The Case Against Presupposition - Mitchell LeBlanc

8/13/2019 The Case Against Presupposition - Mitchell LeBlanc

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1. The Case Against Presuppositionalism13/10/09The presuppositionalist apologetic method is being employed by increasingly more Christians.

Unfortunately, the apologetic system is dead on arrival.

Authored by:Mitchell LeBlanc.

Authors Note: This post is part of a series which has culminated in a scholarly paper on the topic.As such, I

kindly ask that any criticism of the subject matter therein is given with a cognizance of the most recent material

on the subject.

Presuppositionalism is a branch of apologetics which, instead of offering the classical

arguments in favor of Gods existence, attempts to show that any worldview which does not

presuppose the Christian God is internally incoherent. This type of apologetic has been

defended by the likes of Van Til, Greg Bahnsen and John Frame. Defenders of

presuppositional apologetics with whom I am more familiar include the folks over atChoosing

Hats.

Presuppositional apologetics have always seemed to be more of a set of debating tactics

rather than a epistemic system. However it is pertinent to treat it as what it claims to be for the

sake of discussion.

Spawning from presuppositional apologetics is an argument known as the TAG, or the

Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God. Presuppositionalism produces nowhere

else (to my understanding) a formal argument for its claim. As such, if one wants to

thoroughly provide a critique of presuppositionalism, it seems necessary that they offer a

critique of the TAG as well.

Presuppositionalism Stated

Succinctly, presuppositionalism argues that the Christian God is necessary for the intelligibility

of various features of human understanding (logic, morality, meaning). It does so by making a

transcendental argument. Transcendental arguments take the following form:

A: For X to be the case, Y would have to be the case, because Y is a

precondition of X

B: X is the case

C: Therefore, Y is the case
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Contextualized, this argument becomes:

A: For there to be intelligibility in the world, God must exist because God is a

precondition of intelligibility

B: There is intelligibility in the world

C: Therefore, God exists

The support for A is often a series of claims that non-Christian worldviews cannot make sense

of the various features of human understanding coupled with the notion that if it is impossible

for non-Christian worldviews to justify intelligibility and intelligibility exists, it must thereby only

be justified by a Christian worldview.

It is also important to note that presuppositionalists state that their reasoning operates using

two axioms. To quote a presuppositionalist with whom I havedebated:

As a Christian, I have two axiomatic, interrelated foundations for my

epistemology, and for everything else I encounter through the grid of that

epistemology. The Triune God of Scripturewho created the universe and

all it contains; who established and even now maintains the laws which

govern that creation. That is foundation one.

The self-revelation of that self-existent, self-conscious, self-sufficient,

omniscient, omnipotent, all-wise, immutable, eternal, and sovereign God;

The Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, are the self-communication

of the extent, nature, and specifics of His eternal propertieswhich are

the guarantor of the laws and assumptions which we, as creatures in the

image of that God, require to operate rationally and coherently. That is

foundation 2.

God as an axiom

For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on the claim that logic is dependent on the

Christian God. Presuppositionalists do not stop merely at logic, but assert that morality,

science, etc all presuppose their Christian God. Ive chosen to address only the logic portion

of these claims because I see it as the most important issue, and if it can be shown that logic
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does not depend on the Christian God it seems that presuppositionalist apologetics are

defeated.

First and foremost, one should note the peculiarity of the espoused axioms of

presuppositionalism. They are in fact, not axioms. My colleague Dawson Bethrick outlines this

comprehensively onhis blog,but I wish to do so in a slightly different manner.

A statement must satisfy three conditions to be considered axiomatic:

It must be irreducible to prior concepts

It must be self-evident to introspective and extrospective acts of cognition

It must be undeniable without direct contradiction

The concept of God fails to meet each of these:

One can reduce the concept of God to an unembodied mind, thereby rendering the concept of

God as non-foundational

The concept of God is not self-evident to all acts of cognition

The denial of God does not lead to direct contradiction, in stating that God does not exist

one is making use of various axioms but not presuming the existence of God.

As such, we can reject the notion that God is an axiom.

Logic and God

As stated, the presuppositionalist will say that the very existence of logic (or logical absolutes)

depends on the existence of the Christian God. Philosopher Michael Martin analyzes this

claim in his Transcendental Argument for the Non-existence of God (TANG). This argument is

often dismissed by presuppositionalists, but I have yet to hear a compelling case as to why

such a dismissal occurs.

The portion of the TANG which deals with logic is as follows:

1. Logic presupposes that its principles are necessarily true.

2. According to the brand of Christianity assumed by TAG, God createdeverything, including logic; or at least everything, including logic, isdependent on God.

3. If something is created by or is dependent on God, it is not necessary itis contingent on God.
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4. If principles of logic are contingent on God, they are not logicallynecessary.

5. If principles of logic are contingent on God, God could arrange matters sothat a proposition and its negation were true at the same time. But this isabsurd. How could God arrange matters so that New Zealand is south ofChina and that New Zealand is not south of it?

6. Hence logic is not dependent on God, and, insofar as the Christian worldview assumes that logic is so dependent, it is false.

The argument is formally valid, so we must discover whether or not it is sound. Premise (2) isusually called into question as being a misunderstanding. For many Christians God did notcreate the laws of logic, it is claimed that they exist as part of Gods nature. In taking the statement that Logic exists as an intrinsic part of Gods nature, one can deducethat if God did not exist than there would be no logical absolutes. That is to say if God doesnot exist, the law of non-contradiction can be denied.But is this the case? We can cite such an argument from Van Til himself in his The Defenseof the Faith (pg 256-257):

(7) If the Christian God did not exist, then predication would operate against abackground of bare possibility.

(8) If predication operates against a background of bare possibility, the

predication of P to x ( x is P) may be reversed and ~ P might be predicated of

x ( x is ~ P)

(9) But if the predication of P to x ( x is P) is reversed and ~ P is be

predicated of x ( x is ~ P), then the Law of Non-contradiction must be denied.

(10) Therefore, If the Christian God did not exist, then the Law of Non-

contradiction must be denied

For the readers who are not particularly philosophically inclined, the above argument is saying

that the law of non-contradiction (which states that someone cannot be X and not X

simultaneously) can be denied if God does not exist. Thereby attempting to show that if God

does not exist we can say that the apple is orange and that the apple is not orange, because

there is no law of non-contradiction.

Interestingly enough, (7) makes mention of a background of bare possibility whichpresumably refers to logical possibility. But in order to have logical possibility, one must have

the law of non-contradiction. That is to say, logical possibility is determinedby the law of non-

contradiction. The premise hinges on being an incoherent notion.

(7) further states that if predication operates via logical possibility, then we may reverse the

predications completely. The suggestion is to say that we can have an apple be orange at

one time and not orange at another time. Granted, but this is no way necessitates that the


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apple can be orange and not orange simultaneously. Henceforth, (9) is false. Reversing the

predicate does not change the Law of Non-Contradiction. As such, the argument is unsound

and we can reject (10).

Perhaps the modern presuppositionalist would object to Van Tils formulation, asserting that

the mere denial of Gods existence is logically absurd outright. Such an assertion would state

that it is incoherent to deny the existence of God because of his very nature (he necessarily

exists).

