Press 1992 repr. of 1954orig.).18Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966), 172.


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appearance, otherwise the enemy, instead of yielding, willhold out, in the prospect of a change for the better.19

All terrorist attacks thus contain an implicit or explicit warning of moreviolence to come, and often threaten an escalation in the tempo andseverity of attacks. The credibility of this threat is predicated on the factthat terrorists have the capacity to surprise tactically; and the fear thatthe threat induces is a function of not knowing where, when, andhow the terrorists will strike again. By creating a sense of vulnerabilityin a target society through discrete acts of violence, the terrorist hopesto capitalise on the effects of this perceived insecurity.

The effects of perceived insecurity. The moral effect of surprise does not

itself translate to strategic gains for the surpriser. On the strategic level,what matters is how this moral effect manifests itself in the behaviour of atarget audience. Expressed a different way, the coercive value of aterrorist attack depends on the attackers ability to alter a targetaudiences perceptions in such a way that it causes behavioural pre-ferences to change in a desired manner. Specifically, the terrorist attemptsto manipulate perceptions of vulnerability. He seeks to shatter anaudiences sense of security and thereby force the adversary into asituation where he must choose either to submit to the terrorists will or

live in a condition of heightened insecurity. However, individual measuresto cope with insecurity can have an attritional effect on social, economic,and political life. Such measures often manifest themselves in some degreeofavoidance behaviour a criminological concept that describes how thefear of victimisation can lead to behavioural changes, such as theavoidance of particular places or modes of transportation. The greater thedisruption to normal life, and the greater the harm resulting from thatdisruption, the more oppressive the situation the terrorists place theiradversary in and, hence, the more coercive leverage they can wring from

an act of terrorism.Measures to cope with perceived insecurity do not only take the formof avoidance behaviour, however. Being placed in an intolerable situationcan also propel people to action in the hope that they may escape thestifling effects of persistent fear and anxiety. Because most terrorists aimto change an undesirable status quo, it is often the active response of anaudience to a terrorist attack that is of greatest importance for theterrorists political goals. As terrorism is a form of coercion by proxy,terrorists generally hope that their attacks will act as catalysts thatmobilise the public to pressure the government to change course.

19Clausewitz, On War, 104.

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The consequences for government. The terrorists coercive leverageis a function of his capacity to manipulate the political agenda ofgovernment by placing the latter in a position where it is forced torespond. The terrorist attack is an act of clear provocation it notonly welcomes a response from the government, but loudly demandsone.20 Indeed, any attempt by the government to simply ignore theterrorist would surely invite even more deadly attacks. The terroristseeks to provoke a government response for two principal reasons. Thefirst is for propaganda. The terrorist wants the government toacknowledge his existence and recognise his status as an enemy of thestate. Forcing the state to acknowledge the terrorist as an adversaryessentially legitimates the terrorists claim that he is in fact a politicalactor and not a mere criminal. This recognition is particularly important

for promoting the terrorists cause and for securing the support of hissupposed constituency.

The second reason is a decidedly strategic one. The terrorist oftenhopes to push the government into taking counterproductive measuresthat will ultimately undermine its position at home, disrupt itsalliances, and weaken its standing and prestige. Acts of terrorism allbut assure a response from government because the method is designedto challenge the states protective function. The terrorist attack is oftenmeant to demonstrate to the states citizens that their government is

incapable of protecting them.21

This strategy of undermining thegovernments position was articulated well by Russian revolutionarySergei Stepniak-Kravchinski in 1883:

The terrorists cannot overthrow the government, cannot drive itfrom St Petersburg and Russia. But having compelled it, for somany years running, to neglect everything and do nothing butstruggle with them, by forcing it to do so for years and years, theywill render its position untenable.22

The terrorist employs measures designed to place immense pressure onthe government to take decisive action to restore public confidence.This pressure tends to increase as time passes without visible results. AsStepniak-Kravchinski explained, Every month, every week, of thishesitation, of this irresolution, of this enervating tension, renders the

20

Alex P. Schmid, Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism, Terrorism andPolitical Violence 16/2 (2004), 207.21Ibid., 2078.22Serge Stepniak-Kravchinski, Underground Russia, in Voices of Terror, 93.


