Technology transfer by industry for the construction of nuclear power plants

Annals of Nuclear Energy, Vol. 4 pp. 235-248. Pergamon Press, 1977. Printed in Great Britain.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BY INDUSTRY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

H. FREWER and W. ALTVATER Kraftwerk Union AG, 8520 Erlangen, W. Germany

Abstract - The construction of nuclear power plants calls for a wide sphere of industrial

activities, nuclear as well as conventional. For a specific country the ways and methods of

developing an industrial nuclear power program and reaching the target of independence,

will widely differ, depending on the size of the country, the economic situation, the already

existing industrial manufacturing and engineering capacities, the time schedule of the pro-

gram and the type of contracting.

This paper deals with the experience in effective technology transfer for the strengthening

and seting up of the national industry, and the engineering capacities, needed for the construction of nuclear power plants, up to the largest size existing today. The German nuclear

power industry gained this experience in connection with the turn-key supply of the first units in various countries. The prerequisites and national nuclear power programs were different. Based on a successful technological development, including standardization, the German nuclear power industry could meet the demand and different approaches in these

countries.

The main features and practices followed for the transfer of technology will be described for three different cases, namely Argentina, Brazil and Iran.

1. INTRODUCTION

The peaceful ut i l izat ion of Nuclear Energy is an inalienable right of all nat ions. This includes all techno-

logical steps which would be necessary for a reliable and economical supply of energy, as long as effect-

ive safeguards are accepted. The hegemony of the industr ial na t ions is dissolved in the developing new

world economic order through the ut i l izat ion of new technologies.

A worksharing cooperat ion arises; its first step is technology transfer with due regard to agreed-on safe-

guards.

The cons t ruc t ion of nuclear power plants requires a wide spect rum of engineering activities, which are no t automat ical ly available even in highly industrial ized countries. To achieve an increasingly independ-

en t nuclear power plant cons t ruc t ion program in a count ry , it is necessary to possess an au tonomous capacity for t raining and investigation in research centers. The building-up of a strong engineering capacity for the p lanning and cons t ruc t ion of such large projects is also required. This is primari ly an industr ial problem which faces reactor manufac tur ing firms, the com ponen t supply industry, architect- engineer firms, and nuclear power plant cons t ruct ion companies. Fur thermore , the future operat ing personnel have to be thoroughly t rained on time.

235

236 Technology transfer by industry for the construction of nuclear power plants

2. GENERAL METHODS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Several ways have proved in practice to promote knowledge transfer in these fields. They are different in their methods and prerequisites, as well as in their efficiency and time scale.

i t can generally be said, however, that the mult i tude of authorities, institutes and firms involved make a governmental coordination of the total transfer desirable. The governmental 'umbrella ' is also necessary for reasons associated with non-proliferation policy, and serves, in the long run, as cover for the ex-

tensive sums to be financed.

The total know-how to be transferred can be divided into three levels as shown in Fig. 1.

BB

LEVEL I Government of GFR BMFT, BMI ....

CitYoooPlanning l I Energy ] I Government, x~ Oceano°grap~y Ministries

LEVEL II [ Licensing i Authorities

Research Centers, Institutes

I Authorized I Exploration Inspectors

o 0 o

[ Nuclear Energy J o o o LAppropriate _J ,~ New Forms of Energy E Nati°nal -]

["Partners -]

LEVEL III

Fuel Processing o o o

I "u°'''' [ Power Plants o o o

Fuel Repr0cessing Fig. 1. Transfer of

KWU ] Subsuppliers J Utilities I

Engineering Companies ] National Industry J National Utilities ,]

nuclear technology: cooperation concept.

The highest -- Level I consists of a comprehensive governmental agreement of scientific research and continued development of technologies. In it, the governments agree on cooperation in the fields mentioned, and settle basic information procedures.

In the middle - Level H, a branch of Level I, e.g. energy technology, is singled out and described more closely. The cooperation of the federal and state authorities, authorized inspection agencies, institutes etc. of Germany on the one hand, with those of the recipient country on the other, is also defined here. This concerns general guidelines, codes, licensing procedures etc.