Consider the following:

(11) It is not the case that it is not that P and not P (law of non-contradiction denied, meaning

it would be possible for your apple to be both orangte and not orange simultaneously)

(12) It is not the case that God exists

In attempting to affirm (11), one arrives at an obvious logical incoherence. How could an apple be both orange

and not orange simultaneously? In this sense, it is logically incoherent to affirm (11). But is it as logicallyincoherent to affirm (12), as the presuppositionalist states?

There is no self evident incoherence in affirming (12) and thereby denying that God exists. The only way

there would be such an incoherence is if we applied a premise which stated:

(13) It is logically necessary that God exists

With the establishment of (13) it becomes obviously incoherent to affirm (12) and deny the existence of God. But

how can the presuppositionalist assert (13)?

To say that it is logically necessary that God exists is to affirm the conclusion of an Ontological Argument. It is

essentially saying that God cannot fail to exist because of his nature. But the presuppositionalist has chosen to

forego classical arguments for the existence of God and thereby cannot support this claim! Why should oneaccept that it is logically necessary that God exists without an Ontological Argument to defend such a

conclusion?

In effect, the presuppositionalist has shot themselves in the foot by choosing to dismiss classical arguments for

the existence of God. The presuppositionalist requires one, but is unable to use one (by virtue of their own

apologetic).

It should also be further noted that (13) is often confused for another premise. There is a

difference between God necessarily existing and God (if existing) necessarily having no

beginning or end.

Consider:

(14) It is logically necessary that if at any time God existed, then at every time He existed

While (14) is required in presumably every branch of Christianity, and with good philosophical

warrant, (13) isnt.

Conclusion


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As such, we can reach a couple of conclusions:

Firstly, God cannot be asserted as an axiomatic concept. Secondly, if logic is created or dependent on God, than

it is not necessary and insofar as logic presupposes that its principles are necessarily true, logic simply cannot

be based on the Christian God. Furthermore, if one is to say that logic exists necessarily as a part of Gods

nature it becomes a logical consequence that denying the existence of God would lead to the denial of the law of

non-contradiction. Since it has been shown that such is not the case without assuming the conclusion of a

successful ontological argument we can reject this notion altogether.

At this point it seems that presuppositionalist apologetics are dead in the water. By its very nature

presuppositionalism has rejected the classical theistic arguments and such arguments have become the very

thing needed to keep presuppositionalism afloat.


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2. The Case Against Presuppositionalism: Part II 23/10/09Mitchell LeBlanc gives a succinct reformulation of his Case Against Presuppositionalism and

responds to a few preliminary objections.


Authors Note: This post is part of a series which has culminated in a scholarly paper on the topic.As such, I


on the subject.

I have received some feedback on my previous article,The Case Against Presuppositionalism.I

have decided to outline some received objections and deal with them accordingly. If you have

not done so already, you should read the previous post before continuing.

I presented quite a lengthy criticism of presuppositionalism in my previous post and I am

operating under the assumption that you have read the material. As such, I will condense and

reformulate my arguments and answer some received objections afterwards:

Argument #1: That logical principles are not contingent on God

(1) Logical principles are either dependent on God or not dependent on God

(premise)

(2) Logical principles are dependent on God if and only if (i) logical principles

are created by God or (ii) logical principles are part of Gods nature (premise)

(3) If logical principles are dependent on God they are not logically

necessary, they are contingent (premise)

(4) It is logically necessary that the principles of logic be necessarily true

(premise)

(5) Therefore, the principles of logic are necessarily true (from 4)

(6) If the principles of logic are necessarily true they are not contingent

(premise)

(7) Therefore the principles of logic are not contingent (from 4, 6)
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(8) Therefore logical principles are not created by God nor exist as part of

Gods nature ( from 2,3,4,5,6,7)

(9) Therefore, logical principles are not dependent on God

The above argument is a summation of many points in my previous article and shows the

absurdity in claiming that logical principles depend on God for their existence.

The deduction proof is:

1. G(l) v ~G(l) (tautology)

2. G(l) (Cr(l) v Na(l))

3. G(l) -> (~N(l) ^ C(l))

4. N(T(l))

5. T(l) conclusion

6. T(l) -> ~C(l)

7. ~C(1) conclusion

8. ~Cr(l) ^ ~Na(l)

9. ~G(l) conclusion

Argument #2: That presuppositionalism presumes an Ontological Argument

(1) Logical principles are either dependent on God or not dependent on God

(premise)

(2) Logical principles are dependent on God if logical principles are part of

Gods nature (premise)

(3) If logical principles are a part of Gods nature there can be no logical

principles if God does not exist (premise)

(4) If there are no logical principles without the existence of God the

proposition God does not exist entails that the LNC fails (premise)

(5) There is a possible world, w1, in which God does not exist (premise)


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(6) In w1 the LNC must hold as logical possibility is determined by the LNC

(from 5)

(7) It is the case that in w1 the LNC holds even though God does not exist

(from 5,6)

(8) Is not the case that logical principles are dependent on God

This argument is sound insofar as (5) is true. If the presuppositionalist wants to assert that

(5) isfalse, they MUST present an Ontological Argument which exemplifies that God exists

necessarily (that he exists in every possible world), they may not merely assume that

conclusion.

Argument #1: Objections and Replies 1. Even if logic is part of Gods nature it is still logically necessary

It simply cannot be the case that logic is both contingent upon Gods existence and logically necessary, it MUST

be one or the other. It seems to be the understanding of presuppositionalists that nothing can exist

independently of God but this is a very elementary mistake in the philosophy of religion as logically necessary

abstract objects MUST exist independently.

To quote Keith E. Yandell

It is logically consistent with monotheism that there exist abstract objects

that possess logically necessary existence. Abstract objects have no causalpowers, are not self-conscious or even conscious and exercise no creation of

providence. They are of little if any religious interest. It is a necessary truth

that if X has logically necessary existence then there is nothing Y such that Y

is distinct from X and X depends on Y for Xs existence. So ifthere are abstract

objects that have logically necessary existenceis true, it is also true that there exists

something whose existence does not depend on God. Gods status as

Creator and any coherent notion of divine sovereignty, does not require that

something that cannot depend for its existence on anything else depend for

its existence on God or deny that the existence of such things is logicallypossible. But the only candidates for being something of this sort would seem

to be things that exist with logical necessity. (Philosophy of Religion: A

Contemporary Introduction pg. 373, Keith Yandell)

As Yandell says:


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It is a necessary truth that if X has logically necessary existence then there is

nothing Y such that Y is distinct from X and X depends on Y for Xs existence

As such:

It is a necessary truth that if logic has logically necessary existence then

there is no God that can exist distinct from logic and it be the case that logic

depend on God for its existence

One might argue that Yandells statement does not apply here as it was not asserted that

logic and God exist distinct from each other but rather that Gods nature is logical. This simply

characterizes yet another misunderstanding of logic. Logic is not attributable to one being or

concept but rather only to the relationships between two or more concepts or arguments.

Thus, whereas it may be possible that when Gods nature is analyzed, it is coherent andorderly this is not to say that Gods nature IS logic. In fact, it is to say something wholly

different.

Assume a situation where God performs an action, A. Gods action must presuppose the LNC

as God cannot do act A and not A at the same time. God cannot also have property P and not

P at the same time. In this respect, it is the case that Gods nature corresponds to necessarily

existent logical principles. So whereas God MUST presuppose logic, it is not clear that logic

presupposes God, rather we have good reasons to reject that logic presupposes God.