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position of their adversary worse, and consequently strengthens theirown.23

Governments will often go to significant lengths to restore theirstanding and demonstrate that the terrorist threat is under control. Thisusually involves the imposition of enhanced security measures designedto make it more difficult for terrorists to move and operate freelyamongst the people, but it is ultimately the people who incur the costsof these measures. Thus, and with some degree of irony, the publicslargely overblown perceptions of risk create self-imposed disruption tonormal routines (such as avoidance of travel), which then placespressure on the government to respond by implementing securitymeasures that cause state-imposed disruption to public life (such asrestrictions on freedom of movement), which may then reinforce public

perceptions of insecurity. Indeed, this practice of provoking govern-ment overreaction is a time-tested strategy of terrorism.

Terrorism thus presents an almost intractable dilemma for govern-ments: efforts to enhance security are likely to cause disruption tonormal life while paradoxically fostering a sense of insecurity amongthe population. On the other hand, doing nothing, or too little toaddress public fear will likely reinforce perceptions of insecurity andhighlight the impotence of government to protect its citizens. This is amajor strategic advantage of terrorism, which is, in part, afforded by

the terrorists use of surprise on both the tactical and strategic levels.Through the strategic effects of surprise and shock, terrorists can havean impact that would otherwise be unthinkable for small, clandestinegroups of sub-state actors. There is no better illustration of this than thecase of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States.

9/11 and the Logic of Surprise

Surprise as Tactical Necessity

Today we raid them; they will not raid us. The raid must take theenemy at unawares. This is what the tradition has preserved of ourprophets teachings on war. It is a strong point that tips the scalesin war and confuses the enemy.24

Abu Sad al-Amili,Learning Lessons from the Raids on

New York and Washington (2002)

23

Ibid.24Abu Sad al-Amili, Learning Lessons from the Raids on New York and Washington,in Essays on the September 11th Raid (orig. pub. in Arabic by Majallat al-Ansar,English trans. provided by OSC 2002), 434.

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The 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington wereoperationally impressive: creatively conceived, intricately planned,and almost flawlessly executed. In less than two hours, 19 menarmed with knives managed to demolish the Twin Towers of theWorld Trade Center, severely damage the Pentagon, destroy fourcommercial airliners, and kill almost 3,000 people.25 Nevertheless,the ingenious tactic of using passenger airplanes as guided missilesreached its viability expiration date that very same morning. Indeed,a modality such as this could probably work only once. The plotsgenius lay in its novelty in its capacity to take the enemy bycomplete surprise. Once the capacity to surprise the enemy by thismode of attack was eliminated, it was no longer viable. Surprise wasthus a critical element of the attacks as a matter of operational

necessity. In fact, without presupposing the surprise of the enemy,the plot could hardly have been conceived at all. The plansoperational coherence was predicated on American unpreparednessfor this specific type of attack.

Unlike in the military context, where strategic surprise attacksalmost always require an elaborate deception scheme to conceal theattackers true intentions, the preparations for a terrorist attackrequire no such cover. Al-Qaeda did not need to conceal its intentionto target the United States. What was needed to preserve the element

of surprise was simply to deny the United States information thatwould allow it to uncover the plot, or otherwise eliminate thevulnerability that the plot was designed to exploit. To this end, Al-Qaeda compartmentalised information and operated a strict need-to-know information protocol. Even among Al-Qaedas senior leader-ship, only a select few had full knowledge of the plot. The operativeschosen to fly the planes had experience living in the West and wouldtherefore be less likely to rouse suspicion. Communications werecoded and funds were transferred to the operatives in ways and

amounts that were inconspicuous. Thus a sufficient degree ofoperational security and tradecraft was practised in order to denyUS authorities the information that would be needed to prevent theattacks. The attackers were able to board the planes on 11 Septemberwith the element of surprise on their side.

The element of surprise was not only needed to board the aircraft,however. Once on-board the airplanes, the hijackers would beconsiderably outnumbered by the passengers and crew. Despite beingarmed, the hijackers were simply too few in number to maintain

25Wirtz, Theory of Surprise, 113.


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control of the aircraft in the event of a significant passenger uprising.The hijackers thus needed to avoid such a battle at all costs. To reachtheir intended targets in New York and Washington, they would haveto rely heavily on the principles of speed and surprise in order toachieve and maintain relative superiority on-board the aircraft. Thismeant deceiving the passengers into believing that cooperation was intheir best interests, and minimising the amount of time between thepoint of takeover to target impact.