H. Frewer and W. Altvater 237

A further objective of the nuclear energy sector is pursued on L e v e l I I I - the industrial. This agreement, to be dealt with later on, is specifically aimed at the construction of nuclear power plants. It consists of three stages:

1. The construction of nuclear power plants

(including): design, delivery, construction, commissioning; financing; turnkey job with increasing participation of the local industry; training of personnel; service for maintenance, operation etc.

Comprised herein is the training of personnel during design, construction and commissioning of the nuclear power plants. This applies to the operators as well as to the engineering firms.

2. The industrial agreement

incorporating: cooperation or licensing agreements; specifications; quality assurance system etc.

A transfer of experience of the national supply industries is accomplished through licenses, joint ventures and on-the-job training.

3. The utility agreement

consisting of: utility planning; operating experience, maintenance, service.

This is the cooperation of utilities with the national utilities in the operation, utilization planning, maintenance etc. of the nuclear power plants.

In order to achieve the aim of increasing independence in the shortest time possible, the contracting partner should meet the following essential prerequisites:

The practical experience necessary in the construction of nuclear power plants has to be demonstrated in a sufficient number of plants already in operation or construction (experience curve).

The technology offered for the whole nuclear power plant must have attained a sufficient degree of maturity.

The company should possess a comprehensive nuclear power plant know-how and access to the component technology.

Figure 2 shows KWU's consolidation process over a period of 10 yr.

The experience curve extends from the prototype phase - a stage dependent upon licensing, over the period of construction of demonstration nuclear power plants based on the company's technology, and the stage of consolidation of this technology, to the building of standardized plants incorporating a high level of safety. The accomplishment of standardization gains in importance as a guarantee of a con- solidated technology, easing the transfer of engineering know-how.

Without attempting to evaluate the different types of engineering necessary for the construction of nuclear power plants, Fig. 3 depicts -- without any claim to completeness - the separate steps and the time to be expended, as well as the necessary percentage of personnel required during the four main


MW(terminal output)

20000

Consolidation S~

~erience- Curve

10000 Prototype

C.,=ldelmm MZFA

I Atucha 340MW ssen 670MW 662 MW

Commercial Operation

~' Letter of Intent or Order

1962 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 year

Fig. 2. KWU: Knowhow.

l Site analysis, I Concept of location plan

Disposition ~tq civi works

J Basic design I mechan.+ electr. I engineering

Site installation, I [ ~ - Start of Final location ] civil works Commissioning plan. Fixing of ~ of sylten~, design p a r a m e t e r s ~ l 1st criticality

Fixing of [ structure dis- I Trial operation position plans

System t basic design

Ordering of main components

Man hours required (approx.)

Execution plannin! electric. engineering

Manufacturing. Erection

Ouality control supervision

Training plant staff

Dismantling I site installation. outdoor works

i Completion of plant documentation

Post commissioning service

Fig. 3. Main steps for designing and construction of NPP.

phases: (1) Basic project design; (2) Detailed planning; (3) Execution; (4)Commissioning, trial oper. ation.

Within the framework of the steps depicted in Fig. 3, it is possible, dependent on the given basic prerequisites, to carry out a know-how transfer by an extensive cooperation between customer and supplier. In the most favourable case, the industry of the customer's country can be called in in a suitable manner.

In the performance of exports within the scope of nuclear power plant construction, financing facilities often play an important part. Generally, one can say that in all industrial countries there are government organizations which financially cover the risk involved in export transactions. Such an export credit insurance is a major prerequisite for long-term financing of the supplies and services to be exported. Periods of 5, and in special cases up to 10 yr - to be counted from the date of plant commissioning - are possible.

With a view to the orders of magnitude involved, the amount left after the deduction of the usual downpayments and interim payments of at least 15%, is financed by a consortium of banks as well as by a special public institution available in most countries (in Germany: the Kreditanstalt f/Jr Wiederauf- bau (Reconstruction Loan Corporation)).