Argument #2: Objections and Replies

1. This entire possible world matter is just silliness

Possible world semantics (or modal logic) is simply a form of reasoning to discern logical

necessity/contingency. The fact that we say there is a possible world where X does not mean

that there is an actual world where X, merely that X could possibly be the case (even though it

might not be). For an easy to understand overview:Modal Logic on Wikipedia

2.The premise, (5), can be shown to be false from the mere fact that without God you cannot prove anything!

This is, of course, the precise issue being discussed and so one should not beg this question.

However, it is not the case that if without God nothing can be proven, God must exist

necessarily. Such an argument:

(1) Without God, one cannot prove anything

(2) Therefore God exists necessarily
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is a complete non-sequitur.

Why must God exist in all possible words because without him, nothing can be proven? There

can exist a possible world in which there is nothing to be proven and as such, according to

the criteria assumed by such a formulation, God would not exist in such a world or his

existence would be arbitrary.

Non-argument specific: Objections and Replies

1. You still have not accounted for logic

The notion of justifying logic is a peculiar one. It is clear and evident that logical principles

exist as logically necessary abstractions, furthermore, logical principles are axioms and as

such they are not subject to any proof or justification outside of themselves.

(10) If something needs justification/accounting from an external source that

thing is logically contingent and not logically necessary

(11) The principles of logic are logically necessary

(12) The principles of logic are not logically contingent (from 11)

(13) The principles of logic do not require justification/accounting from an

external source

It is difficult to see what is even meant by justifying/accounting for logic.

3. The Case Against Presuppositionalism: Part III 30/10/09In his most comprehensive post in the series, Mitchell LeBlanc further refines his previous

arguments and presents new critiques of the Presuppositional apologetic approach.

4.Authored by:Mitchell LeBlanc.

Authors Note: This post is part of a series which has culm inated in ascholarly paper on the topic.As such, I


on the subject.

In my previous posts,The Case Against PresuppositionalismandThe Case Against Presuppositionalism:

Part II,I have outlined a couple of arguments against presuppositionalism and answered some

objections. In this article, I would like to further refine my previously presented formal
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arguments (thanks to the help of the UrbanPhilosophy user VazScep), present two additional

arguments, including one fromJason Streitfeld.

I have previously presented two main arguments against the claim that logic depends on

Gods existence, the following are the same arguments with minor revisions to presentation:

Argument #1: That logical principles are not contingent on God(1) If logical principles are dependent on God, they are not logically

necessary

(2) But logical principles are logically necessary

(3) Therefore, logical principles are not dependent on God

The key premise is, of course, (1). In my previous article I have outlined a brief defenseagainst the claim that though logic is part of Gods nature, its still logically necessary. Ive

seen no reason to abandon (1) as most of the objections are bare assertions that something

can be both logically contingent/necessary.

Argument #2: That logical principles are not contingent on God (and that presuppositionalism presumes an

Ontological Argument)

(4) If logic depends on God, then if God possibly doesnt exist, then some

law of logic possibly fails

(5) No law of logic can possibly fail

(6) So God necessarily exists

(7) But there is a possible world in which God does not exist

(8) Therefore, logic is not dependent on God

The key premise here is (7). Surely the presuppositionalist will state that there is no possible

world in which God does not exist, and thus, God is logically necessary. A defeater of (7)

must be some type of Ontological Argument, showing that God exists necessarily because of

the type of thing that he is. In the absence of such an argument one should not be expected

to accept a denial of (7). The presuppositionalist may assume the falsity of (7) but this refusal
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should be rejected if it is not established soundly. That is to say, if (7) cannot be negated by

virtue of anything other than presuming that it is false, it must hold. If the presuppositionalist

wishes to simply presume that (7) is false by virtue that God is a necessary precondition for

logic, they have in effect committed a vicious circularity; God being a necessary precondition

for logic is precisely what is at issue and they should therefore not beg that question.

Argument #3: The absurdity of Christian logical necessity

As we should all understand by now Christian presuppositionalism states that no other

worldview can account for the laws of logic. Their approach to suggest such is twofold. The

alleged proof of this statement is the impossibility of the contrary, which states that if all non-

Christian worldviews fail at accounting for X, the Christian worldview is able to account for X.

Of course this in itself does not follow as it may simply be impossible to account for X, that is

to say the presumption of justification may not be valid.

But in this respect, it is a peculiar notion and indeed a bold claim which suggests that all non-

Christian worldviews are illogical.

Let C be standard Christianity. Consider worldview C1which matches Christianity point for

point sans the fact that the second person of the trinity became incarnate. Consider worldview

C2where the Godhead is quadripersonal rather than tripersonal. Lastly, consider C3where

Jesus had an extra disciple.

It is clear that C1, C2, and C3 differ from C in ways that make the definitionally non-Christian.

They are, in effect, non-Christian worldviews that match Christianity point for point in everyregard, save for one difference. Is one to understand that the differences, however seemingly

minute, cause a collapse of rationality? Is it true, then, that all the truths of Christianity, every

single line of the Bible is a necessary truth; that is to say that in all possible worlds Cmust

obtain? That is to say that it is logically impossible that Jesus was born elsewhere, that is

logically impossible that the Godhead be quadripersonal and that it is logically impossible that

Christ have had one more disciple. Even the most seemingly trivial facts become logically

necessary, consider all the Bible stories, it is not the case that they could be any other way,

such is logically impossible.

But the implications of this view are grave, for if it is logically impossible that thingshave occurred in a manner other than what is reported to have occurred through the Bible this

entails that not even God could have made them so. General understandings of Divine

Omnipotence state that God can produce any conceivable thing or arrangement of things.

And it follows that since such deviations from our current state of affairs are logically

impossible, they are as inconceivable as a square circle.


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But this entails that God could not have made it so that Peter denied Jesus twice, or four

times. God could not have made it so that Mary was named something else. God could not

have made it that there was one more guard at Jesus tomb. This seems to be an absurd

notion: (i) why should one accept these as logically necessary facts, (ii) why do they directly

affect the ability of God to account for logic?

The Christian presuppositionalist, to defend their position, must argue for the following:

(9) All non-Christian worldviews are not even possibly true

To analyze whether or not the presuppositionalist meets this challenge, let us bring forth a

version of the Christian TAG to analyze (This is Sean Chois reformulation of Bahnsens argument as

espoused in theBahnsen vs. Stein debateand subsequent analysisthe full version can be found in Reasons

for Faith: Making a Case for the Christian Faith):(10) There is a rational justification for the laws of logic

(11) It is necessary that: if Christian theism is false, then there is no rational

justification for the laws of logic

(11a) If there is a non-Christian theistic way to justify the laws of logic, then it

will be either the a priori way or the a posteriori way or the conventionalist

way

(11b) Neither the a priori way nor the a posteriori way nor the conventionalist

way will justify the laws of logic

(11c) So, there is no non-Christian theistic way to justify the laws of logic

At this point, one can grant for the sake of argument that (11a) and (11b) are true, but such a

grant does not seem to establish the truth of (11). It has been proposed that one couldestablish the truth of (11) via:

(11d) Necessarily: if there is a rational justification for the laws of logic, then it

will be either Christian theistic or non-Christian theistic.
http://web.archive.org/web/20100817083930/http:/www.bellevuechristian.org/faculty/dribera/htdocs/PDFs/Apol_Bahnsen_Stein_Debate_Transcript.pdfhttp://web.archive.org/web/20100817083930/http:/www.bellevuechristian.org/faculty/dribera/htdocs/PDFs/Apol_Bahnsen_Stein_Debate_Transcript.pdfhttp://web.archive.org/web/20100817083930/http:/www.bellevuechristian.org/faculty/dribera/htdocs/PDFs/Apol_Bahnsen_Stein_Debate_Transcript.pdfhttp://web.archive.org/web/20100817083930/http:/www.bellevuechristian.org/faculty/dribera/htdocs/PDFs/Apol_Bahnsen_Stein_Debate_Transcript.pdf


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The claim is that the addition of (11d) to (11a)-(11c) may appear to allow the valid derivation

of (11), but this is mistaken. It is the case that (11c) follows from (11a) and (11b) by modus

tollens(if p then q; not-q, so, not-p), but the inference from (11a), (11b), (11c), and (11d) to (11) is

logically invalid. Even with (11d) which is plausibly true, one cannot derive the necessary

proposition (11) as a conclusion because (11a) and (11b) are contingent.

This is a clear modal defect and to solve it one must take (11a) and (11b) to be necessary truths:(11a*) It is necessary that: if there is a non-Christian theistic way to justify the

laws of logic, then it will be either the a priori way or the a posteriori way or

the conventionalist way

(11b*) It is necessary that: neither the a priori way nor the a posteriori way

nor the conventionalist way will justify the laws of logic

It now follows from modal modus tollens (it is necessary that: if p then q; it is necessary that

not-q; so, it is necessary that no-p) that:

(11c*) Therefore, it is necessary that there is no non-Christian theistic way to

justify the laws of logic

Thus, from (2a*), (2b*), (2c*) and (2d) it validly follows that (11) and given the granted

premise (10), which in itself may be assuming to much, and the new transcendental premise

(11), it follows that:

(12) Christian theism is true

So, now that there exists a logically valid formulation of this argument, the question falls onto

the reasons to accept (11a*) and (11b*). If there are such reasons, the Christian TAG will be

valid and sound.

Let us consider (11b*) once more:



Even if one is to grant that this premise is not a false trilemma (for the sake of argument),

(11b*) might still be false. As mentioned earlier, it is not the case that the presuppositionalist


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has exhaustively examined and refuted every possible a priori, a posteriori and

conventionalist way or justifying the laws of logic! As such, the only sound premise to make

would be:

(11b**) All the a priori, a posteriori, and conventionalist ways of justifying the

laws of logic thus far examined have failed

But this premise is wholly coherent with (11b*) being false, ergo (11b**) does not entail (11b*)

and insofar as this argument relies upon the truth of (11b*) it cannot establish its conclusion.

As such, there is a need for an argument from the presuppositionalist that shows that every

possibly a priori, a posteriori, or conventionalist way of justifying the laws of logic must fail.

This argument would have to establish that these systems not only fail, but fail necessarily. I am

not presently aware of any such argument.

To quickly recap, the Christian presuppositionalist TAG takes the following form:

(10) There is a rational justification for the laws of logic




Premise (11) is the key premise insofar as (10) is granted and (12) follows logically from (10)

and (11), which it does. Much work was needed, however, to support (11), so that the

argument became:




(11a*) It is necessary that: if there is a non-Christian theistic way to justify the

laws of logic, then it will be either the a priori way or the a posteriori way or

the conventionalist way


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(11c*) So, it is necessary that there is no non-Christian theistic way to justify

the laws of logic [from (11a*) and (11b*)]

(11d*) Necessarily: if there is a rational justification for the laws of logic, then

it will be either Christian theistic or non-Christian theistic


We have already seen that the truth of (11b*) has not been established, but what of premise

(11a*)?

We can begin to analyze whether or not (11a*) is true by looking at a negation of it:

~(11a*) It is possible that: there is a non-Christian theistic way to justify the

laws of logic and it is neither the a priori way the a posteriori way nor the

conventionalist way

There are not, to my knowledge, any reason to reject this possibility, and in fact, if ~(11a*) is

merely possible then (11a*) must be false. As such, we must find discern whether or not there

is a reason for thinking that ~(11a*) is impossible.

The first glaring example that this is not the case would be the absence of evidence against

the following proposition:

(A) It is possible that: there is a worldview distinct from Christian theism and

which is such that if it were true, it would provide a sufficient justification for

the laws of logic

Consider my previous example of worldview C2wherein is it identical to Christianity in every

respect sans the fact that the godhead is quadrinitarian rather than trinitarian. This means that

in whatever way Christianity accounts for the laws of logic, C2 does so in like manner.

Perhaps the presuppositionalist will argue that C2 is not an actual worldview. But this is

besides the point, the presuppositionalist seeks to establish the rational necessityof Christian


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theism. To defeat such a necessity claim, possibleworldviews are fair game. To argue

otherwise is simply to make an act of special pleading that one side may use modal logic

whereas the other may not, this would be absurd.

Michael Butler has offered an argument against the notion of C2or what he calls Fristianity

(due to the fourth person of the Godhead being posited as Mr. Fred). The presuppositionalist

will be quick to say, again, that they need not refute every opposing worldview as they cansimply be sorted in terms of Christian worldviews and non-Christian worldviews; those that

presuppose Christ and those that reject him. This is simply far too absurd and juvenile of a

claim. For the hypothetical Fristian could argue: There are only two worldviews, Fristian

theism and theunbelieving one which is to say that any worldview that has as its

presupposition the rejection of Fristian theism. All of these worldviews (which would include

Christian theism) are just variation on a common presuppositional theme that Fristian theism

is false. As such, this criteria cannot be rationally held to absolve the presuppositionalist of

the need to address worldviews.

But with further regard to Fristianity, Butler states:

that the only way we know that God is a Trinity is that He revealed it

mere speculation or empirical investigation would never lead to this

conclusion. But for the Fristian, which is, ex hypothesis, identical to

Christianity in every other way, asserts that its God is a quadrinity. But if

Fristianity is otherwise identical to Christian, the only way for us to know this

would be for the Fristian god to reveal this to us. But there is a problem with

this. Supposing Fristianity has inspired scriptures they would have to reveal

that the Fristian god is one in four. But notice that by positing a quadrinity, the

Fristian scriptures would be quite different from the Christian Scriptures.

Whereas the Christian Scriptures teach that, with regard to mans salvation,

God the Father ordains, God the Son accomplishes, and God the Spirit

applies, the Fristian scriptures would have to teach a very different order. But

exactly how would the four members of its imagined godhead be involved in

mans salvation? ore fundamentally, whereas in the Christian Trinity we read

that the personal attribute of the Father is paternity, the person attribute of

the Son is filiation, and the personal attribute of the Spirit is spiration, what

would be the person, distinguishing attributes of the members of the Fristian

quadrinity? What would their relationship be to each other? Further questions

flow out of this. How would the quadrinity affect the doctrine of mans sin?

How would redemptive history look different? What about eschatology? This

all needs to be spelled out in detail. This illustration reveals a general

problem. One cannot tinker with Christian doctrine at one point and maintain

that other doctrine will not be affected. It does no good for the proponent of


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Fristianity to claim that the only difference between his worldview and the

Christian worldview is over the doctrine of the Trinity. Christian doctrine is

systemic, and a change in one area will necessarily require changes in other.

