Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab

Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab

ERRI/EmergencyNet News, 2010

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An Emerging Threat to the USA and her European Allies??

PUBLISHED BY: EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC.

December 1, 2010

Authored by: C. L. Staten and Associates



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Terrorist Alliance Between

AQAP and Al-Shabaab

An Emerging Threat to the USA and her European Allies?

Al-Shabaab

The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin (al-Shahbaab)— also

known as al-Shabaab, Shabaab, the Youth, Mujahidin al-

Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement,

Mujahidin Youth Movement, and other names and variations

— was the militant wing of the Somalia Council of Islamic

Courts that took over most of southern Somalia in the second

half of 2006.

Although the Somali government and Ethiopian forces routed the

group in a two-week war between December 2006 and January

2007, al-Shabaab has continued its violent insurgency in southern

and central Somalia. The group has gained control of many parts of

southern and central Somalia by using „guerrilla warfare and

terrorist tactics‟.

The Bab al Mandab waterway and Gulf of Aden were termed "of supreme

strategic importance "in Al Qaeda's long term plan. On April 2009 , the

deputy leader of Al Qaeda in Arab Peninsula (AQAP), Sa'id Ali Jaber Al

Khathim Al Shihri (aka Abu Sufian al-Azdi) released a message calling on

Somali jihadists to step up their attacks on "crusader" forces at sea in the

Gulf of Aden and on land in neighboring Djibouti, which hosts France

largest military base in Africa. "To our steadfast brethren in Somalia, take

caution and prepare yourselves and Increase your strikes against the

crusaders at sea and in Djibouti.” Shihri opened his message by

addressing the Jihadi leaders: Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar,

Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri.

The troubled Gulf

of Aden Area

In the waters off the coast

of East Africa,

CENTCOM‟s Coalition

Task Force 151 (CTF-

151), conducts maritime

security operations to

protect shipping routes in

the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of

Oman, the Arabian Sea,

Red Sea, and the Indian

Ocean.

Coalition and U.S. naval

forces have had numerous

engagements with pirates

in these waters in the past

few years.

It must also be noted that

Africa‟s exports of crude

oil to the United States are

now roughly equal to those

of the Middle East, further

emphasizing this

continent‟s increasing

strategic importance.



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Though this story has fallen out of favor with the popular press (MSM –

Main Stream Media), the battle for the Gulf of Aden, and other nearby

(and not so nearby) waters, goes on almost every day. One of the more

recent attacks (11 Dec 2010) involves alleged Somali pirates hijacking a

Liberian-owned bulk cargo ship in the Indian Ocean, about 1,050 nautical

miles east of the Somali coastal village of Eyl. In typical Somali pirate

fashion, the attack was launched from two attack skiffs, supported by a

mother ship, with pirates firing small arms and rocket propelled grenades

(RPG‟s) at the merchant vessel (See photo – right).

At last report, the Panama-flagged MV Renuar was headed for Somalia,

with the 24-man Filipino crew in the custody of the armed pirates. “There are presently no communications with

the ship and the condition of the crew is not known,” according to the EU anti-piracy task-force.

Why is this attack, or other similar attacks…significant? Because these kinds of crimes, and the ransoms that they

most often generate, are believed to be a major funding sources for tribal groups, criminals, insurgents and

radical Islamists in this region. In other words, the pirates (and a larger Islamic insurgency) are, in actuality, being

funded by Western companies/nations, who would rather pay a ransom than try to engage and defeat the pirates.

Consequently, each successful ship hijacking/hostage-taking, (and corresponding ransom payment) funds even

more pirates. And, the ransom money also facilitates the logistics (purchase of more boats, weapons, and

explosives) to allow the pirates to undertake more and even bigger attacks in the future.

Furthermore, given current circumstances, where is the downside for the pirates? Few attacks are thwarted, as

many ships and crews are taken and eventually ransomed – usually following the payment hundreds of

thousands or million dollars in payments to the pirates. In actuality, the number of hijackings by Somali pirates

has steadily increased in recent years, with the Somalis accounting for 35 of the world‟s 39 ships hijacked in the

first nine months of 2010.