In Germany, the 'Hermes Kreditversicherung AG', acting on behalf of the Federal government, is available to take over the risks resulting from such financing. An inter-ministerial committee, in which the involved ministries are represented, decides upon the applications of the German exporters. In ex- ceptional cases, the decision is taken by the cabinet.

The timing and evaluation of all risks play an important role in the construction of nuclear power plants. As far as the utility is concerned, they are primarily influenced by the contract arrangements between the parties involved in the actual construction of the nuclear power plant.

A Utility I B

o .r / I Utility

/

Supplier

Turn-Key C!lltractor Order

Fig. 4. Variations of contracts.

Coordinati~on i ,

I Plant Engineering Staff


Figure 4 shows the possibilities for contractual arrangements with variations A, B and C.

Variation A illustrates the turnkey contract, where the turnkey contractor takes the full responsibility


for planning, ordering and contract administration, as well as all the corresponding risks: total price; delivery and erection time; output and efficiency; data and properties; omissions, faults and failures; quality and reliability; transport and erection damage; warranties; liability; training.

Variation B demonstrates an award of orders for components with its related partial orders with the consultants who have the task of coordinating the interface criteria.

Variation C shows the placing of component orders without the interposition of consultants.

The risks which fall, under Variation A, upon the turnkey contractor, are, under Variants B and C, to a large extent borne by the utility.

Period (Months) 100-

90-

90-

70-

60-

50-

40-

30

! I ! • ~ power pkants O USmmp=~ 0n US~

• other LWli's Sources: NUS, NUI~G-G~ e o ~ I ~ a r S ~ ind.

I

1968 I 1969 1970

4 r ~ c s4

~ ~,_.~ oth. L ~ ,

i ~ . ,U [

I a4

1971 ! 1972 I 1973 1974 I 1975 1976 I 1977 I Year of Commissioning

Fig. 5. Comparison of construction periods of LWR power plants in respect of KWU--PWR-turnkey plants.

As shown by Fig. 5, it has been demonstrated that the pressurized water reactor nuclear power plants built by KWU on a turnkey basis require relatively short construction periods from groundbreaking to handover. Presently, the plants built by KWU on a turnkey basis require construction periods of approximately 60 months.

A strong management and a short and effective flow of information within the company's extensive engineering organization, to the company's factories or those of the subcontractors, are advantageous to the turnkey operator in that with respect to the scopes of systems and supplies no 'grey zones' occur. This avoids time delays and coordination difficulties, as well as the consequent price increases. This enables the turnkey contractor to accept the risks inherent in such a contract arrangement.

The experience gained through the know-how transfer will now be illustrated by a few examples of ordered turnkey nuclear power plants (Atucha - Argentina; Angra dos Reis 2 + 3 -- Brazil; Iran 1 and Iran 2).


In accordance with the conditions which vary in each case, different methods were applied.

3. SPECIALIZED CASES OF THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

Atucha, Argentina

This project, the first nuclear power plant in South America of 340 MW, was initiated by the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) in 1967, in an early phase of nuclear power development, as seen from the present. Ordered on a turnkey basis, this plant, with a heavy water pressure vessel reactor and onqoad refuelling, was constructed by one main contractor with a local industry participation of approximately 40%, including the civil part. This achievement was only possible by intensive industrial cooperation.

Argentinian industry had to show willingness in extending its program to manufacture conventional items of unprecedented dimensions (as weU as its program covering nuclear components) whilst at the same time increasing the level of technology and also applying new not yet experienced quality assurance requirements.

In the course of the contract negotiations a so-called 'Lista Positiva' of 71 electromechanical items was prepared, which were planned to be manufactured in Argentina. These items were selected taking into consideration the following three aspects:

introduction of new manufacturing processes; development of a specialized nuclear industry, and knowledge of new materials.

The Argentinian industry accepted this challenge in such a way that orders for 20 elements and components, in addition to the 71 items of the 'Lista Positiva' could be placed with the national industry.