It is necessary, therefore, that the advocate of Fristianity spell out how this

one change in doctrine affects all other doctrines. But once this is done, there

is no guarantee that the result will be coherent.

Thus, without providing the details of Fristian theology, this objection loses its

punch. It can only be thought to be a challenge to Christianity if it, like

Christianity, provides preconditions of experience. But without knowing the

details, we cannot submit it to an internal critique. Until this happens, we can

justifiably fall back on the conclusion that there is no conceivable worldview

apart from Christianity that can provide the preconditions of experience.

(Butler, The Transcendental Argument, 118-119)

Is it the case that Butler has disposed of the Fristianity objection? Not quite. Consider Butlers

claim:

(*) If Fristianity is otherwise identical to Christianity, the only way for us to

know [that its God is a quadrinity] would be for the Fristian God to reveal this

to us

Butler proposes that (*) is true, but there seem to be good reason to accept it as false. That

the Fristian God is a quadrinity is something we know to be true in virtue of stipulation. It is

such by the very virtue that it was introduced as such. Whereas when one says:

consider Fristianity, which is a theistic worldview that holds to the doctrine

of the quadrinity (one God in four persons) and is otherwise identical to

Christianity, or as similar to Christianity as possible (given its quadrinitarian

tenet)

there can be no question as to what Fristianity is. Its come to mean what it does precisely

because in offering a possible defeater to presuppositionalism, Fristianity was definedas a

possible worldview that includes a quadrinitarian God. There is no need for a mysterious

revelation to teach us that the Fristian God, a God of a merely possible worldview Fristainity,

is a quadrinity. Also, insofar as the content of Fristianity is identical to the content of

Christianity (sans the quadrinity), this does not entail that the means by which we know about


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God in one worldview is the means by which we know about God in the other. Christianity is

actual, in that it is a worldview that exists and Fristianity is possible and our methods for

knowing about actual states of affairs are different from knowing about a possible state of

affairs. Also, the numerous unaswered questions that Butler espouses is not an argument for

anything. Many of his questions erroneously assume that worldviews need revelation and are

as such, irrelevant.But what about this notion that once Fristianity is spelt out, it might be incoherent? This isnt

quite the issue. Its the job of TAG to show that all worldviews (actual and possible)

incompatible with Christian theism are incoherent. If TAG is successful there should be a

guarantee that Fristainity (and every other possible worldview) will be incoherent. The

proponent of TAG must show that all possible ways of tinkering with the contents of Christian

theism, to create Fristainity are bound to fail, and mustfail, necessarily.

As such, the Fristian objector to TAG needs not provide a positive proof for the coherence of

Fristianity as all that is needed to defeat TAG is to argue that for all we have reason to

believe, a fully developed Fristianity seems coherent. Of course, it may sound odd and bizarrebut judgments about oddness and such are governed by ones presuppositions and are not

reliable indicators of incoherence.

I am currently only aware of an objection to Chois criticism fromJosh Walker of Bring the Books.

Though, it is difficult to see the appeal of his objection.

Josh Walker states:

Thus, Choi offer Fristianity as an alternative worldview to Christianity that,as he claims, would account for the preconditions for intelligibility. This

argument is not substantial to the TAG for at least two reasons. First, we are

not concerned about hypotheticalworldviews that can be made up to fit the

preconditions; rather, we are interested in actualworldviews. In other words,

the TAG is concerned with actual worldviews that can stand this criticism. If

no one holds to Fristianity, at the end of the day, it is really irrelevant to the

presuppositional project.

But clearly, as Choi himself has said, in order for the TAG to succeed it must show the

impossibility of any worldview contrary to Christ. This must include hypothetical worldviews asTAGs claim attempts to establish supremacy over such hypotheticals. To be as bold to say

that the TAG does not deal with hypotheticals is to offer a defeater on that very premise. If the

TAG is not making a modal claim, then it becomes largely useless even if we grant that the

laws of logic actually need accounting. This uselessness arises by virtue of the fact that

there would be no basis to make the claim that Christianity is the only worldview which can

account for the laws of logic without modality.
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Walkers second objection is largely similar to Butlers:

Second, and much more substantial, Choi has failed to provided

acoherentworldview to account for intelligibility. The worldview that Choi sets

forth is identical to Christianity with one major alteration, the Trinity is gone.

But what Choi does not understand that worldviews are not disconnected

propositionsas if one doctrine can be changed and the system remains

largely in tack. Instead, worldviews are organic. One part flows into the other.

By changing one part the whole system will change. Thus, if the doctrine of

the Trinity is changed the entireworldview is altered. Take for instance the

doctrine of the Scripture. The Christian worldview teaches that the Bible is

the final and complete revelation from God about himself. If the Trinity were

altered, the Christian Bible would have to be altered significantly to make

room for the quadrinity. At the very least, sections would have to be added

introducing us to this fourth person. Or take the doctrine of salvation; it would

have to be changed. As it stands, Christianity holds that all three person of

the Trinity are directly involved in the salvation of Gods peoplethe Father

chooses his people, the Son dies for his people and the Holy Spirit sanctifies

his people. If a fourth person were added to the Godhead, a role for this

person would need to be added to the doctrine of salvation. These are but a

few of the many examples that could be given to show that adding the

quadrinity is not as nice and neat as Choi would like it to be and as such,

Choi fails to understand the organic nature of worldviews.

Again, of course Fristianity might be incoherent, but it is the duty of the TAG to establish this

outright. Should the TAG be wholly successful, one could establish today that all future

worldviews will fail. If the TAG cannot make this claim, it can be dismissed by mere

pragmatism and a denial of its claim to omnipotence.

Argument #4:Argument from Invalidity

Jason Streitfeld, in 2008, published anargumentagainst presuppositionalism. For the purpose

of this argument validity does not refer solely to formal validity as petitio principii is an informal

fallacy, but no less an egregious error of reasoning. With that said, valid argument refers notonly to the formal validity but the informal validity as well:

(13) All valid arguments do not beg the question

(14) All knowledge presupposes the existence of God [Presuppositionalist

premise]
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(15) If one presupposes the existence of God in an argument, one begs the

question against atheism

(16) All valid arguments presuppose knowledge

(17) All valid arguments beg the question against atheism

(18) But then, all valid arguments beg the question

(19) But this is absurd and either (13) or (14) must be rejected

To this argument Paul Manata, a defender of the presuppositionalism offered an objection.

Primarily, the objection was a series of parodies which replaced that which was claimed as

being presupposed (note that I have replaced valid with sound for specificity):

(13*) All valid arguments do not beg the question.

(14*) All knowledge presupposes the existence of knowledge.

Global skepticism (e.g., the former Unger) may here be defined as any

explicit or implicit denial of the existence of knowledge.

Thus, if one presupposes the existence of knowledge of in an argument, one

begs the question against global skepticism.

Now consider that all valid arguments presuppose knowledge.

Combining this with the second claim above, we find that all valid arguments

presuppose the existence of knowledge.

Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question against global skepticism.

Therefore, all valid arguments beg the question.


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This contradicts Streitfelds first claim. Therefore, at least one of the two

claims is invalid.

To avoid contradiction, Streitfeld must abandon one of his two claims.