The fate of the fourth hijacked plane illuminates the importance ofsurprise for the operational success of the 9/11 attacks, and how theelements of friction and chance can cause even the most well-planned operations to break down.26 The news of the other hijackedplanes crashing into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon had begun

to reach passengers on-board United Airlines Flight 93 via mobilephones. The revelation that the hijackers were on a suicide missiondramatically changed the nature of the engagement on board theaircraft. Suddenly faced with the prospect of certain death if theyremained passive, some passengers and crew attempted to retake theaircraft. Having lost the element of surprise, the attackers no longerfaced an inactive opposition and hence relative superiority was lost.Unable to put down the passenger uprising, the hijackers were forcedto terminate their mission prematurely, crashing the plane in rural

Pennsylvania.The success of the 9/11 operation hinged on two critical factors:

American unpreparedness for the method of suicide hijacking, andAl-Qaedas ability to place trained operatives on board US airliners.Thus, to defeat US intelligence it was sufficient for Al-Qaeda toconceal at least two critical types of information from the enemy: thatpertaining to the attack modality (using commercial airliners asmissiles) and that pertaining to the identities of its covert operators.The first simply required withholding information; the second required

tradecraft to conceal terrorist signals and transactions.27

These twoconditions afforded Al-Qaeda the element of surprise, which enabledthe operation to succeed. However, it was the strategic effects of thetactical surprise that ultimately made the 9/11 attacks much more thanjust a national tragedy.

26

Ibid., 105.27See John P. Sullivan, Terrorism Early Warning and Co-Production of Counter-Terrorism Intelligence, paper presented at the Canadian Association for Security andIntelligence Studies 20th Anniversary Conference, Montreal, 21 Oct. 2005.

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Surprise as Strategic Choice

The blow came as a surprise to everyone. This is the essence of theProphets wisdom and the soundest application of his advice: Waris deception.28

Abu Sad al-Amili,Learning Lessons from the Raids on


A great destructive act, wrote Carl von Clausewitz, inevitably exertson all other actions, and it is exactly at such times that the moralfactor is, so to speak, the most fluid element of all, and thereforespreads most easily to affect everything else.29 The destructiveness of

the 9/11 attacks was severe, but nevertheless local. However, theemotional shock of the attacks swept across the country that Tuesdaymorning like a tidal wave. The 9/11 event was as much an attack onperceptions as it was against buildings. The strikes were designed soas to maximise their moral effect and cause perceptions of reality tocollapse under enormous psychological strain. Surprise was anintegral element of the 9/11 operation not merely by tactical necessity,but strategic choice. Exploring the role of surprise to captureattention, alter perceptions, and provoke a response will elaborate

this argument further.

Surprise to capture attention. Al-Qaedas strategy is predicated on thecapacity to reach its intended audiences, and this capacity itself depends onAl-Qaedas ability to act. At any point in time there are countlessindividuals and groups around the world wishing to publicise their cause.Until they act, however, it is almost as if they do not exist; they need anaction that demonstrates the importance of their cause and theirunwavering commitment to it. With few exceptions, the American media

largely ignored Osama bin Laden before 11 September 2001. Even after binLadens organisation was implicated in several high profile attacks on USinterests on several continents, hardly any Americans would have beenaware of his existence, let alone hearing his message before 9/11. It makeslittle sense to issue a threat that is not heard by the party one wishes tocompel.Similarly, a worldwide call to jihad will almost certainly fall on deafears unless it is accompanied by a profound event of similarly globalproportions.

For Al-Qaeda, securing an attentive global audience meansexecuting spectacular acts of violence that have far-reaching impact.

28al-Amili, Learning Lessons from the Raids on New York and Washington, 423.29Clausewitz, On War, 97.


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Al-Qaedas attacks are meant to both terrify and impress. This is whyAl-Qaeda adopted what has become its trademark practice oflaunching sophisticated suicide operations, often involving multiplebombers, designed to inflict maximum casualties. As bin Ladenexplained to journalist Abdel Bari Atwan in a November 1996interview, The nature of the battle calls for operations of a specifictype that will make an impact on the enemy, and this of course calls forexcellent preparation.30 Similarly, in his 2001 book, Knights under theProphets Banner, Ayman al-Zawahiri explains: The targets as well asthe type and method of weapons used must be chosen to have animpact on the structure of the enemy and deter it enough to stop itsbrutality.31 In other words, the manner in which the enemy is attackedis important in itself.