Supporting measures of the Argentinian authorities facilitated the implementation of this program. The CNEA succeeded in having the government release tax laws and issue import duty decrees which en- couraged those companies willing to manufacture parts for the Central Nuclear Atucha.

At this point, brief reference should be made to the field of quality assurance. In cooperation with the Argentianian Atomic Energy Commission it was possible to build up a component-related quality assurance system, thereby avoiding a general increase in the cost and price level of the industry concerned.

The main items manufactured in Argentina were:

all cranes in the power plant, such as the turbine house crane, the reactor building polar crane;

large heat exchangers, including the feedwater tank, all austenitic tanks and vessels;

the turbine condenser, including the condenser tubes;

the erection of the containment structure of 50 m diameter;

the startup transformer, the ventilation systems, almost all of the electrical power and control cables, and

A N E 4. 6 / 8 - - C


a variety of valves, pumps and the major part of the ferritic pipes.

Following the industrial know-how transfer, we would like to mention two other areas of know-how transfer, namely the training of engineers and management staff of a nuclear power plant, and training of the operating personnel for Atucha. The bid already contained a program for personnel training which was extended following the award of the order, and then elaborated in detail so as to obtain workable guidelines. The programs were set up individually, depending on the knowledge and experience of the trainees. Here we may remember that in its various research centers the Argentinian Commission had already been performing extensive activities in nuclear research. At Ezeiza, the Commission had built, without foreign assistance, its own 5 MW research reactor.

On the occasion of the Atucha contract, the Argentinian engineers and physicists were trained for years in the engineering departments of the main contractor dealing with nuclear as well as conventional systems. The operating personnel were trained partly at Siemens, and to a large extent in German power plants.

On commencement of construction, and in particular of the electromechanical, conventional, and nuclear erection work, a great number of trainees could be delegated to the job site to assist the German erection engineers and personnel, and to gain an in-depth knowledge of the systems and components of the plant by immediate access to all systems during their installation and commissioning.

After commissioning of the plant, the Argentinian personnel was able to take over the plant within the relatively short period of 6 months. Subsequently, the German personnel was gradually withdrawn from the site. For more than 12 months, only one German engineer has been assisting the power plant super- intendent, who, together with his team, succeeded in attaining the excellent availability record of 85% by the end of 1976.

Angra dos Reis 2 and 3 - Brazil

The peaceful utilization of nuclear energy was the obvious choice for Brazil for two reasons. Firstly, Brazil possesses her own uranium deposits, and secondly, the domestic industry can, through sharing this highly developed technology, speed up its rise to the level of the industrial nations.

The governing factor, however, was the negative effects of the oil crisis of 1973 on the balance of payments and the realization that the great dependence on the import of sufficient quantities of energy constitutes a hazard to the desired industrial development, which has to be reduced quickly and effect- ively.

The logical consequence was a partnership arrangement for a sufficiently long term with a group having experience in all branches of nuclear energy technology, and willing to transfer its knowledge without reservations. The Brazilians put a high value on the know-how transfer taking place so comprehensively as to enable them at the end of the contractual period, to use the new technology independently.

The graph, Fig. 6, shows the widely ramified cooperation in all fields of the nuclear infrastructure. Its presentation as a circle symbolizes the completeness and integrity of all individual measures as integral package. This extends from common uranium prospecting, through the transfer of know-how and experience in the engineering of nuclear power stations, the manufacturing of components, the operation of the power plants, to the fuel cycle including waste management. Scientists and engineers are being exchanged during the contract period, and technological developments are pursued and carried on.