To this objection Streitfeld replied:

It does not make sense to say all knowledge presupposes knowledge.

A proposition cannot presuppose itself. That is, if X presupposes Y, then Y

does not equal X. So the statement knowledge presupposes knowledge is

just wrong.

Perhaps the idea you had in mind was more like this: For every true

proposition X, there exists some true proposition Y, such that X presupposes

Y. Lets call this idea A.

Maybe you dont want to postulate A. Maybe you do. But lets say you do, for

the sake of argument.

I could list a number of reasons why A is not a valid defeater for my

argument, but I will mention only oneone which your own position binds

you to accept

First, lets go over the logic of presuppositions for a moment.

Again, as I noted, a proposition cannot presuppose itself. That is, if X

presupposes Y, then Y does not equal X.

Furthermore, if (X presupposes Y) and (Y presupposes X), then X and Y are

identical.

As a presuppositionalist, you maintain that all propositions presuppose that

God exists. In other words, for all propositions X, X presupposes that God

exists.


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Of course, X cannot contain the proposition God exists. So, we can restate

it as follows: For all propositions X (such that X is not God exists), X

presupposes that God exists.

We can also add that the proposition God exists does not presuppose any

other proposition. For, if it did, it would be equivalent to that proposition, and

so would presuppose itselfan impossibility.

Now, you say that you know God exists. This means there is some

proposition, the knowledge of which does not presuppose any other

proposition. This means you cannot use A as a defeater for my argument.

I agree with this analysis from Streitfeld though I do not think that Manata has come to accept

it. Of course, the presuppositionalist will perhaps state that all arguments for epistemologiesbeg the question. Then surely it stands to reason that there can be no sound arguments for

epistemologies. That entails then, that there can be no sound argument for

presuppositionalism and no, non-question begging way for the presuppositionalist to argue

against atheism.

Of course, one can claim that such an argument can be used on atheism and state that all

arguments beg the question against presuppositionalism (insofar as they assume that God

does not exist). But as Streitfeld accurately notes, the atheist is not solely committed to the

denial of God as traditionally understood. Should an atheist be more accurately defined as an

Ignostic (theological non-cognitivism) and accept that a coherent definition of God must be

presented prior to meaningful discussions on God and that such has not yet been

accomplished, then the Argument from Invalidity as applied to Ignosticism (and any atheists

within) fail.

Conclusion

If any of the above arguments are sound one can safely conclude that Presuppositionalism

has been defeated and subsequently that logic does not presuppose the existence of God in

the manner espoused by presuppositional apologists.


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5. The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God08/12/09Is the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God sound? In this paper I contend that

it is not, for various reasons.


Draft version of a paper submitted for publication. The final version may include changes not present in this

version.

Abstract:

I briefly trace the origin of the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God and present

both an informal and formal version of the argument. The argument suggests that the

Christian God is a necessary precondition of logical principles. I present a couple of

objections formulated by Sean Choi and Michael Martin and develop three of my own. I

propose firstly that a Euthyphro-like dilemma regarding the principles of logic reveals an

insufficient, or at least, arbitrary justification. I then show that the symmetrical relationship

between logical principles and the existence of God is a severe problem for Christian theism

which must either reject the necessity of logical principles, or Christian theism altogether. I

conclude that the existence of logical principles cannotdepend on the Christian God. Lastly, I

show that the mere possibility that God justifies logical principles in any of the ways criticized

by the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God requires further explanation from

the Christian theist as to how divine justification differs from human justification. My

conclusion is that the Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God is not sound.

Introduction[1]

Cornelius Van Til set the foundation of an argument for the existence of God that focuses on

certain tenets. Van Til believed that (i) everyone has knowledge of God, some just suppress it

(ii) Natural theological arguments are ineffective because they do not prove the Christian God

uniquely over any other, (iii) we all have presuppositions which either assist or defeat our

truth-seeking intentions (all non-Christian presuppositions defeat such intention), (iv) it can be

shown that without Christian theism as an adopted worldview, the intelligibility of the world is

lost, that one cannot make sense of logic, morality, or science. Van Tils system became

known as presuppositionalism and the modern scholars which have taken up a defence of his

position include Greg Bahnsen and John M. Frame.

The most intriguing part of presuppositionalism is the assertion that there is, and only can be,

one argument for the existence of the Christian God. With the exception of Frame,

presuppositionalists largely reject traditional arguments for the existence of God claiming, as

Van Til, that they offer only the mere probability of Gods existence and not the certainty that

a Christian requires[2].
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As such, Van Til proposed a transcendental argument. Transcendental arguments have

origins which trace back to Immanuel Kant and generally take the form of modus tollens:

P

If not-Q then not-P

Therefore, Q

We can find an example of such an argument in Descartes Cogito:

I am thinking

If I do not exist, then I am not thinking

Therefore, I exist

The unique purpose of transcendental arguments is in many ways geared towards addressing

the skeptic[3]. The arguments begin with a premise with which even the most hardened

skeptic will agree and move to show that there is a precondition of that premise which cannot,

thereby, be denied. In the above example of Descartes Cogito, existing is found to be the

necessary precondition of thinking.

In the case of Christian theism, the transcendental argument employed is one which asserts

that God is a precondition for the existence, and intelligibility of logic, morality, and science

(amongst other things). For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on the claim that the

existence of the Christian God[4] is a necessary precondition of the existence of logical

principles[5]. I will present a formulation of such an argument, but first I would like to clarify

what the TAG is asserting.

Throughout presuppositionalist literature is this notion of needing to account for logicalprinciples. To be sure to understand what is meant by this, it would be prudent to present an

excerpt from presuppositionalist Greg Bahnsen in his debate with atheist Gordon Stein[6]:

What are the laws of logic, Dr. Stein, and how are they justified? Well still have to answer

that question from a materialist standpoint[7]. From a Christian standpoint, we have an

answerobviously they reflect the thinking of God. They are, if you will, a reflection of the

way God thinks and expects us to think.


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With the argument presented informally, I now introduce a formal version.

The Transcendental Argument Stated:

Sean Choi, in his criticism, offers us the following formulation of the TAG[8]:





In support of (2), Choi observes the justification as being:

(2a) It is necessary that: if there is a non-Christian theistic way to justify

the laws of logic, then it will be either the a priori way or the a posteriori way

or the conventionalist way

(2b) It is necessary that: neither the a priori way nor the a posteriori way


(2c) Therefore, it is necessary that: there is no non-Christian theistic way

to justify the laws of logic

Initial Objections

There are a number of criticisms which Choi makes in his paper. He chooses to grant

premises (1) and (2a) though with regard to (2a) while he does grant the premise for the sake

of argument, he notes that it may be a false trillema. I am inclined to agree with Chois

analysis. It seems to me that some hybridization of any of the mentioned means of

justification may bring about a new means of justification. For example, a hybridization of an apriori and conventionalist system may succeed in providing the justification of logic sought by

Bahnsen, but in a manner wherein the new system may be thought of as unique to both

previous a priori systems, and forms of conventionalism.

Elsewhere in his presentation[9] Choi presents a criticism of (2b) by outlining the sheer

impossibility of a TAG defender showing that everypossiblea priori, a posteriori or


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conventionalist way of justifying the laws of logic fail. Of course, the TAG defender may

succeed if they show that all defences of either an a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist

justification depend upon a particular claim that can be shown to be false.