Aside from the efforts of Combined Task Force 151, (a

multinational task force established in January 2009 to

conduct counter-piracy operations under a mission-based

mandate throughout the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)

area of responsibility to actively deter, disrupt and suppress

piracy), little else is being done (internationally, politically,

diplomatically) to eliminate this immediate threat to shipping

and/or a larger potential for disruption of a strategic “choke-

point” at an outlet through the Red Sea and the Suez

Canal.

At last count, the increasingly brazen pirates were holding

26 vessels and 609 hostages off the coast of Somalia,

according to a European Union anti-piracy force.

(A representation of the location of the actual

attacks/attempted attacks appears at left.)



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Current Developments…

The three main factions of jihadists, or Islamists, in Somalia: there is the dominant faction of al Shabaab that is

globalist and jihadist in its aim led by an individual known as Godane Abu Zubayr. The second faction of al

Shabaab is the nationalist wing of al Shabaab, led by a commander known as Muktar Robow, also known as Abu

Mansur. Now this Hizbul Islam faction is led by an old-time warlord and Somali nationalist leader whose name is

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Now the Godane wing of al Shabaab essentially issued a threat to Aweys‟ group of

Hizbul Islam basically saying “join us or die,” and after a series of clashes over the last couple of weeks, Aweys‟

group basically conceded. Now this significance is less in the number of troops that the Awey‟s faction of Hizbul

Islam brings to al Shabaab, but the significance is rather of the Godane-led dominant faction of al Shabaab,

eliminating internal dissents which ultimately would lead to its defeat if it festered. While these internal tensions

are never going to be fully eliminated, Godane must fight these. He has no choice but to eliminate internal

tensions that are on the radar of his enemies, such as the Somali government and its backers.

The latest (officially unconfirmed) intelligence out of Somalia would seem to indicate that Al-Shahbaab may be

consolidating its hold over new (and larger) parts of the mostly ungoverned nation. According to at least one

recent account, the radical Islamist Somali group “Hisbul Islam” is now joining forces with Al-Shahbaab.

Apparently, this alliance was a “shot-gun wedding,” with Al Shahbaab “forcibly” increasing its control over Hisbul

Islam areas. (e,g.- in grunt „milspeak‟; Al-Shahbaab kicked some Hisbul Islam butt, and is now “appropriating”

their territory. i.e. - Parts of Somalia could well be compared to parts of a U.S. „ghetto‟, with gang combat carried

out in order to assume control of small tracts of land…sometimes as small as one or several blocks).

According to the Wall Street Journal, a U.S. intelligence official said information gleaned from militant

communications shows links between al Shabaab and al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and Yemen. U.S. officials

also see evidence of overlap in training and membership and say their working assumption is that al Shabaab has

several hundred core members, similar to the numbers in al Qaeda in Pakistan and in al Qaeda's Yemeni outpost.

Assessment by Foreign Policy Magazine: Somalia

“If Somalia keeps heading south in 2011, the entire country could fall under Islamist insurgent control. Up to

now, the country's U.N.-backed transitional government has withstood attacks from Islamist insurgents only

thanks to protection from an African Union peacekeeping force; it remains weak and divided, a national

government in name alone. Further, the capital city of Mogadishu is under perpetual siege by militants, a reality

that has sent millions fleeing from their homes in this year alone. When the government does make gains on the

insurgents, they are counted in mere city blocks, captured one by one.

The largest and most alarming insurgent group is al Shabab, which professes to desire the creation of a strict,

conservative Muslim state and portions of whose leadership pledged allegiance to al Qaeda in early 2010. The

group already controls most of southern and central Somalia and is currently trying to capture Mogadishu.

Meanwhile, Somalia's neighbors fear that al Shabab will begin to export terrorism, as it did for the first time last

summer in a series of bombings in Uganda during the World Cup.

That said, Somaliland in the country's northwest is an island of stability and democracy, and Puntland in the

northeast is relatively peaceful, if troubled by Islamists and pirate gangs.