H. Frewer and W. Altvater

UG: Urangesellschaft mbH & Co., KG, Frankfurt

STEAG: STEAG AG, Essen

INTERATOM: Interatom Internationale Atomreaktorbau GmbH, Bensberg near Cologne

KWU: Kraftwerk Union AG, Miilheim/Ruhr

RBU: Reaktor-Brenoelement Union G;nbH,Hanau

KEWA: Kernbrennstoff.Wiederaufarbeitungs. Gesellschaft mbH, Frankfurt

UHDE: Friedrich Uhde GmbH, Dortmund

BMFT: German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, Boon.Bad Godesber 9

BM]: German Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, Bonn

RSK: Reaktor-Sicherhejtskommission, Cologne (Reactor Safety Commission)

TUV: Technischer Oberwachungsverein (Technical Inspection Associations)

IRS: Institut fiJr Reaktorsicherheit der Technischen Oberwachungs-Vereine e. V., Cologne (Institute for Reactor Safety)

VOEST: Vereinigte Osterreichische Eisen. und Stahlwerke.Alpine Montan Aktiengesellschaft, Linz

GHH: Gutehoffnungshtitte Sterkrade AG, Oberhausen

German pub.

UG

ST IN

KWU+German

KEWA BMIRSK UHDE

VU,

~EST

KWU

WU

243

Fig. 6. The nuclear infrastructure of Brazil is being built up by cooperation between

the German and Brazilian governments, companies and authorities.

In a tripartite agreement with the IAEA of Vienna, surveillance safeguards and inspection on a long- term basis are stipulated so that the peaceful use of the nuclear plants is assured. In this agreement Brazil undertakes to submit to more extensive safeguards than the signatories to the non-proliferation agreement. These inspections are to be implemented by the IAEA. It also accepts the condition to export the knowledge and capabilities acquired through the operation of the plants to be supplied by the FRG only if the receiving company, too, accepts the safeguards inspections by the IAEA. The same applies to the export of nuclear materials.

The nuclear power plant program provides the construction of eight units with pressurized water re- actors of KWU's standard type each of 1300 MWe output.

The time schedule is shown in Fig. 7, which also shows the development of the national share of supplies for the nuclear power plant program corresponding industry, yet to be developed.

The first two units will be built in the Itaorna Bay, close to Angra dos Reis, 130 km west of Rio de Janeiro. Their commissioning is scheduled for 1983 and 1984.

At the end of 1974, the Ministry of Mining and Energy founded Nuclebras for establishing the Brazilian infrastructure in the fields of nuclear power plant engineering, fuel cycle, and manufacturing of heavy components. It will, in cooperation with Elect-cobras and the regional utilities, plan and direct the construction of nuclear power plants. All necessary activities are carried on by Nuclebras through the foundation of joint companies with experienced European firms.

The Brazilian industry, whose contribution to the construction, as well as integration into the manu-

244 Technology transfer Percentage IUO.~: of the 90- Total Supply

t 80- 70-

60-

50-

40-

30-

20

10

by industry for the construction of nuclear power plants

jJ I

Electrical

Mechanical

Installed 10,000 Power Generatin 9 Capacity

t

2X1300 MW

2X1300 MY/

5.0oo ̧ I , , . , w I 1300 MW

1300 MY/

J 1300 MW 6,001Mw, . . . .

75 80 '85' i996 Year

Fig. 7. Development of the national scope of supply for the Brazilian NPP program.

Engineering

Site management

J Brazilian Companies with Governmental Participation

Heavy rea~tor d / / componen s an - ~ turbogenerator parts 18%

Engineering

- - Erection and commissioning

10% /

/ / 15%

Civil works \

52%

Mechanical and electrical equipment

24%

Private Brazilian Companies ]

Mechanical and electrical equipment

(Envisaged future participation of brazilian companies in order awarding) Fig. 8. Brazilian nuclear power plants in the framework of the Brazilian--German cooperation.


facture of components and systems, was investigated at a very early stage, will, in line with its production programs and capacities and with the aid of the transferred technologies for engineering and manufacturing, contribute a major share from the very outset. Even for the first two power plants, its share will amount to 50%. Beginning with the third unit, heavy reactor components of Brazilian manufacture are to be furnished. For this purpose, a factory for heavy components is being constructed in cooperation with a European consortium composed of GHH, KWU and VAL (V6est-Alpine).