Bahnsen seems to think that any a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justification of the

laws of logic is incompatible with Christianity. That is to say, if one is justifying the principles

of logic in any of these manners, they are employing tenets rejected by Christianity. In otherwords, Bahnsen believes that it follows from Christianity is true that the a priori way, a

posteriori way and the conventionalist way fail to justify the laws of logic for if Christianity is

true, the laws of logic can only be justified in the manner he presents[10]. By doing so,

Bahnsen asserts that non-Christian justifications operate on the presupposition that

Christianity is false. As such, in an attempt to avoid the arduous task of showing that all

flavours of the aforementioned possible justifications are false (and thereby that any

worldviews that employ them are false), he seeks only to show that they all depend upon a

particular claim, that Christianity is false, and that this claim renders everything unintelligible.

Clearly, Bahnsen has drawn a dichotomy wherein one either accepts Christianity, or whollyrejects it; no middle ground is possible. As Bahnsen states[11]:

It is absolutely crucial that transcendental argumentation begin by positing that Christian

theism is either true or false. Van Tils defense of the faith does not require the apologist to

be aware of and refute every single variation of unbelieving philosophy, but only the

presupposition common to them all (namely, the rejection of Christian theism). Many

apologists mistakenly imagine that there are really three options available: one may accept

Christianity, reject it, or be undecided. But, as Van Til recognized, to be undecided about

the claim that Christian theism is the presupposition necessary to make sense out of any

reasoning whatsoever is to begin ones reasoning on the operational assumption that this

claim is false (and can be laid aside as one proceeds to research and develop ones views).

Since there are only two options at the most fundamental levelthe truth or falsity of

Christian theism as a presuppositionthe refutation of the unbelieving one (in whatever

illustrative variation it appears) is an indirect proof of the other.

But what might this mean for our discussion? If Bahnsen is permitted to carry on with his

criteria, then if any a priori, a posteriori or conventionalist justifications of logic are shown to

be false (and subsequently, the worldviews that house and depend on them) all other

formulations which properly fall under those headings will also be false (worldviews included)

since they employ the same proposition, namely, Christianity is false. Of course, this is not

sound reasoning unless the shared proposition is what is causingthe justification to be false.

Bahnsen needs to show that Christianity is false is the false-making proposition of all non-

Christian worldviews, and it doesnt seem that this is possible by any means other than (i)

showing that all possible non-Christian justifications will have Christianity is false as

the onlyproposition in common (for if there is even one other proposition shared by these

worldviews, how might one disqualify thatproposition as possibly being the false-maker?),

and (ii) showing that Christianity is not false. The obvious problem is that if (ii) is shown, the


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TAG becomes superfluous as it is no longer needed; one has already arrived at the truth of

Christian theism, and for (i) to be shown, one still has to have an awareness of every single

variation of unbelieving philosophy.

Further, Choi rightly points out that this criterion for distinguishing between the Christian

worldview and all others is insufficient. He shows the absurdity of the criteria when applied to

another worldview, namely, Fristianity[12]. Fristianity is a worldview adopted by Choi, which isidentical to Christianity with the exception of the triune godhead, to make the point that the

claim that non-Christian worldviews cannot account for X is false, since in whichever way

Christianity accounted for X, Fristianity would do so in the same manner. The distinguishing

feature of Fristianity is that its godhead is a quadrinity rather than a trinity, it is essentially a

Christianity + 1. Michael Butler, a defender of TAG, has responded to the Fristianity

objection by stating that there is no guarantee that Fristianity will be a coherent worldview

after it is laid out and thus cannot be an objection to the TAG[13]. Chois reply is that this is

simply besides the point as the TAG, if successful, should prove that Fristianity will be

incoherent outright and that there is no burden on the Fristian to exemplify coherence.Further, in response to Bahnsens statement that there can only two worldviews, the

believing one and the unbelieving one, Choi notes:

on the same basis the hypothetical Fristian could argue as follows: There are only two

worldviews, Fristian theism and the unbelieving onewhich is to say, any worldview that

has as its presupposition the rejection of Fristian theism. All the alleged worldviews (and here

we would have to include Christian theism) are really just variations on a common

presuppositional theme that Fristian theism is false

In other words, we may not simply claim that all worldviews which share a certain proposition

are false because some worldviews which share a certain proposition are such. It needs to be

shown that the worldviews are false becauseof the shared proposition. Under Bahnsens

proposal, an atheist could show one theistic worldview to be incoherent, and reason from this

that all theistic worldviews, including Christianity, are incoherent since they all share the same

presuppositional theme, that atheism is false. Clearly, an exhaustive examination of possible

worldviews is still required if one wants to make the strong claim made in (2b).

The Transcendental Argument for the Non-Existence of God

I would like to call attention to a statement made by Bahnsen in the excerpt taken from his

debate regarding the Christians justification for logical principles: From a Christian

standpoint, we have an answerobviously they reflect the thinking of God. They are, if you

will, a reflection of the way God thinks and expects us to think. [14] This is supposed to be

the factor that separates Christian worldviews from non-Christian worldviews, but the claim

seems rather vague. What does it mean to say that the justification for logical principles is the

fact that they reflect the thinking of God?

Michael Martin asks a similar question and formulates a Transcendental Argument for the

Non-Existence of God (TANG) which he defended against criticisms from John Frame.[15]


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Martin stated[16]:

How might TANG proceed? Consider logic. Logic presupposes that its principles are

necessarily true. However, according to the brand of Christianity assumed by TAG, God

created everything, including logic; or at least everything, including logic, is dependent on

God. But if something is created by or is dependent on God, it is not necessaryit is

contingent on God. And if principles of logic are contingent on God, they are not logically

necessary. Moreover, if principles of logic are contingent on God, God could change them.

Thus, God could make the law of noncontradiction false; in other words, God could arrange

matters so that a proposition and its negation were true at the same time. But this is absurd.

How could God arrange matters so that New Zealand is south of China and that New

Zealand is not south of it? So, one must conclude that logic is not dependent on God, and,

insofar as the Christian world view assumes that logic so dependent, it is false.

Frames response[17] stated that:

Logic is neither above God nor arbitrarily decreed by God. Its ultimate basis is in Godseternal nature. God is a rational God and necessarily so. Therefore logic is necessary.

Human logical systems dont always reflect Gods logic perfectly. But insofar as they do, they

are necessarily true.

Bahnsen and Frames defence of the TAG depend upon two claims:

(A) Logical principles (such as the Law of Noncontradiction) exist because

God exists and the principles are reflections of his thinking[18]

(B) Logical principles cannot be changed by God as their ultimate basis is inGods nature, and God is necessarily a rational God.

A Logical Euthyphro Application

In analyzing both (A) and (B) it seems that the famous Euthyphro dilemma can be applied to

the TAG, substituting notions of goodness for logical principles. The dilemma could perhaps

be expressed as the following: does God think in a certain way because it is logical to do so,

or is thinking in a certain way logical because God does it? If the first horn of the dilemma

holds it seems clear that logical principles exist independently of God. If the second horn of

the dilemma holds logical principles seem to be under the whim of God, meaning that God

could change them. A TAG defender might respond by saying that this dilemma is a false

one, and advocate similar to Frame that logical principles have their basis in Gods nature and

are thus neither external, nor arbitrary. Firstly, this seems to add some confusion: are logical

principles based on Gods thinking, or on his nature? Frames above statement in response to

Michael Martin seems to indicate that both are true: logical principles reflect the thinking of

God and the thinking of God has its basis in Gods nature.[19]


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Frame essentially makes the claim that it is logically impossiblefor the nature of God to change.