The 9/11 operation was designed not only to inflict mass casualties,but to create a spectacle of violence so dramatic and unprecedented thatthe entire world would be compelled to watch, polarising audiences bytheir reaction: horror or jubilation. In other words, the United Stateswas attacked in a manner that was intentionally designed to surpriseand shock so that Al-Qaeda could communicate its message. As onejihadist writer notes:

The power and significance of the raid on the US enemy lay not

only in the loss of life and property, but also in the politicalmessage that the raid sent to the freedom-loving downtroddenwho yearn for freedom, dignity, and pride. . . . It was unexpectedand unimaginable. It struck a sudden blow at the [United States]from an unexpected direction.32

As previously noted, the media acts as a relay between theterrorist attack and the public, ensuring that the tactical surprise isexperienced collectively in a target society. Al-Qaeda designed an

attack that, even if it had failed to destroy its targets, was all butguaranteed to attract unprecedented media attention. Bin Ladencould hardly have asked for better coverage of the attacks.Millions watched the second plane crash into the World TradeCenter in real-time an unforgettable scene that would be replayed

30Abdel Bari Atwan, My Weekend with Osama Bin Laden, The Guardian, 12 Nov. 2001.31Quoted in Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, Understanding Al Qaeda: The

Transformation of War (London: Pluto 2007), 55.32Abu Ayman al-Hilali, The Real Story of the Raids on New York and Washington, inEssays on the September 11th Raid (orig. pub. in Arabic by Majallat al-Ansar, Englishtrans. provided by OSC 2002), 37.

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over and over again by the media. If the real-time news coverage ofthe attack was not Al-Qaedas intention then they undoubtedlylearned something from the 9/11 experience. The cameras of CNN[Cable News Network] and other Western media dinosaurs under-took the task of filming the raid and sowing fear in its aftermath,wrote Abu Ubayd al-Qirshi. It didnt cost al-Qaida a cent.33

Thus the first challenge for any terrorist group is to capture and holdthe attention of an audience by creating media-worthy events. Themore dramatic and extraordinary the action, the more attention it islikely to attract from the media and, by extension, the public and thegovernment. This is to say that surprise is a device that can expandthe media reach of a terrorist group by exploiting the naturalhuman attraction to the dramatic and the unorthodox. Al-Qaeda

demonstrated their mastery of this principle on 9/11 by striking in away that was almost completely unexpected and unimaginable.However, attracting attention was not an objective in itself but rathera means. The purpose of attracting attention is, first, to alterperceptions.

Surprise to alter perceptions.

Al-Qaida took the enemy by surprise with the raids on New York

and Washington. Roles were reversed, and the enemy was throwninto confusion by the event. He was left looking for explanations,a prisoner of his reactions. The mujahidin were in motion, movingthe battle along, a powerful factor in their favor. This is the secretof the United States fear of al-Qaida. Al-Qaida has hit on thecorrect method for fighting and defeating the United States, Godwilling.34

Abu Ayman al-Hilali,The Real Story of the Raids on


Within the above passage from a 2002 jihadist essay one can identifythree different ways in which surprise was utilised on 9/11. The authorhighlights the obvious tactical advantage afforded by the element ofsurprise: with the enemy paralysed by the shock of surprise, theattackers faced little active opposition, allowing them to remain inmotion, moving the battle along. The two other ways are less obvious,

33

Abu Ubayd al-Qirshi, The 11 September Raid: The Impossible Becomes Possible, inEssays on the September 11th Raid (orig. pub. in Arabic by Majallat al-Ansar, Englishtrans. provided by OSC 2002), 22.34al-Hilali, The Real Story of the Raids on New York and Washington, 31.


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but equally important. One is the link the author draws betweensurprise and fear. Al-Qaeda induces fear in its enemies preciselybecause its attacks are unexpected and shocking. The third way isrelated to the second, but the target audience here is not the enemy. Bydefeating US intelligence and surprising its government, Al-Qaeda wasexposing Americas vulnerability. By means of dramatic demonstration,it was sending a message to Muslims everywhere that the US could besuccessfully challenged on its own soil. The following paragraphselaborate on these two important ways that surprise was used to alterperceptions.