The capacity of the first construction phase up to the year 1990 amounts to one set of heavy components per year consisting of one reactor pressure vessel, four steam generators and one pressurizer. The annual production is to be increased later by means of a gradual expansion of the factories.

Right from the beginning, the Brazilian industry will take over the complete manufacture in certain fields, e.g. lifting gear, air-conditioning equipment, steel structures. In other fields, a gradual expansion of the shares of the national production is aimed at. Only very special equipment, for which local manufacture appears to be uneconomical, will have to be imported in the future. This is in line with the practice followed in the work-sharing world economy between highly industrialized countries. The previous diagram (Fig. 8) shows the future aim of percentage participation of Brazilian companies.

The engineering of the first power plants was started more than a year ago. Essential work is being carried out in Rio de Janeiro by Nuclen, a joint engineering firm with a 75% capital share owned by Nuclebras and 25% by KWU. Approximately 400 engineers will be employed there, 50 of them being Germans, in the initial phase. The training of Brazilian engineers at KWU has been underway for 2 yr. Over the first few years an average of 45 engineers, will be trained for a period of about 2 yr. The total training volume is estimated to be 300 man-years. The first German-trained engineers have already taken up their work in Rio de Janeiro.

Additionally, extensive training programs for the operating personnel will be implemented (Fig. 9). These will start early in 1979 and continue in each case until handover of the power plants. They are

4th year A 3rd year l 2nd year 1st year before take over

1 iObservatio. F.K F = Furnas K B = Nuclebras Training in NPP K K = KWU

F N = Nuclen

I '

l ! / B Coordination Preparation Application Evaluation

I,F I.F

IIIll I

I General Coordination: FKN 1 Fig. 9. Training program for operation personnel.


jointly conducted by KWU, Nuclebras, and the responsible utilities. The emphasis lies in the transfer of the specific KWU-know-how, with the objective of laying the complete training into the hands of the Brazilians. Therefore, the purchase by the owner of a simulator for operator training is also provided. Related to this is an extensive training program for the staff of the simulator training center to make them independent for further modification. For this reason, the Brazilian engineers will be integrated into the engineering and project groups of both the simulator manufacturer and KWU to get the practical know-how on the job.

Nuclear power plant Iran 1 and lran 2

The situation in lran is again different from both preceding countries. As a nation rich in oil, which to a large extent is exported, lran took, only a few years ago, a decision in favour of an extensive nuclear energy program. By means of this program, more than 40% of the electrical power requirements are to be met by nuclear power plants by the early nineties. To achieve the objective of approximately 20,000 MW of nuclear power plant capacity by that time, a quick and effective start of the construction program was necessary. This means that the establishment of the newly-created Atomic Energy Organiz- ation of Iran (AEOI), which is responsible for this program and the licensing authority, as well as the consolidation of the capacity for nuclear R & D and the development of an industrial program virtually started only with the construction of the first nuclear power plant.

A safe method for this approach is to award the first plant on a total turnkey basis. In this case an experienced general contractor and his efficient organization, as well as his supply capability, are con- structing the nuclear power plants:

'in a contractually guaranteed short construction time; with all their auxiliary systems, and the necessary infrastructure ready for operation.'

From these considerations and on this basis, the AEOI gave KWU a Letter of Intent to construct Iran's first two nuclear power units, Iran 1 and Iran 2.

These 1300 MW units are located near the harbour town of Bushehr on the Persian Gulf where site work has been going on since July 1975.

The emphasis of the know-how transfer in this first period of the nuclear program - i.e. during the construction of the first nuclear power plants lies with the future operating staff who, through an extensive training program must be prepared for their future tasks of operation and control of these first few plants.

According to Fig. 10, the training program follows different paths for each of the two groups of personnel: Category I, engineers and technicians - to be trained for maintenance and operation; Cate- gory II, skilled workmen - to be trained for maintenance and repairs.