The best hope for Somalia is for its forces to exploit the divisions among the insurgency to recapture territory,

particularly in Mogadishu. International support, already forthcoming, will help. But so would a lot of luck.”



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Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

emerged in January 2009 following an announcement that

unified Yemeni and Saudi operatives under a common

banner and signaled the group‟s intention to serve as a hub

for regional operations targeting government and Western

interests both in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The leadership of

this new organization was composed of the group‟s amir,

Nasir al-Wahishi, and commander Qasim al-Rimi, both

veteran Yemeni extremist leaders, as well as two Saudis,

one of whom surrendered to Saudi authorities in February.

AQAP‟s predecessor, al-Qa„ida in Yemen (AQY), largely re-emerged after the escape of 23 al-Qaeda members

from a Political Security prison in the Yemeni capital, Sana‟a, in February 2006.

In early 2008 dramatically increased its operational tempo, carrying out small-arms attacks on foreign tourists and a series of mortar attacks against the US Embassy in Sana‟a, Yemeni military complexes, the Italian Embassy, and the Presidential Compound.

On February 8, 2010, deputy leader Said Ali al-Shihri called for a regional holy war and blockade of the Red Sea to prevent shipments to Israel. In an audiotape he called upon Somalia's al-Shahbaab militant group for assistance in the blockade.

Current References

Read more: “Dispatch: Al Shabaab's Increasing Power” | STRATFOR

JULY 17, 2010 – “Somali Militant Group Built Training Camps, al Qaeda Links,” WSJ.com

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703722804575369112124063190.html

Source: Foreign Policy; “Next Year's Wars,” The 16 brewing conflicts to watch for in 2011. (Pictoral)

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/28/next_years_wars?page=full

Since then, AQAP‟s activity level and public profile have both risen in a significant way. Particularly, the

involvement of Anwar al-Awlaki seems to have taken AQAP to a new level of international recognition...as

well as energizing the operational activity/capability of the group. According to U.S. counter-terrorism

officials, Awlaki is the one of the main forces behind AQAP's decision to transform itself from a regional

threat into al-Qaeda's most active affiliate outside Pakistan and Afghanistan (AF-PAK).

In recent times, Awlaki‟s alleged involvement in an attempted bombing of an airliner in-bound to Detroit, MI

(the Underwear Bomber) in 2009…and his participation in a 2010 cargo plane/printer cartridge bomb plot

have given him and AQAP far greater visibility on the world stage (and probably more significantly… moved

him to the top of America‟s most wanted lists).

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101222-dispatch-al-shabaabs-increasing-power?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=official&utm_campaign=link#ixzz19SqCiAUj

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703722804575369112124063190.html

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/28/next_years_wars?page=full



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Previous ERRI/EmergencyNet News References:

“Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab (An Emerging Threat to the USA and her European Allies?)”

http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/Terrorist_ Alliance_ Between_ aqap_ and_Al-Shabaab2010.pdf

“Evidence of increasing alliance between Islamic militants in Somalia, Yemen and Al-Qaeda,” By C. L. Staten, Senior National

Security Analyst, ERRI, June 2010

http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/al-shahbaab_Somalia_Al-Qaeda_Yemen.pdf

“AQAP and Al-Shabaab Alliance; An Emerging Terrorist Threat, (Includes Preliminary Report; Yemen Airliner Bomb Plot)”

Saturday, 30 Oct 2010

http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/Yemen_AQAP_bomb_alliance.pdf

ENN, “Somalia Piracy Brief,” Nov., 2008 (Flash Slideshow)

http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/Terrorist_%20Alliance_%20Between_%20AQAP_%20and_Al-Shabaab2010.pdf



http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/al-shahbaab_Somalia_Al-Qaeda_Yemen.pdf





http://emergencynet-news.com/reference/Somalia_Piracy_Brief2008.htm

http://emergencynet-news.com/reference/Somalia_Piracy_Brief2008.htm

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Terrorist Alliance Between AQAP and Al-Shabaab