Al-Qaedas coercive credibility depends on fostering a perception inthe enemy that the threat it presents is a ubiquitous one. Al-Qaedacultivates this perception by striking in unexpected ways and from

unexpected directions. Following its 2004 attack on a residentialcompound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaeda released a longstatement reiterating its strategy. As we explained earlier, thestatement reads, this war is based on a strategy to widen thebattlefield. The entire world has become a battlefield in practice andnot in theory.35 The first point is true but the latter is clearlyhyperbole the Al-Qaeda network certainly does not have unlimitedreach. However, what matters for Al-Qaedas strategy is that thisnotion the theoretical possibility for terrorists to attack anywhere and

at any time is accepted within the enemys society as a reality. Thisillusory belief is predicated, in large part, on the basis that Al-Qaedasattacks are invariably surprise attacks.

The 9/11 attacks were designed to foster this perception in theAmerican public in order to undermine perceptions of security andinfluence behaviour. The attacks literally came from out of the blue andwithout warning. The implicit message that was conveyed by themanner in which Al-Qaeda struck was that nowhere was safe; Al-Qaeda demonstrated that they could reach Americans whether in the

air, on the ground, in their grandest buildings, and even in theirfortresses. This message was convincing because Al-Qaeda had theelement of surprise on its side. As one writer put it, The skillfulexecution of the raid sent a message to the enemy that the mujahidinare capable of responding in kind and striking the enemy where he livesand in ways he cannot imagine.36 The same theme of striking

35The Operation of 11 Rabi Al-Awwal: The East Riyadh Operation and Our War withthe United States and Its Agents (orig. published in Arabic by the Center for Islamic

Studies and Research, English trans. provided by OSC 2003), 1516.36Sayf al-Din al-Ansari, The Raid on New York and Washington: A GenericDescription, in Essays on the September 11th Raid(orig. pub. in Arabic by Majallat al-Ansar, English trans. provided by OSC 2002), 15. [Emphasis added].

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unexpectedly in ways the enemy cannot imagine was highlighted by binLaden in an April 2006 audio message: We have also destroyed edifices[towers] in the United States. So, can you deny such a clear thing? Wehave invaded you by the wings of death, and this has never occurred toyou.37

People implicitly understand that if terrorists can strike unexpectedlyand are willing to die in the process there is little preventing them. Al-Qaeda demonstrated on 9/11 that its motivation to kill Americans wasabsolute and its capacity to do so in large numbers was proven. Fromthe perception of Americans, future surprises were inevitable. Indeed, aColumbia Broadcasting System (CBS) News poll taken one month afterthe attacks revealed that 88 per cent of respondents thought it likelythat the United States would be attacked again by terrorists within a

few months.38 The fact that such attacks did not materialise in themonths after 9/11 would have done little to assuage American concernsabout terrorism; the surprise on 11 September was such that Americansrealised they could no longer presume to be safe from attack, nor couldthey presume to know what Al-Qaeda was capable of pulling offnext.39 At least some jihadists appear to have understood this. Theattacks put fear in the hearts of Americans everywhere, observes AbuUbayd al-Qirshi. Warnings of impending jihad attacks have taken amurderous toll on the nerves of the US masses, who do not understand

why their vast military apparatus has failed to stop these attacks.40

Al-Qirshis point about the United States inability to prevent theattacks reflects another important way that surprise is used to alterperceptions. Al-Qaedas strategy of widening the battlefield involvesinciting Muslims to unite and attack the Americans wherever they areuntil their forces are driven out of all the lands of Islam, defeated andunable to threaten any Muslim.41 However, from Al-Qaedasperspective, a significant obstacle was the defeatism that had overcomethe Ummah the global community of Muslims after decades of

humiliation, oppression, and occupation. Al-Qaeda wanted todemonstrate that the United States was a paper tiger, that itsunrivalled military power and intelligence capabilities were but

37Full Version of Bin Ladins 23 April [2006] Audio Message, English transcriptprovided by OSC (27 Apr. 2006). [Emphasis added].38Cited in Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the TerroristThreat (London: John Murray 2006), 179.39I am grateful to Robert Jervis for providing this observation in comments on an

earlier draft of this article.40al-Qirshi, The 11 September Raid: The Impossible Becomes Possible, 20.41Osama Bin Laden, Jihad against Jews and Crusaders: World Islamic Front Statement[1998 Fatwa] (23 Feb. 1998).


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elaborate deceptions. Thus, the very fact that the Americans were takenby surprise was itself an important message meant to awaken andinspire Muslims to answer the call of jihad.