But the standard Frame is using to identify logical possibility is allegedly the nature of God. As

such, his claim appears to be represented more accurately as:

(C) Based on Gods nature it is logically impossible for Gods nature to be

different because God is necessarily a rational God

This does not seem to assist in any regard as what is rational isallegedly determined by

Gods nature. So to argue that Gods naturemustbe the way it is becauseGod is necessarily

rational seems to only appeal to a standard of rationality that is separate from God, otherwise

it is clearly circular.

In what manner would it be the case that Gods nature wasnotrational? It does not seem that

a God who forms the basis of logical principles and thereby is the standard of rationality can

ever be irrational (though he may certainly appear irrational when judged by a foreign

standard). That is to say, if one wants to state that the Christian God forms the basis of

rationality and the logical principles thereby in effect cannot be anything other than what they

are, they must be appealing to a standard of logic that is separate from Gods nature as to

appeal solely to Gods nature does not sufficiently answer the question; it is a non -answer.

God and the Abstract

In his TANG, Martin stated that if logical principles depend on God in any way, they lose their

logical necessity and become contingent. Frame countered by making the claim that though

dependent on God, the principles of logic have their basis in the nature of God and because

the nature of God is necessary, so too are the logical principles.

An obvious defeater to Frames claim, and subsequently the TAG, would be to show that not

only are logical principles not dependent on God, but they cannot be so dependent.

The dependence relationship between God exists and logical principles exist seems

problematic. If God is the source of all things other than himself, and he depends on nothing

for his existence, surely the relationship must be asymmetrical (with primacy granted to God),

but it appears not to be. It can be shown, in fact, that God depends on logical principles for

his existence.

Consider:

(4) Necessarily, xdepends on y for its existence iff y were not to exist,

neither wouldx[20]

Lewis counterfactual semantics tell us that any proposition is counterfactually implied by a

necessarily false proposition. Since logical principles do not exist is a necessarily false


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proposition, it counterfactually implies any proposition whatsoever.[21] So it is also true that if

logical principles did not exist, neither would God. Thus, God depends on logical principles for

his existence.

The relationship between the existence of logical principles and the existence of God would

be asymmetrical iff God depended on nothing for his being and logical principles depended

wholly on him. In this regard, the relationship of dependence is one-way; logical principles

depend on God but not vice versa. If dependence is asymmetrical, then logic cannot depend

on God as it has been shown that God depends on logic.

The asymmetrical relationship can be depicted further: where Prefers to logical principles

and Qrefers to God. If Pdepends on Q asymmetrically, then the worlds in which Pis true must

be a proper subset of the worlds in which Qis true. Since it is the case that the principles of

logic hold in every world, and the set of all worlds is not a proper subset of any other set of

worlds, the laws of logic cannot depend on anything, including God.

In order to overcome this problem, one could deny the necessaryexistence of logical principles.

This seems antithetical to the presuppositionalist position which seeks to show that the only

way to make sense out of logical necessity is through the existence of the Christian God.

Indeed, the opposite becomes true; the only way that logical principles can be necessary is if

logical principles depend on God is false. One could further deny the claim that God

depends on nothing else for his existence, but this seems incompatible with Christian theism

and perhaps even with a more general notion of God.

Another possible solution is twofold. One must first accept that abstract objects are thethoughts of God. This is not problematic for the TAG proponent as they have already explicitly

stated that this is the case. One must then further embrace the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity

(DDS) and accept that God is identical with each of his attributes and thoughts. Under this

view, the statements God exists and Logical principles exist express the same proposition.

This eliminates the problem because any proposition is counterfactually dependent on itself.

But it is not clear that DDS is a coherent option[22]. Indeed it is not clear that the principles of

logic can be thought to be attributes of God, in any capacity. This problem seems even more

severe for the Christian. If the proponent of the TAG attempts to establish the conclusion that

the Christian God exists, but has to accept the DDS to do so (as per the above objection) it isunclear as to how they would reconcile the fact that God is identical with his attributes and the

belief that he is internally distinct as a Trinity. Indeed, if DDS is coherent, how can there be

any distinction whatsoever between God the Father, God the Son and the Holy Spirit? The

DDS seems wholly incoherent with Christian theism.


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As such, in order to avoid the consequence of conceding that God is not entirely sovereign,

one must either (i) deny that logical principles are necessary (ii) deny Christian theism. Both

are unacceptable consequences for the proponent of the TAG.

The Mind of God

There is yet another respect in which the TAG is vague. It states that the Christian worldviewcan account for the laws of logic because they have their basis as reflections of Gods

thought. Presumably, this means that the reason why the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) is

the way it is depends on the fact that God cannot avoid thinking in accordance with it due to

his nature as logical. Even temporarily disregarding the previous objections, this claim seems

dubious. This justification or grounding of the principles of logic does not seem to necessitate

any transcendental reference. Consider Bob the Conventionalist[23]; he is a normal human

being. Even as a conventionalist, Bob cannot help but think in accordance with the LNC, for

how could Bob visualize the effects of a proposition that is both true and false

simultaneously? If, as per Bahnsens statement, logical principles are reflections of the way

God thinks and further if it is true that the LNC exists and holds because God cannot think

that p and not-p, surely Bobs own inability to think that P and not-P fulfills the same

justification requirement.

One foreseeable objection is that Bobs self-grounding does not explain the seeming

universality of the LNC. However, it is impossible to think of anyonein existence who could

visualize the effects of a proposition which violated the LNC[24] and in this regard the LNC is

universally self-grounded.

In the aforementioned debate, Bahnsen criticized conventionalism for being arbitrary and

potentially giving way to people with contradictory logical systems. Though it is hard to

imagine someone who has adopted a logical system in which there is no LNC or equivalent

mechanism. Such a system would be as trivial as a magic eight-ball that answers yes to

every question[25]. It is difficult to see why Bob or any of his friends would adopt a system

with no mechanism to differentiate between any propositions. On pragmatic grounds, it is

entirely useless.

One may make the case that Bahnsen has misunderstood conventionalism[26], and onemight further make the more interesting point of asking how God accounts for the laws of

logic. If it is even possiblethat God justifies his use of logic in either an a priori, or

conventionalist manner[27] premise (2b) of the TAG can be further rejected.

What might it mean to say that God justifies logic in an a priori manner? Bahnsens criticisms

of an a priori justification can be found in his debate with Stein:


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But if you dont take that approach and want to justify the laws of logic in some a priori

fashion, that is apart from experience, something that [Stein] suggests when he says these

things are self-verified. Then we can ask why the laws of logic are universal, unchanging,

and invariant truthswhy they, in fact, apply repeatedly in the realm of contingent

experience.

He argues that an a priori justification of the laws of logic does nothing to explain their

universality. But, the fact that the laws of logic would be known a priori to be logicallynecessary does seem to explain the universality in a self-verifying manner; they are

necessarily true. One might further press to as

Documents

The Case Against Presupposition - Mitchell LeBlanc