The wide-range training program will run over several years. It comprises theoretical instruction on fundamental and plant-related knowledge, as well as a practical training in nuclear power plants under construction and in operation and at the simulator. Additionally, the future operating staff will cooperate, right from the beginning, in the commissioning of the nuclear power plants lran 1 and lran 2. The maintenance personnel will receive a supplementary training at the manufacturers of the larger components by participation in the final assembly at the works.


Catego

Germany: . German Language Instr. (6 month) . Contractor's Basic Course (2.4 month) • Commissioning/Operating Training

in Contractor's NPP's (6 month and more) • Special Courses (3 month) . Contractor's Main Course (6 month) . Simulator Course (2 month)

Category 2

Theoretical Practical

Prov. Acceptance of Unit Iran 1

Commissioning Training at Site: . Theoretical Refreshing Training • Simulator Refreshin 9 Training, if

a simulator is available in Iran

Additional Training during the Warranty Period

"r-aining in Nuc. Power Plant

German KWU. Language Basic Instruct. Course

Suppliers. Workshop. Training. Spec. Courses

Site Training Iran

German Language Instruction

Apprenticeship in Germany

=---; ' lation

KWU. Practical• Basic Special Course Courses

Commissioning Training at Site

German Language Instruction

Chemistry School in Germany KWU. Practical Basic Special Course Courses

Site Training in Iran

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

Fig. 10. Training program for plant staff unit 1.

Train. Opel Person. AEOI

Liaison Office AEOI

Erlanger

HD6

AEOI NueL Plant Div.

Site.Managem. AEOI

Bushehr

AEOI Nucl•

Tehran

I Oper. Pers.

Fig. 11. NPP Iran 1 and Iran 2 organization chart.


Fuller details concerning this training program are contained in two other papers presented at this con- ference (Haas and Recker, 1977; Kirchweger and Hinterw/ilder, 1977).

Another, essential know-how transfer in the engineering field takes place during the construction of

Iran 1 and lran 2. This is carried out by means of organizational ties between customer and supplier.

The most important ties are presented in an outline organization chart in Fig. 11.

An intensive contact exists between the project management teams and the specialist engineers of both parties in Tehran, and in the central office of the general contractor in the FRG during which technical and organizational problems are continuously subjected to discussion.

This enables the customer to follow each step in engineering by means of numerous technical documents and meetings and to verify through his quality assurance and quality control organization all essential manufacturing and erection activities. In the field of civil engineering, a capable consortium of construction firms assists the general contractor.

An analogous situation exists on site, where in both organizations a construction and commissioning group are matched with each other. Here, too, an essential know-how transfer takes place in all dis- ciplines. Special emphasis is placed on quality assurance and quality control.

Addit ionally, a number of engineers are delegated by the customer to cooperate with several of the general contractor 's specialist departments. Through this, they receive several years of an intensive specialized training in their discipline.

All these measures together form a concentrated know-how transfer from only one organization of the general contractor to the customer, and are, therefore, particularly effective.

CONCLUSIONS

As the experience of the above-mentioned examples shows, the manner, method and efficiency of the technology and know-how transfer on an industrial basis depends on the boundary conditions under which it will have to take place in each individual case. In the first place, it will be dependent on the existing preconditions on the national and on the industrial level in the customer's country; on the concept of the nuclear program, and also on the number of partners in the national and industrial commit- ments. Last, not least, the efficiency depends on the potential of the industrial partner or partners. The concentrated know-how which a capable and experience general contractor can contribute to the construction of the first nuclear power plants turns out to be of particular value for the customer country.

REFERENCES

Haas K.F. and Recker M. Basic training of operational personnel for nuclear power plants. Transfer of Nuclear Techno- logy, Persepolis and Shiraz, Irma, 10-14 April 1977. To be published.

Kirchweger K and Hinterwaider J. On-the-job training during the construction and commissioning of nuclear power plants. Transfer of Nuclear Tecbnolog06 Persepolis and Shiraz, Irma, 10-14 April 1977. To be published.

Documents

Technology transfer by industry for the construction of nuclear power plants