Sayf al-Din al-Ansari captures the essence of this message and puts itin plain language for his readers: A small group destroyed symbolsmeant to last for eternity, and they did so with an operation thatsurprised everyone. They made the terror that the United States inspiresa thing of the past. . . . After September 11 everything is possible.42

Other jihadist writers have drawn similar conclusions. Abu Ayman al-Hilali writes, It was a blow to the credibility and competence of thefamed security and intelligence agencies and their legendary status inthe US and global imagination. They were revealed as weak andineffective against the mujahidin.43 Abu Ubayd al-Qirshi notes that the

9/11 operation represented a clear failure on the part of the USintelligence agencies that used to strike fear into the hearts of so manypeople. The [US intelligence] agencies with their enormous budgetscould not stop 19 mujahidin armed with knives who used the enemysown weapons against his economic and military installations.44

In sum, the principle of surprise played an important role in alteringperceptions in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Al-Qaedas exceptionaluse of the element of surprise is one of the keys to its coercive credibilityin the eyes of the enemy. Undermining public confidence in the capacity

of the intelligence services to prevent such attacks leaves them feelingthat future surprise attacks are inevitable. The flip side to this is that thesurprise of the enemy can be used to boost the morale and confidence ofthe sympathetic audience. Surprises will continue to gladden the heartsof the believers and sadden the enemies of God, with sudden strikes andcovert planning and execution, writes al-Amili.45 By revealing that USintelligence is neither all-seeing nor all-knowing, Al-Qaeda was at oncedemonstrating the possibility of resistance and providing a powerfulmodel for its praxis.

Surprise to provoke a response.

Our ultimate objective of these painful strikes against the head ofthe serpent was to prompt it to come out of its hole. This wouldmake it easier for us to deal consecutive blows to undermine it andtear it apart. It would foster out credibility in front of our nation

42

al-Ansari, The Raid on New York and Washington, 9.43al-Hilali, The Real Story of the Raids on New York and Washington, 31.44al-Qirshi, The 11 September Raid: The Impossible Becomes Possible, 21.45al-Amili, Learning Lessons from the Raids on New York and Washington, 44.

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and the beleaguered people of the world. A person will reactrandomly when he receives painful strikes on his head from anundisclosed enemy. Such strikes will force the person to carry outrandom acts and provoke him to make serious and sometimesfatal mistakes. This was what actually happened.46

Sayf al-Adl, Al-Qaeda military commander (2005)

When attacked unexpectedly, human beings instinctively react in one oftwo ways: we either fight or flee. However, the nature of the 9/11attacks was such that neither option was immediately available toAmericans. There was nowhere to run because the attacks took place athome; there was no one to fight because the hijackers died with theirvictims. The absence of any claim of responsibility made the attacks

that much more provocative. War had been initiated against the UnitedStates but from an undisclosed enemy; Americans did not understandwho was waging war against them, let alone why. Americans were leftwith an overwhelming sense that something profound had to be done,but unsure as to what that something should be. President George W.Bush probably summed up the national mood that day when heremarked to Vice President Dick Cheney as the crisis was stillunfolding, Were at war . . . somebodys going to pay.47

The incredibly surprising nature of the strikes put the US

government on the political defensive. The credibility of the Bushadministration, the intelligence services, and the military were allsuddenly on the line. The fact that the attacks came as a completesurprise to Americans threatened to undermine public confidence inthe capacity of the government to protect them. The government wasthus placed under enormous pressure to take decisive action to restorepublic perceptions of security. The attacks on New York andWashington were so provocative that to not respond with force wasvirtually unthinkable, not to mention politically untenable. Moreover,

the attacks suddenly forced the government to think differently aboutnational security threats catastrophic threat scenarios once thoughttoo remote to warrant real attention took on new meaning after theunprecedented surprise of 9/11. By striking hard and unexpectedlyagainst Americans at home, Al-Qaeda all but assured the response itwas hoping for: the initiation of a US military adventure in theMuslim world.

46

Quoted in Peter L. Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of Al-Qaedas Leader (New York: Free Press 2006), 309.47The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on TerroristAttacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton 2004), 39.


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9/11 and the Concept of Strategic Surprise

It is an excellent strategic surprise. The American intelligenceservices were caught by a surprise that they had not considered.. . . It is a surprise that has results. This surprise led to a shock inthe American consciousness [and] led to a radical change in theperception of American Security.48

Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah,The Myth of Delusion: Exposing the American Intelligence, nd

It is debatable whether 9/11 came as a strategic surprise to the USgovernment. As with most cases of strategic surprise attack, therewas some degree of strategic warning communicated to decision-

makers prior to 11 September. The September 11 attack was not ascales-falling-from-the-eyes revelatory event, argues former USgovernment official Paul Pillar. The essential facts about al-Qaeda,what it was doing in Afghanistan, its relationship with the Taliban,and most of all its deadly intent to inflict more harm on the UnitedStates were all well known and the subject of repeated and accurateanalytical production by the intelligence community.49 There isempirical support for this view.50 Indeed, Director of CentralIntelligence George Tenet testified publicly in February and March

2001 that bin Laden and his network constituted the mostimmediate and serious threat to the United States.51 This was anunusually clear statement of strategic warning by the most seniorofficial in the US Intelligence Community.

However, while Tenet and other officials in the US government mayhave been convinced that a major terrorist attack was imminent, theAmerican public could hardly have imagined what was in store forthem on 11 September 2001. Before the attacks, the vast majority of

48Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah, The Myth of Delusion: Exposing the AmericanIntelligence (orig. published in Arabic by al-Maqreze Center, English translationprovided by OSC nd ), 4.49Paul R. Pillar, Metaphors and Mantras: A Comment on Shultz and VogtsDiscussion of Terrorism, Intelligence, and War, Terrorism and Political Violence 15/2 (2003), 149.50See, for instance, Paul R. Pillar, Good Literature and Bad History: The 9/11Commissions Tale of Strategic Intelligence, Intelligence and National Security 21/6

(Dec. 2006), 102244.51Statement by the Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet for the SenateArmed Services Committee 7 March 2001, 5www.senate.gov/*armed_services/statemnt/2001/010308gt.pdf/4.

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Americans did not know they were at war, let alone who they were atwar with. The American public was undoubtedly taken bycomplete surprise on 9/11. If we were to rely on the traditionalunderstanding of strategic surprise, which is based on the conditionsof intelligence warning and political response, then the surpriseexperienced by the American public on 11 September would be oflittle, if any importance to the analysis. However, adopting such anarrow understanding of strategic surprise attack in this context wouldrisk overlooking the main reason why terrorism is most often directedagainst civilians, and would certainly miss the point of the 9/11operation.

There is nothing to suggest that there was any conscious effort on thepart of Al-Qaeda to impose the condition of strategic surprise on the

US government or its intelligence services on 9/11. There would havebeen little advantage in doing so; in fact, the whole point of Al-Qaedascoercive strategy is to make the enemy clearly understand the threat it isfacing. Al-Qaeda did not need to lure the United States into a falsesense of security in order create a vulnerability to exploit. There was, inother words, no need for strategic deception of the Americangovernment or its people. Indeed, the successful suicide attack on thedestroyer USS Cole at Aden in October 2000 was executed whilepreparations for 9/11 were well underway bin Laden was clearly not

attempting to hide his hostile intentions. American unpreparednesswas, in fact, self-imposed. The false sense of security that was pervasivein America prior to 9/11 was simply exploited by Al-Qaeda to greateffect.

Thus, questions about precisely which government bodies orofficials were taken by surprise on 11 September arenow largely academic. Regardless of what the government orthe Intelligence Community knew or understood about the nature ofthe Al-Qaeda threat before 11 September 2001, the attacks were,

as far as the American public was concerned, a monumentalstrategic surprise. From Al-Qaedas perspective, this is the onlykind of strategic surprise that mattered. It is important to understandthis surprise as strategic because it was used by Al-Qaeda as a weaponthat was directed against the United States centre of gravity: publicopinion.

Conclusion

A [grave] danger of the future, Robert Kupperman warned in 1982, isthe probability that unconventional incidents will have a much greaterimpact than they perhaps warrant and will be allowed to resonate untilthey eventually fractionate some of our important stabilizing social and


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political structures.52 The events of 11 September 2001 convincinglydemonstrated that this danger had become a reality. Terrorists haveshown it possible for the shock generated by the unexpected actions of19 individuals to rival that produced by an attacking army, air force orfleet a demonstration that did not go unnoticed by terrorists the worldover, not least on bin Laden himself. As bin Laden stated in aSeptember 2007 video address to the American public:

America has the largest economic power and the strongest andmost modern arsenal. It spends on this war and its army morethan the entire world does on it armies. It is the superpower thatinfluences the world policies, as though the unjust veto were itsexclusive right. Despite all of this, 19 young men managed with

Gods help to cause it to deviate from its course. Talk about themujahidin has become an integral part of your leaders speeches.The effects and signs of this are obvious.53

Al-Qaedas effective use of surprise on both the tactical and strategiclevels is of central importance for understanding how the organisationwas able to carry out the operation and how the attacks were able togenerate the effects and signs to which bin Laden proudly refers.

This article has presented a framework for understanding the

relationship between surprise and terrorism. As a method of irregularwarfare, terrorism is wholly dependent on the mechanism of surprise inorder to overcome the states overwhelming military advantage. AsColin Gray observes, surprise is an ironbound necessity for the tacticalsuccess of terrorism.54 However, surprise is also an important principleon the strategic level. As a form of psychological warfare, terrorismdepends on the fear the method induces in a broader audience. This fearis a function of the inherently unexpected nature of the terrorist threat,which injects an element of reasonable doubt in peoples held

assumptions of personal security. If surprise itself is one of theterrorists principal weapons, then no one can be certain how, where,or when the next attack will come the only certainty is that it willeventually come. Consequently, the public tends to fear future attacksthat may be well beyond the terrorists capabilities. This has the effect

52Robert H. Kupperman, Debra van Opstal, and David Williamson Jr, Terror, theStrategic Tool: Response and Control, Annals of the American Academy of Political

and Social Science 463/1 (1982), 35.53Message from Usama bin Ladin to the American People, original video productionby Al-Sahab (English transcript provided by OSC 11 Sept. 2007).54Gray, Transformation and Strategic Surprise, v.

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of promoting what is essentially a tactical problem to the level of astrategic threat. Therein lies the key to Al-Qaedas coercive strategy.

The 9/11 case reveals an important dimension of surprise that may beunique to terrorism. Just as terrorists often communicate differentmessages to different audiences, the surprise of a terrorist attack can bedirected simultaneously at different audiences and for different effects both negative (punitive) and positive (inspirational). In addition to itsrole as a weapon to undermine public perceptions of security andconfidence in government, surprise may also be employed to awakenthe sympathetic audience in order to embolden it, demonstrate theenemys vulnerability, and provide a model for defeating him. In somecases, the positive application of surprise may in fact be the moreimportant of the two, particularly when the attackers strategy depends

as al-Qaedas does on inspiring others to follow its example and actindependently against the enemy.

Two points need to be stressed. The first is that the strategic use ofsurprise in terrorism is notably different from strategic militarysurprise. In the military context, strategic surprise is equated with afailure of intelligence or a failure of political response to intelligencewarning. It is a condition imposed often through the use of strategicdeception on the political and military leadership of a country inorder to enable the concentration of the attackers forces at the decisive

point. In other words, military attackers use strategic surprise in orderto enable tactical surprise and win the decisive battle. Terroristsobviously do not use surprise in this manner. In terrorism, the logic is infact reversed: terrorists use the tactical surprise of the attack to enablethe effects of surprise and shock at the societal level in order to realisestrategic goals.

The second point is that this model does not necessarily reflect thestrategy of all terrorist groups. As we have argued, surprise in terrorismis a tactical mechanism by necessity, and a strategic weapon by choice.

While all terrorists must employ surprise on the tactical level or face thecertain prospect of being thwarted by the authorities (or, for thatmatter, the intended victims themselves), the strategic use of surpriseremains an option for the terrorist. However, those groups thatconsciously harness the fear-multiplying effects of surprise and shockarguably pose the greatest threat to democratic societies. RobertKupperman and colleagues were prescient when they predicted aquarter century ago, While amateurs may continue to rely on time-tested tactics, such as sky-jacking or embassy seizures, imaginativeprofessional terrorists will alter their methods to ensure surprise, panic,and genuine disruption.55 In this technological age, the gap between

55Kupperman, van Opstal, and Williamson Jr, Terror, the Strategic Tool, 28.


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amateur and professional terrorists is closing, and with each successiveterrorist spectacular the bar is being raised. As such, the terroristsreliance on surprise as a strategic weapon may become increasinglyprevalent.

Acknowledgments

This article has benefited from the advice of various individuals,especially Joshua A. Geltzer, Michael S. Goodman, Gregory OHayon,and John P. Sullivan. The author also wishes to thank Professor Robert Jervis for providing invaluable comments on an earlier draft of thisarticle.

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Documents

Surprise and Terrorism a Conceptual Framework